Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 2984-3143 [E8-144]
Download as PDF
2984
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission
18 CFR Part 37
[Docket Nos. RM05–17–001, 002 and RM05–
25–001, 002; Order No. 890–A]
Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service
Issued December 28, 2007.
Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Order on rehearing and
clarification.
AGENCY:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission affirms its basic
determinations in Order No. 890,
granting rehearing and clarification
regarding certain revisions to its
regulations and the pro forma openaccess transmission tariff, or OATT,
adopted in Order Nos. 888 and 889 to
ensure that transmission services are
provided on a basis that is just,
reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory. The reforms affirmed in
this order are designed to: (1)
Strengthen the pro forma OATT to
ensure that it achieves its original
purpose of remedying undue
discrimination; (2) provide greater
specificity to reduce opportunities for
undue discrimination and facilitate the
Commission’s enforcement; and (3)
increase transparency in the rules
applicable to planning and use of the
transmission system.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will
become effective March 17, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
W. Mason Emnett (Legal Information),
Office of the General Counsel—Energy
Markets, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–6540.
Daniel Hedberg (Technical
Information), Office of Energy Market
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, 888 First Street, NE.,
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502–6243.
Tony Ingram (Technical Information),
Office of Energy Market Regulation, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426,
(202) 502–8938.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Need for and Applicability of Order No.
888
A. The Need for Reform
B. Core Elements of Order No. 888 That
Are Retained
C. Scope and Applicability of Order No.
890
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
III. Reforms of the OATT
A. Consistency and Transparency of ATC
Calculations
B. Coordinated, Open, and Transparent
Planning
C. Transmission Pricing
1. Energy and Generation Imbalances
2. Credits for Network Customers
3. Capacity Reassignment
4. ‘‘Operational’’ Penalties
5. ‘‘Higher of’’ Pricing Policy
6. Other Ancillary Services
D. Non-Rate Terms and Conditions
1. Modifications to Long-Term Firm Pointto-Point Service
2. Rollover Rights
3. Modification of Receipt or Delivery
Points
4. Acquisition of Transmission Service
5. Designation of Network Resources
6. Clarifications Related to Network
Service
7. Transmission Curtailments
8. Standardization of Rules and Practices
9. OATT Definitions
E. Enforcement
IV. Information Collection Statement
V. Document Availability
VI. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: Petitioner Acronyms
Appendix B: Post-Technical Conference
Commenter Acronyms
Appendix C: Pro Forma Open Access
Transmission Tariff
Before Commissioners: Joseph T.
Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G. Kelly,
Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon
Wellinghoff.
I. Introduction
1. On February 16, 2007, the
Commission issued Order No. 890,1
addressing and remedying opportunities
for undue discrimination under the pro
forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
(OATT) adopted in Order No. 888.2 The
pro forma OATT was intended to foster
greater competition in wholesale power
markets by reducing barriers to entry in
the provision of transmission service. In
the ten years since Order No. 888,
however, flaws in the pro forma OATT
undermined its ability to realize the
core objective of remedying undue
discrimination. The Commission acted
in Order No. 890 to correct these flaws
1 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Order No. 890,
72 FR 12,266 (March 15, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,241 (2007) (Order No. 890).
2 Promoting Wholesale Competition Through
Open Access Non-discriminatory Transmission
Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded
Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,036 (1996), order on reh’g, Order
No. 888–B, 81 FERC ¶ 61,248 (1997), order on reh’g,
Order No. 888–C, 82 FERC ¶ 61,046 (1998), aff’d
in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access
Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (TAPS v. FERC), aff’d sub nom. New York v.
FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
PO 00000
Frm 00002
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
by reforming the terms and conditions
of the pro forma OATT in several
critical areas, including the calculation
of available transfer capability (ATC),
the planning of transmission facilities,
and the conditions of services offered by
each transmission provider.
2. Many have expressed support of
the Commission’s reforms. Greater
specificity regarding the transmission
provider’s obligations under its OATT
will reduce opportunities for the
exercise of undue discrimination, make
undue discrimination easier to detect,
and facilitate the Commission’s
enforcement of the tariff. Greater
transparency in the rules applicable to
the planning and use of the
transmission system will help both
transmission providers and customers
comply with applicable tariff
requirements. Although we grant
rehearing and clarification below to
address certain implementation issues
raised by petitioners, we leave in place
the fundamental reforms adopted in
Order No. 890.
3. At the outset, we note that work is
well underway to develop consistent
practices governing the calculation of
ATC, in coordination with the North
American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) and the North
American Energy Standards Board
(NAESB). Eliminating the broad
discretion that transmission providers
currently have in calculating ATC will
increase nondiscriminatory access to the
grid and ensure that customers are
treated fairly in seeking alternative
power supplies. We commend
transmission providers for the
substantial resources they have
dedicated to this process and NERC and
NAESB for their leadership in guiding
the standardization effort.
4. We also commend transmission
providers for the substantial resources
dedicated to the development of
transmission planning processes in
response to Order No. 890.
Transmission providers and
stakeholders recently submitted tariff
proposals that will govern transmission
planning under the pro forma OATT.
Transmission planning is critical
because it is the means by which
customers consider and access new
sources of energy and have an
opportunity to explore the feasibility of
non-transmission alternatives. It is
therefore vital for each transmission
provider to open its transmission
planning process to customers,
coordinate with customers regarding
future system plans, and share
necessary planning information with
customers.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
5. In addition, transmission providers
have implemented new service options
for long-term firm point-to-point
customers and adopted modifications to
other services. Instead of denying a
long-term request for point-to-point
service because as little as one hour of
service is unavailable, transmission
providers must now consider their
ability to offer a modified form of
planning redispatch or a new
conditional firm option to accommodate
the request. This increases opportunities
to efficiently utilize transmission by
eliminating artificial barriers to use of
the grid. Charges for energy and
generation imbalances also have been
standardized, including relaxed
penalties for intermittent resources.
This standardization reduces the
potential for undue discrimination,
increases transparency, and reduces
confusion in the industry that resulted
from the prior lack of consistency.
6. Taken together, these and other
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 will
better enable the pro forma OATT to
achieve the core object of remedying
undue discrimination in the provision
of transmission service. The
Commission therefore rejects requests to
eliminate, or substantially modify, the
various reforms adopted in Order No.
890.3 We address each of the arguments
made by petitioners in turn. We also
address comments received in response
to the technical conference held by
Commission staff on July 30, 2007,
regarding certain issues related to the
designation and termination of network
resources, in section III.D.5.4
II. Need for and Applicability of Order
No. 888
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
A. The Need for Reform
7. As the Commission noted in Order
No. 888, it is in the economic selfinterest of transmission monopolists to
3 A list of petitioners filing requests for rehearing
and/or clarification is provided in Appendix A. The
requests for rehearing filed by American
Transmission, Bonneville, EPSA, Pacific Northwest
Parties, and REPIO are deficient because they fail
to include a Statement of Issues section separate
from the arguments made, as required by Rule 713
of the Commission’s Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See 18 CFR 385.713(c)(2). Consistent
with Rule 713, we deem these petitioners to have
waived the particular issues for which they seek
rehearing. We also reject TranServ’s request for
rehearing for having been filed late, in violation of
section 313(a) of the Federal Power Act (FPA). See
16 U.S.C. 8351(a). The Commission does consider,
however, these petitioners’ requests for
clarification, to the extent they are not in fact
requests for rehearing. We also address the merits
of each request for rehearing to demonstrate that,
had they been considered, our decision would be
unchanged.
4 A list of parties filing comments in response to
the July 30, 2007 technical conference is provided
in Appendix B.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
deny transmission to competitors or to
offer transmission on a basis that is
inferior to that which they provide
themselves.5 The Commission sought to
remedy that potential for discrimination
through adoption of the pro forma
OATT in Order No. 888. Despite the
many accomplishments of Order No.
888, the Commission determined in
Order No. 890 that the existing pro
forma OATT continued to allow
transmission providers substantial
discretion in implementing some of its
basic requirements. This discretion, in
turn, created substantial opportunities
for undue discrimination. Order No. 890
reformed the pro forma OATT to limit
opportunities for undue discrimination
and promote efficient use of the grid.
8. In Order No. 890, the Commission
rejected arguments that it was relying on
unsubstantiated allegations of
discriminatory conduct to justify its
reforms. Although certain commenters
did allege discriminatory conduct in
response to the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR) initiating this
proceeding,6 the Commission made
clear that it was not making specific
factual findings of discrimination and
that such specific findings were not
required in order for it to promulgate a
generic rule to eliminate undue
discrimination.7 The Commission
explained that it had ample grounds to
act as necessary to limit opportunities
for undue discrimination that continue
to exist under the pro forma OATT.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
9. Many petitioners agree with the
Commission on rehearing that reforms
to the pro forma OATT are needed
because there continues to be both the
opportunity and incentive for
transmission providers to engage in
undue discrimination.8 Two petitioners,
however, seek rehearing of that finding
as sufficient justification for adopting
the reforms set forth in Order No. 890.
10. E.ON U.S. argues that the
Commission has not presented any
actual evidence of discrimination or
opportunities for undue discrimination.
Without actual evidence of
discrimination, E.ON U.S. argues that
the Commission lacks reasoned support
for its finding that the reforms adopted
5 Order
No. 888 at 31,682.
Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 71 FR 32,636 (Jun. 6, 2006),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 32,603 (2006) (NOPR).
7 See Order No. 890 at P 41 (citing Transmission
Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667
(D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub nom., New York v. FERC,
535 U.S. 1 (2002); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp
v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
8 See e.g., Constellation, MISO, NRECA, Powerex,
PSEG, and TAPS.
6 Preventing
PO 00000
Frm 00003
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2985
in Order No. 890 are necessary to
remedy undue discrimination. E.ON
U.S. states a particular concern for the
cost of implementing these reforms.
E.ON U.S. contends that, absent
evidence of unduly discriminatory
behavior, the burdensome nature of
compliance with Order No. 890
outweighs the benefits of its reforms.
11. Southern expresses similar
concern that Order No. 890 lacks actual
findings of discrimination. Southern
claims that the theoretical claims of
discrimination relied upon by the
Commission are attenuated and
inconsistent with statements
discouraging commenters from making
sweeping generalizations regarding
undue discrimination. Rather than
predicating Order No. 890 on the
Commission’s authority to prevent
undue discrimination, Southern
suggests that the Commission clarify
that it is promulgating these reforms
pursuant to its authority to ensure just
and reasonable rates and not to prevent
undue discrimination.
12. Southern also argues that the
Commission failed to acknowledge
other legal requirements and processes
adopted after issuance of Order No. 888
that mitigate a transmission provider’s
incentives to discriminate, such as the
Standards of Conduct, enforcement
audits, new civil penalty authority, and
mandatory reliability standards.
Southern contends that transmission
providers have a pecuniary incentive to
grant, rather than deny, customer
requests since doing so provides
additional OATT revenues. Southern
argues that the Commission appears to
equate discretion with opportunities for
discrimination, yet in certain
circumstances expressly acknowledges
that the transmission provider retains
discretion in certain activities.
Commission Determination
13. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that reforms to the pro
forma OATT were necessary to address
remaining opportunities for undue
discrimination by transmission
providers. Despite the efforts of Order
No. 888 and our subsequent reforms,
including those cited by Southern,
opportunities for undue discrimination
continued to exist. Under section 206 of
the FPA, the Commission has a
continuing obligation to ‘‘determine
whether any rule, regulation, practice or
contract affecting rates for such
transmission or sale for resale is unduly
discriminatory or preferential, and must
prevent those contracts and practices
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
2986
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
that do no meet this standard.’’ 9 The
Commission’s finding that continuing
opportunities to discriminate exist
therefore supports our action under FPA
section 206 to adopt changes to the pro
forma OATT. Upon review of the
extensive record of this proceeding,
including the support of a vast majority
of commenters, the Commission
remains convinced that the particular
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 are
appropriate to satisfy our obligation to
remedy undue discrimination.
14. We reject E.ON U.S.’ arguments
that, without actual evidence of undue
discrimination, Order No. 890 lacks
reasoned support. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 890, the courts
have made clear that the Commission
need not make specific factual findings
of discrimination in order to promulgate
a generic rule to eliminate undue
discrimination. In Associated Gas
Distributors v. FERC, the D.C. Circuit
Court explained that the promulgation
of generic rate criteria involves the
determination of policy goals and the
selection of the means to achieve
them.10 The court concluded that, just
as courts do not insist on empirical data
for every proposition upon which the
selection depends, ‘‘[a]gencies do not
need to conduct experiments in order to
rely on the prediction that an
unsupported stone will fall.’’ 11 The
Commission exercised this authority in
Order No. 890, discussing with
particularity the concerns motivating
each of the reforms adopted. As it did
in Order No. 888, the Commission
properly acted to limit continuing
opportunities for undue discrimination,
not to remedy actual instances of undue
discrimination.
15. We acknowledge, as argued by
Southern, that it is appropriate for
transmission providers to retain
discretion in some areas and that such
discretion does not necessarily equate to
discrimination. It is also true that some
OATT revenues may increase as
requests for service are granted (such as
for point-to-point requests), rather than
denied. This is not always or even
predominantly the case, however, given
that rates for network service are based
on load-ratio shares and revenues do not
increase with designations of network
resources unless new facilities are
constructed. Moreover, there are
competing incentives for a transmission
provider to deny or restrict service to
customers in certain circumstances and
allowing broad discretion in such areas
is no longer appropriate. The
No. 888 at 31,669.
F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
11 Id. at 1008.
Commission identified these areas in
Order No. 890, including the calculation
of ATC, planning for transmission
needs, and the provision of certain
transmission services, and acted to
remedy potential discrimination in each
area. Notwithstanding the other legal
requirements and processes cited by
Southern, the Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that the reforms adopted
were necessary based on a decade of
experience administering the pro forma
OATT. While the Standards of Conduct,
audit procedures, and enhanced
authority under the Energy Policy Act of
2005 (EPAct 2005) 12 have aided the
Commission in fulfilling its obligations
under the FPA, the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 are also necessary to
reduce opportunities for the exercise of
undue discrimination, make undue
discrimination easier to detect, and
facilitate the Commission’s enforcement
of the open access requirements.
16. We appreciate that a significant
amount of resources must be dedicated
to implementation of the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 by
transmission providers. We believe the
burden of implementing these reforms is
fully justified by the need to eliminate
remaining opportunities for undue
discrimination in the administration
and implementation of open access
requirements under the pro forma
OATT. We note, moreover, that these
reforms will benefit transmission
providers seeking to comply with our
regulations in good faith by providing
more clarity regarding the requirements
of the pro forma OATT previously left
open to interpretation, thereby
decreasing the possibility of disputes
with transmission customers and
enforcement actions by the Commission.
The ability of transmission customers to
misuse the tariffs to their own
advantage, particularly in the
scheduling process, has similarly been
addressed. Taken together, we conclude
that the benefits of our reforms
outweigh the associated costs of
implementation.
B. Core Elements of Order No. 888 That
Are Retained
17. Although Order No. 890
introduced many important reforms, the
Commission also retained many core
elements from Order No. 888. As noted
in the NOPR, many provisions of Order
No. 888 enjoy broad support from many
sectors of the industry and the
Commission did not intend in this
proceeding to pursue the same level of
industry restructuring undertaken there.
9 Order
10 824
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
12 Pub. L. No. 109–58, 119 Stat. 594 (to be
codified in scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00004
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Rather, the Commission intended Order
No. 890 to strengthen the pro forma
OATT while retaining the fundamental
structure articulated in Order No. 888.
18. The Commission thus retained the
existing boundaries between wholesale
and retail service drawn in Order No.
888. The Commission also retained the
native load priority established in Order
No. 888. The Commission stated that
this priority continues to strike the
appropriate balance between the
transmission provider’s need to meet its
native load obligations and the needs of
other entities to obtain service from the
transmission provider to meet their own
obligations. Order No. 890 also did not
alter the types of services required
under Order No. 888, i.e., network
service and point-to-point service.
Finally, the Commission retained the
functional unbundling requirement
promulgated in Order No. 888.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
19. South Carolina E&G objects to the
Commission’s decision to retain the
native load priority established in Order
No. 888, arguing that FPA section 217
requires further protection for native
load service. South Carolina E&G states
that the native load priority adopted
under Order No. 888 was implemented
so that all customers, native load and
non-native load, would be entitled to
equivalent, nondiscriminatory service.13
South Carolina E&G argues that FPA
section 217(k) now entitles load-serving
entities (LSEs) to use their transmission
systems to meet their state-law imposed
native load service obligations and that
this entitlement can no longer be
deemed discriminatory under the FPA.
To the extent an OATT provision
compromising native load service is
grounded in a finding of undue
discrimination, South Carolina E&G
argues that it must yield to the need to
meet native load service obligations.
20. Joined by South Carolina
Regulatory Staff, South Carolina E&G
objects in particular to the
Commission’s decision to retain equal
curtailment priority for all firm
service.14 These petitioners argue that
requiring transmission providers to
curtail service to network and point-topoint customers on a basis comparable
to the curtailment of service to native
load customers unfairly exalts nonnative customers at the expense of the
13 Citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 114 FERC
¶ 61,282 at P 125 (2006).
14 South Carolina E&G and South Carolina
Regulatory Staff also argue that reforms related to
planning redispatch and conditional firm, rollover
rights, and capacity reassignment are in violation of
FPA section 217. We address those arguments in
sections III.D.1, III.D.2, and III.C.3 respectively.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
native load that financed the
transmission system. They also contend
the Commission’s decision is
inconsistent with Northern States Power
Co. v. FERC,15 which they argue
prohibits mandating comparable
curtailment priority among native load
and non-native load services in the face
of a state commission edict requiring a
transmission provider to give its native
load top curtailment priority. In their
view, this precedent must be read
broadly in light of enactment of FPA
section 217(k), which they contend
peremptorily counters any argument
that priority for native load would be
discriminatory.
21. E.ON LSE similarly argues that
FPA section 217 categorically protects
an LSE’s use of firm transmission
service to the extent that such
transmission service is required to meet
the LSE’s service obligation. E.ON LSE
asks the Commission to allow LSEs to
deviate from the requirements of Order
No. 890 in circumstances where, in the
LSE’s good faith judgment, compliance
would adversely affect the provision of
firm transmission service to native load
protected by FPA section 217.
22. TDU Systems request clarification
or rehearing to confirm that there is no
preference under the reformed pro
forma OATT for a public utility
transmission provider’s native load over
the service obligations of other LSEs
that use their transmission system. TDU
Systems argue that section 217(a) of the
FPA does not distinguish between the
service obligations of transmission
providers and the service obligations of
their load serving customers and,
therefore, neither should the pro forma
OATT.
Commission Determination
23. The Commission affirms the
decision to retain the native load
protections embodied in Order No. 888,
as enhanced by the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890. In Order No. 888, the
Commission gave public utilities the
right to reserve existing transmission
capacity needed for native load growth
reasonably forecasted within the
utility’s current planning horizon.16 The
Commission also allowed transmission
providers to restrict rollover rights
based on reasonably forecasted need at
the time the contract is executed.17
Contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the
native load protections affirmed in
Order No. 890 satisfy the requirements
of FPA section 217. Section 217 applies
not only to distribution utilities
15 176
F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999).
Order No. 888 at 31,394.
17 See id. at 31,745.
16 See
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
providing service to end-users, but also
to electric utilities with long-term
contracts to provide service to a
distribution utility.18 Congress placed
each of these types of customers on
equal footing, regardless of their status
as a network or firm point-to-point
customer under the pro forma OATT or
a transmission provider serving its
native load. We therefore disagree with
petitioners that section 217 requires the
Commission to give top curtailment
priority solely to network customers or
the transmission provider serving native
load.
24. We decline to allow LSEs to
deviate from the requirements of the pro
forma OATT as they believe necessary
to serve their native load, as suggested
by E.ON LSE. Section 217 is intended to
facilitate the ability of all utilities using
firm transmission to meet their longterm service obligations, which the
statute defines broadly to include not
only service to end-users, but also
distribution utilities serving endusers.19 The requirements of the pro
forma OATT and the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 appropriately balance the
needs of these various classes of
transmission customers, including the
transmission provider’s native load, LSE
customers serving network load, and
other firm users of the system. This is
entirely consistent with, if not expressly
required by, FPA section 217.
C. Scope and Applicability of Order No.
890
25. The reforms adopted in Order No.
890 apply to all transmission providers,
including Commission-approved
regional transmission organizations
(RTOs) and independent system
operators (ISOs), and non-public utility
transmission providers with reciprocity
obligations. The particular process for
implementing certain of the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 varied
depending on the type of transmission
provider at issue.
26. For those transmission providers
that have not been approved as ISOs or
18 See EPAct 2005 sec. 1233(a)(3) (to be codified
at section 217(a)(3) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C.
824q(a)(3)). Petitioners’ reliance on Northern States
Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999),
is therefore misplaced. As the Commission has
explained, the court upheld our authority to require
pro rata curtailment of both network/native load
and firm point-to-point service except in the limited
circumstance when it would require the shedding
of bundled retail load. Indeed, FPA section 217
could be read to grant electric utilities with longterm contracts to provide service to a distribution
utility equal curtailment priority with other LSEs
even in that limited situation, although we decline
to address that argument here as it has not been
raised on rehearing.
19 See EPAct 2005 sec 1233(a) (to be codified at
section 217(a) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824q(a)).
PO 00000
Frm 00005
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2987
RTOs, and whose facilities are not
under the control or within the footprint
of an ISO or RTO, Order No. 890
established a two-tiered compliance
process for adopting the non-rate terms
and conditions of the revised pro forma
OATT. These transmission providers
were directed to submit FPA section 206
compliance filings that contain the
revised non-rate terms and conditions of
the revised pro forma OATT within 60
days after publication of the order in the
Federal Register.20 Any of these
transmission providers that wished to
retain a previously-approved variation
from the Order No. 888 pro forma OATT
that was substantively affected by a
reform adopted in Order No. 890 were
directed to submit, within 30 days after
publication of Order No. 890 in the
Federal Register, a request under FPA
section 205 to retain those previouslyapproved variations, provided they
continued to be consistent with or
superior to the revised pro forma OATT
adopted in Order No. 890.
27. ISO and RTO transmission
providers were directed to submit FPA
section 206 compliance filings, within
210 days after the publication of Order
No. 890 in the Federal Register, that
contain the non-rate terms and
conditions set forth in Order No. 890 or
that demonstrate that their existing tariff
provisions are consistent with or
superior to the revised provisions of the
pro forma OATT. Transmission-owning
members of ISOs and RTOs, and nonISO/RTO transmission providers within
the footprint of an ISO or RTO, were
similarly directed to make any
necessary tariff filings within 210 days
of its publication in the Federal
Register.
28. With regard to non-public utility
transmission providers, the Commission
retained the reciprocity language of the
Order No. 888 pro forma OATT with a
few modifications. First, the
Commission updated the language to
contain references to ISOs and RTOs,
requiring transmission customers that
are members of, or that take service
from, an ISO/RTO to make comparable
service available to other members of
the ISO/RTO. As proposed in the NOPR,
the Commission did not adopt a generic
rule to implement FPA section 211A,
which allows the Commission to require
an unregulated transmitting utility to
provide transmission services at rates
that are comparable to those it charges
itself and under non-rate terms and
20 The Commission subsequently extended by 60
days the date on which the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 would have otherwise been effective.
See Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, 119 FERC
¶ 61,037 (2007) (April 11 Order).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
2988
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
conditions that are comparable to those
it applies to itself, and are not unduly
discriminatory or preferential. The
Commission instead explained that it
would follow a case-by-case approach to
implementing FPA section 211A.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
29. Few petitioners question the
applicability of Order No. 890, although
some are concerned with the timing of
the compliance actions required by the
Commission. Southern asks the
Commission to grant rehearing and
extend the initial compliance deadlines
by 60 days and to remain open to
further requests for extension if the
deadlines set forth in Order No. 890
cannot be met. MidAmerican asks the
Commission to extend the effective date
for the revisions to the pro forma OATT
to the first day of the month following
the effective date of these reforms.
MidAmerican contends that it will be
burdensome for transmission providers
and confusing to transmission
customers to implement the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 in the middle
of a billing cycle.
30. TDU Systems express concern
with the burden of reviewing section
205 filings by transmission providers
seeking a determination from the
Commission that a previously-approved
variation from Order No. 888 continues
to be consistent with or superior to the
revised pro forma OATT. TDU Systems
contend that reviewing and evaluating
these filings will be a large and timeconsuming process. TDU Systems ask
the Commission to allow transmission
customers 45 days to perform their own
evaluation and comment upon these
filings, while retaining a 90-day
deadline for the Commission to process
the filings. Alternatively, TDU Systems
request rehearing of the Commission’s
decision not to stagger the due dates for
the various compliance filings required
in Order No. 890.
31. Although they recognize that
Order No. 890 preserves existing
waivers of the obligations to file an
OATT, Unitil and Alcoa seek explicit
confirmation that their waivers of the
obligation to maintain an Open Access
Same-Time Information System (OASIS)
site are still valid. Unitil notes that the
Commission has found that it does not
operate or control an interstate
transmission grid.21 In addition, Unitil
states that it voluntarily offers relevant
information to ISO–NE for posting on its
OASIS Web site. Similarly, Alcoa notes
that the Commission has granted waiver
of OASIS requirements to its Long Sault
21 Citing Northern States Power Co., 76 FERC
¶ 61,250 at 62,297 (2002).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
division, which owns five transmission
lines in northern New York connecting
Alcoa to its electric energy suppliers.22
Thus, Unitil and Alcoa seek
confirmation that the Commission did
not intend the OASIS requirements
outlined in Order No. 890 to apply to
their operations.
32. NRECA requests clarification, or
in the alternative rehearing, that the
Commission did not intend in Order No.
890 to extend reciprocity obligations
beyond transmission owning members
of an ISO or RTO. NRECA contends that
the Commission’s modification to the
pro forma OATT creates ambiguity by
imposing the reciprocity obligation for
all ‘‘members’’ of an ISO or RTO.
NRECA points out that some members
of ISOs and RTOs do not own
transmission, such as transmission
dependent utilities, state regulatory
authorities and eligible end-use
customers. NRECA argues that
expanding the reciprocity obligation to
require non-public utility transmission
providers to provide service to nontransmission owning members of an ISO
or RTO would contradict Commission
precedent 23 and be unsupported by the
record in this proceeding.
33. WSPP requests that the
Commission establish a date by which
it must submit a compliance filing
containing the non-rate terms and
conditions of the revised pro forma
OATT. WSPP states that it is neither a
transmission provider nor an RTO/ISO
and, instead, only has a limited open
access transmission tariff on file with
the Commission. WSPP states that this
tariff only applies to its transmissionowning members that do not otherwise
have an OATT.
Commission Determination
34. In the April 11 Order, the
Commission granted requests by EEI
and others to extend by 60 days the date
by which transmissions providers
outside of ISO/RTO regions would have
to submit compliance filings containing
the non-rate terms and conditions of the
revised pro forma OATT.24 Southern’s
request for rehearing on this point is
therefore moot. Similarly, we reject as
unnecessary TDU Systems’ request to
allow transmission customers additional
time to evaluate and comment upon
compliance filings. These filings have
already been made, comments have
been filed, and in many cases orders
addressing the filings have been issued.
22 Citing Alcoa Power Generating, Inc. (Long Sault
Division), 116 FERC ¶ 61,257 (2006).
23 Citing American Transmission Co. LLC, 95
FERC ¶ 61,387 (2001).
24 April 11 Order at P 20.
PO 00000
Frm 00006
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
35. The Commission also determined
in the April 11 Order that it would be
reasonable for a transmission provider
to request that the imbalance-related
provisions in Schedule 4 and Schedule
9 of the pro forma OATT be made
effective on the first day of the billing
cycle following the effectiveness of the
underlying imbalance-related reforms.25
MidAmerican does not explain or
otherwise justify the need to delay the
effectiveness of any other reforms until
the following billing cycle. We therefore
reject as moot MidAmerican’s request to
extend the effective date of the
imbalance-related reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 until the following billing
cycle and reject as unsupported its
request to extend the effective date of all
other reforms adopted in Order No. 890.
36. The Commission made clear in
Order No. 890 that the reforms therein
were not intended to disturb any
existing waivers of the obligation to file
an OATT or otherwise offer open access
transmission service.26 The criteria for
waiver of Order No. 890, moreover,
remains unchanged from that used to
evaluate the requests for waiver under
Order Nos. 888 and 889. Revocation of
any waivers will continued to be
considered on a case-by-case basis in
response to concerns raised by
interested parties. We clarify that this
applies equally to existing waivers of
Order No. 889 and requirements to
maintain an OASIS site.
37. We grant rehearing, in response to
NRECA, to revise section 6 of the pro
forma OATT to require a customer that
is a member of or that takes service from
an RTO or ISO to provide comparable
service, to the extent it owns
transmission facilities, only to the
transmission-owning members of the
RTO or ISO. The Commission has
expressed concern in the past that
failure to grant reciprocity to
transmission-owning members of an
RTO or ISO would cause those members
to lose the right to reciprocity solely as
a result of participating in the RTO or
ISO.27 We did not intend to expand that
obligation in Order No. 890 to other
members of an RTO or ISO when
revising the language of section 6 of the
pro forma OATT to refer to RTOs and
ISOs.
38. Below the Commission adopts
various other revisions to the pro forma
OATT in response to requests for
rehearing and clarification. These
revisions do not disturb the
25 Id.
at P 22.
Order No. 890 at P 135, n.105.
27 See American Transmission Company LLC, 93
FERC ¶ 61,267 at 61,858–59 (2000), reh’g denied,
95 FERC ¶ 61,387 at 62,446 (2001).
26 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
fundamental nature of the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 and, thus, we
do not anticipate any difficulty in their
implementation or disruption in ongoing compliance efforts. We direct
transmission providers that have not
been approved as RTOs or ISOs, and
whose facilities are not in the footprint
of an RTO or ISO, to submit an FPA
section 206 filing that contains the
revised non-rate terms and conditions of
the pro forma OATT stated in Appendix
C within 60 days of publication of this
order in the Federal Register. We direct
RTO and ISO transmission providers,
transmission providers whose facilities
are in the footprint of an RTO or ISO,
and WSPP to submit an FPA section 206
filing that contains the revised non-rate
terms and conditions of the pro forma
OATT as stated within Appendix C
within 90 days of publication of this
order in the Federal Register.
III. Reforms of the OATT
A. Consistency and Transparency of
ATC Calculations
39. In Order No. 890, the Commission
concluded that the lack of consistency
and transparency in the methodology
for calculating ATC creates the potential
for undue discrimination in the
provision of open access transmission
service. To remedy this lack of
consistency and transparency, the
Commission directed public utilities,
working through the NERC reliability
standards and NAESB business
practices development processes, to
produce workable solutions to
implement the ATC-related reforms
adopted by the Commission. A number
of petitioners seek rehearing and/or
clarification regarding the Commission’s
ATC-related rulings, which we address
below.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
1. Consistency
a. Necessary Degree of Consistency
40. The Commission required
industry-wide consistency of all ATC
components 28 and certain definitions,
data inputs, data exchange, and
modeling assumptions in order to
reduce the potential for undue
discrimination in the provision of
transmission service. Although the
Commission concluded that the number
of industry-wide ATC calculation
formulas should be few in number, it
did not require that a single ATC
calculation methodology be applied by
all transmission providers. The
Commission found that it is not the
28 The ATC components are total transfer
capability (TTC), existing transmission
commitments (ETC), capacity benefit margin (CBM),
and transmission reserve margin (TRM).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
methodologies for calculating ATC that
create the opportunity for undue
discrimination, rather the variability in
the calculation of the components of
ATC and the lack of a detailed
description of the ATC calculation
methodology and underlying
assumptions used by the transmission
provider.
41. The Commission noted that NERC
was then in the process of developing
standards for three ATC calculation
methodologies: contract or rated path
ATC, network ATC, and network
Available Flowgate Capacity (AFC). The
Commission concluded that, if all of the
ATC components and certain data
inputs and assumptions are consistent,
the use of the three ATC calculation
methodologies included in reliability
standards being developed would be
acceptable. With regard to network AFC,
the Commission specifically directed
public utilities, working through NERC,
to develop an AFC definition and
requirements used to identify a
particular set of transmission facilities
as a flowgate. However, the Commission
reminded transmission providers that
our regulations require the posting of
ATC values associated with a particular
path, not AFC values associated with a
flowgate. The Commission therefore
directed public utilities, working
through NERC, to develop in the MOD–
001 standard a rule to convert AFC into
ATC values to be posted by
transmission providers that currently
use the flowgate methodology.
42. The Commission also required
further clarification regarding the
calculation algorithms for firm and nonfirm ATC. The Commission directed
public utilities, working through NERC,
to modify related ATC standards by
implementing the following principles:
(1) For firm ATC calculations, the
transmission provider shall account
only for firm commitments; and (2) for
non-firm ATC calculations, the
transmission provider shall account for
both firm and non-firm commitments,
postbacks of redirected services,
unscheduled service, and counterflows.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
43. Southern requests that the
Commission clarify that consistency in
ATC methodologies and CBM and TRM
calculations must not take precedence
over reliability and that some
transmission provider discretion is
necessary. Southern states that, in
several places, Order No. 890 discusses
minimizing transmission provider
discretion in order to achieve
consistency.29 Southern contends that
29 Citing
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 207.
Frm 00007
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2989
totally eliminating this discretion would
not allow transmission providers to
address unique system conditions in
ATC, CBM, and TRM calculations,
which would impact system reliability.
Southern claims that eliminating
transmission provider discretion also
would lead to more conservative
modeling, which would likely result in
understated amounts of ATC and an
inefficient use of the system.30 To the
extent making the treatment of certain
ATC parameters or CBM or TRM
calculations consistent would affect
reliability, Southern asks that
transparency in the treatment of those
parameters and calculations be required,
but that strict consistency not be
enforced.
44. MidAmerican requests
clarification that AFC quantities do not
need to be converted into control areato-control area path ATC quantities and
that the Commission is not eliminating
the coordination of individual
transmission provider service with
seams agreements and/or regional tariff
service on flowgates. MidAmerican asks
the Commission to confirm that it is
merely intending to require NERC to
define a flowgate ATC quantity which is
equal to or related to the flowgate AFC.
MidAmerican contends that
transmission customers, operators, and
owners will not benefit from the
conversion of flowgate AFCs into
control area-to-control area path ATCs,
the elimination of AFC as a useful
transmission commodity, or the
elimination of the coordination of
individual provider and regional
transmission service over flowgates. To
the extent the Commission feels there is
a comparability benefit for the
conversion of AFC to ATC,
MidAmerican requests clarification that
providing transmission customers with
a mechanism on OASIS to query/assess
the effective ATC on a specific
transmission path over a specific time is
sufficient for compliance with the
transmission provider’s ATC posting
obligation.
45. E.ON U.S. requests clarification of
the requirement that AFC calculations
be converted into ATC for purposes of
posting. E.ON U.S. states that some
30 Southern suggests that one example of when a
transmission provider should have discretion is
when modeling long-term firm transmission service
reservation from a combustion turbine generating
facility. Southern argues that, by its nature, such a
generating facility normally will not often run in
off-peak times. During those times, or when there
is an impending outage of a generating facility,
Southern argues that the transmission provider
should have the discretion to reflect the operating
characteristics of the generating facility by not
including transmission service from the facility in
its model.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
2990
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
RTOs, such as MISO and others, utilize
AFC and do not calculate or post ATC
for their systems. Due to interactions
with these RTOs, E.ON U.S. now
calculates AFC as well. E.ON requests
that the Commission clarify that if RTOs
and their member utilities are granted
waivers of the requirement to calculate
and post ATC, in favor of AFC, all
transmission owning utilities in the
region should be able to request a
waiver on the same basis. E.ON claims
that allowing all transmission-owning
utilities within a region to calculate
AFC (instead of ATC) will result in
greater accuracy and consistency within
the industry.
46. Although it does not challenge the
Commission’s decision not to require a
single, industry-wide ATC calculation
method, TDU Systems claims that the
Commission fails to address the
situation where transmission providers
on a single interface choose different
ATC calculation methods. TDU Systems
argue that transmission providers must
be required to provide consistent ATC
values on either side of an interface.
TDU Systems therefore request that
adjacent transmission providers be
required to coordinate to provide
consistent ATC values across their
common interfaces.
47. NorthWestern requests that the
Commission clarify that the consistency
requirements of Order No. 890 do not
prohibit utilities from reducing transfer
capability for the purchase of reliability
services. According to NorthWestern,
some transmission providers may have
to acquire various generation-based
services, such as load following and
regulation service, in the marketplace in
order to meet reliability criteria.
NorthWestern argues that some means
should be allowed for retaining
transmission at no cost for such
deliveries, even though they do not
meet the strict definition of CBM, since
they are made for reliability reasons and
no single user of the system would
otherwise reimburse the transmission
provider for the associated costs.
48. EPSA and Williams request
clarification that ATC and AFC
calculations should be determined and
posted in real-time, not just as planning
information, and that the transmission
provider be required to post results of
its system utilization for ETC. Williams
contends that this would augment the
transparency deemed critical to a
coherent and uniform calculation of
ATC by enabling interested stakeholders
and the Commission to verify the ATC
calculations performed by transmission
providers.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission Determination
49. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
consistency of all ATC components and
certain definitions, data inputs, data
exchange and modeling assumptions.
We continue to believe such consistency
is necessary to reduce the potential for
undue discrimination in the provision
of transmission service.
50. We disagree with Southern that
increasing consistency with respect to
the determination of ATC is contrary to
reliability. Use of the NERC reliability
standards process will, as a matter of
course, guard against any unintended
reduction in reliability. Nevertheless,
we agree that reliability standards
cannot address every unique system
difference or differences in risk
assumptions when modeling expected
flows, which necessitates leaving room
for limited discretion on the part of the
transmission provider. We believe that
the ATC requirements in Order No. 890
allow sufficient flexibility so that
utilities, working through NERC/
NAESB, can develop ATC standards
that continue to provide reliability and
are compatible with all other mandatory
reliability standards or business
practices, yet provide discretion where
appropriate. If a transmission provider
is faced with unique system conditions
or modeling assumptions related to firm
transmission service reservations31 that
are not addressed in the ATC-related
NERC reliability standards, it must
make them transparent through its
Attachment C filing and the OASIS
posting requirements regarding ATC
calculation and modeling approach,
studies, models and assumptions and
implement them consistently for all
transmission customers.
51. We deny MidAmerican’s request
for clarification that AFC values do not
need to be converted into ATC postings
of control area-to-control area path
quantities. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 890, our
regulations require the posting of ATC
values associated with a particular path,
not AFC values associated with a
flowgate.32 The Commission did not
amend that requirement in Order No.
890 and MidAmerican fails to justify
doing so now. To the extent
MidAmerican or its customers find it
31 Transmission providers use different
assumptions related to the percentage of firm
reservations that are actually scheduled and flow.
32 See Order No. 890 at P 211. ATC values must
be posted for control area to control area
interconnections, paths for which service is denied,
curtailed or interrupted for more than 24 hours in
the past 12 months, and paths for which a customer
requests to have ATC or TTC posted. See 18 CFR
37.6(b)(1)(i).
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
beneficial also to post AFC,
MidAmerican is free to post both ATC
and AFC values. In response to E.ON
U.S., however, we clarify that
transmission-owning utilities in an RTO
region can request waiver of the
requirement to convert AFC calculations
into ATC for posting purposes in the
event the RTO has been granted such a
waiver.
52. In response to TDU Systems, we
clarify that adjacent transmission
providers must coordinate and exchange
data and assumptions to achieve
consistent ATC values on either side of
a single interface. This is applicable to
any neighboring transmission providers
no matter whether they use the same or
different ATC methodologies. We note,
however, that the anticipated
consistency is for available capability in
the same direction across an interface.
53. We clarify in response to
NorthWestern that TRM may be used to
accommodate the procurement of
ancillary services used to provide
service under the pro forma OATT. We
deny as premature EPSA’s and
Williams’ requests for clarification
regarding the real-time determination
and posting of ATC and AFC values, as
well as posting of utilization of
transmission provider’s own system
ETC. In Order No. 890, the Commission
required an exchange of the data both
for short and long-term ATC/AFC
calculation that will increase the
accuracy of ATC calculations.33 The
Commission also required that ATC be
recalculated by all transmission
providers on a consistent time interval,
and in a manner that closely reflects the
actual topology of the system, load
forecast, interchange schedules,
transmission reservations, facility
ratings, and other necessary data, and
that NERC/NAESB revise the related
reliability standard and business
practices accordingly.34 EPSA and
William should address their concerns
through the NERC and NAESB
processes implementing these
requirements.
b. Process To Achieve Consistency
54. The Commission directed public
utilities, working through NERC and
NAESB, to modify the ATC-related
reliability standards and business
practices in accordance with specific
direction provided in Order No. 890.
The Commission concluded that the
NERC reliability standards development
process and the NAESB business
standards development process are the
appropriate forums for developing
33 See
34 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 310.
id. at P 301.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
consistency in ATC calculations. To that
end, public utilities were directed,
working through NERC, to modify the
ATC-related reliability standards within
270 days after the publication of Order
No. 890 in the Federal Register, i.e.,
December 10, 2007. Public utilities were
also directed, working through NAESB,
to develop business practices that
complement NERC’s new reliability
standards within 360 days after the
publication of Order No. 890 in the
Federal Register, i.e., March 10, 2008.35
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
55. Several petitioners contend that
the Commission’s direction to public
utilities, working through NERC, to
modify standards to meet specific ATC
requirements is tantamount to dictating
reliability standards in violation of FPA
section 215.36 These petitioners assert
that system reliability will be best
maintained if NERC, having been
certified by the Commission as the ERO,
is afforded discretion in creating the
necessary reliability standards in the
first instance prior to submission to the
Commission for approval consistent
with section 215.37 EEI and Southern
suggest that the Commission give
guidance and direction to NERC on how
standards should be developed, but not
be overly prescriptive. E.ON LSE argues
that the Commission should require, or
at least permit, NERC to consolidate its
ATC development process with its
ongoing reliability standards process to
develop policies, but should refrain
from rewriting any standards developed
through that consolidated process.
clarified that, where Order No. 693
identified a concern and offered a
specific approach to address the
concern, the Commission would
consider an equivalent alternative
approach provided that the ERO
demonstrated that the alternative would
address the Commission’s underlying
concern or goal as efficiently and
effectively as the Commission’s
proposal.38 We believe this provides the
appropriate flexibility for NERC, while
ensuring that the Commission act to
remedy the potential for undue
discrimination in the calculation of
ATC.
c. Applicability to ISOs, RTOs, and
Non-Public Utility Transmission
Providers
57. The Commission did not require
ISO and RTO transmission providers to
‘‘rejustify’’ existing provisions in their
OATTs that are not affected in a
substantive manner by the revisions to
the pro forma OATT in the Final Rule.
However, the Commission did require
all transmission providers, including an
ISO or RTO, to demonstrate that
variations from the tariff modifications
required in Order No. 890 continue to
satisfy the consistent with or superior to
standard. With respect to the
application of the ATC requirements of
Order No. 890, the Commission noted
that ISOs and RTOs would be required
to comply with reliability standards
developed under FPA section 215.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
56. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to rely on the
NERC reliability standards development
process, and the NAESB business
practices development process, to
achieve a more coherent and uniform
determination of ATC. We disagree that
this conflicts with the Commission’s
obligations under section 215 of the
FPA. In Order No. 693, the Commission
exercised its authority under FPA
section 215 to direct the ERO to modify
the existing modeling, data, and
analysis (MOD) standards related to
ATC calculation, providing guidance
consistent with our requirements in
Order No. 890. The Commission
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
58. Because Order No. 890 did not
exempt ISOs/RTOs from the new ATC
standards or curtailment information
posting requirements, NYISO asks the
Commission to clarify that NERC and
NAESB must develop ATC standards
and curtailment information posting
rules that accommodate ISOs/RTOs.
NYISO anticipates that ATC
calculations will continue to be of
limited significance within its control
area, but acknowledges that it does
calculate ATC at its external interfaces
and also uses ATC to determine the
availability of non-firm transmission
service, i.e., service for customers that
do not wish to be exposed to congestion
charges. NYISO states that it, therefore,
has an interest and intends to
participate in the NERC and NAESB
35 The Commission has since extended these
compliance deadlines to May 9, 2008, and August
7, 2008, respectively. See Preventing Undue
Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service, Notice of Extension of Time, Docket Nos.
RM05–17–000, et al. (Dec. 6, 2007).
36 E.g., EEI, E.ON LSE, and Southern.
37 Citing 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2) (requiring the
Commission to ‘‘give due weight to the technical
expertise of the [ERO]’’ on reliability matters).
38 See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the
Bulk Power System, Order No. 693, 72 FR 16,416
(Apr. 4, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,242 (2007)
(Order No. 693), order on reh’g, 120 FERC ¶ 61,053
(2007) (Order No. 693–A). Pending completion of
the NERC/NAESB standardization process, each
transmission provider must perform its ATC-related
calculations in accordance with the methodology
set forth in Attachment C to its OATT, as revised
to comply with Order No. 890.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2991
processes developing new ATC
standards and curtailment information
posting requirements.
59. NYISO contends, however, that
stakeholders from traditional systems
will have a greater interest in the
development of those rules and, as a
result, that the NERC and NAESB
processes may produce rules that
primarily reflect the needs of traditional
systems and do not accommodate ISOs/
RTOs that are based upon locational
marginal pricing of transmission.
NYISO argues that Order No. 890
requires NERC and NAESB to develop
standards that suit both traditional
systems as well as the ISOs/RTOs that
cover more than half of the load in the
United States. NYISO requests that the
Commission expressly state its
expectation that the NERC and NAESB
processes will produce standards that
fulfill Order No. 890’s objectives of
transparency and inter-regional
consistency, yet that are sufficiently
flexible to work for ISO/RTO regions.
Commission Determination
60. Order No. 890 requires NERC and
NAESB to develop a single set of ATCrelated standards that will apply to all
transmission providers, including RTOs
and ISOs. We understand that the NERC
ATC standard drafting team includes
representatives from various industry
sectors, including RTOs/ISOs, and we
encourage NYISO to participate in the
standard development process to
provide NERC an opportunity to address
its concerns. To the extent NYISO feels
its concerns are not addressed in this
process, it should bring the issue to the
Commission’s attention on review of the
resulting reliability standards.
d. ATC Components
61. In Order No. 890, the Commission
adopted certain requirements regarding
the components of ATC (i.e., TTC/TFC,
ETC, CBM and TRM) necessary to
achieve consistency and, in turn, limit
the potential for undue discrimination
in the calculation of ATC. Petitioners
request rehearing and clarification of the
Commission’s determinations related to
ETC, CBM and TRM, which we address
in turn.
(1) ETC
62. The Commission adopted the
NOPR proposal and directed public
utilities, working through NERC and
NAESB, to develop a consistent
approach for determining the amount of
transfer capability a transmission
provider may set aside for its native
load and other committed uses. The
Commission determined that ETC
should be defined to include committed
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
2992
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
uses of the transmission system,
including (1) native load commitments
(including network service), (2)
grandfathered transmission rights, (3)
appropriate point-to-point
reservations,39 (4) rollover rights
associated with long-term firm service,
and (5) other uses identified through the
NERC process. The Commission
determined that ETC should not be used
to set aside transfer capability for any
type of planning or contingency reserve,
which are to be addressed through CBM
and TRM.40 In addition, for short-term
ATC calculations, all reserved but
unused transfer capability (nonscheduled) must be released as non-firm
ATC.
63. The Commission also found that
inclusion of all requests for
transmission service in ETC would
likely overstate usage of the system and
understate ATC. The Commission
therefore found that reservations that
have the same point of receipt (POR)
(generator) but different point of
delivery (POD) (load), for the same time
frame, should not be modeled in the
ETC calculation simultaneously if their
combined reserved transmission
capacity exceeds the generator’s
nameplate capacity at the POR. The
Commission directed public utilities,
working through NERC, to develop
requirements in MOD–001 that lay out
clear instructions on how these
reservations should be modeled. The
Commission also concluded that some
elements of ETC are candidates for
business practices instead of reliability
standards and directed public utilities,
working through NAESB, to develop
business practices necessary for full
implementation of the MOD–001
reliability standard.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
64. TDU Systems contend that,
although the Commission defined the
ETC component of ATC to include
committed uses of the transmission
system, it did not clearly identify how
requests for transmission service are to
be treated. TDU Systems question
whether the Commission’s use of the
term ‘‘committed requests’’ is the same
as ‘‘confirmed requests’’ for service. In
order to provide greater clarity, certainty
and transparency to the ATC calculation
process, TDU Systems ask the
Commission to clarify that ‘‘committed
39 The Commission explained that the reference
to ‘‘appropriate point-to-point reservations’’ meant
that reservations accounted for under ETC depend
on the firmness and duration of the reservation. The
Commission stated that the specific characteristics
should be developed in the reliability standard.
40 TRM also includes such things as loop flow
and parallel path flow.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
requests’’ means the same thing as
‘‘confirmed requests,’’ as this term is
generally understood throughout the
industry.
65. TranServ requests clarification
that the Commission’s statement that all
reserved but unused transfer capability
(non-scheduled) shall be released as
non-firm ATC was limited to the release
of unscheduled firm transmission
capability and not intended to require
transmission providers to release
unscheduled non-firm capability for
additional non-firm sales.41
Commission Determination
66. The Commission clarifies in
response to TDU Systems’ request that
the reference to ‘‘committed requests’’
in Order No. 890 was intended to refer
to confirmed transmission service
requests. Once a service request has
been approved by the transmission
provider and confirmed by the
transmission customer, it should be
taken into account when determining
ETC.
67. We also agree with TranServ that
the Commission’s reference to releasing
unused (non-scheduled) transfer
capability as non-firm ATC applies to
unscheduled firm transmission
capability, since all unused non-firm
capacity is deemed available to any
entity meeting the scheduling
requirements. This does not alter the
requirement that the transmission
provider offer all available capacity,
firm or non-firm, as applicable,
consistent with our longstanding open
access principles.
(2) CBM
68. The Commission directed public
utilities, working through NERC and
NAESB, to develop clear standards and
business practices for how the CBM
value is determined, allocated across
transmission paths and flowgates, and
used. To ensure that CBM is used for its
intended purpose, the Commission
provided that CBM shall only be used
to allow an LSE to meet its generation
reliability criteria. The Commission
rejected requests to allow CBM to be
used to meet reserve-sharing needs,
explaining that TRM is the appropriate
category for that purpose. Public
utilities were directed to work with
NAESB to develop an OASIS
mechanism that will allow for auditing
of CBM usage.
69. The Commission clarified that
each LSE within a transmission
provider’s control area has the right to
request the transmission provider to set
aside transfer capability as CBM for the
41 Citing
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at 244, 389.
Frm 00010
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
LSE to meet its historical, state, RTO, or
regional generation reliability criteria
requirement such as reserve margin, loss
of load probability, the loss of largest
units, etc. It also determined that LSEs
should be permitted to call for the use
of CBM, pursuant to conditions
established in the reliability standards
development process. Public utilities
were directed to work through NERC to
modify the CBM-related standards to
specify the generation deficiency
conditions during which an LSE will be
allowed to use the transfer capability
reserved as CBM. The Commission also
directed public utilities, working
through NERC, to develop clear
requirements for allocating CBM to
paths and flowgates and concluded that
transmission capacity set aside as CBM
shall be zero in non-firm ATC
calculations.
70. Finally, the Commission required
the transmission provider to design
their transmission charges so that the
class of customers not benefiting from
the CBM set-aside, i.e., point-to-point
customers, do not pay a transmission
charge that includes the cost of the CBM
set-aside. Transmission providers were
permitted to submit redesigned
transmission charges that reflect the
CBM set-aside through a limited issue
FPA section 205 rate filing. The
Commission noted that these filings
may be limited to the rate design change
only, i.e., they would not require the
submission of cost of service data or a
revision to the transmission provider’s
revenue requirement.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
71. Duke requests that the
Commission clarify that utilities that do
not reserve CBM for themselves do not
need to make it available to others.
Although the Commission required
transmission providers to make CBM
available to LSEs that request it, Duke
argues that the Commission has no
authority under FPA section 206 to
require transmission providers to do so
when they do not use CBM themselves
since there is no potential for undue
discrimination.
72. With regard to the calculation of
CBM, Southern argues that requiring a
consistent calculation methodology
would be harmful to LSEs because
reserve needs vary from area to area.
Southern contends that LSEs should be
allowed the flexibility to establish CBM
on a per-interface basis so that CBM use
will be commensurate with expected
system conditions, topography, and
available capacity markets. Southern
states, for example, that small LSEs
typically have fewer internal resources
than larger LSEs and therefore need
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
more CBM. Southern contends that a
consistent methodology could result in
higher infrastructure cost, place system
reliability at risk, and ultimately remove
the economic benefit associated with
CBM.
73. Southern also argues that
development of a ‘‘one-size-fits all’’
methodology for the calculation of CBM
would be impossible due to varying
regional and state mandates governing
generation adequacy issues. Southern
contends that such a mandate, if applied
to a transmission provider’s native load
customers that are under varying
regional and state resource adequacy
requirements, would amount to a
regulation of reserve adequacy which is
outside of the Commission’s
jurisdiction. Southern adds that this
would implicate (and may violate) the
reliability provisions of FPA section 215
and the native load protections of FPA
section 217.
74. TDU Systems request that the
Commission clarify, or grant rehearing,
that if a transmission provider does not
accommodate reserve-sharing
arrangements for its load-serving
transmission customers as TRM, then it
must allow access to the CBM set-aside
for reserve-sharing purposes. TDU
Systems are concerned that some
transmission providers do not use TRM
set-asides, but rather use a CBMapproach to reserving capacity across
interfaces for reserve-sharing
arrangements. In such cases, TDU
Systems state that LSEs needing access
to interface capacity to accommodate
reserve-sharing arrangements may not
be able to obtain that capacity if the
Commission limits such usage to TRM.
TDU Systems contend that transmission
providers set aside interface capacity to
serve their retail native load in the case
of both generation emergencies and
economic transactions and that
comparability demands the same for the
reserve-sharing arrangements for LSEs.
75. With regard to cost recovery of the
CBM set-aside, Southern argues that
CBM is a component of network service
that is already paid for by network
customers and native load through their
bearing a load-ratio share responsibility
for the costs of the transmission system.
Southern contends that CBM is used as
a network reservation of resources used
to service network and/or native load
under certain conditions. Southern
argues that a network customer’s cost
responsibility is based upon its load, not
its designation of network resources
and, therefore, the network customer is
already bearing CBM-related costs
through its load ratio share
responsibility.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
76. As a result, Southern concludes
that point-to-point customers are not
paying for CBM capacity and, instead,
are paying their appropriate share of the
total transmission system cost based
upon their reservations of capacity.
Southern states that Commission policy
requires network customers and native
load to bear the costs of both the
capacity they use and any capacity that
is not reserved by point-to-point
customers.42 Southern argues that the
Commission’s finding in Order No. 890
that point-to-point customers are
inappropriately bearing the costs of
CBM represents an unexplained
departure from Order No. 888-A.
77. Southern also contends that this
ruling will result in an inconsistency
within the pro forma OATT, requiring
incremental cost responsibility for
network customers to utilize one
particular type of external resource or
off-system purchase, i.e., the utilization
of CBM. Southern argues that this
conflicts with the structure of network
service under the pro forma OATT,
which allows the network customer to
utilize the interfaces for both external
designated network resources and offsystem opportunity purchases without
additional charge. Southern also
contends that requiring network
customers to pay for CBM on the same
basis as firm point-to-point service
disadvantages the use of CBM since
interface capacity could only be used on
an emergency basis and therefore is not
considered firm service for the purpose
of designating off-system system
resources.
78. Southern goes on to assert that the
Commission’s premise that point-topoint customers are not benefiting from
CBM is incorrect. Southern notes that
under normal conditions the transfer
capability reserved as CBM is made
available for non-firm use by other
customers. Southern notes also that
long-term point-to-point customers
benefit from the non-firm point-to-point
use of that transfer capability because
associated revenues are included as
revenue credits in the numerator of the
OATT rate calculations to reduce
charges to long-term firm point-to-point
customers.
79. If the Commission does not
reverse its decision in Order No. 890
regarding the redesign of transmission
charges, Southern seeks clarification
regarding how the CBM set-aside should
be treated for ratemaking purposes since
it does not represent additional load.
Southern notes that the potential for
long-term customers to receive a rate
benefit from the non-firm point-to-point
42 Citing
PO 00000
use of the set-aside raises the potential
for them receiving a double credit.
Southern also suggests that the
Commission defer the new rate design
filing until after NERC has adopted ATC
standards under MOD–001.
80. EEI and Idaho Power raise similar
concerns, asking the Commission to
clarify that, when the transmission
provider modifies its rate design for
point-to-point transmission service, it
also may propose a rate design
modification to ensure that it recovers
from network and native load customers
any reduction in revenues resulting
from the change in the rates for pointto-point service. Duke contends that
allocating costs of the CBM set-aside
through a downward revision to pointto-point rates would have the effect of
allocating costs to native load and
network customers for a service that is
not taken. EEI and Idaho Power argue
that the Commission should allow
transmission providers to modify their
rates for other services in order to
prevent under-recovery of their costs of
service or inappropriately shifting costs
to native load customers. EEI also
requests the Commission to clarify that
the rate design change may take into
consideration the fact that transmission
providers credit against the cost of
service revenues received from shortterm and non-firm transmission service
provided using capacity that is set aside
for CBM to ensure that long-term firm
point-to-point customers do not receive
a double credit for the use of CBM
capacity.
81. EEI requests further clarification
regarding how a transmission provider
should modify unit charges that are
established by settlement. EEI argues
that transmission providers should not
be required to make an entirely new
cost-of-service filing and, instead,
should be permitted to reduce its rates
for firm point-to-point service by the
ratio of its current transmission load
and reservations without the CBM setaside to its transmission load and
reservations plus the CBM set-aside.
Commission Determination
82. The Commission clarifies in
response to Duke that utilities do not
need to make CBM available to LSEs on
their system if the utilities do not
reserve for themselves CBM or its
equivalent. Comparability only requires
transmission providers to make CBM
available when they set aside for
themselves transfer capability to meet
generation reliability criteria.43 In order
43 We note that Duke states, in its Attachment C
compliance filing, that it has set CBM on all of its
Order No. 888–A at P 30,220.
Frm 00011
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2993
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Continued
16JAR2
2994
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
to provide transparency and consistency
regarding the use of CBM, public
utilities, working through NERC, must
develop clear standards for how CBM is
determined, allocated across
transmission paths, and used.44
83. The Commission did not mandate
a particular methodology for allocating
CBM over transmission paths and
flowgates in Order No. 890. We
therefore reject Southern’s argument
that development of a consistent
methodology for calculating CBM would
be harmful to LSEs because reserve
needs vary from area to area. While we
expect the NERC and NAESB process to
produce a consistent and transparent
process for setting aside and allocating
CBM based on LSE requests, we decline
to prescribe a specific method for how
CBM should be obtained or allocated or
otherwise determine the amount of
capacity that the transmission provider
has to set aside in response to requests
from multiple LSEs.
84. We disagree that a consistent CBM
methodology that allows LSEs access to
historically used resources would
impair reliability, conflict with the
rights of native load under FPA section
217, or otherwise implicate varying
regional and state mandates governing
adequacy issues. In any event, it is
premature to consider these questions
since NERC and NAESB have yet to
complete their work on the reliability
standards and business practices. We
also disagree with Southern that a
consistent CBM methodology will
remove the economic benefit associated
with CBM. Rather, a consistent
methodology for determining how the
CBM value is determined, allocated, and
used will remove excess discretion that
transmission providers previously had
and allow all LSEs to have the benefits
associated with CBM.
85. Regarding TDU Systems’ request
to use CBM for reserve-sharing
arrangements, we reiterate that TRM is
the appropriate category for reservesharing arrangements and that CBM is to
meet verifiable generation reliability
criteria in times of emergency
generation deficiencies.45 As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, TRM may be used for other
transmission-related uncertainties as
interfaces to zero because it uses short-term line
ratings (where available), which yields an operating
margin that may be used for unexpected conditions
or inaccuracies in data. See Compliance filing of
Duke Energy Carolinas, Docket No. OA07–82–000
(Sep. 10, 2007); Open Access Transmission Tariff of
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, FERC Electric Tariff
Fifth Rev. Vol. No. 4, Original Sheet 170H. The
Commission will address the merits of that practice
in Docket No. OA07–82–000.
44 Order No. 890 at P 256, 259.
45 See id. at P 264.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
well.46 Because the transmission
provider may set aside transfer
capability for TRM to operate the system
reliably, we reject TDU Systems’ request
to use CBM for reserve-sharing
purposes.
86. With regard to cost recovery of the
CBM set-aside, we affirm the decision in
Order No. 890 to require transmission
providers to design their transmission
charges to ensure that the class of
customers not benefiting from the CBM
set-aside, i.e., point-to-point customers,
do not pay a transmission charge that
includes the cost of the CBM set-aside.
Only network customers and the
transmission provider on behalf of its
native load may request that
transmission capacity be set aside as
CBM and, therefore, only those users of
the system should bear its costs. We
disagree with Southern that, because
CBM is used by network customers, all
the costs associated with CBM are
already borne by network customers
through their load ratio share
responsibility. As Southern
acknowledges, the rates for point-topoint service are also calculated based
on a share of total transmission system
cost. If the costs associated with CBM
are not excluded from the universe of
costs allocated to all point-to-point
customers, then every point-to-point
customer will end up paying a portion
of those costs. The Commission’s rate
design ruling is therefore consistent
with, not contrary to, the Commission’s
directive in Order No. 888–A for
network customers and native load to
bear the cost of capacity not used by
point-to-point customers.47
87. We acknowledge, as Southern
claims, that point-to-point customers do
reap some indirect benefits from the
CBM set-aside in that related capacity
that is not used is made available on a
non-firm basis and that, in turn, can
generate revenues that are credited to
the transmission cost of service to the
benefit of point-to-point customers. We
do not believe this justifies charging all
point-to-point customers for the cost of
the CBM set-aside. These costs should
instead be allocated to the entities that
have the exclusive right to request the
set-aside in the first instance. We agree
that, in certain circumstances, this may
necessitate modification of other rate
design elements to ensure that costs are
appropriately allocated and that the
transmission provider fully recovers any
reduction in revenues resulting from the
change in the rates for firm point-topoint service. Nothing in Order No. 890
precludes transmission providers from
46 See
47See
PO 00000
id. at P 273.
Order No. 888–A at 30,220.
Frm 00012
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
proposing modification of rates for other
services (such as network service) as
necessary to recover CBM-related costs
previously paid by point-to-point
customers. Similarly, we expect that
transmission providers would address
in their rate design filings any
possibility for particular customers to
receive an inappropriate credit for nonfirm use of capacity set aside for CBM.
88. We disagree that requiring
transmission providers to design their
rates to properly allocate CBM-related
costs conflicts with the nature of
network service or disadvantages
network customers using CBM. Under
the pro forma OATT, transfer capability
is made available for network resource
designations and firm point-to-point
reservations on a non-discriminatory
basis. It is therefore appropriate to
design rates so that network customers
and point-to-point customers pay rates
based on the service available to each.
89. We decline to defer the filing of
CBM-related rate design proposals until
completion of the NERC/NAESB
standardization process. To the extent a
transmission provider’s rates currently
collect the costs associated with the
CBM set-aside from point-to-point
customers, those rates must be
redesigned in accordance with Order
No. 890. We acknowledge, however,
that the on-going NERC and NAESB
standardization processes may result in
CBM being set aside and used
differently in the future. To the extent
such changes implicate the allocation of
costs among those that are eligible to
request or use the set-aside, the
transmission provider should file with
the Commission any necessary rate
changes to ensure that CBM costs
continue to be allocated appropriately.
90. Finally, we decline to address
here what changes may be necessary to
a particular rate settlement in order to
ensure that costs associated with the
CBM set-aside are allocated properly.
All proposals to allocate CBM costs will
be considered on a case-by-case basis,
whether they involve rates stated in a
settlement or otherwise.
(3) TRM
91. The Commission required public
utilities, working through NERC, to
complete the ongoing process of
modifying TRM-related reliability
standards (MOD–008 and MOD–009).
To guide NERC and NAESB in the
process of drafting TRM-related
standards and business practices, the
Commission explained that
transmission providers may set aside
TRM for (1) load forecast and load
distribution error, (2) variations in
facility loadings, (3) uncertainty in
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission system topology, (4) loop
flow impact, (5) variations in generation
dispatch, (6) automatic sharing of
reserves, and (7) other uncertainties as
identified through the NERC reliability
standards development process. To the
extent capability is needed for
transmission of shared reserves, the
Commission stated that it must be
included in TRM, although the
Commission did not mandate the use of
reserve sharing groups.
92. Each transmission provider was
required to calculate, and allocate on
the paths and flowgates, the aggregate
TRM value for all LSEs within its area.
Public utilities also were directed,
working through NERC, to establish an
appropriate maximum TRM. The
Commission expressed support for
NERC’s plan to revise existing reliability
standards for TRM to require clear
documentation of the TRM calculation,
to ensure full transparency. In addition,
the Commission required each
transmission provider to make available
all underlying documentation,
including work papers and load flow
base cases, used to determine TRM, to
any transmission customer and LSE
within its control area, subject to a
confidentiality agreement,48 if
necessary. Because load, facility
loadings, and other uncertainties
constantly deviate, the Commission did
not require that TRM set-aside capacity
be sold on a non-firm basis. The
Commission explained that any request
for regional difference from the
applicable TRM reliability standards
must take place through the NERC
reliability standards development
process.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
93. Duke asks the Commission to
clarify that it intended NERC to develop
a methodology to calculate a maximum
TRM number, not to put an actual
number in the reliability standard,
arguing that requiring an actual number
would overstep the bounds of FPA
section 215. Southern argues that NERC
must be allowed flexibility to develop
appropriate TRM methodologies so that
the use of TRM will be commensurate
with expected system conditions,
topography, and available capacity
markets. Southern contends that setting
a maximum amount of TRM would
overlook the physical realities of the
differing system configurations that
constitute the electrical system.
Southern argues, in particular, that the
percentage ratings reduction proposed
would be poorly suited as a reliability
margin since individual line flows can
change by very large percentages for
single contingency events.
Commission Determination
94. The Commission clarifies that
NERC was not directed to identify an
actual number or a particular
methodology to include in the TRM
standards, MOD–008–0 and MOD–009–
0. The Commission’s intent was to
require NERC and NAESB to include
consistent criteria and guidelines in the
calculation and uses of TRM by
transmission providers.49 Likewise, in
response to Southern’s concern
regarding flexibility to use something
other than the ratings reduction method
discussed in Order No. 890, we clarify
that the ratings reduction method is
only an example of a simple method
that could be used.50 Our intent is not
to prohibit a transmission provider from
using a more sophisticated method, so
long as it is consistent with the
reliability standards developed by
NERC.
e. Modeling, Assumptions and Input
Data
95. The Commission directed public
utilities, working through NERC, to
modify the reliability standards MOD–
010 through MOD–025 51 to incorporate
a requirement for the periodic review
and modification of models for (1) load
flow base cases with contingency,
subsystem, and monitoring files, (2)
short circuit data, and (3) transient and
dynamic stability simulation data, in
order to ensure that these models are up
to date. The Commission stated that the
models should be updated and
benchmarked to actual events.
96. The Commission also required
transmission providers to use consistent
data and assumptions underlying
operational planning for short-term ATC
and expansion planning for long-term
ATC calculation, to the maximum
extent practicable. The Commission
explained that such data and
assumptions include, for example, (1)
load levels, (2) generation dispatch, (3)
transmission and generation facilities
maintenance schedules, (4) contingency
outages, (5) topology, (6) transmission
reservations, (7) assumptions regarding
transmission and generation facilities
additions and retirements, and (8)
49 See
Order No. 890 at P 273.
id. at P 275.
51 The MOD–010 through MOD–025 reliability
standards establish data requirements, reporting
procedures, and system model development and
validation for use in the reliability analysis of the
interconnected transmission systems.
50 See
48 The confidentiality agreement may
appropriately restrict the sharing of sensitive
information with customer personnel that are
involved only in transmission functions, as
opposed to merchant functions.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00013
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2995
counterflows. The Commission directed
public utilities, working through NERC,
to modify ATC standards to achieve this
consistency.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
97. Entergy requests that the
Commission acknowledge that the
benchmarking of ATC calculations to
real-time ATC values is only one piece
of information to be used to evaluate
ATC practices. Entergy agrees that such
updating and benchmarking can provide
information related to ATC/AFC
calculations, but states that differences
between the models used to calculate
ATC/AFC and actual events in fact are
going to occur. Entergy contends that
the purpose of the ATC/AFC models is
not to forecast actual operating
conditions, but instead to reflect the
physical transmission rights that have
been previously granted and to
determine if additional physical rights
may be granted.52 Entergy argues that
benchmarking may be helpful when
evaluating ATC, but it will not tell the
whole story.
98. TDU Systems request that the
Commission explicitly state that
assumptions regarding loop flows must
be consistent for ATC calculation and
planning purposes, within the
respective timeframe. TDU Systems
argue that consistency in modeling the
effects of those loop flows is necessary
to ensure that neighboring transmission
systems have accurately calculated ATC
not only on their own systems but also
on their interfaces with other systems.
TDU Systems also ask that the
Commission clarify that the
assumptions and data to be used in ATC
modeling must include the native load
service obligations of LSEs as well as
the transmission provider’s native load.
Commission Determination
99. The Commission clarifies in
response to Entergy that the models
used by the transmission provider to
calculate ATC, and not actual ATC
values, must be benchmarked. The
52 Entergy asserts that actual conditions will and
should deviate from ATC/AFC models for
numerous reasons. Entergy states that transmission
operators are constantly monitoring their systems
and taking actions to ensure that system constraints
are mitigated well before real-time, including
modifications to transmission outage plans,
generator outage plans, and daily unit commitment
plans. Entergy contends that those actions could,
for example, make a flowgate that months ahead of
time was predicted to be loaded at 100 percent to
be loaded less than 50 percent in real-time. Entergy
also notes that many transmission customers only
use all of their transmission rights a small
percentage of the time and, in any event, actual
operating ATC will not perfectly match posted ATC
since, for example, the level of mandatory
purchases from qualifying facility (QF) can affect
real-time ATC.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
2996
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Commission is concerned with the level
of accuracy of the models and, therefore,
directed in Order No. 890 that the
models be updated and benchmarked to
actual events. If models are not
sufficiently accurate, then ATC/AFC
calculations will not generate correct
results, undermining the benefits of
increased consistency and transparency
of ATC calculations. With regard to
discrepancies between actual and
modeled ATC values, the Commission
directed the ERO in Order No. 693 to
modify MOD–014–0 through the
reliability standards development
process to require that actual system
events be simulated and, if the model
output is not within the accuracy
required, the model shall be modified to
achieve the necessary accuracy.
100. We agree with TDU Systems that
assumptions regarding loop flows in
calculating ATC must be consistent with
those used for planning purposes within
the respective timeframes. We also agree
that loop flow impact in ATC
calculation should not be restricted to
the transmission provider’s control area.
Loop flows that occur in the power
system must be included in the load
flow models that simulate power system
conditions. Loop flows affecting ATC
calculation should be taken into account
consistently by using the same models
and assumptions as used for the
planning of the system. With regard to
modeling LSE uses of the system, we
clarify that each transmission provider
must include the native load service
obligations of LSEs as well as the
transmission provider’s own load in
modeling assumptions and data used for
ATC calculation.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
f. ATC Calculation Frequency
101. The Commission directed public
utilities, working through NERC and
NAESB, to revise reliability standard
MOD–001 to require ATC to be
recalculated by all transmission
providers on a consistent time interval
and in a manner that closely reflects the
actual topology of the system, e.g.,
generation and transmission outages,
load forecast, interchange schedules,
transmission reservations, facility
ratings, and other necessary data. The
Commission stated that this process
must also consider whether ATC should
be calculated more frequently for
constrained facilities.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
102. Powerex asks the Commission to
clarify that transmission providers are
required to update their ATC
calculations when they receive new data
otherwise required to be posted under
the requirements of Order No. 890, such
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
as updated load forecasts. Powerex
argues that the standards adopted
through the NERC and NAESB
processes should serve only as
minimum or ‘‘no less frequent than’’
requirements. In Powerex’s view, the
specification of consistent intervals for
ATC calculations should not prohibit or
deter transmission providers from
calculating and posting ATC on a more
frequent basis as new data becomes
available, particularly in light of the
Commission’s goal in Order No. 890 to
make the ATC calculation process more
transparent to customers.
103. Southern asks the Commission to
clarify that ATC, not TTC, must be
recalculated at consistent time intervals.
Although the Commission referenced
ATC in Order No. 890, Southern
contends that the associated data and
assumptions mentioned by the
Commission (generation and
transmission outages, load forecast,
interchange schedules, transmission
reservations, facility ratings, and other
necessary data) relate to TTC. Southern
argues that ATC is the appropriate
reference because it can be calculated
automatically with relative ease and
frequency. In comparison, Southern
states that TTC requires much more
complex power flow analyses and
should not be driven by changes in
parameters without expert review.
Southern contends that the calculation
frequency requirements established by
the Commission would result in
constantly changing values if applied to
TTC, with little time, if any, for the
necessary review.
Commission Determination
104. The Commission agrees with
Powerex that the standards adopted
through the NERC and NAESB
processes should serve as minimum or
‘‘no less frequent than’’ requirements to
recalculate ATC. Transmission
providers also must update their ATC
calculation when they receive
substantial and material changes in
data, such as updated load forecasts,
changes in topology and dispatch
patterns, which may be more frequent
than the NERC and NAESB standards
would otherwise require. In the absence
of substantial and material changes in
data, transmission providers are not
required to update ATC on a more
frequent basis than the minimum
frequency that the NERC and NAESB
standards require, once implemented.
The Commission will consider the
adequacy of the time frame for ATC
updates on review of these standards.
105. In response to Southern, we
reiterate that Order No. 890 directed
revisions to reliability standard MOD–
PO 00000
Frm 00014
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
001 to require that ATC, not TTC, be
recalculated at consistent time
intervals.53 However, system topology
or other changes such as transmission
outages, load forecast, interchange
schedules, transmission reservations, or
facility ratings, and other necessary data
that affect ATC may of course impact
one or more of the components of ATC,
including TTC. While we agree with
Southern that TTC requires more
involved power flow analyses, the
transmission provider should consider
whether any changes in system
topology, contingency outages, or other
factors are substantial enough to merit
recalculation of TTC.
2. Transparency
106. In Order No. 890, the
Commission adopted a number of
requirements in order to improve the
transparency of ATC calculations. Some
of these reforms applied to the pro
forma OATT, including a requirement
that each transmission provider include
in Attachment C to its OATT more
descriptive information concerning its
ATC/AFC calculation methodology.
Other reforms applied to information
posted on OASIS, including data related
to the calculation of ATC and TTC,
changes in the ATC/TTC values,
disclosure of Critical Energy
Infrastructure Information (CEII), and
the posting of additional ATC-related
data. Petitioners have requested
rehearing and clarification of certain of
these requirements, which we address
in turn.
a. OATT Transparency—Attachment C
107. To increase transparency
regarding ATC calculations, the
Commission directed each transmission
provider to set forth its ATC calculation
methodology in Attachment C to its
OATT. The Commission required that
each transmission provider’s
Attachment C must, at a minimum: (1)
Clearly identify which of the NERCapproved methodologies it employs
(e.g., contract path, network ATC, or
network AFC); (2) provide a detailed
description of the specific mathematical
algorithm the transmission provider
uses to calculate firm and non-firm ATC
for the scheduling horizon (same day
and real-time), operating horizon (day
ahead and pre-schedule), and planning
horizon (beyond the operating horizon);
(3) include a process flow diagram that
describes the various steps that it takes
in performing the ATC calculation; (4)
set forth a definition of each ATC
component (i.e., TTC, ETC, TRM, and
CBM) and a detailed explanation of how
53 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 301.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
each one is derived in both the
operating and planning horizons; and
(5) document their processes for
coordinating ATC calculations with
their neighboring systems.
108. The Commission concluded that
Attachment C must provide an accurate
documentation of processes and
procedures related to the calculation of
ATC, not the actual mathematical
algorithms, which instead should be
posted on their Web site with the link
noted in the Attachment C. The
Commission noted that a transmission
provider may require a confidentiality
agreement for CEII materials, consistent
with our CEII requirements, or may
otherwise protect the confidentiality of
proprietary customer information. The
Commission also required transmission
providers to file a revised Attachment C
to incorporate any changes in NERC’s
revised reliability standards and
NAESB’s business practices related to
ATC calculations, as requested by the
Commission in Order No. 890, within
60 days of completion of the NERC and
NAESB processes.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
109. MidAmerican objects to the
Commission’s decision to require a
process flow diagram to be included in
Attachment C, suggesting instead that
each transmission provider post this
information on its Web site as an
alternative. MidAmerican contends that
process flow diagrams demand large
amounts of computer capacity and that
management of and electronic
transmittal of its OATT would become
difficult if process flow diagrams were
required for other elaborate and
important tasks throughout the tariff,
such as the transmission service request
procedure or the generation
interconnection procedure.
MidAmerican argues that providing a
web link on OASIS would achieve the
Commission’s transparency objective
and expeditiously provide those that
wish to navigate through a process
diagram a direct access to the document.
At a minimum, MidAmerican asks that
the Commission accept an internet
posting of the diagram with the web
address published in Attachment C.
110. Southern requests clarification as
to whether the Commission intends for
transmission providers to make two
filings of ATC methodologies (i.e., one
when the Order No. 890 becomes
effective and another when the NERC
and NAESB processes are completed) or
just one filing of such methodologies
(i.e., a single filing when the NERC and
NAESB processes are completed).
Southern argues that only one filing
should be required, to be made within
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
60 days after the NERC and NAESB
processes are completed. Southern
contends that requiring a premature
filing before those processes are
complete would waste transmission
providers’ resources in preparing those
filings and the Commission’s resources
in reviewing them.
Commission Determination
111. The Commission denies
MidAmerican’s request to permit a
transmission provider to post on its Web
site a process flow diagram and provide
a web address in Attachment C, instead
of providing the process flow diagram as
a part of the Attachment C. A link to a
Web site is not the equivalent of
inclusion in the transmission provider’s
OATT, leaving the Commission unable
to enforce use of the process flow
diagram and the public with potentially
more limited notice of any changes to
the process flow diagram. The
transparency and enforceability benefits
of including the flow diagram in the
tariff outweigh any potential filing
burden. Therefore, we affirm our
determination in Order No. 890 that a
process flow diagram must be filed with
OATT Attachment C, and that any
change of the processes or data
information identified by the process
flow diagram must trigger an update of
the process flow diagram and the filing
of the revised OATT, Attachment C.
112. In response to Southern, Order
No. 890 specifically required
transmission providers to submit an
intermediate filing within 180 days after
the publication of the order in the
Federal Register in order to provide
transparency of the transmission
provider’s existing ATC calculation
methodologies. In compliance with that
requirement, a number of transmission
providers, including Southern,
submitted Attachment C compliance
filings on September 11, 2007. The
immediate transparency benefits of
these filings will be supplemented by a
revised filing following completion of
the NERC and NAESB standardization
processes. We do not believe the
intermediate filing represented an
undue burden to the transmission
providers, as it was no more than a
documentation of existing practices.
b. OASIS
(1) ATC/TTC Posting Requirements
113. The Commission concluded that
transmission providers must continue to
comply with existing ATC-related
posting requirements, as supplemented
by Order No. 890. To that end, the
Commission stated that it would
maintain a requirement for transmission
PO 00000
Frm 00015
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2997
providers to make available, upon
request, all data used to calculate ATC
and TTC for any constrained paths and
any system planning studies or specific
network impact studies performed for
customers. Transmission providers were
also directed to continue to post a list
of such studies on OASIS. The
Commission required the additional
posting of, at a minimum, a list of all
system impact studies, facilities studies,
and studies performed for the
transmission provider’s own network
resources and affiliated transmission
customers, with those studies to be
made available upon request. The
Commission noted that appropriate
procedures to accommodate CEII
concerns should be developed to ensure
eligible entities with a legitimate
interest in transmission study data can
receive access to it. The Commission
required that the studies be made
available for five years, consistent with
data retention requirements pertaining
to denial of service requests.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
114. MidAmerican requests
clarification with regard to the
interaction of the data availability
obligation under Order No. 890 and the
Commission’s Standards of Conduct
with respect to information requests
made by affiliated transmission
customers. In order to provide
comparable transmission service,
MidAmerican argues that data must be
available in all circumstances. If the
Commission does not clarify that this is
the case, MidAmerican requests
rehearing of this provision so that
comparable information can be made
available at all times.
Commission Determination
115. The Commission clarifies that all
data used to calculate ATC and TTC for
any constrained paths and any system
planning studies or specific network
impact studies performed for customers
are to be made available on request,
regardless of whether the customer is
non-affiliated or affiliated with the
transmission provider. To the extent the
requesting party is an affiliate, the
Standards of Conduct would require
that data provided to the affiliate be
simultaneously posted on the
transmission provider’s OASIS or Web
site, as applicable.54
(2) ATC/TTC Narrative Explanation
116. The Commission retained
existing posting requirements for
unconstrained paths and amended its
regulations relating to data posted for
54 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
18 CFR 358.5.
16JAR2
2998
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
constrained paths. Specifically, the
Commission required transmission
providers to post a narrative when a
monthly or yearly ATC value changes as
a result of a 10 percent change in TTC
on constrained paths. Posted
information must include both the (1)
specific events which gave rise to the
change and (2) the new values for ATC
on that path (as opposed to all points on
the network). The Commission also
required the posting of a narrative with
regard to monthly or yearly ATC values
when ATC remains unchanged at a
value of zero for a period of six months
or longer.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
117. E.ON U.S. argues that the posting
of a narrative explanation for changes in
ATC resulting from changes in TTC is
unduly burdensome and, in any event,
would not provide transmission
customers with any meaningful
information. E.ON U.S. contends that,
using the new process for calculating
TTC, a transmission provider would
have to calculate the value for each
horizon model and compare it to values
in the previous hour in order to
implement the posting requirement.
Where those values change by more
than 10 percent, E.ON U.S. states that
the transmission provider will have to
examine individually each changed
parameter to assess its contribution to
the change. E.ON U.S. contends that, for
its system, the list of parameters to be
evaluated would include generation
dispatch, system configuration, loads,
and net interchanges of which there can
be dozens or even hundreds per hour.
E.ON U.S. argues that this would take
24 engineers to monitor the E.ON U.S.
system alone, costing millions of dollars
per year.
118. Southern requests that the
Commission clarify that the required
narratives do not need to list each and
every circumstance or occurrence that
impacts TTC values from the previous
month or year, stating that such a list
would likely be voluminous because of
the many conditions that affect TTC.
Southern instead suggests that
transmission providers list the primary
reasons for the change in TTC to the
extent they are known. Southern
contends, for example, that an
appropriate reason for such changes
would be a new updated monthly
model, arguing that it would not be
practical to determine how much TTC
may change from each outage, service
commitment or other parameter change
incorporated in an updated model.
119. Southern also requests that the
Commission clarify where the
transmission provider should post these
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
narrative explanations and in what
form. Southern proposes that this
information be posted on OASIS via a
template and data element that is to be
defined by a NAESB standard,
incorporated into a revised Standards
and Communications Protocol
document, and subsequently adopted by
the Commission.
120. TDU Systems argue that the
Commission has set too high of a
threshold for reporting changes in ATC/
TTC, arguing that the triggering
requirement should be a 10 percent
decrease in ATC, rather than a 10
percent change in TTC. TDU Systems
contend that TTC is a large enough
number that using a decrease of 10
percent in TTC as a trigger for requiring
a narrative explanation to be posted will
result in very few narrative explanations
posted, thereby defeating the purpose of
the requirement.
121. PJM seeks clarification of the
posting requirement as applied to
transmission providers using an AFC
calculation method. PJM states that TTC
is an output from, not an input to, its
AFC/TTC calculations and therefore the
literal terms of the regulations do not
make sense as applied to PJM. PJM
proposes to post a narrative explanation
for the reason for daily changes in ATC
or TTC values as a result of changes in
AFC inputs (i.e., transmission outages,
generator outages, load forecast, and
model updates) in the event the
resultant ATC or TTC value changes by
10 percent or more, requesting that the
Commission confirm that this approach
would appropriately adapt the Order
No. 890 posting requirement to a system
such as PJM that uses an AFC
methodology. Alternatively, if the
Commission does not wish to address
PJM’s manner of implementation of this
revised regulation in the context of
rehearing/clarification of Order No. 890,
PJM asks that the Commission allow
PJM, and other similarly situated
transmission providers, to address this
issue in their Order No. 890 tariff
compliance filings. In that event, PJM
asks that the Commission clarify only
that such transmission providers may
continue their existing practices until
the Commission acts on their
compliance filings.
122. TDU Systems also argue that the
six-month trigger for posting an
explanation for zero ATC values is
unsupported, asking instead that
transmission providers be required to
post a narrative explanation of zero ATC
values any time those values remain at
zero for a period that affects access in
a practical way, e.g., a day for daily
service, two business days for weekly
service, five business days for monthly
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
or yearly service. TDU Systems contend
that a transmission system where ATC
values remain at zero for any length of
time raises serious concerns as to the
adequacy of the system and the need for
significant upgrades, and simply posting
a zero value for ATC does not provide
market participants with an
understanding of what is happening on
the system.
Commission Determination
123. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to post a brief,
but specific, narrative explanation of the
reason for a change in monthly or yearly
ATC values on a constrained path as a
result of a change in TTC of 10 percent
or more. As the Commission explained,
this will limit the number of ATC
changes for which a narrative will be
required.55
124. We believe that E.ON U.S.
overestimates the burden of complying
with this requirement. Since TTC
standardization is ongoing, it is
impossible to identify with precision
the steps that will need to be taken to
comply with the posting requirement.
The appropriate forum to raise concerns
regarding the burden of particular TTC
calculation requirements is in the
NAESB standards development process.
In any event, we would expect that the
posting of narratives for changes in
monthly and yearly ATC values as a
result of a 10 percent change in TTC
will be triggered mainly by topology
changes resulting from transmission
lines and generator in-service status, as
well as new facilities additions, that are
reported on OASIS.
125. We clarify in response to
Southern that transmission providers do
not need to list each and every
circumstance or occurrence that impacts
TTC values from the previous month or
year and, instead, may list the primary
events that give rise to the update.
Again, we expect that TTC changes will
generally result from topology changes
and, therefore, the primary reasons for
an update would be changes in
schedules of transmission or generation
additions, prolonged outages, or
changes in maintenance schedules
causing a TTC change of 10 percent. We
agree with Southern that the
transmission provider should post these
narrative explanations on OASIS via a
template and data element that is to be
defined by NAESB. We direct
transmission providers, working
through NAESB, to develop the OASIS
functionality necessary for such
postings. Pending completion of this
55 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 369.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
work by NAESB, we direct transmission
providers to post these narrative
explanations as comments on OASIS.
126. We deny TDU Systems’ request
to change the triggering requirement to
a 10 percent decrease in ATC. In Order
No. 890, the Commission relaxed the
ATC narrative reporting requirements
proposed in the NOPR due to concerns
that the posting of those narratives
would become burdensome. We believe
the Commission struck the right balance
by requiring the posting of narratives
only when there is a change in TTC of
10 percent or more and disagree that
more limited postings defeats the
purpose of the posting obligation.
127. In response to PJM, we reiterate
that all transmission providers must
comply with this posting requirement.
Transmission providers using an AFC
calculation method that does not base
changes in ATC on changes in TTC may
comply with this requirement by
posting narrative explanations of the
reasons for changes in AFC values as a
result of changes in AFC inputs that
cause ATC or TTC to change by 10
percent or more. We direct each
transmission provider that employs the
AFC calculation methodology to
provide a statement in the compliance
filing required in section II.C describing
how the narrative is derived for ATC/
TTC postings or, if such information
was provided in a prior compliance
filing, a reference to that filing.
128. We also deny TDU Systems’
request to require transmission
providers to post a narrative explanation
any time ATC values remain at zero for
a day for daily service, two business
days for weekly service, five business
days for monthly or yearly service. The
Commission concludes that a six-month
trigger for monthly or yearly ATC values
more appropriately balances the benefits
of increased transparency for the
Commission and customers against the
burden on transmission providers to
make such postings. If the frequency of
these postings proves inadequate, the
Commission can revisit this requirement
in a future order.
(3) CEII
129. The Commission acknowledged
in Order No. 890 that certain data and
studies required to be made public may
contain CEII and that the Commission
has a responsibility to protect that
information. In order to provide
transparency and avoid undue delays in
providing information to those with a
legitimate need for it, the Commission
required that transmission providers
establish a standard disclosure
procedure for CEII required to be
disclosed in Order No. 890. The
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission stated that transmission
providers will be responsible for
identifying CEII and facilitating access
to it for appropriate entities and the
Commission will be available to resolve
disputes if they arise.
130. With regard to procedures to
access CEII, the Commission noted that
transmission customers already have
digital certificates or passwords to
access publicly restricted transmission
information on OASIS. The Commission
suggested that transmission providers
could set up an additional login
requirement for users to view CEII
sections of the OASIS, requiring users to
acknowledge that they will be viewing
CEII and to sign a nondisclosure
agreement at the time the customer
obtains access to that portion of the
OASIS. The Commission explained that
only information that meets the criteria
for CEII, as defined in section 388.113
of the Commission’s regulations,56
should be posted in this section of the
OASIS.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
131. E.ON U.S. contends that the
Commission should not allow posting of
CEII on OASIS, arguing that information
is designated as CEII because it relates
to the integral operations of the nationwide power grid and that, with access
to this information, a terrorist or other
bad actor could inflict real, substantial
harm on the power grid. E.ON U.S.
states that posting CEII on a
transmission provider’s OASIS, a Web
site that is openly connected to the
internet, will impair the transmission
provider’s ability to adequately protect
this information, even with password
protection. E.ON U.S. suggests there are
other ways of providing transmission
customers with such CEII, such as
individual meetings upon request.
132. New York Transmission Owners
request that transmission providers be
authorized to determine, on a case-bycase basis, the specific level and amount
of CEII that a requesting customer may
obtain. New York Transmission Owners
argue that a terrorist seeking to harm our
country’s energy infrastructure will not
likely be concerned with having to sign
a confidentiality agreement or obtain
multiple passwords.
Commission Determination
133. We agree with E.ON U.S. that
posting CEII on OASIS may not provide
adequate protection of CEII and that
transmission providers may therefore
develop other standard disclosure
procedures to provide relevant CEII to
transmission customers on a timely
56 18
PO 00000
CFR 388.113.
Frm 00017
Fmt 4701
basis. The Commission did not require
CEII postings on OASIS in Order No.
890 and, instead, discussed use of
OASIS as one potential disclosure
mechanism.57 The Commission required
transmission providers to establish a
standard procedure for disclosing
relevant CEII on a timely basis, but did
not specify a particular disclosure
mechanism.
134. Similarly, transmission providers
may determine on a case-by-case basis
the specific level of CEII a customer may
obtain, provided that the information is
made available to appropriate recipients
on a timely basis. If a transmission
provider chooses to post CEII on a
protected section of its OASIS, the
transmission provider can and should
verify the identity of transmission
customers who access that information
as it would for any confidential
information.
(4) Additional Data Posting
135. The Commission also required
transmission providers to post on
OASIS metrics related to the provision
of transmission service under the
OATT. Specifically, non-ISO/RTO
transmission providers were directed to
post (1) the number of affiliate versus
non-affiliate requests for transmission
service that have been rejected and (2)
the number of affiliate versus nonaffiliate requests for transmission
service that have been made. This
posting must detail the length of service
request (e.g., short-term or long-term)
and the type of service requested (e.g.,
firm point-to-point, non-firm point-topoint or network service). The
Commission stated that the affiliate
posting requirements do not apply to
ISOs and RTOs since they do not have
any affiliates.
136. The Commission also required
transmission providers to post their
underlying load forecast assumptions
for all ATC calculations and to post, on
a daily basis, their actual daily peak
load for the prior day and load forecasts
and actual daily peak load for both
system-wide load (including native
load) and native load. ISOs and RTOs
are required to post this load data for
the entire ISO/RTO footprint and for
each LSE or control area footprint
within the ISO/RTO.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
137. E.ON LSE requests clarification
whether the requirement in section
37.6(e)(2) of the Commission’s
regulations to post information
regarding denials of service applies to
denials of requests. Washington IOUs
57 See
Sfmt 4700
2999
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 404.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3000
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
request clarification on the requirement
to post information regarding
transmission service requests from
affiliates, stating that it is not clear what
the Commission means by ‘‘requests for
transmission service.’’ They suggest that
the reference could be to requests for
transmission service by affiliated
merchant or trading entities or requests
for transmission service by the
transmission provider’s merchant
function, including requests to
designate or undesignate network
resources and requests to procure
secondary network service to serve
native load.
138. TDU Systems request that the
Commission reconsider its decision to
exempt RTOs and ISOs from the
requirement to post data regarding their
processing of transmission service
requests. Although RTOs and ISOs have
no generation affiliates, TDU Systems
argue that requiring RTOs and ISOs to
post information as to the number of
requests made and rejected would make
the acquisition of transmission services
more transparent, serve as a signal for
potential congestion problems on the
system that should be studied through
the planning process, and alert market
participants to the emergence of market
power in local submarkets.
139. Constellation requests that the
Commission clarify that the requirement
to post underlying load forecast
assumptions includes a complete list of
modeling assumptions, protocols and
automation modifications, including
what the adjustments are and how they
are applied. Constellation states that it
requested that such information be
required in its NOPR comments, but
that it is unclear whether the
requirement in Order No. 890 is broad
enough to reflect that request.
140. E.ON LSE requests that the
Commission grant rehearing to permit
utilities to decline to publicly post
information regarding actual load and
forecasts where such information is
commercially sensitive or where
customer-specific information is
deemed confidential by the affected
customer. E.ON LSE requests that such
commercially sensitive information
instead be posted four weeks after the
time period that the data covers. E.ON
LSE contends that disclosure of
customer-specific load forecasts could
have adverse competitive effects, such
as a daily forecast signaling to sellers
that a utility is in substantial need for
additional energy during the upcoming
day’s operations. E.ON LSE contends
that the goal of transparency is
sufficiently met even with a slight delay
in posting commercially sensitive
forecasts and load data.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission Determination
141. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to post on OASIS metrics
regarding transmission service requests.
The Commission did not distinguish
between types of requests for
transmission service. Transmission
providers therefore should include in
their metrics any type of request for
service, including transmission service
requests by affiliated merchant or
trading entities as well as requests by
the transmission provider’s merchant
function to designate or undesignate
network resources or to procure
secondary network service to serve
native load. We revise our regulations to
make this clear.
142. In response to TDU Systems, we
clarify that Order No. 890 did not
exempt RTOs and ISOs from the
requirement to post metrics related to
the provision of transmission service.
While the affiliate posting requirements
do not apply to RTOs and ISOs,58 the
requirement to post metrics regarding
all transmission service requests
remains.59 We agree with TDU Systems
that requiring RTOs and ISOs to post
non-affiliate transmission service
request metrics improves the
transparency of transmission service
request processing by those
transmission providers.
143. In response to Constellation, we
clarify that underlying load forecast
assumptions should include economic
and weather-related assumptions. We
revise our regulations to clearly state the
obligation to post both actual daily peak
load and load forecast data, as required
in Order No. 890.60 We decline to adopt
E.ON LSE’s request to delay release of
load data required to be posted in Order
No. 890. Posting load forecast and actual
load data on a control area and LSE
level provides necessary transparency to
transmission customers and does not, in
our view, raise serious competitive
implications.61 If there is customerspecific information deemed
confidential by the affected customer
that impedes the ability of the
transmission provider to post this data,
we will consider requests for exemption
from the posting requirement on a caseby-case base.
58 See
Order No. 890 at P 414.
18 CFR 37.6(i)(1) and (2).
60 See Order No. 890 at P 416.
61 See id. at P 417.
59 See
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(5) Requests for Additional
Transparency
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
144. Constellation repeats a request
from its NOPR comments to require
transmission providers to post certain
additional modeling data, modeling
support information, and model
benchmarking and forecasting data/TSR
study audit data (identified in an
attachment to its request for rehearing).
Constellation argues that, since Order
No. 890 requires transmission providers
to calculate much of this additional
information, the Commission should
require that it be posted as well.
Constellation contends that these
postings would allow transmission
customers and the Commission to assess
the likely availability of transmission
capacity, verify or challenge the
conclusions reached by the transmission
provider on a specific transmission
request, and identify constraints and
congestion, as well as physical or
financial measures that could be taken
to optimize the use of transmission
system.
145. EPSA asks the Commission to
clarify that the standards developed
during the NAESB process should
require transmission providers to post
essential details of ETCs that affect
current customers’ access to
transmission capacity, including
duration and volume, priority rights,
redispatch and scheduling rights, and
any other rights that affect others’ use of
the grid. As part of these postings, EPSA
suggests that transmission providers be
required to include information
concerning transmission arrangements
that are not provided under the OATT,
e.g., pre-OATT transmission
arrangements. EPSA argues that nonOATT transmission arrangements often
include terms that are inconsistent with
OATT terms and which can impact
OATT customers’ access to the grid.
Unless transmission providers are
required to post ETC-related
information, EPSA contends that there
will be no way for market participants
to determine whether the transmission
provider has appropriately modeled
ETC set-asides.
146. Powerex makes a similar request,
reiterating a NOPR proposal that the
Commission require transmission
providers to post those provisions of
pre-Order No. 888 contracts that affect
current customers’ access to
transmission capacity, including
duration and volume, priority rights,
redispatch and scheduling rights, and
any other rights that affect transmission
access. Powerex further requests that the
Commission prohibit the continuation
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
of grandfathered contracts unless the
parties can point to a provision within
the existing contract that contains
explicit and guaranteed rights to extend
or renew the contract term and reaffirm
that pre-Order No. 888 contracts cannot
be altered upon their expiration.
Powerex complains that the
Commission did not address these
proposals in Order No. 890 and that no
commenting party put forward credible
evidence to rebut the information
Powerex presented the Commission in
its NOPR comments.
147. TDU Systems argue that
transmission providers should be
required to provide customers with
access to modeling software used to
calculate ATC values. TDU Systems
state that Commission staff expressed
concern at the Technical Conference
held on October 12, 2006, in this docket
that customers could find it difficult to
sort through and use the large volume
of data the Commission proposed to be
posted by the transmission provider.
TDU Systems argue that providing
access to the modeling software used by
the transmission provider to calculate
ATC would resolve many of these
concerns and better enable transmission
customers to replicate and verify
transmission provider ATC calculations,
avoiding the potential for protracted
litigation over the ATC results. TDU
Systems contend that any proprietary or
licensing concerns of the transmission
provider or its vendors could be
addressed through reasonable charges
for use of the software and/or
appropriate confidentiality agreements.
Commission Determination
148. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to make available, upon
request, all data used to calculate ATC,
TTC, CBM and TRM for any constrained
posted path.62 We believe that this
adequately addresses Constellation’s
request for access to modeling data used
by the transmission provider.
Specifically, we expect transmission
providers to make available, upon
request and subject to appropriate
confidentiality protections and CEII
requirements, the following modeling
data: (1) Load flow base cases and
generation dispatch methodology; (2)
contingency, subsystem, monitoring,
change files and accompanying
auxiliary files; (3) transient and
dynamic stability simulation data and
reports on flowgates which are not
thermally limited; (4) list of transactions
used to update the base case for
transmission service request study; (5)
special protection systems and
operating guides, and specific
description as to how they are modeled;
(6) model configuration settings; (7)
dates and capacities of new and retiring
generation; (8) new and retired
generation included in the model for
future years; (9) production cost models
(including assumptions, settings, study
results, input data, etc.), subject to
reasonable and applicable generator
confidentiality limitations; (10)
searchable transmission maps,
including PowerWorld or PSSE
diagrams; (11) OASIS names to
Common Names table and PTI bus
numbers; and, (12) flowgate and
interface limits including limit category
(thermal, steady state or transient,
voltage or angular). We decline,
however, to require the transmission
provider to post this information on
OASIS, as Constellation suggests. We
conclude that making this information
available on request provides sufficient
transparency for customers without
unduly burdening the transmission
provider.
149. With regard to the modeling
support information sought by
Constellation, we believe much of this
information should already be stated in
each transmission provider’s
Attachment C. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required each transmission
provider to set forth in the Attachment
C to its OATT the ATC calculation
methodology used by the transmission
provider.63 To the extent necessary, we
clarify that the step-by-step modeling
study methodology and criteria for
adding or eliminating flowgates
(permanent and temporary) is part of the
ATC methodology that must be stated in
the transmission provider’s Attachment
C. We direct any transmission provider
that has failed to include this
information in its Attachment C to
include that information as part of the
compliance filing directed in section
II.C. If the transmission provider has
already satisfied this obligation in a
previous compliance filing, it should
refer to that filing instead.
150. We deny as premature
Constellation’s request to require OASIS
postings of additional model
benchmarking and forecasting data/TSR
study audit data. Such information
would be utilized in the process of
updating and benchmarking models to
actual events, which is the subject of
ongoing efforts to modify relevant
reliability standards from the MOD and
facilities design, connections and
maintenance (FAC) groups.
151. We decline to impose additional
posting requirements regarding ETC
uses, as requested by EPSA and
Powerex. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to make available all data
used to calculate ATC for constrained
paths and any system planning studies
or specific network impact studies
performed for customers.64 This would
include information regarding ETC uses,
including grandfathered agreements,
that affect ATC calculations or study
results. EPSA and Powerex fail to
demonstrate that it is necessary to
require the posting of additional
information regarding ETC uses to verify
the accuracy of the transmission
provider’s ATC calculations. We note in
response to Powerex that, if any new
service taken upon expiration of a preOrder No. 888 contract, the terms and
conditions of the transmission
provider’s OATT would apply.65
152. We deny TDU Systems’ request
to require transmission providers to
grant customers access to proprietary
modeling software used to calculate
ATC values. The Commission believes
at this time that the requirements of
Order No. 890 are sufficient to achieve
the Commission’s transparency goals
without further requiring the disclosure
of proprietary software.
B. Coordinated, Open, and Transparent
Planning
1. The Need for Reform
153. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to participate in a
coordinated, open, and transparent
planning process on both a local and
regional level. Transmission providers,
including RTOs and ISOs, were directed
to submit a compliance filing describing
their proposals for a coordinated and
regional planning process that comply
with the planning principles and other
requirements of Order No. 890. The
transmission planning process must be
documented as an attachment to the
transmission provider’s OATT.
154. The Commission determined that
planning-related reforms were necessary
in order to limit opportunities for undue
discrimination and to ensure that
comparable transmission service is
provided by all public utility
transmission providers. The
Commission stated that it did not intend
to reopen prior approvals regarding
planning processes adopted by RTOs
and ISOs and, instead, sought to ensure
that such planning processes are
64 See
62 See
id. at P 348.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
63 See
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
id. at P 323.
Frm 00019
Fmt 4701
65 See
Sfmt 4700
3001
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 348.
Order No. 888 at 31,655.
16JAR2
3002
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
consistent with or superior to the
requirements of Order No. 890. In order
for an RTO’s or ISO’s planning process
to be open and transparent,
transmission customers and
stakeholders must be able to participate
in each underlying transmission
owner’s planning process. The
Commission therefore directed RTOs
and ISOs to indicate in their compliance
filings how participating transmission
owners within their footprint will
comply with the planning requirements
of Order No. 890.
155. The Commission also noted that
the planning obligations imposed in
Order No. 890 did not address or dictate
which investments identified in a
transmission plan should be undertaken
by transmission providers. Through the
principles adopted by the Commission,
a process was established through
which transmission providers will
coordinate with customers, neighboring
transmission providers, affected state
commissions, and other stakeholders in
order to ensure that transmission plans
are not developed in an unduly
discriminatory manner.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
156. E.ON U.S challenges the
Commission’s authority to adopt
transmission planning rules beyond the
implementation of service reservations
or requests by customers. E.ON U.S.
argues that the Commission’s reliance
on new section 217(b)(4) of the FPA is
misplaced because that provision does
not enlarge the Commission’s authority
and, in any event, Order No. 890 goes
beyond assuring that LSEs have
adequate transmission service. E.ON
U.S. contends that characterizing
transmission planning as a practice
affecting rates would require an
expansion of the Commission’s
jurisdiction over the underlying rate,
which it argues does not exist.
157. Southern states that it supports
the bulk of the coordinated planning
provisions of Order No. 890, but
nonetheless argues that reform is not
needed to ensure that transmission
planning is performed on a nondiscriminatory basis. Southern states
that it has invested billions of dollars in
transmission over the last decade and
expects to continue the trend of
considerable investment through the
foreseeable future. Southern also
contends that it and other verticallyintegrated utilities have obligations to
procure generation through
nondiscriminatory requests for
proposals and that contracts awarded to
any non-affiliated generator are already
incorporated into the planning process
as designated resources. Southern
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
therefore contends that it does not have
a disincentive to impede the ability of
lower cost generation to access its
control area. Southern suggests that any
failure to upgrade interfaces is due to
the lack of long-term firm service
commitments to justify the upgrade, not
a desire to keep lower-cost power from
accessing the transmission provider’s
control area.
158. NYISO challenges the
Commission’s reform of previouslyapproved RTO and ISO planning
processes, arguing that the Commission
cannot require changes to the NYISO
planning process without first making a
finding that it is no longer just and
reasonable. NYISO contends that no
such finding was made in Order No.
890, nor did the Commission identify
discrimination in areas with centralized
markets, such as NYISO.
159. NRECA, Old Dominion, and TDU
Systems ask the Commission to clarify
that those RTOs and ISOs and other
public utility transmission providers
able to demonstrate that their planning
processes are consistent with or
superior to the requirements of Order
No. 890 must nevertheless still file their
planning process as part of their OATTs.
These petitioners contend that requiring
an RTO or an ISO to include the details
of its planning process in its OATT,
rather than its operating agreements,
business manuals or Web site postings,
will enable the Commission to monitor
compliance with the reformed planning
principles of Order No. 890 and provide
needed transparency for customers.
Entergy requests clarification that a
transmission provider that has
transferred authority over planning
activities to an independent
transmission coordinator may make the
same compliance filings as an RTO/ISO,
demonstrating that its existing planning
process is consistent with or superior to
the Order No. 890 requirements.
160. Old Dominion asks the
Commission to clarify that the list of
requirements in paragraph 602 of Order
No. 890 (regarding the level of detail to
be included in the OATT) is not
exclusive and that, instead, every
transmission provider must include the
entirety of its planning process in its
Attachment K with sufficient detail for
stakeholders to understand that process.
TDU Systems seek further clarification
that transmission providers that have
not turned over operational control of
their facilities to an RTO or ISO must
comply with the Attachment K filing
obligations even if their facilities are
governed by non-OATT arrangements,
such as facilities agreements.
161. Several petitioners ask the
Commission to clarify whether
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
individual transmission-owning
members within an RTO/ISO must
comply with the planning-related
posting and filing requirements of Order
No. 890.66 New York Transmission
Owners argue that, where there is an
existing compliant regional planning
process conducted by an RTO or ISO,
participation in the planning process by
a transmission owner is sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Order No.
890. Old Dominion and TDU Systems,
however, seek confirmation that each of
the nine planning principles adopted by
the Commission apply equally to
transmission owners that are members
of an RTO, otherwise the RTO’s
planning process will be insufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Order No.
890. TDU Systems argue that RTO and
ISO tariff filings must provide detail on
how the RTO will ensure transmission
owner compliance with planning
requirements and that reliance on
statements of commitment to comply
would be insufficient. Old Dominion
contends that all filing and posting
obligations should rest with the RTO or
ISO and not their transmission-owning
members. EEI suggests that the
processes for incorporating the planning
processes of transmission owning
members of RTOs and ISOs should be
addressed by each RTO and ISO.
162. National Grid objects to any
obligation to allow stakeholders an
opportunity to preview the internal
planning deliberations of transmissionowning RTO/ISO members prior to
presentation of plans to the RTO or ISO.
National Grid argues that this would
give special interest stakeholders two
opportunities to oppose specific
projects, once at the local level without
the full participation of the region and
again at the regional level, and
undermine the ability of the regional
process to resolve conflicts between
competing proposals. National Grid
contends that it would be unfair to
require transmission owners to open up
their internal deliberations in advance
of the regional planning process while
allowing other stakeholders to
deliberate in private their own strategies
for the regional planning process.
National Grid asks the Commission to
clarify that the regional planning
process is the appropriate forum in
which stakeholders can examine each
other’s upgrade proposals. National Grid
argues that the adoption of separate
local planning processes is not
necessary to remedy undue
discrimination and is unnecessary given
66 See, e.g., EEI, National Grid, New York
Transmission Owners, Old Dominion, and TDU
Systems.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
that stakeholders in the ISO–NE
regional planning process have an
opportunity to comment on all aspects
of the transmission plan, even those
developed by the underlying
transmission owners.
163. Several petitioners challenge the
Commission’s decision in Order No. 890
not to mandate the construction of
facilities identified in a transmission
plan. TAPS argues that the
Commission’s finding that
discrimination exists in expansion
decisions compels obligating
transmission providers to build needed
facilities to accommodate uses
identified in the planning process or
explain why they cannot do so. TAPS
contends that, under Order No. 890, a
transmission provider can choose to
build only the planned upgrades that
benefit its native load, leaving a weak
and uneven grid that prevents
embedded TDUs from accessing
economic alternatives.
164. TAPS asks that the following
measures be adopted to protect the
interest of customers potentially harmed
by failing to obligate the transmission
provider to construct facilities identified
in the transmission plan. First, TAPS
suggests that transmission providers be
required to accept any request for
transmission to a network customer
load, if necessary by redispatch shared
on a load-ratio basis, if the request
would have been accepted if the
transmission provider’s own load had
been designated the sink. Second, TAPS
asks the Commission to require
transmission providers to accept a
network customer’s timely designated
network resource so long as the
designation is consistent with the
regional transmission plan and the longterm projections and planning
information provided by the customer
pursuant to OATT § 31.6 and in the
planning process, supporting the
network resource designation through
redispatch if necessary, with costs
shared on a load-ratio basis. Third,
TAPS suggests that transmission
providers be required to offer embedded
cost sales to transmission-dependent
utilities if the provider’s failure to plan
and construct on a comparable basis has
left those embedded utilities trapped
without reasonable access to
competitive alternatives. Finally, TAPS
asks the Commission to make clear that
its ‘‘toolbox’’ to address egregious
failures to plan and construct a robust
grid that meets the needs of network
customers includes the exercise of
jurisdiction over the transmission
component of bundled retail sales of a
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
particular utility to remedy undue
discrimination.67
165. TAPS argues that these measures
would provide transmission providers
with the right financial incentives to
construct facilities identified in the
transmission plan. If the transmission
provider fails to build and there is
insufficient capacity to accommodate
planned uses, TAPS argues it is
appropriate for the transmission
provider to share the cost of providing
alternative service. TAPS argues that
this would also mitigate the
Commission’s concern that imposing an
obligation to build would conflict with
the need for transmission plans to
change over time.
166. TAPS also suggests that the
Commission monitor the transmission
provider’s actions by requiring any
denial of service to a network customer
be reported to the Commission so that
the transmission provider can
demonstrate to enforcement staff that
the transmission provider has
adequately planned for its customers
and made diligent efforts to build
planned upgrades. TAPS also argues
that transmission providers should be
required to demonstrate that they are
making good faith efforts to obtain any
necessary state and local siting
approvals and to acquire any property
rights necessary to construct planned
facilities in order to show that they are
not selecting projects for construction
that favor their own uses over the uses
of their network customers.
167. TDU Systems agree that better
planning will not remedy or mitigate
undue discrimination without an
enforceable obligation to actually
construct upgrades needed to ensure
reliable and economic service to LSEs.
TDU Systems argue that an obligation to
build would be consistent with other
reforms adopted in Order No. 890, such
as extending the minimum term of
contracts eligible for rollover rights and
eliminating the price cap on
reassignments of capacity, by ensuring
that adequate capacity exists to
accommodate transmission service
requests. They contend that the failure
to mandate expansion of the grid is
particularly egregious in situations
when zero ATC values are posted on a
recurring or lengthy basis, which they
argue should trigger a rebuttable
presumption that congestion exists on
the transmission system and that
upgrades are needed. TDU Systems
contend that failing to require
transmission providers to expand their
systems in these and other situations is
inconsistent with the requirement of
67 Citing
PO 00000
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
Frm 00021
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3003
section 217(b)(4) of the FPA for the
Commission to exercise its authority to
facilitate the planning and expansion of
transmission facilities to meet the
reasonable needs of LSEs.
168. TDU Systems suggest that the
Commission strengthen and aggressively
enforce the existing construction
obligations in the pro forma OATT and
subject transmission providers that fail
to implement a transmission plan in
good faith to sanctions. TDU Systems
argue that section 28.2 of the pro forma
OATT should be amended to require a
transmission provider to do more than
endeavor to construct new facilities
needed to meet network customer load
or, in the alternative, the Commission
should indicate that it will aggressively
enforce the existing obligation to build.
They request that the Commission adopt
a clear policy of sanctions for cases in
which a transmission provider is found
to have failed to proceed in good faith
and with due diligence in implementing
the planning process. TDU Systems ask
the Commission to clarify in particular
that it will consider revocation of
market-based rate authority for bad faith
in implementing the transmission
planning and expansion requirements
under Order No. 890.
169. NRECA also urges the
Commission to reiterate and enforce the
existing obligations to build in order to
meet its service obligations to network
and long-term point-to-point customers
under the pro forma OATT.68 NRECA
argues that the obligation to expand
capacity should be viewed as part and
parcel of the transmission provider’s
obligation to plan for these customers
and that statements to the contrary in
Order No. 890 should be clarified.
NRECA argues that leaving the
transmission provider with the
discretion not to build facilities
identified in the transmission plan
would allow it to discriminate in favor
of its native load customers to the
detriment of network and long-term
point-to-point customers.
170. Washington IOUs request
clarification that the planning
requirements of Order No. 890 do not
supersede the planning and
coordination activities undertaken by a
transmission provider under its network
operating agreements. Washington IOUs
state that transmission providers
providing network service currently
engage in local planning and
coordination activities with network
customers to ensure their needs are met
and that such activities should not be
68 Citing pro forma OATT sections 13.5, 15.4 and
28.2.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3004
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
superseded by the planning-related
reforms of Order No. 890.
Commission Determination
171. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to amend the
pro forma OATT to require coordinated,
open and transparent transmission
planning on both a local and regional
level. Although the Commission
encouraged utilities to engage in joint
planning in Order No. 888–A, it placed
no affirmative obligation on
transmission providers to coordinate
with their customers in transmission
planning or otherwise publish the
criteria, assumptions, or data underlying
their transmission plans, nor were
transmission providers required to
coordinate planning activities with
other transmission providers in their
region. This lack of clear criteria
regarding planning obligations has
created opportunities for undue
discrimination by transmission
monopolists with an incentive to deny
transmission or offer transmission on an
inferior basis.
172. Petitioners generally do not
challenge the Commission’s conclusion
that the lack of coordination, openness,
and transparency results in
opportunities for undue discrimination
in transmission planning and, instead,
raise more narrow arguments regarding
particular aspects of the planning
reforms. E.ON U.S. argues that the
Commission must limit the scope of the
planning requirements to
implementation of service requests. We
disagree. The Commission has a
statutory obligation under sections 205
and 206 of the FPA to ensure that each
public utility’s rates, charges,
classifications, and services are just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. The Commission has
exercised jurisdiction over planningrelated proposals submitted by
individual transmission providers in the
past, rejecting arguments regarding a
lack of jurisdiction.69 Transmission
planning activities are within our
jurisdiction and, therefore, we have a
duty under FPA section 206 to remedy
undue discrimination in this area and a
further obligation under FPA section
217 to act in a way that facilitates the
planning and expansion of facilities to
meet the reasonable needs of LSEs.
173. The fact that transmission
providers, such as Southern, have
undertaken some transmission
investment in recent years does not
mean that planning reform is not
69 See New York Independent System Operator,
Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,372 at P 18 (2004); Southwest
Power Pool, Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,010 at P 78 (2004).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
needed. Southern does not challenge the
fundamental conclusion that it is in the
economic self-interest of transmission
monopolists to discriminate in the
provision of service and, in turn, in
planning-related activities. The ability
of generators to participate in requests
for proposals for generation service does
not adequately respond to the need for
a coordinated, open, and transparent
transmission planning process that
considers the needs of all customers as
well as the transmission provider itself.
The planning process adopted in Order
No. 890 is designed to enhance the
ability of all customers to make longterm firm service commitments by
allowing them to participate in the
transmission provider’s planning
activities.
174. The Commission also based its
planning-related reforms on the need to
ensure comparable transmission service
by all transmission providers, including
RTOs and ISOs. We therefore disagree
with NYISO that the Commission failed
to justify application of the Attachment
K filing obligations to RTOs and ISOs.
The Commission was not required to
find each and every tariff unjust and
unreasonable to adopt this rulemaking,
and, instead, had the discretion to adopt
principles of generic applicability to
govern all transmission tariffs. Indeed,
we made clear, and reiterate here, that
RTOs and ISOs can continue to rely on
their existing planning processes if
those processes meet the requirements
of Order No. 890. As the Commission
explained, it is not our intention to
reopen prior approvals simply for the
sake of doing so, but rather to ensure
that those previously approved planning
processes fulfill the obligations imposed
on all transmission providers in Order
No. 890.70
175. We therefore affirm the decision
to require all transmission providers to
comply with the planning-related
reforms adopted in Order No. 890,
including RTOs and ISOs. We agree
with Old Dominion that the filing and
posting requirements stated in Order
No. 890 apply only to the transmission
provider, e.g., the RTO or ISO, and not
the transmission-owning RTO/ISO
members without an OATT.71 Each RTO
and ISO may fulfill its obligations under
70 See
Order No. 890 at P 437.
the Commission noted in Order No. 890,
transmission owning members of an RTO or ISO
that continue to have OATTs on file under which
they provide service over jurisdictional facilities
not under control of the RTO or ISO would
continue to have filing obligations under Order No.
890, like any other transmission provider. See id.
at P 440, n.247. This would apply equally to a
transmission provider that has retained operational
control of facilities governed by other non-OATT
arrangements.
71 As
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Order No. 890 by delegating certain
actions to, or otherwise relying on, their
transmission-owning members,
provided that the rights and
responsibilities of all parties are clearly
stated in the transmission provider’s
OATT. In the end, however, it is each
RTO’s and ISO’s responsibility to
demonstrate compliance with each of
the nine planning principles adopted in
Order No. 890 since it is the entity with
the Attachment K on file.
176. We clarify in response to
National Grid that an RTO or ISO would
not be able to satisfy the requirements
of Order No. 890 if the plans developed
by its transmission-owning members
and relied upon by the RTO/ISO did not
also satisfy those requirements. A
fundamental assumption underlying
National Grid’s argument is that issues
addressed in a local planning proposal
should be final prior to its introduction
at the regional level. Yet such finality
could exclude customers from the
development of aspects of what
eventually becomes the regional plan
implemented by the RTO or ISO. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, local planning issues may be
critically important to some
transmission customers, such as those
embedded within the service areas of
individual transmission owners.72
While we leave the mechanics of
incorporating the planning processes of
transmission owning members to each
RTO and ISO, as EEI suggests, it would
not be appropriate to entirely exclude
such processes as proposed by National
Grid.
177. To the extent necessary, we
clarify in response to NRECA, Old
Dominion and TDU Systems that every
transmission provider, including RTOs
and ISOs, must submit a compliance
filing stating its transmission planning
process in an attachment to its OATT.
This tariff language must satisfy all of
the requirements of Order No. 890 with
sufficient detail for stakeholders to
understand the planning process
implemented by the transmission
provider. To the extent the transmission
provider previously received
Commission approval to delegate
planning responsibilities to an
independent transmission coordinator,
the transmission provider may
demonstrate in its compliance filing that
its planning process is consistent with
or superior to the Order No. 890
planning requirements, similar to the
RTO and ISO compliance filings.
178. The Commission declines to
expand the pro forma OATT to place
additional obligations on the
72 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 440.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission provider to construct
facilities identified in its transmission
plan. As the Commission explained in
Order No. 890, there may be reasons a
transmission provider declines to
undertake a particular project given the
complexity of the transmission grid and
changing conditions of supply and
demand.73 Our focus is therefore on the
process leading to the transmission plan
and not the construction of specific
facilities. This does not, as some
petitioners argue, undermine the
construction-related obligations that
exist under sections 13.5, 15.4 and 28.2
of the pro forma OATT. The planningrelated reforms adopted in Order No.
890 are intended to support, not replace,
those requirements by establishing a
process to govern all planning-related
decisions.
179. We therefore believe adequate
protections are in place to ensure that
transmission providers do not unduly
discriminate in the selection of which
facilities they choose to construct to the
detriment of their customers. If a
particular customer believes that its
transmission provider has in fact not
complied with its OATT obligations, the
customer should bring the matter to the
Commission’s attention, such as by
filing a complaint. Indeed, the planningrelated reforms adopted in Order No.
890 will facilitate tariff compliance by
opening up the transmission provider’s
decisional process, providing much
needed transparency in the area of
transmission planning.
180. We deny as unnecessary TAPS’
request to impose additional
accountability mechanisms or require
other demonstrations regarding a
transmission provider’s construction
decisions or to generically address the
appropriateness of sanctions, including
revocation of market-based rate
authority, for non-compliance with tariff
obligations. We will likewise deny
requests to revise the constructionrelated obligations of the pro forma
OATT. The Commission will remain
actively involved in the review and
implementation of the transmission
planning processes required in Order
No. 890, during and beyond the initial
compliance phase, to ensure that the
potential for undue discrimination in
planning activities is adequately
addressed. Further, we expect
transmission customers to advise the
Commission if transmission providers
do not adhere to the terms of the tariff
provisions we ultimately approve. In the
absence of specific evidence that a
transmission provider has failed to
satisfy its tariff obligations, either under
73 See
id. at P 594.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
sections 13.5, 15.4 or 28.2 of the pro
forma OATT or its Attachment K
planning process, we believe it
unnecessary to adopt the additional
measures proposed by TAPS. In the case
of tariff non-compliance, the
Commission will consider these and any
other remedies that may be appropriate
on a case-by-case basis in the context of
the specific facts presented.
2. Planning Principles
181. The Commission identified nine
planning principles in Order No. 890
that must be satisfied for a transmission
provider’s planning process to be
considered compliant with that order.
These nine planning principles are:
(1) Coordination—the process for
consulting with transmission customers
and neighboring transmission providers;
(2) Openness—planning meetings
must be open to all affected parties;
(3) Transparency—access must be
provided to the methodology, criteria,
and processes used to develop
transmission plans;
(4) Information Exchange—the
obligations of and methods for
customers to submit data to
transmission providers must be
described;
(5) Comparability—transmission
plans must meet the specific service
requests of transmission customers and
otherwise treat similarly-situated
customers (e.g., network and retail
native load) comparably in transmission
system planning;
(6) Dispute Resolution—an alternative
dispute resolution process to address
both procedural and substantive
planning issues must be included;
(7) Regional Participation—there must
be a process for coordinating with
interconnected systems;
(8) Economic Planning Studies—
study procedures must be provided for
economic upgrades to address
congestion or the integration of new
resources, both locally and regionally;
and
(9) Cost Allocation—a process must
be included for allocating costs of new
facilities that do not fit under existing
rate structures, such as regional projects.
Petitioners have requested rehearing
and clarification regarding certain of
these principles, which we address in
turn.
a. Coordination
182. In order to satisfy the
coordination principle, transmission
providers must provide stakeholders the
opportunity to participate fully in the
planning process. The purpose of the
coordination requirement is to eliminate
the potential for undue discrimination
PO 00000
Frm 00023
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3005
in planning by opening appropriate
lines of communication between
transmission providers, their
transmission-providing neighbors,
affected state authorities, customers,
and other stakeholders. The planning
process must provide for the timely and
meaningful input and participation of
customers regarding the development of
transmission plans, allowing customers
to participate in the early stages of
development.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
183. EPSA and TDU Systems argue
that, under Order No. 890, transmission
providers inappropriately retain veto
rights over the decision as to which
upgrade projects to include in
transmission plans. These petitioners
acknowledge that the transmission
provider has the ultimate obligation to
comply with its tariff, but argue that
those tariff obligations be fulfilled in a
way that allows for full and equal
participation of customers. EPSA argues
that transmission providers should be
obligated to consider consensus
positions, to present to the Commission
or its designee minority opinions that
have been excluded, and to explain why
consensus proposals that have been
disregarded will not be converted into
actual plans to expand or reduce
constraints on the system. TDU Systems
request that transmission providers be
required to post on their Web sites a
record of the transmission planning
decisions that reflect the views and
votes of all participants to that process.
TDU Systems argue that this would
enable the Commission to determine
whether the plan reflects consensus
among stakeholders and the needs of
customers, as opposed to the unilateral
determinations of the transmission
providers. NRECA asks the Commission
to clarify that LSEs in particular have
the opportunity to be an integral and
equal part of the regional planning
process from the beginning of the
process to its end, including
implementation of the regional
participation principle.
184. NRECA argues that comparability
requires that LSEs have equal weight in
decision-making. Otherwise, NRECA
contends that transmission providers
will continue to have the opportunity
and right to discriminate. NRECA
expresses concern that transmission
providers will be able to develop the
basic criteria, assumptions, and data
that underlie transmission plans on
their own and merely present the results
to customers after the fact. NRECA asks
the Commission to clarify that public
utility transmission providers may not
arbitrarily, deliberately, or
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3006
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
discriminatorily disregard the input of
LSE customers at any stage in the
development and drafting of the
transmission plan and modify the pro
forma Attachment K to reflect that LSEs
will be an integral part of the planning
process.
185. With regard to small LSE
customers, NRECA asks the Commission
to clarify that the new requirement that
transmission providers develop and
implement joint planning processes
does not leave customers that lack the
resources to fully participate in the
planning process in a worse position
than they were in under Order No. 888.
NRECA states that, under Order No.
888, transmission providers were
required to plan and expand their
systems to meet the needs of all network
customers and long-term point-to-point
customers. NRECA contends that the
new joint planning requirement could
be read to allow transmission providers
to refuse to consider these customers’
needs if they are unable to participate
fully in the transmission planning
process. NRECA suggests that
participation in the planning process be
an opportunity for load-serving
customers, not an obligation, and that
transmission providers be required to
plan for those that are unable to fully
participate.
186. Constellation requests that the
Commission clarify that it will closely
monitor the planning process to ensure
that reforms are implemented in a
meaningful way and that customers
have the ability to truly participate in
the process. Williams requests that the
planning-related requirements of Order
No. 890 be augmented to require a
written record of stakeholder input, in
order to guarantee informed
consideration and debate of nontransmission provider proposals.
187. EEI seeks clarification that
transmission providers may adopt
restrictions on the disclosure of CEII in
the context of transmission planning.
EEI argues that login requirements and
nondisclosure agreements may not
provide sufficient protection for CEII.
EEI suggests that transmission providers
be allowed to adopt the Critical
Infrastructure Protection (CIP) reliability
standards for the disclosure of CEII that
the Commission adopts in Docket No.
RM06–22–000, Mandatory Reliability
Standards for Critical Infrastructure
Protection.
Commission Determination
188. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 not to require
the development of transmission plans
on a co-equal basis with customers.
Transmission planning is the tariff
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
obligation of the transmission provider,
and the pro forma OATT planning
process adopted in Order No. 890 is the
means to see that it is carried out in a
coordinated, open, and transparent
manner. It would not be appropriate to
allow customers and others that do not
bear the responsibility for tariff
compliance to have co-equal control
over the planning process. We reiterate,
however, that the planning process must
provide for the timely and meaningful
input and participation of all interested
customers and other stakeholders in the
development of transmission plans.
Customers and other stakeholders
therefore must have the opportunity to
participate at the early stages of the
development of the transmission plan,
rather than merely given an opportunity
to comment on transmission plans that
were developed in the first instance
without their input.
189. We disagree that the additional
processes proposed by EPSA, TDU
Systems, and Williams are necessary at
this time to ensure that transmission
providers do not unduly discriminate in
the performance of their planning
responsibilities. Customers and other
stakeholders have been given a
meaningful opportunity to participate in
the planning process and to voice their
concerns, not a formal ‘‘vote’’ on the
transmission plan. While we would not
consider it reasonable for the
transmission provider to act in an
arbitrary fashion by simply ignoring the
comments and concerns of interested
parties, we do not believe it appropriate
at this time to adopt additional
procedural mechanisms to measure or
track the views of those participants in
the planning process. Should disputes
arise, they should first be addressed
through the dispute resolution process
set forth in the transmission provider’s
Attachment K and then, if necessary, to
the Commission’s attention through a
complaint or other appropriate
procedural mechanism.
190. With regard to participation by
small LSEs in planning activities, we
reiterate that the planning process
adopted in Order No. 890 is intended to
supplement, not replace, the
transmission provider’s obligations
under section 28.2 of the pro forma
OATT to plan for the transmission
needs of its network customers on a
comparable basis and in accordance
with Good Utility Practice, as well as
the obligation to construct new facilities
pursuant to sections 13.5 and 15.4 of the
pro forma OATT to meet the service
requests of its long-term point-to-point
customers. Transmission providers are
therefore required to craft a planning
process that allows for a reasonable and
PO 00000
Frm 00024
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
meaningful opportunity for those that
are interested and able to meet and
otherwise interact with the transmission
provider.74 Notwithstanding a smaller
LSE’s inability to participate in the
additional processes implemented in
compliance with Order No. 890, the
transmission provider still must fulfill
its network service obligation to that
customer.
191. In response to EEI, we clarify
that, in addition to login requirements
and nondisclosure agreements,
transmission providers may adopt
further restrictions on the distribution of
CEII consistent with any CIP reliability
standards that the Commission may
adopt in Docket No. RM06–22–000.
b. Openness
192. In order to satisfy the openness
principle, transmission planning
meetings must be open to all affected
parties including, but not limited to, all
transmission and interconnection
customers, state commissions and other
stakeholders. The Commission
recognized in Order No. 890 that it may
be appropriate in certain circumstances,
such as a particular meeting of a
subregional group, to limit participation
to a relevant subset of these entities. The
Commission emphasized, however, that
the overall development of the plan
must remain open.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
193. TDU Systems argue that any
condition under which a transmission
planning meeting could be limited so as
to exclude certain customers or
stakeholders must be explicitly set forth
in the transmission provider’s
Attachment K. Otherwise, TDU Systems
contend the transmission provider will
retain undue discretion over who is
allowed to participate in meetings.
Commission Determination
194. The Commission agrees with
TDU Systems that the circumstances
under which participation in a planning
meeting is limited should be clearly
described in the transmission provider’s
Attachment K planning process. All
affected parties must be able to
understand how, and when, they are
able to participate in planning activities.
c. Transparency
195. In order to satisfy the
transparency principle, transmission
providers must disclose to all customers
and other stakeholders the basic criteria,
assumptions, and data that underlie
their transmission system plans. The
Commission concluded that this
74 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 453.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
information should enable customers,
other stakeholders, or an independent
third party to replicate the results of
planning studies and thereby reduce the
incidence of after-the-fact disputes
regarding whether planning has been
conducted in an unduly discriminatory
fashion. Among other things, the
Commission required transmission
providers to make available information
regarding the status of upgrades
identified in their transmission plans in
addition to the underlying plans and
related studies.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
196. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to clarify that transmission
providers, and transmission-owning
members of an RTO or ISO, must
provide customers and other
stakeholders with base case and change
case data. TDU Systems contend that
this would be consistent with the
Commission’s goal of allowing
stakeholders to replicate the results of
planning studies and, in their view,
would virtually eliminate disputes
regarding whether planning has been
conducted in an unduly discriminatory
fashion.
197. TAPS questions whether the
Standards of Conduct would trigger the
full functional separation requirement
for a non-public utility transmission
provider participating in the planning
process. TAPS contends that both
transmission and generation functions
of a non-public utility transmission
provider could participate in planning
activities, consistent with the Standards
of Conduct, so long as all information
used in transmission planning is made
available to all participants. If the
Commission disagrees, TAPS asks that
new mechanisms be adopted to assure
information is not abused, independent
from the Standards of Conduct and
existing Standards of Conduct waivers
that do not inhibit the participation of
non-public utility transmission
providers in the planning process. TAPS
suggests that any entity be allowed to
participate in the regional planning
process if it establishes procedures
defining which employees/consultants
may receive confidential transmission
and planning information and
prohibiting such employees/consultants
from sharing that information with the
entity’s wholesale merchant personnel.
198. Old Dominion requests that the
Commission adopt performance metrics
governing transmission planning in
addition to reports regarding the status
of upgrades. Old Dominion suggests that
the Commission specifically require
transmission providers to report on the
progress and construction of all
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
upgrades and facilities in the
transmission plan.
Commission Determination
199. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to disclose to all customers
and other stakeholders the basic criteria,
assumptions, and data that underlie
their transmission system plans.75 To
the extent necessary, we clarify in
response to TDU Systems that this
includes disclosure of transmission base
case and change case data used by the
transmission provider. These are basic
assumptions necessary to adequately
understand the results reached in a
transmission plan.
200. With regard to management of
non-public information by non-public
utility transmission providers, we
reiterate that the reciprocity obligation
requires non-public utility transmission
providers to abide by the Standards of
Conduct or obtain waiver of them.76
Although we recognize that compliance
with the Standards of Conduct can
impose costs on small entities, an open
planning process cannot be fully
successful if certain entities (whether
jurisdictional or nonjurisdictional) can
use planning-related information to
obtain an undue advantage. The
Commission therefore explained in
Order No. 890 that it may be necessary
to revisit waivers of the Standards of
Conduct granted to certain non-public
utility transmission providers in the
past.77 The Commission declined to
alter such waivers on a generic basis in
Order No. 890 and we affirm that
decision here.
201. As TAPS notes, many of the
concerns regarding management of nonpublic information shared in the
planning process can be alleviated by
simultaneous disclosure of that
information to all participants.
Moreover, the Standards of Conduct
govern the relationship and exchange of
information between transmission
providers and their marketing or energy
affiliates. Entities that do not own,
operate or control transmission
facilities, and who are not affiliated
with transmission providers, are not
subject to the Standards of Conduct. We
believe establishment of new
mechanisms to manage the sharing of
non-public planning information by
transmission providers subject to the
Standards of Conduct would be
premature and more appropriately
addressed in any proceeding in which
75 See
id. at P 471.
Order No. 888–A at 30,286.
77 See Order No. 890 at P 474.
the revocation of a Standards of
Conduct waiver is considered.
202. We also decline to adopt
additional performance metrics
governing transmission planning. The
Commission required in Order No. 890
for transmission providers to make
available information regarding the
status of upgrades identified in their
transmission plans.78 Customers and
other stakeholders that are interested in
the implementation of the transmission
plan will be able to monitor this
information to gather information
regarding the progress and construction
of upgrades and facilities. The
Commission does not believe further
reporting requirements are necessary at
this time to keep interested parties
informed regarding the status of
upgrades identified in a transmission
plan.
d. Information Exchange
203. In order to satisfy the
information exchange principle,
transmission providers must develop
guidelines and a schedule for the
submittal of information in consultation
with their network and point-to-point
customers. The Commission stressed
that information collected by
transmission providers to provide
transmission service to their native load
customers must be transparent and
equivalent information must be
provided by transmission customers to
ensure effective planning and
comparability. Point-to-point customers
were also required to submit any
projections they have of a need for
service over the planning horizon and at
what receipt and delivery points.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
204. E.ON U.S. requests that the
Commission clarify that all entities
seeking comparable treatment for
transmission planning purposes,
including any non-public utilities, must
share their cost information with the
transmission provider, as needed for
planning purposes. E.ON U.S. contends
that it must have access to information
regarding all of its customers’ dispatch
and transmission costs in order to
implement joint planning as envisioned
by Order No. 890. E.ON U.S.
acknowledges that this information
would need to be treated as
competitively sensitive and shielded
from the transmission provider’s
merchant function employees.
205. Duke seeks clarification that
projections of a point-to-point
customer’s anticipated needs do not
have to be included in the models
76 See
PO 00000
Frm 00025
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3007
78 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 472.
16JAR2
3008
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
serving as the predicate of the
transmission plan. Duke agrees that,
while projected uses may be helpful in
understanding the scope of the potential
need for future upgrades, only
reservations impose an obligation on the
transmission provider.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
206. The Commission clarifies in
response to E.ON U.S. that, within the
context of transmission planning,
customers should only be required to
provide cost information for
transmission and generation facilities as
necessary for the transmission provider
to perform economic planning studies
requested by the customer. If
stakeholders request that a particular
congested area be studied, they must
supply relevant data within their
possession to enable the transmission
provider to calculate the level of
congestion costs that is occurring in the
near future.79 This may necessarily
involve customers providing their cost
information. As E.ON U.S. notes,
transmission providers must maintain
the confidentiality of this information,
protecting it from distribution to
employees of the merchant function and
its affiliates. Transmission providers
must clearly define in their Attachment
K the information sharing obligations
placed on customers in the context of
economic planning.
207. We clarify in response to Duke
that good faith projections of anticipated
point-to-point uses of the transmission
system are intended only to give the
transmission provider additional data to
consider in its planning activities. The
Commission did not intend to suggest in
Order No. 890 that such projections be
treated as a proxy for actual
reservations. Even though they are not
the equivalent of reserved uses of the
system, such projections could, for
example, provide planners with likely
scenarios for new investment.
e. Comparability
208. In order to satisfy the
comparability principle, transmission
providers must develop, after
considering the data and comments
supplied by customers and other
stakeholders, a transmission system
plan that (1) meets the specific service
requests of its transmission customers
and (2) otherwise treats similarlysituated customers (e.g., network and
retail native load) comparably in
transmission system planning. The
Commission also required that customer
79 See id. at P 550. The Commission also required
the transmission provider’s merchant function to
provide any information necessary for economic
planning studies (e.g., redispatch cost information).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
demand resources be considered on a
comparable basis to the service
provided by comparable generation
resources where appropriate.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
209. E.ON U.S. argues that the
comparability principle poses a
dilemma for vertically-integrated
utilities in that the utility must engage
in least cost planning at the state level,
but is required to engage in comparable
planning at the federal level. E.ON U.S.
questions whether comparability
requires the transmission provider to
include all customer-identified projects
in its plan or whether the transmission
provider must merely consult with
customers regarding their projects. E.ON
U.S. also objects to treating a non-public
utility customer comparably to its own
native load in instances when the nonpublic utility customer fails to do the
same in its own transmission planning
activities. E.ON U.S. requests that the
Commission clarify that public utilities
are not required to include non-public
utilities in transmission planning to the
extent a non-public utility has not
adopted the transmission planning
principles of the pro forma OATT.
210. REPIO argue that planning
processes must be clear to ensure that
transmission providers fairly consider
and implement the best alternatives
among transmission, generation, and
demand response options. To that end,
REPIO ask the Commission to make
explicit the requirement that all
resource options be given technology
neutral treatment.
211. Areva, however, argues that
transmission providers must be required
to do more than simply include demand
resources in the planning process,
arguing that the Commission failed to
adequately encourage the use of
alternative technologies as required by
section 1223 of EPAct 2005. Areva
contends that the Commission erred in
failing to provide new opportunities for
advanced technologies in the energy
markets, particularly demand response
resources. Areva argues it is inadequate
to merely allow participation of
comparable demand-side resources and,
instead, the Commission must take the
steps necessary to promote integration
of advanced technologies in the
planning process, including the
assessment of penalties for failure to
include such technologies in
transmission plans and, ultimately, on
the transmission grid. If the Commission
declines to do so, Areva contends that
the Commission at a minimum should
require transmission providers to report
their consideration of advanced
technologies in their planning process,
PO 00000
Frm 00026
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
highlight uses of such technologies in
their resulting transmission plan, or
report to the Commission why such
technologies were excluded from the
resulting transmission plan.
212. TDU Systems, however, ask the
Commission to confirm that demand
resources can only substitute for truly
comparable generation resources in the
planning process. TDU Systems state
that demand resources are, for example,
non-dispatchable and can be reasonably
substituted only for equivalent nondispatchable blocks of energy. TDU
Systems ask the Commission to
establish criteria for determining
whether demand resources are
comparable to generation resources for
purposes of consideration in the
transmission plan or direct transmission
providers to develop such criteria in
their Attachment K proposals.
Commission Determination
213. Comparability requires that the
interests of transmission providers and
their similarly-situated customers be
treated on a comparable basis in the
transmission planning process.80 We do
not believe that this creates a conflict
with least cost planning at the state
level. Comparability simply requires
that a transmission provider engage in
comparable planning for its similarlysituated customers. The transmission
provider retains discretion as to which
solutions to pursue. Transmission
providers are therefore not required to
include all customer-identified projects
in its plan, so long as similarly-situated
customers are given comparable
consideration.
214. With regard to non-public utility
transmission providers, we reiterate our
expectation of participation in the
planning processes established pursuant
to Order No. 890 consistent with their
reciprocity obligations.81 Reciprocity
dictates that non-public utility
transmission providers that take
advantage of open access due to
improved planning should be subject to
the same requirements as jurisdictional
providers. A non-public utility
transmission provider with reciprocity
obligations that declines to adopt a
planning process that complies with
Order No. 890 therefore may not be
considered to be providing reciprocal
transmission service and may be at risk
of being denied open access
transmission services by a public utility
transmission provider. We will consider
on a case-by-case basis how a
transmission provider should treat for
planning purposes a non-public utility
80 See
81 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 494.
id. at P 441.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission provider that fails to
implement a planning process that
fulfills the requirements of Order No.
890.82
215. We disagree with Areva that the
transmission planning process required
in Order No. 890 is inconsistent with
section 1223 of EPAct 2005.83 The
Commission made clear in Order No.
890 that advanced technologies and
demand-side resources must be treated
comparably where appropriate in the
transmission planning process and,
thus, the transmission provider’s
consideration of solutions should be
technology neutral. We believe that the
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 are
sufficient to ensure comparable
consideration of such technologies in
transmission planning and, therefore,
we decline to impose the type of special
penalties proposed by Areva.
216. We disagree with TDU Systems
that comparability requires that
generation resources and demand
resources be subject to the same
operational parameters in every
circumstance. Treating similarlysituated resources on a comparable basis
does not necessarily mean that the
resources are treated the same. As part
of its Attachment K planning process,
each transmission provider is required
to identify how it will treat resources on
a comparable basis and, therefore,
should identify how it will determine
comparability for purposes of
transmission planning.
f. Dispute Resolution
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
217. In order to satisfy the dispute
resolution principle, transmission
providers must develop a dispute
resolution process to manage disputes
that arise from the Attachment K
planning process. The Commission
stated that the dispute resolution
process must address both procedural
and substantive planning issues, as the
purpose for including a dispute
resolution process is to provide a means
for parties to resolve all disputes related
82 As the Commission noted in Order No. 890, the
Commission may exercise its authority under
section 211A on a case-by-case basis if we find on
the appropriate record that non-public utility
transmission providers are not participating in the
planning processes required therein. See id. at P
441.
83 We note that, in addition to the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890, the Commission is taking
steps in other proceedings to encourage the
deployment of advanced technologies as required
by section 1223 of EPAct 2005. See, e.g., Promoting
Transmission Investment through Pricing Reform,
Order No. 679, 71 FR 43294 (July 31, 2006), FERC
Stats & Regs. ¶ 31,222 at P 302 (2006), order on
reh’g, Order No. 679–A, 72 FR 1152 (Jan. 10, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,236 (2007), order on reh’g,
Order No. 679–B, 119 FERC ¶ 61,062 (2007).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
to the planning process before turning to
the Commission.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
218. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to clarify that transmission
providers must develop a dispute
resolution process in collaboration with
transmission customers and other
stakeholders. TDU Systems argue that
this clarification is necessary to assure
that ‘‘the shape of the table’’ for dispute
resolution is not fashioned to favor one
side.
219. Duke asks the Commission to
clarify whether alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) will become a vehicle
to challenge the transmission plan
ultimately adopted by the transmission
provider. Duke questions any intent by
the Commission to exercise authority to
approve or disapprove a transmission
plan. Duke argues that ADR should not
be used to substantively second guess a
vertically-integrated transmission
provider’s plan. If ADR is intended to
address substantive planning issues,
Duke asks the Commission to clearly
delineate the scope of those issues.
Duke also asks the Commission to state
the basis for any determination that
ADR could be used to require changes
to a transmission plan that would have
the effect of fashioning binding
obligations to build or not to build any
particular facility in contravention of
the transmission plan.
Commission Determination
220. As with any aspect of the
transmission provider’s Attachment K
compliance filing, the Commission
encourages stakeholder involvement in
the development of an appropriate
dispute resolution process to govern
planning-related disputes. The
Commission will carefully review each
compliance filing to ensure that the
proposed planning process is consistent
with the principles and other
requirements of Order No. 890. Any
stakeholder that has concerns regarding
the dispute resolution mechanism
proposed by a transmission provider, or
any other aspect of the compliance
filing, may bring them to the
Commission’s attention on review of the
proposal.
221. We disagree with Duke that the
scope of this dispute resolution
mechanism is limited to procedural
issues. As the Commission explained in
Order No. 890, the dispute resolution
process should be available to address
all disputes related to the planning
process, both procedural and
substantive.84 This does not mean, as
84 See
PO 00000
id. at P 501.
Frm 00027
Fmt 4701
Duke implies, that any changes to the
plan that may result from dispute
resolution procedures become a binding
obligation to build. In requiring a
dispute resolution process for planningrelated disputes, the Commission is not
asserting any greater authority than it
otherwise has to ensure that
transmission providers comply with
their tariff obligations to expand their
systems to meet the needs of their
customers. The dispute resolution
process therefore does not change the
rights or obligations otherwise
established in the pro forma OATT. As
we reiterate above, the Attachment K
planning process does not place an
affirmative obligation on the
transmission provider to build upgrades
identified in a plan. The tariff
requirements regarding the construction
of new facilities are covered in other
portions of the pro forma OATT, as
discussed above.
g. Regional Participation
222. In order to satisfy the regional
participation principle, transmission
providers must coordinate with
interconnected systems to (1) share
system plans to ensure that they are
simultaneously feasible and otherwise
use consistent assumptions and data
and (2) identify system enhancements
that could relieve congestion or
integrate new resources. The
Commission explained that the specific
features of the regional planning effort
should take account of and
accommodate, where appropriate,
existing institutions, as well as physical
characteristics of the region and
historical practices.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
223. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to clarify that the regional
participation principle requires both
transmission providers and other
stakeholders to be actively involved in
regional planning activities. TDU
Systems contend that some language in
Order No. 890 could be read to limit
regional coordination to transmission
providers.85
224. National Grid asks the
Commission to expand the regional
participation principle to expressly
require regions to adopt interregional
planning processes subject to the same
nine principles applicable to individual
regions. National Grid argues that there
will be little improvement in the area of
interregional planning, and that
disputes will continue to arise, in the
absence of generic action by the
Commission.
85 Citing
Sfmt 4700
3009
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 523.
16JAR2
3010
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
225. EPSA suggests that Commission
staff be designated to attend the
development of all regional planning
processes in non-RTO areas, in order to
ensure adequate and timely oversight
and accountability during the
development stage, as well as to ensure
that all stakeholders have a viable
chance to participate in the
development of their own regional
planning processes.
Commission Determination
226. The Commission clarifies in
response to TDU Systems that, while the
obligation to engage in regional
coordination is directed to transmission
providers, participation in such
processes is not limited to transmission
providers. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to develop a planning process
that facilitates regional participation
and required that process, in turn, to be
open to all interested customers and
stakeholders. In response to National
Grid, we emphasize that effective
regional planning should include
coordination among regions. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, the identification of relevant
regions and sub-regions will depend on
the integrated nature of the power grid
and the particular reliability or resource
issues affecting individual regions and
sub-regions.86 Each of these regions and
sub-regions should coordinate as
necessary to share data, information and
assumptions to maintain reliability and
allow customers to consider resource
options that span the regions.
227. We decline EPSA’s suggestion to
direct Commission staff to attend the
development of all regional planning
processes in non-RTO areas.
Commission staff has organized and
attended a total of seven transmission
planning technical conferences around
the country, and engaged in numerous
other meetings, phone calls and
discussions, in order to assist
transmission providers and customers
in the development of planning
processes that comply with the planning
requirements of Order No. 890.87
Transmission providers and
86 See
id. at P 627.
staff technical conferences were held on:
June 4–7, 2007 in Little Rock, AR and October 1–
2, 2007 in Atlanta, GA, covering the Southeast
including Southwest Power Pool and its members;
June 13, 2007 in Park City, UT, covering the
Northwest and June 26, 2007 in Phoenix, AZ,
covering the Southwest and California, as well as
October 23–24, 2007 in Denver, CO, covering both
of these regions; and June 28–29, 2007 in
Pittsburgh, PA and October 15–16, 2007 in Boston,
MA, covering the ISO New England, NYISO, PJM,
MISO, and Mid-Continent Area Power Pool
subregions.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
87 The
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
stakeholders alike actively participated
in these conferences. Any concerns
regarding the inability of interested
parties to participate in the
development process can be raised on
Commission review of the Attachment K
compliance filings.
h. Economic Planning Studies
228. In order to satisfy the economic
planning studies principle, transmission
providers must take into account both
reliability and economic considerations
in their Attachment K planning
processes. The Commission stated that
the purpose of this principle is to ensure
that customers may request studies that
evaluate potential upgrades and other
investments that could reduce
congestion or integrate new resources
and loads on an aggregated or regional
basis, and not to assign cost
responsibility for any investments or
otherwise determine whether they
should be implemented.88 The
Commission determined that customers
should be permitted to choose the
studies that are of the greatest value to
them, directing transmission providers
to develop a means to allow the
transmission provider and stakeholders
to cluster or batch requests for economic
planning studies so that the
transmission provider may perform the
studies in the most efficient manner.
Customers must be given the right to
request a defined number of high
priority studies annually, the costs of
which would be recovered as a part of
the overall pro forma OATT cost of
service.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
229. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to clarify that the
expansion of economic planning
required in Order No. 890 to include
integration of new resources and loads
did not supplant the need to study both
short-term and long-term congestion.
TDU Systems further argue that any
measure of congestion in the economic
study process must be based on total
gross congestion rather than hedgeable
congestion, which they argue is
unrealistic. TDU Systems state that in
PJM, for example, congestion includes
only that which cannot be hedged
through financial instruments. TDU
Systems contend that this ignores the
significant costs of purchasing the
financial instruments necessary to
hedge the congestion and that gross
congestion more accurately reflects
what load pays for congestion.
88 The Commission addressed the issue of cost
allocation in a separate principle, discussed below.
PO 00000
Frm 00028
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
230. TDU Systems also ask the
Commission to clarify that each
transmission provider must specify in
its Attachment K the process for
requesting and selecting economic
planning studies and the number of
high priority studies that will be paid
for by the transmission provider. TDU
Systems argue that the economic study
process, including selection of which
studies to perform, must be developed
in collaboration with customers and
other interested stakeholders. TDU
Systems, as well as NRECA, suggest that
the high priority studies only include
those requested by non-affiliated
customers so that the economic
planning process is not usurped by the
transmission provider and its affiliates.
231. AWEA asks the Commission to
require transmission providers to engage
in economic planning of upgrades to
address the lumpiness of transmission
investments. AWEA argues that the
needs of native load groups, multiple
generation projects, and load centers
cannot be optimized unless they are
combined in a single transmission plan.
AWEA contends that comparability
requires planning to provide capacity
for OATT customers so that the cost of
large, lumpy upgrades are not all
assigned to single projects.
232. EEI requests clarification that the
stakeholders’ right to designate high
priority studies applies to stakeholders
as a group, not to individual
stakeholders. EEI asserts that allowing
individual stakeholders to designate
specified numbers of studies would be
impractical and inconsistent with the
goal of an aggregated or regional
approach to planning. Entergy asks the
Commission to clarify that economic
studies must be related to congestion
issues affecting a stakeholder and not
simply attempts to obtain competitive
sensitive information about another
party’s resources and loads. Entergy
suggests that a party requesting a study
be required to explain the basis for its
request and how the study relates to its
own transmission service needs.
233. MISO, NYISO and National Grid
ask the Commission to clarify that,
within an RTO or ISO, requests for
congestion studies must be made and
approved through existing stakeholder
processes. Otherwise, National Grid
argues that studies may be tailor-made
to the parochial interests of the
requestor with limited subregional
scope, which in its view would inhibit
the regional planning process and tax
RTO and ISO resources. NYISO requests
further clarification that transmissionowning members of an RTO or ISO are
not required to perform separate,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
individual congestion studies at the
request of customers.
234. Southern argues that the
economic planning requirements of
Order No. 890 should be based on the
Commission’s jurisdiction to ensure just
and reasonable rates, since the
information from such studies could
facilitate customers’ ability to optimize
their future transmission service.
Southern contends that neither Good
Utility Practice nor comparability
support adoption of the economic study
requirements of Order No. 890.
Southern states that its transmission
function planners perform no
congestion analysis and, instead, plan
the system to satisfy reliability
requirements and to meet the needs of
firm transmission customers.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
235. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to allow
stakeholders the right to request a
defined number of high priority studies
annually to address congestion and/or
the integration of new resources or
loads.89 The expansion of the economic
planning principle in Order No. 890 did
not supplant the need to study both
short-term and long-term congestion, if
requested by a stakeholder, as TDU
Systems suggest. Similarly, the choice to
study hedgeable or gross congestion is
the choice of the requesting stakeholder
or group of stakeholders. The intent of
the economic planning principle is to
allow stakeholders, and not the
transmission provider, to identify the
studies that are of the greatest value to
them. This provides sufficient flexibility
to address customer needs, including
the study of large, lumpy transmission
projects, as requested by AWEA.
236. We agree with petitioners that
the transmission provider’s Attachment
K must clearly describe the process by
which economic planning studies can
be requested and how they will be
prioritized.90 We also agree that
stakeholders as a group have the right to
request the defined number of high
priority studies to be paid for by the
transmission provider.91 As a result,
transmission providers must develop a
means to allow the transmission
provider and customers to cluster or
batch requests for economic planning
studies so that the transmission
provider may perform the studies in the
most efficient manner. By limiting the
89 Order
No. 890 at P 547.
and ISOs may continue to use existing
stakeholder processes to identify which economic
planning studies will be of most benefit to the
region, provided such processes are otherwise
consistent with the requirements of Order No. 890.
91 See id. at P 547.
90 RTOs
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
economic planning principle to a
defined number of high priority studies
annually, the Commission did not
intend to preclude stakeholders from
requesting additional studies. To
provide appropriate financial
incentives, the stakeholder(s) requesting
such additional studies would be
responsible for paying the cost of such
studies.92
237. We decline to generically limit
the scope of economic planning studies
as requested by Entergy. Studies may be
requested to address congestion issues
or the integration of new resources/
loads. The limited number of high
priority studies available should restrict
the ability of stakeholders to use these
studies for other purposes, since
stakeholders and the transmission
providers will be working together to
determine which studies will be
pursued. We also reject petitioners’
suggestion that the requests made by a
transmission provider’s affiliates for
economic planning studies should not
count toward the defined number of
high priority studies. The transmission
provider’s affiliates should be treated
like any other stakeholder and,
therefore, their requests for studies
should be considered comparably,
pursuant to the process outlined in the
transmission provider’s Attachment K.
238. We clarify in response to NYISO
that it is the transmission provider’s
obligation to perform economic
planning studies, just as it is the
transmission provider’s obligation to
comply with other aspects of the
planning process required in Order No.
890. As we explain above, RTOs and
ISOs have flexibility in determining
how to fulfill their planning-related
obligations and may delegate certain
responsibilities to their transmissionowning members or otherwise
incorporate the processes of their
members into the RTO/ISO planning
process. To the extent an RTO or ISO
delegates any of its responsibilities in
the context of economic planning, it
will be the obligation of the RTO or ISO
to ensure ultimate compliance with the
requirements of Order No. 890.
239. We disagree with Southern that
the Commission may only require
transmission providers to undertake
economic planning studies pursuant to
its authority to ensure just and
reasonable rates. Consistent with our
authority under FPA section 206, the
Commission acted in Order No. 890 to
limit the opportunities for undue
discrimination in the area of
transmission planning and to ensure
that comparable service is provided by
92 See
PO 00000
id. at P 546.
Frm 00029
Fmt 4701
all public utility transmission providers.
As the Commission explained in Order
No. 890, a prudent vertically-integrated
transmission provider will plan not only
to maintain reliability, but also consider
whether transmission upgrades or other
investments can reduce the overall costs
of serving native load.93 To represent
Good Utility Practice and provide
comparable service, the transmission
planning process under the pro forma
OATT therefore must consider both
reliability and economic considerations.
240. Southern states merely that its
transmission planners do not perform
congestion analyses in particular, not
that they disregard economics in the
planning of their system. Prudent
vertically-integrated transmission
providers take into consideration
whether upgrades or other investments
could allow them to meet the needs of
their customers on a more economic
basis. Through the economic planning
principle, we simply require Southern,
and other transmission providers, to
make available to their customers
services that are comparable to those
they are performing on behalf of their
native load. We therefore affirm the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to perform
economic planning studies at the
request of their stakeholders.
i. Cost Allocation for New Projects
241. In order to satisfy the cost
allocation principle, transmission
providers must address in their
Attachment K planning processes the
allocation of costs of new facilities.
These cost allocation methodologies are
intended to apply to projects that do not
fit under existing rate structures, such as
regional projects involving several
transmission owners or economic
projects that are identified through the
study process, rather than projects built
in response to individual requests for
service. The Commission declined to
impose a particular allocation
methodology for such projects and,
instead, identified three factors to be
considered upon review of cost
allocation proposals. First, we consider
whether a cost allocation proposal fairly
assigns costs among participants,
including those who cause them to be
incurred and those who otherwise
benefit from them. Second, we consider
whether a cost allocation proposal
provides adequate incentives to
construct new transmission. Third, we
consider whether the proposal is
generally supported by state authorities
and participants across the region.
93 See
Sfmt 4700
3011
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 542.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3012
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
242. PSEG questions whether the
Commission intended in Order No. 890
to mandate the funding of economic
projects through the cost allocation
methodology developed as part of the
transmission provider’s planning
process. PSEG argues that this would be
inappropriate since certain transmission
providers, such as NYISO, currently
only conduct reliability planning, not
economic planning. PSEG argues that
the most transmission providers should
be obligated to do is present information
so that market participants may respond
to economic issues. In its view,
introduction of regulated transmission
solutions in response to economic
enhancements destroys incentives for
private investment and precludes the
possibility of other market-based
solutions, such as generation and
demand side management, from
providing a more efficient solution.
PSEG objects to the Commission’s
reliance on the PJM ‘‘market efficiency’’
proposal, arguing that the Commission’s
action in that proceeding was
conditioned on PJM submitting a
compliance filing to clarify aspects of its
proposal.94
243. To the extent the Commission
requires ratepayer funding of economic
upgrades, PSEG suggests that market
participants who are asked to pay be
allowed to vote on acceptance of cost
allocations for the project. PSEG
suggests that construction of a project be
approved only if a certain percentage
vote in favor of building the project and
no more than a certain percentage vote
against building the project. With regard
to reliability upgrades, PSEG argues that
there are also insufficient checks in
place to ensure that RTOs and ISOs do
not undertake expensive upgrades to
solve a reliability criteria violation
when simpler, less expensive projects
may suffice. PSEG therefore requests
that the Commission require that a costbenefit analysis be conducted for both
reliability and economic transmission
projects.
244. TDU Systems argue that the costs
of all network upgrades identified in the
transmission plan be allocated and
recovered on a rolled-in basis. TDU
System maintain that rolled-in rate
treatment for such upgrades would
minimize disputes and encourage
expansion by providing certainty for
transmission providers. TDU Systems
contend that failure to mandate rolledin cost recovery for network upgrades
identified in the transmission plan
defaults on the Commission’s
94 Citing id. at P 545 (citing PJM Interconnection,
LLC, 117 FERC ¶ 61,218 (2006), reh’g pending).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
obligations under FPA section 217 to
promote expansion to support the
ability of LSEs to meet their service
obligations.
245. EPSA argues that any cost
allocation of economic projects must be
based on clear and balanced economic
metrics, calculations, and assumptions.
EPSA objects to any requirement that
cost allocation provisions for economic
projects create a funding mechanism for
proponents of such projects, arguing
that this would be inconsistent with the
Commission’s statements that
transmission providers are not under an
obligation to fund or build upgrades
identified in the transmission plan.
246. Old Dominion urges the
Commission to clarify Order No. 890 by
elaborating and expanding upon the
factors the Commission will consider in
addressing cost allocation for new
transmission. Old Dominion suggests
that the following issues be considered
in evaluating whether a cost allocation
proposal is reasonable: facilitation of
regional market development; benefits
over the life of the facility; reliability
benefits beyond resolution of the
triggering reliability violation; reduction
in capacity, energy, and reserve costs
from reliability upgrades; consideration
of benefits that may not be readily
quantifiable; need for rate certainty;
and, avoidance of rate shock. Old
Dominion argues that elaboration on
these factors will help stakeholders
reach consensus on cost allocation
issues. Old Dominion also seeks
clarification that the cost allocation
principle applies equally to projects that
are built by a single transmission owner,
but that have a regional impact.
247. With regard to interregional cost
allocation, Old Dominion and TDU
Systems argue that the Commission
should require the cost allocation
criteria identified in the transmission
provider’s Attachment K to apply to
transmission facilities in one region that
provide benefits to customers in another
region.95 Old Dominion contends that
omission of cross-border allocation
requirements in the OATT is
inconsistent with basic cost causation
principles as expressed in Order No.
890 itself.96 TDU Systems argue that
regions will benefit from up-front
resolution of cross-border allocation
issues, just as transmission providers
benefit from up-front resolution of
regional cost allocation issues.
248. E.ON U.S. asks the Commission
to clarify that the cost allocation
95 Citing Midwest Ind. Sys. Operator, Inc., 117
FERC ¶ 61,241 (2006); Midwest Ind. Sys. Operator,
Inc., 109 FERC ¶ 61,243 (2004).
96 Citing Order No. 890 at P 559.
PO 00000
Frm 00030
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
principle may not be used to shift
transmission construction costs to
border utilities that receive no direct
benefit from the construction. E.ON U.S.
contends that the transmission
customers of each RTO or ISO already
pay for the cost of upgrades through
transmission rates charged by the RTO
or ISO.
249. Duke does not object to the cost
allocation principle, but notes the
difficulties that have been experienced
in reaching consensus in RTOs and ISOs
and asks the Commission to consider
delaying the requirement beyond the
210-day due date if regional consensus
cannot be reached. In the alternative,
Duke suggests that transmission
providers be allowed to submit
allocation proposals as separate
informational strawmen that will serve
as a vehicle for further discussion in the
region.
Commission Determination
250. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to address in
their Attachment K planning processes
cost allocation for new facilities that do
not fit under existing structures.
Transmission providers and customers
cannot be expected to support the
construction of new transmission unless
they understand who will pay the
associated costs. This applies equally to
reliability and economic projects,
whether built by a single transmission
owner or through joint ownership.
However, mandatory rolled-in rate
treatment for all network upgrades
identified in the transmission plans, as
suggested by TDU Systems, is not
necessarily appropriate. The
Commission is fulfilling its obligations
under FPA section 217 to support
expansion of the grid by requiring
transmission providers to address in
their Attachment K processes how costs
will be allocated for reliability and
economic projects, which we will
address on a case-by-case basis.
251. We disagree with PSEG’s
contention that economic projects
should be excluded from the cost
allocation provisions of the pro forma
OATT. As the Commission noted in
Order No. 890, the issue of cost
allocation is particularly important as
applied to economic upgrades.97
Participants seeking to support new
transmission investment need some
degree of certainty regarding cost
allocation to pursue that investment. We
therefore agree with EPSA that the
details of proposed cost allocation
methodologies must be clearly defined,
97 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 542.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
but emphasize that adoption of a cost
allocation methodology will not impose
an obligation to build. As we reiterate
above, identification of an upgrade
(reliability or economic) in the
transmission plan does not trigger an
obligation to build under the
Attachment K planning process. Upfront identification of how the cost of a
facility will be allocated will, however,
allow transmission providers,
customers, and potential investors to
make the decision whether or not to
build on an informed basis.
252. As explained above, all
transmission providers, including RTOs
and ISOs, must undertake economic
planning studies at the request of
stakeholders. Within an RTO or ISO,
stakeholder processes can be used to
determine whether to pursue either
economic or reliability upgrades and,
thus, voting mechanisms such as those
suggested by PSEG could be adopted if
stakeholders desire. If the transmission
provider or stakeholders determine that
other solutions are superior to
transmission upgrades, they may pursue
those solutions instead and integrate
them into the transmission plan. The
transmission planning process
established in Order No. 890 does not
dictate that particular investments be
made, rather that an open, coordinated,
and transparent process be adopted to
govern the decision-making process.
253. We decline to adopt Old
Dominion’s suggestion to define in more
detail the factors to be considered in
evaluating whether a cost allocation
proposal is reasonable. We intend to
allow regional flexibility regarding cost
allocation and will consider each
proposal on a case-by-case basis. While
we would expect many of the
considerations raised by Old Dominion
to be relevant, since they fall within the
three factors identified by the
Commission, the merits of each
proposal will be analyzed in light of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
proposal. Similarly, issues regarding
cross-border allocation or the potential
shifting of costs to border utilities are
best addressed in the context of a
particular proposal.
254. Finally, we deny Duke’s request
to extend the Attachment K compliance
deadline as it relates to cost allocation
proposals. We acknowledge that
resolution of cost allocation issues are
difficult, as are many of the issues
raised in the context of transmission
planning. The Commission therefore
granted transmission providers an
extension of the Attachment K filing
deadline in order to allow for a second
round of staff technical conferences to
review progress made on draft
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
compliance filings.98 Commission staff
also issued a white paper to further
assist transmission providers in the
drafting of Attachment K tariff
language.99 We believe that
transmission providers have had
adequate time and guidance to complete
the drafting of their Attachment K
proposals prior to the revised filing
deadline.
j. Additional Issues Relating to Planning
Reform
(1) Independent Third-Party
Coordinator
255. The Commission declined in
Order No. 890 to require the use of an
independent third party coordinator for
transmission planning activities, but
encouraged transmission providers and
their customers to explore aspects of
planning where the use of an
independent coordinator would be
beneficial and to incorporate those
aspects in their planning processes.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
256. Old Dominion argues that the
Commission erred by failing to
recognize the need for an independent
third party to oversee transmission
planning. With regard to RTOs in
particular, Old Dominion seeks
confirmation that market monitoring
units have the requisite independence
and authority to investigate and address
undue influence in the transmission
planning process. Old Dominion asks
the Commission to direct RTOs to
include in their compliance filings a
description of the market monitor’s
ability to identify and address undue
influence in the transmission planning
process. Old Dominion argues that the
ability for customers to file a section 206
complaint is insufficient and can only
bring about prospective changes in
monitoring, failing to remedy the
potential exercise of transmission
market power in transmission planning.
257. TDU Systems support the
decision not to mandate use of a thirdparty facilitator in the transmission
planning process and seek clarification
that, to the extend a third-party
facilitator is used, related costs can be
included in a transmission provider’s
cost of service only if all transmission
customers agree or if a cost-benefit
analysis supports the use of the
facilitator. TDU Systems contend this
would avoid disputes regarding the
98 See Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, 120 FERC
¶ 61,103 (2007).
99 Transmission Planning Process Staff White
Paper, Docket No RM05–17–000, et al. (August 2,
2007).
PO 00000
Frm 00031
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3013
wisdom of using a third-party facilitator
if a significant segment of transmission
customers object.
Commission Determination
258. We disagree with Old Dominion
that we did not adequately address the
potential role of an independent third
party in transmission planning in Order
No. 890. As the Commission explained,
there may be benefits to be gained from
independent third party oversight, but
transmission providers, customers, and
other stakeholders should determine for
themselves in developing the
transmission provider’s planning
process whether, and if so how, to
utilize an independent third party.100
This would include considerations
regarding recovery of costs associated
with the use of a third-party in the
transmission planning process and,
within an RTO, the role of the market
monitor, if any, in that process.
(2) Open Season for Joint Ownership
259. Although the Commission
acknowledged in Order No. 890 the
benefits of joint ownership of
transmission facilities, the Commission
declined to mandate open season
procedures to allow market participants
to participate in joint ownership. The
Commission recognized that there may
be reasons, given the complexity of the
transmission grid and changing
conditions of supply and demand for
power, why any given facility identified
in a transmission plan may not be
ultimately constructed. If a transmission
provider declines to construct an
identified upgrade, the Commission
encouraged customers and third parties
to consider, either individually or
jointly, development and ownership of
a project to the extent consistent with
applicable state law.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
260. FMPA asks the Commission to
order transmission providers to make
available opportunities to jointly
participate in the ownership of new
transmission facilities to achieve the
benefits of joint ownership recognized
by the Commission and remedy the
discriminatory and anticompetitive
effects of excluding some public power
utilities from ownership. In the
alternative, FMPA asks the Commission
to take the lesser step of establishing
presumptions that transmission
customers are allowed to jointly invest
in new grid transmission facilities and
that transmission providers are not
entitled to rate incentives if they
exclude some systems that are willing to
100 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 567.
16JAR2
3014
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
invest in transmission. FMPA argues
that such presumptions will prevent
recalcitrant transmission owners from
refusing participation or from using
their control of the grid to extract
unreasonable terms and conditions,
while allowing them to protect any
legitimate interests they may have.
261. TDU Systems argue that
diversification of ownership of the grid,
facilitated by mandatory open seasons
for joint or third-party ownership,
would provide a structural remedy to
the vertical market power enjoyed by
many transmission providers. They
contend that the inadequacy of the grid,
combined with the unwillingness or
inability of transmission providers to
invest in new infrastructure, has
allowed many transmission providers to
retain generation dominance on their
systems and unduly discriminate
against transmission customers. TDU
Systems argue that FPA sections 205
and 206 give the Commission adequate
authority to mitigate this market power
by either requiring open seasons for
joint ownership or third-party
ownership or by conditioning marketbased rate authority or incentive rates
on agreements to offer such open
seasons.
262. TDU Systems argue that the
Commission at a minimum should
require transmission providers to hold
open seasons for third-party
construction where a transmission
provider is unwilling or unable to
construct a new facility that is identified
as needed in the planning process. TDU
Systems further request that the
Commission modify the pro forma
OATT to include an explicit obligation
to interconnect joint or third-party
facilities constructed in response to
projects identified in the local or
regional planning process.
Commission Determination
263. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 not to
mandate procedures for joint ownership
of transmission facilities. We continue
to believe that there are benefits to joint
ownership, particularly for large
backbone transmission facilities, and
encourage transmission providers,
customers, and third parties to consider
joint development and ownership as
appropriate. The Commission
acknowledged in Order No. 890,
however, that joint ownership can
increase the complexity of planning and
developing a transmission project and
we are sensitive to concerns that formal
open seasons can add to that
complexity.101 We therefore decline to
101 Id.
at P 594.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
mandate the generic use of open seasons
or establish presumptions, as suggested
by FMPA, regarding their use.
264. We also reject TDU Systems’
suggestion that declining to mandate
open seasons for joint ownership leaves
the transmission provider with
unmitigated vertical market power.
Transmission providers are required
under the OATT to make transfer
capability available on a nondiscriminatory basis and to expand their
systems as necessary to accommodate
requests for transmission service,
including service associated with new
customer-owned transmission facilities.
In the absence of specific evidence of
undue discrimination by a transmission
provider, we do not believe mandating
open seasons or altering our incentive
rate program is necessary to mitigate
market power in the provision of
transmission service. Customers and
third parties remain free to develop and
construct facilities as they see fit and,
through the Attachment K planning
process, incorporate the development of
those facilities into the transmission
plan.
C. Transmission Pricing
1. Energy and Generation Imbalances
a. Tiered Approach to Imbalance
Penalties in the OATT
265. In Order 890, the Commission
modified Schedule 4 of the pro forma
OATT regarding treatment of energy
imbalances and adopted a separate pro
forma OATT schedule (Schedule 9) to
govern treatment of generator
imbalances. The Commission
determined that charges for both energy
and generator imbalances must follow
three principles: (1) The charges must
be based on incremental cost or some
multiple thereof; (2) the charges must
provide an incentive for accurate
scheduling, such as by increasing the
percentage of the adder above (and
below) incremental cost as the
deviations become larger; and (3) the
provisions must account for the special
circumstances presented by intermittent
generators and their limited ability to
precisely forecast or control generation
levels, such as waiving the more
punitive adders associated with higher
deviations.
266. The Commission also determined
that the same tiered approach should be
used for both energy and generator
imbalances. Imbalances of less than or
equal to 1.5 percent of the scheduled
energy (or two megawatts, whichever is
larger) are to be netted on a monthly
basis and settled financially at 100
percent of incremental cost at the end of
each month. Imbalances between 1.5
PO 00000
Frm 00032
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
and 7.5 percent of the scheduled
amounts (or 2 to 10 megawatts,
whichever is larger) are to be settled
financially at 90 percent of the
transmission provider’s system
incremental cost for overscheduling
imbalances that require the transmission
provider to decrease generation or 110
percent of the incremental cost for
underscheduling imbalances that
require increased generation in the
control area. Finally, imbalances greater
than 7.5 percent of the scheduled
amounts (or 10 megawatts, whichever is
larger) are to be settled at 75 percent of
the system incremental cost for
overscheduling imbalances or 125
percent of the incremental cost for
underscheduling imbalances.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
267. TAPS contends that the use of
the phrase ‘‘same imbalance’’ in the
language of Schedules 4 and 9 is
imprecise and could lead to some
confusion. TAPS asks that the
Commission amend the language of
Schedules 4 and 9 to be consistent with
footnote 387 of Order No. 890, in which
the Commission states that a
transmission provider may only charge
the penalty percent adder to the
incremental cost for either an hourly
generator imbalance or an hourly energy
imbalance for the same imbalance.102
TAPS suggests modifying the first
paragraph of Schedule 9 to read: ‘‘The
Transmission Provider may charge a
Transmission Customer a penalty for
either hourly generator imbalances
under this Schedule or hourly energy
imbalances under Schedule 4 for the
imbalances occurring during the same
hour, but not both (unless the
imbalances aggravate rather than offset
each other).’’ TAPS requests that the
similar change be made to
corresponding language in Schedule 4.
268. Steel Manufacturers Association
argues that the Commission should
abandon the dead band/penalty
mechanism for energy imbalances and
adopt instead the basic framework
employed in the organized markets,
where a customer pays or is paid the
provider’s incremental cost for
imbalances. Steel Manufacturers
Association contends that, in the
organized markets, the Commission
recognizes that pricing imbalances at
the real-time price of energy provides
adequate incentives to ensure that
customers schedule accurately. Steel
Manufacturers Association argues that
the Commission failed to justify
application of a different policy, i.e.,
escalating penalties, under the pro
102 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 632, n.387.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
forma OATT. Steel Manufacturers
Association contends that there is no
evidence of negative reliability impacts
in the organized markets due to the lack
of inaccurate scheduling, nor is there
evidence of customers taking advantage
of the transmission provider by leaning
on the transmission grid. Steel
Manufacturers Association further
contends that similar imbalance pricing
policies should apply in both market
structures. Steel Manufacturers
Association argues that clearing
imbalances outside of the organized
markets at the transmission provider’s
marginal cost for the hour is sufficient
for that purpose. If the Commission
retains a Schedule 4 with a bandwidth
and penalty structure, Steel
Manufacturers Association requests that
the Commission institute a larger
bandwidth of, at minimum, 10 percent
for small wholesale customers and
discrete retail loads in order to provide
some measure of relief for those
customers.
269. Steel Manufacturers Association
also requests that end-use customers
that provide ancillary services through
demand response be exempt from
imbalance charges for imbalances
created as a result of the use of the
demand response. Steel Manufacturers
Association contends that an end-use
customer that modifies its usage in realtime, in order to be price responsive or
respond to a system operator’s call to
curtail load, will create energy
imbalances. If that end-use customer is
assessed a penalty for those energy
imbalances, Steel Manufacturers
Association argues that it will have little
incentive to provide an ancillary service
such as spinning reserve or regulation
through demand response. Steel
Manufacturers Association suggests that
the Commission revise the energy
imbalance provisions to encourage,
rather than discourage, demand
response.
Commission Determination
270. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to adopt a
tiered bandwidth approach for both
energy and generation imbalances. We
disagree with Steel Manufacturers
Association that simply paying the
transmission provider’s incremental
cost for energy imbalances would
provide adequate incentives for
customers to schedule accurately under
the pro forma OATT. Market structures
in place within RTOs and ISOs are
fundamentally different from those in
non-RTO/ISO regions. In the organized
markets, system operators generally use
a five minute dispatch with multiple
suppliers of imbalance energy
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
responding to system operator
instructions. Suppliers and customers
alike are therefore able to respond to
real-time changes in locational prices
that reflect both the cost of energy and
congestion, which serves to discipline
transmission customers and generators
from deviating from their instructed
level. This is not the case outside of the
organized markets and, therefore, other
incentives must be provided to
discourage deviations.
271. We also decline to institute a
larger bandwidth or eliminate the
penalty structure for energy imbalances
caused by small wholesale customers or
discrete loads. Use of the bandwidths
adopted in Order No. 890, with the 2
MW and 10 MW minimums for the first
and second penalty bands,
appropriately links increased deviations
and potential reliability impacts on the
system while allowing increased
tolerance to smaller customers. We note,
moreever, that the 2 MW minimum
specified in Order 890 does allow for a
10 percent bandwidth, as Steel
Manufacturers Association requests, for
loads 20 MW or less.
272. We agree with Steel
Manufacturers Association, however,
that end-use customers providing an
ancillary service through demand
response should generally not be subject
to penalties for imbalances created as a
result of providing the ancillary service.
In this respect, customers using demand
resources for ancillary services should
not be treated differently from
customers using generating units to
provide ancillary services. The
mechanisms for addressing the selfprovision or third-party provision of
ancillary services have developed
outside the pro forma OATT and we
will not disrupt these developments.
Thus, there is no need to revise the pro
forma OATT, as Steel Manufacturers
Association suggests, since existing
practices for third-party provided
ancillary services should apply to
demand resources as they apply to
generating resources.
273. We agree with TAPS that the
reference to ‘‘same imbalance’’ in
Schedules 4 and 9 could lead to
confusion and amend the language of
those schedules accordingly. We revise
the language of Schedules 4 and 9 to
clarify that the transmission provider
may charge a transmission customer a
penalty for either hourly generator
imbalances under Schedule 9 or hourly
energy imbalances under Schedule 4 for
imbalances occurring during the same
hour, but not both unless the
imbalances aggravate rather than offset
each other.
PO 00000
Frm 00033
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3015
b. Generator Imbalance Penalties
274. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that formalizing generator
imbalance provisions in the pro forma
OATT will standardize the future
treatment of such imbalances from the
wide variety of generator imbalance
provisions that previously existed in
various generator interconnection
agreements. Standardizing generator
imbalance provisions, in turn, should
lessen the potential for undue
discrimination, increase transparency
and reduce confusion in the industry.
The Commission emphasized, however,
that it was not abrogating existing
generator imbalance agreements in this
rulemaking proceeding.
275. With regard to intermittent
resources, the Commission provided
that such resources are exempt from the
third-tier deviation band and would pay
the second-tier deviation band charges
for all deviations greater than the larger
of 1.5 percent or two megawatts. The
Commission defined intermittent
resources for this purpose as ‘‘an
electric generator that is not
dispatchable and cannot store its fuel
source and therefore cannot respond to
changes in system demand or respond
to transmission security constraints.’’
The Commission also determined that
all generators should be excused from
imbalance penalties that occur due to
directed reliability actions by a
generator to correct system frequency.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
276. A number of petitioners seek
rehearing and/or clarification of the
generator imbalance reforms adopted in
Order No. 890. Sempra Global asks that
the Commission revise section 3 of the
pro forma OATT to make clear that
generator imbalance service must be
offered for any transmission service
used to deliver energy from a generator
located within the transmission
provider’s control area, as required in
Schedule 9. Sempra Global argues that
section 3 of the pro forma OATT is
inconsistent with Schedule 9, since
section 3 only requires a transmission
provider to offer generator imbalance
service to a transmission customer
serving load within the transmission
provider’s control area.
277. EEI, Entergy, and Southern ask
that the Commission clarify that a
transmission provider is entitled to
charge either the transmission customer
or the generator for generator imbalance
service when the customer takes
transmission service to deliver energy to
an off-system load. In their view,
generator imbalance charges may only
be assessed to a transmission customer
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3016
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
under new Schedule 9. Southern and
EEI argue that this may be inappropriate
because in many instances the generator
is responsible for the generator
imbalance, not the transmission
customer. If the generator sells energy to
more than one customer, Southern and
EEI contend that it will be virtually
impossible to determine which
transmission customer should be
assessed a charge and how the billing
would be determined.
278. EEI and Southern propose
changes to Schedule 9 to address these
concerns. EEI asks the Commission to
clarify that either the transmission
customer or the generator must take
generator imbalance service in
connection with any off-system sale of
energy and that the transmission
provider has no obligation to provide
transmission service on its system to an
off-system load unless the transmission
customer or the generator executes a
service agreement committing to take
generator imbalance service. Southern,
however, argues that the Commission
should require every generator, subject
to the grandfathering provisions in
Order No. 890, to execute a service
agreement to take and pay for generator
imbalance service pursuant to Schedule
9 of the OATT and be a transmission
customer for such purposes. If the
Commission does not do so, Southern
asks in the alternative that the
Commission clarify that transmission
providers, subject to the grandfathering
provisions of Order No. 890, have no
obligation to provide transmission
service from an on-system generator to
an off-system load if such generator has
not executed a service agreement under
the transmission provider’s OATT
providing for the generator to take and
pay for generator imbalance service.
279. PNM argues that transmission
providers should not be required to
provide generator imbalance service
when doing so would impair reliability
for the transmission provider. PNM
contends that some control area
operators may not be able to offer
generator imbalance service unless they
can procure balancing energy and
associated capacity from another entity.
PNM argues that the obligation to
provide Schedule 9 service should be
contingent upon the transmission
provider determining that it is able to
provide this service based upon a
system impact study. Even if the service
can physically be provided, PNM states
that placing a must-offer requirement in
Schedule 9, particularly for the purpose
of supplying imbalance energy for
intermittent generation, may have
unreasonable impacts on the supply
resources operated by small host control
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
areas. In PNM’s view, an absolute mustoffer requirement for Schedule 9 could
lead to proportionately heavy impacts
on small transmission providers that are
required to interconnect generation
developed to serve distant urban areas
within large control areas.
280. Joined by EEI and APS, PNM
suggests that the Commission address
these reliability concerns by allowing
transmission providers the alternative of
offering generators dynamic scheduling
to change the responsibility for
generator imbalances from specific
generators. In cases where system
reliability would be adversely affected,
these petitioners contend that requiring
a generator to accept a dynamic
schedule of its output to the control area
where the load is located, instead of
requiring the transmission provider to
provide generator imbalance service,
would give the transmission provider a
viable alternative to ensure that the
generator’s imbalances are absorbed
without compromising the reliability of
the system where the generator is
located, while also aligning the
responsibility for supplying the
imbalances associated with the parties
that enjoy the benefit of the generation.
281. EEI further argues that imbalance
penalties fail to adequately compensate
transmission providers for threats to
system reliability caused by excessive
generator imbalances and, therefore, use
of dynamic scheduling would be
appropriate. If the Commission does not
allow the alternative of dynamic
scheduling, APS requests that the
Commission revise Schedule 9 to allow
a transmission provider to identify the
total amount of generator imbalance
service it will offer.
282. Other petitioners request
clarification or rehearing regarding the
Commission’s decision to exempt
deviations associated with correcting
system frequency from associated
imbalance penalties. Xcel agrees with
the Commission that generators should
not be subject to imbalance penalties
that occur when the generator is
responding to reliability directives to
correct frequency deviations and
requests that this exception be expressly
incorporated into the pro forma OATT.
Xcel requests that the Commission
either amend the Order No. 890 pro
forma OATT on rehearing or clarify that
a transmission provider can implement
this practice by including such language
in its compliance filing. Xcel suggests
that the Commission also could, in the
alternative, clarify that a transmission
provider may implement this practice
by posting a business practice indicating
the transmission provider will waive
such imbalance charges for generators
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
correcting frequency deviations on a
non-discriminatory basis.
283. EPSA and TAPS request that the
Commission expand the exemption to
include other situations in which a
generator is directed to be off-schedule
by transmission operators, balancing
authorities, or reliability coordinators.
EPSA states, for example, that
generators are often given directives by
balancing authorities in order to reduce
unscheduled flows on other systems
and/or change line flows or voltage
levels. TAPS argues that there should be
an exception for generator imbalances
resulting from transmission loading
relief procedures (TLRs) or other
transmission provider instructions, and
for both the unexpected loss of a
generating unit and the response of
other generators to replace that unit
under the reserve sharing arrangements,
with resulting imbalances treated as
being within the first deadband. TAPS
argues that penalizing imbalances in the
case of forced generation outages is
particularly inappropriate since such
charges do not give plant operators any
better incentive to schedule accurately
because unplanned unit outages by their
very nature cannot be predicted and
scheduled.
284. Several petitioners request that
the Commission clarify its definition of
intermittent resources for purposes of
applying imbalance charges. TAPS
argues that intermittent generation
should include test energy produced by
newly completed units, so that
generators are not unduly penalized
(i.e., at third-tier penalty levels) for
output variations that are inherently
unpredictable. EEI and AMP-Ohio argue
that run-of-river hydroelectric
generating facilities should be deemed
to be intermittent resources because
their inability to store water to produce
energy on demand satisfies the intention
of the Order No. 890 definition,
notwithstanding the fact that strictly
speaking they do not have fuel sources.
Northwestern, however, argues that runof-river hydroelectric projects should
not qualify as an intermittent resource
because they generally do have the
ability to predict flows and schedule
accurately. NorthWestern also requests
that the Commission specifically require
utilities to update their tariffs to reflect
this new definition.
285. AMP-Ohio also argues that
intermittent resources should be
entirely exempt from imbalance
penalties, arguing that it is unfair to
impose any level of penalties on
resources that are not dispatchable. In
AMP-Ohio’s view, wind generators and
run-of-river hydroelectric facilities alike
depend on uncontrollable forces that
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
affect their actual levels of generation.
AMP-Ohio argues that fully exempting
intermittent resources from imbalance
penalties would not be unduly
`
discriminatory vis-a-vis generators that
are dispatchable since the different
treatment would merely recognize their
different circumstances.
286. Finally, Entergy asks that the
Commission confirm that transmission
providers do not need to seek renewal
of existing generator imbalance
agreements. Entergy contends that it is
unclear whether the procedures
described in section IV.C of Order No.
890, regarding Commission
consideration of previously-approved
variations from the pro forma OATT, are
intended to apply to generator
imbalance agreements that have been
previously negotiated between willing
parties.
Commission Determination
287. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to adopt
standardized generator imbalance
provisions in Schedule 9 of the pro
forma OATT. We agree with Sempra
Global that section 3 of the pro forma
OATT, as revised in Order No. 890, does
not properly reflect that generator
imbalance service must be offered for
any transmission service used to deliver
energy from a generator located within
the transmission provider’s control area,
as required in Schedule 9. We revise
section 3 to make this clear.
288. We also agree with EEI and
Southern that, in certain circumstances,
it may be appropriate for the
transmission provider to allow a
generator located within its control area
to execute a service agreement for
generator imbalance service, even if the
generator is not otherwise a
transmission customer. Without settling
with the individual generator, it could
be impossible for the transmission
provider to determine which
transmission customer should be
assessed a charge and how the billing
would be determined if a single
generator was selling to multiple
customers. We have revised Schedule 9
of the pro forma OATT to require the
transmission provider to offer generator
imbalance service to any generator in its
control area (subject to the limitations
discussed below). We clarify that, if a
generator has executed a service
agreement for generator imbalance
service, any transmission customer
scheduling from the generator will be
deemed to have satisfied its obligation
to purchase generator imbalance service
under section 3 and Schedule 9.
289. We further clarify that a
transmission provider only has to
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
provide generator imbalance service
from its own resources to the extent that
it is physically feasible to do so (i.e., the
transmission provider is able to manage
the additional potential imbalances
without compromising reliability). It is
not the Commission’s intent to require
transmission providers to provide
generator imbalance service from its
resources when it would unreasonably
impair reliability. Each transmission
provider therefore may state on its
OASIS the maximum amount of
generator imbalance service it is able to
offer from its resources, based on an
analysis of the physical characteristics
of its system. Alternatively, a
transmission provider may consider
requests for generator imbalance service
on a case-by-case basis, performing as
necessary a system impact study to
determine the precise amount of
additional generation it can
accommodate and still reliably respond
to the imbalances that could occur.
290. This does not relieve the
transmission provider of its obligation
to provide generator imbalance service
if it is able to acquire additional
resources in order to do so. We
acknowledge PNM’s concerns that some
control area operators may only be able
to provide generator imbalance service
by procuring balancing energy and
associated capacity from another entity.
If it is not physically feasible for the
transmission provider to offer generator
imbalance service using its own
resources, either because they do not
exist or they are fully subscribed, the
transmission provider must attempt to
procure alternatives to provide the
service, taking appropriate steps to offer
an option that customers can use to
satisfy their obligation to acquire
generator imbalance service as a
condition of taking transmission service.
In the unlikely circumstance that there
are no additional resources available to
enable the transmission provider to
meet its obligation for generator
imbalance service, the transmission
provider must accept the use of
dynamic scheduling to the extent a
transmission customer has negotiated
appropriate arrangements with a
neighboring control area.103
291. We also reject requests to further
exempt intermittent resources by
eliminating imbalance penalties
altogether for such resources. Generator
imbalance charges are based on the
incremental costs incurred by the
transmission provider to respond to the
103 The Commission addresses request to require
transmission providers to offer dynamic scheduling
as a new service under the pro forma OATT in
section III.D.1.d.
PO 00000
Frm 00035
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3017
generator’s imbalance. In the second
tier, charges escalate somewhat to
provide an incentive for generators not
to deviate outside of the first tier.
Without this penalty component,
intermittent resources would not have
any additional incentive to accurately
schedule. At the same time, the
Commission recognized that
intermittent generators cannot always
accurately follow their schedules and
therefore exempted those resources from
third-tier penalties. If given proper
incentives, intermittent generators can
improve their forecasting methods in
order to submit more accurate
schedules. Thus, we continue to believe
this relaxed penalty structure strikes the
right balance between the need to
encourage accurate scheduling and the
operating limitations of intermittent
resources.
292. We agree with EEI and AMP–
Ohio that the definition of intermittent
resources includes run-of-river
hydroelectric units that do not store
water used to generate electricity, i.e.,
for which instantaneous inflow equals
instantaneous outflow. Hydroelectric
units using storage, however, are not
intermittent resources within the
meaning of Schedule 9 of the pro forma
OATT. The ability of those units to
schedule their output is not as limited
as intermittent resources. The same is
true of newly completed generating
units producing test energy. Under the
pro forma OATT, generators do not have
to submit final schedules until the
morning of the prior operating day and
may revise those schedules up until 20
minutes prior to the operating hour. We
conclude that this provides sufficient
flexibility for hydroelectric units using
storage and newly completed units
producing test energy to change their
schedules to reflect forecasted output
and that any charges resulting from
remaining imbalances are just and
reasonable under the reformed generator
imbalance provisions of the pro forma
OATT.
293. We agree with Xcel that the
exemption from generation imbalance
penalties for generators responding to
correct frequency decay should be
expressly stated in the pro forma OATT.
We also agree with EPSA and TAPS that
a generator that deviates from its
schedule due to directives by balancing
authorities, transmission operators, and
reliability coordinators should not be
subject to the penalty component of
imbalance charges and that this
exemption should be expressly stated in
Schedule 9. It would be inappropriate to
assess imbalance penalties on generators
following instructions to, for example,
reduce unscheduled flows on other
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3018
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
systems (such as a TLR) or change line
flows or voltage levels, because such
charges could create incentives not to
respond and in turn compromise
reliability. Similarly, generators
responding to a reserve sharing event,
with properly structured arrangements
with transmission providers, should not
be subject to penalties. We revise
Schedule 9 accordingly.
294. We decline, however, to carve
out an exception for imbalances
associated with the loss of a generating
unit itself. We disagree with TAPS that
penalizing imbalances in the case of
forced generation outages does not give
plant operators any better incentive to
schedule accurately. Appropriately
designed penalties provide a proper
incentive for generators to reduce
instances of forced outage by, for
example, properly maintaining their
facilities, and therefore adhere to their
schedules.
295. Finally, we reiterate in response
to Entergy that the Commission did not
intend to abrogate existing generator
imbalance agreements as a part of this
rulemaking proceeding.104 The
imbalance-related reforms do, however,
apply to provisions contained in a
transmission provider’s OATT,
including previously-approved
variations from the pro forma OATT.
Transmission providers were given an
opportunity to seek continued approval
of such previously-approved variations,
provided the variations continued to be
consistent with or superior to the
revised pro forma OATT. We note that
Entergy made such a showing with
respect to the generator imbalance
provisions of its OATT.105
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
c. Intentional Deviations and Intra-hour
Netting
296. The Commission declined in
Order No. 890 to impose generic
penalties in the pro forma OATT for
intentional deviations, concluding that
the tiered imbalance penalties generally
provide a sufficient incentive not to
engage in such behavior. The
Commission explained that proposals to
assess additional penalties for
intentional deviations would continue
to be considered on a case-by-case basis,
subject to a showing that they are
necessary under the circumstances. Any
such tariff provisions must include
clearly defined processes for identifying
intentional deviations and the
associated penalties.
104 See
105 See
Order No. 890 at P 671.
Entergy Services, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,042
Commission Determination
298. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 not to impose generic penalties for
intentional deviations. We continue to
believe that it is appropriate to maintain
the status quo of aggregating net
generation over the hour in the pro
forma OATT. To the extent a
transmission provider wishes to adopt
additional penalties for intentional
deviations, it may do so provided it can
show they are necessary under the
circumstances. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 890, requests to
adopt a shorter interval over which to
calculate imbalances also will be
considered on a case-by-case basis,
provided that such proposals are
consistent with relevant market
structures.106
d. Definition of Incremental Cost
299. In Order No. 890, the
Commission defined incremental cost,
for purposes of the tiered imbalance
provisions, as the transmission
provider’s actual average hourly cost of
the last 10 MW dispatched to supply the
transmission provider’s native load,
based on the replacement cost of fuel,
unit heat rates, start-up costs,
incremental operation and maintenance
costs, purchased and interchange power
costs and taxes, as applicable. The
Commission also concluded that it was
appropriate, through the definition of
incremental cost, to allow for recovery
of both commitment and redispatch
costs, but excluded on a generic basis
the cost of additional regulation
106 See
(2007).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
297. South Carolina E&G argues that
the Commission should grant rehearing
to assess additional penalties for entities
that deliberately lean on the system or,
in the alternative, provide for generator
imbalance settlements over a shorter
period than one hour. In its view,
generators unable to ramp up precisely
to meet their schedules can undergenerate in the initial part of the hour
and then over-generate in later parts of
the hour in order to integrate closer to
the schedule when settled over the
entire hour. South Carolina E&G
contends that this practice imposes
costs on balancing authorities and
affects system reliability, yet does not
necessarily trigger the higher-tiered
imbalance charges. South Carolina E&G
argues that adopting higher penalties for
substantial hourly imbalances does not
address the issue of intra-hour swings,
which instead could be resolved by
adopting 10-minute imbalance charges.
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 722.
Frm 00036
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
reserves. The Commission emphasized
that allowable costs should only be
those additional costs incurred by the
transmission provider due to the
imbalance and, if applicable, start-up
costs should be allocated pro rata to the
offending transmission customers based
on cost causation principles.
300. If the transmission provider
elects to have separate demand charges
to recover the cost of holding additional
regulation reserves for meeting
imbalances, the Commission stated that
the transmission provider should file a
rate schedule and demonstrate that
these charges do not allow for double
recovery of such costs. With regard to
the real-time regulation burden imposed
by merchant generation, the
Commission stated that transmission
providers could propose, on a case-bycase basis, separate regulation charges
for generation resources selling out of
the control area. The Commission
concluded that the other demand costs
of providing imbalance service are
already provided under Schedule 3, 5,
and 6 charges.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
301. While generally supporting the
Commission’s definition of incremental
costs, Williams requests that the
Commission further identify how each
component of the transmission
provider’s incremental cost is to be
determined. In Williams’s view, a
specific calculation methodology should
be imposed, otherwise the definition of
the incremental cost will afford
transmission providers undue discretion
in the calculation of imbalance charges.
To remove this discretion, Williams
suggests that the Commission require
transmission providers to use the same
components and the same methodology
for the calculation of incremental costs
for imbalance charges as the
transmission provider (or its affiliate)
uses to calculate the incremental cost of
each resource for dispatching generation
resources. At a minimum, Williams asks
that the Commission require
transmission providers to post on their
OASIS the method used to calculate
incremental costs for purposes of
imbalance charges, along with the
method to obtain each component or
variable in the calculation.
302. Several petitioners argue that the
Commission’s definition of incremental
cost for purposes of calculating
imbalance charges does not properly
account for the costs actually incurred
to provide imbalance energy.107 Ameren
and Southern assert that failure to
provide for recovery of opportunity
107 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Ameren, EEI, E.ON U.S., and Southern.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
costs will prevent utilities required to
serve an imbalance from being made
whole for forgone opportunities to sell
excess energy to third parties. Ameren
contends that the Commission has
determined that not allowing the
recovery of opportunity costs is
inappropriate when the applicable rate
is lower than the market clearing
price.108 Ameren argues that excluding
opportunity costs unnecessarily harms
the transmission provider’s native load
customers since the revenues that the
utilities would have realized from
selling their excess energy would have
been credited back to those customers.
Southern and E.ON U.S. ask that the
Commission expressly provide that
incremental costs include opportunity
costs, as well as environmental costs,
capacity charges, dispatch losses and
other costs that the transmission
provider must bear to provide the
transmission customer with imbalance
service.
303. Some petitioners argue that it is
inappropriate to base the calculation of
incremental cost on the last 10 MW
dispatched to supply the transmission
provider’s native load.109 EEI argues
that the definition of incremental and
decremental cost should be determined
based on the cost to provide the last 10
MW of energy to serve the transmission
provider’s native load and all other
contractual or franchise obligations,
including the imbalance service itself.
Progress Energy and EEI contend that
the transmission provider almost always
incurs incremental costs per kWh that
are higher than the incremental costs of
serving its native load because native
load typically has first call on least-cost
resources. As a result, EEI argues that
the Commission’s definition of
incremental cost transfers to imbalance
customers the value of the difference
between the incremental cost per kWh
to serve native load and the incremental
cost per kWh to serve other contractual
commitments, to the detriment of either
the transmission provider or its native
load customers.
304. MidAmerican argues that the
Commission’s definition of incremental
cost could create an incentive to
deliberately under-generate in order to
receive the benefit of the transmission
provider’s least-cost dispatching. To
provide appropriate incentives, Progress
Energy asks that the Commission revise
the definition to include the cost of
providing the last 10 MW of energy to
serve the transmission provider’s native
108 Citing Xcel Energy Services, Inc., 117 FERC
¶ 61,127 (2006).
109 See, e.g., Ameren, EEI, MidAmerican, Progress
Energy, and Southern.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
load plus third party sales, while
MidAmerican argues that imbalance
charges should be based on the
incremental cost of the most expensive
10 MW of generation resources in
service at the time the imbalance occurs.
Southern contends that incremental cost
should be defined based on the next
(not the last) 10 MW dispatched.
Southern asserts that this distinction is
especially important in those instances
where the cost of the next 10 MW will
be significantly different than the last 10
MW, such as at the break point
requiring deployment of a combustion
turbine generator. Southern therefore
asks that the Commission grant
rehearing to establish separate
definitions for incremental and
decremental cost and revise the
definition of incremental cost so that it
is based on the next 10 MW dispatched.
305. EEI and Progress Energy also
seek clarification of the definition of,
and cost recovery for, decremental costs
in particular. EEI contends that the
definition adopted in Order No. 890
could result in the transmission
provider crediting the customer an
amount that exceeds the costs that the
transmission provider actually avoided
by accepting excess energy. EEI states,
for example, that a transmission
provider might decrease the output of a
dispatchable unit in response to an
imbalance even though it might also
have a higher-cost power purchase
contract with a fixed amount of energy
to be delivered in that hour. EEI argues
that the Commission’s definition of
decremental cost would require the
transmission provider to pay the
imbalance customer based on the
higher-cost purchased power resource
even though it has not avoided those
costs as a result of accepting the
customer’s excess energy. In EEI’s view,
decremental cost should be defined to
include costs that are avoided as a result
of receiving imbalance energy.
306. Progress Energy asks that the
definition of decremental cost be
clarified to allow the recovery of startup costs that are incurred in an hour
different from the hour of excess
imbalance. Progress Energy contends
that requiring a transmission provider to
accept excessive imbalance energy
could force it to cycle a unit off-line in
order to accommodate the energy.
Progress Energy argues that the later
start-up cost for the shut-down unit
should be passed along to the imbalance
customer, rather than shifted to the
native load.
307. Other entities assert the
Commission’s definition of incremental
cost is inappropriate in light of their
particular market structure. When a
PO 00000
Frm 00037
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3019
joint dispatch agreement exists between
the transmission provider and other
balancing authorities, MidAmerican
argues that the joint dispatch
incremental or decremental cost should
be used in place of native load since
there is no identification of the
transmission provider’s native load
other than as part of an aggregated,
jointly dispatched load. MidAmerican
also argues that transmission providers
may have little or no native load from
which to price imbalance costs in retail
choice states. NorthWestern agrees that
the definition of incremental cost fails
to consider the circumstances of
transmission providers that have little
or no generation on their system.
NorthWestern argues that the
Commission should have expressly
provided additional flexibility for such
transmission providers through the
definition of incremental cost instead of
requiring them to file under FPA section
205 for acceptance of previouslyapproved imbalance pricing based on
purchased power costs.
308. Entergy challenges as too narrow
the Commission’s decision to consider
on a case-by-case basis proposals to
charge separate regulation charges for
generation resources selling out of the
control area. Entergy states that the
generator imbalance provisions of its
OATT contain both a generator
imbalance charge and a generator
regulation charge, each of which are
calculated based on the internal and
external schedules submitted by
independent generators. Entergy argues
that this is appropriate because,
regardless of whether the load is within
the control area or outside the control
area, the generator has a schedule with
the control area that is met by control
area resources. Entergy contends that
applying a generation regulation charge
only to external transactions would be
arbitrary. Entergy requests clarification
that the generator regulation service
charges contained in its pro forma
Generator Imbalance Agreement, which
Entergy states was negotiated with
generators on its system, continues to be
acceptable.
Commission Determination
309. The Commission grants rehearing
of the decision to calculate incremental
costs for purposes of assessing
imbalance charges based on the last 10
MW dispatched to supply the
transmission provider’s native load.
Upon consideration of petitioners’
arguments, we agree that it is more
reasonable to base imbalance charges on
the actual cost to correct the imbalance,
which may be different than the cost of
serving native load. As such, we will
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3020
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
modify the definition to require
transmission providers to use the cost of
the last 10 MWs dispatched for any
purpose, i.e., to serve native load,
correct imbalances, or to make offsystem sales. We believe this satisfies
Southern’s concerns and therefore
decline to adopt its suggestion to
separately define incremental and
decremental cost for purposes of
calculating imbalance charges by using
the ‘‘next 10 MW of generation
dispatched’’ in the incremental cost
definition.
310. We also agree with Williams that,
in order to provide transparency and
minimize opportunities for undue
discrimination, each transmission
provider must provide language in its
OATT clearly specifying the method by
which it calculates incremental costs for
purposes of imbalance charges, as well
as the method it will use to obtain each
component of the calculation. We direct
transmission providers to include this
proposed tariff language as part of the
compliance filing ordered in section
II.C.
311. Several entities complain that the
Commission’s definition of incremental
cost does not properly allow for
recovery of opportunity costs. The
determination and calculation of
opportunity costs associated with
providing imbalance service will vary
based on the circumstances of the
transmission provider and, as such, we
do not believe that it is appropriate to
amend the definition of incremental
cost in the pro forma OATT to address
opportunity costs. We will therefore
continue to consider proposals to
include recovery of legitimate and
verifiable opportunity costs on a caseby-case basis consistent with
Commission precedent.110 Such
proposals must clearly explain how
opportunity costs would be determined
and demonstrate that the recovery of
opportunity costs would not lead to
over-recovery of costs. Similarly,
transmission providers participating in
joint dispatch agreements or otherwise
procuring imbalance energy from other
generators may need to have alternative
definitions of incremental cost.
Proposals to adopt a modified definition
of incremental cost to reflect the
transmission provider’s particular
circumstances also will be considered
on a case-by-case basis.
312. With regard to the definition of
incremental cost in particular, we
clarify that transmission providers can
include in the calculation of
incremental cost start-up costs that are
incurred in an hour different from the
110 See
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
e. Inadvertent Energy Treatment
314. The Commission found in Order
No. 890 that inadvertent energy is not
comparable to energy and generator
imbalances and, therefore, allowed
inadvertent energy to be treated
differently from imbalances. The
Commission explained that variables
affecting inadvertent interchange often
depend on the actions or the omissions
of utilities other than the individual
transmission providers and are distinct
from those resulting in energy and
generator imbalances. The Commission
concluded that the historic practice of
paying back inadvertent interchange in
kind has not proven to have adverse
effects on reliability.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
315. TDU Systems contend that the
Commission’s acceptance of in-kind
compensation for interchange energy
111 See Entergy Services, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,042
at P 66 (2007).
Order No. 888 at 31,740.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
hour of excess imbalance, provided that
the costs are in fact associated with
providing imbalance service. We
disagree with EEI with respect to its
description of incremental costs. The
fixed amount power purchase contract
in EEI’s example should not be used in
calculating incremental costs because it
would not be included in the last 10
MW of generation dispatched by the
transmission provider. In the case that
a transmission provider is ramping
down generation in an hour, the
additional costs of the last 10 MW
dispatched by the transmission provider
should be used in calculating
incremental costs for the purpose of
financially settling imbalances.
313. In response to Entergy, we clarify
that transmission providers may
propose to assess regulation charges to
generators selling in the control area, as
well as generators selling outside the
control area, and that the Commission
will consider such proposals on a caseby-case basis, as we have in the case of
Entergy’s pro forma Generator
Imbalance Agreement. In accordance
with the procedures established in
Order No. 890, Entergy sought
continued approval of its generator
imbalance provisions, including the
assessment of generator regulation
charges. The Commission accepted this
variation as consistent with or superior
to the pro forma OATT, based on the
particular circumstances presented by
Entergy.111 We will continue to consider
requests to assess regulation charges on
generators on a case-by-case basis upon
consideration of the facts and
circumstances presented.
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00038
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
undermines its rejection of requests to
allow transmission customers to address
monthly imbalances with in-kind
transfers. TDU Systems argue that there
is no evidentiary basis for the
Commission to conclude that
transmission providers have little
control over the causes of system
imbalances. TDU Systems state that
transmission providers typically control
80–90 percent of the load on their
systems and the dispatch of resources to
serve that load. In TDU Systems’ view,
both transmission provider and
transmission customer imbalances
result from circumstances beyond their
control, namely: telemetry failure, meter
error, generator governor response to
system problems, human error,
uncontrollable load forecast errors due
to rapidly changing weather, and underor over-supply of generation.
316. TDU Systems state that
deviations between load and supply,
whether in the form of energy
imbalances or inadvertent energy, each
require adjustment or compensation and
that there is no reason why that
adjustment or compensation should be
different among transmission users.
TDU Systems argue that failure to allow
for in-kind payment for imbalances
within the month provides a
competitive advantage to transmission
providers and constitutes undue
discrimination in violation of the FPA.
In their view, the Commission remedied
this discrimination within RTOs by
requiring in Order No. 2000 that the
same imbalance rules apply to
transmission users and control area
operators.112 TDU Systems argues that
the Commission fails to explain its
departure from its resolution of this
issue in the RTO context and that it is
irrelevant that transmission providers
may have historically paid back
inadvertent interchanges with in-kind
transfers without problem.
Commission Determination
317. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 to allow inadvertent energy to be
treated differently from energy and
generator imbalances. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, inadvertent energy is not
comparable to energy and generation
imbalances and the variables affecting
each are distinct. It is therefore
112 Citing Regional Transmission Organizations,
Order No. 2000, 65 FR 809 (Jan. 6, 2000), FERC
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,089 at 31,142 (1999), order on
reh’g, Order No. 2000–A, 65 FR 12088 (Mar. 8,
2000), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,092 (2000), aff’d sub
nom. Public Utility District No. 1 of Snohomish
County, Washington v. FERC, 272 F.3d 607 (D.C.
Cir. 2001).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
appropriate to treat inadvertent energy
and imbalances differently
notwithstanding the fact that both
inadvertent exchanges and imbalances
may be beyond the control of the
transmission provider or customer,
respectively.
318. Our primary concern with
respect to inadvertent energy continues
to be avoidance of incentives that could
degrade reliability. To date, the returnin-kind approach to inadvertent energy
has proven adequate as a general matter.
Petitioners do not present any evidence
that in-kind payment of inadvertent
energy is no longer sufficient to
maintain reliability or allows certain
entities to lean on the grid to the
detriment of other entities. We disagree
that this treatment of inadvertent energy
is inconsistent with Order No. 2000.
There the Commission required both
control area operators and transmission
customers within an RTO to clear
imbalances through a real-time
balancing market.113 In the absence of a
real-time balancing market, we continue
to believe it is appropriate for
transmission providers operating under
the pro forma OATT to treat inadvertent
interchange differently than customer
imbalances.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
f. Netting of Energy and Generator
Imbalances
319. In Order No. 890, the
Commission concluded that it is not
appropriate to require transmission
providers to allow netting of generator
and energy imbalances outside of the
tier one band. While the Commission
recognized that allowing transmission
customers to net energy and generator
imbalances would have competitive
benefits and enhance comparability, the
Commission determined that it could
lessen the incentive for accurate
scheduling and, in turn, increase
imbalances that create reliability or
economic issues for specific areas of the
system.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
320. Several petitioners ask that the
Commission clarify that netting and
settling within the first deviation band
should be done on a financial basis,
based on hourly incremental and
decremental costs, rather than netting
imbalances on the basis of megawatthours of imbalance and settling the net
imbalance on a financial basis.114 EEI,
MidAmerican and Progress Energy
assert that otherwise customers would
be able to offset energy shortfalls in on113 See
Order No. 2000 at 31,142.
EEI, MidAmerican, Southern, Progress
Energy, and Entergy.
peak, high-cost periods against excess
energy in off-peak, lower-cost hours,
which would inappropriately shift costs
to native load customers. If imbalances
are netted based on megawatt-hours
prior to financial settlement, EEI and
Progress Energy argue that it would be
impossible to calculate charges for net
imbalances at the end of the month
because the transmission provider
would not be able to correlate monthly
net imbalances with hourly incremental
and decremental costs without
exercising subjective judgment.
Southern and EEI contend that the
Commission, at a minimum, should
require the imbalances to be netted
separately for on-peak periods and offpeak periods if it determines that
imbalances should be netted on a
megawatt-hour basis. EEI suggests that
the price for net first tier imbalances
then be based on each month’s average
incremental and decremental costs,
calculated separately for on-peak
periods and off-peak periods.
321. Other petitioners assert that the
Commission should allow netting
outside of the first tier band.115 Ameren
argues that the threshold of the first tier
band is unnecessarily low, suggesting it
would be more appropriate to allow
imbalances of less than 10 MW to be
netted. For imbalances from 10 MW up
to as much as 50 MW, Ameren suggests
that the Commission allow netting of
imbalances equal to the greater of 10
MW or 50 percent of its scheduled
amount. TDU Systems argue that
transmission customers should be
allowed to net all imbalances across the
transmission system within a month,
reflecting appropriate differences for
imbalances incurred during peak and
off-peak hours. TDU Systems contend
that netting should be unrestricted
within the month so long as the results
keep the transmission provider
economically whole. TDU Systems
argue that there is no evidence that
netting creates reliability problems and
that limiting netting is not comparable
to the transmission provider’s treatment
of imbalances of its retail native load,
generation affiliates, and marketing
affiliates. TDU Systems also argue that
restricting netting within the month is
an unexplained departure from the
Commission’s treatment of natural gas
pipeline imbalances.
322. NRECA asks the Commission to
confirm, either on clarification or
rehearing, that separate imbalance
charges may not be assessed on each of
a customer’s separate transactions on an
interface or within a control area in a
single hour. NRECA contends that a
customer’s contribution to area control
error (ACE) on a given interface is no
more than the aggregate difference
between schedules and deliveries and,
therefore, its impact on the balance of
resources and loads within a control
area is no more than the aggregate
difference between its resources’ output
and its load. If a transmission provider’s
system is so underdeveloped that
constraints prevent transactions
sourcing at different locations within
the control area from being treated
comparably, the Commission should
require the transmission provider to
upgrade its system rather than penalize
the customer with multiple sets of
imbalance charges on separate
transactions.
Commission Determination
323. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to allow
netting of imbalances within the first
tier deviation band. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 890, there is a
tradeoff between allowing customers to
net imbalances, which would enhance
comparability between the transmission
provider’s dispatch and the customers
serving load, and the need to create
incentives to limit customer imbalances
due to the reliability or economic issues
they can cause for specific areas of the
system.116 Netting can cause problems
because it lessens the incentive for
transmission customers to schedule
accurately and inaccurate schedules, in
turn, can require actions by the
transmission provider even when
imbalances offset. We believe the
Commission struck the appropriate
balance in Order No. 890 between the
customer’s need for flexibility and the
transmission provider’s need for
accuracy and, therefore, deny TDU
Systems’ request to require netting of
imbalances outside the tier one band
and Ameren’s related request to expand
the tier one band for purposes of
netting.
324. We also deny NRECA’s request
that separate imbalance charges not be
assessed on each of a customer’s
separate transactions on an interface or
within a control area in a single hour.
Where transmission constraints exist, a
customer whose load and generation
was on net equal could still have an
effect on the transmission system if
some generation is ramping up to
respond to some imbalances while other
generation is ramping down exactly at
the same time. We disagree with TDU
Systems that our decision is an
unexplained departure from the
Commission’s treatment of natural gas
114 E.g.,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
115 E.g.,
PO 00000
TAPS, Ameren, and TDU Systems.
Frm 00039
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3021
116 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 715.
16JAR2
3022
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
pipeline imbalances. Natural gas
pipelines frequently have opportunities
to use storage and line pack to absorb
day-to-day imbalances. Individual
pipelines have tailored their imbalance
requirements, including penalty
provisions as needed, to meet their
specific circumstances. The
transmission of electricity, in contrast to
the transportation of natural gas,
requires instantaneous balancing which
makes the need for imbalance
provisions on a shorter-term basis
important for the protection of
reliability. NERC has created standards
such that each control area is
responsible for managing its Area
Control Error and operating within line
limits in order to protect reliability.
Imbalances created by transmission
customers impose an additional burden
on the transmission provider to manage
imbalances within the hour (as well as
shorter time periods) justifying a
different tariff approach under the pro
forma OATT. As such, the imbalances
provisions adopted in the pro forma
OATT are used to protect reliability
during the applicable time period.
325. With regard to netting within the
tier one band, we clarify that netting
should be done on a megawatt-hour
basis, rolling over the month.
Imbalances remaining at the end of the
month should be settled at the load
weighted average of the hourly
incremental costs during that month.117
We decline to require that imbalances
be netted separately for on-peak and offpeak periods. Netting only applies to
imbalances within the tier one band,
which are relatively minor and largely
within the normal range of uncertainty
that cannot be avoided even under
optimal operating conditions. We
therefore disagree that it is necessary to
adopt a more granular imbalance pricing
mechanism when netting imbalances
within the first tier. However, if a
transmission provider finds that its
customers are arbitraging on-peak and
off-peak prices within the first tier, it
may propose a more granular approach
to netting subject to a showing that it is
necessary under the circumstances.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
g. Distribution of Penalty Revenues
Above Incremental Cost
326. With regard to revenues received
through imbalance charges, the
Commission required transmission
117 For example, if a generator had 5 imbalances
within the first deviation band in a month of +2
MWh, ¥6 MWh, +4 MWh, ¥2 MWh, ¥1 MWh, the
net MWh imbalance for the generator at the end of
the month would be ¥3 MWh. The generator
would pay the transmission provider for 3 MWh at
the load weighted average of the hourly incremental
costs during that month.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
providers to develop a mechanism for
crediting such revenues to all nonoffending transmission customers,
including affiliated transmission
customers, and the transmission
provider on behalf of its own customers.
The Commission concluded that such
distribution of revenues recognizes that
transmission providers bear the
responsibility to correct imbalances and
often use their own facilities to do so.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
327. Ameren contends that the
transmission provider should be
allowed to keep all the penalty revenues
associated with correcting imbalances
and that development of a credit
mechanism imposes an unnecessary and
unwarranted administrative burden on
transmission providers. Ameren argues
that the transmission provider should
receive any amounts above its
incremental costs of providing
imbalance service as a contribution
towards the fixed costs of providing this
service and that any revenues from
penalties assessed on customers for
leaning on the system should be
credited to long-term firm transmission
customers.
328. TDU Systems, however, object to
the Commission’s decision to allow
transmission providers to retain a
portion of the imbalance penalty
revenues for their own retail customers.
TDU Systems contend that transmission
providers do not pay imbalance
penalties when they over- or underschedule their loads and, thus, receipt
of related penalty revenues by
transmission providers would constitute
a windfall. TDU Systems argue that the
Commission failed to explain its
departure from Carolina Power &
Light 118 because the Commission’s
decision in that case to deny credits to
CP&L on behalf of its retail customers
was based on those customers not being
subject to energy imbalance penalties in
the first place. TDU Systems contend
that this fundamental paradigm has not
changed with reform of the OATT.
329. MidAmerican requests
clarification that it is appropriate to
propose its imbalance penalty
distribution mechanism in the
compliance filing containing the nonrate terms and conditions of the pro
forma OATT. Joined by NorthWestern
and Mark Lively, MidAmerican also
requests guidance as to the particular
information the Commission would
require in those filings with regard to
the penalty distribution mechanism.
NorthWestern asks the Commission to
specify how the transmission provider
118 103
PO 00000
FERC ¶ 61,209 (2003) (CP&L).
Frm 00040
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
should determine what customers are
non-offending and over what period of
time. Mark Lively seeks clarification of
the time frame during which there is to
be a matching of penalty revenue and
credits to non-offending customers. If
the matching is done on a monthly
basis, Mark Lively contends that most if
not all transmission customers will be
found to be offending at some time
during the month and thus not be
eligible to be in the class of customers
to receive a credit for part of the penalty
revenue collected by the transmission
provider. Mark Lively suggests an
alternative crediting mechanism to
synchronize penalties and credits by
having the variance from full
incremental cost be uniform for any
hour or any intra-hour period, with
revenues from over-deliveries shared
with non-offending load and revenues
from under-deliveries shared with nonoffending supply.
330. NorthWestern also asks the
Commission to expressly confirm that
the transmission provider is not
required to distribute penalty revenues
until after it recovers all costs (including
any associated transmission costs)
incurred in providing imbalance
service. NorthWestern contends that the
market for such services is limited and,
as a result, it has had to contract with
entities located outside its control area
for system balancing and load following
services in order to provide imbalance
service.
Commission Determination
331. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to credit
revenues from imbalance charges in
excess of incremental costs to all nonoffending customers, including
affiliates, and the transmission provider
on behalf of its retail customers. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, transmission providers with
significant imbalance penalties have
been required in the past to develop a
mechanism to credit penalty revenues to
non-offending transmission
customers.119 We disagree with Ameren
that this imposes an unreasonable
administrative burden on transmission
providers. We note that Ameren did not
seek rehearing of the decision to require
transmission providers to develop a
similar mechanism to distribute
unreserved use penalties to nonoffending customers, discussed in
section III.C.4.b.120 We would not
119 See Order No. 890 at P 727 (citing CP&L, 103
FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 25; Entergy Services, Inc., 105
FERC ¶ 61,319 (2003), reh’g denied, 109 FERC
¶ 61,095 (2004)).
120 See id. at P 860–61.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
expect development of that distribution
mechanism to be any more burdensome
than distributions of imbalance penalty
revenues.
332. We also disagree with TDU
Systems that the transmission provider
on behalf of its native load customers
should be excluded from the
distribution of imbalance revenues.
Transmission providers bear the
responsibility to correct imbalances,
often using their own facilities to do so,
and thus their receipt of imbalance
revenues does not constitute a windfall.
While it is true that the Commission in
CP&L considered relevant the fact that
CP&L’s customers were not subject to
imbalance charges, the Commission
expressly rejected CP&L’s proposal to
retain revenues because it would have
been ‘‘contrary to the Commission’s
objective to eliminate incentives for
transmission providers to use penalties
as a profit center.’’ 121 The imbalance
charges adopted in Order No. 890 more
closely relate to incremental cost and
therefore minimize any incentive on the
part of the transmission provider to rely
on penalty revenues rather than seeking
other methods of encouraging accurate
scheduling. Under these circumstances,
there remains no reason to exclude the
transmission provider from receiving an
appropriate share of penalty revenues.
333. Regarding the time frame during
which there is to be a matching of
penalty revenue and credits to nonoffending customers, we clarify that the
transmission provider should distribute
the penalty revenue received in a given
hour to those non-offending customers
in that hour, i.e., those customers to
whom the penalty component did not
apply in the hour. Customers that were
out of balance, but within the first tier,
should therefore be included in the
distribution. Since most transmission
customers will be out of the first
deviation band at some hour during the
month, we agree that it would not be
appropriate to exclude these customers
from receiving a pro rata portion of
penalty revenues in the other hours. In
response to NorthWestern, we clarify
that the transmission provider, as part of
its distribution methodology, may
address how distributions may be
affected by the transmission provider’s
inability to recover the costs incurred to
provide imbalance service.
2. Credits for Network Customers
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
a. Severance of Credits and Planning
334. In Order No. 890, the
Commission adopted the NOPR
proposal to sever the link in the pro
121 CP&L,
103 FERC ¶ 61,209 at P 26.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
3023
forma OATT between joint planning
and credits for new facilities owned by
network customers. The Commission
concluded that linking credits for new
facilities to a joint planning requirement
can act as a disincentive to coordinated
planning, which is contrary to the
Commission’s original objective in
adopting the provision. The
Commission also concluded that the
coordinated planning initiatives
adopted in Order No. 890 will ensure
that most, if not all, transmission
facilities are planned on a coordinated
basis, notwithstanding the severance of
the link between credits for new
facilities and joint planning.
deny coordinated planning to avoid
granting credits for customer-owned
facilities.122 Therefore, it was necessary
to sever the link between credits and
joint planning. Any efficiencies that
may be lost by severing that link should
be offset by the increased efficiencies
resulting from the coordinated planning
initiative required in Order No. 890,
which the Commission noted will
ensure that most, if not all, transmission
facilities are planned on a coordinated
basis.123 With the clarifications
provided below, we do not expect that
severing the link between joint planning
and credits will lead to unnecessary
litigation.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
335. E.ON U.S. argues on rehearing
that the Commission failed to
adequately address comments
suggesting that severing the link will
excuse network customers from
participating in the joint planning
process and permit a network customer
to build facilities without oversight or
input from a transmission provider.
While Order No. 890 places an
affirmative burden on the transmission
provider to coordinate long-term
transmission planning, E.ON U.S. states
that no corresponding obligation is
placed on the transmission customer.
E.ON U.S. argues that transmission
service credits for facilities constructed
by network customers should be
available only when the facility is
jointly planned with the transmission
provider.
336. NorthWestern agrees, arguing
that if a network customer is permitted
to construct facilities and later declare
them to be worthy of a credit, such
facilities will not serve the overall grid
as efficiently as jointly planned
facilities. NorthWestern also argues that
severing the link will lead to protracted
litigation regarding what facilities
qualify for credits. To ensure efficient
coordination of facility planning,
NorthWestern requests that the
Commission reconsider its decision to
sever joint planning and transmission
service credits.
b. The New Test To Determine
Eligibility for Credits
338. In Order No. 890, the
Commission declined to adopt the
credits test for new facilities proposed
in the NOPR and, instead, revised the
test to more accurately reflect the
Commission’s intent as expressed in the
NOPR. A transmission customer is
required to meet the integration
standard under pro forma OATT section
30.9 to receive a credit for its facilities.
Under the integration standard, the
customer must demonstrate that its
facilities not only are integrated with
the transmission provider’s system, but
also provide additional benefits to the
transmission grid in terms of capability
and reliability and can be relied on by
the transmission provider for the
coordinated operation of the grid.124
Because joint planning will no longer be
required to obtain credits, the
Commission noted that it is particularly
important in this context to require a
showing that a network customer’s
facilities provide benefits to the
transmission provider’s grid. To ensure
comparability, the Commission adopted
the presumption of integration for
transmission customer facilities that, if
owned by the transmission provider,
would be eligible for inclusion in the
transmission provider’s annual
transmission revenue requirement as
specified in Attachment H of the pro
forma OATT.
Commission Determination
337. E.ON U.S. and NorthWestern
both argue that, by severing the link
between joint planning and credits for
network customers, the Commission is
sacrificing the benefits that resulted
when a transmission provider made
credits available as part of its
centralized planning process. We
disagree. As the Commission explained
in Order No. 890, the linkage between
credits and joint planning gave the
transmission provider an incentive to
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
339. NRECA, TAPS and the TDU
Systems request that the Commission
confirm that the integration requirement
under Order No. 890 does not require a
more stringent standard for network
customer facilities than for transmission
provider facilities or in any way
PO 00000
Frm 00041
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
122 See
Order No. 890 at P 735.
id. at P 736.
124 See id. at P 754, n.436 (citing Southwest Power
Pool, Inc., 108 FERC ¶ 61,078 (2004), reh’g denied,
114 FERC ¶ 61,028 (2006)).
123 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3024
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
compromise the language in section
30.9 of the pro forma OATT. NRECA
argues that the language in Paragraph
754 of Order No. 890 and, in particular
the affirmation of the ‘‘benefits to the
grid’’ test in footnote 436, contradict
section 30.9 by establishing an
explicitly different and harder test for
transmission customer facilities than for
transmission provider facilities. Other
petitioners agree,125 requesting that the
Commission explain that it did not
intend to impose the ‘‘additional
benefits to the grid’’ and ‘‘relied on by
the transmission provider’’ criteria
(which they state are not required for a
transmission provider’s facilities) on a
network customer’s facilities.
340. Several petitioners argue that an
integration standard requiring the
showing of benefits to the grid is unduly
discriminatory because it maintains the
presumption that a transmission
provider’s transmission facilities
provide benefits while requiring a
network customer to make an
affirmative showing that its facilities
provide benefits to qualify for credits.126
FMPA and TDU Systems argue that
comparability requires the same
presumption of integration to be applied
to all transmission facilities. To provide
certainty for those building new
infrastructure, TDU Systems contend
that the Commission should require
transmission providers to credit third
parties for the costs of new facilities in
a manner comparable to the
compensation provided for a
transmission provider’s comparable
facilities.
341. APPA contends that the
presumption of integration is confusing
because it is unclear how a network
customer would make a showing that
facilities would be eligible for inclusion
in a transmission provider’s revenue
requirement if owned by the
transmission provider or what the
specific legal effect would be if the
network customer succeeded in making
such showing. APPA suggests that the
Commission require credits if the
customer can show that the
transmission provider includes in its
own revenue requirement or gives
credits to other customers for facilities
similar to those for which the networks
customer seeks credits.
342. In implementing the
presumption of integration to obtain
credits, TAPS and APPA maintain that
the Commission cannot require a
network customer to show more than
that its facilities are comparable to
similar facilities the transmission
provider actually includes in its rate
base. TAPS argues that the Commission
should clarify that the presumption
cannot be overcome by evidence that
the transmission provider and the
transmission provider’s other customers
do not use or directly benefit from the
customer-owned facilities. TAPS
therefore requests that the Commission
make clear that it will not follow
precedents developed in credit cases
decided under the original OATT
section 30.9 regarding the types of
‘‘benefits’’ provided by a customer’s
facilities. Specifically, TAPS argues that
a network customer of a transmission
provider that includes the cost of
facilities (including radials) that are
used solely to serve the transmission
provider’s retail customers must be able
to use the Order No. 890’s presumption
to obtain credits for similar facilities
that serve only that transmission
customer’s retail customers.
343. FMPA also oppose any
implementation of the Commission’s
integration test that treats customers and
transmission providers differently.
FMPA argue that, if a customer’s
facilities are necessary to serve the
customer’s load, the customer should be
provided a credit since the transmission
provider includes in rate base the cost
of its facilities used to serve load. In
their view, the same presumption of
integration applies to all transmission
facilities, i.e., that transmission is
integrated when, if owned by the
transmission provider, it would be
includable in rate base. FMPA cite
legislative history and the court’s
decision in TAPS v. FERC 127 in support
of their argument that the comparability
principle is central to the issue of cost
recognition for customer facilities.
FMPA contend that recognizing their
members’ transmission through credits
is beneficial because it involves all
owners in joint planning and the
exchange of information that results in
grid construction and operation that
will better serve the needs of all
consumers. Without this role in joint
planning, less reliable transmission and
fewer generation and power supply
options for systems will result. In
addition, if credits are denied, FMPA
will be inhibited from contributing
necessary capital to the grid and likely
result in reduced public support for
transmission construction.
344. Other petitioners contend that
the Commission should eliminate any
presumption that a network customer is
entitled to credits, arguing that the
presumption violates the cost-causation
principle by shifting costs to customers
for whom the facilities were not
planned and who are not benefited by
their use.128 These petitioners contend
that a network customer’s facilities are
not planned around the needs of the
transmission provider to meet its
obligations and many customer facilities
are designed only to pick up power from
the transmission provider’s grid and
deliver it to that network customer’s
distribution network.129 These
petitioners request that the Commission
allow for credits only when the
customer’s facilities provide a benefit to
the transmission provider’s grid, i.e.,
when the transmission provider relies
on a network customer’s facility to serve
the transmission provider’s
transmission customers (including the
network customer seeking credits) or the
transmission provider’s retail
customers. They argue that there is no
basis to presume integration simply
because the transmission provider
would include the cost of such facilities
were it the owner.
345. South Carolina E&G argues a
presumption of integration will
encourage customer overbuilding paid
for by a transmission provider’s native
load customers. South Carolina E&G
asks that the Commission confirm that
it is not departing from the decade-old
two-part test for credits for customerowned facilities that requires that the
facilities are both integrated into the
network grid and provide benefits to the
grid. South Carolina E&G disagrees that
any revision to that test is required by
comparability. In its view, customerowned facilities are not comparable to
transmission provider-owned facilities
for purposes of credit eligibility, since
each are built for different purposes and
are subject to different regulatory
oversight.
346. Florida Power argues that the
application of the rebuttable
presumption may impact reliability.
Florida Power contends that, under the
new test for credits, a transmission
provider must show that it does not
need the network customer’s facilities to
provide transmission service to any
other customer in order to deny credits.
Florida Power states that this could
result in a network customer being
denied credits for a facility even if the
transmission provider needs the facility
to reliably serve the network customer.
347. Entergy and Florida Power also
request that the Commission change its
policy of applying a stricter standard to
a transmission provider’s own facilities
128 E.g.,
125 E.g.,
TAPS and TDU Systems.
126 E.g., APPA, FMPA, NRECA and TAPS.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
127 225
F.3d 667, 681 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff’d sub
nom., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
PO 00000
Frm 00042
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Entergy and Florida Power.
Entergy, Florida Power and South
Carolina E&G.
129 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
when a network customer has been
denied credits. These petitioners state
that, when the Commission denies
credits for customer-owned facilities, it
applies the same integration test to the
transmission provider’s facilities as that
applied to the network customer’s
facilities. The petitioners argue that
application of the integration test to the
transmission provider’s facilities in that
instance is unreasonable since the
nature of those facilities does not
change. They argue that different tests
for transmission providers and network
customer systems are appropriate since
each are planned for and used
differently. In their view, concerns
about comparability can be addressed
by allowing a transmission provider’s
looped facility to be rolled into rate base
only if the transmission provider uses
the facility to serve a transmission
customer or the transmission customer’s
retail customers.
348. Entergy and Florida Power
further claim that the Commission’s
approach is inconsistent with the
treatment of generator interconnections
because the Commission’s policy
entitling an interconnecting generator to
credits against transmission charges
does not change simply because the
Commission has denied a network
customer credits. These petitioners
contend that an interconnecting
generator could be entitled to credits
when at the same time the transmission
provider could be prohibited from
rolling the costs of those credits into its
rates.
Commission Determination
349. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 to modify the credits test for new
customer-owned facilities. In Order No.
890, the Commission explained that it
was retaining the existing integration
standard, but adopting a new
presumption of integration for
customer-owned facilities that would be
included in rate base if owned by the
transmission provider.130 The
integration standard to be applied to
new facilities under section 30.9
therefore remains unchanged, so
Commission precedent regarding
application of the standard will
continue to apply. Specifically, to
satisfy the integration standard set forth
in section 30.9 of the pro forma OATT,
it must be shown that a new facility is
integrated with a transmission
provider’s system, provides additional
benefits to the transmission grid in
terms of capability and reliability, and
can be relied on by the transmission
130 Order
No. 890 at P 753–754.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
provider for the coordinated operation
of the grid.131 However, in recognition
of the new requirement for transmission
providers to plan their system on an
open and coordinated basis, a
customer’s transmission facilities will
be presumed to be integrated if the
facilities, if owned by the transmission
provider, would be eligible for inclusion
in the transmission provider’s annual
transmission revenue requirement as
specified in Attachment H of the pro
forma OATT.
350. The adoption of this
presumption is necessary to ensure
comparability between network
customers and transmission providers
serving native load. It is reasonable to
presume, without application of any
particular standard or test, that the
transmission provider’s facilities benefit
the network because they are planned,
constructed and owned, from the
beginning, by the transmission provider
to meet its obligations to its customers.
In comparison, because customerowned facilities are generally
constructed to serve that individual
customer’s needs, the Commission
requires the customer to satisfy the
integration standard in order to qualify
for credits. The Commission concluded
in Order No. 890 that it is now
reasonable to presume that any new
customer-owned facilities satisfy the
integration standard, to the extent they
would be included in the transmission
provider’s revenue requirement if they
were owned by the transmission
provider, in light of the requirement
imposed on transmission providers to
implement an open and coordinated
transmission planning process that
applies to all transmission facilities.
351. To the extent necessary, we
clarify that these presumptions of
integration are rebuttable both as
applied to the transmission provider
and the network customer. For the
network customers’ facilities,
transmission providers may challenge
the presumption that the customer’s
facilities are integrated by showing they
do not actually meet the integration
standard, notwithstanding the fact that
they are similar to facilities in the
transmission provider’s rate base.
Similarly, the presumption that a
transmission provider’s facilities benefit
the network could be overcome by a
showing that the facilities, in fact, do
not provide such benefit. By allowing
the presumptions of integration to be
rebutted, the Commission will ensure
that only the costs of facilities that are
131 Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 108 FERC
¶ 61,078 at P 17 (2004) (citing Order No. 888–A at
30,271), reh’g denied, 114 FERC ¶ 61,028 (2006).
PO 00000
Frm 00043
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3025
actually part of the integrated network
that serves all customers will receive
credits. It also serves as an incentive for
the transmission provider to give credits
to network customers that own
integrated facilities and remove from its
rate base its own non-integrated
facilities.
352. In light of the modifications to
the credits test adopted in Order No.
890, we further clarify that denial of
credits for a network customer no longer
triggers a need for the transmission
provider to demonstrate that its own
facilities satisfy the integration
standard, because credits for network
customer facilities can now be denied
only after an affirmative showing by the
transmission provider that its facilities
are not similar under the integration test
to those of the network customer (i.e., by
overcoming the presumption of
integration). This approach departs from
the approach adopted in FP&L,132 but
reflects the fact that the new rebuttable
presumption in favor of the
transmission customer has shifted the
burden to the transmission provider to
provide evidence that credits for the
customer are not warranted.
353. To provide clarity regarding how
to implement the presumption that a
network customer’s facilities are
integrated, we make clear that a network
customer may justify application of the
presumption by reference to the existing
facilities in the transmission provider’s
rates. A customer need only show that
its new facilities are similar in design
and purpose to facilities owned by the
transmission provider that are included
in rates. A transmission provider may
overcome the network customer’s
presumed integration by demonstrating,
with reference to its own facilities that
meet the integration standard, that the
network customer’s new facilities do not
meet the standard. To the extent there
are disputes regarding whether a
customer’s new facilities are sufficiently
similar to those in the transmission
provider’s rate base, we encourage
transmission providers and customers to
resolve those disputes informally or
with the assistance of the Commission’s
Dispute Resolution Service.
354. We reject requests to eliminate
the presumption of integration for new
customer-owned facilities, as advocated
by certain transmission providers. The
planning-related reforms adopted in
132 Florida Mun. Power Agency v. Florida Power
and Light Co., 74 FERC ¶ 61,006 at 61,010 (1996)
(finding that the integration of facilities into the
plans or operations of a transmitting utility is the
proper test for cost recognition), reh’g denied, 96
FERC ¶ 61,130 at 61,544–45 (2001), aff’d sub nom.
Florida Mun. Power Agency v. FERC, 315 F.3d 362
(D.C. Cir. 2003).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3026
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Order No. 890 will ensure that a process
exists to jointly plan all transmission
facilities, including new facilities
developed by customers. Comparability
requires that transmission providers and
customers alike benefit from a
presumption of integration. It is also
appropriate for both the transmission
provider and its customers to be subject
to the integration standard to the extent
the presumption of integration is
overcome, notwithstanding any
coordinated planning of those facilities.
Under Order No. 890, the Commission
therefore will not apply, as some
petitioners imply, a different or stricter
standard to a transmission provider’s
own facilities when a network customer
has been denied credits.
355. We disagree with claims that a
presumption of credits for certain
customer-owned facilities will
encourage over-building or harm
reliability. Facilities owned by
transmission providers have long
enjoyed a presumption of integration,
yet petitioners do not object to the
presumption as applied to those
facilities. Petitioners offer no reason to
believe that application of a comparable
presumption for new customer-owner
facilities would lead to reliability or
operational difficulties, particularly in
light of the obligation for transmission
providers under Order No. 890 to plan
their transmission systems on an open
and coordinated basis.133 We also
believe that it is unlikely that a
transmission provider would be
required to provide credits to an
interconnecting generator, but be
prohibited from rolling the same credits
into its rates. Nevertheless, should any
such circumstance arise, the
transmission provider should bring the
issue to the Commission’s attention for
resolution.
c. Application of the New Test to
Existing Facilities
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
356. In Order No. 890, the
Commission concluded that the new
test for determining credits will apply
only to transmission facilities added
subsequent to the effective date of Order
No. 890. The Commission found that
there is no reason to revisit the
determinations with respect to the
number of customer-owned
transmission facilities that have been
developed, and resulted in credits
negotiated and litigated, under the prior
test that the Commission determined to
133 As we discuss in section III.B, planning
activities must be open to all customers, who must
provide information regarding expected uses of the
system so that the transmission provider can plan
for their needs.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
be just and reasonable at the time.134 On
a prospective basis, however, given the
increased planning and coordination
required in Order No. 890, the
Commission stated that it is appropriate
to apply the new test for determining
credits.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
357. Several petitioners contend that
it is inappropriate for the Commission
to conclude that the newly announced
test for determining credits under OATT
section 30.9 will apply only to
transmission facilities added subsequent
to the effective date of Order No. 890,
arguing that the Commission should
remedy past undue discrimination
against network service customers such
as the failure of transmission providers
to jointly plan facilities with
transmission customers.135 APPA also
asks that the Commission explain why
this result is legally appropriate.
358. NRECA contends that the
Commission should apply the new test
for transmission credits to both existing
and new facilities, but clarify that
existing credit agreements or
determinations will not be impacted.
NRECA argues that Mobile-Sierra
concerns can be avoided by applying
the new test to facilities that are built
but not yet the subject of a credits
agreement or determination. APPA
suggests that allowing network
customers to obtain credits going
forward for existing facilities that are
comparable to those the transmission
provider includes in its revenue
requirement would be a reasonable
remedy for past discrimination. Noting
the Commission’s requirement for
transmission providers to remove all
generator step-up facility costs from
their transmission rates (not only those
costs incurred after the Commission
changed its policy in Order No. 888),
TAPS maintains that the ‘‘correct and
fair approach’’ is to prospectively
remedy such discrimination by applying
the new standard to both existing and
new facilities.136 To do otherwise
would, in TAPS’ view, undermine
comparability.
359. TDU Systems argue that the
Commission cannot endorse rates that it
knows are unjust and unreasonable and,
therefore, agree that transmission
134 See East Texas Electric Coop., Inc. v. Central
and South West Services, Inc., 114 FERC ¶ 61,027
(2006).
135 E.g., APPA, East Texas Cooperatives, FMPA,
NRECA, TAPS and TDU Systems.
136 TAPS also cites Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co.,
104 FERC ¶ 61,063 (2003), order on reh’g, 108 FERC
¶ 61,177 (2004), order on reh’g, 110 FERC ¶ 61,385
(2005) for the proposition that new policies can be
implemented for existing contracts.
PO 00000
Frm 00044
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
customers should be credited for
transmission facilities regardless of their
vintage to the extent the facilities have
not been subject to a prior
determination. TDU Systems contend
that Order No. 890 failed to adequately
justify allowing rates to remain in place
that reflect undue discrimination.
FMPA argue that comparability
similarly requires that the Commission
apply the presumption of integration to
existing as well as new customer-owned
facilities, since both existing and new
transmission provider-owned facilities
are presumed to provide benefits to the
grid.
360. Entergy and Florida Power ask
that, to the extent the Commission
applies the new test to transmission
provider facilities, the rule apply only to
new facilities constructed by the
transmission provider, not to existing
facilities.
Commission Determination
361. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision to apply the
modified test for credits only to
transmission facilities added subsequent
to the effective date of Order No. 890.
In light of the new planning and
coordination required in Order No. 890,
it is appropriate to apply the new test
on a prospective basis.137 Existing
facilities, by definition, have been
developed without the benefit of the
planning-related reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 and, therefore, are not
similarly situated to new facilities
developed after the effectiveness of
Order No. 890. As a result, only a
network customer’s new facilities will
be subject to the presumption of
integration standard. Similarly, the
existing presumption applied to the
transmission provider’s facilities will
continue to allow it to include in its rate
base from the outset all network
facilities constructed to meet its
obligations to its customers, provided
the presumption is not rebutted.
d. Cost of Customer Facilities
Automatically Included in Transmission
Provider Cost of Service Without a Rate
Filing
362. Noting that automatic recovery of
the costs of credits would be contrary to
the Commission’s long-standing policy
concerning single-issue rate
adjustments, the Commission declined
to generically allow automatic recovery
of the costs of credits associated with
integrated transmission facilities to the
transmission provider’s cost of service.
The Commission explained that
transmission providers continue to have
137 Order
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
No. 890 at P 758.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the option to propose an automatic
adjustment clause in their rates under
FPA section 205 to address the time lag
between incurring costs associated with
credits and the transmission provider’s
next rate case.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
363. Florida Power requests that the
Commission grant rehearing of the
decision that customer credits do not
warrant an exception to the
Commission’s general policy regarding
single-issue rate adjustments. Florida
Power argues that a transmission
provider should not be required to
dedicate the extensive resources
required by a full-blown rate case to
recover costs that, in its view, it has
been forced to incur by the
Commission’s policy and over which it
has no control.
364. E.ON U.S. requests that the
Commission clarify that payment of
credits is dependent on the transmission
provider’s ability to recover the costs of
the credits. E.ON U.S. asks that the
Commission adopt one of the following
requirements: if the network customer’s
facilities are to be eligible for credits,
the network customer must petition the
Commission for a declaratory order
stating that the transmission provider
will be able to recover costs for the
credits in the transmission provider’s
next rate case; the transmission provider
need not provide the network customer
with credits for its facilities until the
costs of the credits are approved in the
transmission provider’s next rate case;
or if the cost of the credits are rejected
in the transmission provider’s next rate
case, the network customer is required
to refund any amounts collected
through the transmission credits, plus
interest.
365. APPA asks that the Commission
clarify that, if a transmission provider
denies credits for network customer
owned facilities, the transmission
provider has a corresponding obligation
to take steps to strip the costs of similar
transmission facilities out of its own
transmission revenue requirement
where comparability requires such a
result. TAPS argues that nothing in
Order No. 890 altered the transmission
provider’s existing obligation to remove
from its rate base transmission provider
facilities comparable to those for which
it denies credits to network customers.
Commission Determination
366. The Commission affirms its
decision in Order No. 890 not to
generically allow automatic rate
recovery of the costs of credits
associated with integrated transmission
facilities to the transmission provider’s
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
cost of service. As explained in Order
No. 890, automatic recovery would be
contrary to our long-standing policy
concerning single-issue rate
adjustments, and transmission providers
continue to have the option to propose
an automatic adjustment clause in their
rates under FPA section 205 to address
the time lag between incurring costs
associated with credits and the
transmission provider’s next rate
case.138 Since transmission providers
may choose to add an automatic
adjustment clause to their rates to
address any lag in cost recovery, we
reject as unnecessary the alternative
proposals offered by E.ON U.S.
367. As for APPA’s argument
regarding the transmission provider’s
obligation to remove nonintegrated
facilities from its revenue requirement,
as explained above, the denial of credits
for a network customer will no longer
trigger an examination of the
transmission provider’s own facilities.
Rather, the presumption of integration
shall be rebuttable for transmission
providers and customers alike. If it
becomes apparent that the transmission
provider has included facilities in its
revenue requirement that are ineligible,
such as when the transmission provider
relies on its own facilities to
demonstrate the lack of integration for
customer-owned facilities, the network
customer or the Commission, as
appropriate, may initiate a complaint
proceeding to have such facilities
removed from rates.
e. RTO and ISO Issues
368. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that it would not be
appropriate to generically exempt all
RTOs and ISOs from the revised
requirements regarding credits for
network transmission customers. The
Commission stated that it would
address issues relating to network
transmission customer credits in the
RTO and ISO context in orders
addressing OATT reform compliance
filings submitted by each RTO and ISO.
The Commission noted its prior
determination that the existing tariffs of
certain RTOs and ISOs provide
opportunities for transmission
customers to receive credit or the
equivalent (e.g., Transmission
Congestion Contracts, Firm
Transmission Rights or Auction
Revenue Rights) for building facilities or
upgrades that are consistent with or
superior to Order No. 888
requirements.139 The Commission
explained that each RTO and ISO would
138 See
139 See
PO 00000
have the opportunity to show on
compliance that this continues to be the
case given the reforms adopted in Order
No. 890.
369. The Commission also addressed
a request by NRECA to prohibit RTOs
and ISOs from using a non-public
utility’s transmission facilities without
compensating the entity because it is
not a member of the RTO/ISO. The
Commission found that there is not
enough evidence on the record to make
a generic determination on that issue.
The Commission instead concluded it
would be appropriate to address such
issues on a case-by-case basis in
response to appropriate filings under
FPA sections 205 and 206.
Requests for Rehearing and/or
Clarification
370. TAPS is concerned that Order
No. 890 suggests that RTOs/ISOs can
justify an exemption from OATT section
30.9 by claiming that firm transmission
rights or similar mechanisms are the
‘‘equivalent’’ of credits under section
30.9. TAPS states that the RTO/ISO
tariff provisions referred to by the
Commission relate only to upgrades,
which are funded by a customer but
owned by a transmission owner, for a
new service request or generator
interconnection. TAPS therefore
requests clarification that the rules with
respect to whether a network customer
funding facilities owned by a
transmission owner should receive firm
transmission rights in lieu of credits are
unrelated to, and should not be
confused with, the requirement in
OATT section 30.9 that a network
customer must be compensated for
customer-owned facilities in a manner
comparable to transmission owners.
371. NRECA reiterates its argument
that the Commission should require
RTOs/ISOs to compensate nonjurisdictional entities for use of the nonjurisdictional entities’ transmission
facilities as required by the principle of
comparability. NRECA argues that the
issue is purely legal and that no
additional evidence is necessary, since
NRECA is not seeking a ruling that a
particular entity is entitled to
compensation. NRECA states that the
Commission’s reliance on a ‘‘case-bycase’’ approach will be illusory if the
Commission dismisses a complaint by a
non-jurisdictional utility on the ground
that the Commission has no jurisdiction
over the non-jurisdictional entity’s rates
id. at P 766.
id. at P 773, n.447.
Frm 00045
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3027
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3028
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA,
as it did in Central Iowa Power Coop.140
Commission Determination
372. It was not the Commission’s
intention in Order No. 890 to prejudge
whether Transmission Congestion
Contracts, Firm Transmission Rights or
Auction Revenue Rights should be
treated as equivalents to the credits
available under section 30.9 of the pro
forma OATT. The Commission simply
noted that those mechanisms exist and
that the Commission would determine,
as it evaluated compliance filings from
individual ISOs and RTOs, whether
such mechanisms served the same
purpose and goal of section 30.9 and, in
turn, should be considered proper
substitutes for network customer
credits. To the extent TAPS or others
object to proposals made by a particular
RTO or ISO, the appropriate forum to
address those concerns is in the relevant
compliance docket.
373. In response to NRECA, we
continue to believe that it is appropriate
to consider on a case-by-case basis
customer claims that RTOs or ISOs are
using the transmission facilities of a
non-public utility without
compensation. It would not be
appropriate to address this issue in a
vacuum, without a complete discussion
by interested parties of the legal and
policy merits of both sides of this issue.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3. Capacity Reassignment
a. Removal of the Price Cap
374. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that it is appropriate to
lift the price cap for all transmission
customers reassigning point-to-point
transmission capacity, i.e., resellers. The
Commission found that the price cap
had served to reduce transmission
options for customers and impair the
development of a secondary market for
transmission capacity. The Commission
concluded that removing the price cap
will allow capacity to be allocated to
those entities that value it the most,
thereby sending more accurate price
signals for identification of the
appropriate location for construction of
new transmission facilities to reduce
congestion.
375. To enhance oversight and
monitoring by the Commission of the
secondary market for transmission
capacity, certain reforms were adopted
to the underlying rules governing
capacity reassignments. First, the
Commission required that all sales or
assignments of capacity be conducted
140 Central Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest ISO, 110
FERC ¶ 61,093, order on reh’g, 113 FERC ¶ 61,116
(2005).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
through, or otherwise posted on, the
transmission provider’s OASIS on or
before the date the reassigned service
commences. Second, the Commission
required that assignees of transmission
capacity execute a service agreement
with the transmission provider prior to
the date on which the reassigned service
commences. Third, in addition to
existing OASIS posting requirements,
the Commission required transmission
providers to aggregate and summarize in
an electric quarterly report (EQR) the
data contained in the service agreements
for reassigned capacity. The
Commission explained that, taken
together, these reforms will increase the
transparency of capacity reassignments
and facilitate our monitoring of the
secondary market for transmission
capacity.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
376. Several petitioners request
rehearing of the decision to lift the price
cap on reassigned capacity.141 Some
petitioners question the Commission’s
stated justifications for the removal of
the price cap. TDU Systems contend
that the non-cost factors cited by the
Commission, including promotion of
the secondary market, enabling
customers to better manage the risk of
their long term commitments required
by the reform of rollover rights, and
sending more accurate price signals for
capacity, do not justify lifting the price
cap or substitute for analyzing the
potential for the exercise of market
power before lifting it. TDU Systems,
APPA, and NRECA challenge the
Commission’s conclusion that removing
the price cap for capacity reassignments
will stimulate greater infrastructure
investment by sending more accurate
price signals as to the incremental cost
of transmission capacity. They argue
that explicit congestion price signals in
RTO markets have failed to stimulate
investment and, in any event, are
useless for transmission customers that
lack the regulatory certainty required to
facilitate third-party construction of
new facilities. APPA argues that
entrenched economic interests often
find it more profitable to pocket the
remaining dollars than to invest in new
facilities.
377. These petitioners all disagree
with the Commission’s finding that the
price cap has impaired the development
of a secondary market for transmission.
They argue that the Commission cites
no support for this finding and that it
failed to address comments in response
to the NOPR stating that non-price
limitations on capacity reassignment,
141 See,
PO 00000
e.g., APPA, NRECA, and TDU Systems.
Frm 00046
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
such as the requirement that the
assignee use the same source and sink
as original customers, are the real reason
that reassignments of capacity do not
occur. APPA also contends that the
Commission failed to explain why the
lifting of the price cap is necessary to
spur investment in light of other reforms
adopted in Order No. 890, such as a
more robust transmission planning
process and the provision of planning
redispatch and conditional firm pointto-point service.
378. TAPS argues that the precedent
relied upon by the Commission in Order
No. 890 does not support the decision
to lift the price cap for reassigned
capacity. TAPS states that, in
Alternatives to Traditional Cost-ofService Ratemaking for Natural Gas
Pipelines and Regulation of Negotiated
Transportation Services of Natural Gas
Pipelines,142 the Commission actually
required a market power analysis to
justify market-based rates. TAPS argues
that in Interstate Nat’l Gas Ass’n of
America v. FERC,143 the D.C. Circuit
relied on empirical evidence to affirm
the Commission’s decision to lift the
cap on gas pipeline capacity releases. In
that case, TAPS argues that: there was
a significant amount of firm capacity
going unused, suggesting that excess
capacity could constrain prices and
with evidence that it did in fact put a
downward pressure on prices; evidence
existed that new entry could restrain
prices; and, the price cap at issue was
lifted only for two years during an
experiment. TAPS argues that similar
empirical evidence is required, showing
that prices for secondary transmission
capacity above the cap would be
competitive and that new entry could
constrain prices.
379. Petitioners generally argue that
removal of the price cap may expose
transmission customers to market power
and is therefore contrary to Commission
and judicial precedent. APPA and TAPS
argue that the Supreme Court has
rejected seller claims justifying higher
prices for electricity based upon the
value ascribed to the product by the
buyer, stating that a ‘‘focus on the
willingness to pay or ability of the
purchaser to pay for a service is the
concern of a monopolist, not a
government agency charged both with
assuring the industry a fair return and
with assuring the public reliable and
efficient service, at a reasonable
142 74 FERC ¶ 61,076, reh’g denied, 75 FERC
¶ 61,024 (1996), petitions for review denied sub.
nom. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. v. FERC,
172 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
143 285 F.3d 18 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (INGAA).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
price.’’ 144 In their view, this precedent
requires the Commission to maintain
the price cap in the absence of hard
evidence of a competitive market for
reassigned capacity.
380. Joined by NRECA and TDU
Systems, APPA and TAPS argue that the
Commission is allowed to authorize
market-based rates only with empirical
proof that existing competition would
ensure that the actual price is just and
reasonable and that undocumented
reliance on market forces will not
suffice.145 In their view, the
Commission must engage in an ex ante
competitive analysis to find that the
seller lacks market power, or take
sufficient steps to mitigate market
power, as well as adopt sufficient postapproval reporting requirements.146
These petitioners argue that the
Commission’s reliance on competition
among resellers, continued rate
regulation of primary capacity, and the
reassignment-related reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 is insufficient to justify
lifting the cap.
381. With regard to competition
among resellers, APPA contends that
transmission capacity is a scarce
commodity and demand is currently
inelastic, due in part to substantial load
growth. APPA argues that allowing
point-to-point customers to make
virtually unlimited profits from
reassignments of their firm service will
not further competition among resellers
and, instead, may discourage
participation in joint planning to
support expansion or acceptance of
increased rates to support new facilities.
APPA acknowledges that firm
transmission not scheduled will be
released on a non-firm basis, but argues
that is of little use to LSEs in need of
firm transmission to deliver their firm
power supplies.
382. NRECA and TDU Systems argue
that it is contradictory for the
Commission to conclude that
competition among resellers will assure
just and reasonable prices when,
elsewhere in Order No. 890, the
Commission acknowledges congestion
and the number of curtailments has
dramatically increased in recent years.
These petitioners question what market
forces would constrain prices for
secondary capacity at or below the price
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
144 Quoting
Gainesville Utilities Department, et al.
v. Florida Power Corp., 402 U.S. 515, 528 (1971).
145 Citing Farmers Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v.
FERC, 734 F.2d 1486 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Farmers
Union) (finding that the Commission failed to
justify relaxation of cost-based regulation of oil
pipeline companies because it did not ensure rates
would remain within the zone of reasonableness).
146 Citing California ex. rel. Lockyer, 383 F.3d
1006 (9th Cir. 2004) (Lockyer).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
of primary capacity if primary capacity
is so scarce. They question how it can
be just and reasonable to price
secondary rights at a level higher than
the just and reasonable price of primary
capacity. TAPS argues that a market
power study of particular transmission
paths is necessary to support a finding
that competition among resellers will
restrict market power.
383. With regard to the availability of
primary capacity at cost-based rates,
TAPS argues that the Commission has
presented no factual basis to conclude
that entry will be timely, likely or
sufficient to defeat price increases due
to transmission market power. TAPS
contends that, where capacity is fully
subscribed, non-existent capacity
cannot act as a price restraint. APPA
argues that any requirement for the
transmission provider to build new
facilities in future years has little if any
bearing on the price an LSE is willing
to pay for the next day, week or month
to ensure it meets its service obligation.
NRECA and TDU Systems contend that,
notwithstanding the planning-related
reforms of Order No. 890, transmission
providers can continue to exert market
power by refusing to expand the system
to meet competitors’ needs. TDU
Systems contends that failure to
mandate expansion of the grid or to
encourage third party construction of
needed upgrades will ensure a lack of
expansion, allowing the holder of rights
to transmission capacity to exert
monopoly power in a secondary market
unprotected by price caps.
384. Petitioners maintain that the
revised oversight and reporting
requirements adopted in Order No. 890
are insufficient to protect transmission
customers from the exercise of market
power. APPA and NRECA argue that
post hoc reporting cannot prevent realtime harm to transmission customers
and the end-users they serve or relieve
the Commission of the obligation to
ensure, at the outset, that the secondary
market for capacity is competitive. TDU
Systems similarly contend that the new
posting and reporting requirements are
unlikely to restrain the exercise of
market power, since monthly reports
will lag significantly behind the daily
and hourly market transactions, even
though greater price transparency may
make market power easier to detect after
the fact.
385. MISO argues that, instead of
relying on continued regulation in the
primary market and competition in the
secondary market to limit the exercise of
market power in the secondary market,
the Commission should provide for a
sharing mechanism between the reseller
and the owner of the transmission asset
PO 00000
Frm 00047
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3029
to allocate any market premium
obtained from the resale. MISO
contends that revenue sharing would
reduce incentives to engage in hoarding
on the part of the reseller and encourage
efficient use of the grid. In its view,
sharing market premiums would have a
solid ground in equity, ensuring that the
owners of transmission, constrained by
cost-based rates, are not unduly
discriminated against in favor of the
reseller.
386. APPA also contends that the use
of value-of-service pricing for firm
transmission service that LSEs require
to meet their loads’ needs violates FPA
section 217(b)(4) because it does not
enable the LSEs to secure the firm
transmission rights they need to serve
their loads as Congress intended. While
not specifically opposing the
Commission’s decision to lift the price
cap on reassignments of transmission
capacity, South Carolina E&G makes a
similar request that removal of the price
cap be subject to the Commission’s
assurances that the resulting increased
use of the grid will not compromise
service to native load customers. In its
view, an active secondary market could
crowd the limits of the grid and increase
the likelihood of curtailments. Southern
Carolina E&G argues that FPA section
217 requires that native load service not
be marginalized a result of any
increased use of the grid.
387. If the Commission declines to
reinstate the price cap on assignments of
transmission capacity, TAPS asks that
the Commission take two steps to offer
consumer protection. First, TAPS asks
the Commission to require utilities
seeking to reassign transmission
capacity to demonstrate a lack of
transmission market power. TAPS
argues that this demonstration should
examine each point of receipt/point of
delivery pair as a distinct market, unless
the public utility can show that
alternative paths provide meaningful
substitutes. Second, TAPS asks the
Commission to lift the price cap only for
short-term services and only for a period
of two years. TAPS suggests that, at the
end of this period, the Commission
should assess whether prices for
reassigned capacity are competitive and
whether the experiment produced the
desired increase in reassigned capacity.
Commission Determination
388. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to remove the
price cap on reassignments of
transmission capacity. We continue to
believe that removal of the price cap
will give market participants additional
options for acquiring transmission.
Point-to-point transmission service
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3030
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
customers will have increased
incentives to resell their service
whenever others place a higher value on
it. Existing transmission therefore will
be put to better, more efficient use.
Point-to-point customers also may be
willing to commit to buy additional
transmission service (such as for periods
long enough to get rollover rights) since
they are able to resell above the price
cap during periods in which they do not
need the capacity. On this basis alone,
we find that establishing a competitive
market for secondary transmission
capacity will send more accurate signals
that promote efficient use of the
transmission system by fostering the
reassignment of unused capacity.
389. We agree with petitioners that
restricting reassignment to the same
point of receipt and point of delivery
has limited, and may continue to limit,
the number of reassignments that take
place. It does not follow, however, that
the price cap is irrelevant or that lifting
the cap will not encourage additional
reassignments of transmission capacity.
Petitioners acknowledge that the
secondary market for transmission
capacity is underdeveloped. Even if the
price cap is not the sole cause for this
lack of development, it is at least a
contributing factor. While other reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 also will
facilitate use of and investment in the
transmission system, this does not mean
that lifting the price cap on capacity
reassignments is unnecessary or
unimportant. The reforms adopted in
Order No. 890, including the decision to
lift the price cap, work together to
enhance customer options and the
transmission provider’s operation of the
grid.
390. We are sensitive, however, to the
concerns expressed by petitioners and
grant rehearing to limit the period
during which reassignments may occur
above the cap. In Order No. 890, the
Commission directed staff to closely
monitor the quarterly reassignmentrelated data submitted by transmission
providers to identify any problems in
the development of the secondary
market and to prepare a report on staff’s
findings for the Commission within 6
months of the receipt of two years worth
of data, i.e., by May 1, 2010. Upon
further consideration, we conclude that
it is most appropriate to lift the price
cap on reassignments of capacity only to
accommodate this study period and
amend section 23.1 of the pro forma
OATT to reinstate the price cap as of
October 1, 2010. Upon review of the
staff report and any feedback from the
industry, the Commission can
determine whether it is appropriate to
continue to allow reassignments of
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
capacity above the price cap beyond
that date.
391. We disagree that a market power
study or other empirical competition
analyses are required to lift the price
cap on capacity reassignments during
this study period. Contrary to
petitioners’ assertions, market power
analyses are not the only method to
ensure that market-based rates remain
just and reasonable.147 In INGAA,148 the
court affirmed the Commission’s
removal of price ceilings for short-term
capacity releasing shippers in the
natural gas market without requiring
sellers to submit market power analyses,
recognizing non-cost factors such as the
need to lift price ceilings to facilitate
movement of capacity into the hands of
those who value it most. The court
concluded that these non-cost factors,
combined with the limitation of
negotiated rates to the secondary
market, distinguished the case from
Farmers Union.149 Similarly, continuing
rate regulation of the transmission
provider’s primary capacity,
competition among resellers, and
reforms to the secondary market for
transmission capacity, combined with
enforcement proceedings, audits, and
other regulatory controls, will assure
that prices in the secondary market for
transmission capacity remain within a
zone of reasonableness.150
392. Petitioners inappropriately
discount the importance of these
regulatory protections, particularly the
continued rate regulation of primary
transmission capacity. Unlike gas
pipelines, transmission providers are
obligated to construct new facilities to
satisfy a request for service if that
request cannot be satisfied using
existing capacity. The pro forma OATT
does not, and will not, permit the
withholding of transmission capacity by
the transmission provider and
effectively establishes a price ceiling for
long-term reassignments at the
transmission provider’s cost of
expanding its system. Petitioner
arguments to the contrary assume non147 See Alternatives to Traditional Cost-of-Service
Ratemaking for Natural Gas Pipelines and
Regulation of Negotiated Transportation Services of
Natural Gas Pipelines, 74 FERC ¶ 61,076 at 61,227–
36 (1996). The Commission ultimately determined
in that case that a market power analysis was
required in order to allow a pipeline to use marketbased pricing instead of cost-of-service rates. The
Commission has not proposed to allow
transmission providers to engage in sales of primary
capacity at market based rates and, as explained
below, sufficient protections exist to ensure the
secondary market for transmission capacity remains
sufficiently competitive without requiring market
power analyses from each reseller.
148 285 F.3d at 33.
149 INGAA, 285 F.3d at 31–34.
150 See Order No. 890 at P 811.
PO 00000
Frm 00048
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
compliance with the transmission
provider’s obligations under the pro
forma OATT. If a customer has evidence
of such non-compliance, it should bring
the matter to the Commission’s attention
through a complaint or other
appropriate procedural mechanism.
Absent such evidence, the Commission
concludes that the continued rate
regulation of the primary market, and
the transmission provider’s obligation to
expand its system to accommodate
service requests, adequately mitigates
any market power that resellers may
have in the long-term secondary market.
393. Pending the completion of
upgrades, we acknowledge that delays
associated with constructing new
facilities could limit the downward
effect that the transmission provider’s
cost of expansion has on prices.
Resellers could attempt to gain market
power through economic or physical
withholding of their primary capacity
when congestion arises. As the
Commission found in Order No. 890,
however, competition among resellers,
as well as the ability of customers
desiring additional capacity to access
primary capacity using conditional firm
point-to-point service or the modified
planning redispatch implemented in
Order No. 890, will mitigate the exercise
of market power in the interim.151
Moreover, any primary capacity that is
not scheduled is made available to other
customers on a non-firm basis,
frustrating any attempts to withhold
capacity.152
394. Reforms to the rules governing
reassignments and associated reporting
obligations also increase our regulatory
oversight of the secondary market,
allowing the Commission to effectively
monitor that market for any attempts to
exercise market power. All
reassignments must now be conducted
through or otherwise posted on OASIS
and assignees must execute service
agreements prior to the date on which
service commences. Transmission
providers must provide information
regarding reassignments in their
EQRs.153 As noted above, Commission
staff will also closely monitor the
151 See
Order No. 890 at P 809, 812.
id. at P 811.
153 As TDU Systems point out, the reports will lag
behind the daily and hourly transactions in the
market. As explained above, competition among
resellers and regulatory protections embedded in
the pro forma OATT will ensure that prices remain
within the zone of reasonableness in the immediate
near-term. The reports will enable the Commission
to identify trends in the market and inefficiencies
that may occur. Furthermore, if parties see that
particular holders of transmission capacity are
attempting to exercise market power through
hoarding or other tactics, they can report such
instances to the Office of Enforcement for
investigation without delay.
152 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
quarterly reassignment-related data
submitted by transmission providers
and prepare a report on staff’s findings
for the Commission’s consideration. The
Commission takes seriously the
possibility that resellers may attempt to
exercise market power in the secondary
market for transmission capacity. We
continue to believe, however, that the
regulatory protections in place and our
increased oversight of this market will
limit the potential for market power
abuse during the period in which the
price cap is lifted. There is no need for
particularized market power studies
regarding secondary transmission
capacity, as suggested by TAPS.
395. We disagree with NRECA and
TDU Systems that the potential for
secondary prices to rise above primary
capacity prices indicates that rates may
not be just and reasonable. As the courts
have recognized, prices in a competitive
market should rise during periods when
capacity is truly scarce in order to
ensure that capacity is being allocated
appropriately.154 The precedent cited by
petitioners clearly permits the
Commission to implement alternative
pricing structures provided that
safeguards are in place to ensure that
rates remain within a zone of
reasonableness.155 We continue to
believe that the regulatory framework
governing the reassignment of
transmission capacity, combined with
our increased oversight and
enforcement authority, will ensure that
the rates for secondary transmission
capacity remain within the zone of
reasonableness. At the same time, lifting
the price cap will give primary
transmission customers greater
incentives to commit to long-term
service because they will be able to
resell above the cap during periods
when they do not need the capacity.
396. We decline to adopt a
mechanism to share revenues from
capacity reassignments with the
transmission provider. Allocation of the
entire reassignment premium to the
reseller is appropriate because it
promotes an efficient allocation of
transmission capacity, while sharing of
the premium could make a potential
seller less likely to resell even though
another customer places a higher value
on the transmission service. The
Commission addressed a similar request
in Order No. 636–A and concluded that
releasing shippers in the gas market
should be entitled to receive the
proceeds from reselling their
capacity.156 Notwithstanding
differences in the secondary market for
transmission capacity, we believe that a
similar approach should be followed for
transmission providers, particularly
since they already receive their full costof-service through payments for the
underlying primary capacity. In any
event, it would only be fair to share
premiums with the transmission
provider if losses were also shared when
capacity was resold for less than the
cost to the reseller of the capacity. Such
sharing could lead to under-recovery of
costs contrary to the premise of cost-ofservice rates.
397. Finally, we do not believe that
assignments will impose risks upon
native load customers in contravention
of FPA section 217 by increasing the
likelihood of curtailments.
Transmission providers should be
planning the operation of their system
to accommodate all reserved uses.
Simply reassigning primary capacity
from one customer to another should
not alter the transmission provider’s
ability to satisfy its service
commitments. We also disagree that
lifting the price cap on reassignments of
capacity will make it more difficult for
LSEs to obtain firm capacity to serve
their load or otherwise marginalize
native load service, as APPA suggests.
Lifting the price cap should encourage
primary capacity holders to make more,
not less, transmission available to other
customers, including LSEs. While it is
true that secondary capacity may at
times be more expensive than primary
capacity, establishing a competitive
market for secondary transmission
capacity will benefit all customers,
including LSEs, by sending more
accurate signals that promote efficient
allocation of transmission capacity.
154 See INGAA, 285 F.3d at 18, 32 (‘‘[B]rief spikes
in moments of extreme exigency are completely
consistent with competition, reflecting scarcity
rather than monopoly * * * A surge in the price
of candles during a power outage is no evidence of
monopoly in the candle market.’’).
155 See Farmers Union, 734 F.2d at 1509–10;
INGAA, 285 F.3d at 32–34; Lockyer, 383 F.3d at 10–
13; see also Environmental Action v. FERC, 996
F.2d 401, 410 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
156 See Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions
to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing
Transportation; and Regulation of Natural gas
Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, Order
No. 636–A, 57 FR 36128 (August 12, 1992) FERC
Stats. & Regs., Regulations Preambles January 1991–
June 1996 ¶ 30,950 at 30,562 (1992) (‘‘Since the
pipeline is not releasing the capacity, no efficiency
or other pro-competitive goal would be furthered by
allowing it to retain incremental proceeds.’’).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
b. Lifting the Price Cap for Merchant
Function and Affiliates
398. The Commission declined in
Order No. 890 to adopt the NOPR
proposal to retain price caps for
capacity resold by a transmission
provider’s merchant function or its
affiliates. After reviewing the comments
PO 00000
Frm 00049
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3031
submitted in response to the NOPR, and
further considering its experience
regulating capacity reassignments, the
Commission concluded that retaining
price caps for this portion of the market
would continue to impair development
of the secondary market and that price
caps for such capacity are not otherwise
necessary to ensure just and reasonable
rates. The Commission found that there
are no significant market power
concerns to justify retaining the price
caps for any transmission customer,
noting that the Commission did not
distinguish between affiliated and nonaffiliated transmission customers when
the Commission initially found in Order
Nos. 888 and 888–A that excess capacity
reserved could be reassigned.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
399. The same petitioners challenging
the Commission’s decision to lift the
price cap for reassignments of capacity
object specifically to lifting the price
cap for reassignments by the
transmission provider and its affiliates.
APPA argues that this decision will
result in more limited primary capacity,
since it will be in the economic interest
of the transmission provider’s corporate
family for the merchant function and/or
affiliates of the transmission provider to
buy any primary capacity that is
available. APPA contends that such
transactions would technically satisfy
the transmission provider’s obligation to
make primary capacity available to
customers, but effectively convert
primary capacity into secondary
capacity not subject to a price cap.
APPA acknowledges that the
Commission found in Order No. 890
that the Standards of Conduct will
mitigate the ability of an affiliate to
hoard capacity, but argues that the
Commission failed to explain how such
mitigation would occur.
400. TAPS expresses similar concern
that the transmission provider will have
an incentive to sell primary capacity to
its merchant function or affiliates to get
around the rate ceiling on primary
capacity. If the secondary market is
clearing at rates above the transmission
provider’s rate ceiling, TAPS argues that
the parent corporation will have the
incentive to put as much capacity in the
hands of its merchant function or
affiliates as possible, reducing the
amount of price-restraining primary
capacity and producing higher revenues
for the parent corporation for sales of
monopoly transmission service. In
TAPS’ view, costs associated with
hoarding will not encourage resale if
withholding profitably raises prices in
the secondary market. TAPS also argues
that the Commission’s decision is
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3032
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
inconsistent with its conclusion
elsewhere in Order No. 890 that
transmission providers have an
incentive to over-designate CBM, which
TAPS states is a form of hoarding. TAPS
complains that, although the
Commission stated in Order No. 890
that it will monitor for hoarding
behavior by transmission providers and
their affiliates, it proposed no remedy in
the event they engage in this behavior.
401. APPA, TAPS and TDU Systems
argue that lifting the price cap for the
transmission provider’s merchant
function and affiliate sales also will
discourage transmission providers from
constructing transmission capacity in an
attempt to raise prices in the secondary
market. They contend that corporate
families profiting more from
transmission capacity resold by its
merchant function or unregulated
affiliates will have a disincentive to
build new transmission that would
lower those resale prices. APPA argues
that much of Order No. 890 is devoted
to attempting to ensure that
transmission providers do not
discriminate in order to favor their own
generation, yet lifting the resale cap for
the transmission provider’s merchant
function and affiliates gives
transmission providers incentives to
favor their own and their affiliates’ sale
of reassigned capacity at unregulated
rates and to limit construction of new
transmission facilities and upgrades to
keep the rates for such reassignments
high. NRECA and TDU Systems agree,
arguing that shareholders and senior
management will be indifferent as to
whether the profits are from primary or
secondary markets, or from transmission
or generation, and will seek to drive
profits to monopoly levels if possible.
TDU Systems argue that the fact that
both affiliated and non-affiliated
transmission customers were permitted
in Order No. 888 to engage in
reassignments of capacity is irrelevant
because the ability to reassign capacity
invoked few market power concerns so
long as the price cap remained.
402. APPA also requests clarification
as to whether the transmission capacity
that a transmission provider’s merchant
function uses to serve the transmission
provider’s own retail loads is eligible for
reassignment. If so, APPA argues that it
is unduly discriminatory to deny
network customers the ability to
reassign their capacity. APPA contends
that network service was developed
specifically to provide to other LSEs a
transmission service comparable to the
transmission service that public utilities
provide themselves.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission Determination
403. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to lift the
price cap for capacity resold by any
point-to-point transmission customer,
including the transmission provider’s
merchant function and its affiliates. We
continue to believe that retaining the
price cap for this portion of the market
would impair development of the
secondary market and is not otherwise
necessary to ensure just and reasonable
rates. In light of the protections
discussed above, we find there are not
significant market power concerns that
would justify retaining resale price caps
for any transmission customer.
404. While it is true that lifting the
price cap for reassignments of capacity
could provide an economic incentive for
the transmission provider’s merchant
function or its affiliates to acquire
transmission capacity in an attempt to
exercise market power, the same is true
for any customer. Under the Standards
of Conduct, affiliated and unaffiliated
customers have equal access to
transmission-related information and,
through the OASIS, equal opportunity
to acquire primary transmission
capacity. Thus, any customer could
engage in speculative purchasing in an
attempt to gain market power. The
Commission found in Order No. 890
that the entire secondary market is now
sufficiently competitive, in light of the
reforms adopted, market forces, and
other considerations, to justify lifting
the price cap for all transmission
customers reselling capacity.157 As we
explain above, there are sufficient
structural and regulatory protections to
ensure that no holder of capacity is able
to exercise market power, regardless of
whether the customer is affiliated with
the transmission provider. The
transmission provider must offer all
firm (including long-term conditional
firm) and non-firm capacity that is
available and award that capacity in a
non-discriminatory manner, which will
undermine any customer’s attempt to
exercise market power. It therefore
would not be appropriate to distinguish
between classes of customers when
lifting the price cap for reassignments.
405. We disagree that our decision
will lead to lower investment in new
facilities by transmission providers. The
pro forma OATT places an affirmative
obligation on transmission providers to
expand their system in order to
157 See Order No. 890 at P 809. There the
Commission distinguished its decision from the
determination in Order Nos. 888 and 888–A to
implement the price cap on all reassignments based
on a finding that the entire secondary market was
not sufficiently competitive to justify market-based
pricing.
PO 00000
Frm 00050
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
accommodate requests for service. In
addition, Order No. 890 requires
transmission providers to establish an
open and transparent planning process
to ensure that transmission plans are
developed on a non-discriminatory
basis. Transmission providers are also
required to file reports with the
Commission if they are late processing
requests for new service and pay
penalties if they are consistently late
with service request studies. We
conclude that these protections are
adequate to ensure that transmission
providers do not forego upgrades in an
attempt to increase the value of capacity
that has been assigned to their affiliates.
406. Because the Commission has
found the secondary market for
transmission capacity to be sufficiently
competitive, it would not be appropriate
to distinguish between classes of
customers reselling their capacity. As
we state above, however, the
Commission takes seriously allegations
of market abuse and we reiterate our
intent to be vigilant in overseeing this
market. If the Commission finds
evidence of market abuse, we will
exercise our enhanced authority by
restricting the ability of an offending
reseller (and possibly its affiliates) to
participate in the secondary market for
transmission capacity or imposing other
remedies, including civil penalties, as
appropriate. Should any customer
believe that capacity is being
preferentially allocated to a
transmission provider’s affiliates, that
particular holders of transmission
capacity are attempting to exercise
market power through hoarding or other
tactics, or that the transmission provider
is failing to meet its expansion
obligations, the customer should bring
the matter to the Commission’s attention
through a complaint or other
appropriate procedural mechanism. We
direct staff to include in its report any
evidence of abuse in the secondary
market for transmission capacity.
407. With regard to APPA’s request
for clarification regarding the ability of
the transmission provider’s merchant
function to reassign transmission
capacity used to serve the transmission
provider’s retail load, we reiterate that
only point-to-point transmission
customers may reassign their
transmission capacity.158 To the extent
the transmission provider’s merchant
function or a network customer has
acquired point-to-point transmission,
either may resell that capacity in the
secondary market.
158 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 825.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
c. Contracting and Posting Issues
408. As noted above, the Commission
required in Order No. 890 that all sales
or assignments of capacity be conducted
through or otherwise posted on the
transmission provider’s OASIS on or
before the date the reassignment
commences. The Commission thus
eliminated the ability of transmission
customers to assign transmission rights
to another party with subsequent
notification to the transmission
provider. The Commission also directed
transmission providers, working
through NAESB, to develop appropriate
OASIS functionality to allow such
postings. Transmission providers were
not required to implement this new
OASIS functionality or any related
business practices until NAESB
develops appropriate standards.
409. The Commission also required
that assignees of transmission capacity
execute a service agreement prior to the
date on which the reassigned service
commences. Transmission customers
with market-based rate tariffs were no
longer permitted to execute and
implement assignments of capacity
without involving the transmission
provider, subject to after-the-fact
reporting and posting. The Commission
explained that this effectively returns
the specified capacity to the
transmission provider for the purpose of
reassignment to the assignee and
eliminates the need for the assigning
party to have a rate schedule governing
reassigned capacity on file with the
Commission. The transmission
provider’s OATT will govern the
reassigned service, with the assignee
paying the transmission provider for
service at the negotiated rate and the
transmission provider billing or
crediting the reseller with any
difference between the negotiated rate
and the reseller’s original rate. All the
non-rate terms and conditions that
otherwise would apply to the
transmission provider’s sale of
transmission capacity continue to apply
in the case of a reassignment.
410. In addition to already existing
OASIS posting requirements, the
Commission required transmission
providers to aggregate and summarize in
an EQR the data contained in the service
agreements for reassigned capacity. The
Commission directed that the quarterly
report be submitted in the EQR so that
it is readily accessible to the
Commission and the public. The
Commission also revised section 23 of
the pro forma OATT to address
reassignments of transmission capacity
and added a pro forma service
agreement for reassignments in a new
Attachment A–1.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
411. Several petitioners request
rehearing and clarification of the
requirement that there must be a service
agreement in place between the
transmission provider and the assignee
prior to the assignment commencing.
Bonneville argues that requiring
transmission providers to execute
service agreements with assignees is too
onerous and that it is unnecessary for
the Commission to monitor more closely
the secondary market for transmission
capacity. Bonneville further argues that
it would be virtually impossible to
execute a service agreement for daily or
hourly reassignments, harming the
market for reassignments of short-term
transmission. Bonneville also suggests
that requiring a written contract for
assignments may cause OASIS
transactions between a reseller and
assignee to be non-binding and force the
transmission provider to maintain two
systems for transactions, one electronic
and one for paper transactions.
412. Bonneville also contends that if
an assignee fails to return an executed
service agreement under the
Commission’s new rules, transmission
service could not commence even
though the reseller and assignee
concluded an assignment on OASIS.
Bonneville claims that, under the
Commission’s OASIS standards, the
transmission provider has no ability to
invalidate, refuse, decline, retract or
annul an assignment on OASIS and,
therefore, no ability to recall the
assigned capacity from the assignee and
return it to the reseller. Bonneville
states that OASIS would show the
reservation in the name of the assignee
and the assignee would be able to
schedule transmission without a service
agreement, effectively nullifying the
requirement.
413. Joined by EEI, Bonneville
suggests that the Commission clarify
that the requirement to execute a service
agreement with the assignee is satisfied
by a previously executed umbrella
agreement between the transmission
provider and the assignee and that the
execution of a service agreement
covering a particular assignment is not
required. EEI contends that this would
be consistent with the current
requirement for customers taking shortterm firm and non-firm service under
the pro forma OATT. EEI requests
clarification that, regardless of whether
the assignee has executed a service
agreement with the transmission
provider, the same OASIS posting
requirements would apply to
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00051
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3033
reassignments as apply to any
reservation of transmission service. EEI
argues that an assignee should be
required to inform the transmission
provider through an OASIS posting of
the terms and conditions of the
assignment so that the transmission
provider and other customers are
informed of the existence of a
reservation for transmission capacity.
414. Constellation argues that there is
no basis in the record for the
Commission to adopt formal assignment
procedures for short-term
reassignments. Constellation asks that
the Commission grant rehearing to allow
short-term and temporary assignments
of transmission capacity to occur
without a formal reassignment of the
transmission service agreement.
Constellation suggests that the
Commission consider other means of
separating the filing requirements for
capacity reassignment from those for
market-based rates tariffs, such as by
establishing standardized tariff terms in
its regulations and authorizing entities,
upon notice to the Commission, to
adopt those regulations as their filed
tariff for reassignments.
415. Several petitioners object to the
billing mechanism adopted for capacity
reassignments. Bonneville argues that
transmission providers should be
allowed to continue billing the reseller
for the assigned capacity. Bonneville
contends that requiring transmission
providers to bill at the negotiated rate
will insert the transmission provider
into the financial arrangements of the
reseller and the assignee, obligating the
transmission provider to monitor the
parties’ business arrangements and
adjust its own operations to
compensate. Bonneville also contends
that transmission providers are not set
up to charge assignees rates that are
different from the normal transmission
rate. If a robust assignment market
develops, Bonneville states that
transmission providers could have to
charge dozens of different rates varying
from day to day or even hour to hour.
Bonneville suggests that both the
reseller and assignee would likely be
purchasing other transmission in
addition to the assigned capacity,
requiring the transmission provider to
charge at least two different rates to the
same customer. Bonneville contends
that significant changes will have to be
made to all transmission providers’
billing systems at substantial cost to the
industry to accommodate the
Commission’s reform of the rules
governing capacity reassignment.
416. EEI and Southern suggest that
transmission providers be required to
charge the assignee at the same rate that
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3034
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the reseller originally agreed to pay and
allow the reseller and assignee to
arrange for any difference between the
original price and the negotiated
reassignment price. Southern argues
that requiring the transmission provider
to act as settlement agent unnecessarily
complicates and duplicates the
transmission provider’s burdens and
responsibilities, noting the Commission
declined to impose such an obligation
when third party generators provide
planning redispatch.159 EEI argues that
the service agreement with the reseller
terminates when the assignee executes a
new service agreement and, as a result,
the transmission provider has no
contractual basis to collect revenues
from the reseller if the reseller has
resold its capacity at a price lower than
the price it agreed to pay the
transmission provider.160 Joined by
Washington IOUs, EEI suggests that
requiring the transmission provider to
charge the assignee at a rate different
from the price stated in its OATT would
violate either the discount rule or the
ceiling price. If the Commission
declines to change its billing rules on
rehearing, EEI requests that Schedules 7
and 8 of the pro forma OATT be
amended to provide that ceiling prices
and discounting rules do not apply in
the context of reassigned transmission
capacity.
417. EEI contends that the
Commission’s concerns with respect to
the reporting of the price of reassigned
capacity can be addressed without
requiring the transmission provider to
become involved in the payment stream
related to the reassignment. EEI argues
that all jurisdictional resellers of
transmission report those transactions
in their EQRs. If the Commission wants
all capacity reassignments on a system
to be in a single report, EEI argues it can
require the assignee to inform the
transmission provider of the price and
other terms of service and the
transmission provider can include this
information in its EQR.
418. Washington IOUs distinguish
between long-term and short-term
reassignments, arguing that different
rules should be adopted for each type of
transaction. For long-term
reassignments, Washington IOUs argue
that transmission providers should only
be required to take on a bilateral
relationship with an assignee where all
rates, terms and conditions of the
assignment are the same as the original
rates, terms and conditions of the
purchase of primary capacity.
Otherwise, they contend the
159 Citing
160 Citing
Order No. 890 at P 1160.
id. at P 816, n.496.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
transmission provider may be unable to
recover the rate owed to it in the event
of a dispute between the reseller and
assignee. For short-term reassignments,
they argue the transmission provider
should continue to bill the reseller for
the assigned capacity scheduling rights,
with the assignee paying the reseller
directly. Washington IOUs contend that
NAESB distinguishes between long-term
and short-term reassignment
transactions, which they argue is
appropriate to ensure transmission
providers are not unduly burdened by
being forced to act as a middleman
between resellers and assignees.
419. TranServ contends that the
NAESB standards distinguish between
resales of scheduling rights and
transfers of all obligations, including
financial responsibilities. TranServ
states that, under the NAESB standards,
a resale does not alter the financial
obligation for the capacity reassigned,
which remains with the reseller.
TranServ argues that the billing
mechanism adopted in Order No. 890
inappropriately shifts this financial
obligation to the assignee, unduly
burdening the transmission provider
with the responsibility to manage
settlement of the reassignment.
420. EEI asks the Commission to refer
to NAESB the issue of whether any
modifications to the OASIS protocols
are required to implement the
modifications to transmission
reassignments required in Order No.
890. EEI requests that NAESB be
directed to report to the Commission on
whether modifications are required to
implement transmission reassignments
being posted before-the-fact rather than
after-the-fact and if so, NAESB’s
estimated timeline for development of
such modifications.
421. Several petitioners complain
about the cost to the transmission
provider of providing the accounting
and billing for capacity reassignments.
EEI and Washington IOUs contend that
the Commission’s billing rules require
the transmission provider to subsidize
the administrative costs of the
reassignment by collecting and
distributing payments on behalf of the
reseller and assignee. Washington IOUs
argue that the transmission provider’s
limited resources would be better used
in areas more central to the transmission
provider’s core responsibilities.
MidAmerican asks that the Commission
expressly limit the ability of assignees to
further assign capacity, arguing that the
administrative tracking and posting of
additional reassignments would be
costly. To the extent the Commission
requires transmission providers to
continue to credit and charge revenues
PO 00000
Frm 00052
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
from reassignments of capacity, E.ON
U.S. and TranServ ask the Commission
to clarify that transmission providers
should be compensated for the
accounting services they provide to act
as billing agents for reassignments of
capacity. Unless a compensation
mechanism is spelled out in the pro
forma OATT, these petitioners argue
that the financial obligations between
the reseller and assignee should remain
with those parties.
Commission Determination
422. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
assignees to execute a service agreement
with the transmission provider
governing reassignments of transmission
capacity prior to scheduling use of that
capacity. We provide clarification of
this requirement, however, in response
to the concerns raised by petitioners. In
Order No. 890, the Commission required
that all reassignments be accomplished
by the assignee executing a service
agreement with the transmission
provider that will govern the provision
of reassigned service.161 The
Commission did not intend to impose
contracting obligations that are more
onerous than the acquisition of primary
transmission capacity, which may be
accomplished through execution of a
service agreement followed by
scheduling on OASIS. We clarify that it
is equally sufficient for an assignee to
execute a service agreement governing
its reassignments of capacity generally
and to complete a particular assignment
through the OASIS. However, as with
reservations of primary transmission
capacity, there remains a threshold
requirement to execute a service
agreement with the transmission
provider in order to commit the assignee
to abide by the terms and conditions of
the transmission provider’s OATT
governing the reassignment of
transmission service.
423. It would not be appropriate to
relieve assignees of the obligation to
execute a service agreement with the
transmission provider since such
agreements establish the necessary
contractual relationship between the
assignee and the transmission provider.
As we explain above, sales of reassigned
capacity now take place under the
transmission provider’s OATT and,
thus, there must be a contractual
relationship between these parties. This
does not mean, however, that all of the
161 See id. at P 816. The Commission adopted
corresponding revisions to section 23.1 of the pro
forma OATT requiring the execution of a service
agreement prior to the date on which the reassigned
service commences that will govern the provision
of reassigned service.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
terms and conditions of a particular
assignment must be stated in the service
agreement. Like short-term firm and
non-firm reservations of primary
capacity, the transmission provider and
assignee may rely on OASIS to provide
information regarding the reseller,
quantity, and price associated with a
particular reassignment of service. This
information would then become part of
the binding agreement between the
transmission provider and assignee
governing the assignment,162 just as
confirmation of short-term firm and
non-firm transactions on OASIS
constitute binding contractual
commitments. Because execution of a
service agreement with the transmission
provider governing reassignments of
capacity is a threshold requirement for
an assignee wishing to accomplish a
particular reassignment on OASIS,
Bonneville’s concern regarding the
failure of an assignee to return its
service agreement is misplaced. The
assignee in that instance would have no
right to schedule a reassignment on
OASIS since it has not first executed the
appropriate service agreement with the
transmission provider.
424. Some of the confusion regarding
these contracting requirements may
have been caused by the Commission’s
reference in section 23.1 of the revised
pro forma OATT to a service agreement
‘‘that will govern the provision of
reassigned service,’’ which could be
interpreted to refer to transaction-bytransaction service agreements for
reassignments. Inclusion of the words
‘‘Long-Term Firm’’ in both the title of
the form of service agreement and the
attached specifications in the new
Attachment A–1 to the pro forma OATT
adopted in Order No. 890 may have
added to the confusion by potentially
implying that use of the service
agreement is limited to long-term firm
point-to-point transactions instead of
also applying to short-term firm pointto-point and non-firm point-to-point
reassignments, as intended by the
Commission.163 We revise section 23.1
of the pro forma OATT and the title of
Attachment A–1 to make clear that use
of the form of service agreement for
reassigned capacity, and associated
posting of schedules and transaction
information on OASIS, should be
162 The EQR for reassignments of transmission
capacity must contain all relevant transaction data,
whether stated in the service agreement or related
OASIS schedule.
163 See pro forma OATT Attachment A–1, Form
of Service Agreement for the Resale, Reassignment
or Transfer of Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Service.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
similar to the use of such agreements for
primary capacity.164
425. The execution of a service
agreement by the assignee does not itself
terminate the reseller’s service
agreement, as EEI argues. The reseller’s
service agreement remains in place,
granting the reseller scheduling rights
for the reserved capacity and obligating
the reseller to pay for that reservation.
During the term of the assignment, the
reseller will continue to be billed under
its agreement with the transmission
provider. The assignment of service
simply transfers to the assignee some or
all of the reseller’s scheduling rights for
the period of the reassignment and, in
return, obligates the assignee to pay the
transmission provider the negotiated
rate. In order to prevent over-recovery
by the transmission provider, the
transmission provider must therefore
credit the reseller the reassignment rate,
which leaves the reseller with the net
difference between the resale rate and
the reseller’s original rate.165 If the
assignee defaults and fails to pay for the
reassigned capacity, the transmission
provider should reverse the credit to the
reseller to reflect the lack of payment by
the assignee.166
426. We disagree that these billing
requirements are unduly burdensome.
While it is true that the transmission
provider may be required to bill at
different rates, that is already the case
under the pro forma OATT.
Transmission providers are permitted to
offer discounts from the rates stated in
their OATT, provided they offer such
discounts to all eligible customers.
Offering discounts thus creates different
164 As with the form of service agreement for firm
point-to-point transmission service, we retain the
specifications attachment for the form of service
agreement governing reassignments. We understand
that long-term agreements for reservations of
primary capacity rely on the specifications
attachment, so we would expect similar practices to
be used regarding long-term reassignments of
transmission capacity. As with any transaction,
however, actual uses of primary and secondary
capacity should be scheduled on OASIS consistent
with applicable business procedures.
165 If the reseller and assignee agree to a full
transfer of the reseller’s rights and obligations, the
reseller would only make payments to the extent
the transfer is executed at a lower rate than the rate
agreed to between the reseller and transmission
provider, to ensure that the transmission provider
receives the full contract price agreed to by the
reseller. If the full transfer is executed at a rate in
excess of the reseller’s contract with the
transmission provider, the transmission provider
must credit the reseller with the additional revenue
as a result of the transfer.
166 The transmission provider may take action
against the assignee as it would any other default
under the pro forma OATT. We recognize that, in
this instance, the transmission provider may have
little incentive to pursue collection since it will
recover its original contract rate from the reseller,
but it could transfer to the reseller its legal rights
to enforce the assignee’s payment obligations.
PO 00000
Frm 00053
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3035
rates for different customers depending
on when they negotiate service. The
transmission provider therefore should
already have mechanisms in place to
bill customers based on rates other than
those stated in its OATT. In any event,
the need to bill assignees directly for
reassignments is inextricably linked to
the decision to require that all
reassignment transactions take place
pursuant to the rate on file in the
transmission provider’s OATT, rather
than bilateral agreements between
customers.167 We therefore do not
intend for the discount rule or the price
ceilings otherwise stated in the
transmission provider’s OATT to apply
to reassignments of capacity. We have
revised schedules 7 and 8 of the pro
forma OATT accordingly.
427. We clarify that, to the extent
necessary, the costs incurred by the
transmission provider to account and
bill for reassignments of transmission
capacity should be included in the
transmission provider’s cost of service,
just like accounting and billing costs for
any other service under the
transmission provider’s OATT. We
decline MidAmerican’s request to
prohibit further assignments of
reassigned capacity. Order No. 888
allowed for multiple reassignments
under the pro forma OATT and
MidAmerican does not justify departing
from this practice. Just as the original
transmission customer may find that it
has excess capacity it can reassign, so
may an assignee. Denying the assignee’s
right to further assign its scheduling
rights would inhibit customers who
value the capacity most from accessing
it and thereby contradict the
Commission goal of creating a
competitive secondary market for
transmission capacity.
428. With regard to OASIS
modifications necessary to allow for the
reassignment of transmission capacity,
the Commission in Order No. 890
already directed transmission providers
working through NAESB to develop
appropriate OASIS functionality to
allow for reassignment-related
postings.168 We understand that this
work is on-going and expect any
necessary modifications to NAESB’s
business practices that are necessary to
reflect our rulings in this order will be
adopted prior to the submission of those
standards for Commission review. In the
interim, transmission providers should
identify in their business practices any
167 It is therefore irrelevant that payments for
third-party planning redispatch are settled
bilaterally, since the underlying planning
redispatch service is not provided under the
transmission provider’s OATT.
168 See Order No. 890 at P 815.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3036
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
procedures necessary to accomplish the
reassignment of capacity by their
customers.
d. Market-Based Rate Tariffs
429. Because purchasers of
transmission capacity in the secondary
market will execute a service agreement
directly with the transmission provider,
the Commission stated in Order No. 890
that there will no longer be a need for
the assigning party to have on file with
the Commission a rate schedule
governing reassignment capacity. The
Commission explained that the
transmission provider’s OATT will
govern the reassigned service.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Request for Rehearing and Clarification
430. EPSA and Powerex question how
sellers with market-based rates are to
proceed regarding the removal of the
price cap stated in their market-based
rates tariffs. In order not to violate their
market-based rate tariffs, these
petitioners contend that sellers may be
obligated to file revisions of their tariffs
and receive an order approving those
revisions prior to reselling transmission
above the cap. Powerex also suggests
that existing market-based rate tariffs
require a seller of transmission capacity
to continue reporting in its quarterly
reports the name of an assignee.
Powerex and EPSA request that the
Commission deem void, as of the
effective date of Order No. 890, the
provisions in each individual seller’s
market-based rate tariffs that impose a
cap on resale prices and reporting
obligations. Petitioners suggest that
these resellers be permitted to update
their market-based rate tariffs at such
time as the tariff is amended or with
their next triennial update.
Commission Determination
431. In Order No. 890, the
Commission explained that
reassignments of transmission capacity
will now be governed by the
transmission provider’s OATT.169 Each
assignee must execute a service
agreement directly with the
transmission provider, which we clarify
above may be an umbrella service
agreement governing multiple
reassignment transactions scheduled on
OASIS. As a result, the sale of
reassigned capacity is made by the
transmission provider pursuant to the
terms and conditions of its OATT, not
by the reseller under its market-based
rate tariff. Although the reseller may
negotiate the relevant price with the
assignee, the reassignment itself is
governed by the transmission provider’s
169 See
id. at P 816, n.496.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
OATT. The reseller’s market-based rate
tariff is no longer relevant or
controlling. The Commission therefore
explained in Order No. 890 that the
reseller does not need to have on file
with the Commission a rate schedule
governing reassigned capacity.
432. In Order No. 697, the
Commission affirmed this approach,
explaining that it is no longer
appropriate to include in the marketbased rate tariff transmission-related
services.170 The Commission stated that
reassignments of capacity are, instead,
provided for in the revised pro forma
OATT and that capacity holders seeking
to reassign transmission capacity should
adhere to the provisions of Order No.
890. Because these reassignment-related
provisions of the market-based rate tariff
were no longer needed, the Commission
directed sellers to revise their marketbased rate tariffs to remove the
provisions at the time they otherwise
revise their tariffs to conform them to
the standard provisions adopted in
Order No. 697.171
433. To the extent confusion remains
as to the relationship between the
market-based tariff and the transmission
provider’s OATT, we reiterate that, as of
the effective date of the reforms adopted
in Order No. 890, all reassignments of
capacity must take place under the
terms and conditions of the
transmission provider’s OATT. To the
extent a reseller has a market-based
tariff on file, the provisions of that tariff,
including a price cap or reporting
obligations, will not apply to the
reassignment since such transactions no
longer take place pursuant to the
authorization of that tariff. As the
Commission directed in Order No. 697,
sellers should amend their market-based
rate tariff to remove provisions
regarding the reassignment of capacity
when they otherwise revise their tariffs
to conform them to the standard
provisions adopted in Order No. 697.
4. ‘‘Operational’’ Penalties
a. Unreserved Use Penalties
(1) Unreserved Use of Transmission
Service and Inappropriate Use of
Network Service
434. In order to eliminate a potential
source of discretion in the
implementation of the pro forma OATT
and to enhance the Commission’s
enforcement of OATT obligations, the
Commission clarified, in Order No. 890,
the application of unreserved use
170 See Market-Based Rates For Wholesale Sales
Of Electric Energy, Capacity and Ancillary Services
By Public Utilities, Order No. 697, 72 FR 39,904
(July 20, 2007), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,252 (2007).
171 Id. at P 920.
PO 00000
Frm 00054
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
penalties. The Commission determined
that a transmission customer would be
subject to unreserved use penalties in
any circumstance where the
transmission customer uses a
transmission service that it has not
reserved. Specifically, a transmission
customer will be subject to an
unreserved use penalty in
circumstances where a transmission
customer has a transmission reservation,
but uses transmission service in excess
of its reserved capacity. A transmission
customer also will be subject to an
unreserved use penalty if the
transmission customer uses
transmission service without the
appropriate transmission reservation.
435. The Commission declined to
exempt any class of customers from the
potential assessment of unreserved use
penalties, including LSEs serving native
load in multiple control areas, and
noted that the transmission provider
itself is subject to the same penalties
when it takes transmission service
under its OATT. The Commission stated
that a network customer or transmission
provider that inappropriately uses
network transmission service to support
off-system sales may be required to
disgorge unjust profits from such sales,
as the Commission may determine on a
case-by-case basis. The Commission
stated that it would evaluate the
appropriateness of civil penalties in
addition to unreserved use penalties on
a case-by-case basis. The Commission
concluded that it is appropriate to
subject both a network customer and
transmission provider inappropriately
using network transmission service to
unreserved use penalties because such
action potentially uses or acquires,
without an appropriate reservation,
transmission service that could be
allocated to other customers. The
Commission modified the language of
section 30.4 of the pro forma OATT to
clarify that network customers are
subject to unreserved use penalties
when they schedule delivery of offsystem non-designated purchases using
transmission capacity reserved for
designated network resources.
436. The Commission clarified that a
network customer may use the
undesignated portion of a remote
network resource to serve network load
using secondary network service and
may use the undesignated portion of the
resource for other non-network service
purposes, such as third-party sales, as
long as the network customer acquires
the appropriate point-to-point service.
The Commission also noted that,
because the transmission provider does
not have to ‘‘take service’’ under its
OATT for the transmission of power
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
that is purchased on behalf of bundled
retail customers, it is free to use the
undesignated portion of a remote
network resource to serve its bundled
retail customers. The Commission
affirmed that, if the transmission
provider desires to use a remote
network resource for non-native load
purposes, such as third-party sales, it
must acquire the appropriate point-topoint service.
437. In order to ensure that the
transmission provider has a basis for
charging an unreserved use penalty, the
Commission modified section 13.4 of
the pro forma OATT to provide that a
customer that takes unreserved point-topoint transmission service and does not
have a service agreement with the
transmission provider is deemed to have
executed the transmission provider’s
form of service agreement for point-topoint service. The Commission also
clarified that a customer that uses more
transmission service than it has reserved
is also subject to charges for ancillary
services based on the period of
unreserved use. The Commission
modified section 3 of the pro forma
OATT to reflect that rule.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
438. AWEA seeks clarification of the
Commission’s statement that
intermittent resources could avoid
unreserved use penalties by reserving
sufficient transmission capacity to
deliver the resource’s full output.
AWEA asks that the Commission
confirm that it did not intend to require
resources to always reserve point-topoint transmission service based on the
maximum potential output in order to
avoid unreserved use penalties. AWEA
contends that such a practice would be
cost prohibitive for a wind generator,
which often operates at less than full
output, and could require multiple
transmission reservations, up to full
nameplate capacity, on multiple
transmission paths for generators that
market their output at multiple trading
points from day to day. AWEA contends
that determining whether a positive
imbalance event results in an
unauthorized use of transmission
depends on whether the transmission
provider is contractually obligated to
deliver a resource’s actual or full output,
or only a fixed amount of power, and,
to the extent the positive generation
imbalance is physically delivered from
point A to point B, whether such
delivery is covered by a transmission
service reservation.
439. If the Commission does not grant
the requested clarification, AWEA
requests rehearing to the extent Order
No. 890 authorizes transmission
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
providers to impose unreserved use
penalties for every instance of positive
generator imbalance. AWEA argues such
a requirement would be inconsistent
with the Commission’s refusal to
delineate the specific circumstances that
constitute unreserved use of the
transmission system. AWEA further
argues that applying unreserved use
penalties in every instance of positive
generation imbalance would subject
generators to duplicative charges for an
imbalance and would render
uneconomic substantial numbers of
wind power transactions. AWEA argues
such a policy would be unjust,
unreasonable and unduly
discriminatory against wind power
generators that have no ability to control
the actual output of their facilities.
440. TDU Systems argue that it is
unjust and unreasonable for the
Commission to subject LSEs to penalties
for inadvertent uses of network service
when managing loads and resources
across a neighboring control area. TDU
Systems contend that serving native
load in multiple control areas requires
managing resources across those
boundaries and the flexibility to
respond to changes in service
requirements on a timely basis in a costefficient manner comparable to the way
in which transmission providers use
network service to manage their retail
native load service obligations. In their
view, inadvertent takes of transmission
service in excess of reservations occur
for reasons beyond the control of the
LSE and, therefore, assessing unreserved
use penalties is inappropriate. TDU
Systems also object to the Commission’s
statement that it would not, as a general
policy, exempt an LSE’s unreserved use
from potential civil penalties. TDU
Systems argue that the imposition of
civil penalties on LSEs that
inadvertently violate the prohibition on
unauthorized use would be unjust and
unreasonable on its face. TDU Systems
suggest that payment for the increment
of service actually used but not reserved
makes the transmission provider whole
without visiting further penalties on
behavior that is by definition
unintentional.
441. TDU Systems argue that
inadvertent takes of transmission
service in excess of reservations by an
LSE serving native load in multiple
control areas should be treated as an
energy imbalance in the control area in
which the energy imbalance occurs,
rather than as an unauthorized use of
point-to-point service. TDU Systems
object to the Commission’s
characterization of energy imbalance
charges as compensation to the
transmission provider for the additional
PO 00000
Frm 00055
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3037
expense it incurs to compensate for a
transmission customer’s failure to
schedule sufficient energy to serve its
load, arguing that imbalance charges
contain a penal, above-cost component
that make the transmission provider
more than whole. In their view, the
more onerous unreserved use charges
should be reserved for intentional overscheduling of transmission reservations.
442. In order to prevent inadvertent
uses from occurring in the first place,
TDU Systems contend that transmission
providers should be required, as a
condition of being able to impose
penalties, to use software designed to
identify unreserved uses. TDU Systems
suggest that such software could
disallow tags for service that exceeds
reserved levels. They argue that the
Commission missed the point by
rejecting this suggestion in Order No.
890 based on the expectation that the
reforms adopted would reduce the level
of unreserved use penalties for instances
of inadvertent uses. TDU Systems
contend that the Commission’s stated
objective of discouraging disorderly use
of the transmission system would be
better achieved by requiring the use of
software designed to identify
inadvertent uses, rather than the
assessment of steep unreserved use
penalties.
443. TDU Systems further argue that
prior Commission approval of penalties
should have been required, arguing that
due process requires nothing less than
Commission notice, review, and
approval, as well as an opportunity for
a hearing, before application of any
unreserved use penalty. TDU Systems
argue that the burden should be on the
transmission provider to justify any
requested penalties, rather than on the
transmission customer to disprove the
reasonableness of a penalty through the
complaint process.
444. TAPS requests clarification of the
Commission’s statement that the
transmission provider is free to use the
undesignated portion of a remote
network resource to serve its bundled
retail customers since it does not have
to ‘‘take service’’ under its OATT for the
transmission of power that is purchased
on behalf of bundled retail customers.
TAPS contends that, although a
transmission provider is not required to
take network service to meet the needs
of its bundled retail loads, it does have
to abide by all of the requirements of
designating network resources for such
purpose 172 and that the non-tariff
172 Citing pro forma OATT section 28.2;
Wisconsin Public Power Inc. SYSTEM v. Wisconsin
Public Svc. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,120 (1998).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3038
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
service the transmission provider uses
for itself must be comparable to the
network service provided to its
transmission customers.173 TAPS argues
that the transmission provider’s own
use of non-designated resources (or
portions of resources) to meet bundled
retail therefore must be on a non-firm
basis supported by secondary network
service, as is the case for network
customers.174 TAPS requests rehearing
to the extent the Commission intended
to allow transmission providers
preferential use of the transmission
system.
445. TAPS also requests clarification
that the Commission’s discussion of
secondary network service was intended
to address only what a network
customer (or the transmission provider)
can and cannot do with respect to the
host transmission provider’s system and
does not place any limitations on the
use of resources on the remote systems.
TAPS asks that the Commission clarify
that the host transmission provider
cannot impose a penalty for scheduling
delivery of designated or undesignated
portions of a customer’s remote
resources when such delivery does not
utilize the host transmission provider’s
transmission system.
446. Washington IOUs contend that
established rules in place since Order
No. 888 have allowed network
customers to use a firm transmission
path reserved for a designated network
resource for any power (including
economy purchases) as long as the use
did not exceed the amount of the firm
network reservation. Washington IOUs
argue that the Commission reversed this
long-standing policy by prohibiting the
use of a reserved firm path for network
capacity to deliver power from a nondesignated resource, which, in turn,
improperly and unreasonably devalued
network service in comparison to pointto-point service. Washington IOUs
contend that whether the megawatts
using the reserved transmission capacity
are coming from a designated network
resource or a replacement power source
is largely irrelevant because this
distinction does not affect grid use and
causes no harm to any other customer
so long as the quantity does not exceed
the amount of the reservation.
Washington IOUs state that the
Commission places no restrictions on
the resource used to provide the
megawatts flowing over a capacity
reserved in a long-term firm point-topoint reservation and that it would
degrade the quality of network service
173 Citing
pro forma OATT section 28.3.
In re SCANA Corp., 118 FERC ¶ 61,028
(2007); Idaho Power Co., 103 FERC ¶ 61,182 (2003).
to impose such restrictions, and
associated penalties, on network
customers. In their view, providing
penalties for such uses of the
transmission system would provide a
windfall to other transmission
customers because the circumstances
giving rise to these penalties cause no
harm to other customers.
Commission Determination
447. The Commission declines to
distinguish between intentional and
unintentional unreserved transmission
uses and reiterates that all unreserved
uses will be subject to operational
penalties. We conclude that maintaining
penalties for any unreserved use of
transmission service will create the right
incentives for customers to take
appropriate measures to minimize any
unreserved use before it occurs, whether
intentional or not. As the Commission
noted in Order No. 890, any unreserved
use of transmission service can harm
reliability and disrupt the allocation of
transmission rights.175 It is therefore
appropriate to maintain penalties for
both intentional and unintentional
unreserved uses. The Commission was
sensitive, however, to the concerns of
commenters, determining in Order No.
890 that penalties should be based on
the period of unreserved use rather than
the period for which service is reserved,
which could be much longer. This
penalty structure more closely
approximates the penalty charge with
the impact on the transmission system
while maintaining the correct incentive
for transmission customers to take the
necessary steps to ensure that they
reserve appropriate service.
448. The Commission continues to
believe that it would not be appropriate
to exempt any class of customers from
unreserved use penalties. While we
appreciate that intermittent resources
have limited ability to precisely forecast
or control generation levels, they are
able to reserve sufficient transmission
capacity to deliver their full output in
the event it is produced, thereby
mitigating potential unreserved use
penalties. In this regard, intermittent
resources are no different than any other
generator and, thus, application of
unreserved use penalties is not
discriminatory. Exempting these or any
other type of resource from unreserved
use penalties would diminish incentives
to reserve adequate transmission to
deliver the resource’s output,
potentially creating reliability problems
for the transmission provider and
discriminating in favor of the resource
in the allocation of transmission rights.
449. The Commission also disagrees
that imposing unreserved use penalties
on generators for inadvertent positive
generation imbalances is duplicative of
imbalance charges that may be assessed.
As the Commission explained in Order
No. 890, imbalance charges and
unreserved use penalties serve different
purposes.176 Imbalance charges result
from a transmission customer’s failure
to schedule adequate capacity for energy
deliveries, whereas unreserved use
penalties result from a transmission
customer’s failure to reserve adequate
capacity for energy deliveries. Even
though a transmission customer may be
assessed charges for both an imbalance
and an unreserved use in a particular
scenario, that is appropriate because the
transmission customer has delivered
energy in excess of what it reserved and
scheduled. In that instance, application
of an imbalance charge in addition to an
unreserved use penalty recognizes that
the transmission customer both failed to
reserve adequate transmission as well as
failed to properly schedule its energy
deliveries.
450. We acknowledge, as TDU
Systems argue, that imbalance charges
contain a penalty, above-cost
component, but disagree that this alone
justifies relieving a customer of an
unreserved use penalty. As a threshold
matter, we note that revenues from
imbalance charges or unreserved use
penalties in excess of the transmission
provider’s costs or relevant transmission
rate are distributed to transmission
customers, not retained by the
transmission provider. More to the
point, however, imbalance charges and
unreserved use penalties are associated
with different actions and, as such, are
designed to compensate the
transmission provider for different
things, while also providing appropriate
incentives to transmission customers.
We continue to believe that both
imbalance charges and unreserved use
penalties should apply to the extent the
customer’s reservation and schedule are
insufficient.
451. We also acknowledge that, in
certain circumstances, inadvertent
unreserved uses by an LSE serving load
in multiple control areas may be beyond
the LSE’s control at the moment they
occur. This does not mean, however,
that penalties should not apply to such
unreserved uses. Like any customer, the
LSE is able to protect itself against
unreserved use penalties by reserving
sufficient capacity. We also reject the
argument that civil penalties would be
unjust and unreasonable on their face if
applied to inadvertent unreserved uses
174 Citing
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
175 See
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 838.
Frm 00056
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
176 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 837.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
by an LSE. As with any civil penalties,
the Commission will consider the facts
and circumstances before it when
determining whether to impose a civil
penalty for unreserved use of
transmission service.
452. As the Commission explained in
Order No. 890, we will not require
transmission providers to use software
designed to identify unreserved uses as
a condition of being able to impose
operational penalties.177 It is the
obligation of the transmission customer,
not the transmission provider, to ensure
that the customer has reserved the
transmission service that it uses.
Moreover, we do not have sufficient
evidence before us now to decide that,
as a general matter, development and
implementation of such software would
be more appropriate than assessing
penalties for inadvertent unreserved
uses, which we note were significantly
reduced by the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890. For the same reasons
expressed in Order No. 890, we reject
TDU Systems’ argument that
Commission approval is required prior
to assessing an unreserved use
penalty.178
453. With regard to TAPS’ concern
about the transmission provider’s use of
the system to serve native load, Order
No. 890 did not disturb the requirement
from Order No. 888 that transmission
providers serving native load must
designate network resources and load.
Although transmission providers are not
required to take service under their
OATT in such circumstances, we
reiterate that, to the extent a
transmission provider takes power from
a non-designated network resource to
serve bundled retail load, such power
must be on a non-firm basis comparable
to secondary network service.179 To the
extent necessary, the Commission
clarifies that Order No. 890 was not
intended to grant transmission
providers greater flexibility than other
network customers when using
undesignated network resources or
undesignated portions of designated
network resources to serve bundled
retail load.
454. We also clarify, as TAPS
requests, that the Commission’s
discussion of secondary network service
in Order No. 890 was intended to
address only what a network customer
(or the transmission provider) can and
cannot do with respect to the host
transmission provider’s system.180 The
host transmission provider cannot
177 See
id. at P 835.
id. at P 836.
179 See, e.g., Order No. 888 at 31,745.
180 See Order No. 890 at P 839.
178 See
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
impose a penalty for scheduling
delivery of designated or undesignated
portions of a customer’s remote
resources when such delivery does not
utilize the host transmission provider’s
transmission system. Unreserved uses of
the host transmission provider’s system
can, however, be charged an unreserved
use penalty, and section 13.4 of the pro
forma OATT provides that the customer
using the unreserved service shall be
deemed to have executed a service
agreement with the host transmission
provider to govern that service. To the
extent necessary, we clarify that all
unreserved uses of the host transmission
provider’s system are to be considered
uses of firm point-to-point transmission
service, even if the customer is taking
network service or non-firm point-topoint service for the reserved portion of
its service.
455. We disagree with Washington
IOUs that a network customer’s use of
firm transmission capacity reserved for
a designated network resource to deliver
power from a non-designated resource
causes no harm to other customers. The
Commission has long required network
customers to use secondary network
service to deliver energy from nondesignated resources to serve network
load.181 To allow network customers to
use the firm transmission capacity
reserved for designated network
resources in such circumstances would
unduly preference the network
customer over other potential users of
that firm capacity. In such a case, the
transmission customer could avoid
potential curtailments because the
purchased energy is scheduled with a
higher curtailment priority under NERC
guidelines than it would receive had the
transmission customer used secondary
network or non-firm point-to-point
transmission service.182 In addition, the
transmission customer uses service that
would have potentially been
unavailable if it had requested service as
required.
(2) Penalty Rate for Unreserved Use of
Transmission Service
456. The Commission determined in
Order No. 890 that it will continue
giving transmission providers discretion
in setting their unreserved use penalty
rates to the extent they are consistent
with that order. If a transmission
provider elects to charge unreserved use
penalties, the Commission explained
that such penalty charges must be based
on the period of unreserved use rather
181 See pro forma OATT section 28.4; Order No.
888 at 31,748.
182 See MidAmerican Energy Co., 112 FERC
¶ 61,346 (2005); PacifiCorp, 118 FERC ¶ 61,026
(2007).
PO 00000
Frm 00057
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3039
than the period for which service is
reserved, subject to certain principles.
First, the unreserved use penalty for a
single hour of unreserved use will be
based on the rate for daily firm pointto-point service, even if the
transmission provider has a rate for
hourly firm point-to-point service on
file. Second, as a general rule, more than
one assessment for a given duration
(e.g., daily) will increase the penalty
period to the next longest duration (e.g.,
weekly).
457. The Commission affirmed the
requirement that a transmission
provider wishing to charge unreserved
use penalties must explicitly state the
penalty rate in its OATT. The
Commission also retained the current
policy established in Allegheny Power
Sys., Inc. that the unreserved use
penalty rate may not be greater than
twice the firm point-to-point rate for the
period of unreserved use.183 The
Commission established a rebuttable
presumption that unreserved use
penalties no greater than twice the firm
point-to-point rate for the penalty
period are just and reasonable. The
Commission further stated that
transmission providers proposing an
unreserved use penalty in excess of
twice the relevant firm point-to-point
rate for pervasive unreserved use could
do so in a filing under section 205 of the
FPA. Transmission providers proposing
such a rate must establish that a higher
penalty rate is required to combat
pervasive unreserved use of
transmission and why the standard rate
that penalizes repeated unreserved use
is not adequate to discourage repeated
instances of unreserved use of
transmission service.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
458. TDU Systems contend that a 200
percent penalty rate is excessive and
unnecessary to the extent it is based on
periods greater than the unreserved use
period. TDU Systems argue that, if
system integrity and reliability are the
bases upon which the penalty policy is
founded, then penalties for a single hour
should be based on the rate for hourly
transmission service, and so forth. TDU
Systems state that that they generally
agree that a transmission customer must
face a penalty in excess of the firm
point-to-point rate in order to have an
incentive to reserve the appropriate
amount of service, but contend that the
Commission fails to justify charging 200
percent penalties on periods greater
than the unreserved use period. In their
view, a 200 percent penalty might be
183 Allegheny Power Sys., Inc., 80 FERC ¶ 61,143
at 61,545–46 (1997).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3040
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
appropriate if based only on the period
of unreserved use but is excessive and
unnecessary when applied to periods
greater than the unreserved use.
459. TDU Systems further contend
that a 200 percent penalty is excessive
in any event for an isolated inadvertent
use. In their view, the Commission
should limit any application of the 200
percent penalty charge to intentional or
persistent, repeated unauthorized uses.
TDU Systems claim that the
Commission misconstrued this proposal
in its comments on the NOPR. TDU
Systems states that they do not argue
that only repeated unreserved uses
should be subject to a penalty. Rather,
they argue that the 200 percent penalty
in particular should apply only to
intentional or persistent unauthorized
uses.
460. E.ON U.S. maintains that the
Commission failed to address whether,
or how, a transmission provider may
recover a penalty from customers whose
unauthorized use of transmission
service also includes unauthorized use
of ancillary services. E.ON U.S. asks the
Commission to clarify that ancillary
service rates for unauthorized uses are
subject to the same price cap (twice the
applicable ancillary services rate for the
period of unauthorized use) and pricing
criteria that apply to the unauthorized
transmission penalty rates. If not, E.ON
U.S. contends that the charge for such
unauthorized uses of ancillary services
will not discourage unauthorized use of
ancillary services.
Commission Determination
461. The Commission affirms the
adoption of a rebuttable presumption
that unreserved use penalties up to two
times the transmission provider’s
applicable point-to-point service rate are
just and reasonable. This penalty
structure provides appropriate
incentives to transmission customers to
purchase the correct amount of
transmission capacity, yet is not unduly
harsh in light of changes to the
definition of the penalty period. Prior to
Order No. 890, transmission providers
could assess unreserved use penalties
based on the length of the transmission
customer’s reservation. The Commission
reformed that practice in Order No. 890,
significantly relaxing unreserved use
penalties by requiring that they be based
on the period of use.184 The
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
184 See
Order No. 890 at P 846. The Commission
explained that penalty charges must be based on the
period of unreserved use, subject to certain
principles. First, the unreserved use penalty for a
single hour of unreserved use will be based on the
rate for daily firm point-to-point service, even if the
transmission provider has a rate for hourly firm
point-to-point transmission service on file. Second,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission balanced the penalty rate
of 200 percent against that reform, and
we continue to believe that the balance
struck provides transmission customers
a just and reasonable incentive to
reserve the correct amount to
transmission capacity.
462. It is therefore appropriate to
apply the 200 percent penalty rate to all
unreserved uses, whether inadvertent or
intentional. As explained above, all
unreserved uses have the potential to
impair reliability and disrupt the
allocation of transmission rights and,
therefore, all should be subject to a
penalty. Underlying TDU Systems’
request for rehearing on this point is an
apparent belief that persistent
unauthorized uses should be subject to
higher penalties to distinguish them
from inadvertent uses. In response, we
note that the penalty structure adopted
in Order No. 890 already provides for
increased penalties for persistent
unreserved uses since more than one
assessment for a given duration will
increase the penalty period to the next
longest duration. To the extent a
transmission provider believes
additional penalties are necessary to
prevent pervasive unauthorized use, it
may make a filing under FPA section
205 to propose such additional
penalties.185
463. In response to E.ON U.S., the
Commission clarifies that all charges for
ancillary service costs associated with
unreserved uses must be based on the
actual costs of the ancillary service
attributable to the unreserved use, i.e.,
not subject to the 200 percent penalty
rate. For example, a transmission
customer with one hour of unreserved
use may be charged for one hour of
ancillary service costs associated with
that use, even if the customer is charged
twice the daily point-to-point rate for
the underlying unreserved use. We
believe the 200 percent penalty as
applied to the firm point-to-point rate
based on the period of unreserved use
is an adequate incentive to accurately
schedule without applying an
additional penalty on the related
ancillary service charge. If a
transmission provider wishes to impose
charges for ancillary services as a
component of an unreserved use
as a general rule, more than one assessment for a
given duration (e.g., daily) will increase the penalty
period to the next longest duration (e.g., weekly).
For example, a customer having two unreserved
daily uses within a week could be charged an
unreserved use penalty equal to the weekly firm
point-to-point rate plus a penalty component up to
100 percent of that weekly firm point-to-point rate,
for a total unreserved use penalty charge up to 200
percent of the point-to-point weekly rate.
185 See id. at P 849.
PO 00000
Frm 00058
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
penalty, the transmission provider must
expressly state so in its OATT.
b. Distribution of Operational Penalties
464. Consistent with its determination
regarding the distribution of imbalance
penalties, the Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that transmission
providers must distribute all unreserved
use and late study penalties they collect,
whether from the transmission
provider’s merchant function or other
transmission customers. The
Commission required that unreserved
use penalties be distributed to all nonoffending transmission customers,
whether or not affiliated with the
transmission provider (including the
transmission provider’s native load) and
required all late study penalties to be
distributed to non-affiliates.
465. The Commission required the
transmission provider to make an
annual compliance filing and, in that
filing, propose: (1) A mechanism to
identify non-offending transmission
customers; (2) a method to distribute the
unreserved use penalty revenues it
receives to the identified transmission
customers; and (3) how it will distribute
late study penalties to unaffiliated
transmission customers. The
Commission also required the
transmission provider to make an
annual filing that provides information
regarding the penalty revenue the
transmission provider has received and
distributed.186 The Commission
declined to require the transmission
provider to make an annual filing to
propose a distribution method for
unreserved use and late study penalties,
concluding instead that the annual
informational filing requirement was
sufficient.
466. In order to make the transmission
provider whole prior to distribution of
unreserved use penalty revenues, the
Commission allows the transmission
provider to retain the base firm point-topoint transmission service charge and to
distribute any revenue collected above
the base firm point-to-point
transmission service charge to all nonoffending customers. The transmission
provider is required to distribute the
entire amount it pays under section 19.9
of the pro forma OATT for completing
service request studies on an untimely
basis. The Commission also prohibited
186 The annual informational filing must provide:
(1) A summary of penalty revenue credits by
transmission customer; (2) total penalty revenues
collected from affiliates; (3) total penalty revenues
collected from non-affiliates; (4) a description of the
costs incurred as a result of the offending behavior;
and (5) a summary of the portion of the unreserved
penalty revenue retained by the transmission
provider. See Order No. 890 at P 864.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
transmission providers from recovering
for ratemaking purposes or through any
service under the Commission’s
jurisdiction any amount it or an affiliate
pays as an operational penalty.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
467. TDU Systems argue that any
retention of revenues from the
unreserved use penalty by affiliated,
non-offending transmission customers
will dilute the impact of the penalty by
returning some of it to the corporate
family. While unaffiliated transmission
customers pay 100 percent of the
penalty, TDU Systems contend that
affiliated transmission customers would
pay less than the full operational
penalty since some of the costs will be
returned to the corporate family. TDU
Systems claim that this discount
constitutes undue discrimination and is
inconsistent with comparability.
468. Claiming that it would be timeconsuming and burdensome for a
transmission provider to refile, on an
annual basis, its methodology for
assessing and distributing operational
penalties, Ameren and EEI ask the
Commission to clarify that the
distribution methodology is to be
proposed in a one-time compliance
filing. In their view, the annual
informational filing is more
appropriately limited to implementation
of the distribution methodology, i.e., the
amount of penalties assessed, the
amounts distributed to customers, and
the amounts retained by the
transmission provider. Ameren and EEI
suggest that any changes to the
distribution methodology proposed after
acceptance of the one-time compliance
filing be submitted in a separate filing
under FPA section 205. EEI also asks the
Commission to clarify whether the onetime compliance filing proposing the
transmission provider’s distribution
methodology is to be submitted when
the transmission provider makes the
other tariff modifications to comply
with Order No. 890 or at some other
date.
469. MidAmerican seeks a number of
clarifications regarding the requirement
to propose a distribution methodology
in a compliance filing. MidAmerican
asks the Commission to clarify that the
transmission provider must wait for a
Commission order before commencing
the implementation of its filed revenue
distribution plan. MidAmerican also
questions whether it would be
acceptable for a transmission provider
to use the full annual compliance period
to identify the non-offending
transmission customers or, if not
acceptable, whether the billing month
should be used. MidAmerican suggests
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
that an ‘‘offending transmission
customer’’ should be classified as such
for the entire reporting period and not
for a subset of the reporting period.
Finally, MidAmerican contends that it
should be acceptable to allocate the
penalty revenues between nonoffending network customers and pointto-point customers based on the total
megawatt-hours that each of these
customer groups scheduled during the
compliance period. If the Commission
disagrees, MidAmerican seeks
clarification of how to allocate the
penalty revenues between the two
customer groups. With regard to the
annual informational filing,
MidAmerican asks the Commission to
confirm that it is acceptable to submit
the annual informational filing some
months following the compliance filing.
MidAmerican also suggests that both the
compliance filing and the informational
filing can be submitted any time during
a calendar year for penalties that were
imposed during the prior calendar year.
470. MidAmerican requests further
clarification that penalty revenue
distribution should be treated as credits
toward a future billing cycle.
MidAmerican also suggests that the
Commission adopt a reasonable
threshold below which penalty revenue
distributions become disproportionately
burdensome, such as any calendar year
when the total penalties are less than
$10,000. Below that threshold,
MidAmerican suggests that the
transmission provider should have the
option to make the payment to the
transmission provider’s regional
reliability organization, which it states
would contribute to reducing payments
for reliability that benefits all customers.
Commission Determination
471. As some petitioners note, the
discussion of the process for
distributing operational penalties in
Order No. 890 is somewhat unclear. We
grant rehearing to explain more
precisely the process transmission
providers must follow in filing their
unreserved use penalty rates,
operational penalty distribution
methodologies, and annual compliance
reports with the Commission.
472. First, if a transmission provider
elects to impose unreserved use
penalties, it must submit to the
Commission a tariff filing under FPA
section 205 stating the applicable
unreserved use penalty rate. Second,
each transmission provider also must
submit a one-time compliance filing
under FPA section 206 proposing the
transmission provider’s methodology for
distributing revenues from late study
penalties and, if applicable, unreserved
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3041
use penalties. This one-time compliance
filing can be submitted at any time prior
to the first distribution of operational
penalties. Transmission providers
should request an effective date for this
distribution mechanism as of the date of
the filing and may begin implementing
the methodology immediately, subject
to refund if the Commission alters the
distribution mechanism on review. The
distribution mechanism, as accepted by
the Commission, will remain effective
until the transmission provider files
changes to the proposed structure or the
Commission directs any such changes
on its own motion. Finally, each
transmission provider must report on its
penalty assessments and distributions in
an annual compliance report to be
submitted on or before the deadline for
submitting FERC Form-1, as established
by the Commission’s Office of
Enforcement each year. This annual
compliance report should be filed under
in the same docket as the docket in
which the proposed one-time
compliance filing is submitted.
473. Although we will continue to
allow transmission providers to propose
a mechanism through which they will
identify who is a ‘‘non-offending’’
transmission customer for purposes of
making unreserved use penalty
distributions, this should not be based
on the entire calendar year, as
MidAmerican suggests. For instance, for
purposes of calculating penalty revenue
distributions, it would not be
appropriate for transmission providers
to lump together all customers who
caused any degree of unreserved use
over the course of a year into one group
and then distribute the penalty revenues
to the remaining customers. We believe
that it is best to consider the remaining
details of a transmission provider’s
distribution mechanism, including the
particular period used to identify nonoffending customers (e.g., quarterly,
monthly, etc.), on a case-by-case basis
on review of the one-time compliance
filing proposing the distribution
mechanism.
474. The Commission rejects requests
for rehearing of the determination to
allow revenues for unreserved use
penalties to be distributed to all nonoffending customers, including
affiliates. We acknowledge that this may
result in the transmission provider
receiving penalty revenues on behalf of
its native load even when its affiliate
has been identified as offending
customers, or vice versa. We
nevertheless believe it is a more
equitable and administratively efficient
method for all users of the transmission
system that are subject to unreserved
use penalties to be eligible to receive a
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3042
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
portion of associated revenues. If the
Commission were to distinguish
between affiliates and non-affiliates in
this instance, it would follow that
transmission customers that are
affiliated among themselves, but not
with the transmission provider, should
also be excluded from distributions to
the extent one of the customers is
offending. Given the complicated
ownership structures prevalent in the
electric industry, in which one company
may own a small percentage of several
companies, determining whether certain
transmission customers are affiliates
would be a time-consuming exercise for
the transmission provider.
475. As the Commission stated in
Order No. 890, we will require all
operational penalty revenues to be
distributed, with no exception. In the
case of unreserved use penalties, we
require penalty revenues to be
distributed to non-offending customers
and, in the case of late study penalties,
we require penalty revenues to be
distributed to all non-affiliates of the
transmission provider. We will therefore
deny MidAmerican’s request to allow
certain thresholds below which
transmission providers may distribute
penalty amounts to third parties such as
regional reliability organizations. Such a
policy could decrease the financial
incentive built into the current rule,
which rewards non-offending customers
with a portion of the distributed
revenues for abiding by Commission
policies. We recognize, however, that it
could be administratively difficult for
some transmission providers to
distribute small amounts of penalty
revenues and note that transmission
providers have flexibility in developing
their distribution methodologies to
minimize administrative burdens, by
establishing reasonable minimum
thresholds to trigger a distribution,
provided they do not unduly restrict the
distribution of penalty amounts.
c. Applicability of Operational Penalties
Proposal to RTOs and Other
Independent or Non-Profit Entities
476. The Commission clarified in
Order No. 890 that RTOs and
independent transmission coordinators,
like any other transmission provider, are
bound by the requirement to distribute
revenues they receive when they assess
operational penalties. The Commission
declined to exempt non-profit
transmission providers from the
requirement to distribute unreserved
use penalties they pay to the extent they
take service under their own tariffs. If a
non-profit transmission provider incurs
an operational penalty as a result of its
activities as a transmission customer, it
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
is required to distribute penalties to
non-offending customers.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
477. Ameren asks the Commission to
clarify that non-profit transmission
providers, including RTOs, are not
liable for any operational penalties. If a
penalty is assessed on an RTO or nonprofit transmission provider, Ameren
contends they should not be allowed to
flow through to their ratepayers the
costs of such penalties, regardless of
whether their affiliates engage in forprofit activities. Ameren contends that
allowing for such recovery would be
inconsistent with Commission
policy.187 With respect to RTOs in
particular, Ameren contends that
allowing RTOs to pass through penalties
essentially punishes companies for
participation in an RTO. To the extent
a non-profit transmission provider is
assessed an operational penalty at all,
Ameren contends it should only be
obligated to pay such penalty to the
extent it can do so through any
operations in which the transmission
provider retains any proceeds above its
costs, such as wholesale marketing
operations of the transmission provider
or its affiliates. If the Commission
wishes to sanction an RTO, ISO, or
independent system administrator,
Ameren argues that it should consider
different measures, such as reductions
in management bonuses.
478. New York Transmission Owners
agree that penalties must be structured
so they do not flow through to other
parties and similarly suggest that
penalties be paid through items like
variable pay or bonus programs. With
respect to potential penalties paid by
NYISO, New York Transmission
Owners ask the Commission to require
that they be paid out of compensation
and incentive programs and that the
Commission tailor such penalties to
recognize NYISO’s limited ability to pay
them.
479. NYISO and the ISO/RTO
Council, however, object to
disallowance of cost recovery for
operational penalties. They state that
the Commission neither generically
allowed nor disallowed pass-throughs of
reliability-related penalty costs in Order
No. 672 and, instead, adopted a case-bycase approach, inviting RTOs and ISOs
to make filings under FPA section 205
to propose penalty cost recovery
mechanisms. They argue that the
Commission failed to identify any
difference between reliability and
operational penalties that would justify
187 Citing
Order No. 890 at P 865; Cleco Corp., 104
FERC ¶ 61,125 at 61,441 (2003).
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
departing from the case-by-case
approach adopted in Order No. 672.
480. The ISO/RTO Council argues that
use of variable employee bonus funds to
pay operational penalties would
penalize employees for issues beyond
their control and impair the ability to
hire and retain qualified management. It
contends the Commission would have
no authority under FPA section 316A to
impose penalties on particular
employees for tariff violations of their
employer utility. The ISO/RTO Council
objects to potential personal liability as
a violation of due process and an
attempt to dictate the internal
management decisions of a public
utility.
481. NYISO contends that the
prohibition on recovering penalty costs
in rates is inconsistent with the
Commission’s Policy Statement on
Enforcement,188 which provides that the
level of penalties should account for the
effect on the financial viability of the
company that committed the
wrongdoing and reasonably reflect the
seriousness of an offense. NYISO
acknowledges that the Commission
indicated it would consider financial
impacts on RTOs and ISOs when
deciding whether to assess penalties,
but argues the Commission erred in
assuming that non-profit RTOs and ISOs
can somehow absorb penalty costs.
482. NYISO states that the premise
underlying the Commission’s decision
in Order No. 890 that RTOs and ISOs
have other sources of revenue that could
absorb penalty costs is flatly incorrect.
NYISO explains that it collects revenues
for both transmission and nontransmission services (i.e., market
administration) through Rate Schedule 1
and that all revenues from sources other
than Rate Schedule 1 (e.g.,
interconnection studies, customer
trainings, and interest earnings) are used
to reduce Rate Schedule 1 charges.
NYISO therefore contends that it has no
excess funds available to pay penalties.
NYISO states that it does interpret Order
No. 890 to allow it to recover penalty
costs through any rates and thus
questions how a non-profit RTO and
ISO could recover those costs. NYISO
asks the Commission to grant rehearing
and allow non-profit RTOs/ISOs to
argue, on a case-by-case basis, for an
opportunity to recover penalty costs or
to explain why sanctions other than
financial penalties should be imposed.
483. National Grid agrees that the
Commission should consider the unique
problems associated with the non-profit
188 Enforcement of Statutes, Orders, Rules, and
Regulations, 113 FERC ¶ 61,068 (2005) (Policy
Statement on Enforcement).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
status of RTOs/ISOs in determining the
type and treatment of penalties
applicable to such entities. Absent
extraordinary circumstances that
warrant a monetary penalty for RTOs/
ISOs, National Grid argues the
Commission should use non-monetary
penalties in the first instance to address
violations by the RTO or ISO. To the
extent that penalties are imposed,
National Grid contends that the RTO or
ISO should be authorized to pass the
costs of such penalties to its customers
and that these customers, in turn should
be authorized to recover the costs of
such penalties from their own
customers.
Commission Determination
484. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 not to categorically exempt any
class of transmission providers from the
potential imposition of operational
penalties. As we explain in section
III.D.4.a., competing internal policies or
staffing issues could lead an RTO or ISO
to treat particular types of requests
differently notwithstanding their
organizational independence from
market participants. By imposing late
study penalties on RTOs and ISOs, the
Commission has established financial
incentives for those transmission
providers to complete request studies in
a timely manner or otherwise justify
their inability to do so. RTOs and ISOs
are like any other transmission provider
in this regard. We will nonetheless take
into consideration the relative ability of
non-profit transmission providers to pay
late study penalties on review of their
notification filings, consistent with the
Enforcement Policy Statement.189
485. We acknowledge, as NYISO
points out, that non-profit transmission
providers may not have sources of
revenue from which they can absorb late
study penalties other than revenues
collected under a Commissionjurisdictional tariff. As we explain in
section III.D.4.a., the intent of
prohibiting transmission providers from
automatically passing on to customers
the costs of late study penalties was to
preclude those transmission providers
from designing their rates to
accommodate a pass through of the
penalties, i.e., effectively including
penalties in its cost of service. The 60day due diligence standard is in place
to protect customers and it would
therefore be inappropriate to
automatically recover from those
customers penalties assessed for non189 See Policy Statement on Enforcement at P 20
(indicating that assessment of penalties should take
account of the financial viability of the offender).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
compliance. An RTO or ISO is
permitted to use revenues previously
collected under Commission-approved
rates to pay late study penalties by
reallocating funds as necessary to
distribute late study penalty amounts.
This does not mean, as the ISO/RTO
Council implies, that the Commission is
imposing personal liability on
employees for penalties applied to an
RTO or ISO. Each RTO and ISO has
discretion to determine, as an
organization, how to reallocate its
funds.
486. We decline to state generically
which particular sources of funds
should be used to pay late study
penalties, since that question would
best be answered on a case-by-case
basis. If the RTO or ISO is unable to
identify any appropriate funds from
which to pay a late study penalty, the
Commission will consider case-specific
cost-recovery proposals under FPA
section 205, provided they do not allow
for automatic pass-through of penalties
applied to the RTO or ISO.
5. ‘‘Higher of’’ Pricing Policy
487. In Order No. 890, the
Commission did not address proposals
to change or clarify the ‘‘higher of’’
pricing policy and, instead, addressed
only the narrow issue of whether
changes to the pro forma OATT are
necessary to ensure that, consistent with
the ‘‘higher of’’ policy, incremental cost
transmission rates are presented as
monthly rates for service.190 Rather than
quoting incremental costs as monthly
rates, the Commission noted that some
transmission providers had been
quoting incremental rates as lump sum
payments, a practice that is inconsistent
with our ratemaking policy. In Order
No. 890, the Commission concluded
that changes to the pro forma OATT are
not needed to address this matter. The
Commission explained that the
transmission provider must continue to
include a proposed monthly
incremental rate with its offer of service
whenever it proposes to charge the
customer an incremental rate. The
transmission provider must also provide
cost support for the derivation of the
rate consistent with the cost support
190 Order No. 890 at P 884. In Order No. 888, the
Commission stated that system expansions should
be priced at the higher of the embedded cost rate
(including the expansion costs) or the incremental
cost rate, consistent with the Transmission Pricing
Policy Statement. See Inquiry Concerning the
Commission’s Pricing Policy for Transmission
Services Provided by Public Utilities Under the
Federal Power Act, Policy Statement, 59 FR 55031
at 55037 (Nov. 3, 1994), FERC Stats. & Regs.
¶ 31,005 at 31,146 (1994), order on reconsideration,
71 FERC ¶ 61,195 (1995) (Transmission Pricing
Policy Statement).
PO 00000
Frm 00061
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3043
that the transmission provider would
provide to the Commission in a section
205 rate filing.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
488. EEI requests clarification that
transmission providers may calculate
the incremental costs of network
upgrades so as to allow incremental
rates to vary over the term of the
contract to reflect changes in the
transmission provider’s cost of service.
While recognizing that the Commission
declined to grant this clarification in
Order No. 890, EEI believes that this
clarification will enhance compliance
with the Commission’s policies and is
therefore within the scope of this
proceeding.
489. Great Northern seeks rehearing of
the Commission’s decision not to
require transmission providers to permit
a customer to opt for a longer contract
term (to obtain a longer amortization
period and a lower rate) once the
incremental cost of transmission
upgrades has been determined. Great
Northern argues that failure to grant this
option will result in uncertainty and
delay in the development of competitive
generation resources. Great Northern
claims that there is no record evidence
that adopting its request would be
problematic for any transmission
provider, customer, or market
participant. Great Northern contends
that, if an increase in contract term
would trigger a need for additional, or
different, upgrades, it would be the
responsibility of the transmission
customer to pay for those upgrades over
the term of the contract.
490. If the Commission does not allow
general flexibility for transmission
customers to adjust the term of their
requested transmission service contract
to provide a longer period for
amortizing the costs of system upgrades
once the incremental cost of expansion
is disclosed by the transmission
provider, Great Northern requests the
Commission to allow contracts to be
extended in the specific circumstances
where pending transmission service
requests were made for one year (or
longer if necessary to pay for any
required system upgrades) and the
transmission provider is on notice of the
potential need for a longer contract
term. Great Northern states that it has
made twenty-three transmission service
requests on transmission provider
systems which are currently being
studied, and in each instance the
request was made for a one year term or
longer if necessary to pay for any
required system upgrades.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3044
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Commission Determination
491. We continue to believe that the
specific pricing proposal suggested by
EEI is outside the scope of this
proceeding, as the NOPR and Order No.
890 addressed only the narrow issue of
whether changes to the pro forma OATT
are necessary to ensure that incremental
cost transmission rates are presented as
monthly rates for service. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, such issues are best addressed on
a case-by-case basis in particular rate
proceedings. We note, however, that the
capital costs of upgrades, as estimated
in a facilities study, and eventually
specified in a service agreement through
an incremental rate, are not subject to
change once the customer has executed
the service agreement. It would not be
appropriate to vary capital costs over
the term of such contracts.
492. Great Northern presents no new
arguments or information on rehearing
that cause us to revisit the decision not
to require the transmission provider to
permit the customer to opt for a longer
contract term once the incremental cost
of the upgrades has been determined.
The Commission explained in Order No.
890 that the specific upgrades required
to provide the requested transmission
service may depend on the time period
over which the service is provided.
Allowing the customer to opt for a
longer contract term may therefore
trigger a need for additional, or
different, upgrades. If this were to
happen, there would be disruption of
the study process and costs could
increase.
493. Additionally, such changes could
undermine the fundamental first-come,
first-served aspect of long-term
transmission service. Order No. 888
provided for long-term firm point-topoint transmission service on a firstcome, first-served basis.191 Lengthening
the term of a contract once the
incremental costs of upgrades is
determined would be a material change
to the original transmission service
request, voiding the original request and
creating a new request. Allowing a
customer to lengthen its contract term as
Great Northern suggests could allow the
transmission customer to supersede
another eligible customer’s first-in-time
claim to future transmission service in
violation of Order No. 888. The fact that
the transmission customer would be
responsible for paying for any
additional upgrades, or the possibility
that development of competitive
generation could be delayed, does not
address the potential uncertainty and
191 See
pro forma OATT section 13.2.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
chaos that could arise from
undermining the first-come, first-served
foundation of long-term point-to-point
transmission service. We therefore deny
rehearing on this issue.
6. Other Ancillary Services
a. Demand Response
494. The Commission affirmed in
Order No. 890 the existing pro forma
OATT provision that transmission
customers may purchase from third
parties, or make alternative comparable
arrangements for the provision of all
ancillary services except for scheduling,
system control and dispatch service,
and reactive supply and voltage control
service. Regarding the sale of other
ancillary services, the Commission
clarified that the sale of such services by
load resources should be permitted
where appropriate on a comparable
basis to service provided by generation
resources. The Commission modified
Schedules 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 9 of the pro
forma OATT to make clear that reactive
supply and voltage control, regulation
and frequency response, energy
imbalance, spinning reserves,
supplemental reserves and generator
imbalance services, respectively, may be
provided by non-generation resources
such as demand resources where
appropriate.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
495. E.ON U.S. asks the Commission
to clarify on rehearing that, for purposes
of providing reactive supply and voltage
control service, non-generation
resources only include dynamic
resources. Without such a clarification,
E.ON U.S. contends that capacitors
added in big blocks could claim to be
resources capable of providing reactive
power, even though such resources only
supply VARS and would need to be
properly sized and located in order to
provide effective reactive capability.
E.ON U.S. also argues that ‘‘nongeneration sources’’ must be a
controllable resource, i.e., a resource
that a transmission provider can
connect to via an automatic signal, to be
followed automatically and immediately
by the resource within a time period
that is useful for providing reactive
power.
496. E.ON U.S. requests further
clarification that, for regulation and
frequency response service, the nongeneration resource must be able to
match and follow the corresponding
generation resource provider
instantaneously, in the same manner
that generation resources now provide
this service for load. If the nongeneration resource does not have this
PO 00000
Frm 00062
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
capability, E.ON U.S. contends that the
transmission system could be placed in
jeopardy and the transmission provider
could be subject to potential reliability
penalties.
497. Southern asks the Commission to
confirm that demand response resources
should satisfy the same reliability
criteria for providing ancillary services
as are required of generation resources.
Specifically, Southern argues that such
resources must meet regional reliability
council requirements and, if no such
requirements have been formalized,
balancing authority requirements for the
qualification of such resources, so long
as those qualification requirements are
not unduly discriminatory. Southern
contends the Commission’s focus in
Order No. 890 on the capability of
demand resources to provide ancillary
services may not take into consideration
qualification of those resources under
non-discriminatory, reliability-based
criteria.
498. Southern also notes that
transmission providers have a certain
degree of discretion, within the bounds
of applicable criteria, to determine the
quantity, mix and distribution of
resources held to provide various
system reliability functions. Southern
states, for example, that it holds and
maintains reserves from the lowest-cost
resources available for that purpose.
Southern requests clarification that
transmission providers are under no
obligation to purchase from nongeneration resources on a non-economic
basis relative to otherwise comparable
generation resources or to somehow
discriminate in favor of non-generation
based resources.
Commission Determination
499. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 that the sale
of ancillary services by load resources
should be permitted where appropriate
on a comparable basis to service
provided by generation resources. A
transmission provider may impose
appropriate technical criteria,
comparable to the requirements placed
on generation resources, in order to
reliably allow load resources to provide
the different ancillary services. We note
that such criteria and requirements have
been implemented in RTO markets that
allow demand response to participate as
an ancillary service resource.192 As
192 PJM, for example, allows load resources to
provide regulation service, but requires
telemetering ability and pre-certification to show
the resource can meet the physical characteristics
in order for the resource to qualify. To participate
in the synchronized reserve market in PJM, demand
response resources must install infrastructure such
that they can curtail consumption within ten
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Southern suggests, any such reliabilitybased qualification criteria should be
developed and imposed on a nondiscriminatory basis. We also agree with
Southern that transmission providers
should give comparable, not
preferential, consideration of load
resources in selecting the mix of
resources to supply ancillary services.
b. Pricing and Procurement of Reactive
Power
500. The Commission rejected
requests to modify requirements
regarding the provision and pricing of
reactive power. The Commission
reiterated the policy stated in Order No.
2003, et al., that interconnection
customers must be treated comparably
with the transmission provider and its
affiliates in terms of reactive power
compensation.193 If the transmission
provider pays its own generators or
those of its affiliates for reactive power,
then the transmission provider also
should pay interconnecting generators
for providing reactive power within the
specified range.194 The Commission
stated that it would continue to resolve
compensation issues for reactive power
to qualifying generators on a case-bycase basis.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
501. E.ON U.S. requests that the
Commission commence a separate
rulemaking to address the conflicts that
continue to arise regarding reactive
power. E.ON U.S. argues that the
Commission should provide the proper
incentives for locating resources to
provide the maximum benefit in terms
of reactive power, and that consumers
should not be forced to pay for reactive
power for units that provide no benefit
in terms of reactive capability. E.ON
U.S. contends it is inappropriate to
compensate units for reactive power
unless they are built in a location where
reactive power output is desirable from
an engineering standpoint and are
available in the time period needed in
order to be useful to the system. E.ON
U.S. contends that initiating a
rulemaking to consider the locational
minutes and also must provide metering
information needed to account for their response.
193 See Standardization of Generator
Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, Order
No. 2003, 68 FR 49845 (Aug. 19, 2003), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,146 (2003), order on reh’g, Order No.
2003–A, 69 FR 15932 (Mar. 26, 2004), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,160 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No.
2003–B, 70 FR 265 (Jan. 4, 2005), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ¶ 31,171 (2004), order on reh’g, Order No.
2003–C, 70 FR 37,661 (Jun. 30, 2005), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,190 (2005), aff’d sub nom. National
Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners v.
FERC, No. 04–1148, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 626
(D.C. Cir. Jan. 12, 2007).
194 Citing Order No. 2003–B at P 119.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
requirements for reactive power
payments would ensure a good supply
of reactive power and reduce the
amount of time-consuming and wasteful
litigation.
Commission Determination
502. We again decline the request to
initiate a separate rulemaking process to
address issues regarding compensation
for reactive power. The Commission
does not believe that acting generically
on pricing for reactive power is
necessary at this time. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, we will continue to resolve
compensation issues for reactive power
to qualifying generators on a case-bycase basis.195
c. Operating Reserves
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
503. Sempra Global contends that the
Commission failed to address its
comments requesting clarification that
transmission providers are obligated to
offer and make available operating
reserves to a generator located within
the transmission provider’s control area,
even if the generator-customer is serving
load outside of the transmission
provider’s control area. Sempra Global
states that various transmission
providers within the WECC interpret the
requirement to provide operating
reserves to customers serving load
within the control area differently.
Sempra Global explains that some in the
WECC have argued that power cannot
be sold as firm unless it includes
operating reserves and that the current
calculation of operating reserve
requirements for WECC control area
operators includes a netting of firm
imports and exports.
504. As a result, Sempra Global argues
that transmission providers that operate
control areas are able to effectively shift
portions of their operating reserve
requirements by contracting for firm
power from other control areas,
provided that the selling control area
carries additional operating reserves for
the sale. Sempra Global contends that
this limits the abilities of generators to
make firm power sales to entities
outside the control area in which the
generator is located. Sempra Global also
argues that this practice allows the
transmission provider to thwart
competition from non-utility generators
by limiting the ability of merchant
generators to make firm power sales
outside of the control area. Sempra
Global asks the Commission to clarify
that transmission providers are
obligated to offer and make available
195 See
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 898.
Frm 00063
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3045
operating reserves regardless of where
the merchant generation-customer is
serving load.
Commission Determination
505. We disagree with Sempra Global
that the transmission provider should be
obligated to offer and make available
operating reserves under Schedules 5
and 6 of the pro forma OATT when
transmission service is used to serve
load outside the transmission provider’s
control area. Operating reserves are
needed to serve load within the control
area in the event of system
contingencies. Unless alternative
arrangements are made, the
transmission provider provides these
reserves from its own resources. It
would be inappropriate to require the
transmission provider to use its
resources to provide additional
operating reserves to loads in other
control areas because the transmission
providers in those control areas are
under their own obligation to make
operating reserves available.
506. We therefore conclude that the
existing requirements of the pro forma
OATT are sufficient to ensure that
operating reserves are available to serve
the type of transaction discussed by
Sempra Global. A generator serving load
outside the control area can make
alternative comparable arrangements to
provide reserves on behalf of its load by
contracting with third parties. The
generator could also request, as part of
its negotiation with a customer, that the
customer acquire reserves from its
transmission provider as necessary to
support the transaction. Modification of
the pro forma OATT is not necessary to
enable generators to engage in firm
power sales to loads outside of their
control area.
D. Non-Rate Terms and Conditions
1. Modifications to Long-Term Firm
Point-to-Point Service
507. In Order No. 890, the
Commission concluded that the
methods for evaluating requests for
long-term point-to-point transmission
service may not be comparable to the
manner in which transmission service is
planned for bundled retail native load
and, therefore, may no longer be just,
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. To remedy this potential
for undue discrimination, the
Commission amended the pro forma
OATT to require transmission
providers, other than most RTOs and
ISOs, to offer a modified form of
planning redispatch as well as a
conditional firm option to long-term
point-to-point customers. A number of
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3046
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
petitioners have requested rehearing of
the Commission’s decision to modify
the planning redispatch requirements
and institute a new obligation to offer
the conditional firm option. We first
address the threshold requirement to
offer these options and then turn to
implementation of each option.
a. Requirement To Offer Planning
Redispatch and Conditional Firm
508. The requirement to offer
planning redispatch was adopted in
Order No. 888 under section 19.3 of the
pro forma OATT. Transmission
providers were required to identify, in
each system impact study, system
constraints as well as redispatch options
available to resolve those constraints
and provide planning redispatch to the
extent redispatch was more economical
than the cost of transmission upgrades.
In Order No. 890, the Commission
modified the planning redispatch
requirement, adding specificity to the
information required in the system
impact study and limiting planning
redispatch to an option that is
reassessed every two years if the
customer chooses not to pay for
upgrades. The Commission also
removed the limitation of offering
planning redispatch only when it is
more economical than the cost of
transmission upgrades. The Commission
rejected arguments against the
underlying requirement to offer
planning redispatch as collateral attacks
on Order No. 888.
509. The Commission also found that
transmission providers were using a
service analogous to the conditional
firm option, in addition to planning
redispatch, to serve their own loads.
The Commission concluded that
transmission providers must evaluate
transmission availability to serve longterm firm point-to-point service requests
in a manner that is comparable with the
method used to evaluate their own
transmission needs and to integrate
their resources to serve bundled retail
native load. The Commission therefore
required non-ISO/RTO transmission
providers to make available both the
planning redispatch and conditional
firm options to long-term firm point-topoint customers. The Commission
emphasized, however, that transmission
providers are not required to offer either
the planning redispatch or conditional
firm option if doing so would impair the
transmission provider’s ability to
reliably serve other firm customers,
including native load and network
customers.
510. The Commission also placed
several limitations on the nature of the
planning redispatch and conditional
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
firm options to limit the their potential
impact on reliability. First, the
Commission required that the planning
redispatch and conditional firm options
be made available to long-term point-topoint customers. While a transmission
provider might choose to propose
planning redispatch or conditional firm
on a shorter-term basis, it would not be
required to under the pro forma OATT.
Second, the Commission distinguished
between two different types of
customers that may request the service:
customers who support the construction
of upgrades and those who do not. For
customers supporting the construction
of upgrades, the planning redispatch or
conditional firm options need only be
offered until the time when the
upgrades are constructed. The
conditions or redispatch applicable to
the interim period must be specified in
the service agreement and will not be
subject to change. For customers
choosing not to support the construction
of new facilities, the planning
redispatch or conditional firm options
must be made available as a
reassessment product, i.e., subject to
reassessment every two years by the
transmission provider. Every two years,
or sooner if at the continuation of the
term of service, the transmission
provider must reassess the redispatch
required to keep the service firm or the
conditions or hours under which the
transmission provider may
conditionally curtail the service.196
511. With regard to transmission
service provided by RTOs and ISOs, the
Commission found that it would be
inappropriate to require RTOs and ISOs
with real-time energy markets to adopt
the provisions for conditional firm
point-to-point service. The Commission
explained that customers transacting in
RTOs and ISOs are able to buy through
transmission congestion in the real-time
energy markets and need no prior
reservation in order to access
transmission. The Commission did
require, however, RTOs and ISOs that
already provided planning redispatch
pursuant to section 13.5 of the Order
No. 888 pro forma OATT to modify the
relevant provisions of their tariffs
consistent with the directives of Order
No. 890.197 RTOs and ISOs not already
196 The Commission acknowledged that some
transmission providers may be able to provide
conditional firm service over a period longer than
two years without the need for reassessment. In the
event a transmission provider is able to extend the
assessment period, the Commission stated that
waiver or extension of the right to reassess the
availability of the option would be permitted,
provided that the waiver or extension is provided
consistently for all similarly situated service.
197 The Commission explained such modification
would include the transmission provider’s
PO 00000
Frm 00064
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
providing planning redispatch were not
required to amend their tariffs to
include the planning redispatch option.
512. The Commission declined to
adopt the conditional firm option for
network service and made no changes to
the planning redispatch provisions for
network customers.
(1) Planning Redispatch
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
513. Several petitioners object to the
requirement that transmission providers
offer planning redispatch point-to-point
service.198 They argue that the planning
redispatch requirement can degrade the
quality of service to existing firm
customers by increasing loop flow and
creating reliability problems or by
shifting costs to them. They argue that
planning redispatch increases
curtailment risks to existing customers
because generators are used in a manner
that is different than the planned use of
those generators. Ameren argues that
planning redispatch is unduly
discriminatory in that it requires the use
of the transmission provider’s
generation resources but not the
resources of network customers or third
parties. Ameren also argues that
planning redispatch is not superior to
the options already in place in the pro
forma OATT adopted in Order No. 888.
Other petitioners assert that the
modifications to planning redispatch
will remove incentives for transmission
expansion because planning redispatch
will always be cheaper and easier for
customers than paying for new
transmission capacity.199
514. Several petitioners argue that the
merits of commenter arguments on
planning redispatch should be
addressed rather than rejected as
collateral attacks against Order No.
888.200 Ameren asks the Commission to
revisit the requirement imposed in
Order No. 888 to provide planning
redispatch to point-to-point customers
as the Commission revisited all Order
No. 888 requirements in Order No. 890.
E.ON LSE asserts that arguments about
the reliability impacts of the planning
redispatch service are not barred as
collateral attacks because the
Commission changed the service by
removing the expansion price cap. E.ON
LSE states that by removing the
expansion cap the Commission placed a
burden on transmission providers to
provide planning redispatch even if it
obligation to post monthly redispatch costs for each
transmission facility over which planning and
reliability redispatch are provided.
198 E.g., Ameren, NRECA, and TDU Systems.
199 E.g., E.ON LSE, NRECA, and TDU Systems.
200 E.g., Ameren, E.ON LSE, and Southern.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
would be more costly than the
construction of transmission upgrades.
515. Ameren and Southern reiterate
concerns that modeling of planning
redispatch will be challenging given the
difficulty of projecting redispatch costs
and the availability of generating units,
even if the projections are limited to a
two-year period. Ameren expects that it
may deny service on reliability grounds
for every request. Given this
expectation, Ameren argues that the
Commission should develop clear
reliability guidelines so that
transmission providers can comply
without subjecting themselves to claims
of discrimination for denying service.
E.ON LSE states that projecting
redispatch costs will be difficult and
likely result in inaccurate estimates.
516. Other petitioners express
concern that a transmission provider
may avoid its obligation to provide
planning redispatch or conditional firm
service by rejecting requests based on an
arbitrary, unreasonable and conservative
definition of reliability.201 Constellation
states that oversight is necessary to
ensure that transmission provider
conclusions are sufficient to
demonstrate that planning redispatch
options were properly considered. EPSA
supports publicly posting on OASIS
reserve margin measures to eliminate
the inflation of margins exceeding
reliability requirements. Williams
recommends adoption of a reliability
standard to ensure the options are not
improperly rejected on reliability
grounds.
517. Ameren argues that the
Commission should grant a blanket
exemption from the planning redispatch
requirement for all RTOs because: RTO
markets are independent; RTOs do not
own or operate generation; and the
redispatch requirement could
exacerbate seams issues and affect the
calculation and distribution of financial
transmission rights (FTRs). Ameren
expresses concern that the planning
redispatch requirement will also
adversely impact the calculation of the
revenue sufficiency guarantee charges in
MISO.
518. Several petitioners contend that
the obligation to provide the planning
redispatch option contradicts section
217 of the FPA to the extent it impinges
on native load service.202 South
Carolina E&G argues that requiring
transmission providers to offer planning
redispatch could marginalize native
load, in violation of section 217, unless
the Commission modifies section 13.6 of
201 E.g.,
Constellation, EPSA, and Williams.
E.ON LSE, South Carolina E&G, South
Carolina Regulatory Staff, and Southern.
202 E.g.,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
the pro forma OATT to eliminate
comparable curtailment of native load
and non-native load service. South
Carolina E&G contends that the
Commission is precluded under section
217(k) from making a finding that it is
unduly discriminatory if practices
governing the evaluation of long-term
firm point-to-point service are not
comparable to the manner in which
transmission service is planned for
bundled retail native load. South
Carolina E&G contends that recognition
of the curtailment primacy of native
load service would provide a necessary
escape mechanism should the planning
redispatch or conditional firm options
threaten native load service. South
Carolina Regulatory Staff objects to the
planning redispatch and conditional
firm options to the extent that native
load purchasers of electricity are
required to bear the costs of additional
transmission capacity necessitated by
transmission to non-native consumers.
519. E.ON LSE also argues that FPA
section 217 prohibits requiring
transmission providers to offer native
load redispatch to non-native load
customers on the basis of claimed
discrimination. E.ON LSE asks the
Commission to clarify that, in real time,
LSEs may use all or a portion of their
resources to serve native load rather
than redispatch for third parties. E.ON
LSE also requests clarification that the
generation facilities having restricted
run times may be reserved for the use
of native load needs and not be offered
for firm point-to-point planning
redispatch service.
520. NorthWestern requests that the
Commission grant waiver of the
redispatch requirements for
transmission providers who do not have
the ability to dispatch generation.
Washington IOUs request Commission
clarification that when a viable, parallel
path is available to a transmission
customer to move its power, the
transmission provider is not required to
offer planning redispatch service.
Washington IOUs state that in the
Pacific Northwest transmission
customers may be able to move power
to the same point more easily by
purchasing transmission service over a
neighboring transmission system.
Washington IOUs argue that in such a
situation requiring a jurisdictional
utility to offer planning redispatch
service would unreasonably increase the
costs of providing transmission service.
521. Washington IOUs further argue
that the Commission erred in not
exempting hydro-based systems from
the planning redispatch requirements.
Washington IOUs argue that the
Commission failed to recognize that
PO 00000
Frm 00065
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3047
hydro units may not be available due to
recreational, flood control, fish
mitigation and other non-power related
requirements. Washington IOUs further
assert the Commission should exempt
hydro-based systems from providing
planning redispatch because of possible
occurrence of pricing disputes, underrecovery of costs, and disputes over
study of planning redispatch
opportunities.
522. TAPS asserts that the
Commission failed to revise to insert
new planning redispatch provisions into
pro forma OATT section 32.3 pertaining
to network service system impact
studies. TAPS also argues that the
Commission must ensure that
transmission service provided to
network customers is comparable to the
service transmission providers provide
themselves through planning redispatch
and low granularity system models.
TAPS argues that transmission
providers use planning redispatch
combined with their system-wide
modeling to designate network
resources that otherwise might be
undeliverable. TAPS asserts they do this
by treating their control areas as a whole
for sink purposes while selectively
disaggregating their resources for
sourcing purposes. TAPS asserts that
undue discrimination arises because a
network customer’s request to bring on
new network resources is modeled with
granularity, without the benefit of
planning redispatch and the redispatch
assumed by modeling the transmission
provider’s own load as a single system
sink when designating resources. TAPS
asks the Commission to redress this
discrimination by prohibiting the
transmission provider from denying any
request for transmission to a network
customer, or requiring upgrades or
mitigation, the costs of which are not
shared on a load-ratio basis, if the
request would have been accepted if the
transmission provider’s own load had
been the designated sink.
523. Finally, EEI requests clarification
of the length of the service request that
would qualify for these options. EEI
notes that sections 15.4(b) of the pro
forma OATT does not qualify the
provision of planning redispatch only to
long-term firm point-to-point customers.
EEI asks the Commission to amend
sections 15.4(b) of the pro forma OATT
to make this section consistent with the
statements in Order No. 890 providing
that a transmission provider is obligated
to provide planning redispatch service
to customers requesting long-term firm
point-to-point service, but not to
customers requesting short-term firm
service.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3048
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
524. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890, originally
established in Order No. 888, to require
transmission providers to redispatch
their generation resources in certain
circumstances to create additional
capacity on the transmission grid.
Petitioners arguing for removal of this
requirement have failed to show any
actual degradation of reliability,
degradation of service to other firm
customers, or delay in grid expansion
caused by planning redispatch service
during the first 10 years in which the
requirement was in place. We therefore
decline to eliminate this long-standing
option for point-to-point customers.203
525. We also affirm the limitation
placed on the planning redispatch
requirement, which we believe
adequately address petitioners’ concerns
regarding potential effects on reliability
or service quality. The Commission in
Order No. 890 scaled back the obligation
to provide planning redispatch service
by severing the link between it and
transmission upgrades, no longer
requiring the provision of planning
redispatch for an indefinite period.204
Under the modified planning redispatch
option, transmission customers must
agree to pay for transmission upgrades
or agree to have the conditions of their
planning redispatch service reassessed
every two years. These modifications
more appropriately balance customers’
needs with transmission providers’
reliability and native load obligations.
Planning redispatch service under Order
No. 890 is, therefore, superior to that
service under Order No. 888, contrary to
Ameren’s assertions.
526. We disagree that planning
redispatch will remove incentives for
transmission expansion. As modified in
Order No. 890, planning redispatch may
provide a means for greater transmission
investment as customers will be able to
receive the bridge service prior to the
completion of upgrades. The benefit of
immediate access to the transmission
grid could result in more attractive
financing and cash flow options for new
resources, in turn resulting in more
investment in transmission. Moreover,
203 Arguments that the Commission has no
authority to impose a planning redispatch
obligation are a collateral attack on Order No. 888.
We disagree with E.ON LSE’s assertion that removal
of the expansion cap placed a new burden on
transmission providers by fundamentally changing
the nature of the service. While Order No. 890
required planning redispatch to be provided even
when it is more expensive than transmission
upgrades, service is only guaranteed for two years
if customers do not pay for upgrades. This puts a
bound upon the service for transmission providers
that benefits rather than burdens them.
204 Order No. 890 at P 926.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
customers taking the reassessment
product may identify over time others
willing to jointly fund upgrades, leading
to further investment. In asserting a
negative impact on transmission
expansion, petitioners imply that
planning redispatch will always be a
less expensive option than investment
in upgrades. But if that were true then
planning redispatch would have
proliferated over the last 10 years given
that transmission providers were
obligated to provide planning
redispatch if it was more economical
than transmission upgrades.
527. Petitioners’ concerns about
harms to existing customers through
increases in loop flow and curtailment
risks are not unique to rights granted
through the use of planning redispatch.
The efficient use of the existing
transmission grid, including every
incremental new firm use, brings with it
an increased risk in the instances and
megawatt quantity of curtailment for all
existing users of the grid. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, the modifications to planning
redispatch will enable transmission
providers to better manage the risks of
curtailment for current users of the
transmission grid because the obligation
to redispatch will no longer be openended.205 We reject TDU Systems’
assertion that planning redispatch will
increase costs for network customers
because it is based upon an incorrect
assumption that Order No. 890 would
require transmission providers to
redispatch network customers’
resources for point-to-point
customers.206
528. We disagree with NRECA and
TDU Systems that planning redispatch
service increases curtailment risk
because generation is used differently
than planned. By definition,
transmission providers must study the
resources that they will redispatch in
order to offer each individual planning
redispatch service. Thus, generation
will be used by transmission providers
as planned. While we acknowledge that
planning redispatch service presents
complicated modeling issues, even
when limited to a two-year period,
modeling difficulties exist throughout
the utility industry. If anything, the
modifications to the planning
redispatch option adopted in Order No.
890 lessen the modeling burden by
scaling back the planning redispatch
requirement.
205 See
id. at P 593.
Systems cites to an argument made by
NRECA that concerns the transparent dispatch
advocates’ proposal for inclusive bid-based realtime redispatch. NRECA Supplemental, Affidavit at
27.
206 TDU
PO 00000
Frm 00066
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
529. With regard to loop flows, we
agree with NRECA that changing and
unpredictable loop flows make it more
difficult for system operators to
understand their systems and respond
to contingencies properly. We do not
agree, however, that planning
redispatch will have any greater adverse
effect on loop flows than the addition of
a new generator to the grid or the
addition of or a change to a firm pointto-point use. The effects of planning
redispatch service will be studied in a
system impact study well before the
service is provided, like any other
proposed firm use of the system.
Transmission providers will therefore
be able to adjust to planning redispatch
uses of the system in the same way they
now adjust to additions of generation
and all new or changed firm point-topoint uses.
530. Planning redispatch service does
not unduly discriminate against
transmission providers by requiring
them to use their resources to provide
service. The Commission does not
require the use of network customer and
third party resources to provide
planning redispatch point-to-point
service because third parties and
network customers do not provide the
associated transmission service. Third
parties or network customers that create
additional grid capacity by
redispatching, such as through a
transaction that flows counter to the
majority of flows on a line, cannot sell
the additional transmission capacity
that they create. A transmission
provider using its resources to serve
loads on its system can however create
and sell additional transmission
capacity on its system through control
of those resources. It is therefore not
unduly discriminatory to require the use
of transmission provider resources to
provide planning redispatch to longterm point-to-point customers.
531. We decline to develop reliability
guidelines or standards for
implementing planning redispatch. The
underlying obligation to provide
planning redispatch has been in place
for 10 years without such guidelines.
This is not surprising given that each
transmission system is different and any
industry-wide guidelines would
necessarily be over- or under-inclusive.
Transmission providers must already
comply with those reliability standards
approved by the Commission and we
will not unnecessarily layer additional
standards upon the transmission
providers for planning redispatch or
conditional firm service. Transmission
providers should retain responsibility
for incorporating reasonable
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
assumptions into their models in order
to manage risks.
532. We do, however, clarify herein
additional valid reasons for denying
service on reliability grounds. We will
not require publication of the metrics
underlying these reliability grounds or,
as EPSA requests, identification of
reserves set aside for customers; these
metrics likely contain competitive
information or relate to state-imposed
requirements. If eligible customers
believe they have been unreasonably
denied redispatch or conditional firm
service on reliability grounds, they
should bring the matter to the
Commission’s attention through a
complaint or other appropriate
procedural mechanism. Transmission
providers can proactively address
claims of discrimination resulting from
denials of planning redispatch (or
conditional firm) service by publishing
modeling assumptions and free flow of
information between the transmission
provider and potential customers.207
533. Concerns about a transmission
provider’s inability to project redispatch
costs are misplaced. In Order No. 890,
the Commission directed transmission
providers to provide eligible customers
with non-binding estimates of the
incremental costs of redispatch.208 The
Commission expects that transmission
providers will use due diligence in
providing the costs estimates, but as
with any non-binding estimate they will
not be liable for their inability to
accurately predict future costs.
534. The Commission grants rehearing
of the decision to require RTOs and
ISOs to modify planning redispatch
provisions that remain in their tariffs.
The tariffs of many RTOs and ISOs were
developed to layer energy markets and
financial transmission rights on top of
the existing pro forma OATT physical
rights systems. Upon consideration of
petitioner’s arguments, we conclude it is
more appropriate not to disturb these
developments by requiring changes to
the existing planning redispatch
provisions stated in sections 13.5, 15.4,
19.1 and 19.3 of the pro forma OATT.209
535. We will not, however, grant
RTOs and ISOs a blanket exemption
from the planning redispatch
requirement, as requested by Ameren.
RTOs and ISOs that currently offer
207 We note that increased information regarding
the modeling, data, and assumptions used by the
transmission provider to calculate ATC and plan
the system must now be made available under
Attachments C and K to the pro forma OATT.
208 Order No. 890 at P 958.
209 To the extent an RTO or ISO has already
incorporated this new language into its OATT in a
prior compliance filing, removal of that language is
at the RTO’s or ISO’s discretion.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
planning redispatch in addition to the
redispatch offered through their energy
markets prior to issuance of Order No.
890 must continue to provide that
service.210 Where such service is
offered, customers should not be
excluded from accessing the service
through planning redispatch unless the
Commission has previously found or
finds in the future that such exclusion
is consistent with or superior to the
provisions of the pro forma OATT. The
exacerbation of seams issues and
disruption of FTR processes are issues
that we would consider if an RTO or
ISO seeks to terminate its existing
planning redispatch service.211
536. We also decline to provide a
blanket exemption from the planning
redispatch requirement for transmission
providers without generation or the
ability to dispatch generation. We
clarify, however, that transmission
providers without the ability to dispatch
generation cannot reliably provide
planning redispatch service and have no
obligation to procure generation to
provide the service. We deny a blanket
exemption because transmission
providers’ situations can change over
time so that they gain the ability to
dispatch generation.
537. We affirm our decision to not
generically exempt hydroelectric-based
systems from the provision of planning
redispatch service. Contrary to
Washington IOU’s assertion, the
Commission took into consideration the
fact that hydroelectric units may not be
available due to recreation, flood control
or fish mitigation when it acknowledged
the ‘‘added difficulty of predicting water
availability’’ in hydroelectric
systems.212 While there is potential for
disputes regarding the availability and
cost of a hydroelectric unit, such
disputes are not unusual for other types
210 For example, although SPP does not own
generation, transmission owners within SPP retain
the obligation through SPP’s Attachment K to use
their resources to provide planning redispatch for
firm transmission service. See Southwest Power
Pool FERC Electric Tariff Fifth Revised Volume No.
1, Attachment K, section B, Original Sheet No. 238–
239 (Effective February 1, 2007).
211 Ameren’s concern with disruption of MISO’s
revenue sufficiency guarantee and FTR allocation
processes due to implementation of the planning
redispatch requirement is misplaced. Under MISO’s
tariff, the provisions of Module C (Energy Markets,
Scheduling and Congestion Management) or the ITC
Rate Schedule apply if redispatch is more
economical than constructing transmission
upgrades. See Midwest ISO Transmission and
Energy Markets Tariff, section 13.5. MISO need not
change its tariff provisions for the management of
redispatch through its energy markets because the
Commission has already accepted them as
consistent with or superior to the Order No. 888 pro
forma OATT.
212 Order No. 890 at P 948.
PO 00000
Frm 00067
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3049
of units that are equally subject to the
planning redispatch requirements.
538. We disagree that the availability
of firm transmission service over a
parallel path on another transmission
provider’s system should relieve a
transmission provider of the obligation
to provide planning redispatch. In order
to obtain planning redispatch service, a
customer must agree to and pay for a
system impact study, await the results
of the study and sign a non-conforming
transmission service agreement. We
would not expect a customer to
undertake the more complicated process
of obtaining planning redispatch if the
transmission service meeting the
customer’s needs is available elsewhere.
We therefore see no need to limit the
availability of planning redispatch
service as Washington IOUs request.
539. It is not necessary to amend the
curtailment priorities under the pro
forma OATT in order for the planning
redispatch requirement to be consistent
with FPA section 217, as South Carolina
E&G contends. As we explain in section
II.B, section 217(b) provides certain
protections to a specified class of
utilities using their firm transmission
rights, to the extent required to meet
their service obligations. The provision
of planning redispatch does not impair
the use of those firm transmission
rights, or otherwise marginalize native
load, notwithstanding the curtailment
priorities established in section 13.6 of
the pro forma OATT. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, there is no obligation to offer
planning redispatch if it either (i)
degrades or impairs the reliability of
service to native load customers,
network customers and other
transmission customers taking firm
point-to-point service or (ii) interferes
with the transmission provider’s ability
to meet prior firm contractual
commitments to others. We clarify that
this exempts transmission providers
from providing planning redispatch
from resources that are expected to
provide reliability redispatch in
response to constraints. Further, if
resources with restricted run times are
required to meet the reliable service
needs of native load, including
reliability redispatch needs, these
resources need not be offered for
planning redispatch service. The
obligation to offer planning redispatch
is therefore consistent with the
requirements of section 217.
540. Contrary to South Carolina
Regulatory Staff’s assertions, native load
will not bear the costs of additional
transmission capacity created through
either the planning redispatch or
conditional firm options. While the
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3050
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
options could lead to the construction of
more transmission if customers agree to
pay for transmission upgrades, during
the period these services are provided
they do not require the construction of
transmission upgrades. Rather, they are
provided by curtailing the customer or
redispatching the transmission
provider’s resources to create long-term
firm transmission. Moreover, costs
otherwise recovered from native load
customers are reduced by the additional
revenues gained by the additional sales
of conditional firm and planning
redispatch service.
541. We also disagree that FPA
section 217(k) precludes the
Commission from finding that it is
unduly discriminatory for transmission
providers to engage in planning
redispatch to serve native load while
refusing to provide comparable service
to long-term point-to-point customers.
The intent of section 217(k) is to
preserve the use of certain firm
transmission rights to the extent
required to meet the service obligations
of a class of specified utilities. The
statute thus protects these utilities’
continued use of protected firm
transmission rights during periods of
constraint or emergency, when service
might not otherwise be available. The
transmission provider’s use of planning
redispatch (as well as conditional firm
service) occurs prior to the occurrence
of such conditions, when the
transmission provider decides to bring a
new resource onto its system. It is
therefore unduly discriminatory for the
transmission provider to refuse to make
planning redispatch (or conditional firm
service) available to similarly situated
customers. Indeed, this furthers the
intent of FPA section 217 by facilitating
the ability of all long-term users of the
transmission system to meet their
service obligations, which the statute
defines broadly to include not only
service to end-users, but also to
distribution utilities serving endusers.213
542. We agree with TAPS that Order
No. 890 inadvertently failed to make
modifications to section 32.3 that
correspond to the amendments to 19.3
of the pro forma OATT to provide more
information for customers requesting
the planning redispatch option. We
revise section 32.3 to make clear that the
information required in a system impact
study is nearly identical for network
and point-to-point customers. We note
that the amended section 32.3 only
requires a transmission provider to
213 See EPAct 2005 sec. 1233(a)(3) (to be codified
at section section 217(a)(3) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C.
824q(a)(3)).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
provide an estimate of costs for the
network customer to the extent it has
cost data for the relevant network
customer’s resources.
543. However, we deny TAPS’ request
to address here the granularity of system
modeling necessary to implement
planning redispatch service. The ATC
and planning-related reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 will help address TAPS’
granularity issue once these reforms are
implemented. Transmission providers
have been directed to address the effect
on ATC of designating and
undesignating network resources as part
of the ongoing NERC/NAESB
standardization effort.214 To the extent
TAPS has concerns regarding the
modeling of ATC to respond to requests
to designate network resources, those
concerns should be addressed in the
first instance through the NERC/NAESB
process. We make no further changes to
the planning and reliability redispatch
services in the existing pro forma OATT
as these services are already provided
comparably to network customers.
544. We agree with EEI’s requested
change to provide consistency between
the pro forma OATT and the preamble
of Order No. 890. As the Commission
stated repeatedly in Order No. 890,
transmission providers are obligated to
provide planning redispatch options
only to customers requesting long-term
firm point-to-point service.215 We
amend section 15.4(b) of the pro forma
OATT accordingly. We also revise
sections 19.1 and 19.3 of the pro forma
OATT to make clear that the planning
redispatch option is available to eligible
customers, not just existing
transmission customers, as provided in
Order No. 890.
(2) Conditional Firm
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
545. Several petitioners object to the
Commission’s decision to require
transmission providers to offer
conditional firm point-to-point
service.216 Ameren states that the
conditional firm option is not superior
to the options already available to
customers under the pro forma OATT
adopted in Order No. 888. Ameren
contends that the conditional firm
service options create more discretion
and uncertainty in the processing of
service requests, contrary to the
Commission’s stated goal of increasing
transparency in the provision of
transmission service. Ameren expresses
concern that ill-defined conditional firm
service rules could lead to non214 See
Order No. 693 at P 1041.
e.g., Order No. 890 at P 4, 78, and 911.
216 E.g., Ameren, NRECA, and TDU Systems.
compliance and assessment of
significant penalties. Ameren and
NorthWestern argue that, at a minimum,
the Commission must provide detailed
guidelines and limit the discretion of
transmission providers in studying
conditional firm service options.
Ameren states that allowing conditional
firm transmission to be curtailed only
during selected events offers less system
reliability. Ameren and NRECA ask the
Commission to limit or remove the
obligation to provide conditional firm
service because maintaining the service
will degrade reliability as system
planners and operators must account for
more and varied uses of the system and
manage increased loadings on the
system. If it is not allowed to deny
service for the degradation of reliability
that would occur with every service
request involving conditional firm,
Ameren asks that the Commission
develop clear reliability guidelines so
that transmission providers can comply
without subjecting themselves to claims
of discrimination for denying service.
546. South Carolina E&G and South
Carolina Regulatory Staff contend that
the obligation to offer the conditional
firm option contradicts section 217 of
the FPA to the extent it impinges on
native load service. South Carolina E&G
states that granting a secondary network
service curtailment priority during
conditional curtailment periods could
adversely affect the reliability of native
load service in direct violation of
section 217 of the FPA. South Carolina
E&G states that native load customers
use secondary network service for
redispatch when the system becomes
constrained; therefore, allowing
increased use of this priority non-firm
service by conditional firm service
customers will adversely affect native
load customers in violation of FPA
section 217. South Carolina E&G also
argues that FPA section 217(k)
precludes the Commission from finding
that the practice of using conditional
firm by transmission providers is
unduly discriminatory.
547. MidAmerican requests
clarification that transmission providers
are not prohibited from voluntarily
offering the conditional firm option for
short-term point-to-point service.
MidAmerican also requests Commission
clarification that Order No. 890 did not
require transmission providers to
submit revised tariff sheets if the
transmission providers already provide
short-term conditional firm service.
548. Some petitioners ask the
Commission to create a conditional firm
network service.217 TAPS and NRECA
215 See,
PO 00000
Frm 00068
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
217 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
NRECA, TAPS, and TDU Systems.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
contend that limiting the conditional
firm option to long-term firm point-topoint service is inappropriate in light of
the Commission’s finding that
transmission providers provide
themselves conditional firm network
service. TAPS and NRECA argue that
the Commission has allowed continued
discrimination as between transmission
providers and network customers. TAPS
argues that Order No. 890 enables
transmission providers to continue to
designate resources on a conditionally
firm basis, but denies network
customers the same right to do so.
549. NRECA and TDU Systems also
contend that conditional firm network
service is required to preserve network
customers’ ability to access those
resources that they are able to obtain
today through redirect service without
being bumped by conditional firm
point-to-point customers. In their view,
conditional firm network service would
prevent gaming and hoarding by pointto-point customers through use of
conditional firm service and achieve
parity in flexibility through use of
secondary network service. TDU
Systems assert that the provision of
conditional firm network service is
essential to ensure that network
customers can receive the same priority
in maintaining transmission access
rights as those granted to conditional
firm point-to-point customers.
550. NRECA and TDU Systems argue
that allowing conditional firm for the
import of designated network resources
but not allowing it for in-control area
transactions is irrational, creates
perverse operational incentives and
does not make legal sense. By way of
example, NRECA states that a resource
could be designated to serve load in a
neighboring control area, but not in the
control area in which the resource is
located. NRECA contends that creation
of a conditional firm network service
would provide additional support to
intermittent resources that wish to sell
their services in the control area in
which these resources are located.
551. Finally, EEI requests clarification
of the length of the service request that
would qualify for these options. EEI
notes that sections 15.4(c) of the pro
forma OATT does not qualify the
provision of conditional firm service
only to long-term firm point-to-point
customers. EEI asks the Commission to
amend sections 15.4(c) of the pro forma
OATT to make this section consistent
with the statements in Order No. 890
providing that a transmission provider
is obligated to provide conditional firm
service to customers requesting longterm firm point-to-point service, but not
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
to customers requesting short-term firm
service.
Commission Determination
552. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to create a
new conditional firm option in the pro
forma OATT for customers seeking and
denied long-term firm point-to-point
transmission service.218 We reiterate
that, like the planning redispatch
option, transmission providers are not
required to provide conditional firm
service if doing so would impair system
reliability. Concerns regarding system
reliability have thus already been
addressed in the design of the
conditional firm option.
553. We disagree with Ameren that
the conditional firm option will create
more discretion and uncertainty in
processing of service requests. In Order
No. 890, the Commission provided a
detailed description of the
characteristics, requirements and
implementation of the new option,
developed through multiple industry
sessions and with supplemental
comments. Ameren argues that the
obligation to offer the conditional firm
option should be eliminated unless the
Commission provides further guidance
regarding how to study its availability,
yet Ameren does not identify the
particular details that it believes are
missing. Even if there is some initial
uncertainty in the processing of service
requests as transmission providers
become comfortable with studying the
conditional firm option, it is more than
offset by the reduction in uncertainty
faced by eligible customers whose
service requests would otherwise have
been rejected for lacking as little as one
hour of firm service during the year.
554. We decline to develop reliability
guidelines for the provision of
conditional firm service, as Ameren
requests. Each transmission system will
have a different ability to accommodate
varying requests for conditional firm
service. As with planning redispatch,
any guidelines we create would
necessarily be over or under-inclusive
and either jeopardize the reliability of
some transmission providers’ systems or
unnecessarily restrict the amount of
conditional firm service that may be
offered. Transmission providers may
determine the amount of conditional
firm service that they can reliably
provide, as long as they do not reject
218 As stated above, RTOs and ISOs with real-time
energy markets are not required to offer the
conditional firm option. Also, those transmission
providers that do not provide long-term firm pointto-point service are exempt from providing
conditional firm point-to-point service.
PO 00000
Frm 00069
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3051
requests from similarly situated
customers.
555. We disagree that requiring
transmission providers to offer
conditional firm service violates FPA
section 217. As we explain above,
section 217 provides certain protections
to a specified class of utilities using
their firm transmission rights, to the
extent required to meet their service
obligations. By its very nature,
conditional firm service will be
conditional when the transmission
provider cannot accommodate
additional firm service in light of other
commitments, including the firm
service obligations of LSEs on its system
or other existing customers. Moreover,
transmission providers are not required
to offer the service if doing so would
impair system reliability. The
restrictions placed on conditional firm
service are thus consistent with, and not
in contrary to, the requirements of FPA
section 217.
556. We also disagree with South
Carolina E&G that conditional firm
service violates FPA section 217
because it will increase the amount and
use of secondary network service, in
competition with the use of secondary
network service by native load.
Secondary network service, also called
priority non-firm service, is a non-firm
transmission right. Increased use of
secondary network service by
conditional firm customers therefore
does not disturb the use of firm rights
protected by section 217. Similarly, FPA
section 217(k) does not preclude our
finding that failure to offer the
conditional firm option is unduly
discriminatory since the conditional
nature of the service is not within the
scope of service protected by FPA
section 217(b).
557. We clarify in response to
MidAmerican that a transmission
provider that provided short-term
conditional firm service prior to
issuance of Order No. 890 need not
revise the existing tariff provisions
relating to short-term firm service.219 A
transmission provider proposing to add
short-term conditional firm service to its
OATT must seek approval under FPA
section 205. In either case, the voluntary
provision of short-term conditional firm
service does not relieve the transmission
provider from the obligation to provide
long-term conditional firm point-topoint service.
558. We affirm the decision in Order
No. 890 not to create a conditional firm
network service. Network customers
may designate network resources any
time firm transmission is available, and
219 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 135, n.106.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3052
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the term of the designation can include
periods of less than a year. Network
customers can also use secondary
network service to access resources
during times when firm service is not
available. This flexibility to use
designated network resources and
secondary network service to access
undesignated resources already
provides a service that is like
conditional firm service that can be
used to integrate new resources,
intermittent or otherwise.
559. We agree, however, that
transmission providers must study the
use of automatic devices when
requested by a network customer in a
system impact study. In Order No. 890,
the Commission found that transmission
providers employ automatic devices,
such as special protection schemes, to
take resources offline during certain
system conditions. Comparability
requires the study of these automatic
devices for network customers seeking
to designate network resources. We
disagree with TAPS that comparability
further requires the same service as
between network customers and pointto-point customers. In Order No. 890,
the Commission reiterated that network
service and point-to-point service were
not designed to be identical and,
therefore, the rights and obligations of
each type of customer need not be the
same.220 We therefore deny rehearing
requests to create a network service that
is the same as conditional firm point-topoint service, but revise section 32.3 of
the pro forma OATT to require the
study of automatic devices at the
request of a network transmission
customer.
560. We acknowledge that conditional
firm point-to-point service may have an
impact on a network customer’s use of
secondary network service due to
increased use of priority non-firm
service, but note that the conditional
firm option does not reduce the
availability of secondary network
service any more than the use of shortterm firm point-to-point service.
Conditional firm point-to-point service
could not possibly disrupt a network
customers use of redirect service
because network customers may not
redirect their service,221 as NRECA
argues, nor does the conditional firm
option disrupt the network customer’s
use of point-to-point service to secure
off-system resources, since network
customers may take conditional firm
point-to-point service if they choose.
Finally, NRECA’s concerns regarding
potential hoarding are based on a
220 See
221 See
id. at P 1093.
id. at P 1612.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
mistaken belief that customers taking
conditional firm service are not charged
the long-term transmission rate. The
Commission made clear in Order No.
890 that customers taking the
conditional firm option pay the rate for
long-term firm point-to-point service.222
561. We agree with EEI’s requested
change to provide consistency between
the pro forma OATT and the preamble
of Order No. 890. As the Commission
stated repeatedly in Order No. 890,
transmission providers are obligated to
provide conditional firm options only to
customers requesting long-term firm
point-to-point service.223 We amend
section 15.4(c) of the pro forma OATT
accordingly. We also revise sections
19.1 and 19.3 of the pro forma OATT to
make clear that the conditional firm
option is available to eligible customers,
not just existing transmission
customers, as provided in Order No.
890.
b. Implementation of Planning
Redispatch and Conditional Firm
(1) Characteristics of Service
562. The Commission explained in
Order No. 890 that the planning
redispatch and conditional firm options
were not services distinct from point-topoint transmission service, but rather a
modification to the procedures for
granting long-term point-to-point
service and the curtailment priorities for
that service. The primary purpose of
each option is to address the ‘‘all or
nothing’’ problem associated with the
current procedures for requesting longterm point-to-point service. Where a
request for long-term point-to-point firm
transmission service is made and cannot
be satisfied out of existing capacity, the
transmission provider must, at the
request of the customer and in the
system impact study, identify (i) the
transmission upgrades necessary to
provide the service and (ii) the options
for providing service during the period
prior to completion of those
transmission upgrades. If upgrades
cannot be completed prior to expiration
of the requested service term, the
transmission provider must, at the
request of the customer and in the
system impact study, identify options
for providing the service during the
requested term. The options studied by
the transmission provider must include
both planning redispatch and
conditional firm options. The
transmission provider, at its discretion,
may study and offer a mix of planning
222 See
id. at P 1047.
e.g., id. at P 4, 78, and 911.
223 See,
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00070
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
redispatch and conditional firm options
for a single service request.
563. If the transmission provider
determines that planning redispatch or
conditional firm options are available,
the system impact study must identify
the following: (i) The system
constraints, identified by transmission
facility or flowgate, causing the need for
the system impact study; (ii) additional
direct assignment facilities or network
upgrades required to provide the
requested service; (iii) redispatch
options, including the relevant
congested transmission facilities for
which redispatch will be provided, the
generation resources that can relieve
those congested facilities, the impact of
each identified resource on the
congested facilities, and an estimate of
the incremental costs of redispatch; and
(iv) conditional firm options, including
the annual number of conditional
curtailment hours and the specific
system conditions during which
conditional curtailment may occur.224
Transmission providers may recover the
costs of studying these options through
the system impact study agreement.
564. If the customer agrees to take
service, the service agreement must
specify the relevant congested
transmission facilities and whether the
transmission provider will provide
planning redispatch, a mix of planning
redispatch and conditional firm, or
conditional firm in order to provide the
point-to-point transmission service. For
the conditional firm option, customers
must choose among, and the service
agreement must specify, either (i)
specific system condition(s) during
which conditional curtailment may
occur 225 or (ii) annual number of
conditional curtailment hours during
which conditional curtailment may
occur.226 In situations in which the
customer commits to paying the costs
224 The Commission did not require a
standardized method of modeling the hours in
which conditional firm point-to-point service
would be conditional, although it did state addition
of a risk factor to their calculation of annual
curtailment hours would be appropriate to account
for forecasting risks.
225 Acceptable system conditions could include
designation of limiting transmission elements, such
as a transmission line, substation or flowgate. The
Commission stated its belief that designation of
system load levels, standing alone, would not
qualify as an acceptable system condition. Load
levels would have to be linked to a specific
constraint or transmission element that is
associated with the request for service, e.g., load
levels in a constrained load pocket.
226 Although the Commission did not require use
of monthly or seasonal caps, it encouraged
transmission providers to offer them if they can
overcome modeling barriers, since monthly or
seasonal caps would give more certainty to
customers regarding the particular aspects of their
service.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
associated with upgrades necessary to
provide the service on a fully firm basis,
the conditions or hours identified by the
transmission provider must remain in
effect until such time as the upgrades
have been completed. For such
customers, the service agreement must
specify the upgrade costs as determined
through the facilities study.
565. Any service agreement that
incorporates planning redispatch or
conditional firm options will be
considered a non-conforming agreement
and must be filed by the transmission
provider pursuant to FPA section 205.
Transmission providers therefore must
also file with the Commission any
amendments to these service agreements
that result from reassessments. If a
transmission provider proposes to
change the redispatch or conditional
curtailment conditions due to a
reassessment, the Commission obligated
transmission providers to provide the
reassessment study to the customer
along with a narrative statement
describing the study and reasons for
changes to the curtailment conditions or
redispatch requirements no later than 90
days prior to the date for imposition of
these new conditions or requirements.
566. During non-conditional periods,
conditional firm service is subject to pro
rata curtailment consistent with
curtailment of any other long-term firm
service. During the hours or specific
system conditions when conditional
firm service is conditional, conditional
firm service share the same curtailment
priority as secondary network service.
In such circumstances, transmission
providers will be allowed to curtail only
for reliability reasons and conditional
firm customers during conditional
curtailment hours will be curtailed only
after all point-to-point non-firm
customers have been curtailed. If the
customer selects the annual hourly cap
option, the transmission provider will
have the flexibility to conditionally
curtail the customer for any reliability
reason during those hours, including
but not limited to, the system
condition(s) identified in the system
impact study.
567. The Commission provided that
short-term firm service reserved prior to
the reservation of conditional firm
service will maintain priority over
conditional firm service in the periods
when conditional firm service is
conditional, i.e., when specified system
conditions exist or conditional
curtailment hours apply. Transmission
providers were directed to work with
NAESB to develop the appropriate
communications protocol to allow for
automatic assignment of short-term firm
point-to-point service to conditional
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
firm customers to the extent short-term
service becomes available. Transmission
providers need not implement this
requirement until NAESB develops
appropriate communications protocols.
568. Transmission providers also
were directed to work with customers to
facilitate the use of third party
generation, where available, in
provision of planning redispatch. To
facilitate provision of redispatch service
by third parties, the Commission further
directed transmission providers,
working through NAESB, to modify
their OASIS sites and develop any
necessary business practices to allow for
posting of third party offers to provide
planning redispatch. Again,
transmission providers were not
required to implement the new OASIS
functionality and any related business
practices until NAESB develops
appropriate standards.
569. Finally, the Commission
recognized that there may be some
regional variation in the way
transmission providers approach the
provision of conditional firm service
beyond the minimum attributes that
established in Order No. 890. The
Commission directed transmission
providers located in the same region to
coordinate among themselves to
develop business practices for
implementation of the conditional firm
service.227 In order to allow time for this
regional coordination, the Commission
directed transmission providers to
implement these mechanisms and
business practices within 180 days after
the publication of this Final Rule in the
Federal Register, or October 11, 2007.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
570. AWEA argues that the
Commission erred in limiting the term
of planning redispatch and conditional
firm services. AWEA contends that
longer-term planning redispatch and
conditional firm services would better
meet the needs of customers seeking
long-term service that are unable to
secure transmission upgrades because
they are uneconomic. If the Commission
declines to eliminate temporal
limitations on the transmission
provider’s obligation to offer these
services, AWEA asks the Commission to
extend the reassessment period from
two years to five years. AWEA argues
that a five year reassessment period may
allow customers to secure financing and
227 The Commission encouraged participation of
non-public utility transmission providers in the
region and interested transmission customers in the
development of these business practices, and
directed public utility transmission providers to
make efforts to include these interested parties in
their regional coordination efforts.
PO 00000
Frm 00071
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3053
would be reflective of a more typical
planning horizon.
571. In contrast, NRECA asks that the
Commission not allow planning
redispatch or conditional firm point-topoint service unless customers agree to
pay for transmission upgrades. NRECA
argues doing so will eliminate the
transmission customer’s incentive to
free-ride on transmission capacity built
and paid for by others. Southern
requests clarification that transmission
customers committing to transmission
construction have a higher priority for
the incremental transmission capacity
created by their upgrades than planning
redispatch or conditional firm
customers. If this priority is not granted,
Southern maintains that planning
redispatch and conditional customers
not willing to commit to such
construction could firm up their
product by waiting for later-queued
customers to pay for and construct the
upgrades.
572. EEI and Southern argue that
bridge customers should also be subject
to the biennial reassessment when the
period for completing upgrades exceeds
two years. EEI contends that, unlike
reassessment customers, bridge
customers receive a lower quality of
service compared to non-bridge
customers because the transmission
provider makes their determinations
using the lowest ATC conditions that
occur during the entire term of the
bridge service agreement. EEI argues
that the transmission provider therefore
incorporates a larger margin of risk into
its initial offer of service to the bridge
customer than would be necessary if it
were able to reassess the service
biennially.
573. Constellation and EPSA request
clarification that the biennial
reassessment is not a de novo review of
whether or not to provide conditional
firm service and, instead, is limited to
evaluation of the triggering conditions
that were identified in the initial
analysis. EPSA argues that if the
transmission provider’s studies show
that only one of 10 key facilities raises
reliability concerns that warrant an offer
of conditional firm service, the
transmission provider must be required
to plan for and maintain all facilities
other than the one identified limiting
element on an ongoing basis. Otherwise,
EPSA contends, conditional firm service
denigrates into a two year service
obligation. MidAmerican asks the
Commission to confirm that
transmission providers can waive their
rights to reassess planning redispatch
and conditional firm service for all
similarly situated customers.
MidAmerican suggests that transmission
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3054
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
providers be able to waive reassessment
rights for customers in areas
experiencing infrequent changes, but
maintain their reassessment rights for
other customers in areas that experience
frequent changes. MidAmerican
contends that a transmission provider’s
act of waiving the reassessment should
not be considered an act of discretion
that requires an OASIS posting.
MidAmerican also requests clarification
that waiver of one reassessment period
does not constitute an infinite waiver of
reassessment rights. EEI asks the
Commission to confirm that the
transmission customer bears
responsibility for the costs of the
biennial reassessments since they are
performed in response to its service
request.
574. E.ON U.S. expresses concern
that, if transmission providers are
completely divorced from the thirdparty provided planning redispatch,
there may be a negative impact on
system reliability and ATC. E.ON U.S.
requests clarification that the reliability
coordinator for the transmission system
must oversee third-party provision of
planning redispatch to avoid
interference with reliability redispatch.
575. MidAmerican seeks rehearing of
the Commission’s decision to expand
the scope of the conditional firm option
beyond the original NOPR proposal to
include curtailment based on system
conditions. MidAmerican asserts that
this expansion assumes that the system
has a built-in ability to absorb
scheduled flow of energy from full
utilization of firm or network service
plus flows from contingent firm service
upon an instantaneous system
contingency until an operator can
curtail conditional firm service.
MidAmerican argues that contingencies
on certain systems, such as systems
susceptible to rapid voltage collapse and
cascading outages, can occur before the
operator can respond by curtailing.
576. Some petitioners argue that the
transmission provider, not the
transmission customer, should choose
whether conditional firm curtailment
will be based on an identified system
condition or number of annual hours.228
Ameren asserts that a system
contingency event is not
interchangeable with a number of hours
limitation because they produce vastly
different impacts on the system. Ameren
and E.ON U.S. contend that modeling
processes and changes in system
conditions provide uncertainty and will
hinder the transmission provider from
specifying accurate curtailable hours.
NRECA suggests that the decision of
228 E.g.,
Ameren, NRECA, and Southern.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
which approach to use should be driven
by the results of the transmission
provider’s studies, local system
conditions governing the availability of
transmission, and a concern for
preserving the reliability and value of
existing firm service. E.ON U.S. asks the
Commission to acknowledge that the
risk factor associated with the number
of hours that a customer can be
curtailed for conditional firm service
may be substantial to reflect the
possibility of unexpected events such as
a car accident, hurricane, or ice storm
that require curtailment of transmission
over a certain path.
577. EEI argues that the Commission
should grant rehearing regarding the
curtailment priority of conditional firm
service during conditional periods. To
allow the same curtailment priority as
secondary network service, EEI asserts,
would adversely impact reliable service
to network and native load customers
because these customers use ‘‘secondary
network service in order to serve
network loads reliably.’’ 229
Additionally, EEI argues that providing
a curtailment priority that is below that
of secondary network service instead of
equal to it does not violate the
prohibition against undue
discrimination or impact comparability.
578. Southern, EEI and Transerv state
that there is no automated process in
NERC’s Interchange Distribution
Calculator (IDC) to convert a tag from
firm priority to non-firm priority in
order to accommodate conditional firm
service. EEI states that currently the
only way to modify the curtailment
priority reflected on a tag is to cancel
the existing tag and issue a new one.
According to EEI, this affects the quality
of service and ultimately causes the
customer to incur imbalance charges.
Southern, EEI and Transerv encourage
implementation of uniform tagging
business practices developed by NAESB
to bring greater uniformity to markets.
Transerv and EEI also request that the
implementation deadline be extended to
allow time for these modifications.
579. Southern also argues that the
conditional firm service requirements
may conflict with NERC reliability
standards which require the
transmission provider to demonstrate
that its transmission system is planned
such that it can be operated to supply
projected demands and firm
transmission services. Southern
contends that if conditional firm service
is modeled in the base case, it will cause
overloads under N–1 contingencies
resulting in the curtailment of firm
transactions in contravention of NERC
229 Citing
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 1601.
Frm 00072
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
planning criteria. Southern asks the
Commission to clarify that a
transmission provider will not be in
violation of NERC reliability standards
by providing conditional firm service or
if so that civil penalties will not be
imposed for such violations.
580. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to require transmission
providers to update their rates to reflect
the new conditional firm service
revenues and to report to the
Commission annually any revenues
from this service.
Commission Determination
581. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to provide
planning redispatch and conditional
firm service subject to a biennial
reassessment when transmission
customers are unwilling to pay for
transmission upgrades. We decline to
adopt a longer reassessment period or
altogether eliminate the reassessment
feature of these services. There are
legitimate circumstances under which a
customer may choose not to support
system upgrades, including high
construction costs or a short term of
service that does not merit construction.
Balanced against these customers’ needs
are the needs of transmission providers
to reliably provide service and of other
customers to continue using their own
firm transmission rights. Adopting a two
year reassessment period appropriately
balances these various interests.
582. The Commission did not, as
AWEA suggests, limit the term of the
reassessment service. A customer taking
planning redispatch or conditional firm
service subject to reassessment could
receive an unlimited term of service,
with the transmission provider
reassessing every two years the
redispatch required to keep the service
firm or the conditions or hours under
which the transmission provider may
conditionally curtail the service.230
583. We disagree with EEI and
Southern that customers supporting
transmission upgrades should be subject
to the biennial reassessment. In Order
No. 890, the Commission required the
specification of unchanging conditions
in a transmission service agreement for
a customer willing to pay for
upgrades.231 Customers agreeing to take
service under this bridge product
require certainty because they typically
are financing and constructing new
resources. While we recognize that a
230 We clarify in response to EEI that conditional
firm and planning redispatch customers should pay
for the costs of conducting their individual biennial
reassessments.
231 See id. at P 980.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission provider may need to
incorporate a larger margin of risk into
the analysis of conditions when a
customer has agreed to pay for upgrades
that will not be brought online for
several years, we do not believe that this
will most often be the case. We require
transmission providers to study the
conditions for bridge service as they
would their own use of a similar service
used prior to the completion of
transmission upgrades. Only those
transmission providers using large
margins of risk in evaluating the
acquisition or construction of their own
new resources with long transmission
construction lead times should apply
large margins of risk to the study of the
conditional firm service for a customer
that agrees to pay for upgrades.
584. We agree with Southern that
customers paying for upgrades have
priority access to the capability created
by those upgrades, up to the point of the
amount of transmission service
requested. To do otherwise would create
disincentives for transmission
customers later in the queue to pay for
upgrades because upgrades must
necessarily be sized to accommodate all
earlier-queued customers. We note,
however, that any capacity created in
excess of the service request should be
allocated to those planning redispatch
and conditional firm customers earlier
in the queue, based on their order in the
queue.
585. We also agree with MidAmerican
that a transmission provider’s waiver of
a reassessment for conditional firm or
planning redispatch service does not
constitute a waiver of all reassessments
for the duration of the service, unless
explicitly agreed to by the transmission
provider. We reiterate, however, that
only one reassessment may be
performed in each two-year period of
service. We also affirm that any waiver
must be granted for similarly situated
service, which would include
conditional firm or planning redispatch
service that is limited because of the
same constraints or general system
limitations. Such a waiver would be an
act of discretion that must be posted on
OASIS. Waiver of the reassessment
presents an opportunity for
discrimination among classes of
customers on the part of the
transmission provider and posting will
provide eligible customers with an
indicator of how often conditions or
redispatch requirements have been
reassessed. Transmission providers are
directed to develop uniform OASIS
posting standards, in coordination with
NAESB, for transmission providers to
post information regarding waivers of
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
the biennial reassessment for planning
redispatch and conditional firm service.
586. We reiterate in response to E.ON
U.S. that both the transmission provider
and reliability coordinator play a role in
ensuring that reliability is maintained
when a customer uses third-party
provided planning redispatch.232
Customers are allowed to use their own
or third-party resources to secure
planning redispatch services in lieu of
or in addition to service from the
transmission provider, provided that the
arrangements are sufficiently detailed
and coordinated with the transmission
provider to ensure that reliability is
maintained. This would entail review of
redispatch plans submitted by
customers, coordination between the
transmission provider and reliability
coordinator, and signaling third party
generators when the redispatch is
needed. The Commission made clear in
Order No. 890 that it would be the
customers’ ultimate responsibility to
ensure that any technical arrangements
required by the reliability coordinator
are in place in order to maintain
reliability.
587. With regard to the conditional
firm option, we continue to require that
transmission providers study and offer
service based on both system conditions
and annual curtailment hours. The
Commission introduced the concept of
conditional curtailment based on system
conditions in its request for
supplemental comments issued on
November 15, 2006. MidAmerican and
other industry participants were
therefore provided adequate notice and
opportunity to comment on the
potential for the Commission to expand
the scope of the required offerings for
conditional firm service. Upon review of
these comments, the Commission
allowed transmission providers to
determine system conditions and
conditional curtailment hours through
different means, implicitly recognizing
that system conditions are not exactly
interchangeable with conditional
curtailment hours.233 Modeling of
conditional curtailment hours entails
difficulties beyond those encountered in
modeling ATC. Transmission providers
have therefore been granted flexibility
in making these determinations and are
allowed to use an additional risk factor
in calculating conditional hours.234 In
light of the flexibility provided to
transmission providers, we reject as
unsupported petitioners’ requests to
eliminate or limit the requirement to
offer conditional firm service based on
232 See
id. at P 1004–07.
id. at P 1065–67.
234 See id. at P 1067.
Frm 00073
Fmt 4701
the number of hours in which service
may be conditional.235
588. In Order No. 890, the
Commission allowed transmission
providers to add a risk factor to their
calculation of annual curtailment hours
to account for forecasting risks. We
decline to clarify the level of this risk
factor as E.ON U.S. requests.
Transmission providers need flexibility
in modeling these conditions and we
will not specify a level of appropriate
risk factor to apply. We note however
that E.ON U.S. lists events that should
not be evaluated in such analysis. Car
accidents, hurricanes, ice storms or
other unexpected events that require
curtailment of firm transmission
customers taking service over a certain
path should not impact the number of
non-firm curtailments of conditional
firm service.
589. We disagree with MidAmerican’s
characterization of curtailment based on
system conditions as requiring
automatic or immediate operator
response. Transmission providers,
especially those with systems
susceptible to rapid voltage collapse and
cascading outages, should manage these
situations as they would manage any
other emergency. The ability to
conditionally curtail conditional firm
service is not meant to address system
emergencies, but rather address system
conditions such as congestion on a line
or flowgate, system load levels or the
outage of a specific line or generator. We
affirm the decision in Order No. 890 to
require transmission providers to offer
eligible customers seeking conditional
firm service a choice between
conditional curtailment based on
specified system conditions or annual
hours.
590. We clarify in response to
Constellation and EPSA that, when a
transmission provider is evaluating its
continued ability to provide conditional
firm service during a biennial
reassessment, the transmission provider
is not limited to the specific conditions
previously agreed to by the transmission
customer in the initial service
agreement or a prior reassessment. The
purpose of the biennial reassessment is
to allow the transmission provider to
adjust the conditions or number of
hours during which conditional firm
service will be conditional in order to
ensure that continued provision of the
service does not impair reliability. Thus,
the Commission does not impose upon
the transmission provider the obligation
to plan its system to keep firm the part
235 We decline requests to extend the date for
implementing conditional firm service, which has
already passed.
233 See
PO 00000
3055
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3056
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
of the conditional firm service that is
firm when service was initiated.
Although this may increase (or
decrease) the number of hours in which
service is conditional, the transmission
provider may not entirely terminate
service to the conditional firm customer.
591. We affirm our decision to assign
conditional firm service the same
curtailment priority as secondary
network service for periods when the
service is conditional. EEI’s argument
that customers use secondary network
service to meet the reliability needs of
their loads is inapposite. Secondary
network service is a non-firm service for
which requests are made in the same
timeframe as other non-firm service.236
While the Commission recognized that
network customers may use secondary
network service on an ‘‘as available’’
basis to meet peak native load, and in
this way meet the reliability needs of
loads, this is not the purpose of
secondary network service. Network
customers that rely upon secondary
network service to meet their peak
native load are already lessening the
reliability of their service by taking nonfirm service. The fact that conditional
firm service will compete with
secondary network service when
curtailments are ordered is irrelevant.
592. We agree with petitioners that
the NAESB rules regarding tagging do
not allow a transmission provider to
change the tag of a transmission
customer. That is why, in Order No.
890, the Commission directed
transmission providers to coordinate
with other transmission providers in
their regions to develop their own
business practices to implement the
tagging and tracking of conditional firm
service.237 Upon consideration of
petitioners’ concerns, we grant
rehearing to require transmission
providers, in coordination with NERC
and NAESB, to develop within 180 days
of publication of this order in the
Federal Register a consistent set of
tracking capabilities and business
practices for tagging for implementation
of conditional firm service. We agree
with petitioners that a consistent set of
practices followed by the industry will
reduce transmission provider discretion
and bring uniformity in implementing
conditional firm service. In the interim,
the existing business practices of each
transmission provider for tracking and
tagging conditional firm service shall
remain in effect.
236 See
id. at P 1606.
id. at P 1077. We clarify that transmission
providers may determine the season, month and
hour for changing the priority of tags for customers
taking the annual hourly conditional firm option.
237 See
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
593. We decline to generically waive
potential penalties for violations of
NERC reliability standards due to
implementation of conditional firm
service, as Southern suggests. Southern
has not provided enough information to
allow us to determine whether its
implementation of conditional firm
service will actually cause violations of
NERC planning criteria. Transmission
providers are able to incorporate the
specifics of a conditional firm service
agreement in their base models to
differing degrees, depending on the
flexibility of different models and the
assumptions used in modeling the
service. Therefore, incorporation of
conditional firm service into the base
case of models need not cause overloads
under N–1 conditions. Under the
Commission’s regulations, if Southern
believes a conflict exists between its
implementation of the conditional firm
option and any of NERC’s reliability
standards, it must bring that conflict to
the attention of the Commission, the
Electric Reliability Organization and the
relevant Regional Entity for resolution.
Pending resolution of the matter, a
transmission provider must continue to
comply with Order No. 890 and provide
conditional firm service.
594. Finally, we reject as unnecessary
TDU Systems’ request to require
separate annual reporting of conditional
firm service revenues. We also decline
to generically require all transmission
providers to address potential updates
to transmission rates as a result of
providing conditional firm service. TDU
Systems has not justified treating these
revenues differently than other longterm firm point-to-point revenues.
(2) Pricing of Planning Redispatch
595. The Commission determined that
customers taking long-term point-topoint service with planning redispatch
will have the option of paying either (i)
the higher of (a) actual incremental costs
of redispatch or (b) the applicable
embedded cost transmission rate on file
with the Commission or (ii) a fixed rate
for redispatch to be negotiated by the
transmission provider and customer and
subject to a cap representing the total
fixed and variable costs of the resources
expected to provide the service. If the
customer selects the higher of
incremental cost or the embedded-cost
rate, the transmission provider must
calculate the incremental costs of
redispatch monthly and charge the
higher of redispatch or the embedded
cost rate each month.
596. For purposes of calculating
planning redispatch charges,
incremental costs must include fuel or
purchase power costs caused by
PO 00000
Frm 00074
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
ramping up generator(s) at the point of
delivery and ramping down generator(s)
at the point of receipt. Where
applicable, transmission providers also
may specify other incremental costs for
inclusion in the monthly actual
incremental costs, including
opportunity costs and purchased power
costs, provided that identification and
derivation of these costs is included in
the service agreement. All information
necessary to calculate and verify
opportunity costs must be made
available at the request of the
transmission customer.238
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
597. Several petitioners argue that
customers choosing planning redispatch
should pay the cost of transmission
service and the cost of redispatching
generation.239 These petitioners
generally maintain that the redispatch of
generators merely reallocates use of
existing transmission capability without
creating any new thermal transmission
capacity. EEI and Progress contend that
planning redispatch takes away firm
transmission capacity from network
customers and the transmission
provider’s native load and gives that
capacity to a new point-to-point
customer, without any corresponding
increase in TTC. Southern notes that
customers agreeing to third-party
provided planning redispatch will pay
both the embedded transmission rate to
the transmission provider and the
redispatch rate charged by the thirdparty generator. EEI and Southern
contend that the pricing of planning
redispatch should be aligned with the
price of reliability redispatch and the
pricing for third-party provided
redispatch, arguing that different cost
recovery for similarly situated
generators is unduly preferential.
598. EEI also argues that the
Commission’s prohibition against
recovery of both the incremental cost of
transmission upgrades and the
embedded cost of transmission service
from the same customer has a different
impact on the transmission provider’s
ability to recover its cost of service than
does the prohibition against the
recovery of the costs of planning
redispatch and the costs of the
238 Although a transmission provider is not
required to contract with a third party to provide
planning redispatch, if it does so then the customer
would be obligated to pay the purchase power
costs, including any reservation charge for the
power. Any flow-through of purchase power costs
must be negotiated between customers and
transmission providers in a stand-alone agreement
if the transmission provider agrees to make
purchases on the customer’s behalf.
239 E.g., Ameren, EEI, Progress, Southern,
Washington IOUs, and Xcel.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission system. When a
transmission provider constructs
additional transmission capacity to
serve a new customer, EEI states that the
transmission provider recovers the
entire cost of its transmission system
and its new facilities and that the only
question is how those costs should be
allocated between new and existing
customers. EEI contends that the pricing
for planning redispatch leaves the
transmission provider unable to recover
additional costs associated with the
service.
599. Southern argues that customers
will receive two distinct services and
should be charged for both according to
cost causation principles. Southern
asserts that the Commission’s pricing
policy for planning redispatch service
results in an uncompensated taking of
the utility’s property by providing no
compensation for either the
transmission or the generator-supplied
redispatch service. Southern concludes
that the rate for planning redispatch
cannot be just and reasonable because
the transmission provider will provide
part of the service for free. E.ON. U.S.
similarly argues that LSEs should have
the opportunity to recover actual fuel
costs since those costs are directly
attributable to the service provided to
the redispatch customer. Ameren asks
the Commission to clarify that all costs,
including lost opportunity costs will be
recovered in order to avoid penalizing
the generator and harming native load
customers.
600. EEI argues that the Commission’s
rationale for prohibiting the recovery of
both lost opportunity costs and the cost
of transmission service in a pre-open
access environment is inapplicable to
the situation that transmission providers
face when they must redispatch
generating resources to create
transmission capacity that would
otherwise be unavailable.240 According
to EEI, the situation in Penelec, in
which the utility was seeking
compensation for the potential loss of
future imports of non-firm energy, is
inapposite to the planning redispatch
requirement, in which the customer’s
request for firm service has priority over
the transmission provider’s non-firm
use of the system.
601. If the Commission does not allow
recovery of the costs of both
transmission service and the cost of
redispatching generation, EEI and
Southern ask the Commission to clarify
rate treatment for the planning
240 Citing Pennsylvania Electric Company, 58
FERC ¶ 61,278 at 62,873, reh’g denied, 60 FERC
¶ 61,034 (1992), aff’d sub nom. Pennsylvania
Electric Co. v. FERC, 11 F.3d 207 (D.C. Cir. 1993)
(Penelec).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
redispatch service. They argue that the
long-term point-to-point reservation that
employs planning redispatch should not
be included in the divisor of a
transmission provider’s rate calculation.
Instead, Southern argues that
generation-related payments associated
with the redispatch should be treated as
a revenue credit to off-set native load
customers’ fuel adjustment clause and
transmission revenues from the
planning redispatch service should be
included in the numerator as a revenue
credit. EEI contends that transmission
providers should be permitted to make
a rate design change through
amendments to their formula rates or in
a general or single rate case filing.
Commission Determination
602. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 not to adopt
‘‘and’’ pricing for planning redispatch
service. In Order No. 890, the
Commission explained that planning
redispatch differs from reliability
redispatch in that planning redispatch
service creates additional transmission
capacity 241 and reliability redispatch
allows customers to avoid real-time
curtailments.242 It is appropriate for
customers to pay the embedded cost of
transmission and the cost of third-party
redispatch because third parties cannot
recover transmission revenues for the
additional transmission capability
created by their redispatch. Thus,
different cost recovery for third party,
network and transmission provider
resources providing redispatch is not
unduly preferential.
603. While we agree that planning
redispatch does not create new thermal
capacity equivalent to grid expansion,
we disagree with EEI and Southern that
planning redispatch does not create
additional transmission capability and
associated revenues for the transmission
provider. When a transmission provider
plans to redispatch its generation
resources in order to provide previously
unavailable firm point-to-point service,
it does not and should not take firm
service away from network and native
load customers. The transmission
provider continues to provide firm
241 See Order No. 890 at P 1029 (citing Order No.
888–A at 30,267). In Order No. 888–A, the
Commission began its discussion of the redispatch
obligation and redispatch pricing by explaining that
‘‘the obligation to create additional transmission
capacity to accommodate a request for firm
transmission service should properly lie with the
transmission provider, not a network customer.’’
See Order No. 888–A at 30,267. Because a network
customer cannot add new transmission upgrades on
its own to the transmission provider’s system, the
Commission was necessarily referring in this
statement to the planning redispatch obligation.
242 See Order No. 890 at P 1028.
PO 00000
Frm 00075
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3057
service to network and native load
customers and receives its revenue
requirement to serve those customers.
The transmission provider also adds
another long-term firm point-to-point
service agreement and receives its
embedded cost transmission rate for that
service, which it would not have
received but for providing the planned
redispatch of its resources.
604. The pricing of planning
redispatch service does not violate cost
causation principles or amount to an
uncompensated taking from utilities.
Transmission providers will receive on
a monthly basis the higher of the cost of
redispatching their generators or the
revenues for transmission service that
they would not have received but for the
redispatch. Transmission providers do
not provide the redispatch of their
generation for free, as Southern
contends, nor do they lose the
opportunity to recover actual fuel costs,
as E.ON U.S. suggests. If the monthly
embedded-cost transmission rate is
lower than the monthly costs of
redispatching resources, including
actual fuel costs, the higher monthly
redispatch costs may be recovered.
605. We will not allow ‘‘and’’ pricing
of planning redispatch service, which
would result in overcompensation of
transmission providers and violate the
Commission’s long-standing
opportunity costs pricing policy
announced in Penelec. In Order No.
888, the Commission affirmed the
rationale in Penelec for allowing
utilities to charge opportunity costs in
an open access environment.243 In
Order No. 888–A, the Commission
specifically concluded that opportunity
cost pricing is appropriate for costs that
arise from a transmission provider
having to reduce its off-system sales to
avoid a transmission constraint and
reiterated that off-system sales can only
be made pursuant to the point-to-point
provisions of the pro forma OATT.244
The Commission also affirmed that
‘‘and’’ pricing is not appropriate for
planning redispatch service.245 EEI’s
assertion that Penelec is not applicable
in a post-open access world is a
collateral attack on Order Nos. 888 and
888–A.
606. Order No. 888 provided that
revenues from direct assignment of
redispatch costs must be credited to the
costs of fuel and purchased power
expense included in the transmission
provider’s wholesale fuel adjustment
243 See
244 See
Order No. 888 at 31,739.
Order No. 888–A at 30,265, n.261.
245 Id.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3058
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
clause.246 We therefore clarify that, in
months in which generation-related
payments are collected for planning
redispatch, these payments should be
treated as a revenue credit to off-set
native load customers’ fuel adjustment
clause. In months in which the
embedded cost rate of transmission is
collected for planning redispatch, these
revenues should be included in the
numerator of the rate calculation as a
revenue credit. For most planning
redispatch service, we believe that there
will likely be at least one month a year
when the actual incremental cost of
redispatch is higher than the embedded
cost rate. For this reason we believe it
is appropriate for transmission
providers to treat transmission revenues
from planning redispatch service
consistent with the rate treatment for
revenues from short-term transmission
reservations. To the extent necessary, a
transmission provider may propose in
an FPA section 205 filing any rate
design change that may be necessary
through an amendment to its formula
rate or in a general or single rate case
filing.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
(3) Rollover Rights
607. The Commission found in Order
No. 890 that rollover rights are
appropriate for point-to-point service
that is provided using planning
redispatch or conditional firm options
and that would otherwise be eligible for
rollover rights. The transmission
provider, however, will continue to
have a right to review the conditions or
redispatch requirements every two
years.
608. The Commission determined that
a conditional firm customer opting to
roll over will retain a priority claim to
the portion of its service that is firm.
The Commission qualified this
statement by providing an example: if a
five-year conditional firm service
initially has a 100-hour annual cap on
curtailments, but the cap is later
reassessed at 150 hours, the rollover
right would continue to give the
customer first call on all but the 150
hours as against all other subsequent
requests for firm service.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
609. TDU Systems and Ameren argue
that the Commission erred in allowing
rollover rights for conditional firm
service that is subject to biennial
reassessment. TDU Systems and
Ameren argue that allowing rollover for
this service is inconsistent with other
requirements of Order No. 890 that limit
conditional firm service to the shorter
246 See
Order No. 888 at 31,740.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
term service if customers do not agree
to pay for upgrades. TDU Systems
contend that allowing rollover rights for
customers taking conditional firm
service creates a continued opportunity
for transmission customers to free ride
on transmission capacity built and paid
for by others. Ameren maintains
allowing rollover rights for conditional
firm agreements will increase
uncertainty in modeling and will
decrease the incentive to upgrade the
transmission system.
Commission Determination
610. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to provide
rollover rights to conditional firm pointto-point service that otherwise qualifies
for rollover rights. We disagree that
granting rollover rights to conditional
firm customers is inconsistent with
statements in Order No. 890 that
customers not willing to pay for
upgrades should have their service
limited. Customers taking conditional
firm service subject to reassessment take
the risk that the firmness of their service
will deteriorate with every biennial
reassessment. These customers are not
free riding on the transmission grid, but
rather are taking less than firm service
and making a contribution to the
embedded costs of the grid by paying
the long-term firm transmission rate.
Allowing rollover will not increase
uncertainty in modeling the service, as
Ameren contends, because transmission
providers will still be able to perform
biennial reassessments every two years
for those conditional firm customers not
willing to pay for upgrades.
611. We also disagree that granting
rollover rights to conditional firm
customers decreases incentives to
expand the grid. Even without rollover
rights, conditional firm customers
wishing to continue their service could
simply submit additional requests for
service, in response to which the
transmission provider would identify
the limiting conditions for continued
service. Granting rollover rights to
longer-term conditional firm customers
allows these customers to keep their
place in line ahead of others seeking
conditional firm service in recognition
of the longer-term commitment they
made to the transmission provider.
Ameren’s concern, then, is with the
underlying requirement to offer
conditional firm service, which we
affirm above.
(4) Use of the Conditional Firm Option
in Designating Network Resources
612. In Order No. 890, the
Commission concluded that conditional
firm point-to-point service is
PO 00000
Frm 00076
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
sufficiently firm to support the
designation of network resources
imported from other control areas. The
Commission concluded that the
conditional firm option only affects the
transmission of the resource to the
network, not the interruptibility of the
generating resource itself, and the
transmission may not be interrupted for
reasons other than reliability.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
613. Several petitioners object to
allowing conditional firm service to be
used to support an off-system
designated network resource.247 EEI and
Progress argue that allowing designation
of such resources would adversely
impact system reliability. EEI asserts
that some customers may take
conditional firm service that is
curtailable in all summer months, not
just 10 to 20 hours a year. EEI contends
that conditional firm service presents
the possibility that the supply of energy
from a generator may be interrupted for
a substantial period of time, well in
excess of the time for an interruption
due to a forced outage or maintenance
outage. EEI asserts that this less reliable
service to serve load will not only
impact the conditional firm customer’s
supply of energy, but could affect other
network customers and native load
customers.
614. Duke requests clarification that
off-system conditional firm-supported
resources may qualify as designated
network resources only if the network
customer clearly specifies in its
Network Integration Transmission
Service Agreement specific backup
arrangements, such as adequate
reserves. Duke also asks the
Commission to clarify that a
transmission provider need not
undertake provider-of-last-resort
obligations to any network customer
that elects to designate a network
resource supported by conditional firm
service.
615. PJM asks the Commission to
clarify that Order No. 890 does not
require it to accept conditional firm
service as sufficient to qualify external
generating resources as capacity
resources for purposes of PJM’s
Reliability Pricing Model (RPM). In
order to qualify as a capacity resource,
PJM asserts that an external unit must
have a firm path to load that is available
year-round, particularly during highlevel periods when adjacent control
areas both are experiencing system
stresses.
247 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Duke, EEI, Progress, and TDU Systems.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Commission Determination
616. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to allow the
designation of off-system resources
supported by conditional firm point-topoint service.248 It is appropriate to
allow conditional firm service to
support the designation of network
resources because the conditional firm
option only affects the transmission of
the resource to the network, not the
interruptibility of the generating
resource itself. Conditional firm service
satisfies the requirement that the
delivery of the resource to the network
to be non-interruptible because
conditional firm transmission service is
curtailable only for specific reliability
reasons, not for economic reasons.
617. We acknowledge that conditional
firm service may have conditions that
apply for most of the peak periods of a
month or season. This does not mean
that such service will necessarily impact
the reliability of the transmission
provider’s system. The Commission
declines Duke’s request to require a
network customer with a designated offsystem resource supported by
conditional firm service to obtain
reserves or backup resources to cover
the periods when the resource
supported with conditional firm pointto-point transmission service might not
be delivered. It is not the responsibility
of the transmission provider to ensure
that the network customer has sufficient
resources to meet its load.
618. Whether or not off-system
resources supported by conditional firm
service may serve as a capacity resource
under PJM’s RPM is governed by the
relevant RPM rules adopted by PJM,
which were not addressed in Order No.
890.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
c. Proposals for Transparent Redispatch
619. In Order No. 890, the
Commission rejected requests to expand
the transmission provider’s real-time
redispatch obligations to incorporate
third-party bids for redispatch or
otherwise require reliability redispatch
to be offered to point-to-point
customers. The Commission concluded
that the provision of reliability
redispatch only to network customers
did not constitute undue discrimination
because, unlike point-to-point
customers, network customers are
required to make their generation
resources available to the transmission
provider to provide reliability
redispatch to maintain the reliability of
both native load and network service.
The Commission also determined that
248 See
Order No. 890 at P 1091.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
mandatory inclusion of third party
offers to redispatch is not necessary to
remedy undue discrimination because,
unlike the transmission provider, third
party generators are under no obligation
to make their resources available to
provide redispatch.
620. The Commission did, however,
require that transmission providers post
certain redispatch cost information
associated with the existing redispatch
services that must be provided under
the pro forma OATT. The Commission
concluded that providing customers
with additional transparency and
greater information regarding the cost of
congestion will facilitate their
consideration of planning redispatch
options, which in turn will provide for
more efficient use of the grid. To that
end, the Commission directed each
transmission provider to post on OASIS
its monthly average cost of redispatch
for each internal congested transmission
facility or interface over which it
provides planning redispatch or
reliability redispatch under the pro
forma OATT. In addition, to
demonstrate the range of redispatch
costs each month, the Commission
directed transmission providers to post
a high and low redispatch cost for the
month for each of these same
transmission constraints.
621. Transmission providers must
post internal constraint or interface data
for the month if any planning redispatch
or reliability redispatch is provided
during the month, regardless of whether
the transmission customer is required to
reimburse the transmission provider for
those exact costs. Thus, if the
transmission customer pays for
planning redispatch pursuant to a
negotiated fixed rate, the transmission
provider is required to post and
calculate the monthly average
redispatch costs and the high and low
costs in the month even though the
transmission provider will bill the
customer the fixed rate. The same
posting requirement applies if the
customer is paying a monthly ‘‘higher
of’’ rate. The Commission concluded
that the relevant reliability redispatch
costs for posting purposes are those
costs the transmission provider invoices
network customers based on a load ratio
share pursuant to section 33.3 of the pro
forma OATT.249 The transmission
provider must post this data on OASIS
as soon as practical after the end of each
249 Order No. 890 provided that the transmission
provider need not perform new calculations of outof-merit redispatch costs; rather the reliability
redispatch invoices should form the basis of
information from which the transmission provider
determines monthly average reliability redispatch
costs.
PO 00000
Frm 00077
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3059
month, but no later than when it sends
invoices to transmission customers for
redispatch-related services. The
Commission directed transmission
providers to work in conjunction with
NAESB to develop this new OASIS
functionality and any necessary
business practice standards.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
622. Ameren argues that the
redispatch cost posting requirement is
unreasonable because it creates a
substantial new burden for transmission
providers without creating offsetting
benefits for transmission customers.
Ameren maintains that the Commission
failed to assess the benefits and the
burdens of the redispatch costs posting
requirement. Ameren also maintains
that this information will not provide
any value to the transmission customer
in anticipating redispatch costs since
certain factors embedded in the
calculation of these costs, including
fuel, will vary greatly over time. Ameren
concludes that existing requirements
under the pro forma OATT are all that
is necessary to provide transparency for
the service.
623. Progress Energy requests
clarification that reliability redispatch
costs need only be posted if the
transmission provider invoices network
customers for those costs. Progress
Energy states that Order No. 890
contains language that could be read to
require the posting of reliability
redispatch costs even if network
customers are not invoiced for those
costs, notwithstanding the
Commission’s statement that the
relevant reliability redispatch costs for
posting purposes are those costs the
transmission provider invoices network
customers.250 Progress Energy
concludes that it would be unduly
burdensome and serve no regulatory
purpose to require transmission
providers to post reliability redispatch
costs when they are not invoicing their
network customers for these costs.
624. Entergy requests clarification
that, when redispatch charges are
calculated and charged on a system
average basis, only the average costs for
the system for the month need be
posted. Entergy states that its new
weekly procurement process will
provide customers a greater opportunity
to obtain transmission service by paying
redispatch costs, as determined through
the optimization models in the weekly
procurement process. These
optimization models will not calculate
redispatch costs for each specific
constrained facility on Entergy’s system.
250 Citing
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 1162, n.707.
16JAR2
3060
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Entergy states it would incur additional
burdens if required to separately
calculate these costs to meet the Order
No. 890 requirement to post redispatch
costs by each constrained facility.
Commission Determination
625. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to require
transmission providers to post on
OASIS monthly average redispatch costs
for each internal congested transmission
facility and interface over which
planning redispatch or reliability
dispatch are provided under the pro
forma OATT. We disagree with Ameren
that this creates a substantial new
reporting burden for transmission
providers. The information to be posted
is readily available to transmission
providers from the invoices used to
charge network customers, in the case of
reliability redispatch costs, or
calculations that the transmission
provider performs to bill for planning
redispatch services. The only added
burden involves posting those
previously calculated costs and
calculating averages in order to mask
commercially sensitive information.
This additional averaging step was
instituted to address concerns raised by
Ameren and others about release of
proprietary or confidential market
information.251 Although we do not
believe this averaging step to be unduly
burdensome, Ameren or any other
transmission provider may propose a
variation from the pro forma OATT to
allow for posting of actual billing data
if the transmission provider believes it
is too burdensome to average this data
prior to posting.
626. Any minimal burden imposed on
transmission providers by the
redispatch cost posting requirement is
offset by the benefits of providing
customers with fairly current
information regarding which facilities
are congested each month and the
average costs of redispatch over those
facilities.252 This information has
previously been provided only to
customers receiving specific redispatch
services. While redispatch costs
incurred by customers in the present do
not always correlate with future
redispatch costs, a fact recognized by
the Commission in Order No. 890,253
more information on the currently
provided redispatch could be invaluable
to a potential or current customer
evaluating different generation and
transmission options. A reporting
requirement that allows customers to
251 See
id. at P 1150.
id. at P 1163.
253 See id. at P 1159.
252 See
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
identify constraints and the monthly
average costs of relieving those
constraints provides a benefit to
customers that outweighs the small
monthly posting burden.
627. To the extent necessary, we
clarify in response to Progress Energy
that transmission providers that do not
calculate and charge separate reliability
dispatch charges to its network
customers have no obligation to report
monthly redispatch costs for those
services. The posting obligations
adopted in Order No. 890 were designed
so that transmission providers could
post redispatch cost information based
on data already calculated for another
purpose, including customer invoices
for reliability dispatch and the
determination of charges for the
monthly ‘‘higher of’’ rate for planning
redispatch.254 If redispatch costs are
calculated and charged on a systemwide basis rather than for each
constraint on the system, the
transmission provider has no obligation
to perform new calculations to estimate
the redispatch costs for each constraint
on its system. We therefore agree with
Entergy that, in the described situation,
only the average costs for the system for
the month, including the highest and
lowest system average redispatch costs
in an hour for the month, need be
posted.
d. Other Requested Service
Modifications
628. The Commission rejected
requests to adopt other new services or
modifications to existing services
beyond those reforms adopted in Order
No. 890. Among other things, the
Commission declined to require
transmission providers to offer a
dynamic scheduling service for loads
and resources that are located in
different transmission providers’ areas.
The Commission stated that
transmission providers seeking to
provide this or additional new services
may submit an FPA section 205 filing to
propose modifications to their OATT,
which would be considered on a caseby-case basis.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
629. TAPS requests that the
Commission require transmission
providers to include provisions in their
OATTs that would permit a
254 The posting requirement for the newly
instituted negotiated fixed rate pricing option for
planning redispatch is an exception. If a
transmission provider chooses to negotiate a fixed
rate for planning redispatch, it must determine and
report the redispatch costs for providing that
service even though it might not otherwise need to
calculate these costs.
PO 00000
Frm 00078
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
transmission dependent utility with
loads and resources in multiple control
areas to consolidate them into a single
control area via dynamic scheduling.
TAPS states that a control area utility
with remote generation and/or load has
the option to use a pseudo-tie to import
generation into its control area. TAPS
argues that transmission dependent
utilities should have comparable
options priced at the transmission
provider’s cost. TAPS contends that
leaving transmission dependent utilities
in the position of having to negotiate
with the transmission providers for this
option will leave them exposed to
unjust and unreasonable and unduly
discriminatory imbalance pricing. TAPS
also argues that changes to the OATT to
allow for dynamic scheduling should
not disturb already existing dynamic
scheduling agreements that have been
successfully negotiated by transmission
dependent utilities.
Commission Determination
630. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 to not mandate a dynamic
scheduling service in the pro forma
OATT. Dynamic schedules and pseudoties are both services that involve
metering, telemetry, computer software,
hardware, communications, engineering
and administration. Each service is
crafted to meet the unique needs of each
customer, typically requiring the
cooperation and services of at least two
control areas as well as contractorproviders of the components of the
services. Comparability does not require
the transmission provider to undertake
these negotiations on behalf of its
network customers. The unique,
customer-specific nature of these
services are more properly arranged by
negotiation between the relevant parties
rather than standardized in the pro
forma OATT. However, to the extent a
transmission provider currently accepts
telemetered generation schedules for its
native load, the transmission provider
must accept such schedules from its
network customers on a comparable
basis.
631. The Commission is also
concerned that the mandatory costbased provision of pseudo-ties could
allow transmission customers to cherrypick among transmission providers
based on differences in service,
including ancillary service costs, and
could cause insurmountable planning
and reliability problems for
transmission providers. Under a
pseudo-tie, the control area receiving
the new load or generation signal
assumes responsibility for ensuring that
the load is properly balanced moment-
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
to-moment, for planning for the load,
and for providing various other
ancillary services including energy or
generator balancing service. We decline
to impose unlimited planning,
reliability and ancillary service
requirements on transmission providers
by forcing them to accept any load or
generator that seeks to move to their
systems. We are encouraged, however,
by the increased availability of pseudoties and dynamic schedules in the
industry. TAPS and others have been
able to secure dynamic scheduling
agreements on a negotiated basis, and
we do not intend to disrupt those
agreements in this proceeding.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
2. Rollover Rights
632. In Order No. 890, the
Commission revised the rollover
provision in section 2.2 of the pro forma
OATT, which grants an ongoing right to
firm transmission customers to renew or
‘‘rollover’’ their contracts. Under Order
No. 888, transmission customers were
allowed to rollover contracts with a
minimum term of one year, provided
that they provide notification of the
rollover no later than 60 days prior to
expiration of their service agreements.
The Commission concluded that this
provision was no longer just and
reasonable, extending the minimum
term necessary to qualify for a rollover
to five years and the notice deadline to
one year. Thus, a transmission customer
must agree to another five-year contract
term or match any longer term
competing request within one year of
expiration of its five-year service
agreement in order to be eligible for a
subsequent rollover. The Commission
stated that this reform will become
effective for each transmission provider
upon acceptance of the transmission
provider’s compliance filing containing
a coordinated and regional planning
process that satisfies the requirements of
Order No. 890.
633. The Commission declined to
eliminate the requirement that an
existing transmission customer match
competing offers as to term and rate in
order to roll over its service. The
Commission also continued to require
rollover restrictions to be based only on
reasonable forecasts of native load
growth or preexisting contracts that
commence in the future. The
Commission affirmed that any
restrictions on a customer’s rollover
rights must be included in the initial
transmission service agreement.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
a. Five-Year Minimum Contract Term
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
634. APPA, NCEMC, TAPS, and TDU
Systems state a general concern that,
under current market conditions, some
transmission customers may be unable
to obtain power supplies of a term and
firmness required to support a five-year
firm transmission agreement. Each of
these petitioners note that FPA section
217(b)(4) requires the Commission to
exercise its authority ‘‘in a manner that
facilitates the planning and expansion
of transmission facilities to meet the
reasonable needs of load-serving entities
to satisfy [their] service obligations
* * * and enables load-serving entities
to secure firm transmission rights * * *
on a long-term basis for long-term power
supply arrangements made, or planned
to meet such needs.’’ These petitioners
argue that the Commission’s rollover
reforms impede, rather than facilitate,
the ability of LSEs to secure firm
transmission rights on a long-term basis
to meet their service obligations.
635. TDU Systems and NCEMC
suggest that implementation of the fiveyear minimum contract requirement for
obtaining rollover rights be conditioned
on a demonstration that the relevant
generation markets can support fiveyear power supply contracts. TDU
Systems state that the Commission
misinterpreted its initial comments on
this issue as a request to require
transmission providers to engage in the
business of procuring supplies for their
transmission customers. TDU Systems
explain that they only requested that the
Commission determine whether market
conditions are such that transmission
customers themselves may procure fiveyear generation contracts, such as by
using the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index as
a tool for determining the
competitiveness of the relevant
generation markets.
636. TAPS argues that, where
transmission constraints exist, a
customer could be forced to remain with
an incumbent supplier or face the loss
of its rights to continued use of the grid.
NCEMC expresses similar concerns,
arguing that on constrained systems the
rollover reforms significantly increase
the potential for market power abuse.
NCEMC contends that an incumbent
generator can limit an LSE’s access to
rollover rights by simply refusing to
offer five-year power supply contracts.
637. TAPS further argues that these
concerns are not adequately addressed
by other reforms adopted in Order No.
890, as suggested by the Commission.
TAPS contends that many of these
reforms, such as those involving
conditional firm and planning
PO 00000
Frm 00079
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3061
redispatch, redirects, and capacity
reassignment, apply only to point-topoint service, not network service.
TAPS argues that reforms increasing the
accuracy of ATC calculations will not
help if the calculation results in zero
ATC and that coordinated transmission
planning will only help if it results in
actual construction of transmission
expansions. APPA similarly argues that
any benefits from increased
coordination in transmission planning
will take some time to develop.
638. APPA and TAPS contend that
the Commission should condition the
requirement of a five-year minimum
contract term to obtain a rollover right
on allowing customers that enter into
such contracts the flexibility to modify
receipt points and resource designations
as their power supply needs change.
TAPS argues that the Commission
should grant certain clarifications
regarding network customers’ rollover
rights, in recognition of the fact that
such customers pay for the transmission
provider’s whole system. First, TAPS
asks the Commission to make clear that
the customer is not restricted to its
existing supplier by requiring
transmission providers to flexibly
accommodate changed resources so that
network customers have the benefit of
continued use of the transmission
system planned on their behalf and paid
for on a load ratio share basis. Second,
TAPS asks the Commission, at a
minimum, to affirm the existing
requirement that a new resource should
not be rejected as a rollover simply
because it is not identical to the prior
resource, i.e., that a rollover must be
allowed unless there is a ‘‘substantial
change’’ in the direction of flows. Third,
TAPS requests that the Commission
require the transmission provider, at
least until compliance with planningrelated reforms, to accept a network
customer’s timely designated network
resource, even if necessary through
redispatch (with costs shared on a load
ratio basis), unless the transmission
provider can show that the customer’s
supply choice was not reasonably
foreseeable. Alternatively, TAPS argues
that the Commission should require
cost-based sales to the trapped
embedded transmission dependent
utility.
639. TDU Systems state that rollover
rights should be allowed unless there is
a substantial change in power flows and
argues further that transmission
providers should be required to permit
rollover of a network customer’s
resource if the transmission provider
would accord itself rollover of the
resource if it served the transmission
provider’s load. TDU Systems argue that
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3062
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission providers commonly treat
their entire transmission systems as
single sinks and apply redispatch in
order to accommodate rollover of their
own network resources, while at the
same time, they evaluate other users’
rollovers of network resources noncomparably, strictly on the basis of
flows to discrete load centers, without
the benefit of redispatch. TDU Systems
contend that this practice discriminates
against network customers. AMP-Ohio
asks the Commission to clarify that a
network customer is permitted to roll
over a portion of a long-term
reservation.
640. Morgan Stanley argues that the
Commission failed to address its
argument that limiting rollover rights to
customers with firm transmission
contracts of five years in length or more
establishes significant barriers to entry.
Morgan Stanley contends the credit and
collateral requirements to enter into a
five-year commitment are much higher
than those necessary to enter into a oneyear deal and that this higher credit
requirement could limit the variety and
flexibility of the resources available to
serve load. Morgan Stanley also argues
that extending the minimum term to
five years will result in an increase in
transmission costs without any
corresponding benefits to parties trying
to serve load. Morgan Stanley asserts
that transmission customers choosing to
serve load will have to purchase more
capacity than needed, which will make
less capacity available for others and
will increase costs to the loads served.
641. Morgan Stanley also argues that
the change in rollover right policy
discriminates against merchant
generators, like Morgan Stanley, that do
not have load linked to generation.
Morgan Stanley contends that forcing a
merchant generator to purchase longerterm transmission will increase its costs
to build and encourage local utilities to
build their own generation rather than
seek competitive alternatives. Morgan
Stanley repeats arguments that the lack
of firm, long-term transmission
reservations in the California and New
England organized markets belies the
Commission’s findings that contract
certainty is needed in order for
transmission providers to appropriately
plan and construct their systems.
642. Ameren similarly argues that the
Commission failed to consider the effect
on the markets of limiting rollover rights
to contracts with a minimum term of
five years, particularly with regard to
markets in which utilities meet their
energy needs through annual auctions
or requests for proposals. Ameren
contends that a one-year minimum term
should be all that is necessary for a
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
customer to roll over its service, arguing
that current market conditions and the
volatility in fuel prices make it
undesirable for power sellers and power
purchasers alike to enter into longer
contracts. Ameren also questions the
Commission’s argument that rollover
reforms are needed to improve
transmission planning, arguing that the
lack of transmission infrastructure
demonstrates that the prior rollover
policy did not in fact lead to
overbuilding. Ameren asserts that there
will be fewer contracts with rollover
rights under the new policy and, as a
result, planning and reliability will be
harmed because transmission providers
will only have to plan for this more
limited group of contracts. At the same
time, Ameren argues that the viability of
the short-term market will be impaired
because the ability of transmission
customers to continue their service will
be placed in doubt. Ameren contends
that this scenario will be exacerbated in
organized markets where many sales
and purchases occur in short-term or
spot markets. If the Commission
declines to grant rehearing regarding the
five-year minimum term requirement,
Ameren asks the Commission to clarify
that it is eliminating the requirement for
transmission providers to plan their
systems to accommodate transmission
customers with contracts that are
shorter than five years.
643. Williams suggests that the
minimum term for the exercise of
rollover rights should be three years, as
it believes this better balances the
respective rights and obligations of
transmission customers and
transmission providers. Williams argues
that extending the minimum rollover
term will result in less flexibility for
transmission customers to adjust to
changing market conditions and more
harm to competition. Williams provides
an example of a customer receiving nonfirm service due to a redirected
transmission service request, asserting
that the customer would be ‘‘saddled’’
with non-firm service for the duration of
the minimum term, notwithstanding the
fact that prior to the redirect the
customer contracted for firm service.
Although the customer would still
receive the same, non-firm service
under a three-year minimum term, the
shorter term enables the customer to
return to the benefit of its bargain
sooner and better reflects the initial
intent of the parties.
Commission Determination
644. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to limit
rollover rights to contracts with a
minimum term of five years. As the
PO 00000
Frm 00080
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Commission explained in Order No.
890, the prior rollover policy was no
longer just, reasonable, and not unduly
discriminatory because the rights and
obligations of a rollover customer no
longer bore a rational relationship to the
planning and construction obligations
imposed on the transmission provider
by the rollover rights. We continue to
believe that a five-year term will ensure
greater consistency between the rights
and obligations of customers and the
corresponding planning and
construction obligations of transmission
providers. While we appreciate that this
reform will affect the way customers
retain transmission service, other
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 will
mitigate the concerns of shorter-term
customers, in particular the obligation
for transmission providers to adopt an
open, coordinated and transparent
process for planning to meet the
transmission needs of all customers.
645. The Commission takes seriously
the concerns and allegations about the
presence of generation market power
and the lack of availability of long-term
power contracts, and we will continue
to address these issues in other contexts,
in particular our market-based rate
program. The purpose of our reform of
the rollover policy, however, is to align
the rights and obligations of the
customer with those of the transmission
provider, not with the availability of
supplies within a market or particular
commercial practices in a region. A
point-to-point customer need not have a
five-year power contract in order to
secure a five-year transmission service
contract. Similarly, it is the length of a
network customer’s network service
agreement, not the length of the power
contract supporting a network resource
designation, that determines whether
the customer is eligible for rollover.255
Thus, the availability of five-year power
contracts is not determinative of the
ability of transmission customers to
obtain rollover rights.
646. We acknowledge that entering
into longer-term transmission service
agreements might increase risk or
reduce flexibility for some customers,
including merchant generators, as they
manage their power supplies and
transmission contracts. Balanced against
this potentially negative effect, however,
are the many benefits that will flow
from rollover reform. Under the prior
rollover policy, a customer could secure
transmission for one year and effectively
require the transmission provider to
plan and upgrade its system on the
255 See Wisconsin Pub. Power Inc. SYSTEM v.
Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp., 84 FERC ¶ 61,120 at
61,659 (1998) (WPPI).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
assumption the rollover right would be
continually renewed. As the
Commission noted in Order No. 890, it
is inappropriate to require transmission
providers to use finite resources to
finance and construct facilities that may
not be necessary, particularly in light of
the difficulty of siting new
transmission.256 The prior rollover
policy also harmed other transmission
customers by allowing rollover
customers to lock up existing capacity
that could have been used by other
customers. A minimum term of five
years, and not a shorter period such as
three years as suggested by Williams,
best balances the benefits and burdens
associated with our rollover policy.
647. In response to TAPS, we clarify
that we did not intend in Order No. 890
to restrict the rollover right to exactly
the same points of receipt and delivery
as the terminating service, as this would
competitively disadvantage existing
customers seeking new sources of
generation. As the Commission
explained in Order Nos. 888 and 888–
A, ‘‘if the customer chooses a new
power supplier and this substantially
changes the location or direction of the
power flows it imposes on the
transmission provider’s system, the
customer’s right to continue taking
transmission service from its existing
transmission provider may be affected
by transmission constraints associated
with the change.’’ 257 Thus, a
transmission provider must allow a
rollover, even where a transmission
customer changes power suppliers, so
long as there is no substantial change in
the location or direction of the power
flows imposed on the transmission
provider’s system. Moreover, we agree
with TDU Systems that it would be
inappropriate for transmission providers
to treat a network customer’s request for
rollover to accommodate a new
designated network resource differently
than they treat their own new resources
for their own loads. Transmission
providers must permit rollover of a
network resource by another user if it
would accord itself rollover of the
resource if it served the transmission
provider’s load.
648. We do not believe, however, that
it is appropriate to expand the rights of
rollover customers as requested by some
petitioners. We therefore decline to
condition the requirement of a five-year
minimum contract term on allowing
customers signing such agreements
unlimited flexibility to modify their
designated resources and receipt points
256 See
Order No. 890 at P 1233.
Order No. 888–A at 30,198, n.52 (citing
Order No. 888 at 31,665, n.176).
as their power supply needs change
within their five-year transmission
service agreements. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 890, such an
approach is unworkable because it
could result in substantial disruptions
in transmission service to higher queued
customers requesting long-term service
over these paths.258 The fact that
network customers pay a load-ratio
share of system costs does not justify
granting such customers a guaranteed
ability to change their service to other
points without regard to other
competing requests for service that may
be in the queue. Without a limit on
rollover customers’ flexibility to modify
designated resources and receipt points,
neither the transmission provider nor
any other customer in the queue would
ever be able to rely on any study process
for service, as it could be thrown into
disarray by a rollover customer seeking
to change its points. The only way such
a system could work would be if every
transmission provider constructs its
system with sufficient redundancy to
permit any customer to take service
from any resource, which would be both
impractical and uneconomic.
649. We also disagree that our reforms
to rollover policy will harm planning
and reliability, even if it does result in
fewer contracts with rollover rights. As
we note above, shorter-term
transmission customers no longer
eligible for rollover rights will
nonetheless have access to the
coordinated, open, and transparent
transmission planning process required
in Order No. 890, which will help
ensure that transmission providers
adequately and comparably plan for the
transmission needs of all of their
customers whether or not they have
rollover rights. This is one of the
reasons why the Commission
conditioned the effectiveness of the
rollover reforms on its acceptance of a
transmission provider’s Attachment K
planning process in compliance with
the transmission planning principles
adopted in Order No. 890. By extending
the minimum term for rollover rights,
the Commission simply relieved
transmission providers of the obligation
to undertake construction on behalf of
shorter-term customers that may not
ultimately need the facilities.
650. We reject the suggestion that a
five-year minimum is inconsistent with
the requirements of FPA section 217.
Limiting rollover rights to contracts
with a minimum term of five-years
ensures that the rollover right is used by
customers with longer-term obligations
to purchase capacity, benefiting all
257 See
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
258 See
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 1236.
Frm 00081
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3063
longer-term customers by limiting the
ability of shorter-term customers to lock
up capacity they do not intend to use
and facilitating efficient planning and
expansion decisions by the transmission
provider. These benefits are shared by
the entire class of customers to which
section 217 applies.
651. In response to AMP-Ohio, we
clarify that both network customers and
point-to-point customers may roll over a
portion of their service, provided that
they will only obtain a subsequent
rollover right if they agree to another
five-year term, or match any longer term
competing request, for that portion of
capacity.
b. One-Year Notice Provision
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
652. Duke asks the Commission to
further revise the rollover notification
provisions to provide for additional
time for construction of new facilities in
the event project upgrades and lead
times have been identified. Duke argues
that the Commission failed to explain in
Order No. 890 why it is reasonable to
expect on-system LSEs, including the
transmission provider, to coordinate
their resource plans with the lead-time
for new transmission facilities, but it is
not reasonable to expect off-system LSEs
that rely upon point-to-point service to
be subject to the same realities. Because
an LSE that is a network customer on
one system must provide sufficient and
adequate notice for its transmission
provider to accommodate an on-system
designated network resource, Duke
contends that the one-year notification
requirement for rollovers means that the
same LSE need not provide a
neighboring transmission provider the
same level of notice to accommodate a
point-to-point rollover request even if
related to the very same designated
network resource. Duke further argues
that the Commission failed to explain
why the native load protection rationale
that prompted adoption of the initial
five-year eligibility provision should not
apply with equal force to the
notification provision.
653. Duke states that, in its
experience, most LSEs do not wait until
one year before the expiration of their
contract resources to make decisions as
to a replacement resource. In the event
an LSE does choose to wait until one
year before its current supply contract
ends, Duke argues that the LSE’s
decision should not disadvantage native
load and network customers if, as the
Commission recognized, necessary
transmission upgrades cannot be
completed within that one-year period.
Duke contends that modification of the
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3064
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
one-year notice requirement is
necessary to ensure greater consistency
between the rights and obligations of
customers and the corresponding
planning and construction obligations of
transmission providers, the stated goal
of the Commission’s rollover reforms. If
the Commission is unwilling to change
the one-year notice provision, Duke
suggests that the Commission provide
that a rollover customer’s service will be
conditionally firm during the period
prior to the point in time when needed
transmission upgrades can be
completed.
654. Southern expresses a similar
concern, arguing that a customer should
be required to provide notice of its
intent to exercise its rollover rights at
the earlier of one year or the lead-time
for any construction of upgrades
identified by the transmission provider
in the service agreement that are
necessary in order to reliably exercise
the rollover right. Southern contends
that this requirement would be
consistent with the ability of the
transmission provider to place in the
original service agreement limits on the
customer’s ability to exercise rollover
rights and is needed to maintain
reliability and protect the provision of
service to other firm users of the
transmission system, including native
load.
Commission Determination
655. We affirm the decision in Order
No. 890 to require customers to notify
the transmission provider of their intent
to exercise their rollover rights at least
one year before expiration of their
service agreement. We reject requests to
tie the notice period to the construction
lead-times for any upgrades a
transmission provider may believe are
necessary in order to accommodate any
rolled over service along with its other
service obligations. The Commission
recognized in Order No. 890 that the
one-year notice period is shorter than
the typical planning horizon, but
declined to extend the notice period to
a time that coincides with the typical
planning horizon or the time it takes to
construct new facilities.259 The
Commission balanced the circumstances
facing customers in renewing power
supply contracts and the interests of
transmission providers in attempting to
plan their system. We continue to
believe that the one-year notice
provision most appropriately balances
these competing interests.
656. We acknowledge that, in certain
circumstances, the one-year notice
period could cause the transmission
259 See
id. at P 1247.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
provider to undertake construction of
facilities that are not ultimately needed
to accommodate other service
obligations in light of a rollover
customer declining to rollover its
service. However, moving from a 60-day
notice period to one year should
mitigate the risk of unnecessary
investments. While allowing a
transmission provider to require
rollover notification prior to
construction of facilities (whether or not
identified in the original service
agreement), or treating the customer’s
service as conditionally firm while
upgrades are completed, would further
reduce this risk for the transmission
provider, it also would further decrease
flexibility for the transmission
customer. As the Commission explained
in Order No. 890, no single notice
period can perfectly balance the needs
of customers and transmission
providers.260 The Commission
concluded that a one-year notice
provision best balances the respective
benefits and burdens for customers and
transmission providers, and we affirm
that decision here.
c. Matching Competing Requests
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
657. APPA argues that the
Commission’s retention of its matching
policy, requiring transmission
customers to match competing requests
for service as to term and rate, is
inconsistent with FPA section 217(b)(4).
In APPA’s view, section 217(b)(4)
requires the Commission to exercise its
FPA authorities to assist LSEs in
meeting their service obligations by
securing firm transmission rights on a
long-term basis. APPA contends it is
contrary to Congressional intent to
require LSEs that have made long-term
financial commitments to the
transmission system, by entering into
five-year agreements, to bid against all
other interested market participants in
order to roll over their firm transmission
rights.
658. APPA also argues that the
Commission’s decision to lift the price
cap on reassignments of firm
transmission capacity might exacerbate
the situation, as it could mean that LSEs
will have to bid against well-heeled
financial players or marketing affiliates
of the transmission provider that may be
bidding for the same capacity with the
sole intent of reassigning it at whatever
price the market will bear. APPA
contends that this would require LSEs
unable to match the longer term offered
(due, for example, to its inability to
260 See
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
id. at P 1246.
Frm 00082
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
obtain a power supply contract of that
length) to have to obtain firm
transmission capacity in the
reassignment market at a much higher
rate. APPA argues that this, too, is
inconsistent with the Commission’s
obligation under FPA section 217(b)(4)
to enable LSEs with service obligations
to obtain the long-term firm
transmission rights they must have to
meet those needs.
659. APPA adds that the transmission
provider should have been planning for
the needs of firm transmission
customers with contracts that carry
rollover rights throughout the term of
the contract, since the stated purpose of
the rollover reform is to ensure that the
rights and obligations of the customer
are better aligned with the planning and
construction obligations of the
transmission provider. APPA argues
that capacity should therefore be
available to meet the needs of firm
transmission customers seeking to
exercise their rollover rights without
forcing them to ‘‘bid on the margin’’ for
transmission capacity every time their
contracts come up for renewal.
660. TAPS proposes what it
characterizes as safeguards to prevent
network customers exercising rollover
rights from being significantly
disadvantaged by the obligation to
match point-to-point reservations. TAPS
contends that a point-to-point customer,
faced with a competing longer-term
reservation, can simply extend the term
of its point-to-point commitment to
match the competing request. If the
matching process applies to network
service designations under a network
service agreement (versus the service
agreement itself), TAPS contends that
the network customer would need to
extend its power supply commitment in
order to extend its transmission
reservation to match the competing
request and would not be able to resell
any transmission capacity for which it
could not find supplies. TAPS argues
that this fails to recognize and preserve
the LSE’s continuing rights under FPA
section 217(b)(1) to (3) to use their
existing firm transmission rights,
including rollover rights, and that it is
inconsistent with section 217(b)(4) for
the Commission to leave transmissiondependent LSEs at risk of denial of
continued use of transmission to meet
their service obligations.
661. TAPS therefore suggests that the
Commission implement matching based
on the duration of a network customer’s
network service agreement rather than
its resource designation. Alternatively,
if the Commission concludes that the
network customer must extend its
resource commitment (rather than just
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
its network agreement duration) to
match a competing request, TAPS
proposes the following modifications to
the process so that the network
customer is on a level playing field with
competing point-to-point customers in
the matching process: restrict
reservations qualified to compete
against a network customer’s reservation
to customers with long-term power
contracts (even if they seek only pointto-point reservations); and provide a
cut-off for competing requests that
accommodates the network customer’s
need to extend power supply
arrangements in order to match
competing requests. TAPS suggests, for
example, that the network customer
should only need to compete with
requests submitted at least three months
prior to when the network customer
exercises its rollover right, which would
allow the network customer to structure
its power supply commitments with
some degree of advanced knowledge of
the competing requests. TAPS also
suggests that such a rolling cut-off (i.e.,
one tied to the network customer’s
rollover notice) be adopted to encourage
early exercise of rollover rights, thereby
benefiting the planning process.
662. TDU Systems suggest that the
Commission cap the matching term
required to secure rollover rights to five
years, arguing that a customer agreeing
to pay the maximum rate allowed under
the tariff for a five-year term should be
assured that it will retain its rollover
rights. TDU Systems contend that the
increase in the minimum term from one
year to five years has mitigated the need
for an unlimited matching requirement
by providing the transmission provider
greater certainty in planning its system.
TDU Systems also contend that
transmission providers will not be
financially harmed by capping the
matching requirement at five years since
competing rollover customers would be
subject to price-matching as well.
Finally, TDU Systems argue that the
‘‘longer of’’ matching policy is unduly
discriminatory when applied to requests
from transmission providers in
particular, since they are able to request
transmission service for unreasonable
terms that no transmission customer
could prudently match.
663. Ameren and Powerex propose
other modifications to the matching
process. Ameren proposes that
customers be required to provide notice
of a rollover within 15 days of a preconfirmed competing request to prevent
the customer from sitting on capacity
until the end of its notice period.
Powerex makes a related request to
restrict the matching requirement to
bona fide competing commitments to
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
take such service, such as by requiring
competing requests to be pre-confirmed
or requiring the execution of contingent
service contracts. Powerex contends
that, without such a restriction, a
customer wishing to roll over its service
could be required to match requests in
the queue for a longer duration that
ultimately may not come to fruition.
Powerex also asks that the Commission
clarify that, in cases where a long-term
customer that has exercised its rollover
right is ‘‘trumped’’ by a longer-duration
competing request for a lesser quantity,
the rollover of the original request
should be displaced only by the
quantity needed to fulfill the longerterm, lesser MW request. Powerex
argues that no commenter opposed this
proposal and that the Commission did
not provide any rational basis for its
rejection in Order No. 890.
Commission Determination
664. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 not to
eliminate the requirement to match
competing requests in order to retain
rollover rights. Long-standing policy
requires transmission customers, at the
time of rollover of their contracts, to
match competing requests for service as
to term and rate. We disagree with
petitioners who claim that the
requirement of a five-year minimum
contract term, or the terms of FPA
section 217, necessitate any change to
our matching policy. The same rationale
for the matching policy articulated in
Order No. 888 and its progeny with
regard to the original rollover right
applies with equal force to the reformed
rollover right. That is, the matching
policy provides a mechanism not only
for awarding capacity to those who
value it most, but also for breaking
ties.261 We do not see how a change to
a five-year minimum contract term
diminishes the need for, or the efficacy
of, such a mechanism.
665. As we noted in Order No. 890,
absent the requirement that a customer
match the term of a competing request,
transmission providers could be forced
to enter into shorter-term arrangements
that could be detrimental from both an
operational standpoint, including
system planning, and a financial
standpoint.262 While it is true that the
extension of the minimum rollover term
from one to five years will otherwise
enhance the transmission provider’s
ability to fulfill its planning and
construction obligations, it does not
follow that the transmission provider
should be required to forgo the
operational and financial certainty of an
even longer-term competing request at
the time of a rollover. By awarding
capacity to the customers that value it
the most, the matching requirement
benefits all longer-term customers,
whether LSEs or other classes of
customers, and is therefore fully
consistent with the requirements of FPA
section 217.
666. We reiterate our existing policy
that, in the event of competing,
mutually exclusive requests for network
resource designations, the network
customer seeking rollover must match
the term of the competing network
resource power contract.263 However,
we agree with TAPS that, given the
differing nature and obligations of
network service versus point-to-point
service, a network customer seeking
rollover of its network service for a
designated resource should be able to
match a competing point-to-point
request by extending its network service
agreement rather than the power
contract supporting the network
resource designation.264 We also clarify,
in response to Powerex, that a customer
exercising a rollover right is only
required to match a bona fide competing
commitment to take service, evidenced
for example by a pre-confirmed
transmission request or the execution of
a contingent service contract. We
disagree with Ameren, however, that the
transmission provider should be
permitted to effectively shorten the
customer’s notice period by requiring
the rollover customer to match a
competing request prior to the date by
which its rollover notice would
otherwise be required.
667. With these clarifications, we
continue to believe that it is not
unreasonable to require network
customers to match competing requests
for their capacity, even if made by
marketers in order to engage in resales
of capacity or by the transmission
provider itself. Matching ensures that
the customers that value the capacity
the most are awarded the capacity. In
any event, we believe it unlikely that a
network customer would be routinely
faced with viable competing requests
from a point-to-point customer seeking
service at the time of the rollover
because of the significant differences
between network transmission service
(under which loads and resources are
designated, but not specific points of
263 See
WPPI 84 FERC at 61,655–56.
subsequent request to designate a
network resource would remain subject to the
requirements of the pro forma OATT, as with any
other request to designate a network resource.
264 Any
261 See
Order No. 888–A at 30,197.
Order No. 890 at P 1255 (citing Order No.
888–A at 30,197).
262 See
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3065
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3066
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
receipt and delivery) and point-to-point
service (under which such points are
required to be designated).
668. We disagree with APPA’s
suggestion that rollover customers
should be relieved of having to match
competing requests because the
transmission provider is planning and
upgrading its system on the assumption
that the rollover customer will continue
service. The matching requirement only
arises if there are competing requests,
i.e., notwithstanding any upgrades
constructed or planned, capacity will
not be available to serve both the
rollover customer and the competing
customer. If there is a bona fide request
from a competing longer-term customer,
it is reasonable to expect the rollover
customer to match the request in order
to ensure that capacity is awarded to the
customer that values it the most.
669. Finally, we further clarify in
response to Powerex that, in cases
where a rollover customer loses service
to a longer-duration competing request
for a lesser quantity, the rollover of the
original request should only be
displaced by the quantity needed to
fulfill the longer-term request for a
lesser quantity. In such instances, the
transmission provider should grant
service to the competing customer and
reduce the amount of capacity available
for roll over by the original customer
accordingly.
d. Rollover Restrictions Based on Native
and Network Load Growth
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
670. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to eliminate the ability of
transmission providers to restrict other
LSEs’ rollover rights based on forecasts
of the transmission provider’s retail and
wholesale native load growth. TDU
Systems argue that extending the
minimum term to qualify for rollover
rights effectively provides the
transmission provider five years of
notice that it will need to construct
transmission upgrades to serve its native
load growth. Thus, TDU Systems
contend, there is no justification for that
transmission provider to fail to build to
meet its service obligation within this
period. TDU Systems further contend
that permitting a transmission provider
to avoid its obligation to build for its
known native load growth by curtailing
an LSE customer’s rollover rights gives
an undue preference to the transmission
provider’s native load and violates the
Commission’s comparability principle.
TDU Systems argue this also violates
FPA section 217(b), which it contends
does not distinguish between the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
transmission provider’s native load and
the native load of other LSEs.
671. If the Commission does not
eliminate the ability of the transmission
provider to restrict rollover rights based
on its own forecasted load growth, TDU
Systems ask, at a minimum, that the
Commission require transmission
providers to treat the load growth of
other LSEs with native load service
obligations in the same manner as the
transmission provider’s own native load
growth. NRECA makes a similar request,
arguing that comparability requirements
and FPA section 217 should place the
service obligations of all LSEs on an
equal footing. NRECA asks the
Commission to confirm that a
transmission customer using rollover
rights to serve native load enjoys the
same priority as a transmission provider
serving its own retail native load and
will be factored into any native load
growth forecasts.
672. By contrast, South Carolina E&G
and South Carolina Regulatory Staff
argue that the Commission should
expand the ability of transmission
providers to restrict rollover rights.
South Carolina Regulatory Staff asks the
Commission to ensure that native load
growth is not marginalized by new nonnative customers. The South Carolina
Regulatory Staff expresses concern that
native load service may be forced to
yield to other service if the transmission
provider’s native load forecasts turn out
to be wrong. South Carolina E&G agrees,
arguing that limiting the ability of
transmission providers to restrict
rollover rights only in the initial service
agreement puts service to native load at
an unreasonable risk. South Carolina
E&G requests that transmission
providers be allowed to add rollover
restrictions at the time of each rollover
(rather than only at the initiation of
service) to reflect changes in load
growth forecasts.
673. Alternatively, South Carolina
E&G suggests that the Commission
provide for a procedure that would
allow the transmission provider to
terminate rollover rights when new
facility construction is required during
system planning, i.e., at any point the
transmission provider determines that a
new facility is necessary to
accommodate a new request or
projected native load growth, given the
possibility of full rollover by eligible
customers. South Carolina E&G
proposes that transmission providers be
required to promptly give notice of that
determination, which would trigger a
limited period of time (e.g., 30 days) for
each long-term customer to indicate
whether it desires to rollover its current
contract for another designated period
PO 00000
Frm 00084
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
of time. Absent such election by the
customer within the designated time,
South Carolina E&G proposes that the
customer’s rollover rights be terminated.
South Carolina E&G argues that this
proposal would provide at least partial
protection against the inequitable
prospect of being forced to construct
facilities that would be needed in the
event of full rollover of service, only to
be left ‘‘high and dry’’ by a customer’s
failure to exercise its rollover rights.
South Carolina E&G argues its
alternative proposal would ensure that
native load does not subsidize the
customer seeking rollover.
674. If the Commission declines to
modify its rollover policies, South
Carolina E&G suggests the adoption of a
native load curtailment priority to
ensure that continued service to the
rollover candidate does not impinge on
native load service. Specifically, South
Carolina E&G states that point-to-point
customers could receive rollover rights,
but if curtailment is required, then that
rollover contract (like all other point-topoint contracts) would be curtailed
before native load. South Carolina E&G
also asks the Commission to provide
greater specificity regarding the
meaning of the statement in Order No.
890 that, in forecasting native load
growth, consideration should be given
to state-approved integrated resource
plans that show a native load need for
the capacity. South Carolina E&G asks
the Commission to specify whether such
a plan would be a determining factor in
the Commission’s evaluation of a
transmission provider’s native load
growth forecast, how much weight the
Commission would place on the
existence of such a plan, and whether
the plan would need to incorporate
specific elements.
Commission Determination
675. The Commission continues to
believe it is appropriate to require that
rollover restrictions be based on
reasonable forecasts of native load
growth or preexisting contracts that
commence in the future and that such
restrictions be included in the initial
transmission service agreement. As
explained in Order No. 890, this will
remain the only appropriate way to
restrict a rollover right.265 We are not
persuaded by petitioners’ arguments
that the requirement of a five-year
minimum contract term, or the native
load protections found in FPA section
217, necessitates any change to this
policy. The same rationale for this
policy articulated in Order No. 888 and
its progeny with regard to the original
265 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 1256.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
rollover right applies with equal force to
the reformed rollover right.266
676. We disagree with TDU Systems
that extending the minimum term to
five years justifies eliminating the
ability of the transmission provider to
restrict a customer’s rollover right. The
transmission provider is allowed to
restrict a rollover right in favor of its
reasonably forecasted native load
growth in order to ensure that capacity
that exists on the provider’s system, at
the time of entering into a contract with
a customer seeking a rollover right, can
be recalled for the use of its reasonably
forecasted native load growth at some
time in the future. Our longstanding
policy, which was not changed by Order
No. 890, permits transmission providers
to reserve existing capacity for the use
of its reasonably forecasted native load
growth.
677. Arguments that the transmission
provider has more time to plan for
upgrades to meet its native load growth
because of the new five-year minimum
contract term miss the point. A
transmission provider should not be
forced to allow rollover where, at the
time of entering into a five-year
transmission contract with a customer
for existing capacity, it can show that it
will need to reclaim that capacity to
serve its reasonably forecasted native
load growth. Customers that are denied
rollover rights may nonetheless secure
transmission service by submitting
service requests for the period in
question and committing to fund any
necessary upgrades.
678. Alternatively, TDU Systems and
NRECA ask the Commission to require
transmission providers to treat the load
growth of other LSEs with native load
service obligations in the same manner
as the transmission provider’s own
native load growth during forecasting.
This is already our policy. In Order No.
888-B, the Commission, in addressing a
transmission provider’s ability to recall
capacity needed for native load growth,
clarified that ‘‘network transmission
customers are afforded the same
treatment as the transmission provider
on behalf of native load (retail and
wholesale requirements customers) in
terms of the reservation of existing
transmission capacity by the
transmission provider.’’ 267 This ensures
that the LSE’s native load is treated the
same as the transmission provider’s
native load at the time a rollover
restriction is considered.
679. We reject the argument of South
Carolina E&G and South Carolina
266 See Order No. 888 at 31,694; Order No. 888–
A at 30,198.
267 See Order No. 888–B at 62,084–85.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Regulatory Staff that the Commission
should expand the ability of
transmission providers to restrict
rollover rights by, for example, allowing
rollover restrictions to be added at the
time of each rollover (rather than only
at the initiation of service) or when the
need for new facilities arises. We
continue to believe that requiring
transmission providers to determine at
the initiation of service whether they
have a reasonably forecasted native load
growth need for the capacity strikes a
reasonable balance between the
transmission provider’s needs and those
of its customers seeking long-term
transmission service with a rollover
right.268 If we were to allow the
transmission provider the ability to seek
to restrict a rollover at the time of each
rollover, as suggested by South Carolina
E&G, it would vitiate the benefit of the
rollover right to transmission customers,
many of which also have load-serving
obligations. We note, however, that
South Carolina E&G’s concerns should
be mitigated going forward since our
requirement of a five-year minimum
contract term, as well as the one-year
notice period and the other rollover
reforms, will ensure greater consistency
between the rights and obligations of
customers and the planning and
construction obligations of transmission
providers.
680. We also decline to adopt South
Carolina E&G’s suggestion that point-topoint customers with rollover rights be
curtailed before native load. The
Commission has long required that firm
point-to-point customers share the same
curtailment priority as network
customers and the transmission
provider serving native load except in
the limited circumstance when it would
require the shedding of bundled retail
load.269 Nothing in our changes to
rollover policies justifies modifying that
requirement. We also decline to
determine generically the weight to be
given to state-approved integrated
resource plans in the determination of
reasonable native load restrictions. The
determinative factors in each case will
be identified based on the record, along
268 In addition, we believe that putting the onus
on the transmission provider to determine the
limitations of its system and its own native load
growth needs at the time of the initial service
agreement appropriately allocates responsibility
and encourages accuracy. Allowing transmission
providers the ability to reevaluate their native load
growth needs on an ongoing basis, or to escape
obligations to serve rollover customers when
upgrades are identified, would tend to discourage
a thorough review upfront.
269 See Northern States Power Co., 89 FERC
¶ 61,178 (1999).
PO 00000
Frm 00085
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3067
with the relevant particular supporting
documentation to be considered.
e. Effectiveness Upon Acceptance of
Coordinated and Regional Planning
Process
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
681. Duke argues that the rollover
reforms should be implemented
immediately and not upon acceptance
of the transmission provider’s planning
process compliance filing. Duke
contends that the Commission
unambiguously found that the prior
rollover policy was no longer just and
reasonable and not unduly
discriminatory. Duke also argues that
the prior rollover policy is inconsistent
with FPA section 217, suggesting that
the prior policy conflicts with the
reasonable needs of LSEs to satisfy their
service obligations. Duke therefore
argues that it is not reasonable for the
Commission to allow its prior rollover
policies to remain in place pending
acceptance of the transmission planning
process compliance filings. Duke
contends that the Commission did not
base its finding that rollover policies
were in need of reform on the lack of
transmission planning processes and,
therefore, making one conditioned on
the other is unsupported.
682. TAPS requests clarification of the
timing of compliance filings
implementing the new rollover policies.
TAPS questions whether transmission
providers were required to submit
conforming changes to section 2.2 in
their initial compliance filings or as part
of the Attachment K compliance filings
due at a later date. If the former, TAPS
states that transmission providers would
be deleting the current language that
will still be in effect. TAPS suggests that
changes to section 2.2 not be made until
the Attachment K is accepted.
Commission Determination
683. The Commission denies
rehearing of the determination to tie the
effectiveness of rollover reform to the
acceptance of the transmission
provider’s coordinated and regional
planning process required under Order
No. 890. As the Commission explained
in Order No. 890, reforms regarding
rollovers and transmission planning
must proceed together because they are
closely related. Under our longstanding
policy, transmission service eligible for
a rollover right must be set aside for
rollover customers and included in
transmission planning. Duke is therefore
incorrect in suggesting that the
Commission did not rely on our
planning-related reforms when
fashioning a remedy to ensure rollover
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3068
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
policies remain just and reasonable and
not unduly discriminatory.
684. With regard to TAPS’ concern
regarding the timing of compliance
filings implementing the new rollover
policies, we reiterate that the previously
existing rollover provisions will remain
in effect for the transmission provider
until such time as the Commission
accepts the transmission provider’s
Attachment K compliance filing.
Accordingly, it is only after a
transmission provider’s Attachment K
planning process is accepted by the
Commission that the transmission
provider should file the rollover reform
language, and the effective date of that
language should be commensurate with
the date of that filing. We have revised
section 2.2 of the pro forma OATT to
make this clear.
f. Transition Issues
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
685. Great Northern seeks
clarification, or in the alternative
rehearing, regarding how rollover
reform would apply to transmission
service requests that were made before
the issuance of Order No. 890 in
reliance on the prior version of section
2.2 of the pro forma OATT. If Order No.
890 is implemented in such a way as to
require a minimum five-year contract
term in order for rollover rights to attach
to pending transmission service
requests, Great Northern contends it
would cause significant disruption in
the development and financing of
competitive generation projects already
in the queue. Great Northern suggests
that requiring pending projects to
submit new contracts for five-year terms
in order to obtain rollover rights in turn
would require it to restart its project
planning process for each of those
projects.
686. Great Northern therefore asks the
Commission to confirm that the current
one-year contract commitment right of
first refusal rule will continue to apply
to transmission service requests that
were made prior to the issuance of
Order No. 890 and that the five-year
contract commitment right of first
refusal rule will not apply until the first
rollover date after both the executed
transmission service contract and
revised section 2.2 of the transmission
provider’s pro forma OATT have
become effective. If the Commission is
not inclined to make such a generalized
determination in this proceeding, Great
Northern requests the Commission to
rule that, in the specific circumstances
where a customer has requested
transmission service for one year with
rollover rights as described in section
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
2.2 of the OATT, and thus the
transmission provider was on notice of
the potential need to exercise rollover
rights, it will allow rollover rights to
apply until the first rollover date after
both the executed transmission service
contract and revised section 2.2 of the
transmission provider’s OATT have
become effective.
687. NCEMC, NRECA, and TDU
Systems request that the Commission
clarify that a transmission customer will
be permitted to rollover an existing
contract one time at the current terms
and conditions following the effective
date of Order No. 890, as this would
avoid any impairment of the contracts
entered into by parties prior to the
Commission’s change in rollover rights
policy, consistent with Mobile-Sierra
requirements.270 By granting one
rollover with the same terms and
conditions following the effective date
of Order No. 890, these petitioners
assert that the Commission will permit
the parties to fulfill all obligations under
their previously-negotiated transmission
contracts and then, following this
rollover, enter into new transmission
and power supply contracts with full
knowledge of the Commission’s new
rollover policy. They contend that
certain preamble language could be
understood to permit a customer to
rollover a contract one time at the
currently-effective terms and conditions
following the effectiveness of the
rollover reforms,271 whereas reformed
section 2.2 suggests that the five-year
term requirement and notice provision
will become effective on the first
rollover following effectiveness of the
rollover reforms.272
688. TAPS contends that there could
be confusion stemming from the
language in the Order No. 890 version
of section 2.2, which states that the
‘‘five-year/one-year requirement’’ will
apply ‘‘on the first rollover date’’ after
Attachment K is accepted. TAPS
believes this language could be read to
require that a customer’s first rollover
after the effective date of Attachment K
must be exercised one year prior to the
270 Citing United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas
Services Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956); Federal Power
Commission v. Sierra Pacific Power Co., 350 U.S.
348 (1956).
271 Citing Order No. 890 at P 1238 (‘‘existing
transmission contracts will be permitted to roll over
under their existing terms until the first such
rollover opportunity following the effectiveness of
the reforms required by this Final Rule.’’).
272 Citing reformed section 2.2 (‘‘[s]ervice
agreements subject to a right of first refusal entered
into prior to [the acceptance by the Commission of
the Transmission Provider’s Attachment K], unless
terminated, will become subject to the five-year/
one-year requirement on the first rollover date after
[the acceptance by the Commission of the
Transmission Provider’s Attachment K].’’).
PO 00000
Frm 00086
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
end of the existing service agreement,
which is at odds with the Commission’s
recognition that some contracts may not
have a year left on them and therefore
the 60-day notice should apply to such
contracts.273 TAPS suggests specific
amendments to section 2.2 of the pro
forma OATT to more clearly state the
process for rolling over service during
the transition period.
689. Powerex also asks that section
2.2 be amended to more clearly state the
Commission’s rollover policies, arguing
that discriminatory and anticompetitive
practices are more likely to occur in
areas where the transmission provider
retains discretion. Powerex suggests that
the Commission clarify that customers
with existing long-term contracts with
rollover rights must only provide 60days prior notice of their desire to roll
over their capacity and that the rollover
may be for a one-year term with no
rollover rights or a five-year term with
rollover rights. TransServ, however,
argues that the modified notice
requirements of section 2.2 should
apply only to existing long-term
agreements set to expire within one or
two years of the effective date of the
new five-year/one-year long-term
service requirements. TranServ argues
that allowing existing customers with
longer-term contracts to retain a 60-day
notice provision for many years into the
future would unnecessarily complicate
and delay the transmission provider’s
ultimate conversion of all existing
service agreements to comply with the
new five-year/one-year provisions for
long-term firm service.
690. Ameren and Tenaska ask the
Commission to clarify that notice of a
rollover given prior to the effectiveness
of rollover reform would remain subject
to the pre-Order No. 890 rollover
polices, including the existing
customer’s willingness to accept a term
of one year (or the term offered by a
competing applicant, if longer).
Commission Determination
691. We agree with Great Northern
that requiring a five-year minimum
contract term in order for rollover rights
to attach to pending transmission
service requests could cause significant
disruption to those transmission
customers already in the transmission
queue at the time of the effective date
of Order No. 890. These customers
requested service believing that they
only needed to enter into a one-year
contract in order to obtain a rollover
right. Accordingly, we grant rehearing
and revise section 2.2 of the pro forma
OATT to provide that the current one273 Citing
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 1267.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
year contract commitment requirement
will continue to apply to all
transmission service requests that were
in a transmission provider’s
transmission queue as of the effective
date of the reforms adopted in Order No.
890 (i.e., July 13, 2007). For such
transmission requests, the five-year
contract commitment requirement will
not apply until the first rollover date
after both the execution of the
transmission service contract and
effectiveness of the revised section 2.2
for the particular transmission provider.
692. We disagree with other
petitioners, however, that a
transmission customer should be
permitted to roll over any other existing
contracts one time at the current terms
and conditions following the effective
date of the rollover reforms. As we
explained in Order No. 890, ‘‘[i]t is only
a rollover contract entered into or
renewed after the effectiveness of
rollover reform that must comply with
the new rollover provisions.’’ 274 While
it is true that the customer rolling over
service after the effectiveness of the
reforms will be required to agree to a
minimum five-year term to obtain
rollover rights for the new agreement,
this does not impair the customer’s
rights or obligations under its existing
contract.
693. To the extent there is any
confusion regarding the discussion in
Order No. 890 of when the rollover
reforms apply to existing customers, we
clarify that an existing customer must
comply with the new rollover reforms at
the time of the first rollover of its
contract occurring after the effectiveness
of the rollover reforms for its
transmission provider, as provided in
the revisions to section 2.2 of the pro
forma OATT. For example, if an existing
customer’s contract expires January 1,
2009, and rollover reform became
effective on January 1, 2008 for its
transmission provider, then any contract
entered into by the customer at the time
of expiration of its existing contract on
January 1, 2009 would have to comply
with the rollover reforms (e.g., the new
contract must be for a minimum term of
five years to retain a rollover right and,
if so, one-year notice must be given to
exercise that right at the expiration of
the contract).
694. In response to TAPS and
Powerex, we reiterate that a
transmission customer with an existing
contract that seeks to exercise its
rollover after the effectiveness of
rollover reform may exercise this
rollover based on the existing 60-day
notice rule, in recognition of the fact
274 See
id.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
that during this transition period certain
customers may not have a year or more
left on their existing contracts.275 We
agree, however, with TranServ that
allowing existing customers with
longer-term contracts to retain a 60-day
notice period provision for many years
in the future would unnecessarily
complicate and delay the transition to
rollover reform. Allowing existing
customers to utilize the 60-day notice
rule was intended largely to address the
situation where a given customer does
not have a year or more left on its
contract such that it is possible to give
one-year notice. This, of course, is not
the case with existing contracts that
have many years left in their terms
before expiration.
695. We therefore clarify that the
current 60-day notice rule will continue
to apply only to those existing contracts
that have less than five years left in their
terms at the time of effectiveness of
rollover reform for its transmission
provider. Any customer with an existing
contract with five or more years left in
its term at the time of effectiveness of
rollover reform for its transmission
provider will be required to give oneyear notice of whether it intends to
exercise its rollover right. We emphasize
that, whether an existing transmission
customer is required to give 60-days or
one-year notice when exercising its
rollover right under its existing contract,
the customer must enter into a
minimum of five years of service and
meet any of the other requirements of
the reformed rollover right in order to
retain a rollover right going forward. An
existing customer may rollover its
service for a term of less than five years,
but will not then retain a rollover right
for this service. We revise section 2.2 of
the pro forma OATT to make these
requirements clear.
696. In response to Ameren and
Tenaska, we reiterate that notice of a
rollover given prior to the effectiveness
of rollover reform remains subject to the
pre-Order No. 890 rollover policies,
including the existing customer’s
willingness to accept a term of one year
(or the term offered by a competing
applicant, if longer).276
3. Modification of Receipt or Delivery
Points
697. Pursuant to Section 22 of the pro
forma OATT, a transmission customer
taking firm point-to-point service may
modify its receipt and delivery points,
275 See
id.
276 See id. at P 1238 (‘‘existing transmission
contracts will be permitted to roll over under their
existing terms until the first such rollover
opportunity following the effectiveness of the
reforms required by this Final Rule.’’).
PO 00000
Frm 00087
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3069
i.e., redirect its service, on either a nonfirm or firm basis. In Order No. 676, the
Commission adopted the ‘‘Standards for
Business Practices and Communication
Protocols for Public Utilities’’ developed
by the NAESB’s Wholesale Electric
Quadrant (WEQ).277 The WEQ standards
include standards addressing
requirements for redirects on both a firm
and non-firm basis, all of which were
incorporated by reference into the
Commission’s regulations except for
WEQ Standard 001–9.7, which
addressed the impact of redirects on the
rollover rights of a long-term
transmission customer. Order No. 676
directed the WEQ to reconsider WEQ
Standard 001–9.7 and develop a revised
standard consistent with Commission
policy.
698. In Order No. 890, the
Commission affirmed reliance on the
NAESB process to develop business
practices implementing the
Commission’s redirect policy. The
Commission also determined that the
reforms adopted in Order No. 676, in
combination with the OATT-related
reforms adopted in this proceeding,
were adequate to ensure that
transmission providers do not engage in
undue discrimination when a customer
seeks to modify its receipt and delivery
points on a firm basis. With respect to
the effect of redirects on rollover rights,
the Commission affirmed its policy
allowing a redirect of firm, long-term
service to retain rollover rights, even if
the redirect is requested for a shorter
period. The Commission concluded that
a transmission customer should not
have to choose between maintaining its
rollover rights and redirecting on a firm
basis. The Commission noted, however,
that any change to a delivery point
would be treated as a new request for
service for purposes of determining
availability of capacity. As a result, a
redirect right does not grant the
customer access to system capacity or
queue position different from other
customers submitting new requests for
service. The Commission also provided
guidance regarding the processing of,
and pricing for, redirected service.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
699. MISO seeks rehearing of the
Commission’s decision to allow rollover
rights to follow the redirected service,
asking that rollover rights be limited or
eliminated altogether in the event of a
277 Standards for Business Practices and
Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, Order
No. 676, 71 FR 26199 (May 4, 2006), FERC Stats.
& Regs. ¶ 31,216 (2006), reh’g denied, Order No.
676–A, 116 FERC ¶ 61,255 (2006), order on reh’g,
Order No. 676–B, 72 FR 21095 (Apr. 30, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,246 (2007).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3070
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
redirect. MISO argues that the
Commission’s statement that it was
simply continuing its existing rollover
policy is confusing since the
Commission found that the current
rollover policy was no longer just and
reasonable. MISO also contends that the
precedent cited by the Commission does
not support migration of rollover rights
to a redirected path. Even if the rollover
policy were justified under the
Commission’s precedent, MISO argues
that the Commission’s finding that the
policy is no longer just and reasonable
undermines continued reliance on that
precedent.
700. If the Commission decides to
maintain rollover rights for redirects,
MISO proposes the following
limitations and requests the
Commission to direct NAESB to draft its
business practices accordingly. First,
MISO suggests that the primary path
agreement should have a term of at least
five years for any rollover rights to
attach. Second, MISO requests that any
redirect must be for firm service for one
year or longer. If the redirect is for a
shorter period, MISO contends that the
rollover rights should remain with the
original path. Third, MISO requests
redirected service to terminate on the
same date as the parent service so as to
maintain the timing for execution of
rollover rights. Finally, MISO suggests
that in order to execute a rollover right
the redirected service must be requested
and granted prior to the one-year
deadline for the customer to request
rollovers along the original path.
701. Bonneville requests a similar
clarification of the application of
rollover rights to redirects. Bonneville
argues that a literal reading of the
revised pro forma OATT allows a longterm point-to-point customer to request
redirected service within the last year of
its service contract, maintain its rollover
rights, and apply them to the new points
even though it is unable to give a year’s
notice of intent to rollover at those
points. Bonneville therefore seeks
clarification from the Commission that
rollover rights will remain with the
original points unless the customer
redirects service for at least one year.
Without clarification, Bonneville
contends that redirecting customers will
have greater rights than customers that
do not redirect, who must give oneyear’s notice.
702. TranServ also requests
clarification regarding the requirement
for the rollover right to follow the
redirect, regardless of the duration of
the redirect. TranServ questions
whether a redirect of a long-term firm
service reservation for one day qualifies
that customer for rollover rights on the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
redirected service points. TranServ
suggests that the Commission instead
restrict rollover rights on redirected
service points to redirects of five years
or longer and further require that the
redirect be co-terminus with the original
request being redirected. TranServ
argues that more guidance regarding
implementation of the rollover and
redirect policies will facilitate the
NAESB standards development process.
703. MidAmerican requests
clarification regarding the queuing of
service requests as applied to redirects.
MidAmerican argues that a request to
redirect service should not result in a
release of transfer capability for thirdparty service requests in the queue,
since the increase in transfer capability
is contingent upon the approval of the
redirect request. MidAmerican argues
that this approach is consistent with the
requirement in section 17 of the pro
forma OATT to use the ‘‘same system
assumptions and analysis applicable to
any other new request for service,
including whether sufficient ATC
exists,’’ when analyzing the ability to
grant a request for redirected service.
Commission Determination
704. The Commission denies
petitioners’ requests to amend the rights
of rollover customers to redirect their
service. Under section 22.2 of the pro
forma OATT, a request for a firm
redirect must be treated like a request
for new transmission service.278 As a
new request for service, each redirect
request is subject to the availability of
capacity and subject to the possibility
that the transmission provider may not
be able to provide rollover rights on the
new redirected path. The transmission
provider is required to offer rollover
rights to a customer requesting a firm
redirect only if rollover rights are
available on the redirected path, i.e., to
the extent not restricted based on
reasonable forecasts of native load
growth or preexisting contracts that
commence in the future.279
705. As the Commission explained in
Order No. 890, rollover rights follow the
redirect regardless of the duration of the
redirect.280 A transmission customer
making a firm redirect request does not
convert its original long-term firm
transmission service agreement into two
short-term service agreements, nor does
it lose its rollover rights under its longterm firm transmission service
agreement.281 At the same time, a
278 See
Order No. 890 at P 1268.
Order No. 676 at P 51.
280 Order No. 890 at P 1280.
281 Id.; see also Commonwealth Edison Co., 95
FERC ¶ 61,027 at 61,083 (2001) (explaining that a
279 See
PO 00000
Frm 00088
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
customer can exercise its rollover right
only at the end of the contract. Thus, if
a customer with rollover rights chooses
to redirect its capacity for less than the
full remaining term of the contract,
absent some further request to redirect,
the original path will automatically be
reinstated and rollover rights would
remain on only the original path. By
contrast, if the customer chooses to
redirect its capacity until the end of its
contract, the customer would have
rollover rights along only the redirected
path, and only to the extent not
restricted based on native load growth
or future contracts along the redirected
path.
706. We therefore reject requests to
restrict rollover rights to longer-term
redirects. A long-term transmission
customer may request multiple,
successive redirects for firm service.
This discretion is limited by the fact
that each successive request is treated as
a new request for service in accordance
with section 17 of the pro forma OATT.
Each request is therefore subject to the
availability of capacity and subject to
the possibility that the transmission
provider may not be able to provide
rollover rights on the new, redirected
path.282 If the customer has not been
granted rollover rights for a redirect that
extends to the end of its contract, the
redirected service will terminate on the
same date as the parent service.
707. We also reiterate that a customer
cannot exercise any rollover rights
unless it first has provided the
appropriate notice to the transmission
provider. If a customer requests and is
granted a rollover right prior to the
relevant notice deadline (60 days for
pre-Order No. 890 agreements or one
year for all others) and subsequently
requests and is granted a redirect for
firm service for the remainder of the
contract term (i.e., within the notice
period), the new reservation governs the
rights at the new receipt and delivery
request to change delivery points on a firm basis for
one month, followed by a reversion to the original
points does not convert the existing long-term firm
agreement into two separate short-term agreements);
American Electric Power Service Corp., 97 FERC
¶ 61,207 at 61,905–06 (2001).
282 For example, assume a transmission customer
with a five-year agreement for firm service between
points A and B, who qualifies for rollover rights on
that path. If the transmission customer seeks to
redirect on a firm basis in year 3 to points C to D
and then redirect back to points A and B thereafter,
at the end of the five year agreement the
transmission customer would have rollover rights
only with respect to points A to B. If, however, the
transmission customer seeks to redirect to points C
and D for the last six months of the contract term
and both qualifies for rollover rights on this path
and has requested rollover within the notice period
of the contract, the customer would then have
rollover rights only with respect to points C and D.
See Order No. 676 at P 59.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
points and the customer can obtain
rollover rights with respect to the
redirected capacity to the extent rollover
rights are available for the redirected
points. If, however, a customer fails to
request a rollover right prior to the
relevant notice deadline, the customer
forfeits rollover rights along the current
or any redirected path.
708. We clarify, to the extent
necessary, that transfer capability is not
freed up for earlier queued service
requests until a redirect has been
granted. A redirect request must be
evaluated in accordance with section 17
of the pro forma OATT using the same
system assumptions and analysis
applicable to any other new request for
service, including whether sufficient
ATC exists to accommodate the
request.283 If there is insufficient ATC to
offer service to customers in the queue,
and an existing customer requests
redirected service, any increase in ATC
along the original path is contingent
upon the acceptance and confirmation
of the redirect. It cannot be assumed at
the time of a redirect request that the
transmission provider will grant the
request.
4. Acquisition of Transmission Service
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
a. Processing of Service Requests
(1) Posting Performance Metrics
709. To enhance the transparency of
the study process and shed light on
whether transmission providers are
processing studies in a timely and nondiscriminatory manner, Order No. 890
required all transmission providers,
including RTOs and ISOs, to post on
their OASIS sites certain metrics that
track their performance in processing
system impact studies and facilities
studies associated with requests for
transmission service. Specifically, the
Commission required all transmission
providers to post on a quarterly basis
performance metrics associated with:
processing time from initial service
requests to the offer of a system impact
study; system impact study processing
time; service requests withdrawn from
the system impact study queue;
processing delays for system impact
studies caused by transmission
customer actions; processing time from
completed system impact study to the
offer of a facilities study; facilities study
processing time; service requests
withdrawn from the facilities study
queue; and, processing delays for
facilities studies caused by transmission
customer actions. The Commission
required transmission providers to begin
tracking these performance metrics
283 Order
No. 890 at P 1285.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
upon the effective date of Order No. 890
and keep the quarterly performance
metrics posted on their OASIS sites for
three calendar years.
710. The Commission also required
transmission providers, including RTOs
and ISOs, to submit a notification filing
to the Commission in the event the
transmission provider processes more
than 20 percent of non-affiliates’ studies
outside of the 60-day due diligence
deadlines in the pro forma OATT for
two consecutive quarters. The
transmission provider may explain in its
notification filing that it believes there
are extenuating circumstances that
prevented it from meeting the deadlines
in the pro forma OATT. Absent a
determination from the Commission
that delays were due to extenuating
circumstances, the transmission
provider is required to post additional
metrics regarding the average number of
hours expended on, and the number of
employees dedicated to, system impact
studies and facilities studies. Unless
otherwise directed by the Commission,
the transmission provider must begin
posting the additional performance
metrics the quarter following the
notification filing.
711. The Commission delegated to
NAESB the responsibility for
developing the Standard and
Communications Protocols, business
practices and OASIS modifications that
will be necessary to implement the
performance metrics.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
712. Two transmission providers
object to aspects of the standard
performance metric posting
requirements. Ameren objects to the
requirement that RTOs post these
metrics, arguing that the requirement
may increase an RTO’s cost even though
it is unnecessary for the efficient
operation of competitive markets.
Ameren argues that RTOs are by
definition independent entities that lack
the incentive to favor any transmission
customer over another and, therefore,
the performance metrics will serve no
purpose in uncovering potential
discrimination in the study request
process. Ameren argues that information
already posted by MISO and other RTOs
allows the Commission to obtain the
data it seeks without placing additional
requirements on RTOs.
713. Old Dominion argues that the
Commission should include in the
standard performance metrics any
denials or delays in the construction
phase of transmission service requests,
suggesting that review of whether
requested transmission service is
effected through construction of
PO 00000
Frm 00089
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3071
identified upgrades and other facilities
is a logical and necessary outgrowth of
Order No. 890.284 Old Dominion asks
the Commission to require transmission
providers to add to the standard
performance metrics: the time period of
any such postponement or delay; the
MW amount of congestion caused by the
delay, if any; the amount of
transmission rights underfunding
caused by the delay, if any; and,
whether the delay resulted in any
degradation of system reliability. Old
Dominion contends that the progress of
each project is essential for transmission
providers to determine whether
transmission service requests can be
accommodated and whether a
transmission project is actually
constructed or not has an effect on the
study process for subsequent projects in
the queue.
714. Other transmission providers
object to the aspects of the additional
performance metrics triggered by
consistently processing studies outside
the 60-day due diligence deadline.
Washington IOUs ask that the
Commission require transmission
providers to post information on
employees and employee-hours devoted
to study processing only if the
Commission first determines that delays
in processing study requests are not
excused by extenuating circumstances.
Washington IOUs contend that the
Commission’s requirement, in Order No.
890, to calculate and post this
additional information will create a
significant additional burden and fails
to recognize that the 60-day window is
a target, not a deadline. They further
contend that customers may ask that
additional time be taken in the
processing of studies. Absent a
determination that delays in processing
study requests are a result of a lack of
good faith and due diligence on the part
of the transmission provider,
Washington IOUs argue that there
should be no requirement to track and
post employees and employee-hours
devoted to study processing.
715. Washington IOUs also ask that
the Commission not count transmission
requests submitted as part of a
transmission provider’s Integrated
Resource Planning (IRP) process in the
calculation of percentages of studies
performed outside the 60-day window.
They contend that transmission requests
associated with such studies are often
made years in advance to ensure that
transmission for service of long-term
284 Old Dominion also argues that the
Commission should require performance reports
regarding transmission planning activities, which
the Commission addresses in section III.B.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3072
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
load is available and can be discussed
in the public domain, to allow
operational personnel to confer with
one another on IRP issues in a public
forum while adhering to the
Commission’s standards of conduct, and
to ensure that the utility will be able to
reserve transmission capacity necessary
to serve the utility’s native load reliably
and in a cost-effective manner.
Washington IOUs argue that there is no
need for studies associated with these
requests to be performed within the 60day window.
716. Southern argues that the
Commission should grant rehearing so
that studies for which the customer has
requested or expressly agreed to extend
the 60-day study period should not be
required to be included among those
studies considered to be completed late.
Southern contends that it would be
arbitrary and capricious to include
studies that are ‘‘late’’ due to no fault of
the transmission provider (e.g., studies
delayed or extended due to customer
request or action) in the metrics
calculations. Southern states that doing
so could cause the transmission
provider to be automatically penalized
with additional reporting requirements
and cross the threshold for which the
transmission provider must proffer
excuses acceptable to the Commission
or suffer significant penalties.
Commission Determination
717. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 to require transmission providers to
post standard performance metrics
regarding the processing of system
impact studies and facilities studies
and, for consistently late studies,
additional performance metrics
regarding the resources dedicated to
processing studies. These posting
requirements are necessary to promote
greater market transparency and
establish important incentives for all
transmission providers to complete
transmission service requests in a timely
and transparent fashion. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, despite the fact that some
transmission providers currently post
some information related to the
processing of transmission service
requests on their OASIS, much of the
public information currently posted by
transmission providers lacks
transparency, accessibility, and
consistency.285
718. We affirm the decision to subject
all transmission providers, including
RTOs and ISOs, to the same reporting
requirements. While it may be true that
285 See
Order No. 890 at P 1308.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
data already posted by RTOs and ISOs
provides much of the information
contained in the standard performance
metrics, it does not follow that posting
the remaining information is
unnecessary. The independent nature of
RTOs and ISOs does not justify relieving
them of this particular obligation. All
transmission providers should be
subject to the same posting
requirements to enhance uniformity and
transparency in processing transmission
service requests and transmission
studies. Indeed, to the extent an RTO or
ISO is already posting much of this
information, the incremental burden of
posting the remaining information
should be minimal.
719. The Commission does not
believe it is appropriate at this time to
add posting requirements regarding
denials or delays in the construction
phase, as requested by Old Dominion.
While construction delays can affect
transmission service start dates, the
transmission provider will be in
communication with the relevant
customers regarding the status of those
projects. The transmission provider is
also required to make available
information regarding the status of
upgrades identified in its transmission
plan, as we discuss in section III.B. We
are not persuaded that, based on the
evidence before us at this time,
additional posting requirements for
denials or delays in the construction
phase of transmission service requests
are necessary or appropriate. Absent
particular evidence to the contrary, we
believe that other OATT provisions
such as section 21.2 and the current
standard performance metrics
adequately protect customers from
inappropriate delays or discrimination
during construction phases.
720. We also affirm the decision to
require any transmission provider that
processes more than 20 percent of nonaffiliates’ studies outside of the 60-day
due diligence deadlines in the pro
forma OATT for two consecutive
quarters to submit a notification filing to
the Commission and post additional
performance metrics. We disagree with
Washington IOUs that transmission
providers should be required to post
these metrics only after Commission
action on a notification filing. Posting of
these additional metrics is not required
until two months after the notification
filing, giving the Commission time to
consider the extenuating circumstances
that prevented the transmission
provider from processing requested
studies on a timely basis. If, upon
review of such a filing, the Commission
finds that delays were caused by
extenuating circumstances, the
PO 00000
Frm 00090
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Commission will not require the
transmission provider to continue to
post the additional performance metrics.
As a result, we expect transmission
providers with legitimate extenuating
circumstances should not have to post
any additional metrics.
721. Similarly, we decline to exempt,
as a general matter, studies that are
delayed by customer agreement or that
are associated with resource planning.
The transmission provider can explain
the circumstances surrounding any
particular delay in its notification filing,
which the Commission will review on a
case-by-case basis. The process adopted
in Order No. 890 is sufficiently flexible
to relieve any transmission provider
who completes more than 20 percent of
non-affiliates’ studies outside of the 60day due diligence deadlines for two
consecutive quarters from any
additional posting requirements, or
operational penalties, if the Commission
finds the delays were due to extenuating
circumstances.
722. The Commission grants rehearing
to make several typographical revisions
to our rules implementing these posting
requirements. In Order No. 890, the
Commission stated that short-term and
long-term requests for point-to-point
service must be aggregated for purposes
of the posting requirement in order to
ease the burden on transmission
providers and in recognition that many
customers requesting short-term pointto-point service are unwilling to pay for
studies.286 The accompanying
regulations, however, stated that
transmission providers must separately
calculate and post metrics for long-term
and short-term requests.287 Upon further
consideration, we believe it appropriate
to allow, but not require, transmission
providers to aggregate requests for longterm and short-term point-to-point
service for purposes of the posting
requirements. We also clarify that the
posting requirements apply to all
requests for service, including requests
for point-to-point service and requests
to designate new network resources or
loads. We have revised our regulations
to make these requirements more clear.
(2) Operational Penalties for Late
Studies
723. The Commission determined in
Order No. 890 that all transmission
providers, including RTOs and ISOs,
would be subject to operational
penalties when they routinely fail to
meet the 60-day due diligence deadlines
prescribed in sections 19.3, 19.4, 32.3
and 32.4 of the OATT. Absent
286 See
287 18
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 1309.
CFR 37.6(h)(1).
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
extenuating circumstances, penalties
will apply to any transmission provider
that continues to be out of compliance
with these deadlines for each of the two
consecutive quarters following a
notification filing, described above,
stating that the transmission provider
has not completed request studies on a
timely basis. A transmission provider
will be deemed out of compliance if it
completes 10 percent or more of nonaffiliates’ system impact studies outside
of the deadlines prescribed in the pro
forma OATT.
724. Operational penalties will be
assessed on a quarterly basis, starting
with the quarter following the
notification filing and continuing until
the transmission provider completes at
least 90 percent of all studies within 60
days after the study agreement has been
executed. The penalty will be equal to
$500 for each day the transmission
provider takes to complete any system
impact study or facilities study beyond
60 days. For any system impact study or
facilities study that is still pending at
the end of the quarter and that has been
in the study queue for more than 60
days, the penalty will equal $500 for
each day the study has been in the study
queue beyond 60 days.
725. As explained above, the
Commission reiterated that transmission
providers may document and describe
in their notification filing any unique
complexities that particular requests
introduce into the study process and
that prevent the transmission provider
from completing a study within the 60day due diligence timeframe. On review
of a notification filing, the Commission
will waive operational penalties if a
transmission provider establishes that
its non-compliance is the result of
extenuating circumstances, including
factors or events that are truly beyond
its control, such as delays caused by the
transmission customer. The submission
of a notification filing documenting
extenuating circumstances will not,
however, suspend the obligation of a
transmission provider to process at least
90 percent of the study requests within
the deadlines, until such time as the
Commission issues a final
determination on the notification of
extenuating circumstances.
726. The Commission declined to
alter the 60-day study completion
timeframe embodied in sections 19.3,
19.4, 32.3 and 32.4 of the pro forma
OATT. The Commission concluded that
this timeframe adequately balances the
need for expeditious resolution of study
requests and the need to ensure that the
transmission provider can reliably
accommodate the transmission service
reserved. The Commission also found
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
that the penalty regime adopted in
Order No. 890 protects the transmission
provider in the event studies take longer
to complete due to the new planning
requirements or the new requirement to
consider conditional firm options.
727. The Commission determined that
revenues associated with operational
penalties for late studies should be
distributed to non-affiliated
transmission customers. Transmission
providers were directed to propose a
method to determine how unaffiliated
transmission customers will receive
operational penalty distributions. In the
event the transmission provider has
raised extenuating circumstances in its
notification filing, the Commission
stated that the transmission provider
should not distribute its operational
penalty while the Commission is
considering the notification filing.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
728. NorthWestern challenges the
application of any operational penalties
for late processing of studies associated
with transmission service requests.
NorthWestern contends that the most
important goal of a system impact study
or facility study should be the ability to
perform an accurate study, not one that
is quick, and that the Commission cites
no record evidence that penalties are
necessary to prevent unduly
discriminatory completion of studies.
NorthWestern argues that all
transmission providers have a financial
incentive to complete system impact
studies quickly in order to maximize
use of their transmission systems. In
NorthWestern’s view, it is unreasonable
for the Commission to maintain a 60day period for processing facility
studies for transmission service
requests, yet allow a 90-day and 180-day
timeframe for generator interconnection
facility studies which may be equally
complicated. NorthWestern argues that
a study may take longer than 60 days for
a myriad of reasons and, therefore,
section 19.9 of the pro forma OATT
should be eliminated.
729. To the extent the Commission
declines to eliminate section 19.9,
NorthWestern argues that it should be
waived for transmission providers that
do not have an affiliate that could
benefit from any delay. NorthWestern
states that it is a transmission and
distribution utility within its Montana
service territory without an active
power marketing affiliate and, as a
result, the Commission’s rationale for
imposing penalties is not applicable to
NorthWestern and similarly-situated
transmission providers.
730. Several petitioners ask the
Commission to clarify that penalties
PO 00000
Frm 00091
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3073
will be assessed only if the transmission
provider fails to exercise due diligence
in completing studies within 60 days.
EEI argues that the due diligence
standard is sufficient to protect
customers and, therefore, the
Commission’s references to extenuating
circumstances and events beyond the
control of the transmission provider
should be interpreted to explain some
aspects of the due diligence standard,
rather than impose a new standard for
completion of studies. Joined by
Progress Energy, EEI asks the
Commission to modify section 19.9(iii)
of the pro forma OATT to explicitly
provide that penalties will be assessed
only if the transmission provider fails to
complete 90 percent of its studies for
non-affiliates within 60 days because of
a lack of due diligence or where there
are no extenuating circumstances.
731. National Grid seeks similar
clarification that the Commission is not
moving away from the due diligence
standard in favor of an excuse-based
standard. National Grid argues that the
requirement that transmission providers
provide an affirmative excuse to avoid
operational penalties for untimely
studies is an unexplained departure
from precedent and inconsistent with
the Commission’s reference to the due
diligence standard in Order No. 890.
National Grid states that the
Commission found in Order No. 2003
that financial penalties were not
appropriate for late interconnection
studies and, instead, required the
transmission provider to use due
diligence to perform within the
specified time frame. National Grid
argues that the Commission failed to
justify use of a different, excuse-based
structure with monetary penalties in the
context of studying transmission service
requests.
732. National Grid, along with the
Washington IOUs, opposes an excusebased standard, arguing that the
transmission provider may not always
have a readily articulated excuse for not
completing studies on time. National
Grid states that transmission providers
cannot simply hire and fire planning
employees or otherwise redeploy other
employees as study queues expand and
contract and that, even if they could, the
pool of qualified planning engineers is
inadequate. Washington IOUs also argue
that there are numerous legitimate
reasons why a transmission provider
might not process a study within the 60day guideline, including requests by the
transmission customer to delay the
study process.
733. Several petitioners argue that the
Commission should extend by 30 days
or 60 days the period within which
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3074
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
studies should be completed.
MidAmerican argues that strict
adherence to the 60-day target will lead
to less complete analyses by limiting the
transmission provider’s ability to
coordinate with neighboring systems
and regional reliability organizations,
which may be necessary to understand
the full effect of a proposed transaction,
and forcing the transmission provider to
make assumptions regarding the
impacts of higher queued requests still
in study status. E.ON U.S. similarly
argues that the length of a study is
influenced by the size and type of the
line or substation upgrade required, the
limited availability of third-party
contractors, and the fact that certain
modeling studies can take many weeks
to prepare. MidAmerican and E.ON U.S.
both argue that internal staff limitations
further impact the transmission
provider’s ability to meet the 60-day
target.
734. EEI, MidAmerican, and Southern
argue that introduction of conditional
firm and modified planning redispatch
service will complicate the study
process, may lead to an increase in
study volume, and ultimately make the
60-day deadline substantially more
difficult to meet. EEI and Southern
argue that it is arbitrary and capricious
for the Commission to acknowledge in
Order No. 890 that studying the
availability of these products will place
increased burdens on transmission
provider without addressing the
problem by granting transmission
providers more time to complete those
studies.
735. MidAmerican, Progress Energy
and TranServ request clarification
regarding when a system impact study
is considered complete for purposes of
the 60-day due diligence deadline.
Progress Energy suggests that failure to
complete a study within 60 days should
be measured from the projected start
date that is included in the applicable
study agreement, rather than the date
the study agreement is executed, and
that the transmission provider must
clearly explain the extenuating
circumstance to the customer.
MidAmerican suggests that the
milestone should be the first submission
of the study report to the transmission
customer because it is customary for
transmission providers to provide a
copy of the system impact study for
customers to review, which may lead to
additional analysis or review of
potential issues prior to issuing a final
system impact study. If provision of the
review copy of the system impact study
does not satisfy the tariff requirement,
MidAmerican contends that
transmission providers will simply omit
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
customer review and provide final
studies, likely resulting in more
disputes between customers and
transmission providers. MidAmerican
also argues that any delays that occur as
a result of review and acceptance of
study results due to regional planning
process criteria should not subject the
transmission provider to penalties.
TranServ similarly notes that certain
system impact studies are subject to
regional coordination review that is out
of its control. TranServ contends that a
system impact study should be deemed
complete when a study report is
concurrently posted on the OASIS,
provided to the customer for review,
and provided for regional coordination.
736. Some petitioners ask that the
Commission exempt from potential
operational penalties certain types of
studies or otherwise confirm that delays
in those circumstances will be
considered extenuating circumstances.
Southern and Washington IOUs ask the
Commission to make clear that
operational penalties will not apply
when the transmission provider and
transmission customer expressly agree
to a study schedule providing for a
study period longer than 60 days.
TranServ contends that extension of a
study period to allow for clustering of
multiple requests from the same
transmission customer should be
deemed an extenuating circumstance.
EEI suggests that studies of the
redispatch or conditional firm options
be exempted from potential penalties or,
at a minimum, that the Commission
establish a one-year transition period
prior to including such studies.
737. Progress Energy asks that the
Commission recognize additional
specific examples of possible
extenuating circumstances, including:
prior submitted generator
interconnection queue requests that
impact the same interface as
transmission service queue requests;
multiple transmission service queue
requests being submitted within a 60day period; a higher queued request that
is withdrawn after it has been accepted
which can cause a restart on subsequent
studies that are underway; and a major
change in transmission and generation
plans of a local or neighboring system
that can cause a restart on subsequent
studies that are underway.
738. MidAmerican argues that the
Commission should remove the penalty
provisions for facilities studies requiring
major construction or offer customers
the option of extending the study period
without penalty to the transmission
provider where a customer has a desire
for an accurate cost and schedule
estimate. MidAmerican contends that
PO 00000
Frm 00092
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the 60-day study window is inadequate
to fully evaluate all the environmental,
cultural, and landowner issues to fully
determine the optimum route for a new
line. Without knowing what route a line
should take, MidAmerican argues that
an accurate cost estimate and schedule
cannot be prepared for the customer
and, in turn, that it is unreasonable to
expect a customer to sign a service
agreement based on a highly variable
cost and schedule estimate.
MidAmerican also suggests that, in
cases where the transmission service
requests are submitted in association
with a new generation interconnection
request, coordination with the
generation interconnection queue
should be explicitly allowed.
MidAmerican states that, under the
Large Generator Interconnection
Procedures, the time required to
determine the facilities necessary to
accommodate a generation
interconnection request can exceed 250
days from the date the interconnection
request is submitted. MidAmerican
contends it is not possible to start the
system impact study for the
transmission service request until after
it is known what the topology of the
system will be with the new generating
facility and any associated network
upgrades and, therefore, the 60-day
target should not apply.
739. E.ON U.S. requests clarification
of the application of operational
penalties to its operations in particular.
E.ON U.S. states that it has delegated
certain tasks, including the
responsibility to perform system impact
studies, to an independent transmission
organization, i.e., Southwest Power
Pool. E.ON U.S. contends that this
delegation of responsibility is consistent
with or superior to the penalties
established in the pro forma OATT
since it ensures that studies will be
performed in a non-discriminatory
manner. In the alternative, E.ON U.S.
seeks guidance on how, or whether it
may influence the length of time it takes
Southwest Power Pool to complete
system impact studies, so that they are
completed within the 60-day due
diligence requirement. E.ON U.S. is
concerned that it may be responsible for
penalties incurred by Southwest Power
Pool for failure to complete system
impact studies for E.ON U.S. while
being prohibited from influencing the
manner in which the studies are
performed due to the Commission’s
orders regarding Southwest Power
Pool’s independence.
740. TDU Systems seek clarification
that imposition of an operational
penalty on a transmission provider for
a late study does not foreclose other
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
remedies to compensate for any
damages arising out of a transmission
provider’s lack of due diligence, such
as, recovery of the incremental cost of
purchasing power from the market as
well as other direct and consequential
damages, if the transmission customer
can show it is entitled to further relief.
TDU Systems suggest that the
Commission explicitly recognize that a
transmission provider’s failure of
performance sufficient to merit the
imposition of an operational penalty
also falls outside the scope of the
indemnification owed by the
transmission customer to the
transmission provider under OATT
section 10.2.
Commission Determination
741. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to subject
transmission providers to operational
penalties when they routinely fail to
meet the 60-day due diligence deadlines
prescribed in sections 19.2, 19.4, 32.3
and 32.4 of the pro forma OATT. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, transmission providers must have a
meaningful stake in meeting study time
frames.288 With the procedural
protections adopted by the Commission,
the new penalties for late study will
ensure that transmission providers have
an adequate financial incentive to
exercise due diligence in processing
service requests in a timely and
nondiscriminatory manner.
742. We agree with petitioners that
transmission providers should not
sacrifice accuracy in order to complete
studies within the 60-day due period
and that transmission providers may
already have an incentive to complete
studies quickly in order to increase
revenues from transmission service.
This does not mean, however, that it is
inappropriate to apply penalties in
instances when transmission providers
repeatedly fail to comply with study
deadlines without justification. The
notice procedures adopted in Order No.
890 give transmission providers an
opportunity to explain why studies have
been completed late. As a practical
matter, then, late study penalties should
only apply to those transmission
providers unable to justify their
repeated failure to meet deadlines. At
the same time, the possibility of
penalties will provide appropriate
incentives to ensure that transmission
providers process studies on a timely
and nondiscriminatory basis.
743. In response to concerns regarding
application of the due diligence
standard, we reiterate that sections 19.3,
288 See
Order No. 890 at P 1340.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
19.4, 32.3, and 32.4 of the pro forma
OATT require transmission providers to
use due diligence to meet the 60-day
study deadline. The 60-day due
diligence deadline serves as a good
measure of a transmission provider’s
use of due diligence since, in our
experience, the vast majority of
transmission studies can be completed
within that period. We recognize,
however, that certain transmission
studies can present challenges or other
circumstances may justify a longer
study period. The Commission therefore
adopted rules that allow transmission
providers to complete studies outside
the due diligence deadlines without
paying late study penalties. In its
notification filing, the transmission
provider can explain the extenuating
circumstances that lead to delay and, in
turn, demonstrate that it has used due
diligence in processing the relevant
studies notwithstanding its inability to
meet the 60-day target. Transmission
providers should discuss any factors
that they believe are relevant, including
reasonable resource limitations, the
accommodation of customer requests
(including clustering), inter-regional
and seams coordination, the scope of
particular studies, or fluctuations in
study volumes. On review of this
information, the Commission will waive
application of late study penalties under
section 19.9 of the pro forma OATT as
appropriate. We therefore do not believe
any modification to the language of
section 19.9 is necessary.
744. We also reject requests to create
broad categories of extenuating
circumstances that would exempt
transmission providers from late study
penalties or related posting
requirements. Consideration of the
particular circumstances causing a
transmission provider to repeatedly
miss study deadlines is best left to a
case-by-case analysis. Again, failure to
meet the 60-day due diligence deadlines
does not lead unavoidably to late study
penalties, regardless of whether the
study is related to the new planning
redispatch option for long-term point-topoint service, the modified conditional
firm option, or any other service
request. Granting broad exemptions for
any particular types of requests would
undermine the Commission’s ability to
gather information regarding the reasons
for processing delays and, in turn,
ensure that those delays are justified
under the circumstances.
745. We also decline to automatically
waive late study penalties for particular
types of transmission providers, such as
transmission and distribution utilities
without a power marketing affiliate, as
suggested by NorthWestern, or RTOs
PO 00000
Frm 00093
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3075
and ISOs, as suggested by MISO. The
Commission is concerned about
potential discrimination in favor of a
transmission provider’s affiliated
customers as well as discrimination
between different classes of unaffiliated
customers. In response to E.ON U.S., we
clarify that delegating to a third party
the responsibility for conducting
transmission studies does not relieve
the transmission provider of its
obligation to ensure compliance with
sections 19 and 32 of the pro forma
OATT. Regardless of whether the thirdparty service provider is under the
transmission provider’s control, the
agreement governing the relationship
between the service provider and the
transmission provider would establish
the service provider’s responsibilities
and potential liability for failing to meet
service obligations. This could include,
for example, the responsibility to submit
notification filings describing any
extenuating circumstances that keep the
contractor from meeting deadlines.
746. We disagree that the 60-day due
diligence period should be extended
simply because there is the possibility
of penalties in the event of repeated
non-compliance. While we recognize
that the timelines we use in Order No.
890 for processing transmission service
requests may differ from those we have
in place in other settings, the 60-day
deadlines have been in place for many
years. We continue to believe that 60
days is, on average, sufficient time to
complete most transmission studies. As
the Commission explained in Order No.
890, and as we reiterate above,
transmission providers that are delayed
due to the addition of the conditional
firm option, modification of planning
redispatch, staffing availability, or any
other issues are free to raise those issues
in their notification filings.289 We
appreciate, and in fact intend, that the
possibility of penalties will create added
incentives to complete system impact
studies and facilities studies within the
60-day due diligence deadlines. It does
not follow, however, that the deadlines
themselves should change. In order for
late study penalties to apply, the
transmission provider would have to be
out of compliance for at least three
quarters after the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 took effect. This gives
transmission providers nine months to
adjust their operations and reallocate
resources as necessary to meet its
obligation to process studies on a timely
basis.
747. In response to MidAmerican and
TranServ, the Commission reiterates its
current policy that transmission studies
289 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
id. at P 1345.
16JAR2
3076
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
will be deemed complete at the point
when the transmission provider returns
a final system impact study or facilities
study to the transmission customer.
Drafts of such studies, whether
submitted to regional coordinators or
the transmission customer, do not
satisfy this threshold because, by
definition, they are subject to revision
and are incomplete. Allowing study
drafts to be considered completed for
purposes of the 60-day due diligence
deadline would undermine incentives
to finalize such studies, leaving
transmission customers with little
assurance that their transmission
requests would be processed in a
reasonable time period. We do not mean
to discourage, however, consultation
with customers or regional
coordination. To the extent such
activities lead to delays, they should be
explained in the notification filing. The
Commission clarifies in response to
Progress Energy that the 60-day due
diligence period starts on the day the
transmission study agreement is
executed unless the transmission
provider and customer agree on an
alternate day for the transmission
provider to begin the study. While the
transmission provider and customer
may not alter the length of the study
period, they can mutually agree as to the
day on which the study begins.
748. Finally, we clarify in response to
TDU Systems that payment of a late
study penalty by the transmission
provider falls outside the scope of the
indemnification provided by
transmission customers under section
10.2 of the pro forma OATT. Similarly,
assessment of a late study penalty
would not preclude other claims for
damages to the extent the transmission
provider is liable under relevant legal
principles.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
(3) Recovery Through Rates
749. In Order No. 890, the
Commission prohibited all
jurisdictional transmission providers
from recovering penalties for late
studies from transmission customers.
The Commission required non-profit
transmission providers to pay late study
penalties from sources other than the
revenue they collect for sales of
transmission service.
Requests for Rehearing and/or
Clarification
750. Several petitioners object to the
application of operational penalties to
RTOs and ISOs and request clarification
of the manner in which penalties could
be recovered by RTOs and ISOs. MISO
argues that RTOs and ISOs should be
exempt from the imposition of penalties
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
because the organizations have little or
no equity cushion from which to pay
penalties and often need to obtain
operational/technical information from
member transmission owners, over
which they have no control, in order to
complete studies. MISO argues that, as
independent entities, RTOs and ISOs
have no incentive to favor one group of
customers over another and that the
Commission’s unsupported reference to
competing internal priorities or staffing
issues is not a reasoned substitute for
the undue discrimination rationale on
which the Commission’s reforms are
based. MISO argues that the distinction
between an RTO and a single system
transmission provider is particularly
acute for MISO, PJM, and Southwest
Power Pool, which have been required
by the Commission to execute seams
operating agreements that require the
sharing of planning information.
751. MISO objects to the potential use
of funds set aside for salaries or bonuses
to pay penalties, suggesting that budget
cuts are not an appropriate remedy for
staffing issues. MISO contends that
RTOs and ISOs should be allowed to
recover penalties in rates. MISO states
that reliability rules permit RTOs and
ISOs to recover their ERO penalties in
rates and the same should be allowed
for operational penalties. MISO
acknowledges that the Commission
allowed transmission providers an
opportunity to avoid operational
penalties by showing that failure to
meet the compliance threshold is due to
extenuating circumstances, but objects
to that process as burdensome. MISO
argues that it is unclear what
circumstances would be considered
extenuating, suggesting that some
customers request service well in
advance because they are aware of
possible delays in performing necessary
studies. To the extent the Commission
retains financial penalties for RTOs and
ISOs, it suggests that delays resulting in
no harm to the customer should not be
included in the 10 percent threshold.
752. EEI, National Grid, and ATCLLC
argue that the Commission first should
consider non-monetary penalties for
RTOs and ISOs, such as increased
oversight, before assessing any monetary
penalties. ATCLLC and National Grid
contend that using a non-monetary
enforcement policy for violations of the
OATT would more closely mirror the
policy adopted by the Commission with
respect to enforcement of reliability
standards, as reflected in NERC
Sanction Guidelines. National Grid
suggests that the Commission not take
the next step of imposing monetary
penalties (whether operational or civil
penalties) on RTOs or ISOs absent
PO 00000
Frm 00094
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
extraordinary reasons, such as repeated
or willful violations.
753. If monetary penalties are
assessed on an RTO or ISO, National
Grid argues that the non-profit status of
RTOs and ISOs justifies allowing those
entities to recover the cost of penalties
through rates, provided those costs are
allocated to all market participants
fairly. ATCLLC and Duke, however,
oppose recovery of any operational or
civil penalties in the rates of an RTO or
ISO. ATCLLC argues that allowing RTOs
and ISOs to include penalties in their
cost of rendering transmission or market
services would defeat the purpose of the
penalty. In its view, the pass-through of
penalty costs would be tantamount to
imposing the financial consequences of
an action on parties that did not commit
the violation, that may not have any
control over the action causing the
violation, and who may have been
negatively impacted by the violation.
Duke asks the Commission to clarify
that the other sources of money from
which RTOs and ISOs must pay
operational or civil penalties do not
include any rates collected from
customers, including administrative
charges, energy charges, or charges for
transmission-related services.
Commission Determination
754. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to prohibit
transmission providers from
automatically passing through to
transmission customers the cost of late
study penalties. The 60-day due
diligence standard is in place to protect
customers and it would therefore be
inappropriate to automatically recover
from those customers penalties assessed
for non-compliance. We are mindful of
the unique operating and budgetary
concerns of independent transmission
providers with respect to their ability to
pay late study penalties and will keep
those concerns in mind when reviewing
these transmission providers’
notification filings. However, as we
explain in section III.C.4.c, it would not
be appropriate to exempt, on a generic
basis, any particular class of
transmission providers from the
requirement to pay operational
penalties.
755. The Commission acknowledged
in Order No. 890 that the independence
of RTOs and ISOs removes incentives to
favor one group of customers over
another. Notwithstanding this
independence, competing internal
policies or staffing issues could lead to
particular types of customers being
treated differently during the study
process. The potential application of
penalties for consistently late studies
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
ensure that the proper incentives are in
place to process request studies in a
timely and non-discriminatory manner
for every customer. The limited ability
of an independent transmission
provider to absorb late study penalties
is more appropriately considered when
determining the penalty, if any, that will
apply to an RTO or ISO on review of its
notification filing, which would not be
possible if a blanket exemption were
granted.290
756. As explained in section III.C.4.c,
we decline to state here the particular
sources of funds from which an RTO or
ISO should pay any late study penalties
ultimately imposed. We do clarify,
however, the Commission’s statement in
Order No. 890 that an RTO or ISO may
not use revenues from sales of
transmission service to pay late study
penalties.291 It may be the case that an
RTO’s or ISO’s only source of funds is
from rates collected from jurisdictional
transmission customers. The
Commission’s intent in restricting
transmission providers, including RTOs
and ISOs, from automatically passing on
to customers the costs of late study
penalties was to prohibit those
transmission providers from designing
their rates to accommodate a pass
through of the penalties, i.e., effectively
including penalties in its cost of service.
A transmission provider is permitted to
use revenues previously collected under
Commission-approved rates to pay late
study penalties by reallocating funds as
necessary to distribute late study
penalty amounts.
757. We clarify in response to MISO
that, if the RTO or ISO is unable to
identify any appropriate funds from
which to pay a late study penalty, the
Commission will consider case-specific
cost-recover proposals under FPA
section 205. As explained above, such
proposals should not include
mechanisms to automatically pass
through to customers any penalties
approved to the RTO or ISO.
(4) Clustering Transmission Service
Request Studies
758. Although the Commission did
not impose, in Order No. 890, a
requirement for transmission providers
to study transmission requests in a
cluster, the Commission did encourage
transmission providers to cluster
request studies when reasonable. In
particular, the Commission directed
transmission providers to consider
clustering studies if requested to do so
290 We clarify that, as part of this analysis, we will
consider whether the use of non-monetary penalties
would be appropriate in the circumstances.
291 Id. at P 1357.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
by a group of transmission customers
and the transmission provider can
reasonably accommodate the request. To
that end, the Commission required each
transmission provider to include tariff
language in its compliance filing that
describes how it will process a request
to cluster studies and how it will
structure the transmission customers’
obligations when they have joined a
cluster.
Requests for Rehearing and/or
Clarification
759. TranServ requests clarification
that, if the transmission provider
receives a large number of study
requests from the same customer within
a short time period with no other
customer requests commingled, it may
be prudent to combine these studies
into a clustered study group to reduce
costs and study queue volumes, even
recognizing that such a practice would
result in an extended study period.
Commission Determination
760. In Order No. 890, the
Commission required transmission
providers to study transmission requests
in a cluster if the customers involved
request the cluster and the transmission
provider can reasonably accept the
request. The Commission did not
preclude transmission providers from
clustering additional request studies if
they believe it reasonable to do so.
Studying transmission service requests
in a cluster in some cases can create
synergistic benefits, simplify complex,
interrelated transmission requests, and
help transmission providers reduce
study queue backlogs. To the extent a
transmission provider wishes to adopt
additional procedures governing the
clustering of requested studies, it may
propose such procedures in a filing
under section 205 of the FPA
demonstrating that clustering will be
implemented in a timely and nondiscriminatory fashion.
761. Although we agree that in certain
circumstances the time required to
process a clustered study group may
exceed the time required to study a
single transmission request, we do not
agree that this should be always be the
case. As the Commission explains
above, we will not exempt broad
categories of extenuating circumstances,
such as the clustering of request studies,
from the 60-day due diligence deadline.
(5) Standardization of Business
Practices for Study Queue Processing
762. The Commission also required
transmission providers working through
NAESB to develop business practice
standards to better coordinate
PO 00000
Frm 00095
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3077
transmission requests across multiple
transmission systems. In order to
provide guidance to NAESB, the
Commission articulated the principles
that should govern processing across
multiple systems. The Commission
further required transmission providers
working through NAESB to develop
business practice standards to allow a
transmission customer to rebid a
counteroffer of partial service so the
transmission customer can take the
same quantity of service for linked
transmission service requests across
multiple systems. The Commission
explained that the transmission
customer should not be required to take
the same quantity of service across
consecutive transmission service
requests and, instead, it should simply
have the option to do so.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
763. TDU Systems argue that the
Commission erred by failing either to
mandate coordination among
transmission providers or to provide the
oversight necessary to ensure that
NAESB effectively addresses the
standards and practices for
coordination. TDU Systems contend
that transmission customers have
experienced denials of service because
of differing response times to
transmission service requests spanning
multiple transmission systems and that
a lack of coordination among
transmission providers reduces
accountability for potentially anticompetitive denials of service. To the
extent the Commission relies on
business practices by NAESB, TDU
Systems contend that the Commission
must provide clear deadlines for NAESB
to complete the development process for
these business practices. TDU Systems
argue that failure to establish deadlines
in this context, while establishing clear
deadlines for the development of ATCrelated standards, is arbitrary and
capricious.
764. TAPS asks the Commission to
articulate more fully the coordination
necessary between transmission
providers when a customer’s request
entails use of multiple systems. TAPS
notes that the Commission refers in
Order No. 890 to coordination of studies
across multiple systems, but that
coordination may be unnecessary if one
of the affected transmission providers
conclude that no system impact study is
required. TAPS contends there is
nonetheless a need to coordinate such
requests so that the customer is not
required to confirm service on the nostudy system before knowing whether
service is available on the other piece of
the transmission path.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3078
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
765. TAPS also requests confirmation
that, in the event only one of the
transmission providers considering a
multi-system request determines that a
facilities study is necessary, the
transmission provider whose system
impact study did not lead to a facilities
study must await the completion of the
other transmission provider’s facilities
study prior to requiring the customer to
commit to the service or lose its queue
position. Similarly, TAPS argues that, if
both transmission providers find a need
to undertake facilities studies, the
customer should not be subject to
different deadlines for entering into
those facilities studies or committing to
service after all of the facilities studies
are completed.
Commission Determination
766. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to rely on the
NAESB process to develop business
practices to govern the processing of
transmission requests across multiple
transmission systems. We decline to
dictate at this time, beyond those
principles outlined in Order No. 890,
the particular practices that must be
implemented. It is more appropriate to
allow transmission providers working
through NAESB, in the first instance, to
consider how best to ensure
coordination across multiple systems. It
is also appropriate to give NAESB an
open timeframe to develop these
standards since they must be broad
enough to account for the complexities
of coordinating multi-system
transmission service requests.292
767. The appropriate forum for TDU
Systems and TAPS to raise substantive
concerns regarding the coordination
required for multi-system requests is
therefore the NAESB process. If
concerns remain at the conclusion of
this process, transmission providers and
customers alike can bring them to the
Commission’s attention on review of the
NAESB business practices.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
(6) Additional Processing Proposals
768. In response to commenter
requests, the Commission revised
section 17.7 of the pro forma OATT so
that the transmission provider is able to
terminate a request for transmission
service if a customer that is extending
the commencement of service does not
pay the required annual reservation fee
within 15 days of notifying the
transmission provider that it would like
292 NAESB has indicated that business practices
governing the coordination of service requests
across multiple transmission systems are in
development. The Commission requests NAESB to
keep us informed regarding the status of developing
these and other business practices.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
to extend the commencement of service.
The Commission denied a request to
require transmission providers to accept
or deny in all cases non-firm and shortterm firm point-to-point transmission
service requests solely based on posted
ATC, explaining that transmission
providers should not be discouraged
from making service available when
posted ATC is not accurate.
Requests for Rehearing and/or
Clarification
769. Southern argues that the
Commission should revise the amended
provisions of section 17.7 of the pro
forma OATT to ensure that transmission
customers cannot escape their
contractual commitments by simply
failing to timely make an extension of
service payment. Southern contends
that the language of section 17.7 of the
pro forma OATT makes the termination
of a customer’s reservation mandatory,
while the Commission’s discussion of
that language in Order No. 890
indicated an intention for such
termination to be permissive.293
Southern contends that mandating
termination in the event of non-payment
would allow customers to easily escape
contractual commitments even where
the transmission provider has reserved
the underlying transmission capacity for
that customer. Southern requests that
section 17.7 be revised to state: ‘‘If the
Transmission Customer does not pay
this non-refundable reservation fee
within 15 days of notifying the
Transmission Provider it intends to
extend the commencement of service,
then the Transmission Provider may
deem the Transmission Customer in
breach and may terminate the
Transmission Customer’s Service
Agreement.’’
770. Southern also requests
clarification that transmission providers
are allowed to study and condition a
request for extension of service for longterm agreements having a term of less
than five years. Southern states that,
under the prior rollover policy, it was
able to condition the continuation of
service beyond the contract term so long
as the condition was stated in the
service agreement. Once the rollover
reforms become effective and the
rollover right extends only to contracts
of five years or longer, Southern
contends that it will no longer evaluate
service availability beyond the
requested term of service during the
system impact and facility studies.
Where such service is not available,
Southern contends it would not be
possible to grant an extension of the
293 Citing
PO 00000
Order No. 890 at P 1390.
Frm 00096
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
commencement date. Southern therefore
asks the Commission to allow
transmission providers to study, and
possibly limit, all requests for
extensions of commencement of service
for long-term agreements having a term
of less than five years. If the
Commission declines to grant this
request generally, Southern argues that
such studies at a minimum should be
allowed for extensions of
commencement of service for customers
having agreements for planning
redispatch or conditional firm service.
Southern contends there is increased
need for continued study regarding the
availability of those products, as the
Commission recognized by allowing a
two-year reassessment period for the
products.
771. Powerex repeats its request to
require transmission providers to
respond to short-term transaction
requests based on the ATC quantity
posted at the time the request is granted.
Powerex contends that allowing
transmission providers to grant or deny
service inconsistent with posted ATC
encourages transmission customers to
always have requests pending in the
queue and may lead to customers
ultimately viewing the transmission
provider’s actions as discriminatory.
Powerex argues that the Commission
cited no evidence that its proposal
would be unworkable, operationally
problematic, or inefficient, nor
explained how its ruling is consistent
with the emphasis placed on accurate,
timely and consistent ATC postings
elsewhere in Order No. 890.
772. Powerex also repeats a request to
modify the language of sections 17.1
and 17.5 of the pro forma OATT to give
transmission providers the flexibility to
grant short-term transmission service
requirements without performing a
system impact study.294 Powerex argues
that requiring transmission providers to
perform system impact studies to
evaluate short-term service requests
imposes deadlines that are often
unworkable. Powerex also contends that
a refusal to modify sections 17.1 and
17.5 would be at odds with the
Commission’s decision in Entergy
Services, Inc.,295 in which the
Commission allowed Entergy to
evaluate short-term requests without
performing a system impact study.
Powerex argues that the ATC-related
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 will
294 Powerex initially raised this issue in the
context of the definition of a system impact study
and, thus, the Commission addressed the argument
in section V.D.10 of Order No. 890.
295 Entergy Services, Inc., 101 FERC ¶ 61,169
(2002).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
ensure that this flexibility will not
impair system reliability.
Commission Determination
773. The Commission grants rehearing
to revise section 17.7 of the pro forma
OATT in order to define more equitably
the rights and obligations of customers
failing to make timely payment of
deposits in order to extend the
commencement of service. Upon further
consideration, we conclude that it
would be inappropriate for a
transmission customer to lose its
underlying transmission service
agreement simply because it failed to
comply with the requirements of
extending the service commencement
date. We believe that it is more
equitable to require those transmission
customers who seek an extension of
service, but fail to pay the required
deposit in a timely fashion, to lose only
their option to extend their transmission
service start date and not the underlying
transmission service agreement.
774. We therefore decline to adopt the
language proposed by Southern, since
that could still result in the
transmission customer losing its entire
transmission service agreement based
on a technicality. The revised language
of section 17.7 will more appropriately
resolve Southern’s stated concern about
a transmission customer’s use of the 15day deadline in section 17.7 of the pro
forma OATT to escape its underlying
transmission service agreement. If a
transmission customer fails to make the
appropriate payment to extend service,
that customer remains obligated to take
service under the original terms and
conditions of the underlying
transmission service agreement.
775. We agree with Southern,
however, that transmission providers
should have the opportunity to consider
the ability to provide service in the
event of an extension for
commencement of service. Under prior
rollover policies, transmission providers
considered whether long-term service
would continue to be available beyond
the original requested term during their
initial consideration of the request for
service, since transmission providers
were required to identify in the initial
service agreement any restrictions on
the customer’s rollover rights. Once the
rollover reforms adopted in Order No.
890 become effective, transmission
providers will undertake that analysis
only for contracts with a term of five
years or more. Transmission providers
should continue to have the opportunity
to consider the availability of extended
service for contracts with terms of less
than five years once the rollover reforms
become effective. We therefore revise
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
section 17.7 of the pro forma OATT to
make clear that extensions of service are
subject to availability. For contracts of
five years or longer, we expect that
identification of any restrictions on
rollover rights in the initial service
agreement will continue to serve as
corresponding restrictions on the ability
of the customer to extend the
commencement of service.
776. We affirm the decision in Order
No. 890 not to require transmission
providers to grant certain short-term
transmission service requests based only
on posted ATC values. Transmission
providers are in the best position to
determine how much capacity exists on
their system in real-time and, therefore,
it would not be appropriate for the
Commission to categorically preclude
transmission providers from making
such short-term allocations on a caseby-case basis. We do not wish to
preclude transmission providers from
making service available at times when
posted ATC is not accurate. The
transmission provider nevertheless must
act on a non-discriminatory basis when
using its discretion to grant service
when posted ATC is insufficient. As the
Commission stated in Order No. 890,
the transmission provider must log such
instances as an act of discretion and
post the log so that the Commission and
customers may monitor the
transmission provider’s actions.296
777. We clarify in response to
Powerex that sections 17.1 and 17.5 of
the pro forma OATT do not require
transmission providers to undertake
system impact studies for all requests
for short-term transmission service.
System impact studies are only required
if it is necessary to evaluate the impact
of the request prior to granting service.
While we would expect a transmission
provider to use its knowledge of its
system, including prior studies and
system assessments, to grant short-term
requests when possible, the
transmission provider must in every
instance consider whether a system
impact study is in fact required to
evaluate the request for transmission
service, as the very precedent cited by
Powerex contemplates.297 We recognize
that on occasion a study period could
exceed the length of service requested
by a transmission customer and thereby
render moot the transmission service
request. As the Commission explained
296 See Order No. 890 at P 1389 (citing 18 CFR
37.6(g)(4)).
297 See Entergy Services, Inc., 101 FERC ¶ 61,169
at P 9–10 (stating that Entergy would have
information to evaluate requests for short-term
service without a system impact study ‘‘in most
instances’’ and should not ‘‘unnecessarily rel[y]’’ on
system impact studies’’).
PO 00000
Frm 00097
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3079
in Order No. 890, however,
implementing a generic rule to
eliminate or shorten the period for
performing system impacts could
jeopardize system reliability.298 We
therefore decline to adopt Powerex’s
suggested revisions to sections 17.1 and
17.5.
b. Reservation Priority
(1) Priority for Pre-Confirmed Requests
778. The Commission determined in
Order No. 890 that longer duration
service requests will continue to have
priority over shorter duration service
requests, with pre-confirmation serving
as a tie-breaker for requests of equal
duration. The Commission further
provided that pre-confirmed, non-firm
point-to-point transmission service
requests and short-term, firm point-topoint transmission service requests
would have priority over nonconfirmed, non-firm and short-term
requests, respectively, of equal duration.
Pre-confirmed requests for transmission
service will not preempt an equal
duration request that has already been
confirmed.
779. The Commission also clarified its
policies regarding the treatment of preconfirmed requests in order to address
concerns regarding operational
difficulties caused by giving priority to
such requests. First, the Commission
prohibited transmission customers from
withdrawing pre-confirmed, non-firm
and short-term firm point-to-point
transmission service requests prior to
when the transmission customer is
offered service or a system impact
study. Transmission providers shall
invalidate, however, a pre-confirmed
request at the request of the
transmission customer in the very near
term following submittal of the request,
in the event the transmission customer
makes an inadvertent error in
submitting its request. Second, the
Commission explained that a customer
is not bound to take service when the
transmission provider counteroffers the
customer’s initial request, although it is
obligated to take service in the event the
transmission provider offers the service
requested.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
780. TranServ objects to the retention
of priority for longer-term service,
regardless of pre-confirmation status.
TranServ maintains that the advantages
of longer-term services in the form of
redirect opportunities and secondary
market sales are sufficient incentives in
and of themselves and that the ability to
preempt shorter term service is
298 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 1707.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3080
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
unnecessary to promote longer term
sales. TranServ acknowledges that the
preemption and matching provisions
have been in the pro forma OATT since
Order No. 888, but questions the extent
to which they have been fully
implemented into the business practices
of all transmission providers. TranServ
argues that transmission customers
would prefer to have transaction
certainty once they have confirmed
service instead of remaining in an
uncertain, conditional state up until the
relevant scheduling deadline. TranServ
also suggests that retention of the
preemption policy will impede
development of the secondary market
for transmission capacity, questioning
whether customers would see any value
in entering into a secondary market
purchase that is subject to preemption
or understand their rights and
obligations, and those of the assignee, in
the event preemption occurs.
781. If the Commission retains the
priority for longer term service,
TranServ requests clarification of how
preemption is to be implemented in
certain circumstances. TranServ
questions whether a reservation for
consecutive terms of service is
considered ‘‘unconditional’’ in its
entirety when the first increment of
service becomes unconditional. For a
reservation for three consecutive days of
daily service, TranServ asks whether
that entire reservation (three days) is
considered unconditional one day prior
to the start of service, or whether only
the first day of that three-day
reservation becomes unconditional and
not subject to preemption.
782. Ameren maintains that the
Commission should include priority for
pre-confirmed long-term firm requests
to ensure that long-term uses are
allocated to those customers that have
the greatest demand. Ameren contends
that excluding long-term firm requests
from consideration as pre-confirmed
requests may distort the transmission
service queue and affect existing longterm firm uses of the grid, such as
agreements eligible for rollover rights,
by triggering the requirement to match
a competing request that has not been
confirmed. Ameren requests that the
Commission require priority for preconfirmed requests of all durations of
firm service or, at a minimum, require
that any request that competes with a
long-term firm transmission service
agreement eligible for rollover must be
pre-confirmed.
783. E.ON U.S. argues that it is not
clear what happens to a pre-confirmed
request if the transmission provider
only can provide the requested service
if additional facilities are constructed.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
E.ON U.S. requests clarification whether
an offer to provide service if additional
facilities are constructed is a
counteroffer that allows the customer
submitting a pre-confirmed request to
decline service.
784. Tenaska requests additional
flexibility regarding the withdrawal of
pre-confirmed requests. Tenaska
suggests that the Commission establish
a defined period, up to the point prior
to the processing of the request by the
transmission provider, during which
pre-confirmed, non-firm and short-term
firm point-to-point transmission service
requests may be withdrawn for any
reason and without penalty. Tenaska
argues this flexibility is necessary to
ensure that point-to-point customers are
not competitively disadvantaged vis-avis network service customers when
obtaining ATC, since network customers
pay no additional cost for transmission
they cannot use.
785. Southern suggests that the
Commission allow transmission
providers working through NAESB
sufficient time to develop procedures
for processing competing pre-confirmed
requests, including how a request whose
evaluation is in progress should or
should not be impacted by a new preconfirmed request received prior to such
evaluation being completed.
Commission Determination
786. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to give
priority based on pre-confirmed status
only to short-term firm and long-term
non-firm requests for service. As the
Commission explained in Order No.
890, the Commission was mindful that
the pre-confirmation process could
disrupt the transmission study process,
undermine longer-term uses of the
transmission system, or disadvantage
transmission customers that are not in a
position to pre-confirm their requests.
Restricting the scope of transmission
service requests receiving priority for
pre-confirmation status to short-term
firm and long-term non-firm service
requests is necessary in order to
minimize disruptions with existing
study procedures and power
procurement practices in place for longterm firm service requests. We believe
this appropriately balances the need to
promote long-term transmission rights
against the need for increased certainty
for customers seeking shorter-term firm
and non-firm service.299 Similarly, we
299 As we explain in section III.D.2.c, a customer
exercising a rollover right is only required to match
a bona fide competing commitment to take service,
evidenced for example by a pre-confirmed
transmission request or the execution of a
contingent service contract.
PO 00000
Frm 00098
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
decline to alter the Commission’s longstanding policy of giving longer
duration requests for service priority
over shorter duration requests. To do so
would undermine the Commission’s
goal of encouraging longer term uses of
the transmission system.
787. We clarify in response to E.ON
U.S. that, in the event an offer for
service on a pre-confirmed request can
only be accommodated by additions to
the transmission provider’s
transmission system, the transmission
customer may: (1) Take a shorter term
of service, if available; (2) agree to
undertake any upgrades that may be
necessary to accommodated the
transmission requests; or (3) decline
service. The Commission rejects
Tenaska’s proposal to adopt a deadline
prior to which a transmission customer
may withdraw a pre-confirmed
transmission service request. Providing
an opportunity to pre-confirm
applications is intended to reduce
overloading of transmission study
queues and minimize the amount of
transmission requests later withdrawn
from the study queue, increasing the
efficiency of processing transmission
service requests. Allowing transmission
customers to withdraw pre-confirmed
transmission service requests without
reason or penalty as suggested by
Tenaska would undermine the very
reason pre-confirmation status has been
given a priority.
788. We decline Southern’s request to
extend the effectiveness of the reforms
regarding pre-confirmation priority
pending development of related
business practices by NAESB. We
believe that Order No. 890 provides
sufficient guidance for transmission
providers to implement this priority in
advance of any standardization efforts
that may be undertaken through the
NAESB process.
789. With respect to TranServ’s
question regarding application of the
right of first refusal for eligible
customers with requests for service over
multiple days, the Commission clarifies
that a competing request must exceed
the total term of service in order to
trigger the right of first refusal. Thus, in
order for a competing request of equal
price to preempt a reservation for three
conservative days of daily service, that
request must be for four consecutive
days or longer and must be received at
least one day before the first day of the
original customer’s three-day term of
service.
790. Upon review of tariff provisions
governing pre-confirmation of
transmission service requests, the
Commission has determined that the
language adopted in Order No. 890 did
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
not fully capture the Commission’s
intent of allowing all eligible customers
the opportunity to pre-confirm shortterm firm and non-firm reservations. As
currently written, the language of
sections 1.39, 17.2 and 18.2 of the pro
forma OATT make pre-confirmation
available only to those that are already
transmission customers, rather than all
eligible customers. The Commission has
revised those sections of the pro forma
OATT to more accurately reflect our
intent that pre-confirmation service
should be available to all eligible
customers seeking short-term firm and
non-firm transmission services.
(2) Price as a Tie-Breaker
791. In Order No. 890, the
Commission added price as a tie-breaker
in determining reservation queue
priority when the transmission provider
is willing to discount transmission
service, so that price will serve as a tie
breaker after pre-confirmation status.
The Commission clarified that, in the
event a later queued short-term request
for transmission service preempts a
conditionally confirmed short-term
request for transmission service based
on price, the conditionally confirmed
request has a right to match the price
offer of the later queued request.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
792. E.ON U.S. requests clarification
that the use of price as a tie-breaker
means that a customer that is receiving
service and that is not otherwise subject
to a discount will receive a reservation
priority over one who receives a
discount. E.ON U.S. states that
transmission service is not provided at
market-based rates and, thus, using
price as a tie-breaker cannot mean that
a customer offering a market-based price
is to be rewarded with reservation
priority.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
793. We agree with E.ON U.S. that use
of price as a tie-breaker does not mean
that a customer is offering to be charged
a market-based rate by the transmission
provider. Under section 13.2 of the pro
forma OATT, price serves as a tiebreaker among competing service
requests of equal duration only when
the transmission provider has offered a
discount or a ‘‘below ceiling rate’’ on
transmission service. Transmission
providers may not charge rates above
those stated in their OATT for primary
transmission capacity.300
300 The Commission addresses the reassignment
of transmission service in the secondary market in
section III.C.3.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
(3) Five-Minute Window for Requests
794. The Commission determined in
Order No. 890 that the first-come, firstserved policy for transmission service
under the pro forma OATT should
remain largely intact. The Commission
allowed, but did not generally require,
transmission providers to propose a
window within which all transmission
service requests the transmission
provider receives will be deemed to
have been submitted simultaneously.
Only transmission providers that have
adopted a ‘‘no earlier than’’ time for
submitting transmission service requests
were required to treat transmission
service requests received within a
specified period of time as having been
received simultaneously. The
Commission stated that the submittal
window for these transmission
providers must be open for at least five
minutes unless the transmission
provider can present a compelling
rationale to justify a shorter submittal
window. The Commission required
these and any other transmission
providers deeming requests submitted
within a specified period as having been
submitted simultaneously to propose a
method for allocating transmission
capacity if requests submitted within
the same time period exceed available
capacity.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
795. Powerex and Southern protest
the Commission’s departure from the
long-standing first-come, first-served
priority scheme. Powerex contends that,
of the commenters supporting a
simultaneous-priority window, none
presented evidence that they were less
sophisticated, had fewer financial
resources, or had encountered
prohibitively high software and other
costs associated with operating an
efficient transmission reservation desk.
Powerex argues that the Commission
mischaracterized support for the
window proposal, stating that half of the
critics of the proposed window provide
and/or use transmission predominantly
within the Western Interconnection.
796. Powerex, Southern, and Tenaska
suggest that use of a simultaneous
priority window will lead to
implementation and operational
problems, requiring transmission
providers to allocate transmission
capacity among multiple requesting
customers, resulting in customers
potentially receiving unusable blocks of
capacity. Powerex contends that the
Commission has relied on first-come,
first-served priority in other contexts
based on a similar concern that pro rata
allocation of scarce capacity may result
PO 00000
Frm 00099
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3081
in blocks too small for the customer to
use.301 If the Commission does not grant
rehearing on this issue, Southern asks
the Commission, at a minimum, to
clarify that NAESB will be permitted to
address and resolve in a uniform
fashion the numerous operational issues
associated with treating all requests
received within a certain timeframe as
having been received simultaneously.
797. Powerex further argues that, with
a pro rata window approach,
transmission customers with multiple
affiliates will be able to secure more
usable blocks of capacity by pooling
their requests through reassignment,
while single-entity customers will
confront numerous transaction obstacles
to obtain a similar result. Powerex again
points to precedent in the gas context,
arguing that the Commission recognized
similar concerns to support a first-come,
first-served approach for reserving
pipeline capacity.302 Powerex argues
that the Commission failed to address
these concerns. Finally, Powerex objects
to the Commission’s characterization of
the first-come, first-served priority
structure as arbitrary, arguing that a
specified window is equally arbitrary
since it separates by a millisecond those
that fall within the simultaneous
window and those that fall outside.
798. If the Commission declines to
grant rehearing of the use of a
simultaneous priority window, Powerex
requests clarification regarding its
implementation. First, Powerex
contends that a simultaneous window
must commence at the start of the ‘‘no
later than’’ hour and conclude five
minutes later, and not be a ‘‘rolling
window’’ that groups together service
requests submitted within five minutes
of each other. Second, Powerex requests
clarification that the simultaneous
priority window would not apply to
hourly transmission service, to the
extent it is offered by the transmission
provider, arguing that there is
insufficient time for customers to
monitor the multitude of various
transmission providers’ windows for
hourly requests and that potential pro
rata allocations of hourly service would
have little value to customers.
799. Tenaska similarly argues that the
Commission must provide clear,
uniform guidance as to what methods
will, and will not, be acceptable for
allocating transmission capacity when
there is insufficient capacity to satisfy
requests deemed to have been submitted
simultaneously, as well as further
guidance regarding the window period
301 Citing Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 108 FERC
¶ 61,049 (2004).
302 Citing id.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3082
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
that a transmission provider may
designate. Tenaska contends that the
Commission has given transmission
providers too much discretion by
allowing them to propose a method for
allocating transmission capacity if
sufficient capacity is not available to
meet all requests submitted within the
specified time period. Tenaska argues
that such discretion is a potential
breeding ground for undue
discrimination and, therefore, that the
Commission should provide additional
guidance to ensure that the methods for
allocating transmission capacity
minimize the opportunity for gaming.
800. Ameren asks the Commission to
clarify that any proposal to voluntarily
adopt an equivalent priority standard
must be clearly defined and supported.
Ameren suggests that an applicant
submitting a proposal for a five-minute
equivalent priority standard must make
clear whether it is proposing to use a
rolling five-minute window or whether
it will use a series of discrete fiveminute windows. Ameren contends the
applicant also should be required to
clearly explain what sort of tie-breaking
mechanisms it will use.
801. EEI asks the Commission to
clarify the requirement to adopt a
submittal window is not triggered by a
‘‘no earlier than’’ time for requests for
non-firm service. EEI notes that section
18.3 of the pro forma OATT requires all
transmission providers to impose limits
on how early a request for non-firm
service may be submitted. EEI therefore
argues that the requirement to adopt a
submittal window should apply only to
transmission providers that have
established a ‘‘no earlier than’’ time for
requests for firm point-to-point or
network service.
Commission Determination
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
802. The Commission denies
rehearing of the Commission’s decision
in Order No. 890 to require transmission
providers that have adopted a ‘‘no
earlier than’’ time for submitting
requests for firm transmission service to
treat all requests received within a
specified period of time as having been
received simultaneously.303 We agree
with petitioners that the Commission’s
long-standing first-come, first-served
policy is a simple and efficient way for
transmission providers to allocate firm
303 We agree with EEI that the requirement to
establish a submittal window applies to those
transmission providers that have adopted a ‘‘no
earlier than’’ time for the submission of firm pointto-point or network service. The pro forma OATT
contains a ‘‘no earlier than’’ time that applies to
requests for non-firm point-to-point service, which
we do not intend to trigger the requirement to
establish a submittal window.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
transmission capacity among competing
service requests. For this reason, Order
No. 890 generally grants transmission
providers the discretion to determine
which transmission services, if any, will
be subject to a submittal window. The
Commission recognized only one
exception to this rule: when the
transmission provider has established
dates before which requests for firm
transmission service will not be
accepted.
803. As the Commission explained in
Order No. 890, the first-come, firstserved policy can disadvantage certain
transmission customers when a ‘‘no
earlier than’’ restriction is in place.304
Such a restriction forces transmission
customers competing for transmission
capacity to precisely time their requests
for service such that they are received
after the ‘‘no earlier than’’ time, yet
before other customers. This has the
potential of disadvantaging transmission
customers that are less sophisticated
and have fewer financial resources. The
Commission stated in Order No. 890
that, when considering requests for firm
transmission service received after the
‘‘no earlier than’’ time has expired, there
is no meaningful difference between
those received seconds ahead of another
because one customer’s computer is
slower than another and no petitioner
argues otherwise on rehearing.305
804. We clarify in response to Ameren
and Powerex that each transmission
provider has discretion to determine
how its submittal window will be
implemented, including the point at
which the window goes into effect.
Although the Commission agrees with
Powerex, in principle, that it would be
logical for submittal windows to begin
on the first minute of the ‘‘no earlier
than’’ time, we will not categorically
dismiss alternatives to this arrangement
since these procedures are best
reviewed on a case-by-case basis.
Similarly, any transmission provider
that has implemented hourly firm pointto-point service should address how the
submittal window would be
implemented for that service, including
any limitations on the use of a submittal
window for that product. It is more
appropriate for the Commission to
consider customer concerns regarding
use of a submittal window for hourly
firm transmission service in the context
of the transmission provider’s particular
proposal.
805. The Commission recognizes that
developing methods to allocate capacity
among requests received during a
submittal window may require detailed
304 See
Order No. 890 at P 1419.
305 Id.
PO 00000
Frm 00100
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
procedures, particularly when
transmission requests received
simultaneously exceed available
capacity. As the Commission explained
in Order No. 890, however, we believe
that each transmission provider is in the
best position to develop allocation
procedures that are suitable for its
system. This does not preclude
transmission providers from working
through NAESB to develop standardized
practices, as suggested by Southern. For
example, as we pointed out in Order No.
890, allocation methods such as that
used by PJM to allocate monthly firm
point-to-point transmission service
could provide useful guidance in
developing general allocation
procedures.306
806. The Commission disagrees with
Tenaska that allowing transmission
providers to develop a methodology to
allocate insufficient capacity will lead
to undue discrimination. As Ameren
suggests, each transmission provider
must clearly define and support its
allocation methodology in its tariff and,
thus, customers can raise any concerns
regarding the potential for
discrimination during the Commission’s
review of the relevant tariff language.
Once the tariff language is in place,
transmission customers can, and
should, bring to the Commission’s
attention any failure by the transmission
provider to follow its tariff. While the
Commission could remove transmission
provider discretion in this area by
adopting a single, one-size-fits-all
approach, such as a mandatory pro rata
distribution methodology, this approach
may not produce the best result in all
cases. As the very precedent cited by
petitioners acknowledges, every
allocation methodology has advantages
and disadvantages.307 We reiterate our
belief that transmission providers are in
the best position to determine which
allocation mechanism works best for
their systems.
(4) Right of First Refusal and
Preemption
807. The Commission declined in
Order No. 890 to otherwise change the
‘‘first come, first served’’ nature of the
306 See
id. at P 1422.
Trailblazer Pipeline Co., 108 FERC
¶ 61,049 at P 41. The Commission in that case
accepted a pipeline’s proposal not to use pro rata
allocations in the event tie breaking was necessary
out of a concern that resulting amounts of capacity
would be too small to be of real use to a shipper.
Shippers, however, had argued for use of pro rata
allocations to increase the number of parties that
could serve a market. Based on the circumstances
of that case, the Commission accepted the proposal
to use a first-in-time tiebreaking methodology. It
does not follow, however, that use of a pro rata
allocation would be inappropriate in all
circumstances.
307 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
reservation process or right of first
refusal process. The Commission
explained that, when a longer-term
request seeks capacity allocated to
multiple shorter-term requests, the
shorter-term customers should have
simultaneous opportunities to exercise
the right of first refusal. The
Commission also stated that, to
minimize the potential for gaming, a
preempting longer request must be for a
fixed capacity over the term of the
request. The Commission also revised
section 13.2(iii) of the pro forma OATT
to more clearly distinguish between the
use of the terms ‘‘request’’ and
‘‘reservation’’ for purposes of
administering the right of first refusal.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
808. TranServ contends that the
Commission did not fully address in
Order No. 890 the procedures governing
the right of first refusal competition and
its potential for gaming. If a longer-term
request initiates a right of first refusal
competition among multiple shorterterm customers, TranServ requests
clarification of whether there should be
rounds of bidding and, if so, what the
timing of that process should be.
TranServ also asks what should happen
in the event that a longer duration (not
pre-confirmed) request is withdrawn in
the middle of a competition, i.e.,
whether those customers that opted to
match are allowed out of their longer
duration reservations and whether those
that opted not to match are re-instated
to their original capacity. TranServ
suggests that, before any preemptions
are initiated, the longer duration, higher
priority request must be confirmed and
locked in with the competing customer
before turning to the right of first refusal
rights holders and seeking their intent to
match to preserve their service priority.
In addition to locking in the longer
duration customer prior to initiating
preemption and right of first refusal,
TranServ argues that the transmission
provider should be required to provide
a ‘‘counter-offer’’ matching request to
the customer being preempted that they
may then elect to ignore or withdraw, or
confirm to retain their service priority.
TranServ further questions what the
transmission provider’s obligation is if
the customer being preempted exercises
its right of first refusal by submitting a
longer duration request which cannot be
granted without preemption of yet
another request.
809. TranServ also questions
implementation of the right of first
refusal in the event transmission
capacity is reassigned. Assuming that a
customer with a confirmed reservation
for one week resells capacity for one
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
day, TranServ asks whether the reseller,
the assignee, or both have responsibility
to match a competing longer-term
request received by the transmission
provider. TranServ states that this issue
was considered by NAESB during WEQ
discussions and that, during those
discussions, there was serious
consideration given to not allowing the
resale of short-term firm prior to its
unconditional deadline.
810. TranServ further questions what
a shorter-term transmission customer’s
obligation is if the longer-term service
request only preempts a portion of the
short-term customer’s service. TranServ
suggests that the term ‘‘match’’ in such
instances be limited to an exact match
of duration with no option for the
preempted customer to go beyond those
bounds and that the capacity of the
match should be in the amount that
would need to be recalled from the
preempted customer to satisfy the
longer duration request.
811. Duke argues that the right of first
refusal regime for transactions as short
as one day for firm and one hour for
non-firm is overly complicated and will
leave customers confused and
unsatisfied as to whether and when they
can be assured that they have secured
transmission capacity. Duke provides
detailed hypotheticals of the right of
first refusal competition process,
arguing that the process is cumbersome
and could lead to anomalous and
unwarranted outcomes. Duke urges that
the Commission place the following
limits on the right of first refusal:
Require that matching requests be preconfirmed and at full tariff price, and
that they be for the same amount (MW)
and duration as the competing requests;
and, provide that rights of first refusal
are only offered when there is no impact
on reservations that are not on
constrained interfaces. With these
limitations in place, Duke contends that
the transmission provider will not have
had to entertain multiple right of first
refusal rounds that in some instances
may leave capacity on the table and
force customers to buy more service
than they may have required.
812. Bonneville seeks clarification as
to how duration, pre-confirmation
status, price and time of response
should be used to determine the order
in which the multiple, preempted
shorter-term requests may exercise the
right of first refusal. By providing
several hypotheticals, Bonneville states
that it cannot envision a circumstance
in which a right of first refusal is offered
to a request when the transmission
provider does not have capacity to
satisfy that request. Bonneville requests
that the Commission either delete the
PO 00000
Frm 00101
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3083
two sentences in section 13.2(iii) of the
pro forma OATT concerning this issue
or clarify how the transmission provider
is expected to apply them.
813. Bonneville also requests
clarification regarding which customers
have a right of first refusal under section
13.2 of the pro forma OATT. Although
the Commission amended the second
sentence in section 13.2(iii) of the pro
forma OATT to grant eligible customers
with a ‘‘reservation’’ a right of first
refusal to match longer-term ‘‘requests,’’
other sentences in that section still refer
to preemption of shorter-term
‘‘requests’’ for service instead of
‘‘reservations.’’ Bonneville states that
this suggests that shorter-term requests
maintain a right of first refusal.
Bonneville also contends that the first
sentence of section 13.2(iii), providing
that ‘‘requests’’ for longer term service
may preempt ‘‘requests for shorter term
service’’ up to specified deadlines,
suggests that a longer duration request
simply preempts a shorter duration
request, which is not offered a right of
first refusal. Bonneville argues that this
would violate the first-come, first-served
rule, yet if the longer duration request
is offered a right of first refusal, it would
contradict the amended language of
section 13.2(iii), under which only
longer duration ‘‘reservations’’ have a
right of first refusal.
Commission Determination
814. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 not to change
the ‘‘first-come, first served’’ nature of
the reservation process and the right of
first refusal. These policies have worked
well in the past and, as we explain in
Order No. 890, benefit transmission
providers and customers alike by
facilitating the administration of the
reservation process and removing
confusion about how to comply.
815. We disagree with Duke and
TranServ that the right of first refusal
policies should be revised based on
complex hypotheticals involving the
preemption of multiple short-term
reservations. The complexities pointed
to by these commenters do not by
themselves warrant changing the right
of first refusal rule. Even though we
recognize the potential for complexities
to arise under the right of first refusal
rule, we believe them to be relatively
limited. In the off-chance that multiple
eligible customers with short-term
reservations choose to exercise their
right of first refusal for the same
capacity simultaneously, the
Commission believes that they should
have a right to do so.
816. We therefore decline to expand
upon the language of the pro forma
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3084
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
OATT to account for every factual
scenario that could arise under sections
13.2 and 14.2 of the pro forma OATT.
Sections 13.2 and 14.2 of the pro forma
OATT set forth adequate guidance for
transmission providers to fairly
administer competing requests,
including the priorities for determining
which reservations or requests trump
one another as well as the timeframes
for eligible customers to respond to
competing requests. As noted above, we
recognize that certain unique cases can
present difficult allocation issues, but
conclude that these extreme cases arise
infrequently in the normal course of
business. In the vast majority of cases,
we believe the right of first refusal rules
are efficient and easy to administer
without further amending the governing
tariff language, as Bonneville and
Southern suggest.
817. To the extent necessary, the
Commission clarifies that a ‘‘competing
request’’ under sections 13.2 and 14.2 of
the pro forma OATT may include a
transmission service request that
overlaps with only part of another
existing transmission service reservation
since both requests cannot be granted
simultaneously. Accordingly, a
‘‘competing request’’ for purposes of
sections 13.2 and 14.2 may also include
a transmission service request for which
transmission capacity cannot be
accommodated without preempting one
or more existing transmission
reservations of parts thereof.
818. In response to TranServ and
Duke, we clarify that sections 13.2 and
14.2 allow an eligible customer to retain
its original reservation by matching the
competing service request’s cost or
duration terms exactly or by exceeding
one or more of the terms of a competing
transmission service request. Since any
‘‘match’’ by an eligible customer in
response to a potentially preempting
request, by definition, either exceeds the
costs, duration or both of the eligible
customer’s original reservation, we do
not believe eligible customers opting to
match a competing request have a strong
incentive, if any, to ‘‘match’’ a
competing request with terms that
exceed the competing request.
Nevertheless, we do not see any harm
resulting from a match that exceeds the
exact terms of a competing request and
therefore believe it would not be
appropriate to preclude the ability of
eligible customers to make such a
request.
819. With regard to reassignments of
capacity in the secondary market, we
clarify that the associated right of first
refusal under sections 13.2 and 14.2 of
the pro forma OATT to match a
competing transmission service request
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
applies to the primary transmission
service, not the reassignment of
scheduling rights. Using TranServ’s
example, the reassignment of one day of
a customer’s weekly service would not
cause the assignor or the assignee to
match a competing three day request for
service since the initial one week
reservation already exceeded the
competing request. The fact that one day
of service has been reassigned does not
alter the assignor’s entitlement to use
service for the remaining week reserved.
820. Finally, we grant rehearing to
revise sections 13.2 and 14.2 of the pro
forma OATT to clarify, as Bonneville
requests, the terms and obligations of
sections 13.2 and 14.2 of the pro forma
OATT.
5. Designation of Network Resources
821. In Order No. 890, the
Commission addressed certain issues
with respect to the qualification,
documentation and undesignation of
resources by a network customer. A
number of petitioners request rehearing
and clarification of the Commission’s
rulings on these issues. We address each
of these issues in turn.
a. Qualification as a Network Resource
(1) LD Contracts
822. In Order No. 890, the
Commission affirmed its existing policy
that a power purchase agreement may
be designated as a network resource
provided it is not interruptible for
economic reasons, does not allow the
seller to fail to perform under the
contract for economic reasons, and
requires the network customer to pay for
the purchase. The Commission
concluded that power purchases with a
firm liquidated damages (LD) provision
may be eligible for designation as a
network resource if the contract
obligates the supplier, in the case of
interruption for reasons other than force
majeure, to make the aggrieved buyer
financially whole by reimbursing them
for the additional costs, if any, of
replacement power. The Commission
found that the ‘‘make whole’’ LD
provisions in the EEI firm LD product
and the WSPP Schedule C agreement
satisfy this requirement.308
308 The Commission further concluded that the
WSPP Schedule C agreement appeared to allow
interruptions for reasons other than reliability and,
as a result, was ineligible for designation as a
network resource. The Commission exercised its
discretion not to invalidate existing designations of
the WSPP Schedule C agreement except under
certain conditions. WSPP subsequently amended
the Schedule C agreement to expressly prohibit
interruptions for reasons other than reliability. See
Western Systems Power Pool, 119 FERC ¶ 61,123
(2007).
PO 00000
Frm 00102
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
823. NCPA contends that the EEI Firm
LD Product does not provide recovery
for certain types of penalties that a
buyer may incur as a result of nondelivery and, therefore, does not make
buyers sufficiently whole to justify
designation as a network resource.
NCPA states that Section 1.51 of the EEI
Firm LD Product prohibits the
reimbursement price from including
‘‘any penalties, ratcheted demand or
similar charges.’’ NCPA states that its
contract with the California ISO
provides for significant penalties if
NCPA operates outside of its deviation
band, but there is no avenue under the
EEI Firm LD Product to recover those
costs if occasioned by a seller’s failure
to deliver.
824. NCPA also contends that the
WSPP Schedule C contract fails to
explicitly allow buyers to recover their
costs if they decide to cover a nondelivery by running their own more
expensive generation. NCPA states that
the issue has been discussed at WSPP
meetings, but there appears to be no
clear consensus that sellers are obligated
to pay compensation for internal
generation under the current language of
the agreement when it is more
expensive than the market cost of
power. NCPA argues that this
interpretation could be particularly
problematic for entities such as NCPA,
as NCPA may prefer to run even very
expensive generation to avoid penalties
imposed by the California ISO.
825. NCPA argues that the
Commission established a clear and
straightforward standard that an LD
clause was acceptable if it required the
buyer to be made whole in the event of
a failure to deliver. NCPA argues that
the Commission can resolve the factual
issues by directing that these form
contracts be amended to require sellers
who elect not to deliver (other than for
force majeure) to make the buyer whole
in all respects, including contractual or
market penalties and the costs of the
buyer operating its own resources.
826. Ameren argues that the
Commission’s decision that purchase
agreements containing make whole LD
provisions can qualify as network
resources ignores reliability. Ameren
maintains that the key issue is whether
such LD products can function as a
resource to provide power, not whether
the power purchaser will be adequately
compensated in the event of a breach.
Even with a make whole payment
provision in place, Ameren argues that
it may still be in the economic interest
of the seller to interrupt delivery. While
the Commission has appropriately
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
recognized that this self-interest
warrants finding that other types of LD
contracts cannot be designated as
network resources, Ameren contends
that the Commission fails to explain
why it should not apply the same
standard to purchase agreements with
make whole LD provisions.
827. Ameren also expresses concern
that purchase agreements with make
whole LD provisions may be doublecounted when determining capacity,
resulting in inadequate physical
supplies to meet the simultaneous
capacity needs of all purchasers in the
event replacement power is needed.
Ameren argues that allowing these types
of contracts to qualify as network
resources is inconsistent with the pro
forma OATT because under such
contracts there are no specific resources
that can be called on. Ameren questions
whether LD products are sufficiently
firm to meet the applicable NERC or
regional reliability council requirements
for firm resources or as capacity
resources.
828. PJM raises a similar concern,
asking the Commission to confirm that
firm power purchase agreements with
make whole LD provisions do not
qualify as capacity resources in the PJM
region even if they can be designated as
network resources under the pro forma
OATT. PJM argues that service as a
capacity resource in the PJM region
raises different considerations than
those addressed in Order No. 890.
829. Noting that parties often modify
form agreements to suit their particular
transactions, Duke requests clarification
that a purchase based on the EEI Master
Agreement qualifies as a designated
network resource only to the extent that
the network customer has, in fact,
contracted for a firm resource that may
be interrupted only for reliability
purposes. Duke also requests
clarification that an agreement that is
not modeled after the EEI Master
Agreement will qualify as a designated
network resource only if it provides for
delivery of a product similar to the EEI
Firm LD Product (i.e., it cannot be
interrupted for economic reasons).
830. EPSA requests clarification that
the Commission’s statement in Order
No. 890 that firm LD contracts create for
the buyer a contractual right to
generation was not intended to require
that a firm LD contract include a
contractual right to the output of a
specific generating facility.
831. PNM seeks confirmation that a
particular long-term power purchase
agreement between itself and
Southwestern Public Service Company
(SPS) is eligible for designation as a
network resource. While the terms of
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
this agreement allow for a specified
level of curtailment by SPS each month
for any reason, the operating procedures
governing the agreement provide for
curtailment and interruption only for
system emergencies. PNM argues that
this agreement is therefore sufficiently
firm to be designated as a network
resource.309
Commission Determination
832. The Commission affirms the
finding in Order No. 890 that the make
whole LD provisions in the EEI firm LD
product and the WSPP Schedule C
agreement are sufficiently firm to make
those agreements eligible for
designation as a network resource. In
Order No. 890, the Commission
distinguished between LD provisions
that make the aggrieved buyer
financially whole by reimbursing the
additional costs, if any, of replacement
power and LD provisions that establish
penalties at a fixed-dollar amount, cap
penalties at some level, or are otherwise
not equivalent to a general make whole
provision.310 The Commission
explained that, under the latter type of
LD provision, the seller need only
compare its savings from interruption
with the specified LD penalty when
deciding whether to interrupt. The EEI
firm LD product and the WSPP
Schedule C agreement make the buyer
adequately whole and, therefore,
appropriately qualify for designation as
a network resource.
833. With respect to the EEI firm LD
product, section 1.51 of the EEI Master
Agreement defines the replacement
price as either the prevailing market
price or, at the buyer’s option, the price
at which the buyer purchases a
replacement product plus costs
reasonably incurred in purchasing the
substitute product and any reasonably
incurred transmission charges to deliver
the product. While the replacement
price does not exclude penalties,
ratcheted demand, or similar charges, as
NCPA points out, that does not mean a
supplier has inadequate incentives to
deliver under the contract. The
aggrieved buyer is explicitly allowed to
cover the costs reasonably incurred to
purchase a substitute product and,
therefore, the seller must take into
consideration the buyer’s actual cost of
replacement power, which is our
principal concern.
834. With respect to the WSPP
Schedule C product, the Commission
did not require that contracts make the
buyer more than whole in the event it
309 Citing
Consolidated Edison v. Pub. Serv. Elec.
& Gas Co., 101 FERC ¶ 61,282 (2002).
310 See Order No. 890 at P 1453.
PO 00000
Frm 00103
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3085
chooses not to purchase less expensive
energy available in the market. Again,
the Commission is concerned that
suppliers providing resources that have
been designated by network customers
take into consideration the cost of
replacing that power should the
supplier decide to interrupt. It is
therefore adequate for a firm LD
contract, such as the WSPP Schedule C
agreement, to provide for recovery of the
market price of replacement power in
the event the buyer decides to run its
more expensive generation to cover the
interruption.
835. We disagree with Ameren that
allowing power purchase agreements
containing make whole LD provisions to
qualify for designation as network
resources will compromise reliability.
Firm energy purchases need not be
backed by capacity to qualify as network
resources since they are by definition
firm, consistent with the Commission’s
finding in Illinois Power.311 We
appreciate Ameren’s concerns that
system reliability be maintained and
would not expect double-counting of
supplies to result from our designation
rules. The proper mechanism for
addressing system reliability is through
the reliability standards, and not
through restrictions on eligibility for
network resource status. The
requirements for eligibility for network
resource status are intended to provide
the proper incentives to network
customers designating network
resources, and not to replace or replicate
reliability requirements.
836. Our decision is not, as Ameren
claims, inconsistent with the structure
of the pro forma OATT. As the
Commission acknowledged in Order No.
890, there may be situations in which
the supplier of a firm LD product is
presented with a net financial gain and
has an incentive to interrupt, but those
incentives are similar to those faced by
the owner of a generating unit that has
been designated as a network
resource.312 Ameren offers no reasons to
require power purchase agreements not
tied to a particular generating unit to be
more firm than those that are in order
to serve as a network resource under the
pro forma OATT.
837. We clarify in response to Duke
that we are not concerned with the
particular form used to contract for
resources. Each power purchase
agreement designated as a network
resource must meet the relevant
requirements. Whether a contract meets
311 Illinois Power Co., 102 FERC ¶ 61,257 at P 14
(2003), reh’g denied, 108 FERC ¶ 61,175 (2004)
(Illinois Power).
312 See Order No. 890 at P 1454.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3086
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
these requirements by being modeled
after any specific form contract has no
bearing on whether the contract is
eligible for designation as a network
resource. Consistent with Illinois Power,
a firm LD contract need not represent a
contractual right to the output of any
specific generating facility. Whether or
not such power purchase agreements
may serve as a capacity resource under
PJM’s Reliability Pricing Model (RPM) is
governed by the relevant RPM rules
adopted by PJM, which were not
addressed in Order No. 890.
838. In response to PNM, we decline
here to rule on whether a particular
purchase qualifies as a network resource
because the contract is not before us in
this rulemaking. We reiterate, however,
that power purchase agreements that are
not interruptible for economic reasons
may qualify for designation as a network
resource. If the binding rules governing
a particular agreement allow the seller
to curtail or interrupt service only for
system emergencies, then that
agreement would be eligible for
designation as a network resource,
provided it complied with the
remaining requirements of section
29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT.
(2) Off-System Resources
839. In order to ensure that
transmission providers have sufficient
information to determine the effect on
ATC associated with the designation of
an off-system network resource, the
Commission in Order No. 890 modified
section 29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT
to specify exactly what information
must be provided to designate an offsystem network resource. As revised by
Order No. 890, section 29.2(v) of the pro
forma OATT requires the following
information to be provided with the
request and posted on OASIS when
designating an off-system resource: (1)
Identification of the resource as an offsystem resource; (2) amount of power to
which the customer has rights; (3)
identification of the control area from
which the power will originate; (4)
delivery point(s) to the transmission
providers’ transmission system; and (5)
transmission arrangements on the
external transmission system(s).
Additionally, Order No. 890 revised
section 29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT
to require that the following information
be provided with off-system
designations, but that such information
must be masked on OASIS to prevent
the release of commercially sensitive
information including (1) any operating
restrictions (periods of restricted
operation, maintenance schedules,
minimum loading level of resource,
normal operating level of resource); and
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
(2) approximate variable generating cost
($/MWH) for redispatch computations.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
840. Duke argues that the
Commission’s finding that network
customers need only identify the control
area from which power will originate for
an off-system resource is inappropriate
in an era in which many control areas
encompass the transmission systems of
multiple operating companies. Duke
requests rehearing, arguing that the
Commission should require network
customers to provide more specific
information for multi-company systems
(like Southern) or for ISOs or RTOs.
Duke argues that designations such as
‘‘the Southern system’’ or ‘‘the PJM
system’’ do not provide sufficient
granularity to accurately model a
transaction. Duke maintains that a
network customer should at least be
required to specify the transmission
system (e.g., Georgia Power Company
for Southern, or Dominion Virginia
Power Company for PJM) from which
the power will originate.
841. Duke acknowledges that the
Commission stated in Order No. 890
that transmission providers could seek
amendments to their OATT via an FPA
section 205 filing if they believe that
they face unique circumstances that
require deviations from the pro forma
OATT to require additional granularity
in order to allow them to determine the
effects of designating network resources
on ATC. Duke argues that this is an
inadequate response to the problem,
stating that the standard for receiving
Commission approval of a variation
from the pro forma OATT has proved to
be a significant bar. Duke also argues
that transmission providers could
undermine consistency by developing
different manners in which to study and
analyze such designations. Instead,
Duke argues, this issue ought to be
resolved ‘‘up front’’ and on a consistent
basis, rather than in subsequent case-bycase skirmishes that may not provide
guidance for future disagreements.
842. TDU Systems disagree with Duke
in their post-technical conference
comments, arguing that the requirement
to identify the control area within
which an off-system resource is located
provides the appropriate balance. TDU
Systems contend that identification of
the control area allows control area
operators to calculate the effects on ATC
of the designation of an off-system
resource while protecting commercially
sensitive information about the specific
location of a customer’s generation
resources. Southern agrees that (at least
in the Eastern Interconnection)
requiring the identification of the
PO 00000
Frm 00104
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
‘‘control area(s)’’ gives the transmission
provider sufficient information to
reliably plan its system while also
providing the market with the flexibility
afforded by such off-system seller’s
choice contracts.
843. Several petitioners request
clarification that specification of the
control area is not required within
purchase agreements for generators
located off-system.313 These petitioners
argue that only the actual delivery point
for power (which could be a physical
resource, a liquid trading hub, and
interface point, or some other location)
is necessary for transmission system
modeling purposes. Information about
the originating control area, they
contend, is almost never known with
certainty at the time the request for
designation as a network resource is
made and, therefore, requiring such
specificity will effectively invalidate
such contracts as network resources.
Financial Service Joint Requestors and
Idaho Power contend that such a
requirement could have serious adverse
effects on liquidity, competition, and
risk management by limiting the ability
of marketers to participate in those
markets, restricting resource options for
LSEs. Financial Service Joint Requestors
maintain that participation in the
market by companies like its members
augments the number of highly
creditworthy counterparties willing and
able to supply power over mid-to-long
tenors to LSEs.
844. In their post-technical conference
comments, Financial Service Joint
Requestors argue that the Final Rule’s
acceptance of LD contracts conflicts
with the requirement in section 29.2(v)
to specify the control area(s) from which
the power is sourced, since an LD
contract may not provide that
information. Financial Service Joint
Requestors also argue that Order No.
890 could be interpreted to allow a
contract to qualify as a network resource
by identifying multiple control areas of
origin of the resource, although not the
resource itself. Financial Service Joint
Requestors state that there is likely to be
a wide range of control areas from
which power might ultimately be
sourced and listing each and every
possible originating control area (such
313 E.g., Financial Service Joint Requestors, Idaho
Power, Washington IOUs, and Morgan Stanley,
joined by Barrick Goldstrike Mines in its posttechnical conference comments. Washington IOUs
also argues that the requirement to identify the
originating control area ‘‘constitutes a direct
restriction on the ability of a utility to serve its
bundled retail load, and thus violates the
limitations on the Commission’s jurisdiction over
transmission in bundled retail transaction, citing
Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090
(8th Cir. 1999) and Order No. 890 at P 92–94.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
as listing all 33 control areas in the
Western Interconnection) seems to be
unduly burdensome and cumbersome.
845. APS and EEI, and Financial
Service Joint Requestors, joined by
Southwestern Utilities in their posttechnical conference comments, argue
that transmission providers should have
discretion to waive the requirement to
provide originating control area
information for proposed network
resources when such information is not
needed or is not meaningful for
determining impacts on ATC. APS and
EEI state that it uses an approved rated
path methodology to determine ATC,
under which the control area of an offsystem purchase delivered to one of its
liquid trading hub border interfaces
(Palo Verde or Four Corners) has no
effect on ATC calculations. APS and EEI
state that this contrasts with a flowbased ATC methodology, where the
specification of the originating control
area can affect the ATC on a
transmission provider’s system and,
therefore, be necessary to calculate ATC.
APS and EEI argue that requiring the
source control area for all purchased
power network resources will
significantly reduce the liquidity of
physical power markets at Palo Verde
and potentially elsewhere in the West.
APS and EEI argue that concerns about
discrimination could be addressed by
directing transmission providers to post
a nondiscriminatory policy on its
OASIS or directing NAESB to include
this issue in its business practices.
846. APS and EEI, and Southwestern
Utilities agree, in their post-technical
conference comments, that the Eastern
and Western Interconnections have very
different physical configurations,
operating modes and planning modes
that have implications for the
Commission’s rules for designating offsystem network resources. In the
Eastern Interconnect, EEI argues,
contract paths have little bearing on
how electrons actually flow, and thus it
is critical for transmission planners to
know the location, at least at the control
area level, of the generation when
reviewing requests to designate network
resources. In the Western
Interconnection, which uses a rated
path ATC calculation methodology, APS
and EEI, and Southwestern Utilities
argue that identification of the source
generation for an off-system resource is
not important. EEI explains that the
physical layout in the West is more of
a hub-and-spoke model where the only
information required to evaluate a
request to designate a network resource
is the point at which power is delivered
(often a trading hub). For these reasons,
EEI argues, seller’s choice contracts are
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
not appropriate for network resource
status in the Eastern Interconnection,
but work well in the Western
Interconnection.
847. Pacific Northwest IOUs also
agree, in their post-technical conference
comments, that it is not necessary in the
Western Interconnection for a
transmission provider to know the
source control area of a remote resource
in order to determine its effect on ATC,
since WECC path ratings incorporate
parallel flows and other operational
conditions. Pacific Northwest IOUs state
that it is only necessary for a
transmission provider in the WECC to
know the border location at which
power will be delivered to its system in
order to determine the effect of the
designation on ATC.
848. Morgan Stanley similarly argues,
in its post-technical conference
comments, that, at a minimum, source
control area information for network
resources should not be required in
control areas where participants agree
that such information is not needed for
planning purposes. Morgan Stanley
suggests that the Commission should
create a default approach that explicitly
allows designations for off-system
network resources to not specify the
resource location.
849. APS and EEI state, in its posttechnical conference comments, that the
kinds of seller’s choice contracts at issue
(the WSPP Schedule C contracts) are
firm, physical contracts that require a
seller to deliver power at a specified
location. Such contracts, APS and EEI
argue, are an important resource for
most network customers, because they
are not unit contingent, and so sellers
must find alternative sources of power
and continue to perform even in the
event of an outage of a particular
generator. These contracts, APS and EEI
contend, are more dependable than
contracts that specify a specific
generator or control area.
850. APS and EEI further contend that
allowing flexibility of supply when it
does not adversely affect the
transmission provider is critical to
maintaining liquid power markets in the
West. The types of contracts which are
at issue, particularly when they are
executed with banks, allow physical
transactions that could not otherwise
occur due to credit quality issues. If the
banks conclude that the regulatory
constraints are too limiting and choose
to move to a financial rather than a
physical approach to trading power, an
important market, that is currently
available to APS and their customers,
will be adversely affected.
851. MISO and Duke oppose allowing
a seller’s choice contract that does not
PO 00000
Frm 00105
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3087
meet all of the section 29.2 requirements
to qualify as a designated network
resource. MISO argues that the
specification of the origin of supply
resources or control area improves
reliability in a tightly interconnected
grid. Duke agrees that, as amended,
section 29.2(v) appropriately requires
identification of the control area(s) from
which the power will originate. Duke
argues, however, that there is a facial
conflict between this tariff requirement
and the preamble, which indicates that
off-system seller’s choice contracts may
be designated network resources. Duke
maintains that, unlike a system sale that
designated a control area from which
the power will originate, a seller’s
choice contract does not require that
power actually originate from the
control area designated.
852. Southern notes, in its posttechnical conference comments, that the
more information that can be provided
to the transmission provider, the more
accurately it can model its system and,
in turn, calculate ATC. Thus, Southern
requests clarification that network
customers that have designated such an
off-system seller’s choice contract as a
network resource should provide to the
transmission provider as much
information as the customer has
regarding the actual, underlying
generating facilities from which the
power will be sourced.
853. On rehearing, TDU Systems
request clarification that a ‘‘delivery
point’’ as contemplated by section
29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT includes
any point on an interface where
deliveries are made. TDU Systems argue
that it is common in the industry to
purchase a system product from offsystem and deliver that product to any
interconnection point on the interface
between the system where the
customer’s native load is embedded and
the system in which the generation is
sourced. TDU Systems contend that this
is how the term ‘‘delivery point’’ is used
throughout the industry generally and,
in particular, in the NAESB WEQ
Glossary Subcommittee’s Preliminary
Draft Glossary which states that ‘‘a
delivery point can be a delivery node,
an aggregation of delivery nodes, an
interface or trading hub.’’ TDU Systems
contend that NERC’s Glossary of Terms
Used in Reliability Standards similarly
contemplates that a delivery point may
include an interface, defining ‘‘Point of
Delivery’’ as ‘‘a location * * * where an
Interchange Transaction leaves or a
Load-Serving Entity receives its
energy.’’ TDU Systems further argue that
current RTO markets embrace the
concept of interfaces as delivery points,
referring to a statement in section 30.2
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3088
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
of the PJM OATT that ‘‘in the event that
the Network Resource to be designated
will use interface capacity’’
contemplates interfaces as delivery
points.
854. Several post-technical conference
comments raised questions regarding
the need to specify a firm transmission
path for the upstream delivery of offsystem firm LD contracts designated as
network resources.314 Morgan Stanley
argues that sellers of firm LD contracts
typically hedge the risk of non-delivery
by purchasing a portfolio of paths and
sources for supply. If a non-firm path is
available that can enable delivery of
power used to source a designated
network resource, Morgan Stanley
contends that the use of that path
should be an option for the seller.
Morgan Stanley maintains that its
experience has shown that firm
transmission is often no more reliable
than non-firm transmission and is often
less reliable. By utilizing more flow
options, especially during high-load
periods, Morgan Stanley argues that
existing transmission capacity is better
utilized, as opposed to forcing users into
arbitrary firm paths.
855. Southwestern Utilities similarly
request that network customers only be
required to specify transmission
arrangements on external systems from
the point at which power is
contractually received to the delivery
point specified on the transmission
provider’s transmission system, rather
than from the source generator or
control area. Sellers of firm LD
contracts, Southwestern Utilities argue,
would frequently not be able to provide
a description of the upstream
transmission arrangements on external
transmission systems at the time the
sale to a network customer is made
because, just as with control area
location, sellers are reluctant to limit
their options well in advance of
delivery.
856. EPSA argues in post-technical
conference comments that the
Commission should require the
identification of neither the control area,
nor the point of delivery, for ‘‘into’’ firm
LD products. To do so would be, in
EPSA’s view, inconsistent with allowing
firm LD contracts to qualify for network
resource designation without
identification of specific physical
generation resources.
857. EPSA contends that, prior to the
effectiveness of Order No. 890, LSEs
have consistently been able to obtain
network resource designations for intoEntergy firm LD contracts, thereby
314 E.g., Barrick Goldstrike Mines, Morgan
Stanley, and Southwestern Utilities.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
ensuring that the LSEs could rely on
firm network transmission to deliver the
energy to their specific loads when their
suppliers delivered energy into the
Entergy system. EPSA maintains that,
beginning July 13, 2007, requests to
designate into-Entergy firm LD contracts
as network resources, even as daily
network transmission, have been denied
because LSEs have been unable to
provide Entergy with the source control
area and information about transmission
arrangements associated with a firm
transmission reservation that will be
used to deliver the firm LD contract.
858. EPSA explains that LSEs cannot
provide this information because, until
the energy is scheduled, the LSE does
not know the source control area and
transmission information. EPSA
maintains that, under the flexible terms
of the firm LD contract, however, the
seller takes full responsibility for
ensuring that the energy will be
delivered into the specified control area.
EPSA states that source and
transmission arrangement information is
provided when energy is scheduled, and
scheduling is made possible only
because appropriate transmission
arrangements have been made. If a seller
cannot make the appropriate
transmission arrangements to provide
energy into the Entergy system, EPSA
explains, it will have defaulted on its
contract to deliver a firm product into
Entergy. EPSA argues that, as noted in
Order No. 890, the liquidated damages
resulting from such a default makes the
buyer whole providing the basis for the
Commission’s determination that firm
LD contracts can be designated as
network resources.
859. EPSA argues that, at a minimum,
the Commission should clarify that
network customers are not required to
provide information as to source control
area and transmission arrangements
except on a day-ahead basis when such
information is made available through
required scheduling and tagging
procedures.
860. On rehearing, Washington IOUs
argue that any reliability concerns the
Commission might have about lack of
control area information at the time of
designation is alleviated by the fact that
the tagging information provided with a
schedule for a designated resource
contains all information to ensure
reliability.
Commission Determination
861. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to continue
to require identification of the control
area in which an off-system resource is
located and the delivery point(s) to the
transmission provider’s transmission
PO 00000
Frm 00106
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
system in order to designate the
resource as a network resource.
Providing both the control area in which
the off-system resource is located and
the delivery point(s) to the transmission
provider’s system is usually sufficiently
specific to allow a transaction to be
evaluated for its effects on ATC of the
local transmission system. As the
Commission acknowledged in Order No.
890, however, some transmission
providers might need additional
information in order to determine the
effects of designating off-system
resources on ATC and that such
transmission providers could propose
variations to the pro forma OATT in an
FPA section 205 filing.315 We continue
to believe that a generic rulemaking is
not the appropriate venue to make
accommodations for system-specific
issues faced by transmission providers
and, therefore, deny Duke’s request to
require more specific information
regarding the transmission system from
which power will originate.
862. Similarly, we decline to
generically relax the designation
requirements by eliminating the need to
identify the source control area for an
off-system resource or delivery point(s)
to the transmission provider’s
transmission system. The Commission’s
policy balances the need to accurately
model transactions for ATC and related
purposes and the flexibility of a seller
to source power from a range of
generators. We are unconvinced that
identification of the source control area
and delivery point(s) is not needed to
perform the ATC analysis in every
circumstance. We therefore reject
requests to allow designation of
purchased power contracts that provide
essentially no advance information
about the location or delivery of their
power sources. Waiting until the
scheduling timeframe for tagging
information fails to address the up-front
need for information in order to
accurately model ATC.
863. Several parties raise arguments
relevant to local and regional concerns
that merit consideration, but a generic
rulemaking is not the appropriate venue
to address such concerns. Transmission
providers that believe that their
circumstances warrant a variation from
the designation requirements of the pro
forma OATT may make a proposal
under section 205 of the FPA. We have
already approved one such request for
Puget Sound Energy, Inc., conditioned
on that company demonstrating that its
tariff variation continues to be
315 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 890 at P 1481.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
appropriate after the ATC
standardization process is complete.316
864. We disagree with Financial
Service Joint Intervenors’ contention
that there is an inconsistency between
the requirement in section 29.2(v) of the
pro forma OATT that the network
customer identify the control area from
which power is sourced and the finding
in Order No. 890 that firm LD contracts
are eligible for designation as network
resources. The Commission did not state
that every firm LD contract can be
designated as a network resource, but
rather that they are eligible for
designation. Such contracts must also
comport with the other requirements of
section 29.2 of the pro forma OATT,
including identifying the control area
from which the power will originate, to
actually be designated as a network
resource. A seller’s choice firm LD
contract therefore cannot be designated
until the source control area is disclosed
by the seller.317 The Commission’s
discussion of particular aspects of firm
LD contracts does not mean that
remaining requirements of section 29.2
no longer apply.
865. We decline to grant Southern’s
request to generically require that
network customers provide as much
information as they have regarding the
actual, underlying generating facilities
from which power will be sourced for
an off-system seller’s choice contract.
We encourage network customers to
share such information when they have
it, and encourage transmission
providers to develop business practices
to establish procedures through which
network customers can provide such
information, but conclude that a formal
requirement would be cumbersome to
administer and enforce. We believe that
the existing requirements generally
provide sufficient information to
evaluate a designation request.
866. Section 29.2(v) of the pro forma
OATT requires identification of the
‘‘delivery point(s) to the transmission
provider’s transmission system.’’ To the
extent necessary, we clarify that the
term ‘‘delivery point’’ does contemplate
an interface between the local
transmission provider’s transmission
system and the neighboring
transmission system from which power
is being received. In response to
Financial Service Joint Intervenors, we
clarify that the use of the plural ‘‘control
area(s)’’ in the revisions to section
316 See Puget Sound Energy, Inc., 120 FERC
¶ 61,232 (2007); see also Arizona Public Service
Company, 121 FERC ¶ 61,246 (2007).
317 See Order No. 890 at P 1481 (requiring
identification of source control area, rather than
more specific transmission system, prior to
designation of off-system seller’s choice contracts).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
29.2(v) adopted in Order No. 890 was
inadvertent and amend that language
accordingly in this order. We disagree
that a network customer could satisfy
the requirements of section 29.2(v) by
identifying multiple control areas, such
as all 33 control areas in the Western
Interconnection, from which a
particular transaction could be sourced.
867. In response to Barrick Goldstrike
Mines, Morgan Stanley, and
Southwestern Utilities, the Commission
clarifies that the requirement in section
29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT to
identify the transmission arrangements
on external systems applies to the
transmission leg from the resource being
designated to the transmission
provider’s transmission system. If an
off-system power purchase is
sufficiently firm to satisfy the
designation requirements, then the
transmission provider need not be
concerned with the upstream
transmission leg(s) from the generator(s)
to the point where the buyer takes title
of the firm power. Because the contract
itself is the resource being designated,
and that contract is firm in nature, it is
not necessary to demonstrate the
firmness of the upstream transmission
in order to designate the contract as a
network resource.
(3) On-System Resources
868. In response to a commenter
request, the Commission clarified in
Order No. 890 that a customer may not
designate as a network resource a
seller’s choice power purchase
agreement that is sourced by generating
units internal to the transmission
provider’s control area, since evaluating
the effect on ATC would be problematic.
The Commission stated that, if a
customer wishes to have a choice of
resources that are internal to the
particular transmission provider’s
control area from which to dispatch
power, it must designate each of the
resources as network resources. The
Commission did not specifically address
on-system system sales (i.e., purchases
from a specified generation system).318
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
869. Various concerns were raised in
post-technical conference comments
regarding a possible interpretation of
Order No. 890 as prohibiting the
designation of on-system system sales as
network resources.319 Some argue that
318 The Commission proposed in the NOPR to
maintain its current policy of allowing network
customers to designate resources from system
purchases not linked to a specific generating unit.
See NOPR at P 407.
319 E.g., Alabama Municipal, Hoosier, and TAPS
and APPA.
PO 00000
Frm 00107
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3089
such an interpretation would be
inconsistent with statements in the
NOPR and Order No. 890 that, when a
network customer is designating a
system purchase as a new network
resource, the source information
required in section 29.2(v) should
identify that the resource is a system
purchase and should identify the
control area from which the power will
originate.320 Given this discussion in
Order No. 890, TAPS and APPA argue
that the deletion of language requiring
‘‘description of purchased power
designated as a Network Resource
including source of supply, Control
Area location, transmission
arrangements and delivery point(s) to
the Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System’’ from section
29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT may
have been inadvertent. TAPS and APPA
state that they are unaware of any party
having argued against the eligibility of
on-system system sales for designation
as network resources and that, given the
absence of any indication of a problem
with these types of contracts, the
Commission should not implement such
a policy.
870. Alabama Municipal argues in its
post-technical conference comments
that designation of on-system system
sales as network resources does not
contribute to difficulties in computing
ATC. Alabama Municipal argues that
system sales contracts do identify the
source of power: the seller’s whole
generation fleet. Others argue in posttechnical conference comments that,
because system power is what utilities
use to supply retail load, wholesale
system power cannot do any more harm
to ATC calculations than the utility’s
service to its retail customers.321
871. Wisconsin Electric argues that
stand-alone transmission providers and
RTOs should be allowed to have
different rules regarding the designation
of on-system system sales as network
resources. Wisconsin Electric contends
that within MISO, for example,
deliverability studies are performed for
each resource to assess whether the
designated capacity is deliverable to the
MISO system and that, once that
deliverability test has been satisfied,
another load within MISO is able to
designate the same resource as a
network resource. Wisconsin Electric
further states that energy may not
actually be delivered from a designated
resource in a particular hour due to
MISO decisions on which units are
dispatched on an hour-by-hour basis.
320 See
NOPR at P 408; Order No. 890 at P 1435.
Alabama Municipal, Hoosier, NRECA
321 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3090
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
872. Others argue in post-technical
conference comments that prohibiting
the designation of on-system system
sales as network resources and requiring
the designation of specific generating
capacity would not be comparable to the
way the transmission provider operates
when serving its load.322 Some contend
that making system products more
difficult to use is contrary to the
Commission’s policy of encouraging and
facilitating use of long-term contracts
and contrary to the Commission’s
obligations under section 217(b)(4) of
the FPA.323
873. Many of the post-technical
conference comments raise concerns
regarding the burdens that would be
imposed on customers if they were
forced to re-structure their system
purchase contracts in order to
micromanage the designation of their
network resources. There is general
agreement that customers would be
subject to unauthorized use penalties
and would lose the benefits of
purchases from system products if they
were required to designate particular
units within the seller’s system.324 In
their view, requiring identification of
each individual generating station with
fixed amounts of generation and fixed
amounts of delivery would be chaotic
and overwhelming and would diminish
reliability.
874. TDU Systems and TAPS and
APPA argue in their post-technical
conference comments that, if on-system
system sales are not allowed to be
designated as network resources,
customers will be motivated to seek offsystem system products instead, leading
to pancaked transmission rates and the
loss of local transmission providers as
possible suppliers. TDU Systems also
argue that disallowing on-system system
sales to be designated as network
resources would, in some areas,
diminish the ability of the wholesale
transmission-dependent utility systems
322 E.g., Alabama Municipal, Hoosier, TDU
Systems, and TAPS and APPA.
323 E.g., Great Lakes, Hoosier, TDU Systems, and
TAPS and APPA.
324 E.g., Alabama Municipal, Duke, Great Lakes,
Hoosier, Kansas Power Pool, NRECA, PNGC Power,
TAPS and APPA, TDU Systems, and Wisconsin
Electric. PPL Parties also appear to support
allowing on-system system sales to be designated as
network resources. PPL Parties state that they
support allowing designation of on-system ‘‘seller’s
choice’’ contracts, but their comments about
increased reliability and reduced costs when
service is provided by a ‘‘fleet of generators’’
suggest they are specifically in support of allowing
designation of on-system system sales, and not
necessarily on-system seller’s choice contracts.
Southern also argues that system sales should be
allowed to be designated so long as the underlying
generating facilities are individually capable of
receiving firm transmission service during the
period of designation.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
that provide virtually the only
competition in retail electricity markets
before Order No. 888 to compete
effectively. TAPS and APPA state that
an alternative would be for the onsystem seller to be the network
customer and take on (or possibly avoid)
the headache of designating and
undesignating resources. TAPS and
APPA argue that this would be
practical, however, only if the network
customer desires full-requirements
system power and that customers
seeking to use other resources in
combination with the system power (as
many transmission dependent utilities
do) would not have this option. TAPS
and APPA also point out that customers
may own transmission facilities for
which, under the Commission’s policy,
credits are to be provided only where
the owner of the transmission assets is
the network customer itself. TAPS and
APPA therefore conclude that a
transmission dependent utility may
have good reason to want to be the
network customer, rather than allowing
the transmission provider to assume
that role.
875. Great Lakes supports TAPS and
APPA’s position in its post-technical
conference comments, adding that
requiring transmission dependent
utilities to be full-requirements
customers of a system power seller
would effectively shut out entities that
do not exclusively utilize fullrequirements system power contracts.
Great Lakes adds that transmission
dependent utilities have begun to
develop the requisite expertise required
to allow them to compete more
effectively in the wholesale market and
should not be required to give up those
benefits in order to utilize system power
contracts.
876. Several petitioners argue that
system sales contracts are not the same
as seller’s choice contracts.325 These
petitioners argue that typically a seller’s
choice contract involves a situation
where, under certain delineated
circumstances, a seller that would
normally sell power to the purchaser
from one unit may choose to deliver
power from an alternate unit. These
petitioners argue that the Commission’s
ruling in Order No. 890 regarding the
eligibility of seller’s choice contracts
does not affect the eligibility of system
sales.
877. Duke Energy Carolinas contends
in its post-technical conference
comments that the requirement in
325 E.g., NRECA, TDU Systems and Wisconsin
Electric. Duke Energy Carolinas and Hoosier make
similar arguments in their post-technical conference
comments.
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
section 29.2(v) to provide the delivery
point for a resource sourced from
purchased power could be interpreted
to require either an interface delivery
point or a local load delivery point. For
system purchases that are sourced by
generators in the same control area as
the load, Duke Energy Carolinas argues,
the only delivery point is the location of
the load. Duke Energy Carolinas states
that a network load may have more than
one load delivery point, but all such
points are where some network load is
located. Duke Energy Carolinas also
distinguishes system sales from seller’s
choice contracts, which it states allow
the seller to select on a daily basis the
source of the physical power. Duke
Energy Carolinas contends that system
sales do not fit within this category of
seller’s choice contracts since the source
control area is known and there is no
‘‘choice’’ as to which units will be used
to serve a network customer’s load,
given that units are dispatched
according to economic and reliability
dispatch principles.
878. Duke Energy Carolinas also
argues that disallowing on-system
system sales would be inconsistent with
the Commission’s longstanding practice
of accepting network integration
transmission service agreements with
designated network resources such as
‘‘Seller’s Generation System’’ or
‘‘Contract with Seller’’ with no concern
about transmission providers
calculating ATC. Duke Energy Carolinas
further argues that disallowing onsystem system sales would be
inconsistent with allowing at least some
wholesale customers to be classified as
native load customers and permitting
the seller to serve such native load
customers from a choice of all of its
network resources. If the Commission
does not allow on-system system sales
to be designated as network resources,
Duke Energy Carolinas requests
clarification of whether a wholesale
customer that entered into an on-system
system purchase contract with a
transmission provider prior to July 13,
2007 can continue to designate the
contract as a network resource. Duke
Energy Carolinas also requests various
other clarifications regarding the
designation of system sales as network
resources.
879. TAPS and APPA state that, while
the pro forma OATT does not now
appear to require it, they would not
object to a requirement that every
network customer, as well as the
transmission providers and merchant
affiliates, seeking to designate on-system
system sales (or generation fleet) list the
generators in the portfolio that stands
behind it, provided that this not
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
translate to a requirement to assign
particular generators or amounts to
serve the contract. These petitioners
argue that the location of the generators,
which presumably the transmission
provider knows anyway, ought to be
enough to permit the transmission
provider to determine whether the
system sale can be delivered to the
customer and, thus, whether the
designation of the network resource can
be accepted.
880. Bonneville argues that, because
of the interconnected nature of a
hydroelectric power system, it cannot
make power sales from particular
generating units and, therefore, all of its
sales are system sales. Bonneville states
that the federal hydroelectric projects in
the Pacific Northwest are multi-purpose
projects and that the operators (the
United States Corps of Engineers and
Bureau of Reclamation) cannot dedicate
a given hydroelectric project to generate
a given amount of power every hour to
serve a given contract or for any other
purpose. Bonneville states that almost
100 of its customers take network
transmission service and have included
Bonneville system purchases of power
as network resources. Bonneville also
notes that, under the Northwest Power
Act, it is obligated to sell electric power
to each Northwest utility to meet the
firm power load, to the extent that the
utility’s firm power load exceeds its
resources.326 Bonneville maintains that
nothing in the Northwest Power Act
contemplates sales out of, or rates based
on, individual resources, and that all of
Congress’s directives treat federal
generation as a whole and make no
distinction based on the individual
resource. Bonneville argues that it has
addressed the ATC issues that the
Commission has identified through its
AFC methodology. PNGC Power and
PPC express support in their posttechnical conference comments for
Bonneville’s general position with
respect to the designation of on-system
system sales from the Bonneville’s
hydroelectric system.
881. Several of the post-technical
conference comments address the
eligibility of on-system seller’s choice
contracts to be designated as network
resources. Southern states that it
generally opposes allowing on-system
seller’s choice contracts to be designated
on a long-term basis, but acknowledges
that such contracts might be designated
on a short-term basis. Southern states
that many seller’s choice contracts
require the source to be named at least
on a day-ahead basis. Southern states
that it would be acceptable to designate
326 16
U.S.C. 839a(10).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
such resources on a short-term basis
once the delivery source is identified.
882. Kansas Power Pool, however,
argues, in its post-technical conference
comments, that all seller’s choice
contracts should be eligible to serve as
network resources. Kansas Power Pool
argues that it is the supplier, not the
customer, of a seller’s choice contract
that enjoys the flexibility to select
resources or to determine which
resources will or will not be dispatched.
883. Some post technical conference
comments argue that seller’s choice
contracts from on-system generation
located in an unconstrained system or
zone (i.e., an area within which there
are no internal paths for which ATC is
calculated) should be eligible for
network resource status.327 Conversely,
Duke Energy Carolinas and EEI argue
that, if a system or zone has congestion
(i.e., internal ATC paths), then unit
designation becomes necessary to be
able to correctly calculate ATC. South
Carolina E&G argues that unconstrained
transmission systems could become
constrained over time, but any possible
need for the designation of network
resources to assist in calculating
internal ATC will be observable on
OASIS. South Carolina E&G argues that
a transmission provider has no
incentive to overstate ATC, so the
Commission can be assured that
designation of network resources is
unnecessary if OASIS shows no
constraints, and vice versa.
884. Other post technical-conference
comments oppose the proposal for
unconstrained transmission areas, at
least as applied to on-system system
sales, arguing that the proposal appears
to be motivated by the incorrect
assumption that the Commission in
Order No. 890 found that both onsystem seller’s choice contracts and onsystem system sales are eligible for
designation as network resources.328
With regard to seller’s choice contracts,
Hoosier and TDU Systems argue that
adopting an unconstrained transmission
area approach would leave those LSEs
unfortunate enough to be located on
constrained systems without the
transmission rights they had prior to
Order No. 890. Hoosier and TDU
Systems argue that ATC would not be
limited unless the transmission provider
has failed to expand its system to meet
the needs of its network customers,
pointing to TLR statistics to emphasize
concerns regarding particular
transmission providers. Hoosier
327 E.g., Duke Energy Carolinas, EEI, Pacific
Northwest IOUs, South Carolina E&G, and
Southwestern Utilities.
328 E.g., TAPS and APPA.
PO 00000
Frm 00109
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3091
contends that restricting seller’s choice
contracts to particular areas of the
transmission provider’s system would
assume the existence of constraints on
a system to such a degree that the longheld rights of network customers to
designate their historical resources as
network resources would be eliminated.
Hoosier and TDU Systems believe that
the Commission’s policy should assume
transmission providers have been
planning and expanding their systems
appropriately, putting the burden on the
transmission provider whose system is
so constrained that it cannot evaluate
internal ATC to make a filing proposing
changes to its OATT to accommodate
their problems. Acceptance of the
unconstrained transmission area
proposal, they argue, would be
inconsistent with the Commission’s
obligations under FPA sections 217.
Hoosier and TDU Systems argue that the
transmission provider should
experience no more difficulty in
calculating ATC for its network
customers than it does to serve its own
retail native load.
Commission Determination
885. In the NOPR, the Commission
proposed to continue to allow resources
from system purchases not linked to a
specific generating unit to be designated
as network resources.329 The
Commission did not specifically address
on-system system sales in Order No.
890, focusing instead on on-system
seller’s choice contracts.330 Thus, the
Commission’s existing policies
regarding the eligibility of on-system
system sales for network resource status
were not affected by the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890.
886. Various concerns have
nonetheless been expressed regarding
the treatment of on-system system sales
in requests for rehearing and
clarification and at the technical
conference held by Commission staff on
July 30, 2007 and in subsequent
comments. TAPS and APPA, for
example, question whether the revisions
to section 29.2(v) of the pro forma
OATT adopted in Order No. 890 were
intended to alter the designation
requirements for on-system system
sales. Alabama Municipal and
Wisconsin Electric argue that the
Commission’s concerns regarding the
accuracy of ATC calculations are not
relevant in the context of system sales.
In order to respond to these concerns,
and provide guidance to the industry,
we clarify that Order No. 890 was not
intended to change the requirements for
329 See
330 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
NOPR at P 407.
Order No. 890 at P 1483.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3092
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
designating on-system system sales as
network resources under the pro forma
OATT.331
887. Prior to Order No. 890, section
29.2(v) of the pro forma OATT did not
distinguish between the designation of
on-system and off-system resources. In
order to designate a network resource,
the network customer was required to
provide information regarding the unit
size, the amount of capacity being
designated, VAR capability, operating
restrictions, approximate variable cost,
and arrangements governing the thirdparty sales and deliveries. For offsystem power purchases, information
was also required regarding the source
of supply, control area location,
transmission arrangements, and delivery
point(s) to the transmission provider’s
system. These various requirements
were stated in a single series of bullets
in section 29.2(v).
888. In Order No. 890, the
Commission restructured section 29.2(v)
to more clearly identify the information
that must be provided for on-system
resources and off-system resources,
breaking apart the series of bullets into
two separate lists. The basic
requirements of designation remain the
same, except that the tariff language
more clearly specifies the information
(i.e., source of supply, control area
location, transmission arrangements,
and delivery point(s) to the system) that
applies only to off-system resources.
This was implicit in the prior tariff
formulation, since the underlying
information related to off-system
transactions. The Commission sought to
more explicitly state the information
required under section 29.2(v) to
facilitate compliance with the new
obligation for customers to provide an
attestation that the requirements for
designation as a network resource have
been met for the particular resource
being designated.
889. These changes to the pro forma
OATT therefore did not change the
substantive requirements for designating
network resources as they apply to onsystem and off-system resources. For onsystem resources, network customers
must continue to provide the same
information in their designation request:
the unit size, the amount of capacity
being designated, VAR capability,
operating restrictions, approximate
variable cost, and arrangements
governing the third party sales and
deliveries. We understand that it is
common practice in the industry for
331 Slice-of-system sales are a type of system sale
and, therefore, our discussion below regarding onsystem system sales applies equally to on-system
slice-of-system sales, as well as system sales from
hydroelectric systems.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
transmission providers to consider the
identification of the source system for
an on-system system sale sufficient to
provide this information, since the
transmission provider already has the
necessary information for constituent
generators on the system given that the
units supporting the system sale have
otherwise been designated for use by
network or native load.332 Nothing in
Order No. 890 imposed new information
requirements on transmission providers
that previously deemed the
requirements of section 29.2(v) fulfilled
by the identification of the source
system for an on-system system sale.
Network customers may therefore
continue to designate such resources as
appropriate.
890. To the extent there are concerns
regarding the effect of designating onsystem system sales on ATC, we note
that transmission providers have been
directed to address the effect on ATC of
designating and undesignating network
resources as part of the on-going NERC/
NAESB standardization effort.333
Through that process, transmission
providers will develop consistent
methodologies for calculating the effect
on ATC of designation resources, both
on-system and off-system. Until the
standardization process is complete,
however, the Commission cannot know
whether additional information is
required in order to accurately model
the designation of an on-system system
sale. We will revisit the requirements of
section 29.2(v) as necessary after the
NERC/NAESB ATC standardization
effort is complete. Until such time as
those requirements change,
transmission providers should continue
their existing practices regarding the
designation of on-system system sales as
network resources. Further clarification
as requested by Duke is not necessary.
891. The Commission affirms the
finding in Order No. 890 that on-system
seller’s choice contracts generally do not
provide enough information to satisfy
the requirements for designation as a
network resource. For on-system
resources, the location of the capacity is
necessary for determining the effect of a
proposed designation on transmission
capacity, both for evaluating the
acceptability of the resource itself, and
for allowing future transmission service
requests to be evaluated. We agree with
Southern, however, that a contract that
may not provide enough information
provided to be designated as a network
resource at one time may become
eligible for designation as the
information becomes available. For
instance, if a day before scheduling the
seller were to identify source generation
for a seller’s choice contract for the
following day, and if the contract were
to bind the seller to use the newly
identified generation (at least for the
period that it was identified), then the
resource would be eligible to be
designated for the period during which
the source information is firm (provided
the resource complied with all other
relevant requirements). At that point,
the agreement is effectively no longer a
seller’s choice contract for the specified
period. If, on the other hand, the seller
identifies only what it intends to source
the power with, but no contractual
mechanism prevents the seller from
sourcing the power from an alternative
source prior to scheduling, then the
resource would remain a seller’s choice
contract and would not be eligible for
network resource status.
892. We disagree with Kansas Power
Pool’s argument that, because it is not
the customer that has the flexibility to
select the generation in a seller’s choice
contract, such contracts should be
eligible for network resource status. It is
the inability to evaluate or determine
the proper transmission reservations for
on-system seller’s choice contracts that
is concerning, and not the fact that it is
the seller or the buyer who has the
‘‘choice’’ of how to dispatch the power.
893. With regard to the proposal to
allow the designation of on-system
seller’s choice contracts within
unconstrained transmission areas, we
believe that our clarification above that
Order No. 890 did not change the Order
No. 888 requirements for designating
on-system system sales will alleviate
most of the concerns expressed by
supporters of this proposal.
332 It may be the case that identification of
another system within the transmission provider’s
control area, such as a fleet of merchant generators,
would trigger the need for additional information
under section 29.2(v). That type of transaction,
however, does not appear to be of concern to
petitioners and thus we do not address it here.
333 See Order No. 693 at P 1041.
Requests for Clarification and/or
Rehearing
895. EEI requests clarification that the
operating restrictions information
required by section 29.2(v) of the pro
forma OATT need not be provided for
PO 00000
Frm 00110
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
(4) Resource Information
894. In Order No. 890, the
Commission affirmed the requirement
that customers designating a network
resource must provide a description of
the resource (current and 10-year
projection) including, among other
things, approximate variable generating
cost ($/MWH) for redispatch
computations and any operating
restrictions.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
off-system system sales if that
information is not contained in the
relevant contracts. EEI also suggests that
the variable price of energy specified in
the contract and not the actual variable
costs of the units that supply the sale
serve as the variable generating cost for
redispatch computations. EEI argues
that the network customer generally will
not know the actual variable cost and
that the price specified in the contract
is the relevant price for purposes of
redispatch, since that is the cost that the
network customer will incur or avoid if
its contract is redispatched up or down.
Bonneville and Duke Energy Carolinas
question in their post-technical
conference comments what variable
costs should be provided for on-system
system sales. Duke Energy Carolinas
states that the contract energy price is
used as the approximate variable
generating cost for redispatch purposes.
896. EPSA requests clarification that
network customers are not required to
provide a redispatch cost for a firm LD
contract, since such contracts are
effectively take-or-pay contracts and
cannot, for example, provide a source of
incremental energy if Entergy is
surveying redispatch options to address
a reliability event. EPSA argues that the
fact that not all network resources are
suitable for redispatch options is not
unusual, since many units may be mustrun in order to meet reliability needs
(such as voltage support) or contractual
requirements (such as QF purchases), or
to reflect operating characteristics (such
as nuclear units that cannot be cycled
off and on quickly). EPSA is concerned
that some transmission providers may
believe that the supplier of a firm LD
contract is required to provide the
network customer with a contractspecific variable redispatch cost based
on its own supply alternatives which, as
noted, is not possible. EPSA argues that
a determination that designation
requests could be rejected for lack of
information that is not relevant to such
contracts would be contrary to the
Commission determination that firm LD
contracts can serve as network
resources.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
897. The Commission clarifies in
response to EEI that the operating
restrictions applicable to off-system
system sales designated as network
resources are the restrictions set forth in
the relevant contracts, not the
underlying units supplying the
contracts. Similarly, the approximate
generating cost for redispatch purposes
for a system sale is the variable energy
cost specified in the contract.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
898. We disagree with EPSA that a
network customer should not be
required to provide a redispatch cost for
a firm LD contract. When a network
customer designates a network resource,
it agrees under section 30.5 of the pro
forma OATT to redispatch its resource
as requested by the transmission
provider pursuant to section 33.2 of the
pro forma OATT. A firm LD contract is
like any other resource, redispatchable
by the transmission provider within the
customer’s rights to the resource, as
stated in the contract.
(5) General
899. In Order No. 890, the
Commission determined that firm pointto-point service provided on a
conditional firm basis is sufficiently
firm to be used for transmission to
import an off-system designated
network resource. The Commission also
denied a request to require the validity
of network resource designations to be
verified by the seller or owner of the
generation, finding that such a
verification is unnecessary in light of
the new attestation requirements.
Finally, the Commission clarified that
the minimum term for designations of
new network resources should be the
same as the minimum term used for
firm point-to-point service (i.e., daily),
unless otherwise demonstrated by the
transmission provider and approved by
the Commission.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
900. Duke seeks clarification that
network customers that designate offsystem resources supported by
conditional firm point-to-point
transmission service are required to
have in place or obtain from the
transmission provider reserves or
backup resources to cover the periods
when the conditional firm point-topoint transmission service is not
available.
901. Indicated Commenters argue that
a network customer designating a
generating unit that it does not own
should have an obligation to provide
contemporaneous notice of the
designation to the owner of the
generating unit. Indicated Commenters
argue that such notice should indicate,
at a minimum, the amount of capacity
claimed to be under contract and the
duration of the claimed contractual
right. Indicated Commenters argue that
their proposed notice requirement is
appropriate since designation as a
network resource may subject the
generation owner to certain must-offer
requirements (in organized markets) or
redispatch orders (in non-organized
markets). Indicated Commenters also
PO 00000
Frm 00111
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3093
contend that such a notice requirement
would facilitate enforcement of the
OATT requirements by ensuring that
generators are not obligated without
their knowledge and that false or
questionable designations are identified
promptly. Indicated Commenters argue
that the current system of audits and
increased penalty authority and other
sanctions will have some deterrent
effect, but that it will do nothing to
make generation owners and other users
of the transmission system whole after
violations occur.
902. Pacific Northwest Parties, joined
by PPC in its post-technical conference
comments, requests clarification that, to
the extent a transmission provider
establishes a minimum term for
designation of network resources, it
need not be the same as the minimum
term offered by the transmission
provider for firm point-to-point service.
Pacific Northwest Parties argue that this
clarification will promote hourly firm
energy markets by allowing
transmission providers to offer hourly
firm point-to-point transmission service
even if they cannot accommodate a onehour minimum term for designation of
network resources.
903. Reliant asks in its post-technical
conference comments that the
Commission carefully consider any
variations from the network service
requirements of the pro forma OATT
proposed by RTOs and ISOs in their
compliance filings. Reliant contends
that requirement for proper
identification of network resources is
intended to ensure that transmission
reserved for firm network use is used
only to deliver properly designated
network resources and that no more
than one LSE has identified the same
resource capacity as serving its load
(i.e., to avoid double-counting). Reliant
asks the Commission to ensure that any
variations from the pro forma OATT
proposed by RTOs and ISOs similarly
prevent double-counting.
Commission Determination
904. The Commission declines Duke’s
request to require that a network
customer, as a condition of designating
off-system resources supported with
conditional firm point-to-point
transmission service, have in place or
obtain from the transmission provider
reserves or backup resources to cover
the periods when the resource
supported with conditional firm pointto-point transmission service might not
be delivered. Duke appears to
misunderstand the nature of conditional
firm service. A network customer
utilizing conditional firm service would
be using firm transmission service
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3094
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
except during the limited periods where
such service is conditional.
Transmission service for those resources
could be curtailed during such periods,
similar to how secondary network
service may be curtailed prior to
curtailment of other firm transactions.
In the event conditional firm service is
curtailed, the network customer would
be required to serve its network load
from other resources, just as when the
transmission provider curtails the
network customer’s use of secondary
network service. It is not the
responsibility of the transmission
provider to ensure that the network
customer has sufficient resources to
meet its load.
905. We disagree with Indicated
Commenters that network customers
should be required to serve notice on
sellers of power that is designated as a
network resource. The obligation to
comply with the designation
requirements applies to the network
customer, not the resource owner. The
appropriate place to impose obligations
on the resource owner is in the contract
governing the sale. To the extent a
contract has been executed that meets
the requirements for network resource
designation, it is not clear why the seller
would be affected by the actual
designation of the resource, since the
network resource redispatch obligations
do not go beyond the amount of power
that is available under the contract as
designated by the network customer. If,
as Indicated Commenters argue, there
are unique considerations in some
organized markets, a generic rulemaking
is not the appropriate venue to make
accommodations for such systemspecific issues.
906. We also decline to grant the
request of Pacific Northwest Parties to
generically allow transmission
providers to establish a minimum term
for designations of network resources
that is not the same as the term for firm
point-to-point service. Pacific Northwest
Parties do not explain why a
transmission provider could
accommodate hourly point-to-point
transmission service, but not hourly
network service. To the extent that a
transmission provider has specific
circumstances that justify adoption of a
different minimum term for network
resource designations, it should raise
them in the context of an FPA section
205 filing.
907. To the extent Reliant or any other
party has a concern regarding an RTO or
ISO’s compliance with the requirements
of Order No. 890, the appropriate forum
to consider those concerns is on review
of the underlying compliance filing.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
b. Documentation for Network
Resources
908. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that transmission
providers should be responsible for
verifying that third-party transmission
arrangements to deliver an off-system
designated network resource to the
transmission provider’s system are firm.
However, the Commission found that
transmission providers should not be
responsible for verifying that the
generating units and power purchase
agreements designated as network
resources satisfy the requirements of
section 30.1 and 30.7 of the pro forma
OATT. The Commission instead
required network customers and the
transmission provider’s network
function to include a statement with
each application for network service or
to designate a new network resource
that attests, for each network resource
identified, that (1) the transmission
customer owns or has committed to
purchase the designated network
resource and (2) the designated network
resource comports with the
requirements for designated network
resources.
909. The Commission stated that
network customers should include this
attestation in the customer’s comments
section of the request when it confirms
the request on OASIS. In the event that
a transmission provider or any other
network customer designates a network
resource that it does not own or has not
committed to purchase, or that does not
comport with the requirements for
designated network resources, the
Commission will deem the network
customer to be in violation of the pro
forma OATT and will consider
assessing civil penalties on a case-bycase basis, consistent with the
Commission’s Policy Statement on
Enforcement. The Commission rejected
requests to allow transmission providers
to voluntarily verify terms and
conditions of power purchase
agreements, concluding that such
authority is unnecessary in light of the
new attestation requirement.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
910. South Carolina E&G asks for
clarification of the language describing
the attestation requirement in paragraph
1521 of Order No. 890, arguing that it
is a less precise paraphrase of the
language in section 30.2 of the pro
forma OATT. South Carolina E&G asks
the Commission to confirm that the
precise language of section 30.2 governs
and that paragraph 1521 of Order No.
890 does not add any additional
requirements. South Carolina E&G also
PO 00000
Frm 00112
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
suggests that, because of space
limitations in the customer’s comment
section on OASIS, the attestation can be
made by a reference, such as ‘‘the
customer attests pursuant to Section
30.2.’’
911. Several petitioners request
rehearing of the Commission’s decision
to not allow transmission providers to
review power supply contracts for
power purchases designated as network
resources.334 These petitioners argue
that allowing such review would
improve reliability and/or allow
transmission providers to more
accurately model their systems. Duke
and EEI argue that transmission
providers should have the right, but not
the obligation, to review such contracts.
They assert that transmission providers
have a legitimate interest in ensuring
the reliability of energy service to
network loads on their systems, since
interruptions and resulting imbalances
may harm the reliability of the entire
system, and because the transmission
providers may be forced to provide
backup energy in order to avoid
curtailment of network load. EEI
complains that network customers who
incorrectly designate unqualified
resources take transmission capacity
that otherwise would be used for
transmission service from legitimate
network resources. Duke notes that it
has routinely been provided access
upon request to underlying contracts,
with commercially sensitive
information redacted.
912. EEI argues that reliance on
attestations by network customers that
their power purchases qualify as
network resources is insufficient to
adequately protect against improper
designations. EEI states that some of its
transmission provider members have
found, by comparing customer contracts
against network resource certifications
that are required by their business
practices, that some customers are
incorrectly designating power purchase
contracts that clearly do not meet the
Commission’s criteria. EEI argues that
after-the-fact audits of customers’
attestations do not address the system
reliability concerns of the misuse of the
transmission system that results from
the designation of unqualified network
resources.
913. EEI acknowledges the
Commission’s reluctance to place
transmission providers in the position
of policing whether customers’ contracts
qualify as network resources, but argues
that does not warrant precluding
voluntary review of network customers’
purchased power contracts. EEI
334 E.g.,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Duke, EEI, and MISO.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
contends that the Standards of Conduct
prohibit any transfer of customer
information to the transmission
provider’s marketing and energy
affiliates and that any residual concerns
about transmission providers deciding
whether power purchase contracts
qualify as network resources could be
addressed by permitting the
transmission provider to act in a purely
advisory role. EEI suggests that
transmission providers could bring
concerns about possibly incorrect
attestations to the attention of the
customer or, if necessary, the
Commission’s Enforcement Hotline. EEI
argues that allowing such review by the
transmission provider would not
supplant the obligation of the network
customer to attest to the validity of its
designations of network resources.
914. MISO argues that a statement
that the transmission customer owns or
has committed to purchase the
designated network resource and that
the designated network resource
comports with applicable requirements
does not provide the necessary level of
assurance to the transmission provider,
particularly in those cases where the
network customer unduly relies on
representations made by its supplying
marketers. MISO asks the Commission
to supplement its existing attestation
requirements with a certification from
an external control area’s administrator
and/or the seller of the generation that
the resource being designated in that
area is not counted as a designated
network resource for another load on or
off the system.
915. Joined by Southern, EEI also
objects to making transmission
providers responsible for verifying the
firmness of off-system transmission
service. Southern argues that the
requirement that transmission providers
verify the firmness of off-system
transmission service is unduly
burdensome and could result in
unnecessary rejection of requests to
designate network resources on a dayahead basis. Southern contends that the
specific transmission path(s) and
arrangements to deliver power to the
network customer usually have not been
finalized at the time off-system
resources are designated in the ‘‘dayahead’’ cycle and, instead, are typically
finalized the hour before delivery.
Southern and EEI suggest that sections
29.2(viii), 30.1, 30.2, and 30.7 of the pro
forma OATT be amended to allow the
network customer to attest that the
external resource is contractually
required to be delivered using firm
transmission service, without
confirmation that an actual firm path
has been scheduled and confirmed.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Southern argues that transmission
customers also could be required to
attest to the firmness of their requested
and expected transmission service and
face the possibility of complaint, audit
or other inquiry and, ultimately,
sanction for false attestations.
916. In the alternative, EEI requests
further clarification that transmission
providers could obtain waiver of the
verification requirement if they
demonstrate that verification of the
firmness of transmission service is not
required because of the way in which
transmission service and markets
operate on the transmission provider’s
transmission system. EEI states that
network resources in the West are
frequently designated at hubs such as
the Palo Verde Hub prior to tagging. EEI
states that a network customer has very
limited ability to know the source of the
energy that is being made available at a
specific hub and, indeed, has no need
to know that information since what is
important is the seller’s commitment
that the energy is being provided at that
hub on a firm basis. EEI argues that the
host transmission provider has no
ability or need to evaluate the firmness
of the external transmission path
between the generator and hub. EEI
contends that the Commission’s
decision to require verification of the
firmness of transmission paths, in
conjunction with other requirements
relating to off-system network resources,
has caused financial institutions to
consider withdrawing from the market.
917. EEI and Southern also argue that,
in many instances, transmission
providers are unable to perform the
verifications required by the
Commission. They state that some
systems refuse to allow other
transmission providers access to their
OASIS and refuse to perform the
verification themselves. EEI suggests
that the Commission require each
transmission provider to grant ‘‘read
only’’ access to its OASIS by any
computer that has an X509 security
certificate (the security certificate that is
provided to transmission function
personnel). EEI requests that the
Commission, at a minimum, delay the
date by which transmission providers
must verify off-system transmission
service for 180 days, in order to allow
time for modifications to OASIS
protocols to grant access to transmission
providers who are seeking to verify the
firmness of transmission service.
918. If the Commission declines to
amend the attestation requirement, EEI
requests clarification with regard to
instances where transmission providers
cannot verify the firmness of off-system
transmission service because the
PO 00000
Frm 00113
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3095
information is not posted on OASIS. EEI
states that many non-jurisdictional
transmission providers that do not have
reciprocity tariffs also do not have
OASIS nodes on which the firmness of
service can be verified. EEI also states
that grandfathered transmission
agreements frequently are not posted on
OASIS or, if they are posted, postings do
not contain sufficient detail to enable
off-system transmission personnel to
verify the firmness of the transmission
service.
Commission Determination
919. The Commission clarifies, in
response to South Carolina E&G’s
request, that the language in paragraph
1521 of Order No. 890 is only meant to
be a paraphrase of the more detailed
attestation to be provided in the pro
forma OATT itself. A network customer
designating network resources should
submit an attestation using the language
set forth in sections 29.2(viii) and 30.2
of the pro forma OATT, as amended in
Order No. 890, not the language of the
preamble. A network customer is not
permitted to merely reference the
applicable section of the pro forma
OATT when completing the attestation
requirement. If the OASIS customer
comment section does not currently
allow enough space for a network
customer to provide its attestation,
transmission providers should modify,
in coordination with NAESB, OASIS
functionality to accommodate the full
attestation. In the interim, the
transmission provider should identify
alternate means, such as by telefax or email, for the network customer to
provide the attestation.
920. We decline to require that
network customers provide their power
supply contracts to transmission
providers for review, whether such
review is advisory or otherwise.
Allowing transmission providers to
review power sales contracts would put
transmission providers in the position
of interpreting their network customer’s
contracts and accepting or rejecting
designations based on their
interpretations. Regardless of the
protections provided by the Standards
of Conduct, it would be inappropriate
for transmission providers to be in that
position. The new attestation
requirement properly places the
responsibility of interpreting the terms
of a power sales agreement on the
network customer, an actual party to the
agreement. We believe that the new
attestation requirement, coupled with
the prospect of significant civil
penalties for improper attestations, will
prove effective at providing the proper
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3096
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
incentives for network customers to not
designate ineligible network resources.
921. Similarly, we decline to require,
as requested by MISO, that network
customers designating off-system
resources provide a certification from
the external control area’s administrator
and/or the seller of the generation that
the resource being designated is not
counted as a network resource for
another load. Again, it is the
responsibility of the network customer
to assure that the requirements of the
pro forma OATT are satisfied prior to
requesting the designation of a network
resource. The network customer must
take appropriate steps to ensure that the
resource has not been committed for
sale to non-designated third party load
or is otherwise unable to be called upon
to meet the network customer’s network
load on a non-interruptible basis.
922. We affirm the decision in Order
No. 890 to require each transmission
provider to verify the firmness of offsystem transmission service to deliver
designated network resources to the
transmission provider’s system. Under
normal circumstances, this verification
requirement should not present a
significant burden for the transmission
provider because it only requires review
of the transmission arrangements from
the designated network resource to the
transmission provider’s system. Several
of the arguments raised by petitioners
incorrectly assume that the transmission
provider is under an obligation to look
beyond a power purchase designated as
a network resource to upstream
transmission arrangements from the
source generator. There is no need for
the transmission provider to consider
transmission arrangements upstream of
the designated resource, since the
network customer has attested that the
resource is sufficiently firm to be
designated as a network resource. We
therefore do not believe, as Southern
argues, that the verification process will
result in unnecessary rejections of
request to designate network resources.
923. We recognize that, in some
circumstances, the external
transmission provider may not have an
OASIS or make relevant information on
its OASIS available to other
transmission providers and, therefore,
the host transmission provider may be
unable to use OASIS to verify the
firmness of transmission used to deliver
the off-system designated network
resource. The Commission explained in
Order No. 890 that the transmission
provider should attempt to remedy such
information deficiencies through
informal communications with the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
customer.335 Network customers have
every incentive to cooperate in
providing this information since, if the
transmission provider is unable to
confirm the firmness of these
transmission arrangements, the request
to designate the network resource is
deficient. We agree with EEI and
Southern, however, that transmission
providers should have access to view
other transmission providers’ OASIS for
this purpose. We therefore direct
transmission providers to allow such
access and to work through NAESB to
modify business practices as
necessary.336 We decline to waive the
verification requirement in the interim
since transmission providers are able to
request this information directly from
customers.
c. Undesignation of Network Resources
(1) Risk to ATC Rights
924. The Commission clarified in
Order No. 890 that a request for
termination of a network resource that
is concurrently paired with a request to
redesignate that resource at a specific
point in time will not result in the
network customer permanently
forfeiting its rights to use that resource
as a designated network resource. Any
change in ATC that is determined by the
transmission provider to have resulted
from the temporary termination shall be
posted on OASIS during this temporary
period. A request that is not
accompanied with a request to
redesignate that resource at a specific
point in time is to be considered an
indefinite termination. After an
indefinite termination of a resource, the
network customer has no continuing
rights to the use of such resource and
future requests to designate that
resource would be processed consistent
with section 30.2 of the pro forma
OATT as a designation of a new
network resource.
Requests for Clarification and Rehearing
925. NorthWestern argues that, once
upgrades specified through the
interconnection process have been
installed, the generator can be specified
as a network resource by any customer,
at the time of commercial operation of
the generator or at any time in the
future. NorthWestern acknowledges that
the Commission rejected this position in
Order No. 890, but contends that the
335 See
Order No. 890 at P 1527.
providers are free to use the
NAESB standards development process to create
automated OASIS functionality for verifying thirdparty transmission service at the time a designation
request is submitted or any other processes to
further minimize any burden associated with the
verification requirement.
336 Transmission
PO 00000
Frm 00114
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Commission’s determination cannot be
reconciled with the ability of a generator
under Order No. 2003 to designate,
during the application process, whether
it wishes to be studied and
interconnected as a network resource or
an energy resource.337 NorthWestern
contends that interconnection as a
network resource assumes that the
generator will be eligible to be
designated by any network customer to
serve its load in the future. If this is not
the case, NorthWestern questions the
distinction between energy resource
interconnection service and network
resource interconnection service and the
transmission provider’s ability to
confidently study any network
generation request will be diminished.
NorthWestern states that a generator’s
request for network interconnection
does not necessarily mean that any
customer has designated the generator
as a network resource, but only that it
may be designated as a network
resource by any customer.
926. NorthWestern also requests
clarification regarding the interaction of
transmission service and generation
interconnection requests, asking the
Commission to confirm that both should
be studied through a single queue
prioritized by request date.
NorthWestern argues that decoupling
the network generation interconnection
study from the transmission service
study could undermine reliability.
NorthWestern suggests that all
generation interconnection and
transmission service requests be studied
through a single study queue, where the
requests are prioritized by their request
date, in order to allow the relationship
and mitigation requirements between
senior and junior queued transmission
and interconnection requests to be
known and applied appropriately in
junior queue studies.
Commission Determination
927. We disagree with NorthWestern
that a generator interconnected under
network resource interconnection
service (NRIS) may be designated as a
network resource by any customer at
any point in time. As the Commission
explained in Order No. 2003–A, NRIS
status does not convey any right to
transmit power and does not constitute
a reservation of transmission capacity to
any specific point.338 The purpose of
NRIS is to provide only those network
upgrades needed to allow the aggregate
of generation in the facility’s local area
to be delivered to the aggregate of load
on the transmission provider’s
337 Citing
338 Order
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 2003.
No. 2003–A at P 516.
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission system, such that the
output of the generating facility will not
be ‘‘bottled up’’ during peak load
conditions.339 As a result, NRIS does
not necessarily provide the
interconnection customer with the
capability to physically deliver the
output of its generating facility to any
particular load on the system without
incurring congestion costs. Requests for
delivery service inside the transmission
provider’s transmission system may
require additional studies and upgrades
to reduce congestion to acceptable
levels.340
928. We decline to adopt at this time
NorthWestern’s request that all
transmission service and generation
interconnection requests be studied
through a single queue prioritized by
application date and time.
NorthWestern requests specific
revisions to the management of
generator interconnection and
transmission service request queues that
were not proposed in the NOPR and are
beyond the scope of this proceeding.
Earlier this month, Commission staff
held a technical conference to address
issues related to the management of
interconnection queues in Docket No.
AD08–2–000.341 The queuing concerns
raised by NorthWestern are more
appropriately addressed in that
proceeding.
(2) Minimum Lead-Time
929. The Commission concluded in
Order No. 890 that network customers
should not be permitted to make firm
third-party sales from any designated
network resource without (1)
undesignating that resource for the
period of the third-party sale pursuant
to section 30.3 of the pro forma OATT
and (2) providing notice of such
undesignation before the firm
scheduling deadline. The Commission
stated that this requirement allows
undesignated capacity to be acquired on
a non-firm basis without creating an
undue adverse effect on third-party
sales.
Requests for Clarification and Rehearing
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
930. Various petitioners have
requested rehearing or clarification of
the Commission’s determinations
regarding the minimum lead-time for
undesignating network resources in
339 Id.
at P 531.
at P 502.
341 See Interconnection Queuing Practices, Notice
of Technical Conference, Docket No. AD08–2–000
(Nov. 2, 2007); Interconnection Queuing Practices,
Notice Inviting Comments, Docket Nos. AD08–2–
000, et al.
340 Id.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
order to make firm third-party sales.342
Petitioners generally object to imposing
this minimum lead-time requirement,
arguing that it unduly restricts the
ability of network customers and the
transmission provider to engage in
third-party sales and impairs liquidity
in the market.
Commission Determination
931. In a notice issued on September
7, 2007, the Commission extended the
effective date of the minimum lead-time
for undesignating network resources
adopted in Order No. 890, deferring the
effectiveness of the phrase ‘‘* * * but
not later than the firm scheduling
deadline for the period of termination’’
in section 30.3 of the pro forma
OATT.343 The Commission stated that it
will address the appropriate effective
date for that tariff language, or any
modification thereto, in a future order to
be issued in this proceeding. The
Commission therefore defers responding
to the requests for rehearing and
clarification on this subject pending
further action in the forthcoming order.
(3) General
932. In response to commenter
requests, the Commission addressed a
number of other issues in Order No. 890
related to the undesignation of network
resources. Among other things, the
Commission denied a request that
network customers be given the
flexibility to substitute new designated
network resources without abandoning
the original transmission queue position
of the existing designated network
resource. The Commission explained
that granting the request would, without
any apparent justification, put point-topoint customers seeking ATC freed up
by an undesignation at a disadvantage.
Pending the implementation of new
OASIS functionality to accept electronic
requests to designate and undesignated
network resources, the Commission
stated that network customers could
submit their requests by transmitting the
required information to the transmission
provider by telefax or providing the
information by telephone over the
transmission provider’s time recorded
telephone line.
342 E.g., APS and EEI, E.ON U.S., Financial
Service Joint Filers, Pacific Northwest Parties, PNM,
Progress Energy, Washington IOUs, and WSPP. In
addition, APS and EEI, Barrick Goldstrike Mines,
Bonneville, EPSA, Morgan Stanley, Pacific
Northwest IOUs, PNGC Power, Powerex, PPL
Parties, Public Power Council, San Diego G&E,
SCE&G, SoCal Edison, Southern, Southwestern
Utilities, and WSPP filed post-technical conference
comments on this issue.
343 Preventing Undue Discrimination and
Preference in Transmission Service, Notice Granting
Extension of Effective Date, 120 FERC ¶ 61,222
(2007).
PO 00000
Frm 00115
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3097
933. The Commission clarified that a
network customer may only enter into a
third-party power sale from a designated
network resource if the third-party
power purchase agreement allows the
seller to interrupt power sales to the
third party in order to serve the
designated network load. The
Commission stated that such
interruptions must be permitted without
penalty, to avoid imposing financial
incentives that compete with the
network resource’s obligation to serve
its network load. The Commission also
clarified that firm third-party sales may
be made from an undesignated portion
of a network customer’s network
resources (i.e., a ‘‘slice-of-system sale’’),
so long as all of the applicable
requirements are met. The Commission
stated that the network customer must
submit undesignations for each portion
of the resource supporting the thirdparty sale.
934. The Commission rejected
requests to relax rules for changing the
undesignation of network resources at
any time to handle system emergencies,
force majeure events, forced outages or
unusual weather conditions. The
Commission explained that other
procedures such as those in NERC’s
standard for Capacity & Energy
Emergencies, EOP–002–2, or the
possible use of capacity benefit margin
are more appropriate to deal with
legitimate system emergencies. In
situations where a request to
undesignate a network resource cannot
be accommodated without jeopardizing
reliability, the Commission stated that
the transmission provider could deny
the request.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
935. Bonneville argues that, if the
only ATC on a path is the ATC freed up
by an undesignation, then the network
customer should be granted use of that
ATC for its requested alternate service.
Bonneville contends that such a policy
would not adversely affect customers
because, if the customer that is
undesignating a resource is not placed
first in line for the capacity made
available by the undesignation, that
customer would not undesignate (since
it will continue to need the capacity on
its existing path) and no capacity would
be freed up for others. Bonneville
concludes that refusing to place the
undesignating customer first in line for
the freed-up ATC will harm that
customer while advantaging no one.
Bonneville suggests that allowing such
redirects of network resources would be
particularly helpful for intermittent
resources such as wind, given that
transmission customers with state-
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3098
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
mandated renewable resource
requirements may wish to redirect for a
short-term period to import renewable
energy, but may be unable to do so on
a constrained path if they are unable to
utilize the capacity they are freeing up
by the request to undesignate.
936. Several petitioners request
rehearing or clarification with respect to
the Commission’s finding in Order No.
890 that network customers making firm
third-party system sales from network
resources must undesignate each
portion of each resource supporting the
third-party sales. 344 Petitioners
generally argue that requiring a network
customer to keep track of the individual
generating units and amounts of
generation from each unit being used to
supply a system sale is unduly
burdensome or impossible. South
Carolina E&G argues that, between the
scheduling deadline and the time when
service commences, any number of
events can change the available
generating units being dispatched,
change the merit order dispatch, or
cause dispatch of additional units.
Joined by EEI, South Carolina E&G asks
the Commission to allow slice of system
sales from a generation fleet by
undesignating the amount of the sale.
937. Duke states that the
Commission’s policies are clear that for
off-system system sales a generating
resource must be identified on a specific
basis for purposes of arranging point-topoint transmission service to support
the off-system sale. However, with
regard to identifying which generating
units will be used to generate the energy
to make on-system system sales, Duke
argues that the Commission has never
required that particular units or portions
of units be identified and undesignated
on a unit-by-unit basis. Duke contends
that all generating units that comprise
the ‘‘system’’ are used to serve all loads,
and the undesignation process should
occur through the recognition that a
share of the generation system is used
for retail native load and a share is used
for wholesale native load (i.e.,
requirements customers) and off-system
firm load. Duke maintains that this
approach is reasonable and ensures that
the transmission provider is not doublecounting or double-reserving
transmission capacity needed to serve
such loads, and is purchasing point-topoint service that is needed.
938. E.ON U.S. argues that the
Commission has provided insufficient
protection for LSEs and others that may
need to recall undesignated resources
344 E.g., Duke, EEI, and South Carolina E&G.
Pacific Northwest IOUs raise similar issues in their
post-tech conference comments.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
for use to supply native load during
times of system emergencies. E.ON U.S.
asks the Commission to make clear in
the pro forma OATT that the obligation
to serve native load may require the
redesignation of network resources in
times of system emergency. Absent such
a clarification, E.ON U.S. argues that
LSEs will be reluctant to make network
resources available to serve the market
and, in a time of emergency, confusion
may occur regarding the proper
procedure for redesignating resources.
939. Pacific Northwest IOUs and
South Carolina E&G request clarification
in their post-technical conference
comments that a network resource does
not have to be undesignated before it is
used to support the provision of reserve
energy under a regional reserve sharing
arrangement. E.ON U.S. requests similar
clarification, arguing that flexible
undesignation rules are necessary to
allow utilities to quickly respond under
reserve-sharing arrangements. Together,
they argue that the failure to provide
such clarification, and the related
complications and potential sanctions,
could impede or destroy reserve sharing
arrangements and/or seriously imperil
system reliability. South Carolina E&G
proposes that the Commission expressly
redefine network load under the pro
forma OATT to include responses by
the transmission provider to requests for
emergency assistance or calls for
reserves under reserves sharing
agreements. If the Commission
concludes that the undesignation
requirements apply to designated
network load used for reserve sharing
purposes, E.ON U.S. proposes to post on
OASIS information regarding its reserve
sharing events within five days of the
end of each month in which an event
occurred. E.ON U.S. states that the
particular units used to meet its reserve
sharing obligation are not known until
it performs an after-the-fact, monthly
allocation of the highest-cost resources
to off-system sales.
940. MidAmerican requests
clarification that, during the period
until improved OASIS functionality is
available for designating and
undesignating network resources,
electronic transmissions and e-mail are
acceptable means of designating and
undesignating network resources.
MidAmerican argues that electronic
transmittals are similar to the already
accepted telefax and recorded telephone
line procedures, in that they provide a
quick, efficient means of
communication that can be readily
stored.
941. NRECA requests rehearing of the
Commission’s determination that
transmission providers have the
PO 00000
Frm 00116
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
discretion to deny undesignations of
network resources. NRECA argues that
the Commission has given transmission
providers the ability to unduly
discriminate against its wholesale
customers (i.e., its direct competitors).
Because the transmission provider is not
likely to deny its own undesignation
requests, NRECA contends that
comparability requires that it not be
allowed the ability to deny
undesignation requests of its network
customers. NRECA argues that while the
actual scheduling of a resource could
affect reliability, there should be no
reliability effects from the mere
designation or undesignation of a
resource. NRECA contends that there
are many other standards and
procedures in place to protect against
insufficient capacity.
942. If the Commission retains the
ability to deny a request to terminate the
designation of a network resource,
NRECA asks the Commission to at least
require that denials come at the
direction of the reliability coordinator,
rather than the transmission provider.
NRECA argues that denying the
undesignation of a network resource is
akin to designating the resource as a
‘‘must-run’’ generating resource. If the
resource is owned by the network
customer, NRECA maintains that the
reliability coordinator should be able to
designate the unit as a reliability-mustrun unit and compensate the network
customer for its dispatch. If the resource
is not owned by the network customer,
NRECA argues that nothing in the FPA
authorizes the Commission to require
the network customer or the owner of
the resource to continue to contract for
service with each other or use any
particular capacity for a specific
purpose.
943. TAPS seeks clarification that a
transmission provider could deny a
request to undesignate a network
resource only in the context of requests
for temporary undesignation. TAPS
argues that there are circumstances in
which a resource is simply not available
because, for example, it is incapable of
continued operation or no longer
economically viable or, in the case of a
purchase, the contract has ended.
944. MidAmerican asks that
transmission providers be required to
explicitly approve or deny requests to
undesignate network resources and that
the timing of action on undesignation
requests be made consistent with the
timing requirements to designate a
network resource. MidAmerican argues
that clarification is necessary to avoid
confusion when one customer is
undesignating a network resource so
that another customer may designate it,
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
otherwise a customer could be
attempting to designate a resource
before the request to undesignate has
been addressed.
945. Bonneville argues that the
Commission should not require network
resources to be temporarily
undesignated to make firm third-party
power sales if the transmission
provider’s ATC methodology already
assures that ATC has not been withheld
to accommodate the underlying
designation. Bonneville maintains that
its transmission customers usually
designate as network resources power
purchase agreements sourced from the
resources that comprise the
interconnected hydroelectric system.
Bonneville argues that its ATC
methodology, which is based on
historical usage data, addresses the
Commission’s concerns about the
availability of ATC without further
requiring network resources to be
undesignated prior to making thirdparty sales from those resources.
Commission Determination
946. We disagree with Bonneville’s
argument that a customer undesignating
a network resource should be first-inline for the transmission capacity freed
up by such a designation. While it may
be true in some circumstances that a
network customer would choose not to
undesignate a resource if there is
insufficient ATC to accommodate a
desired alternative transaction, it does
not follow that the network customer’s
alternative transaction should be put
ahead of other competing requests in the
queue. That would undermine longstanding policies governing the priority
of service requests and unduly
preference network customers. The
Commission rejects similar requests by
point-to-point customers to be first in
line for ATC in section III.D.4.b.
947. With regard to the undesignation
of units used to supply system sales, we
clarify that portions of the seller’s
individual network resources
supporting a sale of system power do
not need to be undesignated so long as
the system sale is itself designated as a
network resource by the buyer. Instead,
the seller should undesignate a portion
of its system equal to the amount of the
system sale, but which is not attributed
to any specific generators. If the system
sale is not designated as a network
resource by the buyer, the seller must
submit undesignations for each portion
of each resource supporting the thirdparty sale. Since we believe most, if not
all, system sales sourced from
designated network resources are
themselves designated as network
resources by the buyer, we expect that
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
few system sales will require
undesignation on a unit-by-unit basis.
948. As we reiterate in section
III.D.9.c there is also no need to
undesignate network resources prior to
making sales that permit curtailment
without penalty to serve the seller’s
native load.345 Since there is no need to
undesignate resources to make such
sales, there is no corresponding need to
redesignate those resources in times of
emergency when power is recalled to
serve native load. We therefore disagree
with E.ON U.S. that special
redesignation procedures are necessary
for LSEs selling recallable energy. In
response to Pacific Northwest IOUs and
South Carolina E&G, we amend sections
1.26 and 30.4 of the pro forma OATT to
make clear that network resources do
not have to be undesignated before they
are used to support the provision of
reserve energy under a Commissionapproved reserve sharing agreement.
949. In response to MidAmerican’s
request, we clarify that, pending
implementation of the new OASIS
functionality, submission of requests to
designate and undesignate network
resources may be provided by any
appropriate electronic procedures
established by the transmission
provider, or by telephone or telefax as
provided in Order No. 890.
950. We grant NRECA and TAPS’
request for rehearing of the
Commission’s decision in Order No. 890
to allow transmission providers to deny
requests to terminate network resource
designations in certain situations. Upon
consideration of petitioners’ arguments,
we agree that it is not appropriate to
allow the transmission provider to deny
undesignation, effectively requiring the
network customer to continue to make
available a resource that the customer is
unable to, or no longer wishes to, make
available. Reliability problems caused
by the lack of available resources should
be dealt with through other means, such
as negotiation of must-run service
agreements. In light of this decision,
MidAmerican’s request to establish a
time by which a transmission provider
must act on a request to terminate the
designation of a network resource is
rejected as moot.
951. We disagree with Bonneville that
the pro forma OATT should be
amended to allow for firm third-party
sales from a network resource without
first undesignating the network
resource. If the particular ATC
methodology used by the transmission
345 See Order No. 890 at P 1459; see also WPPI
84 FERC at 61,152. Curtailment contemplates a
reduction in service as a result of system reliability
conditions, not economic reasons.
PO 00000
Frm 00117
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3099
provider allows for flexibility in
implementing this requirement, the
transmission provider may propose a
variation to the pro forma OATT in an
FPA section 205 filing. Any such
request should adequately address the
Commission’s concern, as stated in
Order No. 888, that network customers
may (absent a prohibition on network
resources including any portion of a
resource that was committed for sale to
a third party) have the incentive to
specify unlimited generation resources
to be integrated into their load without
any commensurate financial obligation,
given that network transmission service
is billed on a load ratio basis.346
6. Clarifications Related to Network
Service
a. Secondary Network Service
952. In Order No. 890, the
Commission declined to adopt further
limitations to the use of secondary
network service under section 28.4 of
the pro forma OATT, which allows a
network customer to deliver energy to
its network load from non-designated
network resources on an as-available
basis without additional charge.
Although the Commission had proposed
in the NOPR to limit the proper use of
secondary network service to deliveries
of economy energy only, upon review of
comments submitted on this issue the
Commission concluded that there were
instances outside of the proposed
definition of economy energy that
warranted the use of secondary network
service. The Commission therefore
decided to retain the existing section
28.4 of the pro forma OATT that allows
the use of secondary network service ‘‘to
deliver energy to its Network Loads.’’
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
953. Idaho Power asks the
Commission to clarify the showing that
transmission customers must make to
demonstrate that they are using
secondary network service properly or
not using secondary network service to
support off-system sales. Idaho Power
states that several commenters lamented
in response to the NOPR the difficulties
of making the calculations necessary to
demonstrate that secondary network
service is not being used to support offsystem sales. Idaho Power contends that
the Commission has never clearly
articulated the test used to determine
improper use of network service.
Although Idaho Power acknowledges
that the Commission has provided some
guidance on these issues in audit and
investigation reports, Idaho Power states
346 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
Order No. 888 at 31,753–54.
16JAR2
3100
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
that it is unclear to what extent the
Commission intends language in such
reports to apply beyond the context of
the particular audit or investigation.
954. Idaho Power suggests that an
economic test would not be precise
enough to address all the circumstances
where network and secondary
transmission should be used. Idaho
Power asks that the Commission instead
consider three factual questions to
evaluate the proper use of secondary
network service: Whether the utility’s
decisions were intended to maintain a
balanced portfolio for service to load;
whether the off-system sale was made at
a time when the utility’s resources
exceeded its expected load and needed
to balance its portfolio; and, whether the
utility either actually needed the
imported energy to serve load or needed
the imported energy to replace a more
expensive resource that otherwise
would have been used to serve load. If
the answer to these questions is ‘‘yes,’’
then Idaho Power argues that the use of
network or secondary transmission
should always be allowed to import
energy.
955. Idaho Power also asks the
Commission to articulate the types of
records it expects a utility to maintain
in order to document the use of its
transmission network in compliance
with Commission requirements. In
Idaho Power’s view, clarification of the
rules and corresponding documentation
requirements will allow utilities and
other network customers to become
more comfortable using secondary
network service rather than buying
excessive amounts of point-to-point
transmission.
Commission Determination
956. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to retain the
existing test for eligibility to use
secondary network service, i.e., when
energy is delivered to serve network
loads. In rejecting the proposed
restriction to deliveries of economy
energy, the Commission recognized that
there may be instances that warrant the
use of secondary service in order to
serve network loads reliably that would
not satisfy an economic test, as Idaho
Power suggests. The Commission
declined to adopt other restrictions on
the use of secondary network service
proposed by commenters, expressing
concern that the proposals could
preclude legitimate use of secondary
network service.
957. We similarly conclude that the
alternative three-part factual test
proposed by Idaho Power might not
reflect all of the factors to be considered
in determining whether a particular use
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
of secondary network service was to
deliver energy to network loads. The
Commission did not preclude in Order
No. 890 consideration of whether the
delivery in question is economic energy
and, instead, determined that restricting
the use of secondary network service
only to economic energy would be too
severe. The primary focus of the
Commission’s analysis is whether the
energy delivered using secondary
network service was intended to serve
network load. Whether a delivery in
question is for economic energy may
very well be relevant when considering
intent, but so would contemporaneous
documentation and other evidence. We
will continue to address the appropriate
use of secondary network service on a
case-by-case basis, as in
MidAmerican,347 which we intend to
serve as guidance to the industry
regarding the appropriate use of
secondary network service and the
documentation that would be relevant
for analysis.
b. ‘‘On an as-available basis’’
958. The Commission clarified in
Order No. 890 that secondary service
must be requested in accordance with
section 18, including the timing
restrictions set forth in section 18.3 of
the pro forma OATT. The Commission
explained that secondary service is on
an as-available basis and that network
customers should not be allowed to lock
in such service in advance of other nonfirm uses of available transmission. The
Commission concluded that allowing
lower priority secondary service to have
a scheduling advantage over non-firm
transmission would be inappropriate
and would discourage the use of nonfirm transmission service.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
959. Several petitioners request
clarification regarding the priority level
of secondary network service in relation
to non-firm transmission service.
NRECA, Southern, and TDU Systems
ask the Commission to clarify that
secondary service has a higher priority
than non-firm point-to-point service.
These petitioners state that section 28.4
of the pro forma OATT grants secondary
service a higher priority than all nonfirm point-to-point service and that the
Commission’s reference to secondary
network service as ‘‘lower-priority’’ in
Order No. 890 is incorrect and
contradictory of Order No. 888. Without
a higher priority for secondary network
service, these petitioners contend that
network customers located in
347 MidAmerican Energy Co., 112 FERC ¶ 61,346
at P 6 (2005) (MidAmerican).
PO 00000
Frm 00118
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
constrained regions who are forced to
rely on secondary service will be worse
off and reliability will be impaired.
960. Joined by TAPS, NRECA argues
that application of the scheduling
requirements for non-firm point-to-point
service to network customer
reservations of secondary service would
present a serious set-back for LSEs.
NRECA states that its members
commonly use secondary service to
import long-term firm power from other
states into their home states in order to
serve native load. NRECA argues that
this use of secondary service could not
happen if network customers were held
to the timing restrictions in section 18.3.
NRECA contends that precluding
network customers from acquiring
secondary service to coincide with longterm generation requirements, but
before actual use of the transmission,
would contradict Congressional intent
to preserve and enhance network
service to native load.
961. NRECA further contends that
there is no evidentiary record for
finding that the existing practice of
scheduling secondary service without
regard to the time restrictions of section
18.3 has ‘‘discouraged’’ the use of nonfirm transmission service or minimized
associated revenue credits. Even if that
is the case, NRECA argues that
secondary network service customers
should have priority and any marginal
amount of foregone revenues is justified
by more reliable, economic service for
LSEs. Because network customers pay a
load ratio share of total transmission
costs regardless of whether their energy
is coming from designated network
resources or non-designated network
resources on an as-available basis,
NRECA concludes that network
customers use the transmission system
in a fundamentally different way from
non-firm users and, therefore, they
should not be held to the same timing
restrictions in 18.3 that apply to nonfirm customers.
962. TAPS argues that, as long as
network customers bear a full share of
the costs of operating the entire system,
they should have first call on non-firm
use, just as secondary network service is
the last non-firm use to be curtailed in
response to constraints. In the event the
Commission denies rehearing on this
issue and retains the new timing
restrictions on secondary service, TAPS
asks that transmission providers also be
required to abide by those same
requirements when they seek to use an
undesignated resource (or the
undesignated portion of a resource) to
service their native load.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Commission Determination
963. The Commission grants
clarification of the reference to ‘‘lowerpriority’’ secondary network service in
paragraph 1606 of Order No. 890, which
was intended to distinguish secondary
network service from firm transmission
service, not non-firm transmission
service. Section 28.4 of the pro forma
OATT affords secondary service a
higher curtailment priority than any
non-firm point-to-point service and the
Commission did not intend to imply
otherwise in Order No. 890. We
disagree, however, that secondary
service should be allowed a higher
scheduling priority compared to all
other non-firm service. Secondary
service is on an ‘‘as available’’ basis and,
therefore, network customers should not
be allowed to lock in such service in
advance of other non-firm uses of
available transmission.
964. Petitioners’ arguments to the
contrary are misplaced. Although FPA
section 217 does address LSE uses of the
transmission systems, the focus of that
provision is on the use of firm
transmission, not non-firm uses such as
secondary network service. The fact that
network customers pay a load ratio
share of transmission costs does not
grant them superior rights when
scheduling firm transmission, nor
should it justify superior rights when
scheduling uses of the transmission
system other than firm uses. Any
request for secondary network service
therefore must be made in compliance
with section 18, including the timing
restrictions set forth in 18.3, of the pro
forma OATT. In response to TAPS, we
reiterate that section 28.2 of the pro
forma OATT requires the transmission
provider to designate resources and
loads in the same manner as any
network customer.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
c. Behind the Meter Generation and
Uses of Point-To-Point Service
965. The Commission declined to
require transmission providers to allow
netting of behind the meter generation
against transmission service charges to
the extent customers do not rely on the
transmission system to meet their
energy needs, stating that commenters
had not provided any different
arguments not fully addressed in Order
No. 888. The Commission explained
that the existing pro forma OATT
already allowed transmission customers
to exclude the entirety of a discrete load
from network service and serve such
load with the customer’s behind the
meter generation and point-to-point
transmission service as necessary,
thereby reducing the network
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
customer’s load ratio share. The
Commission concluded it is most
appropriate to continue to review
alternative transmission provider
proposals for behind the meter
generation treatment on a case-by-case
basis.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
966. Washington IOUs contend that
the language added to section 30.4 of
the pro forma OATT in Order No. 890
appears to permit a transmission
provider or network customer to take
point-to-point service to deliver power
from remote network resources to loads
in certain instances. Washington IOUs
ask the Commission to clarify that a
transmission provider or network
customer may use short-term firm pointto-point service to serve native load or
network load, respectively. Washington
IOUs state that there are at least two
events in which the use of point-topoint service to serve native or network
load is needed and appropriate: the
need to import power when it is unclear
whether or not the power will be
deemed to be used to serve native or
network load because of its relative cost;
and the need to import power reliably
from non-designated network resources
in order to serve native or network load,
instead of relying on secondary network
service. In their view, a restriction on
the use of point-to-point service would
prevent the transmission provider and
network customer from competing for
scarce transmission capacity in order to
serve their native or network load.
967. Idaho Power similarly asks the
Commission to clarify whether a
network customer or transmission
provider could use point-to-point
transmission to serve load in addition
to, and not in place of, paying its full
load ratio share for use of the network.
Idaho Power contends that a
transmission provider or network
customer should have the option to
compete in the market for point-to-point
service when it is not sure at the time
of a purchase whether the energy will be
needed for load or sold off-system as
surplus, provided they pay the full
value of point-to-point service.
Alternatively, Idaho Power requests the
Commission clarify that the network
customer and the transmission provider
may procure firm point-to-point service
in order to serve native and network
load when the utility requires capacity
in addition to the existing network
reservations or secondary transmission
over an interface. In order to ensure that
network and secondary transmission
rights are not being used to support offsystem sales, Idaho Power contends that
the use of network transmission rights
PO 00000
Frm 00119
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3101
must be minimized and used in
combination with point-to-point service.
968. Idaho Power also requests
clarification that the following examples
are considered proper uses of network
transmission, secondary transmission
and point-to-point transmission. First,
use of point-to-point transmission to
accomplish an off-system sale entered
into at a time the utility was forecasted
to be long, even if followed by a
subsequent purchase to serve load using
secondary network service or point-topoint transmission if the utility becomes
short. Second, use of a combination of
network service, secondary network
service, or point-to-point transmission
for a purchase at a time the utility was
forecasted to be short, even if followed
by a subsequent sale using point-topoint transmission from a portion of
that resource that becomes excess due to
a drop in forecasted load. Third, and
related, use of network transmission for
a purchase expected to serve load, even
if followed by a subsequent sale using
point-to-point service from a portion of
that resource that becomes excess in
real-time. Fourth, use of point-to-point
service to purchase economic energy to
serve network load in conjunction with
an off-setting undesignation of network
resources and sale of energy off system
using point-to-point transmission.
Finally, use of secondary network
service to purchase economic energy to
serve network load in conjunction with
an off-setting undesignation of network
resources and sale of energy off system
using point-to-point transmission. Idaho
Power contends that only the last
example should involve an economic
test to demonstrate that the imported
resource will displace a resource in the
utility’s load service stack of resources.
969. TAPS and FMPA argue that the
Commission failed to consider in Order
No. 890 the circumstance when it is
physically impossible for the
transmission system to actually deliver
a customer’s full load, which they
contend was not addressed in Order No.
888.348 TAPS states that the
Commission’s proposed solution of the
exclusion of the entirety of a discrete
load from network service is no help to
a customer that is served through a
single delivery point and, therefore, has
no discrete load that could be service
through a combination of point-to-point
service and behind the meter generation
while other load takes network service.
FMPA argues that it is unjust to charge
a customer for service that cannot be
provided and, therefore, there should be
an exception to load ratio share pricing
348 Citing Florida Mun. Power Agency v. FERC,
411 F.3d 287, 291 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3102
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
when the transmission provider is
unable to serve the network customer’s
entire load.
Commission Determination
970. As stated in Order No. 890, the
pro forma OATT permits transmission
customers to exclude the entirety of a
discrete load from network service and
serve such load with the customer’s
behind the meter generation and
through any needed point-to-point
transmission service, thereby reducing
the network customer’s load ratio
share.349 In other situations, use of
point-to-point service by network
customers is in addition to network
service and therefore does not serve to
reduce their load ratio share. As the
Commission concluded in Order No.
888–A, transmission customers
ultimately must evaluate the financial
advantages and risks and choose to use
either network integration or firm pointto-point transmission service to serve
load.350 Any alternative transmission
provider proposals for behind the meter
generation treatment will be reviewed
on a case-by-case basis.351
971. With regard to concerns of
insufficient transmission to serve the
network customer’s full load, we fail to
understand how, under normal
circumstances, the transmission
provider has no capacity to service a
load that has been designated by the
network customer. Once a load has been
designated, it is the obligation of the
transmission provider to serve that load
and to plan its system so that the load
can be accommodated in the future. To
assist the transmission provider in
fulfilling that obligation, network
customers are required to provide load
forecasts to the transmission provider
each year. The transmission planning
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 will
add greater transparency to this
planning process, better enabling
network customers to understand how
their needs are reflected in the
development of the transmission
system. To the extent a transmission
provider is unable to satisfy its
obligation to serve a designated network
load, it is more appropriate to address
that situation on a case-by-case basis.
972. The Commission also declines to
address here the hypothetical scenarios
offered by Idaho Power. Any
determination regarding the appropriate
use of secondary, network, or point-topoint service will depend upon the facts
surrounding the use of such services.
349 See
Order No. 890 at P 1619.
No. 888–A at 30,260–61.
351 See, e.g., PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 113
FERC ¶ 61,279 (2005).
350 Order
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
While load forecasts may change and
weather related incidents may occur,
with corresponding implications for a
utility’s purchasing activities, it is most
appropriate for the Commission to
consider whether a particular
transaction is an appropriate use of
secondary network service based on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
transaction, as discussed above.
7. Transmission Curtailments
973. The Commission did not propose
in the NOPR, or adopt in Order No. 890,
any changes to the terms and conditions
under which a transmission provider
may curtail service to maintain reliable
operation of the grid, as set forth in
sections 13.6 and 14.7 for point-to-point
service and section 33 for network
service. The Commission did, however,
conclude that the posting of additional
curtailment information is necessary to
provide transparency and allow
customers to determine whether they
have been treated in the same manner
as other transmission system users,
including customers of the transmission
provider. Accordingly, the Commission
required transmission providers,
working through NAESB, to develop a
detailed template for the posting of
additional information on OASIS
regarding firm transmission
curtailments, including all
circumstances and events contributing
to the need for a firm service
curtailment, specific services and
customers curtailed (including the
transmission provider’s own retail
loads), and the duration of the
curtailment.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
974. Powerex claims the Commission
improperly rejected its request that the
pro forma curtailment provisions be
modified to provide for pro rata
curtailment based on a customer’s
reserved capacity rather than its
scheduled capacity. Powerex states that
the Commission appears to have
misunderstood its proposed two-stage
curtailment procedure, which was
rejected for having the potential to
impair reliability since the amount of
capacity curtailed using that approach
would not address the actual power
flows and, therefore, could be less than
required to relieve the overloaded
facility. Powerex explains that the
proposed two-stage process pertained
solely to the timeframe before power is
actually flowing. Powerex further states
that pro rata curtailments based on
reservation capacity would be made
prior to the energy scheduling and
tagging deadline (e.g., 20 minutes before
the operating hour), that the
PO 00000
Frm 00120
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
transmission provider would compare a
customer’s individual schedule to its
reduced/curtailed rights, and, if the
customer’s scheduled quantities fall
within its reduced rights, that schedule
would flow uncut. After calculating the
total capacity scheduled following the
application of the pro rata curtailment,
Powerex proposes that any excess
transmission be allocated back on a pro
rata basis to transmission customers
whose schedules were cut below their
reduced rights. Powerex states that this
would in no way affect curtailments to
actual power flows. Powerex suggests
that curtailment within the hour, due to
the limited time available to affect relief,
should continue to be allocated based
on actual schedules.
975. Powerex contends that the
Commission mistakenly concluded that
Powerex’s proposal would adversely
impact reliability, arguing that the
amount of capacity curtailed under the
two-stage process would be no different
from the amount of capacity the
transmission provider believes is
necessary to address the constraint and
that the capacity would be more
equitably and economically cut
according to the transmission
customers’ reserved quantities rather
than the scheduled quantities. Powerex
states that it is not aware of a single
commenter that provided any evidence
that the above modification would be
detrimental in any way to reliability,
nor did the Commission provide any
evidentiary support for its response.
976. E.ON U.S. requests clarification
of the correct order of curtailments
given the addition of conditional firm
point-to-point transmission service.
Specifically, E.ON U.S. requests
clarification regarding the curtailment
priority of the different conditional firm
options, i.e., conditions based on an
annual number of hours and conditions
based on specific system conditions.
Commission Determination
977. The Commission rejects
Powerex’s request to modify the
curtailment provisions of the pro forma
OATT to provide for pro rata
curtailment based on a customer’s
reserved capacity rather than its
scheduled capacity. Although Powerex
addresses in its request for rehearing the
Commission’s initial concern regarding
the proposal,352 we continue to believe
that the proposal would have a
potentially adverse impact on
reliability. Powerex’s proposal would
352 See Order No. 890 at P 1629 (stating that the
amount of capacity actually curtailed under the
Powerex proposal might be less than required to
relieve the overloaded facility).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
greatly increase the complexity of
scheduling transactions at or near realtime operations, threatening reliability
without providing significant
competitive benefits. Powerex has taken
a complex issue and presented it in two
simple steps, leaving out the details of
how the transmission operators could
obtain all the necessary information
required to make on-the-spot decisions,
perform the analyses to determine
whether each schedule flow fully
utilizes its respective reservation,
reallocate unused reserved capacity, and
curtail transactions without impairing
reliability. We thus reject the Powerex’s
request for rehearing in this regard.
978. In response to E.ON U.S., we
reiterate that the Commission adopted a
secondary network curtailment priority
to apply for the hours or specific
conditions when conditional firm
service is conditional. During nonconditional periods, conditional firm
service curtailment is treated consistent
with curtailment of other long-term firm
service.353 We reiterate that Order No.
890 did not change the terms and
conditions under which a transmission
provider may curtail service to maintain
reliable operation of the grid or change
the priority of curtailment for any type
of transmission service. Rather,
conditional firm point-to-point service,
as adopted in Order No. 890, fits within
the existing curtailment priorities and
constructs.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
8. Standardization of Rules and
Practices
a. Business Practices
979. In Order No. 890, the
Commission adopted the NOPR
proposal to continue to require that only
those rules, standards, and practices
that significantly affect transmission
service be incorporated into a
transmission provider’s OATT. The
Commission affirmed the use of a ‘‘rule
of reason’’ to determine what rules,
standards, and practices significantly
affect transmission service and, as a
result, must be included in the
transmission provider’s OATT.
980. Regarding rules, standards, and
practices that relate to transmission
service, but are not included in the
OATT, the Commission required
transmission providers to post this
information on their public Web sites
and make it accessible via OASIS. The
Commission made this requirement
applicable to all such rules, standards,
and practices, currently written or
otherwise.354 The Commission stated
353 See
id. at P 1074.
respect to the business practices
developed by NAESB, the Commission noted that
354 With
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
that it would not be appropriate to place
the rules, standards, and practices only
on OASIS, as some transmission
providers use certificates to restrict
access to their OASIS sites. The
Commission amended section 4 of the
pro forma OATT to establish this
posting requirement.
981. The Commission also required
each transmission provider to post on
its public Web site, with a
corresponding link on OASIS, a
statement of the process by which the
transmission provider will amend the
rules, standards, and practices that
relate to transmission service, but which
are not included in the OATT. The
Commission stated that this process
must include a mechanism to provide
reasonable notice of any proposed
changes to a posted business practice
and the respective effective date of such
change.355 Section 4 of the pro forma
OATT was further amended to formalize
this posting requirement.
982. Finally, the Commission adopted
the NOPR proposal to amend the pro
forma OATT by including a new
Attachment L specifying the qualitative
and quantitative criteria that the
transmission provider uses to determine
the level of secured and unsecured
credit required. The Commission
determined that Attachment L must
contain the following elements: (1) A
summary of the procedure for
determining the level of secured and
unsecured credit; (2) a list of the
acceptable types of collateral/security;
(3) a procedure for providing customers
with reasonable notice of changes in
credit levels and collateral
requirements; (4) a procedure for
providing customers, upon request, a
written explanation for any change in
credit levels or collateral requirements;
(5) a reasonable opportunity to contest
determinations of credit levels or
collateral requirements; and (6) a
reasonable opportunity to post
additional collateral, including curing
any non-creditworthy determination.
The Commission stated that the
transmission provider could
supplement Attachment L with a credit
guide or manual to be posted on OASIS.
there may be copyright restrictions that limit the
transmission provider’s ability to post those
practices on its own Web site. In such instances, the
Commission stated its expectation that the
transmission provider will reference any NAESB
practices it uses and provide a link on its public
Web site to the copyrighted material on the NAESB
Web site.
355 The Commission permitted transmission
providers to adopt such additional procedures they
deem appropriate, such as opportunities for
comment to proposed changes to rules, standards,
and practices.
PO 00000
Frm 00121
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3103
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
983. TDU Systems contend that the
Commission’s filing standard suggests
that the ‘‘rule of reason’’ test will only
come into play after it has determined
that a particular practice is one that
significantly affects transmission
service. TDU Systems argue that, once
the Commission has determined that a
practice significantly affects rates and
services, the only remaining question is
whether the practice is realistically
susceptible of specification and is not so
generally understood in any contract or
arrangement as to render recitation
superfluous.356 TDU Systems contend
that Order No. 890 is an unexplained
departure from prior precedent and that
the Commission failed to justify its
limitation on the data to be included in
the OATT.
984. In order to increase certainty,
TDU Systems also requests that the
Commission specify in advance the
different categories of transmission
provider issuances that the Commission
expects to see in the tariffs. At a
minimum, TDU Systems asks that the
Commission clarify that any rule,
standard, or practice that can serve to
limit a transmission customer’s access
to transmission service is one that
significantly affects transmission service
and, therefore, should be included in
the OATT.
985. Old Dominion requests that the
Commission clarify that, for individual
transmission-owning members of an
RTO that do not maintain their own
OATT, the transmission owners must
comply with the requirements of Order
No. 890 by including in the RTO’s
OATT any rules, standards and
practices that affect transmission service
that are either different from or an
expansion upon those in the RTO’s
OATT. Old Dominion states that this is
necessary because individual
transmission owners’ planning criteria
and business practices can limit access
to transmission service in the same
manner as those of the RTO.
986. NRECA states that it supports the
Commission’s decision to require each
transmission provider to post on its
public Web site (with a corresponding
link on OASIS) all rules, standards or
business practices that relate to the
terms and conditions of transmission
service, if not already stated in the
OATT itself. NRECA contends,
however, that the Commission’s
subsequent discussion of transmission
providers’ credit guides or manuals
seemingly allows that information to be
356 Citing City of Cleveland v. FERC, 773 F.2d
1368, 1376 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (City of Cleveland).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3104
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
posted only on OASIS.357 Because
credit is such an important potential
barrier to transmission access, NRECA
maintains that it is critical for the
details of the credit criteria and
methodologies to be posted on the
public Web site of the transmission
provider, with a link on OASIS. NRECA
also contends that a statement should be
added to the first paragraph of
Attachment L explicitly clarifying that
the credit review procedures and
criteria may not unfairly disadvantage
public power entities or other customer
groups having unconventional financing
or business structures.
987. Southern requests that the
Commission grant rehearing to allow a
transmission provider that does not
restrict access to its OASIS site the
option of posting rules, standards and
practices relating to transmission
service on its OASIS with a link to such
information on its public Web site.
Southern maintains that permitting
transmission providers that do not
restrict access to their OASIS to make
required postings on OASIS would
satisfy the Commission’s objective to
provide public access to such
information. Southern argues that not
allowing such flexibility would be
arbitrary and capricious.
Commission Determination
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
988. The Commission did not intend,
as TDU Systems suggest, that the
Commission must first determine that a
particular practice significantly affects
transmission service before it applies
the ‘‘rule of reason.’’ In Order No. 890,
the Commission ‘‘affirm[ed] the use of a
‘‘rule of reason’’ to determine what
rules, standards, and practices
significantly affect transmission service
and, as a result, must be included in the
transmission provider’s OATT.’’ 358
Specifically, the ‘‘rule of reason’’
requires ‘‘recitation of only those
practices that affect rates and services
significantly, that are realistically
susceptible of specification, and that are
not so generally understood as to render
recitation superfluous.’’ 359 The
Commission intends to continue to use
the ‘‘rule of reason’’ for this purpose,
consistent with its statutory
responsibility and precedent.
989. We decline to specify in advance
the particular categories of rules,
standards, and practices that must be
documented in the transmission
provider’s OATT. Although rules,
357 Citing
Order No. 890 at P 1657–58.
at P 1649.
359 Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 67 FERC ¶ 61,371 at
62,267 (1994) (quoting City of Cleveland, 773 F.2d
at 1376).
358 Id.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
standards, and practices that limit a
transmission customer’s access to
transmission service may very well have
a significant effect on transmission
services, and therefore should be in the
OATT, any attempt to list the specific
categories of rules, practices and
standards that must be included in an
OATT would be over- or underinclusive as applied to a particular
transmission provider. The Commission
believes that, through application of the
‘‘rule of reason,’’ we will be better able
to identify those rules, standards and
practices that significantly affect
transmission service and, as a result, are
required to be in each transmission
provider’s OATT.
990. In response to Old Dominion, we
reiterate that each ISO and RTO must
include in its OATT all of the rules,
standards and practices that
significantly affect the transmission
service provided by the ISO or RTO and
must electronically post all of the rules,
standards and practices that relate to
transmission service, but which are not
included in the OATT. To the extent
any of the transmission-owning
members of the ISO or RTO have
additional rules, standards and practices
that significantly affect, or relate to, the
transmission service being provided by
the ISO or RTO, the ISO or RTO must
include such rules, standards and
practices in its OATT or electronic
postings, as relevant. Transmission
customers must be able to understand
the rules, standards and practices that
affect or relate to the service being
provided by the transmission provider,
even if such rules, standards or
practices are developed or implemented
by third parties.
991. We agree with Southern’s request
for rehearing to allow a transmission
provider that does not restrict access to
its OASIS site the option of posting
rules, standards and practices relating to
transmission service on its OASIS with
a link to such information on its public
Web site. The Commission is
sympathetic to Southern’s concern and
agrees that section 4 of the pro forma
OATT, as revised by Order No. 890, is
overly restrictive. The Commission’s
purpose in revising section 4 was to
ensure that the public has unrestricted
electronic access to the transmission
provider’s rules, standards and practices
that are not included in its OATT. The
Commission concludes that the
transmission provider should be free to
place this information on OASIS, its
public Web site or other suitable
electronic platform as long as the
transmission provider provides, both on
OASIS and on its public Web site, an
PO 00000
Frm 00122
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
electronic link to the information. We
have revised section 4 accordingly.
992. We also agree with NRECA that,
in Order No. 890, the Commission
appears to allow the transmission
provider to post its credit guides or
manuals only on OASIS.360 This was
not our intent. The Commission
considers credit guides and manuals
containing more detailed information
than that required in Attachment L to be
rules, standards or practices that relate
to transmission service, that not be
included in the transmission provider’s
OATT. We clarify that the transmission
provider must electronically post such
credit guides and manuals and provide
a link to that information on its public
Web site and OASIS. We deny as
unnecessary NRECA’s request to add a
statement to Attachment L regarding
application of credit review procedures
and criteria to customer groups with
unconventional financing or business
structures. The Commission already
provided in Order No. 890 that
transmission providers must consider
both quantitative and qualitative factors
so that the particular circumstances
surrounding public power entities can
be recognized when analyzing their
creditworthiness.361
b. Limitation on Liability
993. In Order No. 890, the
Commission declined to amend the
liability protections found in the pro
forma OATT for the same reasons that
the Commission rejected similar
proposals in the past.362 The
Commission relied upon the reasoning
found in Order Nos. 888–A, 888–B,
2003,363 the Reliability Policy
Statement,364 and Commission
precedent.365 The Commission
explained that the pro forma OATT was
not intended to address liability issues
and that liability was a separate issue
from indemnification.366 The
Commission further explained that
360 See
Order No. 890 at P 1657–58.
id. at P 1659.
362 See, e.g., Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 113
FERC ¶ 61,287 (2005); Southern Company Services,
Inc., 113 FERC ¶ 61,239 (2005); Nevada Power Co.,
99 FERC ¶ 61,347 (2002); Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Co. v. Hall, 7 FERC ¶ 61,175, reh’g denied, 8 FERC
¶ 61,039 (1979).
363 Order No. 2003 at P 636; Order No. 2003–A
at 31,162.
364 Policy Statement on Matters Related to Bulk
Power System Reliability, 107 FERC ¶ 61,052 (2004)
(Reliability Policy Statement).
365 See, e.g., Northeast Utilities Services Co., 111
FERC ¶ 61,333 (2005) (Northeast Utilities);
Southwest Power Pool, Inc., 112 FERC ¶ 61,100 at
P 39 (2005); Southern Company Services, Inc., 113
FERC ¶ 61,239, at P 7 (2005).
366 See Order No. 888–A at 30,301 and Order No.
888–B at 62,081 (section 10.2 of the pro forma
OATT).
361 See
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmission providers were not
precluded from relying on state laws
that protected utilities or others from
claims founded in ordinary
negligence.367 The Commission
declined to adopt a uniform federal
liability standard and decided that,
while it was appropriate to protect the
transmission provider through force
majeure and indemnification provisions
from damages or liability when service
is provided by the transmission
provider without negligence, it would
leave the determination of liability in
other instances to other proceedings.368
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
994. Washington IOUs request that
the Commission grant rehearing and
establish a uniform liability provision in
the pro forma OATT that limits
transmission provider liability except in
instances of gross negligence or willful
misconduct. In their view, enactment of
mandatory reliability standards under
FPA section 215, the threat of civil
penalties and other remedial actions,
and state oversight all provide
appropriate incentives for utilities to
exercise due care in the operation of
their systems. Washington IOUs argue
that state protections do not appear to
be sufficient to protect a transmission
provider against outage liability since
they have arisen in the context of claims
by retail customers. They argue that
granting liability limitations except in
instances of gross negligence or
intentional misconduct is appropriate
given that outage liability is not
necessary to ensure utilities operate
their transmission systems reliably.
995. Washington IOUs also contend
that limitations of liability can be
effected by contracts, such as the pro
forma OATT, under much state law.
They argue that it is therefore arbitrary
for the Commission to expect
transmission providers to rely on state
law for appropriate limitations of
liability, while preventing the inclusion
of provisions in the pro forma OATT to
effectuate such limitations of liability.
Washington IOUs also argue that the
Commission has provided no good
reason for approving limitations on
liability for RTOs/ISOs, but not for other
transmission providers. In their view,
the policy concerns justifying liability
limitations for utilities in RTOs/ISOs are
identical to those confronting utilities in
non-RTO/ISO areas.
Commission Determination
996. The Commission denies
rehearing of the determination in Order
367 Order
368 Order
No. 888–A at 30,301.
No. 888–B at 62,081.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
No. 890 not to change the liability
protections found in the pro forma
OAAT. Washington IOUs raise no new
arguments in support of their position.
As the Commission explained in Order
No. 890, proposals by public utilities to
amend their OATTs to include
limitations on liability will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.369
On review of such requests, the
Commission will consider whether state
laws provide inadequate protection
from liability.370 In response,
Washington IOUs argue that state law
protections appear to be insufficient
because they arose in the context of
claims by retail customers, yet
petitioners offer no evidence that
transmission providers are in fact
precluded from relying on state law for
liability protections. The potential for
legal and regulatory gap is therefore not
so great as to warrant inclusion of
liability protections in the pro forma
OATT for all transmission providers.
997. We also disagree that there is no
reason to distinguish between RTOs/
ISOs and other transmission providers
in considering requests to amend the
liability standard of their OATTs. The
Commission has provided increased
liability protection to RTOs/ISOs
because they were created by and are
solely regulated by the Commission and
otherwise would be without limitations
on liability.371 Because Washington
IOUs have failed to show that other
transmission providers are similarly
situated to RTOs/ISOs in this regard, we
affirm the decision to continue to
review on a case-by-case basis a request
to amend the liability standard in a
transmission provider’s OATT.
9. OATT Definitions
998. In order to support the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 and otherwise
clarify the requirements of the pro
forma OATT, the Commission added
and amended various definitions in the
pro forma OATT. Petitioners have
sought rehearing and clarification of
certain of these definitions.
a. Affiliate
999. In order to support reforms
associated with the distribution of
operational penalties, the Commission
adopted the following definition of
Affiliate in the pro forma OATT: ‘‘With
respect to a corporation, partnership or
other entity, each such other
corporation, partnership or other entity
that directly or indirectly, through one
369 See Order No. 890 at P 1675 (citing Reliability
Policy Statement at P 40).
370 See Southern Company Services, Inc., 113
FERC ¶ 61,239 at P 7.
371 See id.
PO 00000
Frm 00123
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3105
or more intermediaries, controls, is
controlled by, or is under common
control with, such corporation,
partnership or other entity.’’
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
1000. EEI states that the term Affiliate
is used in several provisions of the pro
forma OATT that were not modified by
Order No. 890. To avoid potential
confusion, EEI requests that the
Commission amend the pro forma
OATT to capitalize every use of the
term.
1001. APPA requests that, consistent
with Order No. 888–A, the Commission
clarify that public power joint agencies
and their members are not corporate
affiliates and, therefore, the definition of
Affiliate does not apply to public power
joint action agencies for the purposes of
applying the Standards of Conduct.
APPA notes that the Commission in
Order No. 890 concluded that the
definition of Affiliate does not apply to
G&T cooperatives and their member
distribution cooperatives. APPA argues
that public power joint action agencies
and their members are similarly situated
to G&T cooperatives and their members
and, as a result, the rationale set out in
Order No. 888–A and Order No. 890
applies equally to public power
agencies joint action agencies and their
members.372 APPA suggests
Commission policy that supports not
treating joint action agencies and their
members as consisting of ‘‘single
economic units’’ also supports not
treating joint action agencies and their
members as Affiliates.373
1002. E.ON U.S. requests guidance on
how functionally unbundled
transmission providers should treat
their generation function for purposes of
the pro forma OATT. E.ON U.S. states
that its generation and transmission
functions are owned by the same
corporate entity, but are unbundled
from each other for purposes of the
Standards of Conduct. As a result, E.ON
U.S. contends that its generation and
transmission functions are not Affiliates
because they are part of the same
corporate entity. E.ON U.S. asks the
Commission to clarify whether it
intends to include a transmission
provider’s unbundled generation
function within the definition of
Affiliate even if the generation function
is part of the same corporate entity.
Commission Determination
1003. The Commission grants
rehearing, as requested by EEI, to amend
372 Citing Order No. 890 at P 1682 (citing Order
No. 888–A at 30,286 and 30,366).
373 Citing Southwest Power Pool, 112 FERC
¶ 61,355 at P 23–24 (2005).
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3106
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the pro forma OATT such that every use
of the term Affiliate is capitalized. We
agree with APPA that members of an
umbrella joint action agency are not
Affiliates of the joint action agency
within the meaning of the pro forma
OATT. We clarify in response to E.ON
U.S., however, that the transmission
function and generation function of a
single corporation are Affiliates. Each
would be an entity under common
control, notwithstanding the fact that
they are within the same corporation.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
b. Good Utility Practice
1004. In Order No. 890, the
Commission incorporated the definition
of reliable operation in FPA section 215
into the definition of Good Utility
Practice in the pro forma OATT. As
amended, the definition of Good Utility
Practice is: ‘‘Any of the practices,
methods and acts engaged in or
approved by a significant portion of the
electric utility industry during the
relevant time period, or any of the
practices, methods and acts which, in
the exercise of reasonable judgment in
light of the facts known at the time the
decision was made, could have been
expected to accomplish the desired
result at a reasonable cost consistent
with good business practices, reliability,
safety and expedition. Good Utility
Practice is not intended to be limited to
the optimum practice, method, or act to
the exclusion of all others, but rather to
be acceptable practices, methods, or acts
generally accepted in the region,
including those practices required by
Federal Power Act section 215(a)(4).’’
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
1005. Xcel argues that revising the
definition of Good Utility Practice to
include compliance with the mandatory
reliability standards of FPA section 215
inappropriately subjects transmission
providers to two separate enforcement
schemes for alleged violations of the
reliability standards. Xcel suggests that
the Commission eliminate from the
definition of Good Utility Practice the
reference to practices under FPA section
215. Xcel argues that this would not
eliminate the obligation of transmission
providers or transmission owners to
comply with the mandatory reliability
standards and, instead, would make
such compliance subject to enforcement
and potential penalties under one
enforcement regime, as contemplated by
Congress under the FPA.
1006. If the Commission does not
eliminate the reference to practices
required by section 215, Xcel asks the
Commission to clarify that reliability
standards that have not been approved
under FPA section 215 would not be
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
enforceable as an OATT violation.374
Xcel also argues that a violation of a
mandatory reliability standard approved
by the Commission should be subject to
enforcement only by the ERO or
applicable RE under the compliance and
enforcement scheme created by NERC
and the Commission under FPA section
215. Xcel contends it would subject
FERC-jurisdictional transmission
providers to ‘‘double jeopardy’’ to allow
a claim of an alleged violation of a
mandatory reliability standard to be
pursued in both an OATT enforcement
proceeding and a section 215
enforcement proceeding. Finally, Xcel
argues that in no event should an
alleged violation of a mandatory
reliability standard be subject to dual
financial penalties through separate
enforcement actions by the Commission
for an OATT violation and by the ERO
or RE for a reliability violation.
Commission Determination
1007. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to incorporate
within the definition of Good Utility
Practice those practices required by FPA
section 215(a)(4). Even without the
revisions adopted in Order No. 890, the
definition of Good Utility Practice
would have incorporated each
reliability standard approved by the
Commission, since they represent
practices in which the industry is
required to engage. The Commission
simply made this explicit in Order No.
890.
1008. As we explained in Order No.
693, however, the Commission does not
believe it would be appropriate to retain
a dual mechanism to enforce reliability
standards both as Good Utility Practice
and under FPA section 215.375 The pro
forma OATT only applies to entities
subject to our jurisdiction as public
utilities under the FPA, while section
215 defines more broadly our
jurisdiction with respect to mandatory
reliability standards. We therefore do
not intend to enforce, as an OATT
violation, compliance with any
reliability standard approved by the
Commission under section 215. It is
more appropriate for the Commission to
rely on its authority under section 215
to enforce compliance with mandatory
reliability standards.
c. Non-Firm Sales
1009. In order to clarify the
obligations of network customers under
section 30.4 of the pro forma OATT, the
Commission adopted the following
definition of Non-Firm Sales in the pro
374 Citing
375 See
PO 00000
Order No. 693 at P 302.
id.
Frm 00124
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
forma OATT: ‘‘An energy sale for which
receipt or delivery may be interrupted
for any reason or no reason, without
liability on the part of either the buyer
or seller.’’
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
1010. NRECA asks the Commission to
clarify that a unit-contingent contract is
not a Non-Firm Sale within the meaning
of the pro forma OATT, which NRECA
argues would make it ineligible for
designation as a network resource.
NRECA states that unit-contingent
contracts excuse non-delivery only on
account of constraints on the unit
providing service and not, more
generally, for ‘‘any reason’’ or ‘‘no
reason.’’ NRECA contends that such
contracts are sufficiently firm to be
considered ‘‘LU’’ and ‘‘IU’’ service in
FERC Form One Account 447 and
should likewise not be considered NonFirm Sales under the pro forma OATT.
1011. Southern questions whether
system-firm sales that permit
curtailment without penalty to serve the
seller’s native load should be treated as
Non-Firm Sales for purposes of section
30.4 of the pro forma OATT. Southern
states that the Commission has
considered the purchase of a systemfirm energy to be eligible for designation
as a network resource,376 but contends
that it is ambiguous whether the seller
should consider those sales as a NonFirm Sale. Southern argues that treating
such sales as Non-Firm Sales would
assure internal consistency within the
pro forma OATT, foster liquidity in
short-term wholesale opportunity
markets, and promote the efficient
optimization of network resources.
1012. Washington IOUs argues that a
contract that allows for interruption to
serve native load should be considered
a Non-Firm Sale even if there is a ‘‘make
whole’’ penalty for the interruption.
Washington IOUs argue that a
requirement that sales from a designated
network resource be recallable for
service of native or network load
without any financial consequences
would constitute an unnecessary
regulatory intrusion into wholesale
electricity markets, and is not necessary
for reliability purposes.377
1013. TAPS express similar concerns,
asking the Commission to clarify that
the definition of Non-Firm Sales
includes transactions that permit
interruption for any or no reason
376 Citing
WPPI.
IOUs argue that, now that the
Commission has enforcement authority for
reliability under section 215 of the FPA, there are
avenues to address reliability concerns that are
more effective than the use of rules for designated
network resources.
377 Washington
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
without penalty, even if the seller may
entail some financial liability for
interruption. TAPS states that failure to
deliver energy sold in a day-ahead
organized market creates an obligation
to pay the real-time LMP and potentially
other charges, even though the power
sale is not generally considered firm. If
this potential obligation is interpreted as
a liability for purposes of qualifying as
a Non-Firm Sale, TAPS concludes that
sales into day-ahead organized markets
cannot be made from a network resource
without first undesignating that
resource, which TAPS argues would be
unduly burdensome and would
discourage network customers from
making sales into those markets. TAPS
contends that network customers will be
reluctant to undesignate their network
resources for fear that they would be
unable to redesignate them in a timely
manner if they are needed to serve
native load in real-time.
1014. With regard to the MISO market
in particular, TAPS argues that refusing
to treat sales into that day-ahead market
as Non-Firm Sales would require
network customers to undesignate
resources to comply with MISO’s must
offer requirements. TAPS argues that it
would be inappropriate to require
undesignation of a network resource to
sell into the RTO in which the resource
is located as well as neighboring RTOs,
such as from MISO into PJM. The use
of centralized dispatch in these markets,
TAPS argues, eliminates any effect
temporary resource undesignations and
redesignations may have on dispatch or
ATC calculations. TAPS contends that
the added burden of undesignating and
redesignating network resources is
therefore pointless in centrally
dispatched markets.
1015. E.ON LSE expresses similar
concerns, arguing that the definition of
Non-Firm Sale in combination with
restricted network resource designation
policies will result in fewer resources
being made available. With regard to the
MISO market in particular, E.ON LSE
states that the MISO tariff requires that
certain day-ahead transactions are made
on the condition that the selling
generator provide service on-demand.
E.ON LSE similarly request that the
Commission clarify that day-ahead and
real-time sales in MISO and other RTO/
ISO markets need not meet the
definition of Non-Firm Sales.
Commission Determination
1016. The Commission agrees with
NRECA that, under normal
circumstances, we would not expect a
unit contingent agreement to fall within
the definition of a Non-Firm Sale since
typically delivery can only be
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
interrupted for the specific reasons
identified in the underlying agreement.
We also agree with Southern that, under
normal circumstances, a system sale
that permits curtailment without
penalty to serve the seller’s native load
would fall within the definition of a
Non-Firm Sale since the seller would
have the right to rely on that capacity
in the event it is needed to serve native
load, which is the Commission’s
principal concern in restricting sales
from designated network resources to
Non-Firm Sales. Whether any particular
contract satisfies the definition of NonFirm Sales, however, must be
considered based on the terms and
conditions of that contract.
1017. We disagree with TAPS and
Washington IOUs that the definition of
Non-Firm Sales includes transactions
that permit interruption with financial
liability, whether make whole or limited
to certain penalties. In Order No. 890,
the Commission clarified its existing
policy prohibiting network customers
from making third-party sales from a
designated network resource if the
third-party power purchase agreement
does not allow the seller to interrupt
power sales to the third party in order
to serve the designated network load.378
The Commission adopted the definition
of Non-Firm Sales to identify more
clearly those types of sales that are
permitted from designated network
resources, explaining that any
interruption in service that would create
liability on the part of the seller would
create conflicting incentives regarding
use of the network resource and,
therefore, such sale could not be made
without first undesignating the
resource.379 The Commission concluded
that it would be inappropriate to adopt
commenter suggestions to relax the
definition of a Non-Firm Sale to include
any sale that is not otherwise firm
enough to be designated as a network
resource.380
1018. We appreciate the concerns of
E.ON LSE and TAPS regarding the
potential effect of this decision on RTO/
ISO markets. It does not follow,
however, that the pro forma OATT must
be amended to accommodate the
particular market operations of each
RTO and ISO. RTOs and ISOs have
adopted many variations from the pro
378 See
Order No. 890 at P 1539.
id. at P 1692. The Commission’s use of the
word ‘‘penalty’’ in paragraph 1539 of Order No. 890
was not intended to restrict the scope of Non-Firm
Sales. As the Commission explained in that
paragraph, our concern is that there not be financial
incentives that compete with the network resource’s
obligations to serve its network load. Interruption
must therefore be allowed without liability or
penalty.
380 Id.
379 See
PO 00000
Frm 00125
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3107
forma OATT to facilitate development
of their markets, with some entirely
eliminating the designation/
undesignation requirements for network
resources. As TAPS explains,
centralized dispatch in these markets
may very well eliminate any effect that
temporary resource undesignations and
redesignations have on dispatch or ATC
calculations and, therefore, tailoring the
rules governing the designation of
network resources to each RTO/ISO
market could be appropriate.
1019. We note that MISO has adopted
the pro forma definition of Non-Firm
Sales in its compliance filing in
response to Order No. 890 and certain
members of TAPS have argued in
response that adoption of that definition
is inconsistent with the operation of the
MISO market.381 The Commission will
address those arguments on review of
the MISO compliance filing. In the
interim, we note that MISO retains
significant discretion in how to
implement the undesignation
requirements for network resources.
Pending development of OASIS
functionality for electronic submission
of undesignations and redesignations,
each transmission provider may adopt
business practices governing the
undesignation and redesignation of
network resources. While the
Commission referenced the use of
telefax or recorded telephone lines to
convey this information,382 the bidbased nature of LMP markets may
justify adoption of other procedures. We
decline to impose any particular
requirements here regarding the
designation and undesignation of
network resources selling in an RTO/
ISO market, as it is more appropriate to
leave development of those
requirements to each transmission
provider, in coordination with its
stakeholders as relevant.
d. Commenter Proposals
1020. The Commission declined to
adopt various commenter proposals for
modifications or additions to the
definitions contained in the pro forma
OATT. For example, the Commission
declined to revise the definition of
Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Service to include service
longer than one year, instead of one year
or longer. The Commission also rejected
commenter requests to adopt proposed
definitions for the terms ‘‘source,’’
381 See Supplemental Comments of Indiana
Municipal Power Agency, Lincoln Electric System,
Madison Gas & Electric Company, and Wisconsin
Public Power Inc., Docket No. OA08–14–000 (Nov.
6, 2007).
382 See Order No. 890 at P 1543.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3108
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
‘‘sink,’’ ‘‘use,’’ and ‘‘transmission peak’’
in the pro forma OATT.383
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
1021. Ameren argues that the
Commission failed to adequately
consider its proposal to amend the
definition of long-term firm service to
include only contracts that are longer
than a year. Ameren argues that
contracts of only one year in duration
should be reflected as a revenue credit
and that the current definition of longterm service makes calculation very
difficult in the modern RTO/Seams
Elimination Cost Allocation (SECA)
environment. Ameren contends that the
Commission’s refusal to modify the
definition of long-term service is
inconsistent with other decisions in
Order No. 890, such as the requirement
that the planning redispatch and
conditional firm options for long-term
firm point-to-point service apply be
offered only to customers requesting
service of more than a year in
duration 384 and the intended planning
benefits associated with granting
rollover rights only to customers with
contracts of five years or longer.
1022. Ameren also challenges the
Commission’s rejection of an alternative
definition for ‘‘transmission peak,’’
arguing that the current definition and
calculation methodology is unworkable
because the data necessary no longer
resides with the transmission owner.
Ameren further states that the
Commission failed to adequately
explain rejection of proposed
definitions of ‘‘source’’ and ‘‘sink’’ in
section 22.2 of the pro forma OATT, and
clarification whether the word ‘‘use’’ in
section 30.8 of the pro forma OATT
includes load ratio limitations, although
Ameren states no arguments in support
of that contention.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Commission Determination
1023. The Commission affirms the
decision in Order No. 890 to maintain
the current definition of Long-Term
Firm Point-to-Point Service. The
definition is well-established in
Commission precedent and,
notwithstanding Ameren’s arguments to
the contrary, consistent with the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890.385 Ameren
has failed to justify altering the
383 Powerex’s request for rehearing of the
Commission’s decision not to modify the definition
of System Impact Study to exclude short-term
service requests is discussed in section III.D.4.a.(6)
above.
384 Citing Order No. 890 at P 978.
385 The Commission clarifies in section III.D.1 our
intent that the conditional firm and planning
redispatch options apply to all long-term firm
point-to-point requests for service, i.e., service of
one year or longer.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
definition of Long-Term Firm Point-toPoint Service in light of the disruption
such a change would cause.
1024. We also decline to amend the
pro forma OATT to adopt Ameren’s
proposed definitions of ‘‘transmission
peak,’’ ‘‘source,’’ ‘‘sink,’’ and ‘‘use.’’
Ameren simply repeats arguments that
have previously been rejected. While
peak load data ultimately resides with
the RTO or ISO in those regions, each
transmission owner coordinates this
data with the RTO/ISO and, therefore, it
is not necessary to alter the definition of
transmission peak as suggested by
Ameren. The Commission has
adequately addressed the definitions of
‘‘source’’ and ‘‘sink’’ in Order No. 888
and OASIS related proceedings and
Ameren fails to state why, in its view,
additional clarification is needed.
Finally, the Commission has made clear
that there are no load ratio limitations
on the use of interfaces under section
30.8 of the pro forma OATT.386
E. Enforcement
1025. The Commission addressed
several matters regarding enforcement of
the pro forma OATT in Order No. 890.
Among other things, the Commission
concluded that it would revoke an
entity’s market-based rate authority in
response to an OATT violation only
upon a finding of a specific factual
nexus between the violation and the
entity’s market-based rate authority.387
The Commission reasoned that the
‘‘nexus condition’’ is required in order
to ensure that the Commission’s actions
are not arbitrary or capricious or based
on an inadequate factual record. The
Commission noted that in such
situations it would have the burden to
show a factual nexus and did not assign
a burden on the violator to show a lack
of nexus.
1026. The Commission disagreed that
a finding of a ‘‘serious’’ or ‘‘material’’
violation of the OATT alone would be
sufficient to justify revocation of an
entity’s market-based rate authority. The
Commission concluded that the nexus
condition requires a finding both that a
substantial OATT violation has
occurred and that the violation either
related to the exercise of the violator’s
market-based rate authority or violated
a specific condition of that authority.388
The Commission emphasized,
moreover, that it has discretion to
fashion further sanctions, such as civil
386 See Order No. 888 at 31,753–54; Order No.
888–A at 30,304–5; see also Sierra Pacific Power
Co., 81 FERC ¶ 61,136 at 61,139–40 (1997); New
England Power Pool, 83 FERC ¶ 61,045 at 61,248
(1998).
387 Order No. 890 at P 1743.
388 Id. at P 1744.
PO 00000
Frm 00126
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
penalties or modification of a violator’s
market-based rate authority, for OATT
violations that relate to the violator’s
market-based rate authority where a
factual nexus justification was not
found to justify revocation of that
authority.
1027. The Commission also created a
rebuttable presumption that all of the
transmission provider’s affiliates should
lose their market-based rate authority in
each market in which their affiliated
transmission provider loses its marketbased rate authority as a result of an
OATT violation.389 The Commission
stated that it would allow an affiliate of
a transmission provider to retain its
market-based rate authority in a market
area if the affiliate overcomes the
rebuttable presumption with respect to
that market area. To afford due process
to a transmission provider’s affiliates
and to ensure that revocation of marketbased rate authority in a particular
market for the transmission provider
and all of its affiliates is adequately
based upon record evidence and not
arbitrary or capricious, the Commission
provided that each such affiliate will be
allowed to make a showing that it
should retain its market-based rate
authority or that enforcement action
against it should be less severe than
revocation.
1028. The Commission explained that
whether an affiliate has overcome the
rebuttable presumption will depend on
an analysis of specific facts in the
record. Relevant facts would include,
but are not limited to, whether: (1) The
transmission provider and the affiliate
were under the same control; (2) the
affiliate knew of, participated in or was
an accomplice to the OATT violation;
(3) the affiliate assisted the transmission
provider in exercising market power; or
(4) the affiliate benefited from the
violation.390
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
1029. NRECA argues that it is unclear
what would constitute a sufficient
factual nexus between an OATT
violation and revocation of the violator’s
market-based rate authority. NRECA
suggests that the Commission instead
adopt the standard advocated by APPA
in its NOPR comments, which would
require revocation of the affiliate’s
market-based rate authority when there
is any material violation of the
transmission provider’s OATT that
denies a customer access to just,
reasonable, nondiscriminatory, and
comparable transmission service. If the
Commission retains the nexus
389 Id.
390 Id.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
at P 1747.
at P 1748.
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
requirement as formulated in Order No.
890, NRECA asks that the Commission
provide an illustrative list of what types
of violations could constitute a
sufficient nexus between an OATT
violation and an entity’s market-based
rate authority. NRECA urges the
Commission to specifically identify
failure to comply with the planning
requirements of Order No. 890 as
satisfying the nexus requirement.
1030. TDU Systems argue that the
nexus requirement does not pay
adequate attention to the basic nature
and purpose of the market-based rate
authorization and, in their view, the
critical question is whether the OATT
violation is indicative of conditions in
the market which are significantly
different from those upon which the
market-based rate authorization was
premised. TDU Systems argue that a
transmission provider’s violation of a
material term of its OATT should serve
as prima facie evidence that the
structures presumed to cabin the
exercise of monopoly power may not be
adequate. Even if the transmission
provider has not violated its OATT
explicitly in connection with the
market-based rate authorization, TDU
Systems contend that the violation may
nonetheless promote conditions in
which the transmission provider could
gain an advantage in future transactions.
TDU Systems state particular concern
that failure to comply with the planning
obligations of Order No. 890 may not be
associated with any specific exercise of
market-based rate authority, yet could
foster conditions inconsistent with the
premises of unconstrained and
competitive markets.
1031. EEI argues that, since there is no
rebuttable presumption with respect to
a transmission provider’s OATT
violation and its potential loss of
market-based rate authority, there
should be no rebuttable presumption
regarding the market-based rate
authority of the transmission provider’s
affiliates. EEI contends that the
Commission’s Code of Conduct actually
supports a presumption that a
transmission provider’s OATT violation
does not have any relation to the
activities of the marketing affiliate since,
absent evidence to the contrary, the
utility and its energy affiliates should be
presumed to be obeying the
Commission’s separation of function
requirements. EEI further argues that the
Commission’s reference to allegations
that transmission providers have
engaged in transactions with affiliates
does not justify adoption of a rebuttable
presumption in instances in which there
are no transactions with affiliates that
violated the OATT. EEI therefore asks
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
the Commission to grant rehearing and
hold that the rebuttable presumption
applies only if there is a specific factual
nexus between the activities of the
marketing affiliate and the OATT
violation.
1032. Ameren similarly argues that
most integrated utility companies that
have market-based rate authority have
separated their marketing activities into
‘‘regulated’’ traditional utility functions
and ‘‘non-regulated’’ power marketing
functions and have further separated
their transmission and merchant energy
functions. Ameren states that these
utilities’ codes of conduct and the
Commission’s Standards of Conduct
severely restrict the sharing of
information within an integrated utility
company or the possible benefit to
affiliates from an OATT violation.
Ameren argues that the presumption
adopted by the Commission
unreasonably assumes a lack of
compliance with these obligations and
unfairly shifts the burden to the affiliate
to show that it has not engaged in bad
acts.
1033. Ameren contends that a
decision by the Commission to revoke a
transmission provider’s market-based
rate authority would indicate only that
the Commission has determined that
sanction to be appropriate in light of the
transmission provider’s actions. In
Ameren’s view, there is no reason or
basis to similarly sanction the
transmission provider’s affiliate in the
absence of a showing that the affiliate
participated in, or benefited from, the
transmission provider’s improper
behavior. Ameren also argues that the
presumption is inconsistent with the
Commission’s decision in Order No. 890
to allow non-offending affiliates of the
transmission provider to share in the
distribution of operating penalties.
Finally, Ameren argues that revoking
the market-based rate authority of a
utility because of the actions of an
affiliated transmission provider would
unfairly harm the traditional utility
affiliate as well as its bundled customers
since many traditional utilities engage
in sales at market-based rates to reduce
their overall cost of power.
1034. Southern asks that the
Commission confirm and clarify that the
rebuttable presumption does not shift
the ultimate burden of proof to the
transmission provider or its affiliates,
but rather places a burden of going
forward on the affiliates, with the
ultimate burden remaining with the
Commission or other proponents of a
revocation sanction. Southern suggests
that the presentation of evidence that
rebuts the presumption should result in
the burden of proof reverting back to the
PO 00000
Frm 00127
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3109
Commission or the proponent of
revocation.
1035. Southern also requests
clarification of the relevant facts to be
considered by the Commission in
determining whether a sanction less
severe than revocation of market-based
rate authority may be appropriate for an
affiliate. Southern notes that the first
relevant fact noted by the Commission
in paragraph 1748 of Order No. 890 is
whether the transmission provider and
the affiliate were under ‘‘the same
control.’’ Southern questions what the
Commission meant by that language
since a transmission provider is by
definition under the same corporate
control as an affiliate.
Commission Determination
1036. The Commission denies
rehearing of the decision in Order No.
890 to require a factual nexus between
a substantial OATT violation and the
entity’s market-based rate authority to
justify revocation of that authority. As
the Commission explained in Order No.
890, the ‘‘nexus condition’’ is required
in order to ensure that our actions are
not arbitrary or capricious or based on
an inadequate factual record. We
disagree with NRECA and TDU Systems
that any material OATT violation
should justify revocation of the entity’s
market-based rate authority since the
violation may have no relation to the
market-based rate authority. In such
circumstances, the Commission will
consider such other sanctions as may be
appropriate. We also decline to provide
an illustrative list of examples that
would constitute a sufficient nexus
between an entity’s market-based rate
authority and an OATT violation. The
factual circumstances involved in a
claimed violation will be unique to the
company and, therefore, any such list
would be incomplete. This is especially
true in light of continually developing
market conditions. We continue to
believe that the determination of what
would be a sufficient factual nexus
between an OATT violation and
revocation of the violator’s market-based
rate authority is best left to case-by-case
consideration.
1037. With regard to the transmission
provider’s planning obligations,
violations of the planning-related
requirements of the pro forma OATT
may or may not have a sufficient factual
nexus with the transmission provider’s
market-based rate authority. A case-bycase analysis will be necessary to
determine if the violation justifies
revocation of the transmission
provider’s market-based rate authority.
While we agree with TDU Systems that
a transmission provider’s OATT
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3110
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
violations that are not explicitly
connected with its market-based rate
authorization may nonetheless promote
conditions in which the violator could
gain an advantage in future transactions,
we note that this is the precise result
that we seek to avoid with this
enforcement provision. Therefore, we
will apply the mechanisms adopted in
Order No. 890 to aid us in determining,
on a case-by-case basis if a particular
violation promotes conditions that will
put that company at a future advantage
`
vis-a-vis its market-based rate authority.
1038. We also decline to adopt TDU
Systems’ suggestion that we consider
whether the OATT violation is
indicative of conditions in the market
that are significantly different from
those upon which the market-based rate
authorization was premised. When the
revocation of market-based rate
authority is being considered, we will
distinguish between those violations
resulting from a change in market
conditions upon which the marketbased rate authority was granted (and
which are likely outside of the
company’s control) versus a clear
violation related to the company’s
market-based rate authority. It may be
most appropriate to address those
violations resulting from changes in
market conditions with an amendment
to the affected company’s OATT or
market-based rate tariff.
1039. We also affirm the adoption of
a rebuttable presumption that all of the
transmission provider’s affiliates should
lose their market-based rate authority in
each market in which their affiliated
transmission provider loses its marketbased rate authority as a result of an
OATT violation.391 While we agree that,
absent evidence to the contrary, the
transmission provider and its affiliates
should be presumed to be obeying the
Commission’s separation of function
requirements and Affiliate Restrictions,
we disagree that this undermines the
rebuttable presumption adopted in
Order No. 890. If a violation has
occurred that justifies revocation of the
entity’s market-based rate authority, the
violation must have related to that
market-based rate authority. Assuming
that the Standards of Conduct and
Affiliate Restrictions were followed, the
finding of a nexus between the violation
and the entity’s market-based rate
authority demonstrates that the
Standards of Conduct or Affiliate
Restrictions did not preclude the
violation. An OATT violation by a
transmission provider that merits
revocation of the transmission
provider’s market-based rate authority
391 Accord
Order No. 697 at P 424–427.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
will, at a minimum, raise the question
whether the transmission provider’s
affiliates continue to qualify for marketbased rates under the standards
established by the Commission.
1040. Applying this rebuttable
presumption to the transmission
provider’s affiliates is not, as suggested
by Ameren, inconsistent with the
Commission’s decision in Order No. 890
to allow non-offending affiliates of the
transmission provider to share in the
distribution of unreserved use
penalties.392 Unreserved use penalties
are a mechanism used to redress
administrative violations of the OATT
and can be assessed on any transmission
customer. It is therefore appropriate to
distribute those penalties to all nonoffending customers, whether or not
affiliated with the transmission
provider. Unreserved use penalties do
not rise to the level of the sanction of
revocation of market-based rate
authority, to which the presumption
applies.
1041. We also disagree that there must
be a showing of benefit by the affiliate
in order to revoke its market-based rate
authority or that potential economic
harm to the transmission provider’s
bundled customers categorically
justifies an affiliate to continue making
sales at market-based rates to reduce the
company’s overall cost of power, even if
the affiliate should otherwise lose its
market-based rate authority. It is
possible that a transmission provider
could violate its OATT with an intent to
advantage an affiliated marketer that, in
turn, attempts to take advantage of the
violation in the market but is
unsuccessful because of market
conditions. Alternatively, the affiliated
marketer could be successful, gaining an
unfair advantage due to the
transmission provider’s OATT violation,
but thereby earning revenue that
ultimately serves to lower the cost of
supplies for the company’s bundled
customers. In either of these
circumstances, it could be appropriate
to revoke or modify the market-based
rate authority of the affiliate. Therefore,
the facts of each violation must be
considered in order to determine if
revocation of market-based rate
authority is an appropriate sanction.
1042. With regard to Southern’s
request for clarification concerning the
burden of proof to show that an affiliate
should lose its market-based rate
authority, we confirm that the ultimate
392 Although
Ameren refers more generally to
operational penalties, only unreserved use penalties
may be distributed to affiliated customers. Late
study penalties are to be distributed only to nonaffiliated transmission customers. See Order No.
890 at P 1351.
PO 00000
Frm 00128
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
burden remains with the Commission.
The presumption does not constitute a
definitive finding that the affiliate’s
market-based rate authority should be
revoked and, thus, the affiliate has an
opportunity to demonstrate that
revocation would not be appropriate
under the facts and circumstances at
issue.393 The rebuttable presumption
thus satisfies the Commission’s burden
of going forward and shifts to the
affiliate the burden of presenting
evidence rebutting the presumption.
The ultimate burden of proof remains
with the Commission throughout these
proceedings, and it must base any
finding on a review of the factual
record.394
1043. We clarify in response to
Southern that the reference to whether
‘‘the transmission provider and the
affiliate were under the same control’’ in
paragraph 1748 of Order No. 890 is
intended to reflect that the Commission
will consider whether the affiliation
between the transmission provider and
the affiliate is sufficient to give either or
a common parent control over both
entities.
IV. Information Collection Statement
1044. The Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) regulations require that
OMB approve certain information
collection requirements imposed by an
agency.395 The revisions to the
information collection requirements for
transmission providers adopted in
Order No. 890 were approved under
OMB Control Nos. 1902–0233. This
order further revises these requirements
in order to more clearly state the
obligations imposed in Order No. 890,
but does not substantively alter those
requirements. OMB approval of this
order is therefore unnecessary.
However, the Commission will send a
copy of this order to OMB for
informational purposes only.
V. Document Availability
1045. In addition to publishing the
full text of this document in the Federal
Register, the Commission provides all
interested persons an opportunity to
view and/or print the contents of this
document via the Internet through
FERC’s Home Page (https://www.ferc.gov)
and in FERC’s Public Reference Room
during normal business hours (8:30 a.m.
to 5 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First
393 The use of shifting burdens of proof is
consistent with Commission practice in other areas.
See, e.g., AEP Power Mktg, Inc., 108 FERC ¶ 61,026
(2004); Southern Companies Energy Mktg, Inc., 111
FERC ¶ 61,144 (2005).
394 See Order No. 890 at P 1743–48.
395 5 CFR 1320.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Street, NE., Room 2A, Washington DC
20426.
1046. From FERC’s Home Page on the
Internet, this information is available on
eLibrary. The full text of this document
is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Microsoft Word format for viewing,
printing, and/or downloading. To access
this document in eLibrary, type the
docket number excluding the last three
digits of this document in the docket
number field.
1047. User assistance is available for
eLibrary and the FERC’s Web site during
normal business hours from FERC
Online Support at 202–502–6652 (toll
free at 1–866–208–3676) or e-mail at
ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
8371, TTY (202) 502–8659. E-mail the
Public Reference Room at
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
VI. Effective Date and Congressional
Notification
1048. Changes to Order No. 890
adopted in this order on rehearing will
become effective March 17, 2008.
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 37
Conflict on interests, Electric power
rates, Electric power plants, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
By the Commission.
Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr.,
Deputy Secretary.
In consideration of the foregoing, the
Commission amends part 37, Chapter I,
Title 18 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, as follows:
I
PART 37—OPEN ACCESS SAME-TIME
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
1. The authority citation for part 37
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791–825r, 2601–2645;
31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101–7352.
2. Amend § 37.6 as follows:
a. Paragraph (b)(3)(iv) is revised.
b. Paragraph (h)(1) introductory text is
revised.
I c. Paragraph (h)(3) introductory text is
revised.
I d. Paragraph (i) is revised.
I
I
I
§ 37.6 Information to be posted on the
OASIS.
*
*
*
*
*
(b) * * *
(3) * * *
(iv) Daily load. The Transmission
Provider must post on a daily basis, its
load forecast, including underlying
assumptions, and actual daily peak load
for the prior day.
*
*
*
*
*
(h) Posting information summarizing
the time to complete transmission
service request studies. (1) For each
calendar quarter, the Responsible Party
must post the set of measures detailed
in paragraph (h)(1)(i) through paragraph
(h)(1)(vi) of this section related to the
Responsible Party’s processing of
transmission service request system
impact studies and facilities studies.
The Responsible Party must calculate
and post the measures in paragraph
(h)(1)(i) through paragraph (h)(1)(vi) of
this section for requests for short-term
firm point-to-point transmission service,
requests for long-term firm point-topoint transmission service, and requests
to designate a new network resource or
network load. When calculating the
measures in paragraph (h)(1)(i) through
paragraph (h)(1)(iv) of this section, the
Responsible Party may aggregate
requests for short-term firm point-topoint service and requests for long-term
firm point-to-point service, but must
calculate and post measures separately
for transmission service requests from
Affiliates and transmission service
requests from Transmission Customers
who are not Affiliates. The Responsible
Party is required to include in the
calculations of the measures in
paragraph (h)(1)(i) through paragraph
(h)(1)(vi) of this section all studies the
Responsible Party conducts of
transmission service requests on another
Transmission Provider’s OASIS.
*
*
*
*
*
(3) The Responsible Party will be
required to post on OASIS the measures
in paragraph (h)(3)(i) through paragraph
(h)(3)(iv) of this section in the event the
Responsible Party, for two consecutive
calendar quarters, completes more than
twenty (20) percent of the studies
associated with requests for
transmission service from entities that
are not Affiliates of the Responsible
Party more than sixty (60) days after the
Responsible Party delivers the
appropriate study agreement. The
Responsible Party will have to post the
measures in paragraph (h)(3)(i) through
paragraph (h)(3)(iv) of this section until
it processes at least ninety (90) percent
of all studies within 60 days after it has
received the appropriate executed study
agreement. For the purposes of
calculating the percent of studies
completed more than sixty (60) days
after the Responsible Party delivers the
appropriate study agreement, the
Responsible Party should aggregate all
system impact studies and facilities
studies that it completes during the
reporting quarter.
*
*
*
*
*
(i) Posting data related to grants and
denials of service. The Responsible
Party is required to post data each
month listing, by path or flowgate, the
number of transmission service requests
that have been accepted and the number
of transmission service requests that
have been denied during the prior
month. This posting must distinguish
between the length of the service
request (e.g., short-term or long-term
requests) and between the type of
service requested (e.g., firm point-topoint, non-firm point-to-point or
network service). The posted data must
show:
(1) The number of non-Affiliate
requests for transmission service that
have been rejected,
(2) The total number of non-Affiliate
requests for transmission service that
have been made,
(3) The number of Affiliate requests
for transmission service, including
requests by the transmission provider’s
merchant function to designate a
network resource or to procure
secondary network service, that have
been rejected, and
(4) The total number of Affiliate
requests for transmission service,
including requests by the transmission
provider’s merchant function to
designate, or terminate the designation
of, a network resource or to procure
secondary network service, that have
been made.
*
*
*
*
*
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
APPENDIX A TO THE PREAMBLE: PETITIONER ACRONYMS
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Abbreviation
Petitioner names
Alcoa ...................................................................
Ameren ...............................................................
AMP-Ohio ...........................................................
APPA ..................................................................
AWEA .................................................................
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Alcoa Inc. and Alcoa Power Generating Inc.
Ameren Services Company.
American Municipal Power-Ohio, Inc.
American Public Power Association.
American Wind Energy Association.
PO 00000
Frm 00129
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3111
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3112
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
APPENDIX A TO THE PREAMBLE: PETITIONER ACRONYMS—Continued
Abbreviation
Petitioner names
Areva ...................................................................
APS .....................................................................
ATCLLC ..............................................................
Barclays ..............................................................
Areva T&D.
Arizona Public Service Company.
American Transmission Company LLC.
Barclays Bank PLC, Credit Suisse Energy LLC, J. Aron & Co., and Morgan Stanley Capital
Group Inc.
Bonneville Power Administration.
Constellation Energy Group, Inc.
Duke Energy Corp.
Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc., Entegra Power Group LLC, LS Power Associates.
E.ON Load Serving Entity.
E.ON U.S. LLC.
East Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Northeast Texas Electric Cooperative, Inc.; Sam Rayburn Generation and Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Tex-La Electric Cooperative of Texas,
Inc.
Edison Electric Institute.
Electric Power Supply Association.
Entergy Services, Inc.
Barclays Bank PLC, Credit Suisse Energy LLC, J. Aron & Company, and Morgan Stanley
Capital Group Inc.
Florida Municipal Power Agency and Midwest Municipal Transmission Group.
Florida Power & Light Co.
Great Northern Power Development, L.P.
Idaho Power Co.
Dynegy Power Marketing, Inc., Entegra Power Group LLC, and LS Power Associates, L.P.
ISO/RTO Council.
Mark B. Lively.
MidAmerican Energy Company and PacifiCorp.
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.
National Grid USA.
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
New York Independent System Operator.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., LIPA, New
York Power Authority, New York State Electric & Gas Corp., Orange and Rockland Utilities,
Inc., and Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.
North Carolina Electric Membership Corporation.
Northern California Power Agency.
NorthWestern Corporation.
Old Dominion Electric Cooperative.
Avista Corp., Bonneville Power Administration, PacifiCorp, PNGC Power, Portland General
Electric Company, and Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
PJM Interconnection, LLC.
Powerex Corp.
Progress Energy, Inc. (Carolina Power & Light Co. d/b/a Progress Energy Carolinas, Inc. and
Florida Power Corp., d/b/a Progress Energy Florida, Inc.).
Public Service Company of New Mexico.
Public Service Electric and Gas Company; PSEG Power LLC; and PSEC Energy Resources &
Trade LLC (PSEG Companies).
Renewable Energy and Public Interest Organizations (The Project for Sustainable FERC Energy Policy, Environmental Law & Policy Center, Illinois Citizens Utility Board, Natural Resources Defense Council, Northwest Energy Coalition, Pace Energy Project, Renewable
Northwest Project, West Wind Wires, and Wind on Wires.
Sempra Global.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company.
South Carolina Office of Regulatory Staff.
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Steel Manufacturers Association.
Tenaska Power Services, Co.
TranServ International, Inc.
Transmission Access Policy Study Group.
Transmission Dependent Utilities Systems.
Unitil Power Corp., Unitil Energy Systems, Inc. and Fitchburg Gas and Elec. Light Co.
Avista Corp. and Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
Williams Power Company, Inc.
Wisconsin Electric Power Company.
Western Systems Power Pool, Inc.
Xcel Energy Services, Inc.
Bonneville ...........................................................
Constellation .......................................................
Duke ....................................................................
Dynegy ................................................................
E.ON LSE ...........................................................
E.ON U.S. ...........................................................
East Texas Cooperatives ...................................
EEI ......................................................................
EPSA ..................................................................
Entergy ................................................................
Financial Service Joint Requestors ....................
FMPA ..................................................................
Florida Power ......................................................
Great Northern ....................................................
Idaho Power ........................................................
Indicated Commenters ........................................
ISO/RTO Council ................................................
Mark Lively ..........................................................
MidAmerican .......................................................
MISO ...................................................................
Morgan Stanley ...................................................
National Grid .......................................................
NRECA ...............................................................
NYISO .................................................................
New York Transmission Owners ........................
NCEMC ...............................................................
NCPA ..................................................................
NorthWestern ......................................................
Old Dominion ......................................................
Pacific Northwest Parties ....................................
PJM .....................................................................
Powerex ..............................................................
Progress Energy .................................................
PNM ....................................................................
PSEG ..................................................................
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
REPIO .................................................................
Sempra Global ....................................................
South Carolina E&G ...........................................
South Carolina Regulatory Staff .........................
Southern .............................................................
Steel Manufacturers Association ........................
Tenaska ..............................................................
TranServ .............................................................
TAPS ...................................................................
TDU Systems ......................................................
Unitil ....................................................................
Washington IOUs ................................................
Williams ...............................................................
Wisconsin Electric ...............................................
WSPP .................................................................
Xcel .....................................................................
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00130
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
3113
APPENDIX B TO THE PREAMBLE: POST-TECHNICAL CONFERENCE COMMENTER ACRONYMS
Abbreviation
Commenter names
Alabama Municipal .............................................
APS and EEI .......................................................
Barrick Goldstrike Mines .....................................
Bonneville ...........................................................
Duke Energy Carolinas .......................................
Duke and EEI .....................................................
EPSA ..................................................................
Great Lakes ........................................................
Hoosier ................................................................
Kansas Power Pool ............................................
MISO ...................................................................
Morgan Stanley ...................................................
Pacific Northwest IOUs .......................................
Powerex ..............................................................
PNGC Power ......................................................
PPC .....................................................................
PPL Parties .........................................................
Alabama Municipal Electric Authority.
Arizona Public Service Company and Edison Electric Institute.
Barrick Goldstrike Mines Inc. and Barrick Turquoise Ridge Inc.
Bonneville Power Administration.
Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC.
Duke Energy Corp. and Edison Electric Institute.
Electric Power Supply Association.
Great Lakes Utilities.
Hoosier Energy Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.
Kansas Power Pool.
Midwest Independent Transmission System Operator, Inc.
Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc.
Avista Corp., Portland General Electric Company, and Puget Sound Energy, Inc.
Powerex Corp.
Pacific Northwest Generating Cooperative, Inc.
Public Power Council.
PPL EnergyPlus, LLC, Lower Mount Bethel Energy, LLC, PPL Brunner Island, LLC, PPL
Edgewood Energy, LLC, PPL Great Works, LLC, PPL Holtwood, LLC, PPL Maine, LLC, PPL
Martins Creek, LLC, PPL Montana, LLC, PPL Montour, LLC, PPL Shoreham Energy, LLC,
PPL Susquehanna, LLC, PPL University Park, LLC, and PPL Wallingford Energy LLC.
Reliant Energy, Inc.
Southern California Edison Co. and San Diego Gas & Electric Co.
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company.
Southern Company Services, Inc.
Arizona Public Service Company, El Paso Electric Company, Nevada Power Company and Sierra-Pacific Power Company, Public Service Company of New Mexico, Salt River Project,
Tucson Electric Power Company, and UNS Electric Inc.
Transmission Access Policy Study Group and the American Public Power Association.
Transmission Dependent Utilities Systems.
Western Systems Power Pool, Inc.
Reliant .................................................................
SCE and SDG&E ................................................
South Carolina E&G ...........................................
Southern .............................................................
Southwestern Utilities .........................................
TAPS and APPA .................................................
TDU Systems ......................................................
WSPP .................................................................
Note: The following appendix will not
appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
Appendix C to the Preamble: RM05–17–
001, –002 & RM05–25–001, –002
(Issued)
Pro Forma Open Access Transmission
Tariff
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Table of Contents
I. Common Service Provisions
1 Definitions
1.1 Affiliate
1.2 Ancillary Services
1.3 Annual Transmission Costs
1.4 Application
1.5 Commission
1.6 Completed Application
1.7 Control Area
1.8 Curtailment
1.9 Delivering Party
1.10 Designated Agent
1.11 Direct Assignment Facilities
1.12 Eligible Customer
1.13 Facilities Study
1.14 Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service
1.15 Good Utility Practice
1.16 Interruption
1.17 Load Ratio Share
1.18 Load Shedding
1.19 Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.20 Native Load Customers
1.21 Network Customer
1.22 Network Integration Transmission
Service
1.23 Network Load
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
1.24 Network Operating Agreement
1.25 Network Operating Committee
1.26 Network Resource
1.27 Network Upgrades
1.28 Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.29 Non-Firm Sale
1.30 Open Access Same-Time
Information System (OASIS)
1.31 Part I
1.32 Part II
1.33 Part III
1.34 Parties
1.35 Point(s) of Delivery
1.36 Point(s) of Receipt
1.37 Point-To-Point Transmission Service
1.38 Power Purchaser
1.39 Pre-Confirmed Application
1.40 Receiving Party
1.41 Regional Transmission Group (RTG)
1.42 Reserved Capacity
1.43 Service Agreement
1.44 Service Commencement Date
1.45 Short-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.46 System Condition
1.47 System Impact Study
1.48 Third-Party Sale
1.49 Transmission Customer
1.50 Transmission Provider
1.51 Transmission Provider’s Monthly
Transmission System Peak
1.52 Transmission Service
1.53 Transmission System
2 Initial Allocation and Renewal
Procedures
2.1 Initial Allocation of Available
Transfer Capability
PO 00000
Frm 00131
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
2.2 Reservation Priority For Existing Firm
Service Customers
3 Ancillary Services
3.1 Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch Service
3.2 Reactive Supply and Voltage Control
from Generation or Other Sources
Service
3.3 Regulation and Frequency Response
Service
3.4 Energy Imbalance Service
3.5 Operating Reserve—Spinning Reserve
Service
3.6 Operating Reserve—Supplemental
Reserve Service
3.7 Generator Imbalance Service
4 Open Access Same-Time Information
System (OASIS)
5 Local Furnishing Bonds
5.1 Transmission Providers That Own
Facilities Financed by Local Furnishing
Bonds
5.2 Alternative Procedures for Requesting
Transmission Service
6 Reciprocity
7 Billing and Payment
7.1 Billing Procedure
7.2 Interest on Unpaid Balances
7.3 Customer Default
8 Accounting For The Transmission
Provider’s Use of the Tariff
8.1 Transmission Revenues
8.2 Study Costs and Revenues
9 Regulatory Filings
10 Force Majeure and Indemnification
10.1 Force Majeure
10.2 Indemnification
11 Creditworthiness
12 Dispute Resolution Procedures
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3114
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
12.1 Internal Dispute Resolution
Procedures
12.2 External Arbitration Procedures
12.3 Arbitration Decisions
12.4 Costs
12.5 Rights Under The Federal Power Act
II. Point-To-Point Transmission Service
13 Nature of Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
13.1 Term
13.2 Reservation Priority
13.3 Use of Firm Transmission Service by
the Transmission Provider
13.4 Service Agreements
13.5 Transmission Customer Obligations
for Facility Additions or Redispatch
Costs
13.6 Curtailment of Firm Transmission
Service
13.7 Classification of Firm Transmission
Service
13.8 Scheduling of Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
14 Nature of Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
14.1 Term
14.2 Reservation Priority
14.3 Use of Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service by the
Transmission Provider
14.4 Service Agreements
14.5 Classification of Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
14.6 Scheduling of Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
14.7 Curtailment or Interruption of
Service
15 Service Availability
15.1 General Conditions
15.2 Determination of Available Transfer
Capability
15.3 Initiating Service in the Absence of
an Executed Service Agreement
15.4 Obligation To Provide Transmission
Service That Requires Expansion or
Modification of the Transmission
System, Redispatch or Conditional
Curtailment
15.5 Deferral of Service
15.6 Other Transmission Service
Schedules
15.7 Real Power Losses
16 Transmission Customer
Responsibilities
16.1 Conditions Required of
Transmission Customers
16.2 Transmission Customer
Responsibility for Third-Party
Arrangements
17 Procedures for Arranging Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
17.1 Application
17.2 Completed Application
17.3 Deposit
17.4 Notice of Deficient Application
17.5 Response to a Completed
Application
17.6 Execution of Service Agreement
17.7 Extensions for Commencement of
Service
18 Procedures for Arranging Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
18.1 Application
18.2 Completed Application
18.3 Reservation of Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
18.4 Determination of Available Transfer
Capability
19 Additional Study Procedures for Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
Requests
19.1 Notice of Need for System Impact
Study
19.2 System Impact Study Agreement and
Cost Reimbursement
19.3 System Impact Study Procedures
19.4 Facilities Study Procedures
19.5 Facilities Study Modifications
19.6 Due Diligence in Completing New
Facilities
19.7 Partial Interim Service
19.8 Expedited Procedures for New
Facilities
19.9 Penalties for Failure To Meet Study
Deadlines
20 Procedures if the Transmission
Provider Is Unable To Complete New
Transmission Facilities for Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
20.1 Delays in Construction of New
Facilities
20.2 Alternatives to the Original Facility
Additions
20.3 Refund Obligation for Unfinished
Facility Additions
21 Provisions Relating to Transmission
Construction and Services on the
Systems of Other Utilities
21.1 Responsibility for Third-Party
System Additions
21.2 Coordination of Third-Party System
Additions
22 Changes In Service Specifications
22.1 Modifications On a Non-Firm Basis
22.2 Modification On a Firm Basis
23 Sale or Assignment of Transmission
Service
23.1 Procedures for Assignment or
Transfer of Service
23.2 Limitations on Assignment or
Transfer of Service
23.3 Information on Assignment or
Transfer of Service
24 Metering and Power Factor Correction
at Receipt and Delivery Points(s)
24.1 Transmission Customer Obligations
24.2 Transmission Provider Access to
Metering Data
24.3 Power Factor
25 Compensation for Transmission
Service
26 Stranded Cost Recovery
27 Compensation for New Facilities and
Redispatch Costs
III. Network Integration Transmission Service
28 Nature of Network Integration
Transmission Service
28.1 Scope of Service
28.2 Transmission Provider
Responsibilities
28.3 Network Integration Transmission
Service
28.4 Secondary Service
28.5 Real Power Losses
28.6 Restrictions on Use of Service
29 Initiating Service
29.1 Condition Precedent for Receiving
Service
29.2 Application Procedures
29.3 Technical Arrangements to be
Completed Prior to Commencement of
Service
PO 00000
Frm 00132
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
29.4 Network Customer Facilities
29.5 Filing of Service Agreement
30 Network Resources
30.1 Designation of Network Resources
30.2 Designation of New Network
Resources
30.3 Termination of Network Resources
30.4 Operation of Network Resources
30.5 Network Customer Redispatch
Obligation
30.6 Transmission Arrangements for
Network Resources Not Physically
Interconnected With The Transmission
Provider
30.7 Limitation on Designation of
Network Resources
30.8 Use of Interface Capacity by the
Network Customer
30.9 Network Customer Owned
Transmission Facilities
31 Designation of Network Load
31.1 Network Load
31.2 New Network Loads Connected With
the Transmission Provider
31.3 Network Load Not Physically
Interconnected With the Transmission
Provider
31.4 New Interconnection Points
31.5 Changes in Service Requests
31.6 Annual Load and Resource
Information Updates
32 Additional Study Procedures For
Network Integration Transmission
Service Requests
32.1 Notice of Need for System Impact
Study
32.2 System Impact Study Agreement and
Cost Reimbursement
32.3 System Impact Study Procedures
32.4 Facilities Study Procedures
32.5 Penalties for Failure To Meet Study
Deadlines
33 Load Shedding and Curtailments
33.1 Procedures
33.2 Transmission Constraints
33.3 Cost Responsibility for Relieving
Transmission Constraints
33.4 Curtailments of Scheduled
Deliveries
33.5 Allocation of Curtailments
33.6 Load Shedding
33.7 System Reliability
34 Rates and Charges
34.1 Monthly Demand Charge
34.2 Determination of Network
Customer’s Monthly Network Load
34.3 Determination of Transmission
Provider’s Monthly Transmission System
Load
34.4 Redispatch Charge
34.5 Stranded Cost Recovery
35 Operating Arrangements
35.1 Operation Under The Network
Operating Agreement
35.2 Network Operating Agreement
35.3 Network Operating Committee
Schedule 1—Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch Service
Schedule 2—Reactive Supply and Voltage
Control From Generation Sources
Service
Schedule 3—Regulation and Frequency
Response Service
Schedule 4—Energy Imbalance Service
Schedule 5—Operating Reserve—Spinning
Reserve Service
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Schedule 6—Operating Reserve—
Supplemental Reserve Service
Schedule 7—Long-Term Firm and ShortTerm Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service
Schedule 8—Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Schedule 9—Generator Imbalance Service
Attachment A—Form of Service Agreement
for Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service
Attachment A–1—Form of Service
Agreement for the Resale, Reassignment
or Transfer of Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Attachment B—Form of Service Agreement
for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Attachment C—Methodology To Assess
Available Transfer Capability
Attachment D—Methodology for Completing
a System Impact Study
Attachment E—Index of Point-To-Point
Transmission Service Customers
Attachment F—Service Agreement for
Network Integration Transmission
Service
Attachment G—Network Operating
Agreement
Attachment H—Annual Transmission
Revenue Requirement for Network
Integration Transmission Service
Attachment I—Index of Network Integration
Transmission Service Customers
Attachment J—Procedures for Addressing
Parallel Flows
Attachment K—Transmission Planning
Process
Attachment L—Creditworthiness Procedures
I. Common Service Provisions
1
1.1
Definitions
Ancillary Services
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Annual Transmission Costs
The total annual cost of the
Transmission System for purposes of
Network Integration Transmission
Service shall be the amount specified in
Attachment H until amended by the
Transmission Provider or modified by
the Commission.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
1.6
Completed Application
An Application that satisfies all of the
information and other requirements of
the Tariff, including any required
deposit.
1.7
Control Area
An electric power system or
combination of electric power systems
to which a common automatic
generation control scheme is applied in
order to:
1. Match, at all times, the power
output of the generators within the
electric power system(s) and capacity
and energy purchased from entities
outside the electric power system(s),
with the load within the electric power
system(s);
2. Maintain scheduled interchange
with other Control Areas, within the
limits of Good Utility Practice;
3. Maintain the frequency of the
electric power system(s) within
reasonable limits in accordance with
Good Utility Practice; and
4. Provide sufficient generating
capacity to maintain operating reserves
in accordance with Good Utility
Practice.
Curtailment
A reduction in firm or non-firm
transmission service in response to a
transfer capability shortage as a result of
system reliability conditions.
1.9
Delivering Party
The entity supplying capacity and
energy to be transmitted at Point(s) of
Receipt.
1.10
Those services that are necessary to
support the transmission of capacity
and energy from resources to loads
while maintaining reliable operation of
the Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System in accordance
with Good Utility Practice.
1.3
1.5 Commission
The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission.
1.8
Affiliate
With respect to a corporation,
partnership or other entity, each such
other corporation, partnership or other
entity that directly or indirectly,
through one or more intermediaries,
controls, is controlled by, or is under
common control with, such corporation,
partnership or other entity.
1.2
1.4 Application
A request by an Eligible Customer for
transmission service pursuant to the
provisions of the Tariff.
Jkt 214001
Designated Agent
Any entity that performs actions or
functions on behalf of the Transmission
Provider, an Eligible Customer, or the
Transmission Customer required under
the Tariff.
1.11
Direct Assignment Facilities
Facilities or portions of facilities that
are constructed by the Transmission
Provider for the sole use/benefit of a
particular Transmission Customer
requesting service under the Tariff.
Direct Assignment Facilities shall be
specified in the Service Agreement that
governs service to the Transmission
Customer and shall be subject to
Commission approval.
PO 00000
Frm 00133
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
1.12
3115
Eligible Customer
i. Any electric utility (including the
Transmission Provider and any power
marketer), Federal power marketing
agency, or any person generating
electric energy for sale for resale is an
Eligible Customer under the Tariff.
Electric energy sold or produced by
such entity may be electric energy
produced in the United States, Canada
or Mexico. However, with respect to
transmission service that the
Commission is prohibited from ordering
by Section 212(h) of the Federal Power
Act, such entity is eligible only if the
service is provided pursuant to a state
requirement that the Transmission
Provider offer the unbundled
transmission service, or pursuant to a
voluntary offer of such service by the
Transmission Provider.
ii. Any retail customer taking
unbundled transmission service
pursuant to a state requirement that the
Transmission Provider offer the
transmission service, or pursuant to a
voluntary offer of such service by the
Transmission Provider, is an Eligible
Customer under the Tariff.
1.13
Facilities Study
An engineering study conducted by
the Transmission Provider to determine
the required modifications to the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, including the cost and
scheduled completion date for such
modifications, that will be required to
provide the requested transmission
service.
1.14 Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Transmission Service under this
Tariff that is reserved and/or scheduled
between specified Points of Receipt and
Delivery pursuant to Part II of this
Tariff.
1.15
Good Utility Practice
Any of the practices, methods and
acts engaged in or approved by a
significant portion of the electric utility
industry during the relevant time
period, or any of the practices, methods
and acts which, in the exercise of
reasonable judgment in light of the facts
known at the time the decision was
made, could have been expected to
accomplish the desired result at a
reasonable cost consistent with good
business practices, reliability, safety and
expedition. Good Utility Practice is not
intended to be limited to the optimum
practice, method, or act to the exclusion
of all others, but rather to be acceptable
practices, methods, or acts generally
accepted in the region, including those
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3116
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
practices required by Federal Power Act
section 215(a)(4).
1.16
Interruption
A reduction in non-firm transmission
service due to economic reasons
pursuant to Section 14.7.
1.17
Load Ratio Share
Ratio of a Transmission Customer’s
Network Load to the Transmission
Provider’s total load computed in
accordance with Sections 34.2 and 34.3
of the Network Integration Transmission
Service under Part III of the Tariff and
calculated on a rolling twelve month
basis.
1.18
Load Shedding
The systematic reduction of system
demand by temporarily decreasing load
in response to transmission system or
area capacity shortages, system
instability, or voltage control
considerations under Part III of the
Tariff.
1.19 Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service under Part II of the Tariff with
a term of one year or more.
1.20
Native Load Customers
The wholesale and retail power
customers of the Transmission Provider
on whose behalf the Transmission
Provider, by statute, franchise,
regulatory requirement, or contract, has
undertaken an obligation to construct
and operate the Transmission Provider’s
system to meet the reliable electric
needs of such customers.
1.21
Network Customer
An entity receiving transmission
service pursuant to the terms of the
Transmission Provider’s Network
Integration Transmission Service under
Part III of the Tariff.
has elected not to designate a particular
load at discrete points of delivery as
Network Load, the Eligible Customer is
responsible for making separate
arrangements under Part II of the Tariff
for any Point-To-Point Transmission
Service that may be necessary for such
non-designated load.
1.24
Network Operating Agreement
An executed agreement that contains
the terms and conditions under which
the Network Customer shall operate its
facilities and the technical and
operational matters associated with the
implementation of Network Integration
Transmission Service under Part III of
the Tariff.
1.25
Network Operating Committee
A group made up of representatives
from the Network Customer(s) and the
Transmission Provider established to
coordinate operating criteria and other
technical considerations required for
implementation of Network Integration
Transmission Service under Part III of
this Tariff.
1.26
Network Resource
Any designated generating resource
owned, purchased or leased by a
Network Customer under the Network
Integration Transmission Service Tariff.
Network Resources do not include any
resource, or any portion thereof, that is
committed for sale to third parties or
otherwise cannot be called upon to meet
the Network Customer’s Network Load
on a non-interruptible basis, except for
purposes of fulfilling obligations under
a Commission-approved reserve sharing
program.
1.27
Network Upgrades
The transmission service provided
under Part III of the Tariff.
1.28 Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.23
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
1.22 Network Integration Transmission
Service
Modifications or additions to
transmission-related facilities that are
integrated with and support the
Transmission Provider’s overall
Transmission System for the general
benefit of all users of such Transmission
System.
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
under the Tariff that is reserved and
scheduled on an as-available basis and
is subject to Curtailment or Interruption
as set forth in Section 14.7 under Part
II of this Tariff. Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service is available
on a stand-alone basis for periods
ranging from one hour to one month.
Network Load
The load that a Network Customer
designates for Network Integration
Transmission Service under Part III of
the Tariff. The Network Customer’s
Network Load shall include all load
served by the output of any Network
Resources designated by the Network
Customer. A Network Customer may
elect to designate less than its total load
as Network Load but may not designate
only part of the load at a discrete Point
of Delivery. Where an Eligible Customer
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
1.29
Non-Firm Sale
An energy sale for which receipt or
delivery may be interrupted for any
PO 00000
Frm 00134
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
reason or no reason, without liability on
the part of either the buyer or seller.
1.30 Open Access Same-Time
Information System (OASIS)
The information system and standards
of conduct contained in Part 37 of the
Commission’s regulations and all
additional requirements implemented
by subsequent Commission orders
dealing with OASIS.
1.31
Part I
Tariff Definitions and Common
Service Provisions contained in
Sections 2 through 12.
1.32
Part II
Tariff Sections 13 through 27
pertaining to Point-To-Point
Transmission Service in conjunction
with the applicable Common Service
Provisions of Part I and appropriate
Schedules and Attachments.
1.33
Part III
Tariff Sections 28 through 35
pertaining to Network Integration
Transmission Service in conjunction
with the applicable Common Service
Provisions of Part I and appropriate
Schedules and Attachments.
1.34
Parties
The Transmission Provider and the
Transmission Customer receiving
service under the Tariff.
1.35
Point(s) of Delivery
Point(s) on the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System where
capacity and energy transmitted by the
Transmission Provider will be made
available to the Receiving Party under
Part II of the Tariff. The Point(s) of
Delivery shall be specified in the
Service Agreement for Long-Term Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service.
1.36
Point(s) of Receipt
Point(s) of interconnection on the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System where capacity and energy will
be made available to the Transmission
Provider by the Delivering Party under
Part II of the Tariff. The Point(s) of
Receipt shall be specified in the Service
Agreement for Long-Term Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service.
1.37 Point-To-Point Transmission
Service
The reservation and transmission of
capacity and energy on either a firm or
non-firm basis from the Point(s) of
Receipt to the Point(s) of Delivery under
Part II of the Tariff.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
1.38 Power Purchaser
The entity that is purchasing the
capacity and energy to be transmitted
under the Tariff.
1.39 Pre-Confirmed Application
An Application that commits the
Eligible Customer to execute a Service
Agreement upon receipt of notification
that the Transmission Provider can
provide the requested Transmission
Service.
1.40 Receiving Party
The entity receiving the capacity and
energy transmitted by the Transmission
Provider to Point(s) of Delivery.
1.41 Regional Transmission Group
(RTG)
A voluntary organization of
transmission owners, transmission users
and other entities approved by the
Commission to efficiently coordinate
transmission planning (and expansion),
operation and use on a regional (and
interregional) basis.
1.42
Reserved Capacity
flowgate, that may trigger Curtailment of
Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Service using the
curtailment priority pursuant to Section
13.6. Such conditions must be identified
in the Transmission Customer’s Service
Agreement.
1.47
System Impact Study
An assessment by the Transmission
Provider of (i) the adequacy of the
Transmission System to accommodate a
request for either Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service or Network
Integration Transmission Service and
(ii) whether any additional costs may be
incurred in order to provide
transmission service.
1.48
Third-Party Sale
Any sale for resale in interstate
commerce to a Power Purchaser that is
not designated as part of Network Load
under the Network Integration
Transmission Service.
1.49
Transmission Customer
The maximum amount of capacity
and energy that the Transmission
Provider agrees to transmit for the
Transmission Customer over the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System between the Point(s) of Receipt
and the Point(s) of Delivery under Part
II of the Tariff. Reserved Capacity shall
be expressed in terms of whole
megawatts on a sixty (60) minute
interval (commencing on the clock
hour) basis.
Any Eligible Customer (or its
Designated Agent) that (i) executes a
Service Agreement, or (ii) requests in
writing that the Transmission Provider
file with the Commission, a proposed
unexecuted Service Agreement to
receive transmission service under Part
II of the Tariff. This term is used in the
Part I Common Service Provisions to
include customers receiving
transmission service under Part II and
Part III of this Tariff.
1.43
1.50
Service Agreement
The initial agreement and any
amendments or supplements thereto
entered into by the Transmission
Customer and the Transmission
Provider for service under the Tariff.
1.44
The public utility (or its Designated
Agent) that owns, controls, or operates
facilities used for the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce
and provides transmission service under
the Tariff.
Service Commencement Date
The date the Transmission Provider
begins to provide service pursuant to
the terms of an executed Service
Agreement, or the date the Transmission
Provider begins to provide service in
accordance with Section 15.3 or Section
29.1 under the Tariff.
1.45 Short-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service under Part II of the Tariff with
a term of less than one year.
1.46
System Condition
A specified condition on the
Transmission Provider’s system or on a
neighboring system, such as a
constrained transmission element or
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Transmission Provider
1.51 Transmission Provider’s Monthly
Transmission System Peak
The maximum firm usage of the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System in a calendar month.
1.52
Transmission Service
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
provided under Part II of the Tariff on
a firm and non-firm basis.
1.53
Transmission System
The facilities owned, controlled or
operated by the Transmission Provider
that are used to provide transmission
service under Part II and Part III of the
Tariff.
PO 00000
Frm 00135
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3117
2 Initial Allocation and Renewal
Procedures
2.1 Initial Allocation of Available
Transfer Capability
For purposes of determining whether
existing capability on the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System is
adequate to accommodate a request for
firm service under this Tariff, all
Completed Applications for new firm
transmission service received during the
initial sixty (60) day period
commencing with the effective date of
the Tariff will be deemed to have been
filed simultaneously. A lottery system
conducted by an independent party
shall be used to assign priorities for
Completed Applications filed
simultaneously. All Completed
Applications for firm transmission
service received after the initial sixty
(60) day period shall be assigned a
priority pursuant to Section 13.2.
2.2 Reservation Priority for Existing
Firm Service Customers
Existing firm service customers
(wholesale requirements and
transmission-only, with a contract term
of five years or more), have the right to
continue to take transmission service
from the Transmission Provider when
the contract expires, rolls over or is
renewed. This transmission reservation
priority is independent of whether the
existing customer continues to purchase
capacity and energy from the
Transmission Provider or elects to
purchase capacity and energy from
another supplier. If at the end of the
contract term, the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System cannot
accommodate all of the requests for
transmission service, the existing firm
service customer must agree to accept a
contract term at least equal to the
longest competing request by any new
Eligible Customer and to pay the current
just and reasonable rate, as approved by
the Commission, for such service;
provided that, the firm service customer
shall have a right of first refusal at the
end of such service only if the new
contract is for five years or more. The
existing firm service customer must
provide notice to the Transmission
Provider whether it will exercise its
right of first refusal no less than one
year prior to the expiration date of its
transmission service agreement. This
transmission reservation priority for
existing firm service customers is an
ongoing right that may be exercised at
the end of all firm contract terms of five
years or longer. Service agreements
subject to a right of first refusal entered
into prior to [the date of the
Transmission Provider’s filing adopting
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3118
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
the reformed rollover language herein in
compliance with Order No. 890] or
associated with a transmission service
request received prior to July 13, 2007,
unless terminated, will become subject
to the five year/one year requirement on
the first rollover date after [the date of
the Transmission Provider’s filing
adopting the reformed rollover language
herein in compliance with Order No.
890]; provided that, the one-year notice
requirement shall apply to such service
agreements with five years or more left
in their terms as of the [date of the
Transmission Provider’s filing adopting
the reformed rollover language herein in
compliance with Order No. 890].
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3
Ancillary Services
Ancillary Services are needed with
transmission service to maintain
reliability within and among the Control
Areas affected by the transmission
service. The Transmission Provider is
required to provide (or offer to arrange
with the local Control Area operator as
discussed below), and the Transmission
Customer is required to purchase, the
following Ancillary Services (i)
Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch, and (ii) Reactive Supply and
Voltage Control from Generation or
Other Sources.
The Transmission Provider is
required to offer to provide (or offer to
arrange with the local Control Area
operator as discussed below) the
following Ancillary Services only to the
Transmission Customer serving load
within the Transmission Provider’s
Control Area (i) Regulation and
Frequency Response, (ii) Energy
Imbalance, (iii) Operating Reserve—
Spinning, and (iv) Operating Reserve—
Supplemental. The Transmission
Customer serving load within the
Transmission Provider’s Control Area is
required to acquire these Ancillary
Services, whether from the
Transmission Provider, from a third
party, or by self-supply.
The Transmission Provider is
required to provide (or offer to arrange
with the local Control Area Operator as
discussed below), to the extent it is
physically feasible to do so from its
resources or from resources available to
it, Generator Imbalance Service when
Transmission Service is used to deliver
energy from a generator located within
its Control Area. The Transmission
Customer using Transmission Service to
deliver energy from a generator located
within the Transmission Provider’s
Control Area is required to acquire
Generator Imbalance Service, whether
from the Transmission Provider, from a
third party, or by self-supply.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
The Transmission Customer may not
decline the Transmission Provider’s
offer of Ancillary Services unless it
demonstrates that it has acquired the
Ancillary Services from another source.
The Transmission Customer must list in
its Application which Ancillary
Services it will purchase from the
Transmission Provider. A Transmission
Customer that exceeds its firm reserved
capacity at any Point of Receipt or Point
of Delivery or an Eligible Customer that
uses Transmission Service at a Point of
Receipt or Point of Delivery that it has
not reserved is required to pay for all of
the Ancillary Services identified in this
section that were provided by the
Transmission Provider associated with
the unreserved service. The
Transmission Customer or Eligible
Customer will pay for Ancillary
Services based on the amount of
transmission service it used but did not
reserve.
If the Transmission Provider is a
public utility providing transmission
service but is not a Control Area
operator, it may be unable to provide
some or all of the Ancillary Services. In
this case, the Transmission Provider can
fulfill its obligation to provide Ancillary
Services by acting as the Transmission
Customer’s agent to secure these
Ancillary Services from the Control
Area operator. The Transmission
Customer may elect to (i) have the
Transmission Provider act as its agent,
(ii) secure the Ancillary Services
directly from the Control Area operator,
or (iii) secure the Ancillary Services
(discussed in Schedules 3, 4, 5, 6 and
9) from a third party or by self-supply
when technically feasible.
The Transmission Provider shall
specify the rate treatment and all related
terms and conditions in the event of an
unauthorized use of Ancillary Services
by the Transmission Customer.
The specific Ancillary Services, prices
and/or compensation methods are
described on the Schedules that are
attached to and made a part of the
Tariff. Three principal requirements
apply to discounts for Ancillary
Services provided by the Transmission
Provider in conjunction with its
provision of transmission service as
follows: (1) Any offer of a discount
made by the Transmission Provider
must be announced to all Eligible
Customers solely by posting on the
OASIS, (2) any customer-initiated
requests for discounts (including
requests for use by one’s wholesale
merchant or an Affiliate’s use) must
occur solely by posting on the OASIS,
and (3) once a discount is negotiated,
details must be immediately posted on
the OASIS. A discount agreed upon for
PO 00000
Frm 00136
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
an Ancillary Service must be offered for
the same period to all Eligible
Customers on the Transmission
Provider’s system. Sections 3.1 through
3.7 below list the seven Ancillary
Services.
3.1 Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch Service
The rates and/or methodology are
described in Schedule 1.
3.2 Reactive Supply and Voltage
Control From Generation or Other
Sources Service
The rates and/or methodology are
described in Schedule 2.
3.3 Regulation and Frequency
Response Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule
3.
3.4
Energy Imbalance Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule
4.
3.5 Operating Reserve—Spinning
Reserve Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule
5.
3.6 Operating Reserve—Supplemental
Reserve Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule
6.
3.7
Generator Imbalance Service
Where applicable the rates and/or
methodology are described in Schedule
9.
4 Open Access Same-Time
Information System (OASIS)
Terms and conditions regarding Open
Access Same-Time Information System
and standards of conduct are set forth in
18 CFR § 37 of the Commission’s
regulations (Open Access Same-Time
Information System and Standards of
Conduct for Public Utilities) and 18
C.F.R. § 38 of the Commission’s
regulations (Business Practice Standards
and Communication Protocols for
Public Utilities). In the event available
transfer capability as posted on the
OASIS is insufficient to accommodate a
request for firm transmission service,
additional studies may be required as
provided by this Tariff pursuant to
Sections 19 and 32.
The Transmission Provider shall post
on OASIS and its public Web site an
electronic link to all rules, standards
and practices that (i) relate to the terms
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
and conditions of transmission service,
(ii) are not subject to a North American
Energy Standards Board (NAESB)
copyright restriction, and (iii) are not
otherwise included in this Tariff. The
Transmission Provider shall post on
OASIS and on its public Web site an
electronic link to the NAESB Web site
where any rules, standards and
practices that are protected by copyright
may be obtained. The Transmission
Provider shall also post on OASIS and
its public Web site an electronic link to
a statement of the process by which the
Transmission Provider shall add, delete
or otherwise modify the rules, standards
and practices that are not included in
this tariff. Such process shall set forth
the means by which the Transmission
Provider shall provide reasonable
advance notice to Transmission
Customers and Eligible Customers of
any such additions, deletions or
modifications, the associated effective
date, and any additional
implementation procedures that the
Transmission Provider deems
appropriate.
5
Local Furnishing Bonds
5.1 Transmission Providers That Own
Facilities Financed by Local Furnishing
Bonds
This provision is applicable only to
Transmission Providers that have
financed facilities for the local
furnishing of electric energy with taxexempt bonds, as described in Section
142(f) of the Internal Revenue Code
(‘‘local furnishing bonds’’).
Notwithstanding any other provision of
this Tariff, the Transmission Provider
shall not be required to provide
transmission service to any Eligible
Customer pursuant to this Tariff if the
provision of such transmission service
would jeopardize the tax-exempt status
of any local furnishing bond(s) used to
finance the Transmission Provider’s
facilities that would be used in
providing such transmission service.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
5.2 Alternative Procedures for
Requesting Transmission Service
(i) If the Transmission Provider
determines that the provision of
transmission service requested by an
Eligible Customer would jeopardize the
tax-exempt status of any local
furnishing bond(s) used to finance its
facilities that would be used in
providing such transmission service, it
shall advise the Eligible Customer
within thirty (30) days of receipt of the
Completed Application.
(ii) If the Eligible Customer thereafter
renews its request for the same
transmission service referred to in (i) by
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
tendering an application under Section
211 of the Federal Power Act, the
Transmission Provider, within ten (10)
days of receiving a copy of the Section
211 application, will waive its rights to
a request for service under Section
213(a) of the Federal Power Act and to
the issuance of a proposed order under
Section 212(c) of the Federal Power Act.
The Commission, upon receipt of the
Transmission Provider’s waiver of its
rights to a request for service under
Section 213(a) of the Federal Power Act
and to the issuance of a proposed order
under Section 212(c) of the Federal
Power Act, shall issue an order under
Section 211 of the Federal Power Act.
Upon issuance of the order under
Section 211 of the Federal Power Act,
the Transmission Provider shall be
required to provide the requested
transmission service in accordance with
the terms and conditions of this Tariff.
6
Reciprocity
A Transmission Customer receiving
transmission service under this Tariff
agrees to provide comparable
transmission service that it is capable of
providing to the Transmission Provider
on similar terms and conditions over
facilities used for the transmission of
electric energy owned, controlled or
operated by the Transmission Customer
and over facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy owned,
controlled or operated by the
Transmission Customer’s corporate
Affiliates. A Transmission Customer
that is a member of, or takes
transmission service from, a power pool,
Regional Transmission Group, Regional
Transmission Organization (RTO),
Independent System Operator (ISO) or
other transmission organization
approved by the Commission for the
operation of transmission facilities also
agrees to provide comparable
transmission service to the
transmission-owning members of such
power pool and Regional Transmission
Group, RTO, ISO or other transmission
organization on similar terms and
conditions over facilities used for the
transmission of electric energy owned,
controlled or operated by the
Transmission Customer and over
facilities used for the transmission of
electric energy owned, controlled or
operated by the Transmission
Customer’s corporate Affiliates.
This reciprocity requirement applies
not only to the Transmission Customer
that obtains transmission service under
the Tariff, but also to all parties to a
transaction that involves the use of
transmission service under the Tariff,
including the power seller, buyer and
any intermediary, such as a power
PO 00000
Frm 00137
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3119
marketer. This reciprocity requirement
also applies to any Eligible Customer
that owns, controls or operates
transmission facilities that uses an
intermediary, such as a power marketer,
to request transmission service under
the Tariff. If the Transmission Customer
does not own, control or operate
transmission facilities, it must include
in its Application a sworn statement of
one of its duly authorized officers or
other representatives that the purpose of
its Application is not to assist an
Eligible Customer to avoid the
requirements of this provision.
7
Billing and Payment
7.1
Billing Procedure
Within a reasonable time after the first
day of each month, the Transmission
Provider shall submit an invoice to the
Transmission Customer for the charges
for all services furnished under the
Tariff during the preceding month. The
invoice shall be paid by the
Transmission Customer within twenty
(20) days of receipt. All payments shall
be made in immediately available funds
payable to the Transmission Provider, or
by wire transfer to a bank named by the
Transmission Provider.
7.2
Interest on Unpaid Balances
Interest on any unpaid amounts
(including amounts placed in escrow)
shall be calculated in accordance with
the methodology specified for interest
on refunds in the Commission’s
regulations at 18 CFR 35.19a(a)(2)(iii).
Interest on delinquent amounts shall be
calculated from the due date of the bill
to the date of payment. When payments
are made by mail, bills shall be
considered as having been paid on the
date of receipt by the Transmission
Provider.
7.3
Customer Default
In the event the Transmission
Customer fails, for any reason other than
a billing dispute as described below, to
make payment to the Transmission
Provider on or before the due date as
described above, and such failure of
payment is not corrected within thirty
(30) calendar days after the
Transmission Provider notifies the
Transmission Customer to cure such
failure, a default by the Transmission
Customer shall be deemed to exist.
Upon the occurrence of a default, the
Transmission Provider may initiate a
proceeding with the Commission to
terminate service but shall not terminate
service until the Commission so
approves any such request. In the event
of a billing dispute between the
Transmission Provider and the
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3120
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Transmission Customer, the
Transmission Provider will continue to
provide service under the Service
Agreement as long as the Transmission
Customer (i) continues to make all
payments not in dispute, and (ii) pays
into an independent escrow account the
portion of the invoice in dispute,
pending resolution of such dispute. If
the Transmission Customer fails to meet
these two requirements for continuation
of service, then the Transmission
Provider may provide notice to the
Transmission Customer of its intention
to suspend service in sixty (60) days, in
accordance with Commission policy.
8 Accounting for the Transmission
Provider’s Use of the Tariff
The Transmission Provider shall
record the following amounts, as
outlined below.
8.1 Transmission Revenues
Include in a separate operating
revenue account or subaccount the
revenues it receives from Transmission
Service when making Third-Party Sales
under Part II of the Tariff.
8.2 Study Costs and Revenues
Include in a separate transmission
operating expense account or
subaccount, costs properly chargeable to
expense that are incurred to perform
any System Impact Studies or Facilities
Studies which the Transmission
Provider conducts to determine if it
must construct new transmission
facilities or upgrades necessary for its
own uses, including making Third-Party
Sales under the Tariff; and include in a
separate operating revenue account or
subaccount the revenues received for
System Impact Studies or Facilities
Studies performed when such amounts
are separately stated and identified in
the Transmission Customer’s billing
under the Tariff.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
9
Regulatory Filings
Nothing contained in the Tariff or any
Service Agreement shall be construed as
affecting in any way the right of the
Transmission Provider to unilaterally
make application to the Commission for
a change in rates, terms and conditions,
charges, classification of service, Service
Agreement, rule or regulation under
Section 205 of the Federal Power Act
and pursuant to the Commission’s rules
and regulations promulgated
thereunder.
Nothing contained in the Tariff or any
Service Agreement shall be construed as
affecting in any way the ability of any
Party receiving service under the Tariff
to exercise its rights under the Federal
Power Act and pursuant to the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Commission’s rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder.
10
Force Majeure and Indemnification
10.1 Force Majeure
An event of Force Majeure means any
act of God, labor disturbance, act of the
public enemy, war, insurrection, riot,
fire, storm or flood, explosion, breakage
or accident to machinery or equipment,
any Curtailment, order, regulation or
restriction imposed by governmental
military or lawfully established civilian
authorities, or any other cause beyond a
Party’s control. A Force Majeure event
does not include an act of negligence or
intentional wrongdoing. Neither the
Transmission Provider nor the
Transmission Customer will be
considered in default as to any
obligation under this Tariff if prevented
from fulfilling the obligation due to an
event of Force Majeure. However, a
Party whose performance under this
Tariff is hindered by an event of Force
Majeure shall make all reasonable
efforts to perform its obligations under
this Tariff.
10.2 Indemnification
The Transmission Customer shall at
all times indemnify, defend, and save
the Transmission Provider harmless
from, any and all damages, losses,
claims, including claims and actions
relating to injury to or death of any
person or damage to property, demands,
suits, recoveries, costs and expenses,
court costs, attorney fees, and all other
obligations by or to third parties, arising
out of or resulting from the
Transmission Provider’s performance of
its obligations under this Tariff on
behalf of the Transmission Customer,
except in cases of negligence or
intentional wrongdoing by the
Transmission Provider.
11 Creditworthiness
The Transmission Provider will
specify its Creditworthiness procedures
in Attachment L.
12
Dispute Resolution Procedures
12.1 Internal Dispute Resolution
Procedures
Any dispute between a Transmission
Customer and the Transmission
Provider involving transmission service
under the Tariff (excluding applications
for rate changes or other changes to the
Tariff, or to any Service Agreement
entered into under the Tariff, which
shall be presented directly to the
Commission for resolution) shall be
referred to a designated senior
representative of the Transmission
Provider and a senior representative of
PO 00000
Frm 00138
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
the Transmission Customer for
resolution on an informal basis as
promptly as practicable. In the event the
designated representatives are unable to
resolve the dispute within thirty (30)
days [or such other period as the Parties
may agree upon] by mutual agreement,
such dispute may be submitted to
arbitration and resolved in accordance
with the arbitration procedures set forth
below.
12.2
External Arbitration Procedures
Any arbitration initiated under the
Tariff shall be conducted before a single
neutral arbitrator appointed by the
Parties. If the Parties fail to agree upon
a single arbitrator within ten (10) days
of the referral of the dispute to
arbitration, each Party shall choose one
arbitrator who shall sit on a threemember arbitration panel. The two
arbitrators so chosen shall within
twenty (20) days select a third arbitrator
to chair the arbitration panel. In either
case, the arbitrators shall be
knowledgeable in electric utility
matters, including electric transmission
and bulk power issues, and shall not
have any current or past substantial
business or financial relationships with
any party to the arbitration (except prior
arbitration). The arbitrator(s) shall
provide each of the Parties an
opportunity to be heard and, except as
otherwise provided herein, shall
generally conduct the arbitration in
accordance with the Commercial
Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association and any
applicable Commission regulations or
Regional Transmission Group rules.
12.3
Arbitration Decisions
Unless otherwise agreed, the
arbitrator(s) shall render a decision
within ninety (90) days of appointment
and shall notify the Parties in writing of
such decision and the reasons therefor.
The arbitrator(s) shall be authorized
only to interpret and apply the
provisions of the Tariff and any Service
Agreement entered into under the Tariff
and shall have no power to modify or
change any of the above in any manner.
The decision of the arbitrator(s) shall be
final and binding upon the Parties, and
judgment on the award may be entered
in any court having jurisdiction. The
decision of the arbitrator(s) may be
appealed solely on the grounds that the
conduct of the arbitrator(s), or the
decision itself, violated the standards
set forth in the Federal Arbitration Act
and/or the Administrative Dispute
Resolution Act. The final decision of the
arbitrator must also be filed with the
Commission if it affects jurisdictional
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
rates, terms and conditions of service or
facilities.
12.4
Costs
Each Party shall be responsible for its
own costs incurred during the
arbitration process and for the following
costs, if applicable:
1. The cost of the arbitrator chosen by
the Party to sit on the three member
panel and one half of the cost of the
third arbitrator chosen; or
2. One half the cost of the single
arbitrator jointly chosen by the Parties.
12.5
Act
Rights Under the Federal Power
Nothing in this section shall restrict
the rights of any party to file a
Complaint with the Commission under
relevant provisions of the Federal Power
Act.
II. Point-To-Point Transmission Service
Preamble
The Transmission Provider will
provide Firm and Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service pursuant to
the applicable terms and conditions of
this Tariff. Point-To-Point Transmission
Service is for the receipt of capacity and
energy at designated Point(s) of Receipt
and the transfer of such capacity and
energy to designated Point(s) of
Delivery.
13 Nature of Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
13.1
Term
The minimum term of Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service shall be one
day and the maximum term shall be
specified in the Service Agreement.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
13.2
Reservation Priority
(i) Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service shall be available
on a first-come, first-served basis, i.e., in
the chronological sequence in which
each Transmission Customer has
requested service.
(ii) Reservations for Short-Term Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
will be conditional based upon the
length of the requested transaction or
reservation. However, Pre-Confirmed
Applications for Short-Term Point-toPoint Transmission Service will receive
priority over earlier-submitted requests
that are not Pre-Confirmed and that
have equal or shorter duration. Among
requests or reservations with the same
duration and, as relevant, preconfirmation status (pre-confirmed,
confirmed, or not confirmed), priority
will be given to an Eligible Customer’s
request or reservation that offers the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
highest price, followed by the date and
time of the request or reservation.
(iii) If the Transmission System
becomes oversubscribed, requests for
service may preempt competing
reservations up to the following
conditional reservation deadlines: one
day before the commencement of daily
service, one week before the
commencement of weekly service, and
one month before the commencement of
monthly service. Before the conditional
reservation deadline, if available
transfer capability is insufficient to
satisfy all requests and reservations, an
Eligible Customer with a reservation for
shorter term service or equal duration
service and lower price has the right of
first refusal to match any longer term
request or equal duration service with a
higher price before losing its reservation
priority. A longer term competing
request for Short-Term Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service will be
granted if the Eligible Customer with the
right of first refusal does not agree to
match the competing request within 24
hours (or earlier if necessary to comply
with the scheduling deadlines provided
in section 13.8) from being notified by
the Transmission Provider of a longerterm competing request for Short-Term
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service. When a longer duration request
preempts multiple shorter duration
reservations, the shorter duration
reservations shall have simultaneous
opportunities to exercise the right of
first refusal. Duration, price and time of
response will be used to determine the
order by which the multiple shorter
duration reservations will be able to
exercise the right of first refusal. After
the conditional reservation deadline,
service will commence pursuant to the
terms of Part II of the Tariff.
(iv) Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service will always have a reservation
priority over Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service under the Tariff.
All Long-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service will have equal
reservation priority with Native Load
Customers and Network Customers.
Reservation priorities for existing firm
service customers are provided in
Section 2.2.
13.3 Use of Firm Transmission Service
by the Transmission Provider
The Transmission Provider will be
subject to the rates, terms and
conditions of Part II of the Tariff when
making Third-Party Sales under (i)
agreements executed on or after March
17, 2008 or (ii) agreements executed
prior to the aforementioned date that the
Commission requires to be unbundled,
by the date specified by the
PO 00000
Frm 00139
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3121
Commission. The Transmission
Provider will maintain separate
accounting, pursuant to Section 8, for
any use of the Point-To-Point
Transmission Service to make ThirdParty Sales.
13.4 Service Agreements
The Transmission Provider shall offer
a standard form Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service Agreement
(Attachment A) to an Eligible Customer
when it submits a Completed
Application for Long-Term Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service. The
Transmission Provider shall offer a
standard form Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service Agreement
(Attachment A) to an Eligible Customer
when it first submits a Completed
Application for Short-Term Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service pursuant
to the Tariff. Executed Service
Agreements that contain the information
required under the Tariff shall be filed
with the Commission in compliance
with applicable Commission
regulations. An Eligible Customer that
uses Transmission Service at a Point of
Receipt or Point of Delivery that it has
not reserved and that has not executed
a Service Agreement will be deemed, for
purposes of assessing any appropriate
charges and penalties, to have executed
the appropriate Service Agreement. The
Service Agreement shall, when
applicable, specify any conditional
curtailment options selected by the
Transmission Customer. Where the
Service Agreement contains conditional
curtailment options and is subject to a
biennial reassessment as described in
Section 15.4, the Transmission Provider
shall provide the Transmission
Customer notice of any changes to the
curtailment conditions no less than 90
days prior to the date for imposition of
new curtailment conditions. Concurrent
with such notice, the Transmission
Provider shall provide the Transmission
Customer with the reassessment study
and a narrative description of the study,
including the reasons for changes to the
number of hours per year or System
Conditions under which conditional
curtailment may occur.
13.5 Transmission Customer
Obligations for Facility Additions or
Redispatch Costs
In cases where the Transmission
Provider determines that the
Transmission System is not capable of
providing Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service without (1)
degrading or impairing the reliability of
service to Native Load Customers,
Network Customers and other
Transmission Customers taking Firm
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3122
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Point-To-Point Transmission Service, or
(2) interfering with the Transmission
Provider’s ability to meet prior firm
contractual commitments to others, the
Transmission Provider will be obligated
to expand or upgrade its Transmission
System pursuant to the terms of Section
15.4. The Transmission Customer must
agree to compensate the Transmission
Provider for any necessary transmission
facility additions pursuant to the terms
of Section 27. To the extent the
Transmission Provider can relieve any
system constraint by redispatching the
Transmission Provider’s resources, it
shall do so, provided that the Eligible
Customer agrees to compensate the
Transmission Provider pursuant to the
terms of Section 27 and agrees to either
(i) compensate the Transmission
Provider for any necessary transmission
facility additions or (ii) accept the
service subject to a biennial
reassessment by the Transmission
Provider of redispatch requirements as
described in Section 15.4. Any
redispatch, Network Upgrade or Direct
Assignment Facilities costs to be
charged to the Transmission Customer
on an incremental basis under the Tariff
will be specified in the Service
Agreement prior to initiating service.
13.6 Curtailment of Firm Transmission
Service
In the event that a Curtailment on the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, or a portion thereof, is required
to maintain reliable operation of such
system and the system directly and
indirectly interconnected with
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, Curtailments will be made on a
non-discriminatory basis to the
transaction(s) that effectively relieve the
constraint. Transmission Provider may
elect to implement such Curtailments
pursuant to the Transmission Loading
Relief procedures specified in
Attachment J. If multiple transactions
require Curtailment, to the extent
practicable and consistent with Good
Utility Practice, the Transmission
Provider will curtail service to Network
Customers and Transmission Customers
taking Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service on a basis
comparable to the curtailment of service
to the Transmission Provider’s Native
Load Customers. All Curtailments will
be made on a non-discriminatory basis,
however, Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service shall be
subordinate to Firm Transmission
Service. Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point
Service subject to conditions described
in Section 15.4 shall be curtailed with
secondary service in cases where the
conditions apply, but otherwise will be
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
curtailed on a pro rata basis with other
Firm Transmission Service. When the
Transmission Provider determines that
an electrical emergency exists on its
Transmission System and implements
emergency procedures to Curtail Firm
Transmission Service, the Transmission
Customer shall make the required
reductions upon request of the
Transmission Provider. However, the
Transmission Provider reserves the right
to Curtail, in whole or in part, any Firm
Transmission Service provided under
the Tariff when, in the Transmission
Provider’s sole discretion, an emergency
or other unforeseen condition impairs or
degrades the reliability of its
Transmission System. The Transmission
Provider will notify all affected
Transmission Customers in a timely
manner of any scheduled Curtailments.
13.7 Classification of Firm
Transmission Service
(a) The Transmission Customer taking
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service may (1) change its Receipt and
Delivery Points to obtain service on a
non-firm basis consistent with the terms
of Section 22.1 or (2) request a
modification of the Points of Receipt or
Delivery on a firm basis pursuant to the
terms of Section 22.2.
(b) The Transmission Customer may
purchase transmission service to make
sales of capacity and energy from
multiple generating units that are on the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System. For such a purchase of
transmission service, the resources will
be designated as multiple Points of
Receipt, unless the multiple generating
units are at the same generating plant in
which case the units would be treated
as a single Point of Receipt.
(c) The Transmission Provider shall
provide firm deliveries of capacity and
energy from the Point(s) of Receipt to
the Point(s) of Delivery. Each Point of
Receipt at which firm transmission
capacity is reserved by the Transmission
Customer shall be set forth in the Firm
Point-To-Point Service Agreement for
Long-Term Firm Transmission Service
along with a corresponding capacity
reservation associated with each Point
of Receipt. Points of Receipt and
corresponding capacity reservations
shall be as mutually agreed upon by the
Parties for Short-Term Firm
Transmission. Each Point of Delivery at
which firm transfer capability is
reserved by the Transmission Customer
shall be set forth in the Firm Point-ToPoint Service Agreement for Long-Term
Firm Transmission Service along with a
corresponding capacity reservation
associated with each Point of Delivery.
Points of Delivery and corresponding
PO 00000
Frm 00140
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
capacity reservations shall be as
mutually agreed upon by the Parties for
Short-Term Firm Transmission. The
greater of either (1) the sum of the
capacity reservations at the Point(s) of
Receipt, or (2) the sum of the capacity
reservations at the Point(s) of Delivery
shall be the Transmission Customer’s
Reserved Capacity. The Transmission
Customer will be billed for its Reserved
Capacity under the terms of Schedule 7.
The Transmission Customer may not
exceed its firm capacity reserved at each
Point of Receipt and each Point of
Delivery except as otherwise specified
in Section 22. The Transmission
Provider shall specify the rate treatment
and all related terms and conditions
applicable in the event that a
Transmission Customer (including
Third-Party Sales by the Transmission
Provider) exceeds its firm reserved
capacity at any Point of Receipt or Point
of Delivery or uses Transmission
Service at a Point of Receipt or Point of
Delivery that it has not reserved.
13.8 Scheduling of Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
Schedules for the Transmission
Customer’s Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service must be submitted
to the Transmission Provider no later
than 10 a.m. [or a reasonable time that
is generally accepted in the region and
is consistently adhered to by the
Transmission Provider] of the day prior
to commencement of such service.
Schedules submitted after 10 a.m. will
be accommodated, if practicable. Hourto-hour schedules of any capacity and
energy that is to be delivered must be
stated in increments of 1,000 kW per
hour [or a reasonable increment that is
generally accepted in the region and is
consistently adhered to by the
Transmission Provider]. Transmission
Customers within the Transmission
Provider’s service area with multiple
requests for Transmission Service at a
Point of Receipt, each of which is under
1,000 kW per hour, may consolidate
their service requests at a common point
of receipt into units of 1,000 kW per
hour for scheduling and billing
purposes. Scheduling changes will be
permitted up to twenty (20) minutes [or
a reasonable time that is generally
accepted in the region and is
consistently adhered to by the
Transmission Provider] before the start
of the next clock hour provided that the
Delivering Party and Receiving Party
also agree to the schedule modification.
The Transmission Provider will furnish
to the Delivering Party’s system
operator, hour-to-hour schedules equal
to those furnished by the Receiving
Party (unless reduced for losses) and
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
shall deliver the capacity and energy
provided by such schedules. Should the
Transmission Customer, Delivering
Party or Receiving Party revise or
terminate any schedule, such party shall
immediately notify the Transmission
Provider, and the Transmission Provider
shall have the right to adjust
accordingly the schedule for capacity
and energy to be received and to be
delivered.
14 Nature of Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
14.1 Term
Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service will be available
for periods ranging from one (1) hour to
one (1) month. However, a Purchaser of
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service will be entitled to reserve a
sequential term of service (such as a
sequential monthly term without having
to wait for the initial term to expire
before requesting another monthly term)
so that the total time period for which
the reservation applies is greater than
one month, subject to the requirements
of Section 18.3.
14.2 Reservation Priority
Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service shall be available
from transfer capability in excess of that
needed for reliable service to Native
Load Customers, Network Customers
and other Transmission Customers
taking Long-Term and Short-Term Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service. A
higher priority will be assigned first to
requests or reservations with a longer
duration of service and second to PreConfirmed Applications. In the event
the Transmission System is constrained,
competing requests of the same PreConfirmation status and equal duration
will be prioritized based on the highest
price offered by the Eligible Customer
for the Transmission Service. Eligible
Customers that have already reserved
shorter term service have the right of
first refusal to match any longer term
request before being preempted. A
longer term competing request for NonFirm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service will be granted if the Eligible
Customer with the right of first refusal
does not agree to match the competing
request: (a) immediately for hourly NonFirm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service after notification by the
Transmission Provider; and, (b) within
24 hours (or earlier if necessary to
comply with the scheduling deadlines
provided in section 14.6) for Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
other than hourly transactions after
notification by the Transmission
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Provider. Transmission service for
Network Customers from resources
other than designated Network
Resources will have a higher priority
than any Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service. Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service over
secondary Point(s) of Receipt and
Point(s) of Delivery will have the lowest
reservation priority under the Tariff.
14.3 Use of Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service by the
Transmission Provider
The Transmission Provider will be
subject to the rates, terms and
conditions of Part II of the Tariff when
making Third-Party Sales under (i)
agreements executed on or after March
17, 2008 or (ii) agreements executed
prior to the aforementioned date that the
Commission requires to be unbundled,
by the date specified by the
Commission. The Transmission
Provider will maintain separate
accounting, pursuant to Section 8, for
any use of Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service to make ThirdParty Sales.
14.4 Service Agreements
The Transmission Provider shall offer
a standard form Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service Agreement
(Attachment B) to an Eligible Customer
when it first submits a Completed
Application for Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service pursuant to
the Tariff. Executed Service Agreements
that contain the information required
under the Tariff shall be filed with the
Commission in compliance with
applicable Commission regulations.
14.5 Classification of Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service shall be offered
under terms and conditions contained
in Part II of the Tariff. The Transmission
Provider undertakes no obligation under
the Tariff to plan its Transmission
System in order to have sufficient
capacity for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service. Parties requesting
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service for the transmission of firm
power do so with the full realization
that such service is subject to
availability and to Curtailment or
Interruption under the terms of the
Tariff. The Transmission Provider shall
specify the rate treatment and all related
terms and conditions applicable in the
event that a Transmission Customer
(including Third-Party Sales by the
Transmission Provider) exceeds its nonfirm capacity reservation. Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
PO 00000
Frm 00141
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3123
shall include transmission of energy on
an hourly basis and transmission of
scheduled short-term capacity and
energy on a daily, weekly or monthly
basis, but not to exceed one month’s
reservation for any one Application,
under Schedule 8.
14.6 Scheduling of Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
Schedules for Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service must be
submitted to the Transmission Provider
no later than 2 p.m. [or a reasonable
time that is generally accepted in the
region and is consistently adhered to by
the Transmission Provider] of the day
prior to commencement of such service.
Schedules submitted after 2 p.m. will be
accommodated, if practicable. Hour-tohour schedules of energy that is to be
delivered must be stated in increments
of 1,000 kW per hour [or a reasonable
increment that is generally accepted in
the region and is consistently adhered to
by the Transmission Provider].
Transmission Customers within the
Transmission Provider’s service area
with multiple requests for Transmission
Service at a Point of Receipt, each of
which is under 1,000 kW per hour, may
consolidate their schedules at a
common Point of Receipt into units of
1,000 kW per hour. Scheduling changes
will be permitted up to twenty (20)
minutes [or a reasonable time that is
generally accepted in the region and is
consistently adhered to by the
Transmission Provider] before the start
of the next clock hour provided that the
Delivering Party and Receiving Party
also agree to the schedule modification.
The Transmission Provider will furnish
to the Delivering Party’s system
operator, hour-to-hour schedules equal
to those furnished by the Receiving
Party (unless reduced for losses) and
shall deliver the capacity and energy
provided by such schedules. Should the
Transmission Customer, Delivering
Party or Receiving Party revise or
terminate any schedule, such party shall
immediately notify the Transmission
Provider, and the Transmission Provider
shall have the right to adjust
accordingly the schedule for capacity
and energy to be received and to be
delivered.
14.7 Curtailment or Interruption of
Service
The Transmission Provider reserves
the right to Curtail, in whole or in part,
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service provided under the Tariff for
reliability reasons when an emergency
or other unforeseen condition threatens
to impair or degrade the reliability of its
Transmission System or the systems
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3124
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
directly and indirectly interconnected
with Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System. Transmission
Provider may elect to implement such
Curtailments pursuant to the
Transmission Loading Relief procedures
specified in Attachment J. The
Transmission Provider reserves the right
to Interrupt, in whole or in part, NonFirm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service provided under the Tariff for
economic reasons in order to
accommodate (1) a request for Firm
Transmission Service, (2) a request for
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service of greater duration, (3) a request
for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service of equal duration
with a higher price, (4) transmission
service for Network Customers from
non-designated resources, or (5)
transmission service for Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service during
conditional curtailment periods as
described in Section 15.4. The
Transmission Provider also will
discontinue or reduce service to the
Transmission Customer to the extent
that deliveries for transmission are
discontinued or reduced at the Point(s)
of Receipt. Where required,
Curtailments or Interruptions will be
made on a non-discriminatory basis to
the transaction(s) that effectively relieve
the constraint, however, Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
shall be subordinate to Firm
Transmission Service. If multiple
transactions require Curtailment or
Interruption, to the extent practicable
and consistent with Good Utility
Practice, Curtailments or Interruptions
will be made to transactions of the
shortest term (e.g., hourly non-firm
transactions will be Curtailed or
Interrupted before daily non-firm
transactions and daily non-firm
transactions will be Curtailed or
Interrupted before weekly non-firm
transactions). Transmission service for
Network Customers from resources
other than designated Network
Resources will have a higher priority
than any Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service under the Tariff.
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service over secondary Point(s) of
Receipt and Point(s) of Delivery will
have a lower priority than any Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
under the Tariff. The Transmission
Provider will provide advance notice of
Curtailment or Interruption where such
notice can be provided consistent with
Good Utility Practice.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
15
Service Availability
15.1 General Conditions
The Transmission Provider will
provide Firm and Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service over, on or
across its Transmission System to any
Transmission Customer that has met the
requirements of Section 16.
15.2 Determination of Available
Transfer Capability
A description of the Transmission
Provider’s specific methodology for
assessing available transfer capability
posted on the Transmission Provider’s
OASIS (Section 4) is contained in
Attachment C of the Tariff. In the event
sufficient transfer capability may not
exist to accommodate a service request,
the Transmission Provider will respond
by performing a System Impact Study.
15.3 Initiating Service in the Absence
of an Executed Service Agreement
If the Transmission Provider and the
Transmission Customer requesting Firm
or Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service cannot agree on
all the terms and conditions of the
Point-To-Point Service Agreement, the
Transmission Provider shall file with
the Commission, within thirty (30) days
after the date the Transmission
Customer provides written notification
directing the Transmission Provider to
file, an unexecuted Point-To-Point
Service Agreement containing terms and
conditions deemed appropriate by the
Transmission Provider for such
requested Transmission Service. The
Transmission Provider shall commence
providing Transmission Service subject
to the Transmission Customer agreeing
to (i) compensate the Transmission
Provider at whatever rate the
Commission ultimately determines to be
just and reasonable, and (ii) comply
with the terms and conditions of the
Tariff including posting appropriate
security deposits in accordance with the
terms of Section 17.3.
15.4 Obligation To Provide
Transmission Service That Requires
Expansion or Modification of the
Transmission System, Redispatch or
Conditional Curtailment
(a) If the Transmission Provider
determines that it cannot accommodate
a Completed Application for Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service because
of insufficient capability on its
Transmission System, the Transmission
Provider will use due diligence to
expand or modify its Transmission
System to provide the requested Firm
Transmission Service, consistent with
its planning obligations in Attachment
PO 00000
Frm 00142
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
K, provided the Transmission Customer
agrees to compensate the Transmission
Provider for such costs pursuant to the
terms of Section 27. The Transmission
Provider will conform to Good Utility
Practice and its planning obligations in
Attachment K, in determining the need
for new facilities and in the design and
construction of such facilities. The
obligation applies only to those facilities
that the Transmission Provider has the
right to expand or modify.
(b) If the Transmission Provider
determines that it cannot accommodate
a Completed Application for Long-Term
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service because of insufficient
capability on its Transmission System,
the Transmission Provider will use due
diligence to provide redispatch from its
own resources until (i) Network
Upgrades are completed for the
Transmission Customer, (ii) the
Transmission Provider determines
through a biennial reassessment that it
can no longer reliably provide the
redispatch, or (iii) the Transmission
Customer terminates the service because
of redispatch changes resulting from the
reassessment. A Transmission Provider
shall not unreasonably deny selfprovided redispatch or redispatch
arranged by the Transmission Customer
from a third party resource.
(c) If the Transmission Provider
determines that it cannot accommodate
a Completed Application for Long-Term
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service because of insufficient
capability on its Transmission System,
the Transmission Provider will offer the
Firm Transmission Service with the
condition that the Transmission
Provider may curtail the service prior to
the curtailment of other Firm
Transmission Service for a specified
number of hours per year or during
System Condition(s). If the
Transmission Customer accepts the
service, the Transmission Provider will
use due diligence to provide the service
until (i) Network Upgrades are
completed for the Transmission
Customer, (ii) the Transmission
Provider determines through a biennial
reassessment that it can no longer
reliably provide such service, or (iii) the
Transmission Customer terminates the
service because the reassessment
increased the number of hours per year
of conditional curtailment or changed
the System Conditions.
15.5 Deferral of Service
The Transmission Provider may defer
providing service until it completes
construction of new transmission
facilities or upgrades needed to provide
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Service whenever the Transmission
Provider determines that providing the
requested service would, without such
new facilities or upgrades, impair or
degrade reliability to any existing firm
services.
15.6 Other Transmission Service
Schedules
Eligible Customers receiving
transmission service under other
agreements on file with the Commission
may continue to receive transmission
service under those agreements until
such time as those agreements may be
modified by the Commission.
15.7
Real Power Losses
Real Power Losses are associated with
all transmission service. The
Transmission Provider is not obligated
to provide Real Power Losses. The
Transmission Customer is responsible
for replacing losses associated with all
transmission service as calculated by
the Transmission Provider. The
applicable Real Power Loss factors are
as follows: [To be completed by the
Transmission Provider].
16 Transmission Customer
Responsibilities
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
shall be provided by the Transmission
Provider only if the following
conditions are satisfied by the
Transmission Customer:
(a) The Transmission Customer has
pending a Completed Application for
service;
(b) The Transmission Customer meets
the creditworthiness criteria set forth in
Section 11;
(c) The Transmission Customer will
have arrangements in place for any
other transmission service necessary to
effect the delivery from the generating
source to the Transmission Provider
prior to the time service under Part II of
the Tariff commences;
(d) The Transmission Customer agrees
to pay for any facilities constructed and
chargeable to such Transmission
Customer under Part II of the Tariff,
whether or not the Transmission
Customer takes service for the full term
of its reservation;
(e) The Transmission Customer
provides the information required by
the Transmission Provider’s planning
process established in Attachment K;
and
(f) The Transmission Customer has
executed a Point-To-Point Service
Agreement or has agreed to receive
service pursuant to Section 15.3.
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Any scheduling arrangements that
may be required by other electric
systems shall be the responsibility of the
Transmission Customer requesting
service. The Transmission Customer
shall provide, unless waived by the
Transmission Provider, notification to
the Transmission Provider identifying
such systems and authorizing them to
schedule the capacity and energy to be
transmitted by the Transmission
Provider pursuant to Part II of the Tariff
on behalf of the Receiving Party at the
Point of Delivery or the Delivering Party
at the Point of Receipt. However, the
Transmission Provider will undertake
reasonable efforts to assist the
Transmission Customer in making such
arrangements, including without
limitation, providing any information or
data required by such other electric
system pursuant to Good Utility
Practice.
17 Procedures for Arranging Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
17.1
16.1 Conditions Required of
Transmission Customers
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16.2 Transmission Customer
Responsibility for Third-Party
Arrangements
Jkt 214001
Application
A request for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service for periods of one
year or longer must contain a written
Application to: [Transmission Provider
Name and Address], at least sixty (60)
days in advance of the calendar month
in which service is to commence. The
Transmission Provider will consider
requests for such firm service on shorter
notice when feasible. Requests for firm
service for periods of less than one year
shall be subject to expedited procedures
that shall be negotiated between the
Parties within the time constraints
provided in Section 17.5. All Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
requests should be submitted by
entering the information listed below on
the Transmission Provider’s OASIS.
Prior to implementation of the
Transmission Provider’s OASIS, a
Completed Application may be
submitted by (i) transmitting the
required information to the
Transmission Provider by telefax, or (ii)
providing the information by telephone
over the Transmission Provider’s time
recorded telephone line. Each of these
methods will provide a time-stamped
record for establishing the priority of the
Application.
17.2
Completed Application
A Completed Application shall
provide all of the information included
in 18 CFR 2.20 including but not limited
to the following:
PO 00000
Frm 00143
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3125
(i) The identity, address, telephone
number and facsimile number of the
entity requesting service;
(ii) A statement that the entity
requesting service is, or will be upon
commencement of service, an Eligible
Customer under the Tariff;
(iii) The location of the Point(s) of
Receipt and Point(s) of Delivery and the
identities of the Delivering Parties and
the Receiving Parties;
(iv) The location of the generating
facility(ies) supplying the capacity and
energy and the location of the load
ultimately served by the capacity and
energy transmitted. The Transmission
Provider will treat this information as
confidential except to the extent that
disclosure of this information is
required by this Tariff, by regulatory or
judicial order, for reliability purposes
pursuant to Good Utility Practice or
pursuant to RTG transmission
information sharing agreements. The
Transmission Provider shall treat this
information consistent with the
standards of conduct contained in Part
37 of the Commission’s regulations;
(v) A description of the supply
characteristics of the capacity and
energy to be delivered;
(vi) An estimate of the capacity and
energy expected to be delivered to the
Receiving Party;
(vii) The Service Commencement Date
and the term of the requested
Transmission Service;
(viii) The transmission capacity
requested for each Point of Receipt and
each Point of Delivery on the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System; customers may combine their
requests for service in order to satisfy
the minimum transmission capacity
requirement;
(ix) A statement indicating that, if the
Eligible Customer submits a PreConfirmed Application, the Eligible
Customer will execute a Service
Agreement upon receipt of notification
that the Transmission Provider can
provide the requested Transmission
Service; and
(x) Any additional information
required by the Transmission Provider’s
planning process established in
Attachment K.
The Transmission Provider shall treat
this information consistent with the
standards of conduct contained in Part
37 of the Commission’s regulations.
17.3 Deposit
A Completed Application for Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
also shall include a deposit of either one
month’s charge for Reserved Capacity or
the full charge for Reserved Capacity for
service requests of less than one month.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3126
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
If the Application is rejected by the
Transmission Provider because it does
not meet the conditions for service as
set forth herein, or in the case of
requests for service arising in
connection with losing bidders in a
Request For Proposals (RFP), said
deposit shall be returned with interest
less any reasonable costs incurred by
the Transmission Provider in
connection with the review of the losing
bidder’s Application. The deposit also
will be returned with interest less any
reasonable costs incurred by the
Transmission Provider if the
Transmission Provider is unable to
complete new facilities needed to
provide the service. If an Application is
withdrawn or the Eligible Customer
decides not to enter into a Service
Agreement for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service, the deposit shall
be refunded in full, with interest, less
reasonable costs incurred by the
Transmission Provider to the extent
such costs have not already been
recovered by the Transmission Provider
from the Eligible Customer. The
Transmission Provider will provide to
the Eligible Customer a complete
accounting of all costs deducted from
the refunded deposit, which the Eligible
Customer may contest if there is a
dispute concerning the deducted costs.
Deposits associated with construction of
new facilities are subject to the
provisions of Section 19. If a Service
Agreement for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service is executed, the
deposit, with interest, will be returned
to the Transmission Customer upon
expiration or termination of the Service
Agreement for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service. Applicable
interest shall be computed in
accordance with the Commission’s
regulations at 18 CFR 35.19a(a)(2)(iii),
and shall be calculated from the day the
deposit check is credited to the
Transmission Provider’s account.
17.4 Notice of Deficient Application
If an Application fails to meet the
requirements of the Tariff, the
Transmission Provider shall notify the
entity requesting service within fifteen
(15) days of receipt of the reasons for
such failure. The Transmission Provider
will attempt to remedy minor
deficiencies in the Application through
informal communications with the
Eligible Customer. If such efforts are
unsuccessful, the Transmission Provider
shall return the Application, along with
any deposit, with interest. Upon receipt
of a new or revised Application that
fully complies with the requirements of
Part II of the Tariff, the Eligible
Customer shall be assigned a new
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
priority consistent with the date of the
new or revised Application.
17.5 Response to a Completed
Application
Following receipt of a Completed
Application for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service, the Transmission
Provider shall make a determination of
available transfer capability as required
in Section 15.2. The Transmission
Provider shall notify the Eligible
Customer as soon as practicable, but not
later than thirty (30) days after the date
of receipt of a Completed Application
either (i) if it will be able to provide
service without performing a System
Impact Study or (ii) if such a study is
needed to evaluate the impact of the
Application pursuant to Section 19.1.
Responses by the Transmission Provider
must be made as soon as practicable to
all completed applications (including
applications by its own merchant
function) and the timing of such
responses must be made on a nondiscriminatory basis.
17.6 Execution of Service Agreement
Whenever the Transmission Provider
determines that a System Impact Study
is not required and that the service can
be provided, it shall notify the Eligible
Customer as soon as practicable but no
later than thirty (30) days after receipt
of the Completed Application. Where a
System Impact Study is required, the
provisions of Section 19 will govern the
execution of a Service Agreement.
Failure of an Eligible Customer to
execute and return the Service
Agreement or request the filing of an
unexecuted service agreement pursuant
to Section 15.3, within fifteen (15) days
after it is tendered by the Transmission
Provider will be deemed a withdrawal
and termination of the Application and
any deposit submitted shall be refunded
with interest. Nothing herein limits the
right of an Eligible Customer to file
another Application after such
withdrawal and termination.
17.7 Extensions for Commencement of
Service
The Transmission Customer can
obtain, subject to availability, up to five
(5) one-year extensions for the
commencement of service. The
Transmission Customer may postpone
service by paying a non-refundable
annual reservation fee equal to onemonth’s charge for Firm Transmission
Service for each year or fraction thereof
within 15 days of notifying the
Transmission Provider it intends to
extend the commencement of service. If
during any extension for the
commencement of service an Eligible
PO 00000
Frm 00144
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Customer submits a Completed
Application for Firm Transmission
Service, and such request can be
satisfied only by releasing all or part of
the Transmission Customer’s Reserved
Capacity, the original Reserved Capacity
will be released unless the following
condition is satisfied. Within thirty (30)
days, the original Transmission
Customer agrees to pay the Firm PointTo-Point transmission rate for its
Reserved Capacity concurrent with the
new Service Commencement Date. In
the event the Transmission Customer
elects to release the Reserved Capacity,
the reservation fees or portions thereof
previously paid will be forfeited.
18 Procedures for Arranging Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
18.1 Application
Eligible Customers seeking Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
must submit a Completed Application
to the Transmission Provider.
Applications should be submitted by
entering the information listed below on
the Transmission Provider’s OASIS.
Prior to implementation of the
Transmission Provider’s OASIS, a
Completed Application may be
submitted by (i) transmitting the
required information to the
Transmission Provider by telefax, or (ii)
providing the information by telephone
over the Transmission Provider’s time
recorded telephone line. Each of these
methods will provide a time-stamped
record for establishing the service
priority of the Application.
18.2 Completed Application
A Completed Application shall
provide all of the information included
in 18 CFR 2.20 including but not limited
to the following:
(i) The identity, address, telephone
number and facsimile number of the
entity requesting service;
(ii) A statement that the entity
requesting service is, or will be upon
commencement of service, an Eligible
Customer under the Tariff;
(iii) The Point(s) of Receipt and the
Point(s) of Delivery;
(iv) The maximum amount of capacity
requested at each Point of Receipt and
Point of Delivery; and
(v) The proposed dates and hours for
initiating and terminating transmission
service hereunder.
In addition to the information
specified above, when required to
properly evaluate system conditions, the
Transmission Provider also may ask the
Transmission Customer to provide the
following:
(vi) The electrical location of the
initial source of the power to be
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
transmitted pursuant to the
Transmission Customer’s request for
service; and
(vii) The electrical location of the
ultimate load.
The Transmission Provider will treat
this information in (vi) and (vii) as
confidential at the request of the
Transmission Customer except to the
extent that disclosure of this
information is required by this Tariff, by
regulatory or judicial order, for
reliability purposes pursuant to Good
Utility Practice, or pursuant to RTG
transmission information sharing
agreements. The Transmission Provider
shall treat this information consistent
with the standards of conduct contained
in Part 37 of the Commission’s
regulations.
(viii) A statement indicating that, if
the Eligible Customer submits a PreConfirmed Application, the Eligible
Customer will execute a Service
Agreement upon receipt of notification
that the Transmission Provider can
provide the requested Transmission
Service.
18.3 Reservation of Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
Requests for monthly service shall be
submitted no earlier than sixty (60) days
before service is to commence; requests
for weekly service shall be submitted no
earlier than fourteen (14) days before
service is to commence, requests for
daily service shall be submitted no
earlier than two (2) days before service
is to commence, and requests for hourly
service shall be submitted no earlier
than noon the day before service is to
commence. Requests for service
received later than 2:00 p.m. prior to the
day service is scheduled to commence
will be accommodated if practicable [or
such reasonable times that are generally
accepted in the region and are
consistently adhered to by the
Transmission Provider].
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
18.4 Determination of Available
Transfer Capability
Following receipt of a tendered
schedule the Transmission Provider will
make a determination on a nondiscriminatory basis of available transfer
capability pursuant to Section 15.2.
Such determination shall be made as
soon as reasonably practicable after
receipt, but not later than the following
time periods for the following terms of
service (i) thirty (30) minutes for hourly
service, (ii) thirty (30) minutes for daily
service, (iii) four (4) hours for weekly
service, and (iv) two (2) days for
monthly service. [Or such reasonable
times that are generally accepted in the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
region and are consistently adhered to
by the Transmission Provider].
19 Additional Study Procedures for
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service Requests
19.1 Notice of Need for System Impact
Study
After receiving a request for service,
the Transmission Provider shall
determine on a non-discriminatory basis
whether a System Impact Study is
needed. A description of the
Transmission Provider’s methodology
for completing a System Impact Study is
provided in Attachment D. If the
Transmission Provider determines that a
System Impact Study is necessary to
accommodate the requested service, it
shall so inform the Eligible Customer, as
soon as practicable. Once informed, the
Eligible Customer shall timely notify the
Transmission Provider if it elects to
have the Transmission Provider study
redispatch or conditional curtailment as
part of the System Impact Study. If
notification is provided prior to tender
of the System Impact Study Agreement,
the Eligible Customer can avoid the
costs associated with the study of these
options. The Transmission Provider
shall within thirty (30) days of receipt
of a Completed Application, tender a
System Impact Study Agreement
pursuant to which the Eligible Customer
shall agree to reimburse the
Transmission Provider for performing
the required System Impact Study. For
a service request to remain a Completed
Application, the Eligible Customer shall
execute the System Impact Study
Agreement and return it to the
Transmission Provider within fifteen
(15) days. If the Eligible Customer elects
not to execute the System Impact Study
Agreement, its application shall be
deemed withdrawn and its deposit,
pursuant to Section 17.3, shall be
returned with interest.
19.2 System Impact Study Agreement
and Cost Reimbursement
(i) The System Impact Study
Agreement will clearly specify the
Transmission Provider’s estimate of the
actual cost, and time for completion of
the System Impact Study. The charge
shall not exceed the actual cost of the
study. In performing the System Impact
Study, the Transmission Provider shall
rely, to the extent reasonably
practicable, on existing transmission
planning studies. The Eligible Customer
will not be assessed a charge for such
existing studies; however, the Eligible
Customer will be responsible for charges
associated with any modifications to
existing planning studies that are
PO 00000
Frm 00145
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3127
reasonably necessary to evaluate the
impact of the Eligible Customer’s
request for service on the Transmission
System.
(ii) If in response to multiple Eligible
Customers requesting service in relation
to the same competitive solicitation, a
single System Impact Study is sufficient
for the Transmission Provider to
accommodate the requests for service,
the costs of that study shall be pro-rated
among the Eligible Customers.
(iii) For System Impact Studies that
the Transmission Provider conducts on
its own behalf, the Transmission
Provider shall record the cost of the
System Impact Studies pursuant to
Section 20.
19.3 System Impact Study Procedures
Upon receipt of an executed System
Impact Study Agreement, the
Transmission Provider will use due
diligence to complete the required
System Impact Study within a sixty (60)
day period. The System Impact Study
shall identify (1) any system constraints,
identified with specificity by
transmission element or flowgate, (2)
redispatch options (when requested by
an Eligible Customer) including an
estimate of the cost of redispatch, (3)
conditional curtailment options (when
requested by an Eligible Customer)
including the number of hours per year
and the System Conditions during
which conditional curtailment may
occur, and (4) additional Direct
Assignment Facilities or Network
Upgrades required to provide the
requested service. For customers
requesting the study of redispatch
options, the System Impact Study shall
(1) identify all resources located within
the Transmission Provider’s Control
Area that can significantly contribute
toward relieving the system constraint
and (2) provide a measurement of each
resource’s impact on the system
constraint. If the Transmission Provider
possesses information indicating that
any resource outside its Control Area
could relieve the constraint, it shall
identify each such resource in the
System Impact Study. In the event that
the Transmission Provider is unable to
complete the required System Impact
Study within such time period, it shall
so notify the Eligible Customer and
provide an estimated completion date
along with an explanation of the reasons
why additional time is required to
complete the required studies. A copy of
the completed System Impact Study and
related work papers shall be made
available to the Eligible Customer as
soon as the System Impact Study is
complete. The Transmission Provider
will use the same due diligence in
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3128
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
completing the System Impact Study for
an Eligible Customer as it uses when
completing studies for itself. The
Transmission Provider shall notify the
Eligible Customer immediately upon
completion of the System Impact Study
if the Transmission System will be
adequate to accommodate all or part of
a request for service or that no costs are
likely to be incurred for new
transmission facilities or upgrades. In
order for a request to remain a
Completed Application, within fifteen
(15) days of completion of the System
Impact Study the Eligible Customer
must execute a Service Agreement or
request the filing of an unexecuted
Service Agreement pursuant to Section
15.3, or the Application shall be deemed
terminated and withdrawn.
the requested service. The Transmission
Customer shall provide the
Transmission Provider with a letter of
credit or other reasonable form of
security acceptable to the Transmission
Provider equivalent to the costs of new
facilities or upgrades consistent with
commercial practices as established by
the Uniform Commercial Code. The
Transmission Customer shall have thirty
(30) days to execute a Service
Agreement or request the filing of an
unexecuted Service Agreement and
provide the required letter of credit or
other form of security or the request will
no longer be a Completed Application
and shall be deemed terminated and
withdrawn.
19.4 Facilities Study Procedures
If a System Impact Study indicates
that additions or upgrades to the
Transmission System are needed to
supply the Eligible Customer’s service
request, the Transmission Provider,
within thirty (30) days of the
completion of the System Impact Study,
shall tender to the Eligible Customer a
Facilities Study Agreement pursuant to
which the Eligible Customer shall agree
to reimburse the Transmission Provider
for performing the required Facilities
Study. For a service request to remain
a Completed Application, the Eligible
Customer shall execute the Facilities
Study Agreement and return it to the
Transmission Provider within fifteen
(15) days. If the Eligible Customer elects
not to execute the Facilities Study
Agreement, its application shall be
deemed withdrawn and its deposit,
pursuant to Section 17.3, shall be
returned with interest. Upon receipt of
an executed Facilities Study Agreement,
the Transmission Provider will use due
diligence to complete the required
Facilities Study within a sixty (60) day
period. If the Transmission Provider is
unable to complete the Facilities Study
in the allotted time period, the
Transmission Provider shall notify the
Transmission Customer and provide an
estimate of the time needed to reach a
final determination along with an
explanation of the reasons that
additional time is required to complete
the study. When completed, the
Facilities Study will include a good
faith estimate of (i) the cost of Direct
Assignment Facilities to be charged to
the Transmission Customer, (ii) the
Transmission Customer’s appropriate
share of the cost of any required
Network Upgrades as determined
pursuant to the provisions of Part II of
the Tariff, and (iii) the time required to
complete such construction and initiate
Any change in design arising from
inability to site or construct facilities as
proposed will require development of a
revised good faith estimate. New good
faith estimates also will be required in
the event of new statutory or regulatory
requirements that are effective before
the completion of construction or other
circumstances beyond the control of the
Transmission Provider that significantly
affect the final cost of new facilities or
upgrades to be charged to the
Transmission Customer pursuant to the
provisions of Part II of the Tariff.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
19.5
Facilities Study Modifications
19.6 Due Diligence in Completing New
Facilities
The Transmission Provider shall use
due diligence to add necessary facilities
or upgrade its Transmission System
within a reasonable time. The
Transmission Provider will not upgrade
its existing or planned Transmission
System in order to provide the
requested Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service if doing so would
impair system reliability or otherwise
impair or degrade existing firm service.
19.7
Partial Interim Service
If the Transmission Provider
determines that it will not have
adequate transfer capability to satisfy
the full amount of a Completed
Application for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service, the Transmission
Provider nonetheless shall be obligated
to offer and provide the portion of the
requested Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service that can be
accommodated without addition of any
facilities and through redispatch.
However, the Transmission Provider
shall not be obligated to provide the
incremental amount of requested Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
that requires the addition of facilities or
upgrades to the Transmission System
PO 00000
Frm 00146
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
until such facilities or upgrades have
been placed in service.
19.8 Expedited Procedures for New
Facilities
In lieu of the procedures set forth
above, the Eligible Customer shall have
the option to expedite the process by
requesting the Transmission Provider to
tender at one time, together with the
results of required studies, an
‘‘Expedited Service Agreement’’
pursuant to which the Eligible Customer
would agree to compensate the
Transmission Provider for all costs
incurred pursuant to the terms of the
Tariff. In order to exercise this option,
the Eligible Customer shall request in
writing an expedited Service Agreement
covering all of the above-specified items
within thirty (30) days of receiving the
results of the System Impact Study
identifying needed facility additions or
upgrades or costs incurred in providing
the requested service. While the
Transmission Provider agrees to provide
the Eligible Customer with its best
estimate of the new facility costs and
other charges that may be incurred, such
estimate shall not be binding and the
Eligible Customer must agree in writing
to compensate the Transmission
Provider for all costs incurred pursuant
to the provisions of the Tariff. The
Eligible Customer shall execute and
return such an Expedited Service
Agreement within fifteen (15) days of its
receipt or the Eligible Customer’s
request for service will cease to be a
Completed Application and will be
deemed terminated and withdrawn.
19.9 Penalties for Failure To Meet
Study Deadlines
Sections 19.3 and 19.4 require a
Transmission Provider to use due
diligence to meet 60-day study
completion deadlines for System Impact
Studies and Facilities Studies.
(i) The Transmission Provider is
required to file a notice with the
Commission in the event that more than
twenty (20) percent of non-Affiliates’
System Impact Studies and Facilities
Studies completed by the Transmission
Provider in any two consecutive
calendar quarters are not completed
within the 60-day study completion
deadlines. Such notice must be filed
within thirty (30) days of the end of the
calendar quarter triggering the notice
requirement.
(ii) For the purposes of calculating the
percent of non-Affiliates’ System Impact
Studies and Facilities Studies processed
outside of the 60-day study completion
deadlines, the Transmission Provider
shall consider all System Impact Studies
and Facilities Studies that it completes
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
for non-Affiliates during the calendar
quarter. The percentage should be
calculated by dividing the number of
those studies which are completed on
time by the total number of completed
studies. The Transmission Provider may
provide an explanation in its
notification filing to the Commission if
it believes there are extenuating
circumstances that prevented it from
meeting the 60-day study completion
deadlines.
(iii) The Transmission Provider is
subject to an operational penalty if it
completes ten (10) percent or more of
non-Affiliates’ System Impact Studies
and Facilities Studies outside of the 60day study completion deadlines for each
of the two calendar quarters
immediately following the quarter that
triggered its notification filing to the
Commission. The operational penalty
will be assessed for each calendar
quarter for which an operational penalty
applies, starting with the calendar
quarter immediately following the
quarter that triggered the Transmission
Provider’s notification filing to the
Commission. The operational penalty
will continue to be assessed each
quarter until the Transmission Provider
completes at least ninety (90) percent of
all non-Affiliates’ System Impact
Studies and Facilities Studies within
the 60-day deadline.
(iv) For penalties assessed in
accordance with subsection (iii) above,
the penalty amount for each System
Impact Study or Facilities Study shall
be equal to $500 for each day the
Transmission Provider takes to
complete that study beyond the 60-day
deadline.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
20 Procedures if the Transmission
Provider Is Unable To Complete New
Transmission Facilities for Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
20.1 Delays in Construction of New
Facilities
If any event occurs that will
materially affect the time for completion
of new facilities, or the ability to
complete them, the Transmission
Provider shall promptly notify the
Transmission Customer. In such
circumstances, the Transmission
Provider shall within thirty (30) days of
notifying the Transmission Customer of
such delays, convene a technical
meeting with the Transmission
Customer to evaluate the alternatives
available to the Transmission Customer.
The Transmission Provider also shall
make available to the Transmission
Customer studies and work papers
related to the delay, including all
information that is in the possession of
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
the Transmission Provider that is
reasonably needed by the Transmission
Customer to evaluate any alternatives.
20.2 Alternatives to the Original
Facility Additions
When the review process of Section
20.1 determines that one or more
alternatives exist to the originally
planned construction project, the
Transmission Provider shall present
such alternatives for consideration by
the Transmission Customer. If, upon
review of any alternatives, the
Transmission Customer desires to
maintain its Completed Application
subject to construction of the alternative
facilities, it may request the
Transmission Provider to submit a
revised Service Agreement for Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service. If
the alternative approach solely involves
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service, the Transmission Provider shall
promptly tender a Service Agreement
for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service providing for the
service. In the event the Transmission
Provider concludes that no reasonable
alternative exists and the Transmission
Customer disagrees, the Transmission
Customer may seek relief under the
dispute resolution procedures pursuant
to Section 12 or it may refer the dispute
to the Commission for resolution.
20.3 Refund Obligation for Unfinished
Facility Additions
If the Transmission Provider and the
Transmission Customer mutually agree
that no other reasonable alternatives
exist and the requested service cannot
be provided out of existing capability
under the conditions of Part II of the
Tariff, the obligation to provide the
requested Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service shall terminate
and any deposit made by the
Transmission Customer shall be
returned with interest pursuant to
Commission regulations
35.19a(a)(2)(iii). However, the
Transmission Customer shall be
responsible for all prudently incurred
costs by the Transmission Provider
through the time construction was
suspended.
21 Provisions Relating to Transmission
Construction and Services on the
Systems of Other Utilities
21.1 Responsibility for Third-Party
System Additions
The Transmission Provider shall not
be responsible for making arrangements
for any necessary engineering,
permitting, and construction of
transmission or distribution facilities on
PO 00000
Frm 00147
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3129
the system(s) of any other entity or for
obtaining any regulatory approval for
such facilities. The Transmission
Provider will undertake reasonable
efforts to assist the Transmission
Customer in obtaining such
arrangements, including without
limitation, providing any information or
data required by such other electric
system pursuant to Good Utility
Practice.
21.2 Coordination of Third-Party
System Additions
In circumstances where the need for
transmission facilities or upgrades is
identified pursuant to the provisions of
Part II of the Tariff, and if such upgrades
further require the addition of
transmission facilities on other systems,
the Transmission Provider shall have
the right to coordinate construction on
its own system with the construction
required by others. The Transmission
Provider, after consultation with the
Transmission Customer and
representatives of such other systems,
may defer construction of its new
transmission facilities, if the new
transmission facilities on another
system cannot be completed in a timely
manner. The Transmission Provider
shall notify the Transmission Customer
in writing of the basis for any decision
to defer construction and the specific
problems which must be resolved before
it will initiate or resume construction of
new facilities. Within sixty (60) days of
receiving written notification by the
Transmission Provider of its intent to
defer construction pursuant to this
section, the Transmission Customer may
challenge the decision in accordance
with the dispute resolution procedures
pursuant to Section 12 or it may refer
the dispute to the Commission for
resolution.
22
Changes in Service Specifications
22.1 Modifications on a Non-Firm
Basis
The Transmission Customer taking
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service may request the Transmission
Provider to provide transmission service
on a non-firm basis over Receipt and
Delivery Points other than those
specified in the Service Agreement
(‘‘Secondary Receipt and Delivery
Points’’), in amounts not to exceed its
firm capacity reservation, without
incurring an additional Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service charge or
executing a new Service Agreement,
subject to the following conditions.
(a) Service provided over Secondary
Receipt and Delivery Points will be nonfirm only, on an as-available basis and
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3130
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
will not displace any firm or non-firm
service reserved or scheduled by thirdparties under the Tariff or by the
Transmission Provider on behalf of its
Native Load Customers.
(b) The sum of all Firm and non-firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
provided to the Transmission Customer
at any time pursuant to this section
shall not exceed the Reserved Capacity
in the relevant Service Agreement under
which such services are provided.
(c) The Transmission Customer shall
retain its right to schedule Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service at the
Receipt and Delivery Points specified in
the relevant Service Agreement in the
amount of its original capacity
reservation.
(d) Service over Secondary Receipt
and Delivery Points on a non-firm basis
shall not require the filing of an
Application for Non-Firm Point-ToPoint Transmission Service under the
Tariff. However, all other requirements
of Part II of the Tariff (except as to
transmission rates) shall apply to
transmission service on a non-firm basis
over Secondary Receipt and Delivery
Points.
22.2
Modification on a Firm Basis
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Any request by a Transmission
Customer to modify Receipt and
Delivery Points on a firm basis shall be
treated as a new request for service in
accordance with Section 17 hereof,
except that such Transmission Customer
shall not be obligated to pay any
additional deposit if the capacity
reservation does not exceed the amount
reserved in the existing Service
Agreement. While such new request is
pending, the Transmission Customer
shall retain its priority for service at the
existing firm Receipt and Delivery
Points specified in its Service
Agreement.
opportunity cost capped at the
Transmission Provider’s cost of
expansion; provided that, for service
prior to October 1, 2010, compensation
to Resellers shall be at rates established
by agreement between the Reseller and
the Assignee.
The Assignee must execute a service
agreement with the Transmission
Provider governing reassignments of
transmission service prior to the date on
which the reassigned service
commences. The Transmission Provider
shall charge the Reseller, as appropriate,
at the rate stated in the Reseller’s
Service Agreement with the
Transmission Provider or the associated
OASIS schedule and credit the Reseller
with the price reflected in the
Assignee’s Service Agreement with the
Transmission Provider or the associated
OASIS schedule; provided that, such
credit shall be reversed in the event of
non-payment by the Assignee. If the
Assignee does not request any change in
the Point(s) of Receipt or the Point(s) of
Delivery, or a change in any other term
or condition set forth in the original
Service Agreement, the Assignee will
receive the same services as did the
Reseller and the priority of service for
the Assignee will be the same as that of
the Reseller. The Assignee will be
subject to all terms and conditions of
this Tariff. If the Assignee requests a
change in service, the reservation
priority of service will be determined by
the Transmission Provider pursuant to
Section 13.2.
23.3 Information on Assignment or
Transfer of Service
23.2 Limitations on Assignment or
Transfer of Service
Unless otherwise agreed, the
Transmission Customer is required to
maintain a power factor within the same
range as the Transmission Provider
pursuant to Good Utility Practices. The
power factor requirements are specified
in the Service Agreement where
applicable.
If the Assignee requests a change in
the Point(s) of Receipt or Point(s) of
Delivery, or a change in any other
specifications set forth in the original
Service Agreement, the Transmission
23 Sale or Assignment of Transmission Provider will consent to such change
subject to the provisions of the Tariff,
Service
provided that the change will not impair
23.1 Procedures for Assignment or
the operation and reliability of the
Transfer of Service
Transmission Provider’s generation,
transmission, or distribution systems.
Subject to Commission approval of
The Assignee shall compensate the
any necessary filings, a Transmission
Customer may sell, assign, or transfer all Transmission Provider for performing
any System Impact Study needed to
or a portion of its rights under its
evaluate the capability of the
Service Agreement, but only to another
Transmission System to accommodate
Eligible Customer (the Assignee). The
the proposed change and any additional
Transmission Customer that sells,
costs resulting from such change. The
assigns or transfers its rights under its
Reseller shall remain liable for the
Service Agreement is hereafter referred
performance of all obligations under the
to as the Reseller. Compensation to
Service Agreement, except as
Resellers shall not exceed the higher of
(i) the original rate paid by the Reseller, specifically agreed to by the
Transmission Provider and the Reseller
(ii) the Transmission Provider’s
through an amendment to the Service
maximum rate on file at the time of the
Agreement.
assignment, or (iii) the Reseller’s
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
PO 00000
Frm 00148
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
In accordance with Section 4, all sales
or assignments of capacity must be
conducted through or otherwise posted
on the Transmission Provider’s OASIS
on or before the date the reassigned
service commences and are subject to
Section 23.1. Resellers may also use the
Transmission Provider’s OASIS to post
transmission capacity available for
resale.
24 Metering and Power Factor
Correction at Receipt and Delivery
Points(s)
24.1 Transmission Customer
Obligations
Unless otherwise agreed, the
Transmission Customer shall be
responsible for installing and
maintaining compatible metering and
communications equipment to
accurately account for the capacity and
energy being transmitted under Part II of
the Tariff and to communicate the
information to the Transmission
Provider. Such equipment shall remain
the property of the Transmission
Customer.
24.2 Transmission Provider Access to
Metering Data
The Transmission Provider shall have
access to metering data, which may
reasonably be required to facilitate
measurements and billing under the
Service Agreement.
24.3
Power Factor
25 Compensation for Transmission
Service
Rates for Firm and Non-Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service are
provided in the Schedules appended to
the Tariff: Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service (Schedule 7); and
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service (Schedule 8). The Transmission
Provider shall use Part II of the Tariff to
make its Third-Party Sales. The
Transmission Provider shall account for
such use at the applicable Tariff rates,
pursuant to Section 8.
26
Stranded Cost Recovery
The Transmission Provider may seek
to recover stranded costs from the
Transmission Customer pursuant to this
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Tariff in accordance with the terms,
conditions and procedures set forth in
FERC Order No. 888. However, the
Transmission Provider must separately
file any specific proposed stranded cost
charge under Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act.
27 Compensation for New Facilities
and Redispatch Costs
Whenever a System Impact Study
performed by the Transmission Provider
in connection with the provision of
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service identifies the need for new
facilities, the Transmission Customer
shall be responsible for such costs to the
extent consistent with Commission
policy. Whenever a System Impact
Study performed by the Transmission
Provider identifies capacity constraints
that may be relieved by redispatching
the Transmission Provider’s resources to
eliminate such constraints, the
Transmission Customer shall be
responsible for the redispatch costs to
the extent consistent with Commission
policy.
III. Network Integration Transmission
Service
Preamble
The Transmission Provider will
provide Network Integration
Transmission Service pursuant to the
applicable terms and conditions
contained in the Tariff and Service
Agreement. Network Integration
Transmission Service allows the
Network Customer to integrate,
economically dispatch and regulate its
current and planned Network Resources
to serve its Network Load in a manner
comparable to that in which the
Transmission Provider utilizes its
Transmission System to serve its Native
Load Customers. Network Integration
Transmission Service also may be used
by the Network Customer to deliver
economy energy purchases to its
Network Load from non-designated
resources on an as-available basis
without additional charge. Transmission
service for sales to non-designated loads
will be provided pursuant to the
applicable terms and conditions of Part
II of the Tariff.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
28 Nature of Network Integration
Transmission Service
28.1 Scope of Service
Network Integration Transmission
Service is a transmission service that
allows Network Customers to efficiently
and economically utilize their Network
Resources (as well as other nondesignated generation resources) to
serve their Network Load located in the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
3131
Transmission Provider’s Control Area
and any additional load that may be
designated pursuant to Section 31.3 of
the Tariff. The Network Customer taking
Network Integration Transmission
Service must obtain or provide
Ancillary Services pursuant to Section
3.
(except for transmission rates) shall
apply to secondary service. Deliveries
from resources other than Network
Resources will have a higher priority
than any Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service under Part II of
the Tariff.
28.2 Transmission Provider
Responsibilities
The Transmission Provider will plan,
construct, operate and maintain its
Transmission System in accordance
with Good Utility Practice and its
planning obligations in Attachment K in
order to provide the Network Customer
with Network Integration Transmission
Service over the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System. The
Transmission Provider, on behalf of its
Native Load Customers, shall be
required to designate resources and
loads in the same manner as any
Network Customer under Part III of this
Tariff. This information must be
consistent with the information used by
the Transmission Provider to calculate
available transfer capability. The
Transmission Provider shall include the
Network Customer’s Network Load in
its Transmission System planning and
shall, consistent with Good Utility
Practice and Attachment K, endeavor to
construct and place into service
sufficient transfer capability to deliver
the Network Customer’s Network
Resources to serve its Network Load on
a basis comparable to the Transmission
Provider’s delivery of its own generating
and purchased resources to its Native
Load Customers.
Real Power Losses are associated with
all transmission service. The
Transmission Provider is not obligated
to provide Real Power Losses. The
Network Customer is responsible for
replacing losses associated with all
transmission service as calculated by
the Transmission Provider. The
applicable Real Power Loss factors are
as follows: [To be completed by the
Transmission Provider].
28.3 Network Integration Transmission
Service
The Transmission Provider will
provide firm transmission service over
its Transmission System to the Network
Customer for the delivery of capacity
and energy from its designated Network
Resources to service its Network Loads
on a basis that is comparable to the
Transmission Provider’s use of the
Transmission System to reliably serve
its Native Load Customers.
28.4 Secondary Service
The Network Customer may use the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System to deliver energy to its Network
Loads from resources that have not been
designated as Network Resources. Such
energy shall be transmitted, on an asavailable basis, at no additional charge.
Secondary service shall not require the
filing of an Application for Network
Integration Transmission Service under
the Tariff. However, all other
requirements of Part III of the Tariff
PO 00000
Frm 00149
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
28.5
28.6
Real Power Losses
Restrictions on Use of Service
The Network Customer shall not use
Network Integration Transmission
Service for (i) sales of capacity and
energy to non-designated loads, or (ii)
direct or indirect provision of
transmission service by the Network
Customer to third parties. All Network
Customers taking Network Integration
Transmission Service shall use Point-toPoint Transmission Service under Part II
of the Tariff for any Third-Party Sale
which requires use of the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System. The
Transmission Provider shall specify any
appropriate charges and penalties and
all related terms and conditions
applicable in the event that a Network
Customer uses Network Integration
Transmission Service or secondary
service pursuant to Section 28.4 to
facilitate a wholesale sale that does not
serve a Network Load.
29
Initiating Service
29.1 Condition Precedent for
Receiving Service
Subject to the terms and conditions of
Part III of the Tariff, the Transmission
Provider will provide Network
Integration Transmission Service to any
Eligible Customer, provided that (i) the
Eligible Customer completes an
Application for service as provided
under Part III of the Tariff, (ii) the
Eligible Customer and the Transmission
Provider complete the technical
arrangements set forth in Sections 29.3
and 29.4, (iii) the Eligible Customer
executes a Service Agreement pursuant
to Attachment F for service under Part
III of the Tariff or requests in writing
that the Transmission Provider file a
proposed unexecuted Service
Agreement with the Commission, and
(iv) the Eligible Customer executes a
Network Operating Agreement with the
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3132
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Transmission Provider pursuant to
Attachment G, or requests in writing
that the Transmission Provider file a
proposed unexecuted Network
Operating Agreement.
29.2 Application Procedures
An Eligible Customer requesting
service under Part III of the Tariff must
submit an Application, with a deposit
approximating the charge for one month
of service, to the Transmission Provider
as far as possible in advance of the
month in which service is to commence.
Unless subject to the procedures in
Section 2, Completed Applications for
Network Integration Transmission
Service will be assigned a priority
according to the date and time the
Application is received, with the
earliest Application receiving the
highest priority. Applications should be
submitted by entering the information
listed below on the Transmission
Provider’s OASIS. Prior to
implementation of the Transmission
Provider’s OASIS, a Completed
Application may be submitted by (i)
transmitting the required information to
the Transmission Provider by telefax, or
(ii) providing the information by
telephone over the Transmission
Provider’s time recorded telephone line.
Each of these methods will provide a
time-stamped record for establishing the
service priority of the Application. A
Completed Application shall provide all
of the information included in 18 CFR
§ 2.20 including but not limited to the
following:
(i) The identity, address, telephone
number and facsimile number of the
party requesting service;
(ii) A statement that the party
requesting service is, or will be upon
commencement of service, an Eligible
Customer under the Tariff;
(iii) A description of the Network
Load at each delivery point. This
description should separately identify
and provide the Eligible Customer’s best
estimate of the total loads to be served
at each transmission voltage level, and
the loads to be served from each
Transmission Provider substation at the
same transmission voltage level. The
description should include a ten (10)
year forecast of summer and winter load
and resource requirements beginning
with the first year after the service is
scheduled to commence;
(iv) The amount and location of any
interruptible loads included in the
Network Load. This shall include the
summer and winter capacity
requirements for each interruptible load
(had such load not been interruptible),
that portion of the load subject to
interruption, the conditions under
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
which an interruption can be
implemented and any limitations on the
amount and frequency of interruptions.
An Eligible Customer should identify
the amount of interruptible customer
load (if any) included in the 10 year
load forecast provided in response to
(iii) above;
(v) A description of Network
Resources (current and 10-year
projection). For each on-system Network
Resource, such description shall
include:
• Unit size and amount of capacity
from that unit to be designated as
Network Resource
• VAR capability (both leading and
lagging) of all generators
• Operating restrictions
—Any periods of restricted operations
throughout the year
—Maintenance schedules
—Minimum loading level of unit
—Normal operating level of unit
—Any must-run unit designations
required for system reliability or
contract reasons
• Approximate variable generating
cost ($/MWH) for redispatch
computations
• Arrangements governing sale and
delivery of power to third parties from
generating facilities located in the
Transmission Provider Control Area,
where only a portion of unit output is
designated as a Network Resource;
For each off-system Network
Resource, such description shall
include:
• Identification of the Network
Resource as an off-system resource
• Amount of power to which the
customer has rights
• Identification of the control area
from which the power will originate
• Delivery point(s) to the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System
• Transmission arrangements on the
external transmission system(s)
• Operating restrictions, if any
—Any periods of restricted operations
throughout the year
—Maintenance schedules
—Minimum loading level of unit
—Normal operating level of unit
—Any must-run unit designations
required for system reliability or
contract reasons
• Approximate variable generating
cost ($/MWH) for redispatch
computations;
(vi) Description of Eligible Customer’s
transmission system:
• Load flow and stability data, such
as real and reactive parts of the load,
lines, transformers, reactive devices and
load type, including normal and
PO 00000
Frm 00150
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
emergency ratings of all transmission
equipment in a load flow format
compatible with that used by the
Transmission Provider
• Operating restrictions needed for
reliability
• Operating guides employed by
system operators
• Contractual restrictions or
committed uses of the Eligible
Customer’s transmission system, other
than the Eligible Customer’s Network
Loads and Resources
• Location of Network Resources
described in subsection (v) above
• 10 year projection of system
expansions or upgrades
• Transmission System maps that
include any proposed expansions or
upgrades
• Thermal ratings of Eligible
Customer’s Control Area ties with other
Control Areas;
(vii) Service Commencement Date and
the term of the requested Network
Integration Transmission Service. The
minimum term for Network Integration
Transmission Service is one year;
(viii) A statement signed by an
authorized officer from or agent of the
Network Customer attesting that all of
the network resources listed pursuant to
Section 29.2(v) satisfy the following
conditions: (1) The Network Customer
owns the resource, has committed to
purchase generation pursuant to an
executed contract, or has committed to
purchase generation where execution of
a contract is contingent upon the
availability of transmission service
under Part III of the Tariff; and (2) the
Network Resources do not include any
resources, or any portion thereof, that
are committed for sale to nondesignated third party load or otherwise
cannot be called upon to meet the
Network Customer’s Network Load on a
non-interruptible basis; and
(ix) Any additional information
required of the Transmission Customer
as specified in the Transmission
Provider’s planning process established
in Attachment K.
Unless the Parties agree to a different
time frame, the Transmission Provider
must acknowledge the request within
ten (10) days of receipt. The
acknowledgement must include a date
by which a response, including a
Service Agreement, will be sent to the
Eligible Customer. If an Application
fails to meet the requirements of this
section, the Transmission Provider shall
notify the Eligible Customer requesting
service within fifteen (15) days of
receipt and specify the reasons for such
failure. Wherever possible, the
Transmission Provider will attempt to
remedy deficiencies in the Application
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
through informal communications with
the Eligible Customer. If such efforts are
unsuccessful, the Transmission Provider
shall return the Application without
prejudice to the Eligible Customer filing
a new or revised Application that fully
complies with the requirements of this
section. The Eligible Customer will be
assigned a new priority consistent with
the date of the new or revised
Application. The Transmission Provider
shall treat this information consistent
with the standards of conduct contained
in Part 37 of the Commission’s
regulations.
29.3 Technical Arrangements To Be
Completed Prior to Commencement of
Service
Network Integration Transmission
Service shall not commence until the
Transmission Provider and the Network
Customer, or a third party, have
completed installation of all equipment
specified under the Network Operating
Agreement consistent with Good Utility
Practice and any additional
requirements reasonably and
consistently imposed to ensure the
reliable operation of the Transmission
System. The Transmission Provider
shall exercise reasonable efforts, in
coordination with the Network
Customer, to complete such
arrangements as soon as practicable
taking into consideration the Service
Commencement Date.
29.4 Network Customer Facilities
The provision of Network Integration
Transmission Service shall be
conditioned upon the Network
Customer’s constructing, maintaining
and operating the facilities on its side of
each delivery point or interconnection
necessary to reliably deliver capacity
and energy from the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System to the
Network Customer. The Network
Customer shall be solely responsible for
constructing or installing all facilities on
the Network Customer’s side of each
such delivery point or interconnection.
29.5 Filing of Service Agreement
The Transmission Provider will file
Service Agreements with the
Commission in compliance with
applicable Commission regulations.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
30
Network Resources
30.1 Designation of Network Resources
Network Resources shall include all
generation owned, purchased or leased
by the Network Customer designated to
serve Network Load under the Tariff.
Network Resources may not include
resources, or any portion thereof, that
are committed for sale to non-
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
designated third party load or otherwise
cannot be called upon to meet the
Network Customer’s Network Load on a
non-interruptible basis. Any owned or
purchased resources that were serving
the Network Customer’s loads under
firm agreements entered into on or
before the Service Commencement Date
shall initially be designated as Network
Resources until the Network Customer
terminates the designation of such
resources.
30.2 Designation of New Network
Resources
The Network Customer may designate
a new Network Resource by providing
the Transmission Provider with as much
advance notice as practicable. A
designation of a new Network Resource
must be made through the Transmission
Provider’s OASIS by a request for
modification of service pursuant to an
Application under Section 29. This
request must include a statement that
the new network resource satisfies the
following conditions: (1) The Network
Customer owns the resource, has
committed to purchase generation
pursuant to an executed contract, or has
committed to purchase generation
where execution of a contract is
contingent upon the availability of
transmission service under Part III of the
Tariff; and (2) The Network Resources
do not include any resources, or any
portion thereof, that are committed for
sale to non-designated third party load
or otherwise cannot be called upon to
meet the Network Customer’s Network
Load on a non-interruptible basis. The
Network Customer’s request will be
deemed deficient if it does not include
this statement and the Transmission
Provider will follow the procedures for
a deficient application as described in
Section 29.2 of the Tariff.
30.3 Termination of Network
Resources
The Network Customer may terminate
the designation of all or part of a
generating resource as a Network
Resource by providing notification to
the Transmission Provider through
OASIS as soon as reasonably
practicable, but not later than the firm
scheduling deadline for the period of
termination. Any request for
termination of Network Resource status
must be submitted on OASIS, and
should indicate whether the request is
for indefinite or temporary termination.
A request for indefinite termination of
Network Resource status must indicate
the date and time that the termination
is to be effective, and the identification
and capacity of the resource(s) or
portions thereof to be indefinitely
PO 00000
Frm 00151
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3133
terminated. A request for temporary
termination of Network Resource status
must include the following:
(i) Effective date and time of
temporary termination;
(ii) Effective date and time of
redesignation, following period of
temporary termination;
(iii) Identification and capacity of
resource(s) or portions thereof to be
temporarily terminated;
(iv) Resource description and
attestation for redesignating the network
resource following the temporary
termination, in accordance with Section
30.2; and
(v) Identification of any related
transmission service requests to be
evaluated concomitantly with the
request for temporary termination, such
that the requests for undesignation and
the request for these related
transmission service requests must be
approved or denied as a single request.
The evaluation of these related
transmission service requests must take
into account the termination of the
network resources identified in (iii)
above, as well as all competing
transmission service requests of higher
priority.
As part of a temporary termination, a
Network Customer may only redesignate
the same resource that was originally
designated, or a portion thereof.
Requests to redesignate a different
resource and/or a resource with
increased capacity will be deemed
deficient and the Transmission Provider
will follow the procedures for a
deficient application as described in
Section 29.2 of the Tariff.
30.4 Operation of Network Resources
The Network Customer shall not
operate its designated Network
Resources located in the Network
Customer’s or Transmission Provider’s
Control Area such that the output of
those facilities exceeds its designated
Network Load, plus Non-Firm Sales
delivered pursuant to Part II of the
Tariff, plus losses, plus power sales
under a Commission-approved reserve
sharing program. This limitation shall
not apply to changes in the operation of
a Transmission Customer’s Network
Resources at the request of the
Transmission Provider to respond to an
emergency or other unforeseen
condition which may impair or degrade
the reliability of the Transmission
System. For all Network Resources not
physically connected with the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, the Network Customer may not
schedule delivery of energy in excess of
the Network Resource’s capacity, as
specified in the Network Customer’s
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3134
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Application pursuant to Section 29,
unless the Network Customer supports
such delivery within the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System by
either obtaining Point-to-Point
Transmission Service or utilizing
secondary service pursuant to Section
28.4. The Transmission Provider shall
specify the rate treatment and all related
terms and conditions applicable in the
event that a Network Customer’s
schedule at the delivery point for a
Network Resource not physically
interconnected with the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System exceeds
the Network Resource’s designated
capacity, excluding energy delivered
using secondary service or Point-toPoint Transmission Service.
30.5 Network Customer Redispatch
Obligation
As a condition to receiving Network
Integration Transmission Service, the
Network Customer agrees to redispatch
its Network Resources as requested by
the Transmission Provider pursuant to
Section 33.2. To the extent practical, the
redispatch of resources pursuant to this
section shall be on a least cost, nondiscriminatory basis between all
Network Customers, and the
Transmission Provider.
30.6 Transmission Arrangements for
Network Resources Not Physically
Interconnected With the Transmission
Provider
The Network Customer shall be
responsible for any arrangements
necessary to deliver capacity and energy
from a Network Resource not physically
interconnected with the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System. The
Transmission Provider will undertake
reasonable efforts to assist the Network
Customer in obtaining such
arrangements, including without
limitation, providing any information or
data required by such other entity
pursuant to Good Utility Practice.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
30.7 Limitation on Designation of
Network Resources
The Network Customer must
demonstrate that it owns or has
committed to purchase generation
pursuant to an executed contract in
order to designate a generating resource
as a Network Resource. Alternatively,
the Network Customer may establish
that execution of a contract is
contingent upon the availability of
transmission service under Part III of the
Tariff.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
30.8 Use of Interface Capacity by the
Network Customer
There is no limitation upon a Network
Customer’s use of the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System at any
particular interface to integrate the
Network Customer’s Network Resources
(or substitute economy purchases) with
its Network Loads. However, a Network
Customer’s use of the Transmission
Provider’s total interface capacity with
other transmission systems may not
exceed the Network Customer’s Load.
30.9 Network Customer Owned
Transmission Facilities
The Network Customer that owns
existing transmission facilities that are
integrated with the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System may be
eligible to receive consideration either
through a billing credit or some other
mechanism. In order to receive such
consideration the Network Customer
must demonstrate that its transmission
facilities are integrated into the plans or
operations of the Transmission
Provider, to serve its power and
transmission customers. For facilities
added by the Network Customer
subsequent to the [the effective date of
a Final Rule in RM05–25–000], the
Network Customer shall receive credit
for such transmission facilities added if
such facilities are integrated into the
operations of the Transmission
Provider’s facilities; provided however,
the Network Customer’s transmission
facilities shall be presumed to be
integrated if such transmission facilities,
if owned by the Transmission Provider,
would be eligible for inclusion in the
Transmission Provider’s annual
transmission revenue requirement as
specified in Attachment H. Calculation
of any credit under this subsection shall
be addressed in either the Network
Customer’s Service Agreement or any
other agreement between the Parties.
31
Designation of Network Load
31.1 Network Load
The Network Customer must
designate the individual Network Loads
on whose behalf the Transmission
Provider will provide Network
Integration Transmission Service. The
Network Loads shall be specified in the
Service Agreement.
31.2 New Network Loads Connected
With the Transmission Provider
The Network Customer shall provide
the Transmission Provider with as much
advance notice as reasonably practicable
of the designation of new Network Load
that will be added to its Transmission
System. A designation of new Network
PO 00000
Frm 00152
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Load must be made through a
modification of service pursuant to a
new Application. The Transmission
Provider will use due diligence to
install any transmission facilities
required to interconnect a new Network
Load designated by the Network
Customer. The costs of new facilities
required to interconnect a new Network
Load shall be determined in accordance
with the procedures provided in Section
32.4 and shall be charged to the
Network Customer in accordance with
Commission policies.
31.3 Network Load Not Physically
Interconnected With the Transmission
Provider
This section applies to both initial
designation pursuant to Section 31.1
and the subsequent addition of new
Network Load not physically
interconnected with the Transmission
Provider. To the extent that the Network
Customer desires to obtain transmission
service for a load outside the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, the Network Customer shall
have the option of (1) electing to include
the entire load as Network Load for all
purposes under Part III of the Tariff and
designating Network Resources in
connection with such additional
Network Load, or (2) excluding that
entire load from its Network Load and
purchasing Point-To-Point Transmission
Service under Part II of the Tariff. To the
extent that the Network Customer gives
notice of its intent to add a new
Network Load as part of its Network
Load pursuant to this section the
request must be made through a
modification of service pursuant to a
new Application.
31.4 New Interconnection Points
To the extent the Network Customer
desires to add a new Delivery Point or
interconnection point between the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System and a Network Load, the
Network Customer shall provide the
Transmission Provider with as much
advance notice as reasonably
practicable.
31.5 Changes in Service Requests
Under no circumstances shall the
Network Customer’s decision to cancel
or delay a requested change in Network
Integration Transmission Service (e.g.
the addition of a new Network Resource
or designation of a new Network Load)
in any way relieve the Network
Customer of its obligation to pay the
costs of transmission facilities
constructed by the Transmission
Provider and charged to the Network
Customer as reflected in the Service
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Agreement. However, the Transmission
Provider must treat any requested
change in Network Integration
Transmission Service in a nondiscriminatory manner.
31.6 Annual Load and Resource
Information Updates
The Network Customer shall provide
the Transmission Provider with annual
updates of Network Load and Network
Resource forecasts consistent with those
included in its Application for Network
Integration Transmission Service under
Part III of the Tariff including, but not
limited to, any information provided
under section 29.2(ix) pursuant to the
Transmission Provider’s planning
process in Attachment K. The Network
Customer also shall provide the
Transmission Provider with timely
written notice of material changes in
any other information provided in its
Application relating to the Network
Customer’s Network Load, Network
Resources, its transmission system or
other aspects of its facilities or
operations affecting the Transmission
Provider’s ability to provide reliable
service.
32 Additional Study Procedures for
Network Integration Transmission
Service Requests
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
32.1 Notice of Need for System Impact
Study
After receiving a request for service,
the Transmission Provider shall
determine on a non-discriminatory basis
whether a System Impact Study is
needed. A description of the
Transmission Provider’s methodology
for completing a System Impact Study is
provided in Attachment D. If the
Transmission Provider determines that a
System Impact Study is necessary to
accommodate the requested service, it
shall so inform the Eligible Customer, as
soon as practicable. In such cases, the
Transmission Provider shall within
thirty (30) days of receipt of a
Completed Application, tender a System
Impact Study Agreement pursuant to
which the Eligible Customer shall agree
to reimburse the Transmission Provider
for performing the required System
Impact Study. For a service request to
remain a Completed Application, the
Eligible Customer shall execute the
System Impact Study Agreement and
return it to the Transmission Provider
within fifteen (15) days. If the Eligible
Customer elects not to execute the
System Impact Study Agreement, its
Application shall be deemed withdrawn
and its deposit shall be returned with
interest.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
32.2 System Impact Study Agreement
and Cost Reimbursement
(i) The System Impact Study
Agreement will clearly specify the
Transmission Provider’s estimate of the
actual cost, and time for completion of
the System Impact Study. The charge
shall not exceed the actual cost of the
study. In performing the System Impact
Study, the Transmission Provider shall
rely, to the extent reasonably
practicable, on existing transmission
planning studies. The Eligible Customer
will not be assessed a charge for such
existing studies; however, the Eligible
Customer will be responsible for charges
associated with any modifications to
existing planning studies that are
reasonably necessary to evaluate the
impact of the Eligible Customer’s
request for service on the Transmission
System.
(ii) If in response to multiple Eligible
Customers requesting service in relation
to the same competitive solicitation, a
single System Impact Study is sufficient
for the Transmission Provider to
accommodate the service requests, the
costs of that study shall be pro-rated
among the Eligible Customers.
(iii) For System Impact Studies that
the Transmission Provider conducts on
its own behalf, the Transmission
Provider shall record the cost of the
System Impact Studies pursuant to
Section 8.
32.3
System Impact Study Procedures
Upon receipt of an executed System
Impact Study Agreement, the
Transmission Provider will use due
diligence to complete the required
System Impact Study within a sixty (60)
day period. The System Impact Study
shall identify (1) any system constraints,
identified with specificity by
transmission element or flowgate, (2)
redispatch options (when requested by
an Eligible Customer) including, to the
extent possible, an estimate of the cost
of redispatch, (3) available options for
installation of automatic devices to
curtail service (when requested by an
Eligible Customer), and (4) additional
Direct Assignment Facilities or Network
Upgrades required to provide the
requested service. For customers
requesting the study of redispatch
options, the System Impact Study shall
(1) identify all resources located within
the Transmission Provider’s Control
Area that can significantly contribute
toward relieving the system constraint
and (2) provide a measurement of each
resource’s impact on the system
constraint. If the Transmission Provider
possesses information indicating that
any resource outside its Control Area
PO 00000
Frm 00153
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3135
could relieve the constraint, it shall
identify each such resource in the
System Impact Study. In the event that
the Transmission Provider is unable to
complete the required System Impact
Study within such time period, it shall
so notify the Eligible Customer and
provide an estimated completion date
along with an explanation of the reasons
why additional time is required to
complete the required studies. A copy of
the completed System Impact Study and
related work papers shall be made
available to the Eligible Customer as
soon as the System Impact Study is
complete. The Transmission Provider
will use the same due diligence in
completing the System Impact Study for
an Eligible Customer as it uses when
completing studies for itself. The
Transmission Provider shall notify the
Eligible Customer immediately upon
completion of the System Impact Study
if the Transmission System will be
adequate to accommodate all or part of
a request for service or that no costs are
likely to be incurred for new
transmission facilities or upgrades. In
order for a request to remain a
Completed Application, within fifteen
(15) days of completion of the System
Impact Study the Eligible Customer
must execute a Service Agreement or
request the filing of an unexecuted
Service Agreement, or the Application
shall be deemed terminated and
withdrawn.
32.4 Facilities Study Procedures
If a System Impact Study indicates
that additions or upgrades to the
Transmission System are needed to
supply the Eligible Customer’s service
request, the Transmission Provider,
within thirty (30) days of the
completion of the System Impact Study,
shall tender to the Eligible Customer a
Facilities Study Agreement pursuant to
which the Eligible Customer shall agree
to reimburse the Transmission Provider
for performing the required Facilities
Study. For a service request to remain
a Completed Application, the Eligible
Customer shall execute the Facilities
Study Agreement and return it to the
Transmission Provider within fifteen
(15) days. If the Eligible Customer elects
not to execute the Facilities Study
Agreement, its Application shall be
deemed withdrawn and its deposit shall
be returned with interest. Upon receipt
of an executed Facilities Study
Agreement, the Transmission Provider
will use due diligence to complete the
required Facilities Study within a sixty
(60) day period. If the Transmission
Provider is unable to complete the
Facilities Study in the allotted time
period, the Transmission Provider shall
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3136
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
notify the Eligible Customer and
provide an estimate of the time needed
to reach a final determination along
with an explanation of the reasons that
additional time is required to complete
the study. When completed, the
Facilities Study will include a good
faith estimate of (i) the cost of Direct
Assignment Facilities to be charged to
the Eligible Customer, (ii) the Eligible
Customer’s appropriate share of the cost
of any required Network Upgrades, and
(iii) the time required to complete such
construction and initiate the requested
service. The Eligible Customer shall
provide the Transmission Provider with
a letter of credit or other reasonable
form of security acceptable to the
Transmission Provider equivalent to the
costs of new facilities or upgrades
consistent with commercial practices as
established by the Uniform Commercial
Code. The Eligible Customer shall have
thirty (30) days to execute a Service
Agreement or request the filing of an
unexecuted Service Agreement and
provide the required letter of credit or
other form of security or the request no
longer will be a Completed Application
and shall be deemed terminated and
withdrawn.
32.5 Penalties for Failure To Meet
Study Deadlines
Section 19.9 defines penalties that
apply for failure to meet the 60-day
study completion due diligence
deadlines for System Impact Studies
and Facilities Studies under Part II of
the Tariff. These same requirements and
penalties apply to service under Part III
of the Tariff.
33
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
33.1
Load Shedding and Curtailments
Procedures
Prior to the Service Commencement
Date, the Transmission Provider and the
Network Customer shall establish Load
Shedding and Curtailment procedures
pursuant to the Network Operating
Agreement with the objective of
responding to contingencies on the
Transmission System and on systems
directly and indirectly interconnected
with Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System. The Parties will
implement such programs during any
period when the Transmission Provider
determines that a system contingency
exists and such procedures are
necessary to alleviate such contingency.
The Transmission Provider will notify
all affected Network Customers in a
timely manner of any scheduled
Curtailment.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
33.2 Transmission Constraints
During any period when the
Transmission Provider determines that a
transmission constraint exists on the
Transmission System, and such
constraint may impair the reliability of
the Transmission Provider’s system, the
Transmission Provider will take
whatever actions, consistent with Good
Utility Practice, that are reasonably
necessary to maintain the reliability of
the Transmission Provider’s system. To
the extent the Transmission Provider
determines that the reliability of the
Transmission System can be maintained
by redispatching resources, the
Transmission Provider will initiate
procedures pursuant to the Network
Operating Agreement to redispatch all
Network Resources and the
Transmission Provider’s own resources
on a least-cost basis without regard to
the ownership of such resources. Any
redispatch under this section may not
unduly discriminate between the
Transmission Provider’s use of the
Transmission System on behalf of its
Native Load Customers and any
Network Customer’s use of the
Transmission System to serve its
designated Network Load.
33.3 Cost Responsibility for Relieving
Transmission Constraints
Whenever the Transmission Provider
implements least-cost redispatch
procedures in response to a
transmission constraint, the
Transmission Provider and Network
Customers will each bear a
proportionate share of the total
redispatch cost based on their respective
Load Ratio Shares.
33.4 Curtailments of Scheduled
Deliveries
If a transmission constraint on the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System cannot be relieved through the
implementation of least-cost redispatch
procedures and the Transmission
Provider determines that it is necessary
to Curtail scheduled deliveries, the
Parties shall Curtail such schedules in
accordance with the Network Operating
Agreement or pursuant to the
Transmission Loading Relief procedures
specified in Attachment J.
33.5 Allocation of Curtailments
The Transmission Provider shall, on a
non-discriminatory basis, Curtail the
transaction(s) that effectively relieve the
constraint. However, to the extent
practicable and consistent with Good
Utility Practice, any Curtailment will be
shared by the Transmission Provider
and Network Customer in proportion to
their respective Load Ratio Shares. The
PO 00000
Frm 00154
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
Transmission Provider shall not direct
the Network Customer to Curtail
schedules to an extent greater than the
Transmission Provider would Curtail
the Transmission Provider’s schedules
under similar circumstances.
33.6 Load Shedding
To the extent that a system
contingency exists on the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System and the
Transmission Provider determines that
it is necessary for the Transmission
Provider and the Network Customer to
shed load, the Parties shall shed load in
accordance with previously established
procedures under the Network
Operating Agreement.
33.7 System Reliability
Notwithstanding any other provisions
of this Tariff, the Transmission Provider
reserves the right, consistent with Good
Utility Practice and on a not unduly
discriminatory basis, to Curtail Network
Integration Transmission Service
without liability on the Transmission
Provider’s part for the purpose of
making necessary adjustments to,
changes in, or repairs on its lines,
substations and facilities, and in cases
where the continuance of Network
Integration Transmission Service would
endanger persons or property. In the
event of any adverse condition(s) or
disturbance(s) on the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System or on
any other system(s) directly or
indirectly interconnected with the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System, the Transmission Provider,
consistent with Good Utility Practice,
also may Curtail Network Integration
Transmission Service in order to (i)
limit the extent or damage of the
adverse condition(s) or disturbance(s),
(ii) prevent damage to generating or
transmission facilities, or (iii) expedite
restoration of service. The Transmission
Provider will give the Network
Customer as much advance notice as is
practicable in the event of such
Curtailment. Any Curtailment of
Network Integration Transmission
Service will be not unduly
discriminatory relative to the
Transmission Provider’s use of the
Transmission System on behalf of its
Native Load Customers. The
Transmission Provider shall specify the
rate treatment and all related terms and
conditions applicable in the event that
the Network Customer fails to respond
to established Load Shedding and
Curtailment procedures.
34 Rates and Charges
The Network Customer shall pay the
Transmission Provider for any Direct
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Assignment Facilities, Ancillary
Services, and applicable study costs,
consistent with Commission policy,
along with the following:
35
34.1
The Network Customer shall plan,
construct, operate and maintain its
facilities in accordance with Good
Utility Practice and in conformance
with the Network Operating Agreement.
35.1 Operation Under the Network
Operating Agreement
Monthly Demand Charge
The Network Customer shall pay a
monthly Demand Charge, which shall
be determined by multiplying its Load
Ratio Share times one twelfth (1/12) of
the Transmission Provider’s Annual
Transmission Revenue Requirement
specified in Schedule H.
34.2 Determination of Network
Customer’s Monthly Network Load
The Network Customer’s monthly
Network Load is its hourly load
(including its designated Network Load
not physically interconnected with the
Transmission Provider under Section
31.3) coincident with the Transmission
Provider’s Monthly Transmission
System Peak.
34.3 Determination of Transmission
Provider’s Monthly Transmission
System Load
The Transmission Provider’s monthly
Transmission System load is the
Transmission Provider’s Monthly
Transmission System Peak minus the
coincident peak usage of all Firm PointTo-Point Transmission Service
customers pursuant to Part II of this
Tariff plus the Reserved Capacity of all
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service customers.
34.4
Redispatch Charge
The Network Customer shall pay a
Load Ratio Share of any redispatch costs
allocated between the Network
Customer and the Transmission
Provider pursuant to Section 33. To the
extent that the Transmission Provider
incurs an obligation to the Network
Customer for redispatch costs in
accordance with Section 33, such
amounts shall be credited against the
Network Customer’s bill for the
applicable month.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
34.5
Stranded Cost Recovery
The Transmission Provider may seek
to recover stranded costs from the
Network Customer pursuant to this
Tariff in accordance with the terms,
conditions and procedures set forth in
FERC Order No. 888. However, the
Transmission Provider must separately
file any proposal to recover stranded
costs under Section 205 of the Federal
Power Act.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
35.3
Operating Arrangements
35.2
Network Operating Agreement
The terms and conditions under
which the Network Customer shall
operate its facilities and the technical
and operational matters associated with
the implementation of Part III of the
Tariff shall be specified in the Network
Operating Agreement. The Network
Operating Agreement shall provide for
the Parties to (i) operate and maintain
equipment necessary for integrating the
Network Customer within the
Transmission Provider’s Transmission
System (including, but not limited to,
remote terminal units, metering,
communications equipment and
relaying equipment), (ii) transfer data
between the Transmission Provider and
the Network Customer (including, but
not limited to, heat rates and
operational characteristics of Network
Resources, generation schedules for
units outside the Transmission
Provider’s Transmission System,
interchange schedules, unit outputs for
redispatch required under Section 33,
voltage schedules, loss factors and other
real time data), (iii) use software
programs required for data links and
constraint dispatching, (iv) exchange
data on forecasted loads and resources
necessary for long-term planning, and
(v) address any other technical and
operational considerations required for
implementation of Part III of the Tariff,
including scheduling protocols. The
Network Operating Agreement will
recognize that the Network Customer
shall either (i) operate as a Control Area
under applicable guidelines of the
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO)
as defined in 18 CFR 39.1, (ii) satisfy its
Control Area requirements, including all
necessary Ancillary Services, by
contracting with the Transmission
Provider, or (iii) satisfy its Control Area
requirements, including all necessary
Ancillary Services, by contracting with
another entity, consistent with Good
Utility Practice, which satisfies the
applicable reliability guidelines of the
ERO. The Transmission Provider shall
not unreasonably refuse to accept
contractual arrangements with another
entity for Ancillary Services. The
Network Operating Agreement is
included in Attachment G.
PO 00000
Frm 00155
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3137
Network Operating Committee
A Network Operating Committee
(Committee) shall be established to
coordinate operating criteria for the
Parties’ respective responsibilities under
the Network Operating Agreement. Each
Network Customer shall be entitled to
have at least one representative on the
Committee. The Committee shall meet
from time to time as need requires, but
no less than once each calendar year.
Schedule 1—Scheduling, System
Control and Dispatch Service
This service is required to schedule
the movement of power through, out of,
within, or into a Control Area. This
service can be provided only by the
operator of the Control Area in which
the transmission facilities used for
transmission service are located.
Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch Service is to be provided
directly by the Transmission Provider (if
the Transmission Provider is the Control
Area operator) or indirectly by the
Transmission Provider making
arrangements with the Control Area
operator that performs this service for
the Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System. The Transmission
Customer must purchase this service
from the Transmission Provider or the
Control Area operator. The charges for
Scheduling, System Control and
Dispatch Service are to be based on the
rates set forth below. To the extent the
Control Area operator performs this
service for the Transmission Provider,
charges to the Transmission Customer
are to reflect only a pass-through of the
costs charged to the Transmission
Provider by that Control Area operator.
Schedule 2—Reactive Supply and
Voltage Control From Generation or
Other Sources Service
In order to maintain transmission
voltages on the Transmission Provider’s
transmission facilities within acceptable
limits, generation facilities and nongeneration resources capable of
providing this service that are under the
control of the control area operator are
operated to produce (or absorb) reactive
power. Thus, Reactive Supply and
Voltage Control from Generation or
Other Sources Service must be provided
for each transaction on the
Transmission Provider’s transmission
facilities. The amount of Reactive
Supply and Voltage Control from
Generation or Other Sources Service
that must be supplied with respect to
the Transmission Customer’s
transaction will be determined based on
the reactive power support necessary to
maintain transmission voltages within
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3138
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
limits that are generally accepted in the
region and consistently adhered to by
the Transmission Provider.
Reactive Supply and Voltage Control
from Generation or Other Sources
Service is to be provided directly by the
Transmission Provider (if the
Transmission Provider is the Control
Area operator) or indirectly by the
Transmission Provider making
arrangements with the Control Area
operator that performs this service for
the Transmission Provider’s
Transmission System. The Transmission
Customer must purchase this service
from the Transmission Provider or the
Control Area operator. The charges for
such service will be based on the rates
set forth below. To the extent the
Control Area operator performs this
service for the Transmission Provider,
charges to the Transmission Customer
are to reflect only a pass-through of the
costs charged to the Transmission
Provider by the Control Area operator.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Schedule 3—Regulation and Frequency
Response Service
Regulation and Frequency Response
Service is necessary to provide for the
continuous balancing of resources
(generation and interchange) with load
and for maintaining scheduled
Interconnection frequency at sixty
cycles per second (60 Hz). Regulation
and Frequency Response Service is
accomplished by committing on-line
generation whose output is raised or
lowered (predominantly through the use
of automatic generating control
equipment) and by other non-generation
resources capable of providing this
service as necessary to follow the
moment-by-moment changes in load.
The obligation to maintain this balance
between resources and load lies with
the Transmission Provider (or the
Control Area operator that performs this
function for the Transmission Provider).
The Transmission Provider must offer
this service when the transmission
service is used to serve load within its
Control Area. The Transmission
Customer must either purchase this
service from the Transmission Provider
or make alternative comparable
arrangements to satisfy its Regulation
and Frequency Response Service
obligation. The amount of and charges
for Regulation and Frequency Response
Service are set forth below. To the
extent the Control Area operator
performs this service for the
Transmission Provider, charges to the
Transmission Customer are to reflect
only a pass-through of the costs charged
to the Transmission Provider by that
Control Area operator.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Schedule 4—Energy Imbalance Service
Energy Imbalance Service is provided
when a difference occurs between the
scheduled and the actual delivery of
energy to a load located within a
Control Area over a single hour. The
Transmission Provider must offer this
service when the transmission service is
used to serve load within its Control
Area. The Transmission Customer must
either purchase this service from the
Transmission Provider or make
alternative comparable arrangements,
which may include use of nongeneration resources capable of
providing this service, to satisfy its
Energy Imbalance Service obligation. To
the extent the Control Area operator
performs this service for the
Transmission Provider, charges to the
Transmission Customer are to reflect
only a pass-through of the costs charged
to the Transmission Provider by that
Control Area operator. The
Transmission Provider may charge a
Transmission Customer a penalty for
either hourly energy imbalances under
this Schedule or a penalty for hourly
generator imbalances under Schedule 9
for imbalances occurring during the
same hour, but not both unless the
imbalances aggravate rather than offset
each other.
The Transmission Provider shall
establish charges for energy imbalance
based on the deviation bands as follows:
(i) Deviations within +/¥1.5 percent
(with a minimum of 2 MW) of the
scheduled transaction to be applied
hourly to any energy imbalance that
occurs as a result of the Transmission
Customer’s scheduled transaction(s)
will be netted on a monthly basis and
settled financially, at the end of the
month, at 100 percent of incremental or
decremental cost; (ii) deviations greater
than +/¥1.5 percent up to 7.5 percent
(or greater than 2 MW up to 10 MW) of
the scheduled transaction to be applied
hourly to any energy imbalance that
occurs as a result of the Transmission
Customer’s scheduled transaction(s)
will be settled financially, at the end of
each month, at 110 percent of
incremental cost or 90 percent of
decremental cost, and (iii) deviations
greater than +/¥7.5 percent (or 10 MW)
of the scheduled transaction to be
applied hourly to any energy imbalance
that occurs as a result of the
Transmission Customer’s scheduled
transaction(s) will be settled financially,
at the end of each month, at 125 percent
of incremental cost or 75 percent of
decremental cost.
For purposes of this Schedule,
incremental cost and decremental cost
represent the Transmission Provider’s
PO 00000
Frm 00156
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
actual average hourly cost of the last 10
MW dispatched for any purpose, i.e., to
supply the Transmission Provider’s
Native Load Customers, correct
imbalances, or make off-system sales,
based on the replacement cost of fuel,
unit heat rates, start-up costs (including
any commitment and redispatch costs),
incremental operation and maintenance
costs, and purchased and interchange
power costs and taxes, as applicable.
Schedule 5—Operating Reserve—
Spinning Reserve Service
Spinning Reserve Service is needed to
serve load immediately in the event of
a system contingency. Spinning Reserve
Service may be provided by generating
units that are on-line and loaded at less
than maximum output and by nongeneration resources capable of
providing this service. The
Transmission Provider must offer this
service when the transmission service is
used to serve load within its Control
Area. The Transmission Customer must
either purchase this service from the
Transmission Provider or make
alternative comparable arrangements to
satisfy its Spinning Reserve Service
obligation. The amount of and charges
for Spinning Reserve Service are set
forth below. To the extent the Control
Area operator performs this service for
the Transmission Provider, charges to
the Transmission Customer are to reflect
only a pass-through of the costs charged
to the Transmission Provider by that
Control Area operator.
Schedule 6—Operating Reserve—
Supplemental Reserve Service
Supplemental Reserve Service is
needed to serve load in the event of a
system contingency; however, it is not
available immediately to serve load but
rather within a short period of time.
Supplemental Reserve Service may be
provided by generating units that are
on-line but unloaded, by quick-start
generation or by interruptible load or
other non-generation resources capable
of providing this service. The
Transmission Provider must offer this
service when the transmission service is
used to serve load within its Control
Area. The Transmission Customer must
either purchase this service from the
Transmission Provider or make
alternative comparable arrangements to
satisfy its Supplemental Reserve Service
obligation. The amount of and charges
for Supplemental Reserve Service are
set forth below. To the extent the
Control Area operator performs this
service for the Transmission Provider,
charges to the Transmission Customer
are to reflect only a pass-through of the
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
costs charged to the Transmission
Provider by that Control Area operator.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Schedule 7—Long-Term Firm and
Short-Term Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
The Transmission Customer shall
compensate the Transmission Provider
each month for Reserved Capacity at the
sum of the applicable charges set forth
below:
(1) Yearly delivery: one-twelfth of the
demand charge of $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per year.
(2) Monthly delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per month.
(3) Weekly delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per week.
(4) Daily delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per day.
The total demand charge in any week,
pursuant to a reservation for Daily
delivery, shall not exceed the rate
specified in section (3) above times the
highest amount in kilowatts of Reserved
Capacity in any day during such week.
(5) Discounts: Three principal
requirements apply to discounts for
transmission service as follows (1) any
offer of a discount made by the
Transmission Provider must be
announced to all Eligible Customers
solely by posting on the OASIS, (2) any
customer-initiated requests for
discounts (including requests for use by
one’s wholesale merchant or an
Affiliate’s use) must occur solely by
posting on the OASIS, and (3) once a
discount is negotiated, details must be
immediately posted on the OASIS. For
any discount agreed upon for service on
a path, from point(s) of receipt to
point(s) of delivery, the Transmission
Provider must offer the same discounted
transmission service rate for the same
time period to all Eligible Customers on
all unconstrained transmission paths
that go to the same point(s) of delivery
on the Transmission System.
(6) Resales: The rates and rules
governing charges and discounts stated
above shall not apply to resales of
transmission service, compensation for
which shall be governed by section 23.1
of the Tariff.
Schedule 8—Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
The Transmission Customer shall
compensate the Transmission Provider
for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service up to the sum of
the applicable charges set forth below:
(1) Monthly delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per month.
(2) Weekly delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per week.
(3) Daily delivery: $ll/KW of
Reserved Capacity per day.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
The total demand charge in any week,
pursuant to a reservation for Daily
delivery, shall not exceed the rate
specified in section (2) above times the
highest amount in kilowatts of Reserved
Capacity in any day during such week.
(4) Hourly delivery: The basic charge
shall be that agreed upon by the Parties
at the time this service is reserved and
in no event shall exceed $ll/MWH.
The total demand charge in any day,
pursuant to a reservation for Hourly
delivery, shall not exceed the rate
specified in section (3) above times the
highest amount in kilowatts of Reserved
Capacity in any hour during such day.
In addition, the total demand charge in
any week, pursuant to a reservation for
Hourly or Daily delivery, shall not
exceed the rate specified in section (2)
above times the highest amount in
kilowatts of Reserved Capacity in any
hour during such week.
(5) Discounts: Three principal
requirements apply to discounts for
transmission service as follows (1) any
offer of a discount made by the
Transmission Provider must be
announced to all Eligible Customers
solely by posting on the OASIS, (2) any
customer-initiated requests for
discounts (including requests for use by
one’s wholesale merchant or an
Affiliate’s use) must occur solely by
posting on the OASIS, and (3) once a
discount is negotiated, details must be
immediately posted on the OASIS. For
any discount agreed upon for service on
a path, from point(s) of receipt to
point(s) of delivery, the Transmission
Provider must offer the same discounted
transmission service rate for the same
time period to all Eligible Customers on
all unconstrained transmission paths
that go to the same point(s) of delivery
on the Transmission System.
(6) Resales: The rates and rules
governing charges and discounts stated
above shall not apply to resales of
transmission service, compensation for
which shall be governed by section 23.1
of the Tariff.
Schedule 9—Generator Imbalance
Service
Generator Imbalance Service is
provided when a difference occurs
between the output of a generator
located in the Transmission Provider’s
Control Area and a delivery schedule
from that generator to (1) another
Control Area or (2) a load within the
Transmission Provider’s Control Area
over a single hour. The Transmission
Provider must offer this service, to the
extent it is physically feasible to do so
from its resources or from resources
available to it, when Transmission
Service is used to deliver energy from a
PO 00000
Frm 00157
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3139
generator located within its Control
Area. The Transmission Customer must
either purchase this service from the
Transmission Provider or make
alternative comparable arrangements,
which may include use of nongeneration resources capable of
providing this service, to satisfy its
Generator Imbalance Service obligation.
To the extent the Control Area operator
performs this service for the
Transmission Provider, charges to the
Transmission Customer are to reflect
only a pass-through of the costs charged
to the Transmission Provider by that
Control Area Operator. The
Transmission Provider may charge a
Transmission Customer a penalty for
either hourly generator imbalances
under this Schedule or a penalty for
hourly energy imbalances under
Schedule 4 for imbalances occurring
during the same hour, but not both
unless the imbalances aggravate rather
than offset each other.
The Transmission Provider shall
establish charges for generator
imbalance based on the deviation bands
as follows: (i) deviations within +/¥1.5
percent (with a minimum of 2 MW) of
the scheduled transaction to be applied
hourly to any generator imbalance that
occurs as a result of the Transmission
Customer’s scheduled transaction(s)
will be netted on a monthly basis and
settled financially, at the end of each
month, at 100 percent of incremental or
decremental cost, (ii) deviations greater
than +/¥1.5 percent up to 7.5 percent
(or greater than 2 MW up to 10 MW) of
the scheduled transaction to be applied
hourly to any generator imbalance that
occurs as a result of the Transmission
Customer’s scheduled transaction(s)
will be settled financially, at the end of
each month, at 110 percent of
incremental cost or 90 percent of
decremental cost, and (iii) deviations
greater than +/¥7.5 percent (or 10 MW)
of the scheduled transaction to be
applied hourly to any generator
imbalance that occurs as a result of the
Transmission Customer’s scheduled
transaction(s) will be settled at 125
percent of incremental cost or 75
percent of decremental cost, except that
an intermittent resource will be exempt
from this deviation band and will pay
the deviation band charges for all
deviations greater than the larger of 1.5
percent or 2 MW. An intermittent
resource, for the limited purpose of this
Schedule is an electric generator that is
not dispatchable and cannot store its
fuel source and therefore cannot
respond to changes in system demand
or respond to transmission security
constraints.
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
3140
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
1. Notwithstanding the foregoing,
deviations from scheduled transactions
in order to respond to directives by the
Transmission Provider, a balancing
authority, or a reliability coordinator
shall not be subject to the deviation
bands identified above and, instead,
shall be settled financially, at the end of
the month, at 100 percent of
incremental and decremental cost. Such
directives may include instructions to
correct frequency decay, respond to a
reserve sharing event, or change output
to relieve congestion.
2. For purposes of this Schedule,
incremental cost and decremental cost
represent the Transmission Provider’s
actual average hourly cost of the last 10
MW dispatched for any purpose, i.e., to
supply the Transmission Provider’s
Native Load Customers, correct
imbalances, or make off-system sales,
based on the replacement cost of fuel,
unit heat rates, start-up costs (including
any commitment and redispatch costs),
incremental operation and maintenance
costs, and purchased and interchange
power costs and taxes, as applicable.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Attachment A—Form of Service
Agreement For Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.0 This Service Agreement, dated
as of llll, is entered into, by and
between llll (the Transmission
Provider), and llll (‘‘Transmission
Customer’’).
2.0 The Transmission Customer has
been determined by the Transmission
Provider to have a Completed
Application for Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service under the Tariff.
3.0 The Transmission Customer has
provided to the Transmission Provider
an Application deposit in accordance
with the provisions of Section 17.3 of
the Tariff.
4.0 Service under this agreement
shall commence on the later of (1) the
requested service commencement date,
or (2) the date on which construction of
any Direct Assignment Facilities and/or
Network Upgrades are completed, or (3)
such other date as it is permitted to
become effective by the Commission.
Service under this agreement shall
terminate on such date as mutually
agreed upon by the parties.
5.0 The Transmission Provider
agrees to provide and the Transmission
Customer agrees to take and pay for
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service in accordance with the
provisions of Part II of the Tariff and
this Service Agreement.
6.0 Any notice or request made to or
by either Party regarding this Service
Agreement shall be made to the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
representative of the other Party as
indicated below.
Transmission Provider:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
Transmission Customer:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
7.0 The Tariff is incorporated herein
and made a part hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties
have caused this Service Agreement to
be executed by their respective
authorized officials.
Transmission Provider:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
Transmission Customer:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
Specifications for Long-Term Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service
1.0 Term of Transaction: llllll
Start Date: lllllllllllll
Termination Date: llllllllll
2.0 Description of capacity and energy
to be transmitted by Transmission Provider including the electric Control Area
in which the transaction originates. ll
llllllllllllllllll
l
3.0 Point(s) of Receipt: lllllll
Delivering Party: llllllllll
4.0 Point(s) of Delivery: llllll
Receiving Party:
llllllllll
5.0 Maximum amount of capacity and
energy to be transmitted (Reserved Capacity):
llllllllllllll
6.0 Designation of party(ies) subject to
reciprocal service obligation: lllll
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
7.0 Name(s) of any Intervening Systems providing transmission service: l
llllllllllllllllll
l
8.0 Service under this Agreement may
be subject to some combination of the
charges detailed below. (The
PO 00000
Frm 00158
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
appropriate charges for individual
transactions will be determined in
accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Tariff.)
8.1 Transmission Charge: llllll
llllllllllllllllll
l
8.2 System Impact and/or Facilities
Study Charge(s): llllllllll
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
8.3 Direct
Assignment
Facilities
Charge:
llllllllllllll
llllllllllllllllll
l
8.4 Ancillary Services Charges: lll
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
Attachment A–1—Form of Service
Agreement for the Resale,
Reassignment, or Transfer of Point-ToPoint Transmission Service
1.0 This Service Agreement, dated
as of llll, is entered into, by and
between llll (the Transmission
Provider), and llll (the Assignee).
2.0 The Assignee has been
determined by the Transmission
Provider to be an Eligible Customer
under the Tariff pursuant to which the
transmission service rights to be
transferred were originally obtained.
3.0 The terms and conditions for the
transaction entered into under this
Service Agreement shall be subject to
the terms and conditions of Part II of the
Transmission Provider’s Tariff, except
for those terms and conditions
negotiated by the Reseller of the
reassigned transmission capacity
(pursuant to Section 23.1 of this Tariff)
and the Assignee, to include: contract
effective and termination dates, the
amount of reassigned capacity or
energy, point(s) of receipt and delivery.
Changes by the Assignee to the
Reseller’s Points of Receipt and Points
of Delivery will be subject to the
provisions of Section 23.2 of this Tariff.
4.0 The Transmission Provider shall
credit the Reseller for the price reflected
in the Assignee’s Service Agreement or
the associated OASIS schedule.
5.0 Any notice or request made to or
by either Party regarding this Service
Agreement shall be made to the
representative of the other Party as
indicated below.
Transmission Provider:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
Assignee:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
6.0 The Tariff is incorporated herein
and made a part hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties
have caused this Service Agreement to
be executed by their respective
authorized officials.
Transmission Provider:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
Assignee:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
Specifications for the Resale,
Reassignment, or Transfer of Long-Term
Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service
1.0 Term of Transaction: llllll
Start Date: lllllllllllll
Termination Date: llllllllll
2.0 Description of capacity and energy
to be transmitted by Transmission Provider including the electric Control Area
in which the transaction originates. ll
llllllllllllllllll
l
3.0 Point(s) of Receipt: lllllll
Delivering Party: llllllllll
4.0 Point(s) of Delivery: llllll
Receiving Party:
llllllllll
5.0 Maximum amount of reassigned
capacity: llllllllllllll
6.0 Designation of party(ies) subject to
reciprocal service obligation: lllll
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
7.0 Name(s) of any Intervening Systems providing transmission service: l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
8.0 Service under this Agreement
may be subject to some combination of
the charges detailed below. (The
appropriate charges for individual
transactions will be determined in
accordance with the terms and
conditions of the Tariff.)
8.1 Transmission Charge: llllll
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
8.2 System Impact and/or Facilities
Study Charge(s): llllllllll
8.3 Direct
Assignment
Facilities
Charge:
llllllllllllll
8.4 Ancillary Services Charges: lll
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
9.0 Name of Reseller of the
reassigned transmission capacity:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Attachment B—Form of Service
Agreement for Non-Firm Point-To-Point
Transmission Service
1.0 This Service Agreement, dated
as of llll, is entered into, by and
between llll (the Transmission
Provider), and llll (Transmission
Customer).
2.0 The Transmission Customer has
been determined by the Transmission
Provider to be a Transmission Customer
under Part II of the Tariff and has filed
a Completed Application for Non-Firm
Point-To-Point Transmission Service in
accordance with Section 18.2 of the
Tariff.
3.0 Service under this Agreement
shall be provided by the Transmission
Provider upon request by an authorized
representative of the Transmission
Customer.
4.0 The Transmission Customer
agrees to supply information the
Transmission Provider deems
reasonably necessary in accordance
with Good Utility Practice in order for
it to provide the requested service.
5.0 The Transmission Provider
agrees to provide and the Transmission
Customer agrees to take and pay for
Non-Firm Point-To-Point Transmission
Service in accordance with the
provisions of Part II of the Tariff and
this Service Agreement.
6.0 Any notice or request made to or
by either Party regarding this Service
Agreement shall be made to the
representative of the other Party as
indicated below.
Transmission Provider:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
Transmission Customer:
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
llllllllllllllllll
l
7.0 The Tariff is incorporated herein
and made a part hereof.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Parties
have caused this Service Agreement to
PO 00000
Frm 00159
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3141
be executed by their respective
authorized officials.
Transmission Provider:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
Transmission Customer:
By:
llllllllllllllllll
l
Name
llllllllllllllllll
l
Title
llllllllllllllllll
l
Date
Attachment C—Methodology To Assess
Available Transfer Capability
The Transmission Provider must
include, at a minimum, the following
information concerning its ATC
calculation methodology:
(1) A detailed description of the
specific mathematical algorithm used to
calculate firm and non-firm ATC (and
AFC, if applicable) for its scheduling
horizon (same day and real-time),
operating horizon (day ahead and preschedule) and planning horizon (beyond
the operating horizon);
(2) A process flow diagram that
illustrates the various steps through
which ATC/AFC is calculated; and
(3) A detailed explanation of how
each of the ATC components is
calculated for both the operating and
planning horizons.
(a) For TTC, a Transmission Provider
shall: (i) Explain its definition of TTC;
(ii) explain its TTC calculation
methodology; (iii) list the databases
used in its TTC assessments; and (iv)
explain the assumptions used in its TTC
assessments regarding load levels,
generation dispatch, and modeling of
planned and contingency outages.
(b) For ETC, a transmission provider
shall explain: (i) Its definition of ETC;
(ii) the calculation methodology used to
determine the transmission capacity to
be set aside for native load (including
network load), and non-OATT
customers (including, if applicable, an
explanation of assumptions on the
selection of generators that are modeled
in service); (iii) how point-to-point
transmission service requests are
incorporated; (iv) how rollover rights
are accounted for; (v) its processes for
ensuring that non-firm capacity is
released properly (e.g., when real-time
schedules replace the associated
transmission service requests in its real-
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
3142
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
time calculations); and (vi) describe the
step-by-step modeling study
methodology and criteria for adding or
eliminating flowgates (permanent and
temporary).
(c) If a Transmission Provider uses an
AFC methodology to calculate ATC, it
shall: (i) Explain its definition of AFC;
(ii) explain its AFC calculation
methodology; (iii) explain its process for
converting AFC into ATC for OASIS
posting; (iv) list the databases used in its
AFC assessments; and (v) explain the
assumptions used in its AFC
assessments regarding load levels,
generation dispatch, and modeling of
planned and contingency outages.
(d) For TRM, a Transmission Provider
shall explain: (i) Its definition of TRM;
(ii) its TRM calculation methodology
(e.g., its assumptions on load forecast
errors, forecast errors in system topology
or distribution factors and loop flow
sources); (iii) the databases used in its
TRM assessments; (iv) the conditions
under which the transmission provider
uses TRM. A Transmission Provider that
does not set aside transfer capability for
TRM must so state.
(e) For CBM, the Transmission
Provider shall include a specific and
self-contained narrative explanation of
its CBM practice, including: (i) An
identification of the entity who
performs the resource adequacy analysis
for CBM determination; (ii) the
methodology used to perform generation
reliability assessments (e.g.,
probabilistic or deterministic); (iii) an
explanation of whether the assessment
method reflects a specific regional
practice; (iv) the assumptions used in
this assessment; and (v) the basis for the
selection of paths on which CBM is set
aside.
(f) In addition, for CBM, a
Transmission Provider shall: (i) Explain
its definition of CBM; (ii) list the
databases used in its CBM calculations;
and (iii) demonstrate that there is no
double-counting of contingency outages
when performing CBM, TTC, and TRM
calculations.
(g) The Transmission Provider shall
explain its procedures for allowing the
use of CBM during emergencies (with an
explanation of what constitutes an
emergency, the entities that are
permitted to use CBM during
emergencies and the procedures which
must be followed by the transmission
providers’ merchant function and other
load-serving entities when they need to
access CBM). If the Transmission
Provider’s practice is not to set aside
transfer capability for CBM, it shall so
state.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
Attachment D—Methodology for
Completing a System Impact Study
To be filed by the Transmission
Provider.
Attachment E—Index of Point-To-Point
Transmission Service Customers
Customer Date of Service Agreement
Attachment F—Service Agreement for
Network Integration Transmission
Service
To be filed by the Transmission
Provider.
Attachment G—Network Operating
Agreement
To be filed by the Transmission
Provider.
Attachment H—Annual Transmission
Revenue Requirement for Network
Integration Transmission Service
1. The Annual Transmission Revenue
Requirement for purposes of the
Network Integration Transmission
Service shall be lll.
2. The amount in (1) shall be effective
until amended by the Transmission
Provider or modified by the
Commission.
Attachment I—Index of Network
Integration Transmission Service
Customers
Customer Date of Service Agreement
Attachment J—Procedures for
Addressing Parallel Flows
To be filed by the Transmission
Provider.
Attachment K—Transmission Planning
Process
The Transmission Provider shall
establish a coordinated, open and
transparent planning process with its
Network and Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Customers and other
interested parties, including the
coordination of such planning with
interconnected systems within its
region, to ensure that the Transmission
System is planned to meet the needs of
both the Transmission Provider and its
Network and Firm Point-to-Point
Transmission Customers on a
comparable and nondiscriminatory
basis. The Transmission Provider’s
coordinated, open and transparent
planning process shall be provided as
an attachment to the Transmission
Provider’s Tariff.
The Transmission Provider’s planning
process shall satisfy the following nine
principles, as defined in the Final Rule
in Docket No. RM05–25–000:
coordination, openness, transparency,
information exchange, comparability,
PO 00000
Frm 00160
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
dispute resolution, regional
participation, economic planning
studies, and cost allocation for new
projects. The planning process shall also
provide a mechanism for the recovery
and allocation of planning costs
consistent with the Final Rule in Docket
No. RM05–25–000.
The Transmission Provider’s planning
process must include sufficient detail to
enable Transmission Customers to
understand:
(i) The process for consulting with
customers and neighboring transmission
providers;
(ii) The notice procedures and
anticipated frequency of meetings;
(iii) The methodology, criteria, and
processes used to develop transmission
plans;
(iv) The method of disclosure of
criteria, assumptions and data
underlying transmission system plans;
(v) The obligations of and methods for
customers to submit data to the
transmission provider;
(vi) The dispute resolution process;
(vii) The transmission provider’s
study procedures for economic upgrades
to address congestion or the integration
of new resources; and
(viii) The relevant cost allocation
procedures or principles.
Attachment L—Creditworthiness
Procedures
For the purpose of determining the
ability of the Transmission Customer to
meet its obligations related to service
hereunder, the Transmission Provider
may require reasonable credit review
procedures. This review shall be made
in accordance with standard
commercial practices and must specify
quantitative and qualitative criteria to
determine the level of secured and
unsecured credit.
The Transmission Provider may
require the Transmission Customer to
provide and maintain in effect during
the term of the Service Agreement, an
unconditional and irrevocable letter of
credit as security to meet its
responsibilities and obligations under
the Tariff, or an alternative form of
security proposed by the Transmission
Customer and acceptable to the
Transmission Provider and consistent
with commercial practices established
by the Uniform Commercial Code that
protects the Transmission Provider
against the risk of non-payment.
Additionally, the Transmission
Provider must include, at a minimum,
the following information concerning its
creditworthiness procedures:
(1) A summary of the procedure for
determining the level of secured and
unsecured credit;
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 / Rules and Regulations
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES2
(2) A list of the acceptable types of
collateral/security;
(3) A procedure for providing
customers with reasonable notice of
changes in credit levels and collateral
requirements;
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:36 Jan 15, 2008
Jkt 214001
(4) A procedure for providing
customers, upon request, a written
explanation for any change in credit
levels or collateral requirements;
(5) A reasonable opportunity to
contest determinations of credit levels
or collateral requirements; and
PO 00000
Frm 00161
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4700
3143
(6) A reasonable opportunity to post
additional collateral, including curing
any non-creditworthy determination.
[FR Doc. E8–144 Filed 1–15–08; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
E:\FR\FM\16JAR2.SGM
16JAR2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 73, Number 11 (Wednesday, January 16, 2008)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 2984-3143]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E8-144]
[[Page 2983]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part II
Department of Energy
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
18 CFR Part 37
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service;
Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 73, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 16, 2008 /
Rules and Regulations
[[Page 2984]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
18 CFR Part 37
[Docket Nos. RM05-17-001, 002 and RM05-25-001, 002; Order No. 890-A]
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service
Issued December 28, 2007.
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, DOE.
ACTION: Order on rehearing and clarification.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission affirms its basic
determinations in Order No. 890, granting rehearing and clarification
regarding certain revisions to its regulations and the pro forma open-
access transmission tariff, or OATT, adopted in Order Nos. 888 and 889
to ensure that transmission services are provided on a basis that is
just, reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory. The reforms affirmed
in this order are designed to: (1) Strengthen the pro forma OATT to
ensure that it achieves its original purpose of remedying undue
discrimination; (2) provide greater specificity to reduce opportunities
for undue discrimination and facilitate the Commission's enforcement;
and (3) increase transparency in the rules applicable to planning and
use of the transmission system.
DATES: Effective Date: This rule will become effective March 17, 2008.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
W. Mason Emnett (Legal Information), Office of the General
Counsel--Energy Markets, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888
First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6540.
Daniel Hedberg (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market
Regulation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street,
NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6243.
Tony Ingram (Technical Information), Office of Energy Market
Regulation, 888 First Street, NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-
8938.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Table of Contents
I. Introduction
II. Need for and Applicability of Order No. 888
A. The Need for Reform
B. Core Elements of Order No. 888 That Are Retained
C. Scope and Applicability of Order No. 890
III. Reforms of the OATT
A. Consistency and Transparency of ATC Calculations
B. Coordinated, Open, and Transparent Planning
C. Transmission Pricing
1. Energy and Generation Imbalances
2. Credits for Network Customers
3. Capacity Reassignment
4. ``Operational'' Penalties
5. ``Higher of'' Pricing Policy
6. Other Ancillary Services
D. Non-Rate Terms and Conditions
1. Modifications to Long-Term Firm Point-to-Point Service
2. Rollover Rights
3. Modification of Receipt or Delivery Points
4. Acquisition of Transmission Service
5. Designation of Network Resources
6. Clarifications Related to Network Service
7. Transmission Curtailments
8. Standardization of Rules and Practices
9. OATT Definitions
E. Enforcement
IV. Information Collection Statement
V. Document Availability
VI. Effective Date and Congressional Notification
Regulatory Text
Appendix A: Petitioner Acronyms
Appendix B: Post-Technical Conference Commenter Acronyms
Appendix C: Pro Forma Open Access Transmission Tariff
Before Commissioners: Joseph T. Kelliher, Chairman; Suedeen G.
Kelly, Marc Spitzer, Philip D. Moeller, and Jon Wellinghoff.
I. Introduction
1. On February 16, 2007, the Commission issued Order No. 890,\1\
addressing and remedying opportunities for undue discrimination under
the pro forma Open Access Transmission Tariff (OATT) adopted in Order
No. 888.\2\ The pro forma OATT was intended to foster greater
competition in wholesale power markets by reducing barriers to entry in
the provision of transmission service. In the ten years since Order No.
888, however, flaws in the pro forma OATT undermined its ability to
realize the core objective of remedying undue discrimination. The
Commission acted in Order No. 890 to correct these flaws by reforming
the terms and conditions of the pro forma OATT in several critical
areas, including the calculation of available transfer capability
(ATC), the planning of transmission facilities, and the conditions of
services offered by each transmission provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Order No. 890, 72 FR 12,266 (March 15, 2007),
FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 31,241 (2007) (Order No. 890).
\2\ Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-
discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery
of Stranded Costs by Public Utilities and Transmitting Utilities,
Order No. 888, 61 FR 21540 (May 10, 1996), FERC Stats. & Regs. ]
31,036 (1996), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-B, 81 FERC ] 61,248
(1997), order on reh'g, Order No. 888-C, 82 FERC ] 61,046 (1998),
aff'd in relevant part sub nom. Transmission Access Policy Study
Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (TAPS v. FERC), aff'd
sub nom. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Many have expressed support of the Commission's reforms. Greater
specificity regarding the transmission provider's obligations under its
OATT will reduce opportunities for the exercise of undue
discrimination, make undue discrimination easier to detect, and
facilitate the Commission's enforcement of the tariff. Greater
transparency in the rules applicable to the planning and use of the
transmission system will help both transmission providers and customers
comply with applicable tariff requirements. Although we grant rehearing
and clarification below to address certain implementation issues raised
by petitioners, we leave in place the fundamental reforms adopted in
Order No. 890.
3. At the outset, we note that work is well underway to develop
consistent practices governing the calculation of ATC, in coordination
with the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) and the
North American Energy Standards Board (NAESB). Eliminating the broad
discretion that transmission providers currently have in calculating
ATC will increase nondiscriminatory access to the grid and ensure that
customers are treated fairly in seeking alternative power supplies. We
commend transmission providers for the substantial resources they have
dedicated to this process and NERC and NAESB for their leadership in
guiding the standardization effort.
4. We also commend transmission providers for the substantial
resources dedicated to the development of transmission planning
processes in response to Order No. 890. Transmission providers and
stakeholders recently submitted tariff proposals that will govern
transmission planning under the pro forma OATT. Transmission planning
is critical because it is the means by which customers consider and
access new sources of energy and have an opportunity to explore the
feasibility of non-transmission alternatives. It is therefore vital for
each transmission provider to open its transmission planning process to
customers, coordinate with customers regarding future system plans, and
share necessary planning information with customers.
[[Page 2985]]
5. In addition, transmission providers have implemented new service
options for long-term firm point-to-point customers and adopted
modifications to other services. Instead of denying a long-term request
for point-to-point service because as little as one hour of service is
unavailable, transmission providers must now consider their ability to
offer a modified form of planning redispatch or a new conditional firm
option to accommodate the request. This increases opportunities to
efficiently utilize transmission by eliminating artificial barriers to
use of the grid. Charges for energy and generation imbalances also have
been standardized, including relaxed penalties for intermittent
resources. This standardization reduces the potential for undue
discrimination, increases transparency, and reduces confusion in the
industry that resulted from the prior lack of consistency.
6. Taken together, these and other reforms adopted in Order No. 890
will better enable the pro forma OATT to achieve the core object of
remedying undue discrimination in the provision of transmission
service. The Commission therefore rejects requests to eliminate, or
substantially modify, the various reforms adopted in Order No. 890.\3\
We address each of the arguments made by petitioners in turn. We also
address comments received in response to the technical conference held
by Commission staff on July 30, 2007, regarding certain issues related
to the designation and termination of network resources, in section
III.D.5.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ A list of petitioners filing requests for rehearing and/or
clarification is provided in Appendix A. The requests for rehearing
filed by American Transmission, Bonneville, EPSA, Pacific Northwest
Parties, and REPIO are deficient because they fail to include a
Statement of Issues section separate from the arguments made, as
required by Rule 713 of the Commission's Rules of Practice and
Procedure. See 18 CFR 385.713(c)(2). Consistent with Rule 713, we
deem these petitioners to have waived the particular issues for
which they seek rehearing. We also reject TranServ's request for
rehearing for having been filed late, in violation of section 313(a)
of the Federal Power Act (FPA). See 16 U.S.C. 8351(a). The
Commission does consider, however, these petitioners' requests for
clarification, to the extent they are not in fact requests for
rehearing. We also address the merits of each request for rehearing
to demonstrate that, had they been considered, our decision would be
unchanged.
\4\ A list of parties filing comments in response to the July
30, 2007 technical conference is provided in Appendix B.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II. Need for and Applicability of Order No. 888
A. The Need for Reform
7. As the Commission noted in Order No. 888, it is in the economic
self-interest of transmission monopolists to deny transmission to
competitors or to offer transmission on a basis that is inferior to
that which they provide themselves.\5\ The Commission sought to remedy
that potential for discrimination through adoption of the pro forma
OATT in Order No. 888. Despite the many accomplishments of Order No.
888, the Commission determined in Order No. 890 that the existing pro
forma OATT continued to allow transmission providers substantial
discretion in implementing some of its basic requirements. This
discretion, in turn, created substantial opportunities for undue
discrimination. Order No. 890 reformed the pro forma OATT to limit
opportunities for undue discrimination and promote efficient use of the
grid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Order No. 888 at 31,682.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
8. In Order No. 890, the Commission rejected arguments that it was
relying on unsubstantiated allegations of discriminatory conduct to
justify its reforms. Although certain commenters did allege
discriminatory conduct in response to the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NOPR) initiating this proceeding,\6\ the Commission made clear that it
was not making specific factual findings of discrimination and that
such specific findings were not required in order for it to promulgate
a generic rule to eliminate undue discrimination.\7\ The Commission
explained that it had ample grounds to act as necessary to limit
opportunities for undue discrimination that continue to exist under the
pro forma OATT.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 71 FR 32,636
(Jun. 6, 2006), FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 32,603 (2006) (NOPR).
\7\ See Order No. 890 at P 41 (citing Transmission Access Policy
Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667 (D.C. Cir. 2000), aff'd sub nom.,
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002); National Fuel Gas Supply Corp
v. FERC, 468 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
9. Many petitioners agree with the Commission on rehearing that
reforms to the pro forma OATT are needed because there continues to be
both the opportunity and incentive for transmission providers to engage
in undue discrimination.\8\ Two petitioners, however, seek rehearing of
that finding as sufficient justification for adopting the reforms set
forth in Order No. 890.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ See e.g., Constellation, MISO, NRECA, Powerex, PSEG, and
TAPS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
10. E.ON U.S. argues that the Commission has not presented any
actual evidence of discrimination or opportunities for undue
discrimination. Without actual evidence of discrimination, E.ON U.S.
argues that the Commission lacks reasoned support for its finding that
the reforms adopted in Order No. 890 are necessary to remedy undue
discrimination. E.ON U.S. states a particular concern for the cost of
implementing these reforms. E.ON U.S. contends that, absent evidence of
unduly discriminatory behavior, the burdensome nature of compliance
with Order No. 890 outweighs the benefits of its reforms.
11. Southern expresses similar concern that Order No. 890 lacks
actual findings of discrimination. Southern claims that the theoretical
claims of discrimination relied upon by the Commission are attenuated
and inconsistent with statements discouraging commenters from making
sweeping generalizations regarding undue discrimination. Rather than
predicating Order No. 890 on the Commission's authority to prevent
undue discrimination, Southern suggests that the Commission clarify
that it is promulgating these reforms pursuant to its authority to
ensure just and reasonable rates and not to prevent undue
discrimination.
12. Southern also argues that the Commission failed to acknowledge
other legal requirements and processes adopted after issuance of Order
No. 888 that mitigate a transmission provider's incentives to
discriminate, such as the Standards of Conduct, enforcement audits, new
civil penalty authority, and mandatory reliability standards. Southern
contends that transmission providers have a pecuniary incentive to
grant, rather than deny, customer requests since doing so provides
additional OATT revenues. Southern argues that the Commission appears
to equate discretion with opportunities for discrimination, yet in
certain circumstances expressly acknowledges that the transmission
provider retains discretion in certain activities.
Commission Determination
13. The Commission concluded in Order No. 890 that reforms to the
pro forma OATT were necessary to address remaining opportunities for
undue discrimination by transmission providers. Despite the efforts of
Order No. 888 and our subsequent reforms, including those cited by
Southern, opportunities for undue discrimination continued to exist.
Under section 206 of the FPA, the Commission has a continuing
obligation to ``determine whether any rule, regulation, practice or
contract affecting rates for such transmission or sale for resale is
unduly discriminatory or preferential, and must prevent those contracts
and practices
[[Page 2986]]
that do no meet this standard.'' \9\ The Commission's finding that
continuing opportunities to discriminate exist therefore supports our
action under FPA section 206 to adopt changes to the pro forma OATT.
Upon review of the extensive record of this proceeding, including the
support of a vast majority of commenters, the Commission remains
convinced that the particular reforms adopted in Order No. 890 are
appropriate to satisfy our obligation to remedy undue discrimination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Order No. 888 at 31,669.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
14. We reject E.ON U.S.' arguments that, without actual evidence of
undue discrimination, Order No. 890 lacks reasoned support. As the
Commission explained in Order No. 890, the courts have made clear that
the Commission need not make specific factual findings of
discrimination in order to promulgate a generic rule to eliminate undue
discrimination. In Associated Gas Distributors v. FERC, the D.C.
Circuit Court explained that the promulgation of generic rate criteria
involves the determination of policy goals and the selection of the
means to achieve them.\10\ The court concluded that, just as courts do
not insist on empirical data for every proposition upon which the
selection depends, ``[a]gencies do not need to conduct experiments in
order to rely on the prediction that an unsupported stone will fall.''
\11\ The Commission exercised this authority in Order No. 890,
discussing with particularity the concerns motivating each of the
reforms adopted. As it did in Order No. 888, the Commission properly
acted to limit continuing opportunities for undue discrimination, not
to remedy actual instances of undue discrimination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
\11\ Id. at 1008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
15. We acknowledge, as argued by Southern, that it is appropriate
for transmission providers to retain discretion in some areas and that
such discretion does not necessarily equate to discrimination. It is
also true that some OATT revenues may increase as requests for service
are granted (such as for point-to-point requests), rather than denied.
This is not always or even predominantly the case, however, given that
rates for network service are based on load-ratio shares and revenues
do not increase with designations of network resources unless new
facilities are constructed. Moreover, there are competing incentives
for a transmission provider to deny or restrict service to customers in
certain circumstances and allowing broad discretion in such areas is no
longer appropriate. The Commission identified these areas in Order No.
890, including the calculation of ATC, planning for transmission needs,
and the provision of certain transmission services, and acted to remedy
potential discrimination in each area. Notwithstanding the other legal
requirements and processes cited by Southern, the Commission concluded
in Order No. 890 that the reforms adopted were necessary based on a
decade of experience administering the pro forma OATT. While the
Standards of Conduct, audit procedures, and enhanced authority under
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005) \12\ have aided the
Commission in fulfilling its obligations under the FPA, the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890 are also necessary to reduce opportunities for
the exercise of undue discrimination, make undue discrimination easier
to detect, and facilitate the Commission's enforcement of the open
access requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Pub. L. No. 109-58, 119 Stat. 594 (to be codified in
scattered titles of the U.S.C.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
16. We appreciate that a significant amount of resources must be
dedicated to implementation of the reforms adopted in Order No. 890 by
transmission providers. We believe the burden of implementing these
reforms is fully justified by the need to eliminate remaining
opportunities for undue discrimination in the administration and
implementation of open access requirements under the pro forma OATT. We
note, moreover, that these reforms will benefit transmission providers
seeking to comply with our regulations in good faith by providing more
clarity regarding the requirements of the pro forma OATT previously
left open to interpretation, thereby decreasing the possibility of
disputes with transmission customers and enforcement actions by the
Commission. The ability of transmission customers to misuse the tariffs
to their own advantage, particularly in the scheduling process, has
similarly been addressed. Taken together, we conclude that the benefits
of our reforms outweigh the associated costs of implementation.
B. Core Elements of Order No. 888 That Are Retained
17. Although Order No. 890 introduced many important reforms, the
Commission also retained many core elements from Order No. 888. As
noted in the NOPR, many provisions of Order No. 888 enjoy broad support
from many sectors of the industry and the Commission did not intend in
this proceeding to pursue the same level of industry restructuring
undertaken there. Rather, the Commission intended Order No. 890 to
strengthen the pro forma OATT while retaining the fundamental structure
articulated in Order No. 888.
18. The Commission thus retained the existing boundaries between
wholesale and retail service drawn in Order No. 888. The Commission
also retained the native load priority established in Order No. 888.
The Commission stated that this priority continues to strike the
appropriate balance between the transmission provider's need to meet
its native load obligations and the needs of other entities to obtain
service from the transmission provider to meet their own obligations.
Order No. 890 also did not alter the types of services required under
Order No. 888, i.e., network service and point-to-point service.
Finally, the Commission retained the functional unbundling requirement
promulgated in Order No. 888.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
19. South Carolina E&G objects to the Commission's decision to
retain the native load priority established in Order No. 888, arguing
that FPA section 217 requires further protection for native load
service. South Carolina E&G states that the native load priority
adopted under Order No. 888 was implemented so that all customers,
native load and non-native load, would be entitled to equivalent,
nondiscriminatory service.\13\ South Carolina E&G argues that FPA
section 217(k) now entitles load-serving entities (LSEs) to use their
transmission systems to meet their state-law imposed native load
service obligations and that this entitlement can no longer be deemed
discriminatory under the FPA. To the extent an OATT provision
compromising native load service is grounded in a finding of undue
discrimination, South Carolina E&G argues that it must yield to the
need to meet native load service obligations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co., 114 FERC ] 61,282 at P
125 (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
20. Joined by South Carolina Regulatory Staff, South Carolina E&G
objects in particular to the Commission's decision to retain equal
curtailment priority for all firm service.\14\ These petitioners argue
that requiring transmission providers to curtail service to network and
point-to-point customers on a basis comparable to the curtailment of
service to native load customers unfairly exalts non-native customers
at the expense of the
[[Page 2987]]
native load that financed the transmission system. They also contend
the Commission's decision is inconsistent with Northern States Power
Co. v. FERC,\15\ which they argue prohibits mandating comparable
curtailment priority among native load and non-native load services in
the face of a state commission edict requiring a transmission provider
to give its native load top curtailment priority. In their view, this
precedent must be read broadly in light of enactment of FPA section
217(k), which they contend peremptorily counters any argument that
priority for native load would be discriminatory.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ South Carolina E&G and South Carolina Regulatory Staff also
argue that reforms related to planning redispatch and conditional
firm, rollover rights, and capacity reassignment are in violation of
FPA section 217. We address those arguments in sections III.D.1,
III.D.2, and III.C.3 respectively.
\15\ 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
21. E.ON LSE similarly argues that FPA section 217 categorically
protects an LSE's use of firm transmission service to the extent that
such transmission service is required to meet the LSE's service
obligation. E.ON LSE asks the Commission to allow LSEs to deviate from
the requirements of Order No. 890 in circumstances where, in the LSE's
good faith judgment, compliance would adversely affect the provision of
firm transmission service to native load protected by FPA section 217.
22. TDU Systems request clarification or rehearing to confirm that
there is no preference under the reformed pro forma OATT for a public
utility transmission provider's native load over the service
obligations of other LSEs that use their transmission system. TDU
Systems argue that section 217(a) of the FPA does not distinguish
between the service obligations of transmission providers and the
service obligations of their load serving customers and, therefore,
neither should the pro forma OATT.
Commission Determination
23. The Commission affirms the decision to retain the native load
protections embodied in Order No. 888, as enhanced by the reforms
adopted in Order No. 890. In Order No. 888, the Commission gave public
utilities the right to reserve existing transmission capacity needed
for native load growth reasonably forecasted within the utility's
current planning horizon.\16\ The Commission also allowed transmission
providers to restrict rollover rights based on reasonably forecasted
need at the time the contract is executed.\17\ Contrary to petitioner's
assertions, the native load protections affirmed in Order No. 890
satisfy the requirements of FPA section 217. Section 217 applies not
only to distribution utilities providing service to end-users, but also
to electric utilities with long-term contracts to provide service to a
distribution utility.\18\ Congress placed each of these types of
customers on equal footing, regardless of their status as a network or
firm point-to-point customer under the pro forma OATT or a transmission
provider serving its native load. We therefore disagree with
petitioners that section 217 requires the Commission to give top
curtailment priority solely to network customers or the transmission
provider serving native load.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See Order No. 888 at 31,394.
\17\ See id. at 31,745.
\18\ See EPAct 2005 sec. 1233(a)(3) (to be codified at section
217(a)(3) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824q(a)(3)). Petitioners' reliance
on Northern States Power Co. v. FERC, 176 F.3d 1090 (8th Cir. 1999),
is therefore misplaced. As the Commission has explained, the court
upheld our authority to require pro rata curtailment of both
network/native load and firm point-to-point service except in the
limited circumstance when it would require the shedding of bundled
retail load. Indeed, FPA section 217 could be read to grant electric
utilities with long-term contracts to provide service to a
distribution utility equal curtailment priority with other LSEs even
in that limited situation, although we decline to address that
argument here as it has not been raised on rehearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
24. We decline to allow LSEs to deviate from the requirements of
the pro forma OATT as they believe necessary to serve their native
load, as suggested by E.ON LSE. Section 217 is intended to facilitate
the ability of all utilities using firm transmission to meet their
long-term service obligations, which the statute defines broadly to
include not only service to end-users, but also distribution utilities
serving end-users.\19\ The requirements of the pro forma OATT and the
reforms adopted in Order No. 890 appropriately balance the needs of
these various classes of transmission customers, including the
transmission provider's native load, LSE customers serving network
load, and other firm users of the system. This is entirely consistent
with, if not expressly required by, FPA section 217.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See EPAct 2005 sec 1233(a) (to be codified at section
217(a) of the FPA, 16 U.S.C. 824q(a)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
C. Scope and Applicability of Order No. 890
25. The reforms adopted in Order No. 890 apply to all transmission
providers, including Commission-approved regional transmission
organizations (RTOs) and independent system operators (ISOs), and non-
public utility transmission providers with reciprocity obligations. The
particular process for implementing certain of the reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 varied depending on the type of transmission provider at
issue.
26. For those transmission providers that have not been approved as
ISOs or RTOs, and whose facilities are not under the control or within
the footprint of an ISO or RTO, Order No. 890 established a two-tiered
compliance process for adopting the non-rate terms and conditions of
the revised pro forma OATT. These transmission providers were directed
to submit FPA section 206 compliance filings that contain the revised
non-rate terms and conditions of the revised pro forma OATT within 60
days after publication of the order in the Federal Register.\20\ Any of
these transmission providers that wished to retain a previously-
approved variation from the Order No. 888 pro forma OATT that was
substantively affected by a reform adopted in Order No. 890 were
directed to submit, within 30 days after publication of Order No. 890
in the Federal Register, a request under FPA section 205 to retain
those previously-approved variations, provided they continued to be
consistent with or superior to the revised pro forma OATT adopted in
Order No. 890.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ The Commission subsequently extended by 60 days the date on
which the reforms adopted in Order No. 890 would have otherwise been
effective. See Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in
Transmission Service, 119 FERC ] 61,037 (2007) (April 11 Order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
27. ISO and RTO transmission providers were directed to submit FPA
section 206 compliance filings, within 210 days after the publication
of Order No. 890 in the Federal Register, that contain the non-rate
terms and conditions set forth in Order No. 890 or that demonstrate
that their existing tariff provisions are consistent with or superior
to the revised provisions of the pro forma OATT. Transmission-owning
members of ISOs and RTOs, and non-ISO/RTO transmission providers within
the footprint of an ISO or RTO, were similarly directed to make any
necessary tariff filings within 210 days of its publication in the
Federal Register.
28. With regard to non-public utility transmission providers, the
Commission retained the reciprocity language of the Order No. 888 pro
forma OATT with a few modifications. First, the Commission updated the
language to contain references to ISOs and RTOs, requiring transmission
customers that are members of, or that take service from, an ISO/RTO to
make comparable service available to other members of the ISO/RTO. As
proposed in the NOPR, the Commission did not adopt a generic rule to
implement FPA section 211A, which allows the Commission to require an
unregulated transmitting utility to provide transmission services at
rates that are comparable to those it charges itself and under non-rate
terms and
[[Page 2988]]
conditions that are comparable to those it applies to itself, and are
not unduly discriminatory or preferential. The Commission instead
explained that it would follow a case-by-case approach to implementing
FPA section 211A.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
29. Few petitioners question the applicability of Order No. 890,
although some are concerned with the timing of the compliance actions
required by the Commission. Southern asks the Commission to grant
rehearing and extend the initial compliance deadlines by 60 days and to
remain open to further requests for extension if the deadlines set
forth in Order No. 890 cannot be met. MidAmerican asks the Commission
to extend the effective date for the revisions to the pro forma OATT to
the first day of the month following the effective date of these
reforms. MidAmerican contends that it will be burdensome for
transmission providers and confusing to transmission customers to
implement the reforms adopted in Order No. 890 in the middle of a
billing cycle.
30. TDU Systems express concern with the burden of reviewing
section 205 filings by transmission providers seeking a determination
from the Commission that a previously-approved variation from Order No.
888 continues to be consistent with or superior to the revised pro
forma OATT. TDU Systems contend that reviewing and evaluating these
filings will be a large and time-consuming process. TDU Systems ask the
Commission to allow transmission customers 45 days to perform their own
evaluation and comment upon these filings, while retaining a 90-day
deadline for the Commission to process the filings. Alternatively, TDU
Systems request rehearing of the Commission's decision not to stagger
the due dates for the various compliance filings required in Order No.
890.
31. Although they recognize that Order No. 890 preserves existing
waivers of the obligations to file an OATT, Unitil and Alcoa seek
explicit confirmation that their waivers of the obligation to maintain
an Open Access Same-Time Information System (OASIS) site are still
valid. Unitil notes that the Commission has found that it does not
operate or control an interstate transmission grid.\21\ In addition,
Unitil states that it voluntarily offers relevant information to ISO-NE
for posting on its OASIS Web site. Similarly, Alcoa notes that the
Commission has granted waiver of OASIS requirements to its Long Sault
division, which owns five transmission lines in northern New York
connecting Alcoa to its electric energy suppliers.\22\ Thus, Unitil and
Alcoa seek confirmation that the Commission did not intend the OASIS
requirements outlined in Order No. 890 to apply to their operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Citing Northern States Power Co., 76 FERC ] 61,250 at
62,297 (2002).
\22\ Citing Alcoa Power Generating, Inc. (Long Sault Division),
116 FERC ] 61,257 (2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
32. NRECA requests clarification, or in the alternative rehearing,
that the Commission did not intend in Order No. 890 to extend
reciprocity obligations beyond transmission owning members of an ISO or
RTO. NRECA contends that the Commission's modification to the pro forma
OATT creates ambiguity by imposing the reciprocity obligation for all
``members'' of an ISO or RTO. NRECA points out that some members of
ISOs and RTOs do not own transmission, such as transmission dependent
utilities, state regulatory authorities and eligible end-use customers.
NRECA argues that expanding the reciprocity obligation to require non-
public utility transmission providers to provide service to non-
transmission owning members of an ISO or RTO would contradict
Commission precedent \23\ and be unsupported by the record in this
proceeding.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Citing American Transmission Co. LLC, 95 FERC ] 61,387
(2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
33. WSPP requests that the Commission establish a date by which it
must submit a compliance filing containing the non-rate terms and
conditions of the revised pro forma OATT. WSPP states that it is
neither a transmission provider nor an RTO/ISO and, instead, only has a
limited open access transmission tariff on file with the Commission.
WSPP states that this tariff only applies to its transmission-owning
members that do not otherwise have an OATT.
Commission Determination
34. In the April 11 Order, the Commission granted requests by EEI
and others to extend by 60 days the date by which transmissions
providers outside of ISO/RTO regions would have to submit compliance
filings containing the non-rate terms and conditions of the revised pro
forma OATT.\24\ Southern's request for rehearing on this point is
therefore moot. Similarly, we reject as unnecessary TDU Systems'
request to allow transmission customers additional time to evaluate and
comment upon compliance filings. These filings have already been made,
comments have been filed, and in many cases orders addressing the
filings have been issued.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ April 11 Order at P 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
35. The Commission also determined in the April 11 Order that it
would be reasonable for a transmission provider to request that the
imbalance-related provisions in Schedule 4 and Schedule 9 of the pro
forma OATT be made effective on the first day of the billing cycle
following the effectiveness of the underlying imbalance-related
reforms.\25\ MidAmerican does not explain or otherwise justify the need
to delay the effectiveness of any other reforms until the following
billing cycle. We therefore reject as moot MidAmerican's request to
extend the effective date of the imbalance-related reforms adopted in
Order No. 890 until the following billing cycle and reject as
unsupported its request to extend the effective date of all other
reforms adopted in Order No. 890.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Id. at P 22.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
36. The Commission made clear in Order No. 890 that the reforms
therein were not intended to disturb any existing waivers of the
obligation to file an OATT or otherwise offer open access transmission
service.\26\ The criteria for waiver of Order No. 890, moreover,
remains unchanged from that used to evaluate the requests for waiver
under Order Nos. 888 and 889. Revocation of any waivers will continued
to be considered on a case-by-case basis in response to concerns raised
by interested parties. We clarify that this applies equally to existing
waivers of Order No. 889 and requirements to maintain an OASIS site.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See Order No. 890 at P 135, n.105.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
37. We grant rehearing, in response to NRECA, to revise section 6
of the pro forma OATT to require a customer that is a member of or that
takes service from an RTO or ISO to provide comparable service, to the
extent it owns transmission facilities, only to the transmission-owning
members of the RTO or ISO. The Commission has expressed concern in the
past that failure to grant reciprocity to transmission-owning members
of an RTO or ISO would cause those members to lose the right to
reciprocity solely as a result of participating in the RTO or ISO.\27\
We did not intend to expand that obligation in Order No. 890 to other
members of an RTO or ISO when revising the language of section 6 of the
pro forma OATT to refer to RTOs and ISOs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ See American Transmission Company LLC, 93 FERC ] 61,267 at
61,858-59 (2000), reh'g denied, 95 FERC ] 61,387 at 62,446 (2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
38. Below the Commission adopts various other revisions to the pro
forma OATT in response to requests for rehearing and clarification.
These revisions do not disturb the
[[Page 2989]]
fundamental nature of the reforms adopted in Order No. 890 and, thus,
we do not anticipate any difficulty in their implementation or
disruption in on-going compliance efforts. We direct transmission
providers that have not been approved as RTOs or ISOs, and whose
facilities are not in the footprint of an RTO or ISO, to submit an FPA
section 206 filing that contains the revised non-rate terms and
conditions of the pro forma OATT stated in Appendix C within 60 days of
publication of this order in the Federal Register. We direct RTO and
ISO transmission providers, transmission providers whose facilities are
in the footprint of an RTO or ISO, and WSPP to submit an FPA section
206 filing that contains the revised non-rate terms and conditions of
the pro forma OATT as stated within Appendix C within 90 days of
publication of this order in the Federal Register.
III. Reforms of the OATT
A. Consistency and Transparency of ATC Calculations
39. In Order No. 890, the Commission concluded that the lack of
consistency and transparency in the methodology for calculating ATC
creates the potential for undue discrimination in the provision of open
access transmission service. To remedy this lack of consistency and
transparency, the Commission directed public utilities, working through
the NERC reliability standards and NAESB business practices development
processes, to produce workable solutions to implement the ATC-related
reforms adopted by the Commission. A number of petitioners seek
rehearing and/or clarification regarding the Commission's ATC-related
rulings, which we address below.
1. Consistency
a. Necessary Degree of Consistency
40. The Commission required industry-wide consistency of all ATC
components \28\ and certain definitions, data inputs, data exchange,
and modeling assumptions in order to reduce the potential for undue
discrimination in the provision of transmission service. Although the
Commission concluded that the number of industry-wide ATC calculation
formulas should be few in number, it did not require that a single ATC
calculation methodology be applied by all transmission providers. The
Commission found that it is not the methodologies for calculating ATC
that create the opportunity for undue discrimination, rather the
variability in the calculation of the components of ATC and the lack of
a detailed description of the ATC calculation methodology and
underlying assumptions used by the transmission provider.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ The ATC components are total transfer capability (TTC),
existing transmission commitments (ETC), capacity benefit margin
(CBM), and transmission reserve margin (TRM).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
41. The Commission noted that NERC was then in the process of
developing standards for three ATC calculation methodologies: contract
or rated path ATC, network ATC, and network Available Flowgate Capacity
(AFC). The Commission concluded that, if all of the ATC components and
certain data inputs and assumptions are consistent, the use of the
three ATC calculation methodologies included in reliability standards
being developed would be acceptable. With regard to network AFC, the
Commission specifically directed public utilities, working through
NERC, to develop an AFC definition and requirements used to identify a
particular set of transmission facilities as a flowgate. However, the
Commission reminded transmission providers that our regulations require
the posting of ATC values associated with a particular path, not AFC
values associated with a flowgate. The Commission therefore directed
public utilities, working through NERC, to develop in the MOD-001
standard a rule to convert AFC into ATC values to be posted by
transmission providers that currently use the flowgate methodology.
42. The Commission also required further clarification regarding
the calculation algorithms for firm and non-firm ATC. The Commission
directed public utilities, working through NERC, to modify related ATC
standards by implementing the following principles: (1) For firm ATC
calculations, the transmission provider shall account only for firm
commitments; and (2) for non-firm ATC calculations, the transmission
provider shall account for both firm and non-firm commitments,
postbacks of redirected services, unscheduled service, and
counterflows.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
43. Southern requests that the Commission clarify that consistency
in ATC methodologies and CBM and TRM calculations must not take
precedence over reliability and that some transmission provider
discretion is necessary. Southern states that, in several places, Order
No. 890 discusses minimizing transmission provider discretion in order
to achieve consistency.\29\ Southern contends that totally eliminating
this discretion would not allow transmission providers to address
unique system conditions in ATC, CBM, and TRM calculations, which would
impact system reliability. Southern claims that eliminating
transmission provider discretion also would lead to more conservative
modeling, which would likely result in understated amounts of ATC and
an inefficient use of the system.\30\ To the extent making the
treatment of certain ATC parameters or CBM or TRM calculations
consistent would affect reliability, Southern asks that transparency in
the treatment of those parameters and calculations be required, but
that strict consistency not be enforced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Citing Order No. 890 at P 207.
\30\ Southern suggests that one example of when a transmission
provider should have discretion is when modeling long-term firm
transmission service reservation from a combustion turbine
generating facility. Southern argues that, by its nature, such a
generating facility normally will not often run in off-peak times.
During those times, or when there is an impending outage of a
generating facility, Southern argues that the transmission provider
should have the discretion to reflect the operating characteristics
of the generating facility by not including transmission service
from the facility in its model.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
44. MidAmerican requests clarification that AFC quantities do not
need to be converted into control area-to-control area path ATC
quantities and that the Commission is not eliminating the coordination
of individual transmission provider service with seams agreements and/
or regional tariff service on flowgates. MidAmerican asks the
Commission to confirm that it is merely intending to require NERC to
define a flowgate ATC quantity which is equal to or related to the
flowgate AFC. MidAmerican contends that transmission customers,
operators, and owners will not benefit from the conversion of flowgate
AFCs into control area-to-control area path ATCs, the elimination of
AFC as a useful transmission commodity, or the elimination of the
coordination of individual provider and regional transmission service
over flowgates. To the extent the Commission feels there is a
comparability benefit for the conversion of AFC to ATC, MidAmerican
requests clarification that providing transmission customers with a
mechanism on OASIS to query/assess the effective ATC on a specific
transmission path over a specific time is sufficient for compliance
with the transmission provider's ATC posting obligation.
45. E.ON U.S. requests clarification of the requirement that AFC
calculations be converted into ATC for purposes of posting. E.ON U.S.
states that some
[[Page 2990]]
RTOs, such as MISO and others, utilize AFC and do not calculate or post
ATC for their systems. Due to interactions with these RTOs, E.ON U.S.
now calculates AFC as well. E.ON requests that the Commission clarify
that if RTOs and their member utilities are granted waivers of the
requirement to calculate and post ATC, in favor of AFC, all
transmission owning utilities in the region should be able to request a
waiver on the same basis. E.ON claims that allowing all transmission-
owning utilities within a region to calculate AFC (instead of ATC) will
result in greater accuracy and consistency within the industry.
46. Although it does not challenge the Commission's decision not to
require a single, industry-wide ATC calculation method, TDU Systems
claims that the Commission fails to address the situation where
transmission providers on a single interface choose different ATC
calculation methods. TDU Systems argue that transmission providers must
be required to provide consistent ATC values on either side of an
interface. TDU Systems therefore request that adjacent transmission
providers be required to coordinate to provide consistent ATC values
across their common interfaces.
47. NorthWestern requests that the Commission clarify that the
consistency requirements of Order No. 890 do not prohibit utilities
from reducing transfer capability for the purchase of reliability
services. According to NorthWestern, some transmission providers may
have to acquire various generation-based services, such as load
following and regulation service, in the marketplace in order to meet
reliability criteria. NorthWestern argues that some means should be
allowed for retaining transmission at no cost for such deliveries, even
though they do not meet the strict definition of CBM, since they are
made for reliability reasons and no single user of the system would
otherwise reimburse the transmission provider for the associated costs.
48. EPSA and Williams request clarification that ATC and AFC
calculations should be determined and posted in real-time, not just as
planning information, and that the transmission provider be required to
post results of its system utilization for ETC. Williams contends that
this would augment the transparency deemed critical to a coherent and
uniform calculation of ATC by enabling interested stakeholders and the
Commission to verify the ATC calculations performed by transmission
providers.
Commission Determination
49. The Commission affirms the decision in Order No. 890 to require
consistency of all ATC components and certain definitions, data inputs,
data exchange and modeling assumptions. We continue to believe such
consistency is necessary to reduce the potential for undue
discrimination in the provision of transmission service.
50. We disagree with Southern that increasing consistency with
respect to the determination of ATC is contrary to reliability. Use of
the NERC reliability standards process will, as a matter of course,
guard against any unintended reduction in reliability. Nevertheless, we
agree that reliability standards cannot address every unique system
difference or differences in risk assumptions when modeling expected
flows, which necessitates leaving room for limited discretion on the
part of the transmission provider. We believe that the ATC requirements
in Order No. 890 allow sufficient flexibility so that utilities,
working through NERC/NAESB, can develop ATC standards that continue to
provide reliability and are compatible with all other mandatory
reliability standards or business practices, yet provide discretion
where appropriate. If a transmission provider is faced with unique
system conditions or modeling assumptions related to firm transmission
service reservations\31\ that are not addressed in the ATC-related NERC
reliability standards, it must make them transparent through its
Attachment C filing and the OASIS posting requirements regarding ATC
calculation and modeling approach, studies, models and assumptions and
implement them consistently for all transmission customers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Transmission providers use different assumptions related to
the percentage of firm reservations that are actually scheduled and
flow.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
51. We deny MidAmerican's request for clarification that AFC values
do not need to be converted into ATC postings of control area-to-
control area path quantities. As the Commission explained in Order No.
890, our regulations require the posting of ATC values associated with
a particular path, not AFC values associated with a flowgate.\32\ The
Commission did not amend that requirement in Order No. 890 and
MidAmerican fails to justify doing so now. To the extent MidAmerican or
its customers find it beneficial also to post AFC, MidAmerican is free
to post both ATC and AFC values. In response to E.ON U.S., however, we
clarify that transmission-owning utilities in an RTO region can request
waiver of the requirement to convert AFC calculations into ATC for
posting purposes in the event the RTO has been granted such a waiver.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See Order No. 890 at P 211. ATC values must be posted for
control area to control area interconnections, paths for which
service is denied, curtailed or interrupted for more than 24 hours
in the past 12 months, and paths for which a customer requests to
have ATC or TTC posted. See 18 CFR 37.6(b)(1)(i).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
52. In response to TDU Systems, we clarify that adjacent
transmission providers must coordinate and exchange data and
assumptions to achieve consistent ATC values on either side of a single
interface. This is applicable to any neighboring transmission providers
no matter whether they use the same or different ATC methodologies. We
note, however, that the anticipated consistency is for available
capability in the same direction across an interface.
53. We clarify in response to NorthWestern that TRM may be used to
accommodate the procurement of ancillary services used to provide
service under the pro forma OATT. We deny as premature EPSA's and
Williams' requests for clarification regarding the real-time
determination and posting of ATC and AFC values, as well as posting of
utilization of transmission provider's own system ETC. In Order No.
890, the Commission required an exchange of the data both for short and
long-term ATC/AFC calculation that will increase the accuracy of ATC
calculations.\33\ The Commission also required that ATC be recalculated
by all transmission providers on a consistent time interval, and in a
manner that closely reflects the actual topology of the system, load
forecast, interchange schedules, transmission reservations, facility
ratings, and other necessary data, and that NERC/NAESB revise the
related reliability standard and business practices accordingly.\34\
EPSA and William should address their concerns through the NERC and
NAESB processes implementing these requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ See Order No. 890 at P 310.
\34\ See id. at P 301.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
b. Process To Achieve Consistency
54. The Commission directed public utilities, working through NERC
and NAESB, to modify the ATC-related reliability standards and business
practices in accordance with specific direction provided in Order No.
890. The Commission concluded that the NERC reliability standards
development process and the NAESB business standards development
process are the appropriate forums for developing
[[Page 2991]]
consistency in ATC calculations. To that end, public utilities were
directed, working through NERC, to modify the ATC-related reliability
standards within 270 days after the publication of Order No. 890 in the
Federal Register, i.e., December 10, 2007. Public utilities were also
directed, working through NAESB, to develop business practices that
complement NERC's new reliability standards within 360 days after the
publication of Order No. 890 in the Federal Register, i.e., March 10,
2008.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ The Commission has since extended these compliance
deadlines to May 9, 2008, and August 7, 2008, respectively. See
Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service, Notice of Extension of Time, Docket Nos. RM05-17-000, et
al. (Dec. 6, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
55. Several petitioners contend that the Commission's direction to
public utilities, working through NERC, to modify standards to meet
specific ATC requirements is tantamount to dictating reliability
standards in violation of FPA section 215.\36\ These petitioners assert
that system reliability will be best maintained if NERC, having been
certified by the Commission as the ERO, is afforded discretion in
creating the necessary reliability standards in the first instance
prior to submission to the Commission for approval consistent with
section 215.\37\ EEI and Southern suggest that the Commission give
guidance and direction to NERC on how standards should be developed,
but not be overly prescriptive. E.ON LSE argues that the Commission
should require, or at least permit, NERC to consolidate its ATC
development process with its ongoing reliability standards process to
develop policies, but should refrain from rewriting any standards
developed through that consolidated process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ E.g., EEI, E.ON LSE, and Southern.
\37\ Citing 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2) (requiring the Commission to
``give due weight to the technical expertise of the [ERO]'' on
reliability matters).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Commission Determination
56. The Commission affirms the decision in Order No. 890 to rely on
the NERC reliability standards development process, and the NAESB
business practices development process, to achieve a more coherent and
uniform determination of ATC. We disagree that this conflicts with the
Commission's obligations under section 215 of the FPA. In Order No.
693, the Commission exercised its authority under FPA section 215 to
direct the ERO to modify the existing modeling, data, and analysis
(MOD) standards related to ATC calculation, providing guidance
consistent with our requirements in Order No. 890. The Commission
clarified that, where Order No. 693 identified a concern and offered a
specific approach to address the concern, the Commission would consider
an equivalent alternative approach provided that the ERO demonstrated
that the alternative would address the Commission's underlying concern
or goal as efficiently and effectively as the Commission's
proposal.\38\ We believe this provides the appropriate flexibility for
NERC, while ensuring that the Commission act to remedy the potential
for undue discrimination in the calculation of ATC.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\38\ See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk Power
System, Order No. 693, 72 FR 16,416 (Apr. 4, 2007), FERC Stats. &
Regs. ] 31,242 (2007) (Order No. 693), order on reh'g, 120 FERC ]
61,053 (2007) (Order No. 693-A). Pending completion of the NERC/
NAESB standardization process, each transmission provider must
perform its ATC-related calculations in accordance with the
methodology set forth in Attachment C to its OATT, as revised to
comply with Order No. 890.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
c. Applicability to ISOs, RTOs, and Non-Public Utility Transmission
Providers
57. The Commission did not require ISO and RTO transmission
providers to ``rejustify'' existing provisions in their OATTs that are
not affected in a substantive manner by the revisions to the pro forma
OATT in the Final Rule. However, the Commission did require all
transmission providers, including an ISO or RTO, to demonstrate that
variations from the tariff modifications required in Order No. 890
continue to satisfy the consistent with or superior to standard. With
respect to the application of the ATC requirements of Order No. 890,
the Commission noted that ISOs and RTOs would be required to comply
with reliability standards developed under FPA section 215.
Requests for Rehearing and Clarification
58. Because Order No. 890 did not exempt ISOs/RTOs from the new ATC
standards or curtailment information posting requirements, NYISO asks
the Commission to clarify that NERC and NAESB must develop ATC
standards and curtailment information posting rules that accommodate
ISOs/RTOs. NYISO anticipates that ATC calculations will continue to be
of limited significance within its control area, but acknowledges that
it does calculate ATC at its external interfaces and also uses ATC to
determine the availability of non-firm transmission service, i.e.,
service for customers that do not wish to be exposed to congestion
charges. NYISO states that it, therefore, has an interest and intends
to participate in the NERC and NAESB processes developing new ATC
standards and curtailment information posting requirements.
59. NYISO contends, however, that stakeholders from traditional
systems will have a greater interest in the development of those rules
and, as a result, that the NERC and NAESB processes may produce rules
that primarily reflect the needs of traditional systems and do not
accommodate ISOs/RTOs that are based upon locational marginal pricing
of transmission. NYISO argues that Order No. 890 requires NERC and
NAESB to develop standards that suit both traditional systems as well
as the ISOs/RTOs that cover more than half of the load in the United
States. NYISO requests that the Commission expressly state its
expectation that the NERC and NAESB processes will produce standards
that fulfill Order No. 890's objectives of transparency and inter-
regional consistency, yet that are sufficiently flexible to work for
ISO/RTO regions.
Commission Determination
60. Order No. 890 requires NERC and NAESB to develop a single set
of ATC-related standards that will apply to all transmission providers,
including RTOs and ISOs. We understand that the NERC ATC standard
drafting team includes representatives from various industry sectors,
including RTOs/ISOs, and we encourage NYISO to participate in the
standard development process to provide NERC an opportunity to address
its concerns. To the extent NYISO feels its concerns are not addressed
in this process, it should bring the issue to the Commission's
attention on review of the resulting reliability standards.
d. ATC Components
61. In Order No. 890, the Commission adopted certain requirements
regarding the components of ATC (i.e., TTC/TFC, ETC, CBM and TRM)
necessary to achieve consistency and, in turn, limit the potential for
undue discrimination in the calculation of ATC. Petitioners request
rehearing and clarifi