Special Conditions: Aviation Technology Group, Inc., Javelin Model 100; High Altitude Operations, 72265-72270 [07-6129]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2007 / Proposed Rules
must highlight the information that you
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[FR Doc. E7–24381 Filed 12–19–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8025–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 23
[Docket No. CE275; Notice No. 23–07–04–
SC]
Special Conditions: Aviation
Technology Group, Inc., Javelin Model
100; High Altitude Operations
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed special
conditions.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This action proposes special
conditions for the Aviation Technology
Group, Inc., Javelin Model 100 airplane.
This airplane will have a novel or
unusual design feature(s) associated
with high altitude operations. The
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for these design
features. These proposed special
conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level
of safety equivalent to that established
by the existing airworthiness standards.
DATES: We must receive your comments
by January 22, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Mail two copies of your
comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Regional Counsel,
ACE–7, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas
City, Missouri 64106. You may deliver
two copies to the Small Airplane
Directorate at the above address. Mark
your comments: Docket No. CE275. You
may inspect comments in the Rules
Docket weekdays, except Federal
holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Leslie B. Taylor, Regulations & Policy
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Branch, ACE–111, Federal Aviation
Administration, Small Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 901 Locust, Kansas City, MO
64106; telephone (816) 329–4134;
facsimile (816) 329–4090, e-mail at
leslie.b.taylor@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite interested parties to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, data, or views. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special
conditions, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data. We ask that you send
us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with FAA personnel
concerning these special conditions.
You may inspect the docket before and
after the comment closing date. If you
wish to review the docket in person, go
to the address in the ADDRESSES section
of this preamble between 7:30 a.m. and
4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
We will consider all comments we
receive on or before the closing date for
comments. We will consider comments
filed late if it is possible to do so
without incurring expense or delay. We
may change these special conditions
based on the comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge
receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments
a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on
which the docket number appears. We
will stamp the date on the postcard and
mail it back to you.
Background
On February 15, 2005, Aviation
Technology Group (ATG), 8001 S.
InterPort Blvd., Englewood, CO 80112
applied for a type certificate for their
new Javelin Model 100 airplane. The
Javelin Model 100 is a two-seat,
pressurized, retractable-gear, composite
airplane with two turbofan engines
mounted in the aft fuselage.
The Aviation Technology Group, Inc.
(ATG) Javelin Model 100 will be
certificated for operations at a maximum
altitude of 45,000 feet. This unusually
high operating altitude constitutes a
novel or unusual design feature for
which the applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards. Therefore,
it is necessary to develop special
conditions that provide the level of
safety equivalent to that established by
the regulations.
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ATG indicated they will fully comply
with Special Conditions for a., Pressure
Vessel Integrity; b., Ventilation; and c.,
Air Conditioning.
However, ATG is unable to fully
comply with Special Conditions d.
Pressurization and e. Oxygen equipment
and supply. As a result from these
discussions, the Special Conditions d.
and e. were revised to include an
alternate means or compensating
features that require the use of an
oxygen system and emergency descent
procedures that addresses a rapid
decompression event.
Discussion
The 14 CFR part 23 certification basis
for the ATG Javelin Model 100 is part
23, Amendment 23–55. The FAA issues
high altitude special conditions for
airplanes when the certificated altitude
exceeds human physiological limits.
Crack growth could result in rapid
depressurization to cabin altitudes that
exceed human physiological limits.
Damage tolerance methods are proposed
to be used to assure pressure vessel
integrity while operating at the higher
altitudes. Crack growth data is used to
prescribe an inspection program, which
will detect cracks before an opening in
the pressure vessel would allow rapid
depressurization. Initial crack sizes for
detection are determined under
§ 23.571, Amendment 23–55. The cabin
altitude after permissible crack growth
may not exceed specified limits.
To ensure that there is adequate fresh
air for crewmembers to perform their
duties, to provide reasonable passenger
comfort, and to enable occupants to
better withstand the effects of
decompression at high altitudes, the
ventilation system must be designed to
provide 10 cubic feet of fresh air per
minute per person during normal
operations. Therefore, these special
conditions require that crewmembers
and passengers be provided with 10
cubic feet of fresh air per minute per
person. In addition, during the
development of the supersonic transport
special conditions, it was noted that
certain pressurization failures resulted
in hot ram or bleed air being used to
maintain pressurization. Air
conditioning special conditions are
required because such a measure can
lead to cabin temperatures that exceed
human tolerance limits following
probable and improbable failures.
Continuous flow passenger oxygen
equipment is certificated for use up to
40,000 feet; however, for rapid
decompressions above 34,000 feet,
reverse diffusion leads to low oxygen
partial pressures in the lungs, to the
extent that a small percentage of
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passengers may lose useful
consciousness at 35,000 feet. The
percentage increases to an estimated 60
percent at 40,000 feet, even with the use
of the continuous flow system. To
prevent permanent physiological
damage, the cabin altitude must not
exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2
minutes, or 40,000 feet for any time
period. The maximum peak cabin
altitude of 40,000 feet is consistent with
the standards established for previous
certification programs.
Decompression above 37,000 feet can
result in cabin altitudes that approach
the physiological limits of the average
person; therefore, every effort must be
made to provide the pilot with adequate
oxygen equipment to withstand these
severe decompressions. Reducing the
time interval between pressurization
failure and the time the pilot receives
oxygen will provide a safety margin
against being incapacitated and can be
accomplished by the use of maskmounted regulators. The proposed
special condition, therefore, requires
pressure demand masks with maskmounted regulators for the flight crew.
This combination of equipment will
provide the best practical protection for
the failures covered by the proposed
special conditions and for improbable
failures not covered by the special
conditions, provided the cabin altitude
is limited.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR part 21, § 21.17,
Aviation Technology Group, Inc. must
show that the Javelin Model 100 meets
the applicable provisions of part 23, as
amended by Amendments 23–1 through
23–55 thereto.
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations in
part 23 do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for the
Javelin Model 100 because of a novel or
unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under § 21.16.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Javelin Model 100 must
comply with the fuel vent and exhaust
emission requirements of 14 CFR part
34 and the noise certification
requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the
FAA must issue a finding of regulatory
adequacy under § 611 of Public Law 92–
574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in § 11.19, under § 11.38, and
they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
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include any other model that
incorporates the same or similar novel
or unusual design feature, the special
conditions would also apply to the other
model under § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Javelin Model 100 will
incorporate the following novel or
unusual design features:
Part 23 did not envision operation at
the service ceiling requested for this
airplane. The methods used to ensure
pressure vessel integrity and to provide
ventilation, air conditioning,
pressurization, and supplemental
oxygen will be unique due to that
operating altitude.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the Javelin
Model 100. Should Aviation
Technology Group, Inc., apply at a later
date for a change to the type certificate
to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design
feature, the special conditions would
apply to that model as well under the
provisions of § 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features on one model
of airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability, and it affects only the
applicant who applied to the FAA for
approval of these features on the
airplane.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and
symbols.
Citation
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, and
44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.17; and 14 CFR
11.38 and 11.19.
The Proposed Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) proposes the
following special conditions as part of
the type certification basis for Aviation
Technology Group, Inc., Javelin Model
100 airplanes.
a. Pressure Vessel Integrity.
1. The maximum extent of failure and
pressure vessel opening that can be
demonstrated to comply with paragraph
d (Pressurization) of this special
condition must be determined. It must
be demonstrated by crack propagation
and damage tolerance analysis
supported by testing that a larger
opening or a more severe failure than
demonstrated will not occur in normal
operations.
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2. Inspection schedules and
procedures must be established to
ensure that cracks and normal fuselage
leak rates will not deteriorate to the
extent that an unsafe condition could
exist during normal operation.
b. Ventilation. In lieu of the
requirements of § 23.831(b), the
ventilation system must be designed to
provide a sufficient amount of
uncontaminated air to enable the
crewmembers to perform their duties
without undue discomfort or fatigue,
and to provide reasonable passenger
comfort during normal operating
conditions and also in the event of any
probable failure of any system which
could adversely affect the cabin
ventilating air. For normal operations,
crewmembers and passengers must be
provided with at least 10 cubic feet of
fresh air per minute per person, or the
equivalent in filtered, recirculated air
based on the volume and composition at
the corresponding cabin pressure
altitude of not more than 8,000 feet.
c. Air Conditioning. In addition to the
requirements of § 23.831, paragraphs (b),
the cabin cooling system must be
designed to meet the following
conditions during flight above 15,000
feet mean sea level (MSL):
1. After any probable failure, the
cabin temperature-time history may not
exceed the values shown in Figure 1.
(Please see Advisory Circular (AC)
23.1309–1C, pages 10 and 16.)
2. After any improbable failure, the
cabin temperature-time history may not
exceed the values shown in Figure 2.
(Please see AC 23.1309–1C, pages 9 and
16.)
d. Pressurization: In addition to the
requirements of § 23.841, the following
revised Special Condition was designed
to limit high altitude exposure by
slowing down the depressurization
event and to mitigate or eliminate acute
affects of dangerously low atmospheric
pressure on flight crew and passengers.
1. For the purposes of this special
condition, the pressurization system
includes bleed air, air conditioning, and
pressure control systems. The
pressurization system must prevent the
cabin altitude from exceeding the cabin
altitude-time history shown in Figure 3
after each of the following:
(a) Any probable malfunction or
failure of the pressurization system. The
existence of undetected, latent
malfunctions or failures in conjunction
with probable failures must be
considered.
(b) Any single failure in the
pressurization system combined with
the occurrence of a leak produced by a
complete loss of a door seal element, or
a fuselage leak through an opening
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having an effective area 2.0 times the
effective area, which produces the
maximum permissible fuselage leak rate
approved for normal operation,
whichever produces a more severe leak.
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Note: The ATG Javelin Model 100 proposes
to use a mechanical canopy seal that is not
subject to complete loss of the door seal
element. ATG must still show compliance by
analysis and/or test a fuselage leak through
an opening having an effective area 2.0 times
the effective area that produces the maximum
permissible fuselage leak rate approved for
normal operation.
2. The cabin altitude-time history may
not exceed that shown in Figure 4 after
each of the following:
(a) The maximum pressure vessel
opening resulting from an initially
detectable crack propagating for a
period encompassing four normal
inspection intervals. Mid-panel cracks
and cracks through skin-stringer and
skin-frame combinations must be
considered.
(b) The pressure vessel opening or
duct failure resulting from probable
damage (failure effect) while under
maximum operating cabin pressure
differential due to a tire burst, engine
rotor burst, loss of antennas or stall
warning vanes, or any probable
equipment failure (bleed air, pressure
control, air conditioning, electrical
source(s), etc.) that affects
pressurization.
3. Complete loss of thrust from all
engines. In showing compliance with
paragraphs d.1 and d.2 of these special
conditions (Pressurization), it may be
assumed that an emergency descent is
made by an approved emergency
procedure. A 5-second crew recognition
and reaction time must be applied
between cabin altitude warning and the
initiation of an emergency descent.
The additional Special Conditions
below show full compliance to
paragraphs d.1. and d.2. and are
applicable to both aircraft models.
Special Conditions that are aircraft
model specific will be noted as Mk–10
or Mk–20.
4. A decompression event is
considered to be a rapid decompression
event; therefore, the following
requirements must be met: The airplane
design must include an auto descent
feature. The AFM must contain specific
instructions for its use, including
considerations for air traffic conditions,
terrain awareness, annunciation, and
accessibility to the control(s) for
automatic initiation of the descent
sequence by each occupant.
Note: For the flight evaluation of the rapid
descent, the test article must have the cabin
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volume representative of what is expected to
be normal, such that ATG must reduce the
total cabin volume by that which would be
occupied by the furnishings and total number
of people.
5. ATG must provide flight crew and
crewmember training requirements,
including physiological training that
covers—
(a) Pressure or reverse cycle breathing,
(b) Rapid decompression training,
(c) Physical condition with respect to
the hazards of high altitude rapid
decompression, and
(d) Recognition of decompression
sickness symptoms and the need for
medical treatment.
6. The oxygen system must be
compatible with paragraph e, Oxygen
Equipment and Supply Special
Conditions.
(a) Mk–10: The flight crew and
passenger(s) are required to use oxygen
masks for all operating altitudes above
25,000 feet.
(b) Mk–20: The flight crew and
crewmember are required to use oxygen
masks for all operating altitudes above
10,000 feet.
7. ATG will show a means of guarding
or de-activating the automatic ‘‘auto
emergency descent’’ mode control in the
forward or aft cockpit to prevent
inadvertent descent mode activation.
Appropriate placards will be required
for each control device.
8. ATG will show a means of guarding
or de-activating the in-flight jettison
canopy control, canopy fracturing
system, or any other safety critical
control device in the forward or aft
cockpit to prevent inadvertent
activation. Appropriate placards will be
required for each control device.
9. Cabin pressure loss must be
annunciated as a warning. (See
Equivalent Level of Safety Findings for
Cabin Pressurization.)
10. The AFM will include:
(a) Mk–10: Require a passenger
briefing concerning items 4 through 9
above and the following:
(i) Seat belts.
(ii) Emergency exit.
(iii) Use of quick-donning oxygen
mask system with a pressure-demand as
described in paragraph e2, Oxygen
Equipment and Supply.
(b) Mk–20: Required flight crew and
crewmember briefing concerning items
4 through 10(a) above.
(i) The flight crew is the pilot and
crewmember, which means a person
assigned to perform duty in an aircraft
during flight time. The Mk–20 poses
safety concerns for a typical passenger
since additional training beyond the
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72267
pre-flight briefing may be required to
use the emergency egress system (i.e.,
ejection seat). Each occupant of the Mk–
20 will be considered as a flight crew or
crewmember and be required to
complete the minimum requisite
training in paragraph d5 before flying on
the airplane.
e. Oxygen equipment and supply.
After several follow-on FAA/ATG
discussions, the FAA Position Stage 3
for the Mk–10/Mk–20 Special
Conditions e.1 and e.2 were revised to
include quick-donning pressuredemand oxygen mask or an alternate
helmet mounted oxygen mask for both
occupants that complies with TSO–C89
requirements up to 45,000 feet.
Furthermore, Special Condition e.3 was
revised to allow a common oxygen
source with a larger capacity as an
alternate means or compensating
feature.
1. In addition to the requirements of
§ 23.1441(d), the following applies: A
quick-donning oxygen mask system
with a pressure-demand, mask mounted
regulator that complies with TSO–C89
requirements up to 45,000 feet must be
provided for the flight crew. It must be
shown that each quick-donning mask
can, with one hand and within 5
seconds, be placed on the face from its
ready position, properly secured, sealed,
and supplying oxygen upon demand.
Alternately, a helmet mounted oxygen
mask, panel mounted regulator that
complies with TSO–C89 requirements
up to 45,000 feet may be provided to the
flight crew.
2. In addition to the requirements of
§ 23.1443, the following applies: A
quick-donning oxygen mask system
with a pressure-demand, mask mounted
regulator that complies with TSO–C89
requirements up to 45,000 feet must be
provided for the passenger or
crewmember. Alternately, a helmet
mounted oxygen mask, panel mounted
regulator that complies with TSO–C89
requirements up to 45,000 feet may be
provided to the passenger.
3. In addition to the requirements of
§ 23.1445, the following applies: If the
flight crew and passenger/crewmember
share a common source of oxygen, a
means to separately reserve the
minimum supply required by the flight
crew must be provided. Alternately, if
the oxygen system can provide the
minimum required for the flight crew as
well as all other occupants, the system
can have a common source.
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2007 / Proposed Rules
72270
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 244 / Thursday, December 20, 2007 / Proposed Rules
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on
December 12, 2007.
James E. Jackson,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 07–6129 Filed 12–19–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–C
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2007–0368; Directorate
Identifier 2007–NM–050–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; BAE
Systems (Operations) Limited Model
BAe 146–100A, –200A, and –300A
Series Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We propose to adopt a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This proposed
AD results from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
originated by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSALS
Cracking has been found on the centre
fuselage top aft longeron at Rib ‘0,’ on an inservice aircraft. * * *
This condition could result in reduced
structural integrity of the airplane. The
proposed AD would require actions that
are intended to address the unsafe
condition described in the MCAI.
DATES: We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by January 22, 2008.
ADDRESSES:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Mail: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC 20590.
• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M–
30, West Building Ground Floor, Room
W12–40, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE.,
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
Examining the AD Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://
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www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this proposed AD, the
regulatory evaluation, any comments
received, and other information. The
street address for the Docket Operations
office (telephone (800) 647–5527) is in
the ADDRESSES section. Comments will
be available in the AD docket shortly
after receipt.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Todd Thompson, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116, FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601
Lind Avenue SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–1175;
fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to send any written
relevant data, views, or arguments about
this proposed AD. Send your comments
to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2007–0368; Directorate Identifier
2007–NM–050–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this proposed AD. We will
consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this
proposed AD based on those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information you provide. We
will also post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact we receive
about this proposed AD.
Discussion
The European Aviation Safety Agency
(EASA), which is the Technical Agent
for the Member States of the European
Community, has issued EASA
Airworthiness Directive 2006–0215,
dated July 14, 2006 (referred to after this
as ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe
condition for the specified products.
The MCAI states:
Cracking has been found on the centre
fuselage top aft longeron at Rib ‘0’ on an inservice aircraft. Subsequent investigation has
indicated that the currently defined
threshold and repeat inspection period must
be reduced, and the area of inspection
expanded for the BAe 146 series 100 and 200.
For the BAe146 series 300, only the repeat
inspection period must be reduced, and the
area of inspection expanded.
Cracking on the center fuselage top aft
longeron at Rib ‘0,’ could result in
reduced structural integrity of the
airplane. Corrective actions include
repetitive inspections of the center
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fuselage top aft longeron for cracking
and repair/replacement if necessary.
You may obtain further information by
examining the MCAI in the AD docket.
Relevant Service Information
BAE Systems (Operations) Limited
has issued Service Bulletin ISB.53–173,
Revision 2, dated March 28, 2006. The
actions described in this service
information are intended to correct the
unsafe condition identified in the
MCAI.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of This Proposed AD
This product has been approved by
the aviation authority of another
country, and is approved for operation
in the United States. Pursuant to our
bilateral agreement with the State of
Design Authority, we have been notified
of the unsafe condition described in the
MCAI and service information
referenced above. We are proposing this
AD because we evaluated all pertinent
information and determined an unsafe
condition exists and is likely to exist or
develop on other products of the same
type design.
Differences Between This AD and the
MCAI or Service Information
We have reviewed the MCAI and
related service information and, in
general, agree with their substance. But
we might have found it necessary to use
different words from those in the MCAI
to ensure the AD is clear for U.S.
operators and is enforceable. In making
these changes, we do not intend to differ
substantively from the information
provided in the MCAI and related
service information.
We might also have proposed
different actions in this AD from those
in the MCAI in order to follow FAA
policies. Any such differences are
highlighted in a NOTE within the
proposed AD.
Costs of Compliance
Based on the service information, we
estimate that this proposed AD would
affect about 1 product of U.S. registry.
We also estimate that it would take
about 8 work-hours per product to
comply with the basic requirements of
this proposed AD. The average labor
rate is $80 per work-hour. Based on
these figures, we estimate the cost of the
proposed AD on U.S. operators to be
$640, or $640 per product.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
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[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 244 (Thursday, December 20, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 72265-72270]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-6129]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 23
[Docket No. CE275; Notice No. 23-07-04-SC]
Special Conditions: Aviation Technology Group, Inc., Javelin
Model 100; High Altitude Operations
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Notice of proposed special conditions.
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SUMMARY: This action proposes special conditions for the Aviation
Technology Group, Inc., Javelin Model 100 airplane. This airplane will
have a novel or unusual design feature(s) associated with high altitude
operations. The applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for these design features.
These proposed special conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator considers necessary to establish a
level of safety equivalent to that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
DATES: We must receive your comments by January 22, 2008.
ADDRESSES: Mail two copies of your comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration, Regional Counsel, ACE-7, 901 Locust, Room 506, Kansas
City, Missouri 64106. You may deliver two copies to the Small Airplane
Directorate at the above address. Mark your comments: Docket No. CE275.
You may inspect comments in the Rules Docket weekdays, except Federal
holidays, between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Leslie B. Taylor, Regulations & Policy
Branch, ACE-111, Federal Aviation Administration, Small Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 901 Locust, Kansas City,
MO 64106; telephone (816) 329-4134; facsimile (816) 329-4090, e-mail at
leslie.b.taylor@faa.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite interested parties to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We ask
that you send us two copies of written comments.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
concerning these special conditions. You may inspect the docket before
and after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in
person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble
between 7:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays.
We will consider all comments we receive on or before the closing
date for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is
possible to do so without incurring expense or delay. We may change
these special conditions based on the comments we receive.
If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the
postcard and mail it back to you.
Background
On February 15, 2005, Aviation Technology Group (ATG), 8001 S.
InterPort Blvd., Englewood, CO 80112 applied for a type certificate for
their new Javelin Model 100 airplane. The Javelin Model 100 is a two-
seat, pressurized, retractable-gear, composite airplane with two
turbofan engines mounted in the aft fuselage.
The Aviation Technology Group, Inc. (ATG) Javelin Model 100 will be
certificated for operations at a maximum altitude of 45,000 feet. This
unusually high operating altitude constitutes a novel or unusual design
feature for which the applicable airworthiness regulations do not
contain adequate or appropriate safety standards. Therefore, it is
necessary to develop special conditions that provide the level of
safety equivalent to that established by the regulations.
ATG indicated they will fully comply with Special Conditions for
a., Pressure Vessel Integrity; b., Ventilation; and c., Air
Conditioning.
However, ATG is unable to fully comply with Special Conditions d.
Pressurization and e. Oxygen equipment and supply. As a result from
these discussions, the Special Conditions d. and e. were revised to
include an alternate means or compensating features that require the
use of an oxygen system and emergency descent procedures that addresses
a rapid decompression event.
Discussion
The 14 CFR part 23 certification basis for the ATG Javelin Model
100 is part 23, Amendment 23-55. The FAA issues high altitude special
conditions for airplanes when the certificated altitude exceeds human
physiological limits.
Crack growth could result in rapid depressurization to cabin
altitudes that exceed human physiological limits. Damage tolerance
methods are proposed to be used to assure pressure vessel integrity
while operating at the higher altitudes. Crack growth data is used to
prescribe an inspection program, which will detect cracks before an
opening in the pressure vessel would allow rapid depressurization.
Initial crack sizes for detection are determined under Sec. 23.571,
Amendment 23-55. The cabin altitude after permissible crack growth may
not exceed specified limits.
To ensure that there is adequate fresh air for crewmembers to
perform their duties, to provide reasonable passenger comfort, and to
enable occupants to better withstand the effects of decompression at
high altitudes, the ventilation system must be designed to provide 10
cubic feet of fresh air per minute per person during normal operations.
Therefore, these special conditions require that crewmembers and
passengers be provided with 10 cubic feet of fresh air per minute per
person. In addition, during the development of the supersonic transport
special conditions, it was noted that certain pressurization failures
resulted in hot ram or bleed air being used to maintain pressurization.
Air conditioning special conditions are required because such a measure
can lead to cabin temperatures that exceed human tolerance limits
following probable and improbable failures.
Continuous flow passenger oxygen equipment is certificated for use
up to 40,000 feet; however, for rapid decompressions above 34,000 feet,
reverse diffusion leads to low oxygen partial pressures in the lungs,
to the extent that a small percentage of
[[Page 72266]]
passengers may lose useful consciousness at 35,000 feet. The percentage
increases to an estimated 60 percent at 40,000 feet, even with the use
of the continuous flow system. To prevent permanent physiological
damage, the cabin altitude must not exceed 25,000 feet for more than 2
minutes, or 40,000 feet for any time period. The maximum peak cabin
altitude of 40,000 feet is consistent with the standards established
for previous certification programs.
Decompression above 37,000 feet can result in cabin altitudes that
approach the physiological limits of the average person; therefore,
every effort must be made to provide the pilot with adequate oxygen
equipment to withstand these severe decompressions. Reducing the time
interval between pressurization failure and the time the pilot receives
oxygen will provide a safety margin against being incapacitated and can
be accomplished by the use of mask-mounted regulators. The proposed
special condition, therefore, requires pressure demand masks with mask-
mounted regulators for the flight crew. This combination of equipment
will provide the best practical protection for the failures covered by
the proposed special conditions and for improbable failures not covered
by the special conditions, provided the cabin altitude is limited.
Type Certification Basis
Under 14 CFR part 21, Sec. 21.17, Aviation Technology Group, Inc.
must show that the Javelin Model 100 meets the applicable provisions of
part 23, as amended by Amendments 23-1 through 23-55 thereto.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations in part 23 do not contain adequate or appropriate safety
standards for the Javelin Model 100 because of a novel or unusual
design feature, special conditions are prescribed under Sec. 21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Javelin Model 100 must comply with the fuel vent and
exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise
certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36, and the FAA must issue a
finding of regulatory adequacy under Sec. 611 of Public Law 92-574,
the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in Sec. 11.19, under
Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis under
Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also
apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The Javelin Model 100 will incorporate the following novel or
unusual design features:
Part 23 did not envision operation at the service ceiling requested
for this airplane. The methods used to ensure pressure vessel integrity
and to provide ventilation, air conditioning, pressurization, and
supplemental oxygen will be unique due to that operating altitude.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Javelin Model 100. Should Aviation Technology Group, Inc., apply at a
later date for a change to the type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or unusual design feature, the
special conditions would apply to that model as well under the
provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
on one model of airplane. It is not a rule of general applicability,
and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval
of these features on the airplane.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and symbols.
Citation
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and
21.17; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19.
The Proposed Special Conditions
Accordingly, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) proposes the
following special conditions as part of the type certification basis
for Aviation Technology Group, Inc., Javelin Model 100 airplanes.
a. Pressure Vessel Integrity.
1. The maximum extent of failure and pressure vessel opening that
can be demonstrated to comply with paragraph d (Pressurization) of this
special condition must be determined. It must be demonstrated by crack
propagation and damage tolerance analysis supported by testing that a
larger opening or a more severe failure than demonstrated will not
occur in normal operations.
2. Inspection schedules and procedures must be established to
ensure that cracks and normal fuselage leak rates will not deteriorate
to the extent that an unsafe condition could exist during normal
operation.
b. Ventilation. In lieu of the requirements of Sec. 23.831(b), the
ventilation system must be designed to provide a sufficient amount of
uncontaminated air to enable the crewmembers to perform their duties
without undue discomfort or fatigue, and to provide reasonable
passenger comfort during normal operating conditions and also in the
event of any probable failure of any system which could adversely
affect the cabin ventilating air. For normal operations, crewmembers
and passengers must be provided with at least 10 cubic feet of fresh
air per minute per person, or the equivalent in filtered, recirculated
air based on the volume and composition at the corresponding cabin
pressure altitude of not more than 8,000 feet.
c. Air Conditioning. In addition to the requirements of Sec.
23.831, paragraphs (b), the cabin cooling system must be designed to
meet the following conditions during flight above 15,000 feet mean sea
level (MSL):
1. After any probable failure, the cabin temperature-time history
may not exceed the values shown in Figure 1. (Please see Advisory
Circular (AC) 23.1309-1C, pages 10 and 16.)
2. After any improbable failure, the cabin temperature-time history
may not exceed the values shown in Figure 2. (Please see AC 23.1309-1C,
pages 9 and 16.)
d. Pressurization: In addition to the requirements of Sec. 23.841,
the following revised Special Condition was designed to limit high
altitude exposure by slowing down the depressurization event and to
mitigate or eliminate acute affects of dangerously low atmospheric
pressure on flight crew and passengers.
1. For the purposes of this special condition, the pressurization
system includes bleed air, air conditioning, and pressure control
systems. The pressurization system must prevent the cabin altitude from
exceeding the cabin altitude-time history shown in Figure 3 after each
of the following:
(a) Any probable malfunction or failure of the pressurization
system. The existence of undetected, latent malfunctions or failures in
conjunction with probable failures must be considered.
(b) Any single failure in the pressurization system combined with
the occurrence of a leak produced by a complete loss of a door seal
element, or a fuselage leak through an opening
[[Page 72267]]
having an effective area 2.0 times the effective area, which produces
the maximum permissible fuselage leak rate approved for normal
operation, whichever produces a more severe leak.
Note: The ATG Javelin Model 100 proposes to use a mechanical
canopy seal that is not subject to complete loss of the door seal
element. ATG must still show compliance by analysis and/or test a
fuselage leak through an opening having an effective area 2.0 times
the effective area that produces the maximum permissible fuselage
leak rate approved for normal operation.
2. The cabin altitude-time history may not exceed that shown in
Figure 4 after each of the following:
(a) The maximum pressure vessel opening resulting from an initially
detectable crack propagating for a period encompassing four normal
inspection intervals. Mid-panel cracks and cracks through skin-stringer
and skin-frame combinations must be considered.
(b) The pressure vessel opening or duct failure resulting from
probable damage (failure effect) while under maximum operating cabin
pressure differential due to a tire burst, engine rotor burst, loss of
antennas or stall warning vanes, or any probable equipment failure
(bleed air, pressure control, air conditioning, electrical source(s),
etc.) that affects pressurization.
3. Complete loss of thrust from all engines. In showing compliance
with paragraphs d.1 and d.2 of these special conditions
(Pressurization), it may be assumed that an emergency descent is made
by an approved emergency procedure. A 5-second crew recognition and
reaction time must be applied between cabin altitude warning and the
initiation of an emergency descent.
The additional Special Conditions below show full compliance to
paragraphs d.1. and d.2. and are applicable to both aircraft models.
Special Conditions that are aircraft model specific will be noted as
Mk-10 or Mk-20.
4. A decompression event is considered to be a rapid decompression
event; therefore, the following requirements must be met: The airplane
design must include an auto descent feature. The AFM must contain
specific instructions for its use, including considerations for air
traffic conditions, terrain awareness, annunciation, and accessibility
to the control(s) for automatic initiation of the descent sequence by
each occupant.
Note: For the flight evaluation of the rapid descent, the test
article must have the cabin volume representative of what is
expected to be normal, such that ATG must reduce the total cabin
volume by that which would be occupied by the furnishings and total
number of people.
5. ATG must provide flight crew and crewmember training
requirements, including physiological training that covers--
(a) Pressure or reverse cycle breathing,
(b) Rapid decompression training,
(c) Physical condition with respect to the hazards of high altitude
rapid decompression, and
(d) Recognition of decompression sickness symptoms and the need for
medical treatment.
6. The oxygen system must be compatible with paragraph e, Oxygen
Equipment and Supply Special Conditions.
(a) Mk-10: The flight crew and passenger(s) are required to use
oxygen masks for all operating altitudes above 25,000 feet.
(b) Mk-20: The flight crew and crewmember are required to use
oxygen masks for all operating altitudes above 10,000 feet.
7. ATG will show a means of guarding or de-activating the automatic
``auto emergency descent'' mode control in the forward or aft cockpit
to prevent inadvertent descent mode activation. Appropriate placards
will be required for each control device.
8. ATG will show a means of guarding or de-activating the in-flight
jettison canopy control, canopy fracturing system, or any other safety
critical control device in the forward or aft cockpit to prevent
inadvertent activation. Appropriate placards will be required for each
control device.
9. Cabin pressure loss must be annunciated as a warning. (See
Equivalent Level of Safety Findings for Cabin Pressurization.)
10. The AFM will include:
(a) Mk-10: Require a passenger briefing concerning items 4 through
9 above and the following:
(i) Seat belts.
(ii) Emergency exit.
(iii) Use of quick-donning oxygen mask system with a pressure-
demand as described in paragraph e2, Oxygen Equipment and Supply.
(b) Mk-20: Required flight crew and crewmember briefing concerning
items 4 through 10(a) above.
(i) The flight crew is the pilot and crewmember, which means a
person assigned to perform duty in an aircraft during flight time. The
Mk-20 poses safety concerns for a typical passenger since additional
training beyond the pre-flight briefing may be required to use the
emergency egress system (i.e., ejection seat). Each occupant of the Mk-
20 will be considered as a flight crew or crewmember and be required to
complete the minimum requisite training in paragraph d5 before flying
on the airplane.
e. Oxygen equipment and supply. After several follow-on FAA/ATG
discussions, the FAA Position Stage 3 for the Mk-10/Mk-20 Special
Conditions e.1 and e.2 were revised to include quick-donning pressure-
demand oxygen mask or an alternate helmet mounted oxygen mask for both
occupants that complies with TSO-C89 requirements up to 45,000 feet.
Furthermore, Special Condition e.3 was revised to allow a common oxygen
source with a larger capacity as an alternate means or compensating
feature.
1. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 23.1441(d), the
following applies: A quick-donning oxygen mask system with a pressure-
demand, mask mounted regulator that complies with TSO-C89 requirements
up to 45,000 feet must be provided for the flight crew. It must be
shown that each quick-donning mask can, with one hand and within 5
seconds, be placed on the face from its ready position, properly
secured, sealed, and supplying oxygen upon demand. Alternately, a
helmet mounted oxygen mask, panel mounted regulator that complies with
TSO-C89 requirements up to 45,000 feet may be provided to the flight
crew.
2. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 23.1443, the following
applies: A quick-donning oxygen mask system with a pressure-demand,
mask mounted regulator that complies with TSO-C89 requirements up to
45,000 feet must be provided for the passenger or crewmember.
Alternately, a helmet mounted oxygen mask, panel mounted regulator that
complies with TSO-C89 requirements up to 45,000 feet may be provided to
the passenger.
3. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 23.1445, the following
applies: If the flight crew and passenger/crewmember share a common
source of oxygen, a means to separately reserve the minimum supply
required by the flight crew must be provided. Alternately, if the
oxygen system can provide the minimum required for the flight crew as
well as all other occupants, the system can have a common source.
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Issued in Kansas City, Missouri on December 12, 2007.
James E. Jackson,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 07-6129 Filed 12-19-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-C
