Special Condition: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 429 Helicopters, High Intensity Radiated Fields, 73579-73582 [E7-25143]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 248 / Friday, December 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations have such documents returned to the individual if he or she requests the return of the documents when submitting the documents. If OPM receives a request for return of such documents at a later time, OPM may provide the individual with a copy of the document that is derived from electronic records. § 72.214 List of approved spent fuel storage casks. Subpart D—Submission of Law Enforcement, Firefighter, and Nuclear Materials Courier Retirement Coverage Notices * * § 850.401 Electronic notice of coverage determination. [FR Doc. E7–25153 Filed 12–27–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6325–38–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-Related Greater Than Class C Waste pwalker on PROD1PC71 with RULES CFR Correction In Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 51 to 199, revised as of January 1, 2007, on page 395, in § 72.214, Certificate of Compliance 1005 is reinstated to read as follows: 23:53 Dec 27, 2007 Jkt 214001 * * * * * * * [FR Doc. 07–55524 Filed 12–27–07; 8:45 am] Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 11 CFR Correction In Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Parts 1 to 59, revised as of January 1, 2007, on page 27, reinstate § 11.71 to read as follows: § 11.71 What information must I include in my petition for rulemaking? (a) You must include the following information in your petition for rulemaking: (1) Your name and mailing address and, if you wish, other contact information such as a fax number, telephone number, or e-mail address. (2) An explanation of your proposed action and its purpose. (3) The language you propose for a new or amended rule, or the language you would remove from a current rule. (4) An explanation of why your proposed action would be in the public interest. (5) Information and arguments that support your proposed action, including relevant technical and scientific data available to you. (6) Any specific facts or circumstances that support or demonstrate the need for the action you propose. (b) In the process of considering your petition, we may ask that you provide information or data available to you about the following: (1) The costs and benefits of your proposed action to society in general, and identifiable groups within society in particular. (2) The regulatory burden of your proposed action on small businesses, small organizations, small governmental jurisdictions, and Indian tribes. (3) The recordkeeping and reporting burdens of your proposed action and whom the burdens would affect. Frm 00007 Fmt 4700 [FR Doc. 07–55525 Filed 12–27–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 1505–01–D DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Parts 21 and 27 Special Condition: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 429 Helicopters, High Intensity Radiated Fields Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special condition; request for comments. AGENCY: General Rulemaking Procedures PO 00000 (4) The effect of your proposed action on the quality of the natural and social environments. [Docket No. SW017; Special Condition No. 27–017–SC] BILLING CODE 1505–01–D DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION (a) An agency or other entity that submits electronic employee records directly or through a shared service center to the electronic retirement and insurance processing system must include in the notice of law enforcement officer, firefighter, or nuclear materials retirement coverage, required by § 831.811(a), 831.911(a), 842.808(a), or 842.910(a) of this chapter, the position description number, or other unique alphanumeric identifier, of the position for which law enforcement officer, firefighter, or nuclear materials courier retirement coverage has been approved. (b) The Director will issue directives under § 850.104 that identify the acceptable methods for an agency or other entity to submit to OPM electronic files of both the notice required by § 831.811(a), 831.911(a), 842.808(a), or 842.910(a) of this chapter, and the coverage determination files and background material required under § 831.811(b), 831.911(b), 842.808(b), or 842.910(b) of this chapter, associated with the positions included in the notice. VerDate Aug<31>2005 * Certificate Number: 1005 SAR Submitted by: Transnuclear, Inc. SAR Title: TN-24 Dry Storage Cask Topical Report. Docket Number: 72-1005. Certification Expiration Date: November 4, 2013. Model Number: TN-24. 73579 Sfmt 4700 SUMMARY: This special condition is issued for the Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters. These helicopters will have novel or unusual design features associated with installing electrical and electronic systems that perform critical functions, including an Electronic Flight Instrument System (EFIS) and a Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards to protect systems that perform critical control functions, or provide critical displays, from the effects of high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). This special condition contains the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to ensure that critical functions of systems will be maintained when exposed to HIRF. DATES: The effective date of this special condition is December 11, 2007. Comments must be received on or before February 11, 2008. ADDRESSES: Send comments on this special condition in duplicate to: Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket (ASW–111) Docket No. SW017, Fort Worth, Texas 76193–0111, or deliver them in duplicate to the Rotorcraft Directorate at 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. Comments must be marked: Docket No. SW017. You may inspect comments in the Docket that is maintained in Room 448 in the Rotorcraft Directorate offices at 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas, on weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carroll Wright, Electrical Flight Systems E:\FR\FM\28DER1.SGM 28DER1 73580 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 248 / Friday, December 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76193–0110; telephone (817) 222–5120, FAX (817) 222–5961. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We have determined that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary since the substance of this special condition has been subject to the public comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments received. Therefore, we determined that good cause exists for making this special condition effective upon issuance. Comments Invited You are invited to submit written data, views, or arguments. Your communications should include the regulatory docket or special condition number and be sent in duplicate to the address stated above. We will consider all communications received on or before the closing date and may change the special condition in light of the comments received. Interested persons may examine the Docket. We will file a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this special condition in the docket. If you wish us to acknowledge receipt of your comments, you must include a self-addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: ‘‘Comments to Docket No. SW017.’’ We will date stamp the postcard and mail it to you. Background On September 13, 2004, Bell Helicopter submitted an application for a Type Certificate for the Model 429 helicopter. The Model 429 helicopter is a new design based on the existing drive train of the Bell Model 427 helicopter and a new fuselage. The Model 429 is a twin-engine, 4-bladed main and tail rotor helicopter with a maximum gross weight of 7,000 pounds, capable of carrying up to nine passengers plus a pilot. The helicopter will be designed for dual and single pilot instrument flight rules (IFR) and Category A operations. pwalker on PROD1PC71 with RULES Type Certification Basis Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Bell Helicopter must show that the Model 429 helicopter meets the applicable provisions of the regulations as listed below: 14 CFR part 27, Amendment 27–0 through Amendment 27–40 dated May 9, 2001. Sections of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29–14 dated September 1, 1977, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 VerDate Aug<31>2005 23:53 Dec 27, 2007 Jkt 214001 Appendix B for instrument flight rules (IFR). Sections of 14 CFR part 29 Amendment 29–0 through Amendment 29–47 dated May 9, 2001, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 Appendix C for Category A. 14 CFR part 36 Appendix H, Amendment 36–25, including FAA stage 3 noise limits for helicopters. Any special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent safety findings deemed necessary. In addition, the certification basis includes certain special conditions and equivalent safety findings that are not relevant to this special condition. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for these helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters must comply with the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36; and the FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to § 611 of Public Law 92–574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ Special conditions, as appropriate, are defined in § 11.19, and issued by following the procedures in § 11.38, and become part of the type certification basis in accordance with § 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the other model under the provisions of § 21.101. Novel or Unusual Design Features The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features: Electrical, electronic, or combination of electrical electronic (electrical/electronic) systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays, such as electronic flight instruments that will be providing displays critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter during operation in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), and Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) that will be performing engine control functions that are critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter during visual flight rules (VFR) and IFR operations. PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Discussion The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter, at the time of application, was identified as incorporating one and possibly more electrical/electronic systems, such as electronic flight instruments and FADEC. After the design is finalized, Bell Helicopter will provide the FAA with a preliminary hazard analysis that will identify any other critical functions, required for safe flight and landing, that are performed by the electrical/electronic systems. Recent advances in technology have led to the application in aircraft designs of advanced electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays. These advanced systems respond to the transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by HIRF incident on the external surface of the helicopter. These induced transient currents and voltages can degrade the performance of the electrical/electronic systems by damaging the components or by upsetting the systems’ functions. Furthermore, the electromagnetic environment has undergone a transformation not envisioned by the current application of 14 CFR 27.1309(a). Higher energy levels radiate from operational transmitters currently used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of transmitters has increased significantly. Existing aircraft certification requirements are inappropriate in view of these technological advances. In addition, the FAA has received reports of some significant safety incidents and accidents involving military aircraft equipped with advanced electrical/ electronic systems when they were exposed to electromagnetic radiation. The combined effects of the technological advances in helicopter design and the changing environment have resulted in an increased level of vulnerability of the electrical/electronic systems required for the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. Effective measures to protect these helicopters against the adverse effects of exposure to HIRF will be provided by the design and installation of these systems. The following primary factors contributed to the current conditions: (1) Increased use of sensitive electronics that perform critical functions; (2) reduced electromagnetic shielding afforded helicopter systems by advanced technology airframe materials; (3) adverse service experience of military aircraft using these technologies; and (4) an increase in the number and power of radio frequency E:\FR\FM\28DER1.SGM 28DER1 pwalker on PROD1PC71 with RULES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 248 / Friday, December 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations emitters and the expected increase in the future. On July 30, 2007, we issued a final HIRL rule (72 FR 44016, August 6, 2007). This rule provides standards to protect aircraft electrical and electronic systems from HIRFs. It was effective September 5, 2007. However, that rule included provisions that provide relief from the new testing requirements for equipment previously certificated under HIRF special conditions issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.16. To obtain this relief the applicant must be able to show that— (1) The system has previously been shown to comply with special conditions for HIRF, prescribed under § 21.16, issued before December 1, 2007; (2) The HIRF immunity characteristics of the system have not changed since compliance with the special conditions was demonstrated; and (3) The data used to demonstrate compliance with the HIRF special conditions is provided. The Bell 429 installations are eligible for this relief provided in 14 CFR 29.1317(d) of the final HIRF rule. However, to meet their HIRF requirements they must comply with this Special Condition, which is based on similar, historical HIRF protections requirements. Compliance with HIRF requirements will be demonstrated by tests, analysis, models’ similarity with existing systems, or a combination of these methods. Service experience alone will not be acceptable since such experience in normal flight operations may not include an exposure to HIRF. Reliance on a system with similar design features for redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external HIRF is generally insufficient because all elements of a redundant system are likely to be concurrently exposed to the radiated fields. This special condition will require aircraft installed systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays to meet certain standards based on either a defined HIRF environment or a fixed value using laboratory tests. Control system failures and malfunctions can more directly and abruptly contribute to a catastrophic event than display system failures and malfunctions. Therefore, it is considered appropriate to require more rigorous HIRF verification methods for critical control systems than for critical display systems. The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational capabilities of the installed electrical/ electronic systems that perform critical functions are not adversely affected VerDate Aug<31>2005 23:53 Dec 27, 2007 Jkt 214001 when the aircraft is exposed to the defined HIRF test environment. We have determined that the test environment defined in Table 1 is acceptable for critical control functions in helicopters. The test environment defined in Table 2 is acceptable for critical display systems in helicopters. The applicant may also demonstrate, by a laboratory test, that the electrical/ electronic systems that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays can withstand a peak electromagnetic field strength in a frequency range of 10 kHz to 18 GHz. If a laboratory test is used to show compliance with the defined HIRF environment, no credit will be given for signal attenuation due to installation. A level of 100 volts per meter (v/m) is appropriate for critical display systems. A level of 200 v/m is appropriate for critical control functions. Laboratory test levels are defined according to RTCA/DO–160D Section 20 Category W (100 v/m and 150 mA) and Category Y (200 v/m and 300 mA). As defined in DO–160D Section 20, the test levels are defined as the peak of the root means squared (rms) envelope. As a minimum, the modulations required for RTCA/ DO–160D Section 20 Categories W and Y will be used. Other modulations should be selected as the signal most likely to disrupt the operation of the system under test, based on its design characteristics. For example, flight control systems may be susceptible to 3 Hz square wave modulation while the video signals for electronic display systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case modulation is unknown or cannot be determined, default modulations may be used. Suggested default values are a 1 kHz sine wave with 80 percent depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 kHz to 400 MHz, and 1 kHz square wave with greater than 90 percent depth of modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the unmodulated signal would cause deviations from normal operation, several different modulating signals with various waveforms and frequencies should be applied. Applicants must perform a preliminary hazard analysis to identify electrical/electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term ‘‘critical’’ means those functions whose failure would contribute to or cause an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. The systems identified by the hazard analysis as performing critical functions are required to have HIRF protection. A system may perform both critical and non-critical functions. PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 73581 Primary electronic flight display systems and their associated components perform critical functions such as attitude, altitude, and airspeed indications. HIRF requirements would apply only to the systems that perform critical functions, including control and display. Acceptable system performance would be attained by demonstrating that the critical function components of the system under consideration continue to perform their intended function during and after exposure to required electromagnetic fields. Deviations from system specifications may be acceptable, but must be independently assessed by the FAA on a case-by-case basis. TABLE 1.—ROTORCRAFT CRITICAL CONTROL FUNCTIONS FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/METER Frequency 10 kHz–100 kHz 100 kHz–500 kHz ................ 500 kHz–2 MHz 2 MHz–30 MHz 30 MHz–70 MHz 70 MHz–100 MHz ............... 100 MHz–200 MHz ............... 200 MHz–400 MHz ............... 400 MHz–700 MHz ............... 700 MHz–1 GHz 1 GHz–2 GHz ... 2 GHz–4 GHz ... 4 GHz–6 GHz ... 6 GHz–8 GHz ... 8 GHz–12 GHz 12 GHz–18 GHz 18 GHz–40 GHz Peak Average 150 150 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 730 1400 5000 6000 7200 1100 5000 2000 1000 200 240 250 490 400 170 330 330 420 TABLE 2.—ROTORCRAFT CRITICAL DISPLAY FUNCTIONS FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/METER Frequency 10 kHz–100 kHz 100 kHz–500 kHz ................ 500 kHz–2 MHz 2 MHz–30 MHz 30 MHz–70 MHz 70 MHz–100 MHz ............... 100 MHz–200 MHz ............... 200 MHz–400 MHz ............... 400 MHz–700 MHz ............... 700 MHz–1 GHz 1 GHz–2 GHz ... 2 GHz–4 GHz ... E:\FR\FM\28DER1.SGM 28DER1 Peak Average 50 50 50 50 100 50 50 50 100 50 50 50 100 100 100 100 700 700 2000 3000 50 100 200 200 73582 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 248 / Friday, December 28, 2007 / Rules and Regulations TABLE 2.—ROTORCRAFT CRITICAL DIS- Protection for Electrical and Electronic PLAY FUNCTIONS FIELD STRENGTH Systems from High Intensity Radiated Fields VOLTS/METER—Continued Frequency Peak 4 GHz–6 GHz ... 6 GHz–8 GHz ... 8 GHz–12 GHz 12 GHz–18 GHz 18 GHz–40 GHz Average 3000 1000 3000 2000 600 200 200 300 200 200 Applicability As previously discussed, this special condition is applicable to the Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter. Should Bell Helicopter apply at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the special condition would apply to that model as well under the provisions of § 21.101. Conclusion This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of helicopters. It is not a rule of general applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the helicopter. The substance of this special condition has been subjected to the notice and comment period previously and is written without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained in this special condition. For this reason, we have determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, and good cause exists for adopting this special condition upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and 27 Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety. The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: I Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303. pwalker on PROD1PC71 with RULES The Special Condition Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the type certification basis for Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters. VerDate Aug<31>2005 23:53 Dec 27, 2007 Jkt 214001 1. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities of these critical functions are not adversely affected when the helicopter is exposed to high intensity radiated fields external to the helicopter. 2. For the purpose of this special condition, critical functions are defined as those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or cause, an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft. Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 11, 2007. Mark R. Schilling, Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E7–25143 Filed 12–27–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 25 [Docket No. NM365 Special Conditions No. 25–357–SC] Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787– 8 Airplane; Systems and Data Networks Security–Protection of Airplane Systems and Data Networks from Unauthorized External Access Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final special conditions. AGENCY: SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 787–8 airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness standards for transport category airplanes. The architecture of the Boeing Model 787–8 computer systems and networks may allow access to external systems and networks, such as wireless airline operations and maintenance systems, satellite communications, electronic mail, the Internet, etc. Onboard wired and wireless devices may also have access to parts of the airplane’s digital systems that provide flight critical functions. These new connectivity capabilities may result in security vulnerabilities to the airplane’s critical systems. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or PO 00000 Frm 00010 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 appropriate safety standards for protection and security of airplane systems and data networks against unauthorized access. These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing standards. Additional special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Boeing Model 787–8 airplanes. DATES: Effective Date: January 28, 2008. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Will Struck, FAA, Airplane and Flight Crew Interface, ANM–111, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2764; facsimile (425) 227–1149. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Background On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for its new Boeing Model 787–8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787–8 airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds, with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers. Type Certification Basis Under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 21.17, Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787–8 airplanes (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the 787’’) meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as amended by Amendments 25–1 through 25–117, except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25–115. If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under provisions of 14 CFR 21.16. In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of part 36. The FAA must also issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2). Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the type certificate E:\FR\FM\28DER1.SGM 28DER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 248 (Friday, December 28, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 73579-73582]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-25143]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 21 and 27

[Docket No. SW017; Special Condition No. 27-017-SC]


Special Condition: Bell Helicopter Textron Canada Limited Model 
429 Helicopters, High Intensity Radiated Fields

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final special condition; request for comments.

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SUMMARY: This special condition is issued for the Bell Helicopter Model 
429 helicopters. These helicopters will have novel or unusual design 
features associated with installing electrical and electronic systems 
that perform critical functions, including an Electronic Flight 
Instrument System (EFIS) and a Full Authority Digital Engine Control 
(FADEC). The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain 
adequate or appropriate safety standards to protect systems that 
perform critical control functions, or provide critical displays, from 
the effects of high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF). This special 
condition contains the additional safety standards that the 
Administrator considers necessary to ensure that critical functions of 
systems will be maintained when exposed to HIRF.

DATES: The effective date of this special condition is December 11, 
2007. Comments must be received on or before February 11, 2008.

ADDRESSES: Send comments on this special condition in duplicate to: 
Federal Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, Attention: 
Rules Docket (ASW-111) Docket No. SW017, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0111, 
or deliver them in duplicate to the Rotorcraft Directorate at 2601 
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76137. Comments must be marked: Docket 
No. SW017. You may inspect comments in the Docket that is maintained in 
Room 448 in the Rotorcraft Directorate offices at 2601 Meacham Blvd., 
Fort Worth, Texas, on weekdays, except Federal holidays, between 8:30 
a.m. and 4 p.m.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carroll Wright, Electrical Flight 
Systems

[[Page 73580]]

Engineer, FAA, Rotorcraft Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards, 2601 
Meacham Blvd., Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0110; telephone (817) 222-5120, 
FAX (817) 222-5961.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: We have determined that notice and 
opportunity for prior public comment are unnecessary since the 
substance of this special condition has been subject to the public 
comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments 
received. Therefore, we determined that good cause exists for making 
this special condition effective upon issuance.

Comments Invited

    You are invited to submit written data, views, or arguments. Your 
communications should include the regulatory docket or special 
condition number and be sent in duplicate to the address stated above. 
We will consider all communications received on or before the closing 
date and may change the special condition in light of the comments 
received. Interested persons may examine the Docket. We will file a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this special condition in the docket. If you wish us to 
acknowledge receipt of your comments, you must include a self-
addressed, stamped postcard on which the following statement is made: 
``Comments to Docket No. SW017.'' We will date stamp the postcard and 
mail it to you.

Background

    On September 13, 2004, Bell Helicopter submitted an application for 
a Type Certificate for the Model 429 helicopter. The Model 429 
helicopter is a new design based on the existing drive train of the 
Bell Model 427 helicopter and a new fuselage. The Model 429 is a twin-
engine, 4-bladed main and tail rotor helicopter with a maximum gross 
weight of 7,000 pounds, capable of carrying up to nine passengers plus 
a pilot. The helicopter will be designed for dual and single pilot 
instrument flight rules (IFR) and Category A operations.

Type Certification Basis

    Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Bell Helicopter must show 
that the Model 429 helicopter meets the applicable provisions of the 
regulations as listed below:
    14 CFR part 27, Amendment 27-0 through Amendment 27-40 dated May 9, 
2001.
    Sections of 14 CFR part 29, Amendment 29-14 dated September 1, 
1977, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 Appendix B for instrument flight 
rules (IFR).
    Sections of 14 CFR part 29 Amendment 29-0 through Amendment 29-47 
dated May 9, 2001, as listed in 14 CFR part 27 Appendix C for Category 
A.
    14 CFR part 36 Appendix H, Amendment 36-25, including FAA stage 3 
noise limits for helicopters.
    Any special conditions, exemptions, and equivalent safety findings 
deemed necessary.
    In addition, the certification basis includes certain special 
conditions and equivalent safety findings that are not relevant to this 
special condition.
    If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness 
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for 
these helicopters because of a novel or unusual design feature, special 
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec.  21.16.
    In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special 
conditions, Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters must comply with the 
noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36; and the FAA must 
issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to Sec.  611 of Public 
Law 92-574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
    Special conditions, as appropriate, are defined in Sec.  11.19, and 
issued by following the procedures in Sec.  11.38, and become part of 
the type certification basis in accordance with Sec.  21.17(a)(2).
    Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which 
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended 
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or 
unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the 
other model under the provisions of Sec.  21.101.

Novel or Unusual Design Features

    The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter will incorporate the 
following novel or unusual design features: Electrical, electronic, or 
combination of electrical electronic (electrical/electronic) systems 
that perform critical control functions or provide critical displays, 
such as electronic flight instruments that will be providing displays 
critical to the continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter 
during operation in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC), and 
Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) that will be performing 
engine control functions that are critical to the continued safe flight 
and landing of the helicopter during visual flight rules (VFR) and IFR 
operations.

Discussion

    The Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter, at the time of 
application, was identified as incorporating one and possibly more 
electrical/electronic systems, such as electronic flight instruments 
and FADEC. After the design is finalized, Bell Helicopter will provide 
the FAA with a preliminary hazard analysis that will identify any other 
critical functions, required for safe flight and landing, that are 
performed by the electrical/electronic systems.
    Recent advances in technology have led to the application in 
aircraft designs of advanced electrical/electronic systems that perform 
critical control functions or provide critical displays. These advanced 
systems respond to the transient effects of induced electrical current 
and voltage caused by HIRF incident on the external surface of the 
helicopter. These induced transient currents and voltages can degrade 
the performance of the electrical/electronic systems by damaging the 
components or by upsetting the systems' functions.
    Furthermore, the electromagnetic environment has undergone a 
transformation not envisioned by the current application of 14 CFR 
27.1309(a). Higher energy levels radiate from operational transmitters 
currently used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of 
transmitters has increased significantly.
    Existing aircraft certification requirements are inappropriate in 
view of these technological advances. In addition, the FAA has received 
reports of some significant safety incidents and accidents involving 
military aircraft equipped with advanced electrical/electronic systems 
when they were exposed to electromagnetic radiation.
    The combined effects of the technological advances in helicopter 
design and the changing environment have resulted in an increased level 
of vulnerability of the electrical/electronic systems required for the 
continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. Effective measures 
to protect these helicopters against the adverse effects of exposure to 
HIRF will be provided by the design and installation of these systems. 
The following primary factors contributed to the current conditions: 
(1) Increased use of sensitive electronics that perform critical 
functions; (2) reduced electromagnetic shielding afforded helicopter 
systems by advanced technology airframe materials; (3) adverse service 
experience of military aircraft using these technologies; and (4) an 
increase in the number and power of radio frequency

[[Page 73581]]

emitters and the expected increase in the future.
    On July 30, 2007, we issued a final HIRL rule (72 FR 44016, August 
6, 2007). This rule provides standards to protect aircraft electrical 
and electronic systems from HIRFs. It was effective September 5, 2007. 
However, that rule included provisions that provide relief from the new 
testing requirements for equipment previously certificated under HIRF 
special conditions issued in accordance with 14 CFR 21.16. To obtain 
this relief the applicant must be able to show that--
    (1) The system has previously been shown to comply with special 
conditions for HIRF, prescribed under Sec.  21.16, issued before 
December 1, 2007;
    (2) The HIRF immunity characteristics of the system have not 
changed since compliance with the special conditions was demonstrated; 
and
    (3) The data used to demonstrate compliance with the HIRF special 
conditions is provided.
    The Bell 429 installations are eligible for this relief provided in 
14 CFR 29.1317(d) of the final HIRF rule. However, to meet their HIRF 
requirements they must comply with this Special Condition, which is 
based on similar, historical HIRF protections requirements.
    Compliance with HIRF requirements will be demonstrated by tests, 
analysis, models' similarity with existing systems, or a combination of 
these methods. Service experience alone will not be acceptable since 
such experience in normal flight operations may not include an exposure 
to HIRF. Reliance on a system with similar design features for 
redundancy as a means of protection against the effects of external 
HIRF is generally insufficient because all elements of a redundant 
system are likely to be concurrently exposed to the radiated fields.
    This special condition will require aircraft installed systems that 
perform critical control functions or provide critical displays to meet 
certain standards based on either a defined HIRF environment or a fixed 
value using laboratory tests. Control system failures and malfunctions 
can more directly and abruptly contribute to a catastrophic event than 
display system failures and malfunctions. Therefore, it is considered 
appropriate to require more rigorous HIRF verification methods for 
critical control systems than for critical display systems.
    The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational 
capabilities of the installed electrical/electronic systems that 
perform critical functions are not adversely affected when the aircraft 
is exposed to the defined HIRF test environment. We have determined 
that the test environment defined in Table 1 is acceptable for critical 
control functions in helicopters. The test environment defined in Table 
2 is acceptable for critical display systems in helicopters.
    The applicant may also demonstrate, by a laboratory test, that the 
electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions 
or provide critical displays can withstand a peak electromagnetic field 
strength in a frequency range of 10 kHz to 18 GHz. If a laboratory test 
is used to show compliance with the defined HIRF environment, no credit 
will be given for signal attenuation due to installation. A level of 
100 volts per meter (v/m) is appropriate for critical display systems. 
A level of 200 v/m is appropriate for critical control functions. 
Laboratory test levels are defined according to RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 
Category W (100 v/m and 150 mA) and Category Y (200 v/m and 300 mA). As 
defined in DO-160D Section 20, the test levels are defined as the peak 
of the root means squared (rms) envelope. As a minimum, the modulations 
required for RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Categories W and Y will be used. 
Other modulations should be selected as the signal most likely to 
disrupt the operation of the system under test, based on its design 
characteristics. For example, flight control systems may be susceptible 
to 3 Hz square wave modulation while the video signals for electronic 
display systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz sinusoidal modulation. If 
the worst-case modulation is unknown or cannot be determined, default 
modulations may be used. Suggested default values are a 1 kHz sine wave 
with 80 percent depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 kHz 
to 400 MHz, and 1 kHz square wave with greater than 90 percent depth of 
modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the 
unmodulated signal would cause deviations from normal operation, 
several different modulating signals with various waveforms and 
frequencies should be applied.
    Applicants must perform a preliminary hazard analysis to identify 
electrical/electronic systems that perform critical functions. The term 
``critical'' means those functions whose failure would contribute to or 
cause an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight 
and landing of the helicopter. The systems identified by the hazard 
analysis as performing critical functions are required to have HIRF 
protection. A system may perform both critical and non-critical 
functions. Primary electronic flight display systems and their 
associated components perform critical functions such as attitude, 
altitude, and airspeed indications. HIRF requirements would apply only 
to the systems that perform critical functions, including control and 
display.
    Acceptable system performance would be attained by demonstrating 
that the critical function components of the system under consideration 
continue to perform their intended function during and after exposure 
to required electromagnetic fields. Deviations from system 
specifications may be acceptable, but must be independently assessed by 
the FAA on a case-by-case basis.

  Table 1.--Rotorcraft Critical Control Functions Field Strength Volts/
                                  Meter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Frequency                        Peak       Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 kHz-100 kHz................................          150          150
100 kHz-500 kHz...............................          200          200
500 kHz-2 MHz.................................          200          200
2 MHz-30 MHz..................................          200          200
30 MHz-70 MHz.................................          200          200
70 MHz-100 MHz................................          200          200
100 MHz-200 MHz...............................          200          200
200 MHz-400 MHz...............................          200          200
400 MHz-700 MHz...............................          730          200
700 MHz-1 GHz.................................         1400          240
1 GHz-2 GHz...................................         5000          250
2 GHz-4 GHz...................................         6000          490
4 GHz-6 GHz...................................         7200          400
6 GHz-8 GHz...................................         1100          170
8 GHz-12 GHz..................................         5000          330
12 GHz-18 GHz.................................         2000          330
18 GHz-40 GHz.................................         1000          420
------------------------------------------------------------------------


  Table 2.--Rotorcraft Critical Display Functions Field Strength Volts/
                                  Meter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Frequency                        Peak       Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10 kHz-100 kHz................................           50           50
100 kHz-500 kHz...............................           50           50
500 kHz-2 MHz.................................           50           50
2 MHz-30 MHz..................................          100          100
30 MHz-70 MHz.................................           50           50
70 MHz-100 MHz................................           50           50
100 MHz-200 MHz...............................          100          100
200 MHz-400 MHz...............................          100          100
400 MHz-700 MHz...............................          700           50
700 MHz-1 GHz.................................          700          100
1 GHz-2 GHz...................................         2000          200
2 GHz-4 GHz...................................         3000          200

[[Page 73582]]

 
4 GHz-6 GHz...................................         3000          200
6 GHz-8 GHz...................................         1000          200
8 GHz-12 GHz..................................         3000          300
12 GHz-18 GHz.................................         2000          200
18 GHz-40 GHz.................................          600          200
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Applicability

    As previously discussed, this special condition is applicable to 
the Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopter. Should Bell Helicopter apply 
at a later date for a change to the type certificate to include another 
model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the 
special condition would apply to that model as well under the 
provisions of Sec.  21.101.

Conclusion

    This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features 
on one model series of helicopters. It is not a rule of general 
applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for 
approval of these features on the helicopter.
    The substance of this special condition has been subjected to the 
notice and comment period previously and is written without substantive 
change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public 
comment would result in a significant change from the substance 
contained in this special condition. For this reason, we have 
determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, and 
good cause exists for adopting this special condition upon issuance. 
The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit 
views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior 
opportunities for comment.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and 27

    Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.


0
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

    Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113, 
44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.

The Special Condition

    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the 
type certification basis for Bell Helicopter Model 429 helicopters.

Protection for Electrical and Electronic Systems from High Intensity 
Radiated Fields

    1. Each system that performs critical functions must be designed 
and installed to ensure that the operation and operational capabilities 
of these critical functions are not adversely affected when the 
helicopter is exposed to high intensity radiated fields external to the 
helicopter.
    2. For the purpose of this special condition, critical functions 
are defined as those functions, whose failure would contribute to, or 
cause, an unsafe condition that would prevent the continued safe flight 
and landing of the aircraft.

    Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on December 11, 2007.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
 [FR Doc. E7-25143 Filed 12-27-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P

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