Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 71703-71719 [E7-24284]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 242 (Tuesday, December 18, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 71703-71719]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-24284]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

    Pursuant to section 189a. (2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. 
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments 
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the 
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an 
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such 
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, 
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a 
hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from November 22, 2007, to December 5, 2007. The 
last biweekly notice was published on December 4, 2007 (72 FR 68206).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation 
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this 
notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and 
any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who 
wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written 
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public 
File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave 
to intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, 
person(s) may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
via electronic submission through the NRC E-Filing system for a hearing 
and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a hearing and a 
petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in accordance with the 
Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' 
in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested person(s) should consult a current copy of 
10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the Commission's PDR, located at 
One White Flint North, Public File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike 
(first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available records will be 
accessible from the Agencywide Documents Access and Management System's 
(ADAMS) Public Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web 
site, https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request 
for a hearing or petition for leave to intervene is filed within 60 
days, the Commission or a presiding officer designated by the 
Commission or by the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety 
and Licensing Board Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; 
and the Secretary or the Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic 
Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of a hearing or an 
appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or

[[Page 71704]]

fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner/
requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for the 
contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention at the hearing. The 
petitioner/requestor must also provide references to those specific 
sources and documents of which the petitioner is aware and on which the 
petitioner/requestor intends to rely to establish those facts or expert 
opinion. The petition must include sufficient information to show that 
a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material issue of law 
or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within the scope of 
the amendment under consideration. The contention must be one which, if 
proven, would entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/
requestor who fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at 
least one contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the 
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve 
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that 
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held 
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final 
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant 
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the 
issuance of any amendment.
    A request for hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must be 
filed in accordance with the NRC E-Filing rule, which the NRC 
promulgated in August 28, 2007, (72 FR 49139). The E-Filing process 
requires participants to submit and serve documents over the internet 
or in some cases to mail copies on electronic storage media. 
Participants may not submit paper copies of their filings unless they 
seek a waiver in accordance with the procedures described below.
    To comply with the procedural requirements of E-Filing, at least 
five (5) days prior to the filing deadline, the petitioner/requestor 
must contact the Office of the Secretary by e-mail at 
HEARINGDOCKET@NRC.GOV, or by calling (301) 415-1677, to request (1) a 
digital ID certificate, which allows the participant (or its counsel or 
representative) to digitally sign documents and access the E-Submittal 
server for any proceeding in which it is participating; and/or (2) 
creation of an electronic docket for the proceeding (even in instances 
in which the petitioner/requestor (or its counsel or representative) 
already holds an NRC-issued digital ID certificate). Each petitioner/
requestor will need to download the Workplace Forms ViewerTM 
to access the Electronic Information Exchange (EIE), a component of the 
E-Filing system. The Workplace Forms ViewerTM is free and is 
available at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-submittals/install-
viewer.html. Information about applying for a digital ID certificate is 
available on NRC's public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/site-help/e-
submittals/apply-certificates.html.
    Once a petitioner/requestor has obtained a digital ID certificate, 
had a docket created, and downloaded the EIE viewer, it can then submit 
a request for hearing or petition for leave to intervene. Submissions 
should be in Portable Document Format (PDF) in accordance with NRC 
guidance available on the NRC public Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html. A filing is considered complete at the 
time the filer submits its documents through EIE. To be timely, an 
electronic filing must be submitted to the EIE system no later than 
11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date. Upon receipt of a 
transmission, the E-Filing system time-stamps the document and sends 
the submitter an e-mail notice confirming receipt of the document. The 
EIE system also distributes an e-mail notice that provides access to 
the document to the NRC Office of the General Counsel and any others 
who have advised the Office of the Secretary that they wish to 
participate in the proceeding, so that the filer need not serve the 
documents on those participants separately. Therefore, applicants and 
other participants (or their counsel or representative) must apply for 
and receive a digital ID certificate before a hearing request/petition 
to intervene is filed so that they can obtain access to the document 
via the E-Filing system.
    A person filing electronically may seek assistance through the 
``Contact Us'' link located on the NRC Web site at https://www.nrc.gov/
site-help/e-submittals.html or by calling the NRC technical help line, 
which is available between 8:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m., Eastern Time, 
Monday through Friday. The help line number is (800) 397-4209 or 
locally, (301) 415-4737.
    Participants who believe that they have a good cause for not 
submitting documents electronically must file a motion, in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.302(g), with their initial paper filing requesting 
authorization to continue to submit documents in paper format. Such 
filings must be submitted by: (1) First-class mail addressed to the 
Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; or (2) courier, express mail, or expedited 
delivery service to the Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One 
White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, 
Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff. Participants filing a 
document in this manner are responsible for serving the document on all 
other participants. Filing is considered complete by first-class mail 
as of the time of deposit in the mail, or by courier, express mail, or 
expedited delivery service upon depositing the document with the 
provider of the service.
    Non-timely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding 
officer, or the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition 
and/or request should be granted and/or the contentions should be 
admitted, based on a balancing of the factors specified in 10 CFR 
2.309(c)(1)(i)-(viii). To be timely, filings must be submitted no later 
than 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the due date.
    Documents submitted in adjudicatory proceedings will appear in 
NRC's electronic hearing docket which is available to the public at 
https://ehd.nrc.gov/EHD_Proceeding/home.asp, unless excluded pursuant 
to an order of the Commission, an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, or 
a Presiding Officer. Participants are requested not to include personal 
privacy information, such as social security numbers, home addresses, 
or home phone numbers in their filings. With respect to copyrighted 
works, except for limited excerpts that serve the purpose of the 
adjudicatory filings and would constitute a Fair Use application, 
participants are requested not to include copyrighted materials in 
their submission.

[[Page 71705]]

    For further details with respect to this amendment action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS 
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or 
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

AmerGen Energy Company, LLC, Docket No. 50-461, Clinton Power Station, 
Unit No.1 (CPS), DeWitt County, Illinois

    Date of amendment request: September 27, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify technical specification (TS) by relocating references to 
specific American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM) standards 
for fuel oil testing to licensee-controlled documents. In the 
referenced letter, AmerGen (the licensee) previously received approval 
for a change to the Unit No. 1, CPS TS that added the water and 
sediment content test as alternative criteria to the ``clear and 
bright'' acceptance test for new fuel oil.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate the specific ASTM standard 
references from the Administrative Controls Section of TS to a 
licensee-controlled document. Requirements to perform testing in 
accordance with applicable ASTM standards are retained in the TS as 
are requirements to perform surveillances of both new and stored 
diesel fuel oil. Future changes to the licensee-controlled document 
will be evaluated pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, 
``Changes, tests and experiments,'' to ensure that such changes do 
not result in more than a minimal increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated. In addition, the 
``clear and bright'' test used to establish the acceptability of new 
fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage tanks has been 
expanded to recognize more rigorous testing of water and sediment 
content. Relocating the specific ASTM standard references from the 
TS to a licensee-controlled document and allowing a water and 
sediment content test to be performed to establish the acceptability 
of new fuel oil will not affect nor degrade the ability of the 
emergency diesel generators (DGs) to perform their specified safety 
function. Fuel oil quality will continue to meet ASTM requirements.
    The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators 
or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, and 
configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is 
operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not adversely 
affect the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to 
perform their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences 
of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits.
    The proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment 
isolation, or radiological release assumptions used in evaluating 
the radiological consequences of any accident previously evaluated. 
Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types and amounts 
of radioactive effluent that may be released offsite, nor 
significantly increase individual or cumulative occupational/public 
radiation exposures.
    Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate the specific ASTM standard 
references from the Administrative Controls Section of TS to a 
licensee-controlled document. In addition, the ``clear and bright'' 
test used to establish the acceptability of new fuel oil for use 
prior to addition to storage tanks has been expanded to allow a 
water and sediment content test to be performed to establish the 
acceptability of new fuel oil. The changes do not involve a physical 
alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment 
will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operation. The requirements retained in the TS continue to require 
testing of the diesel fuel oil to ensure the proper functioning of 
the DGs. Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a 
new or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed changes relocate the specific ASTM standard 
references from the Administrative Controls Section of TS to a 
licensee-controlled document. Instituting the proposed changes will 
continue to ensure the use of applicable ASTM standards to evaluate 
the quality of both new and stored fuel oil designated for use in 
the emergency DGs. Changes to the licensee-controlled document are 
performed in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.59. This 
approach provides an effective level of regulatory control and 
ensures that diesel fuel oil testing is conducted such that there is 
no significant reduction in a margin of safety.
    The ``clear and bright'' test used to establish the 
acceptability of new fuel oil for use prior to addition to storage 
tanks has been expanded to allow a water and sediment content test 
to be performed to establish the acceptability of new fuel oil. The 
margin of safety provided by the DGs is unaffected by the proposed 
changes since there continue to be TS requirements to ensure fuel 
oil is of the appropriate quality for emergency DG use. The proposed 
changes provide the flexibility needed to improve fuel oil sampling 
and analysis methodologies while maintaining sufficient controls to 
preserve the current margins of safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. Bradley J. Fewell, Associate General 
Counsel, Exelon Generation Company, LLC, 4300 Winfield Road, 
Warrenville, IL 60555.
    NRC Branch Chief: Russell A. Gibbs.

Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-317 and 50-
318, Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 and 2, Calvert 
County, Maryland

    Date of amendments request: November 8, 2007.
    Description of amendments request: The amendment would clarify the 
Technical Specification definitions for Channel Calibration and Channel 
Functional Test. The proposed amendments would incorporate Technical 
Specification Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification Change 
Traveler, TSTF-205-A, ``Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel 
Functional Test, and Related Definitions,'' Revision 3, dated July 31, 
2003.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Would not involve a significant increase in the probability 
or consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
    The proposed change clarifies the Technical Specification 
requirements for performance of channel calibrations and channel 
functional tests. Specifically, the proposed change incorporates the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Technical Specification Task 
Force Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-205-A, 
``Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and 
Related Definitions,'' Revision 3, dated July 31, 2003. The change 
does not adversely affect the performance or effectiveness of 
required testing, as testing appropriate to the associated 
Surveillance Requirements will continue to be performed. The 
proposed change does not have a detrimental impact on the condition 
or performance of any plant structure, system, or component that 
could initiate an analyzed

[[Page 71706]]

event. Therefore, the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated is not significantly increased.
    The equipment being calibrated or tested is still required to be 
operable and capable of performing the accident mitigation functions 
assumed in the accident analysis. As a result, the consequences of 
any accident previously evaluated are not significantly affected.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant increase 
in the probability or consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated.
    2. The proposed change would not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    The scope of the proposed change is limited to the clarification 
of existing calibration and test requirements. As such, the proposed 
change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (no new 
or different type of equipment will be installed) or a change in the 
methods governing normal plant operation.
    Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated.
    3. The proposed change will not involve a significant reduction 
in [a] margin of safety.
    The margin of safety in this case is the verification of 
instrument channel operability. The proposed change clarifies 
requirements for the performance of channel calibrations and channel 
functional tests. Specifically, the proposed change incorporates the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission-approved Technical Specification Task 
Force Standard Technical Specification Change Traveler, TSTF-205-A, 
``Revision of Channel Calibration, Channel Functional Test, and 
Related Definitions,'' Revision 3, dated July 31, 2003. No changes 
of setpoints to plant process limits are involved. The surveillance 
requirements, as revised, will continue to ensure that affected 
equipment is tested in a manner that gives confidence that the 
equipment can perform its appropriate safety function.
    Therefore, this change does not involve a significant reduction 
in the margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendments request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Carey Fleming, Sr. Counsel--Nuclear 
Generation, Constellation Generation Group, LLC, 750 East Pratt Street, 
17th floor, Baltimore, MD 21202.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Power 
Station, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

    Date of amendment request: November 9, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.a.7 related to the movement of 
heavy loads over and in the spent fuel pools and would relocate the 
modified requirements to a licensee-controlled document, the Kewaunee 
Power Station Technical Requirements Manual (TRM). The proposed 
amendment is needed to facilitate future spent fuel cask handling 
activities associated with dry cask spent fuel storage. The proposed 
amendment would incorporate the use of a single-failure-proof lifting 
system for handling of necessary heavy loads over or in the spent fuel 
pool with irradiated fuel in either the fuel storage racks or in the 
just-loaded spent fuel canister in the spent fuel pool. The proposed 
modified TS 3.8.a.7 would then be relocated to the TRM.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment revises Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) 
heavy load handling Technical Specification (TS) 3.8.a.7 
requirements consistent with modifications to the Auxiliary Building 
(AB) crane and the NRC's [Nuclear Regulatory Commission] current 
guidance for single-failure-proof lifting systems. The proposed 
amendment also relocates the affected heavy load handling-related TS 
to a licensee-controlled document, consistent with the NRC's 
regulations.
    The proposed change to TS 3.8.a.7 permits spent fuel cask 
handling in the spent fuel pool, which is required for loading spent 
fuel for dry storage at the on-site Independent Spent Fuel Storage 
Installation (ISFSI). Proposed TS 3.8.a.7 includes a new requirement 
that the AB crane and associated lifting devices meet the applicable 
single-failure-proof criteria.
    Heavy load handling will continue to be conducted in accordance 
with the KPS heavy load handling program, which meets the NRC's 
guidance in NUREG-0612, as described in this LAR, and as augmented 
by Regulatory Information Summary 2005-25. With the upgrade of the 
AB crane load handling system, drops of heavy loads will not be 
considered credible. Notwithstanding the AB crane upgrade, heavy 
loads will still be prohibited from being suspended over irradiated 
fuel in the spent fuel pool storage racks under the revised 
requirements.
    The previously evaluated cask drop accident is not considered 
credible with the upgraded AB crane because the crane trolley is 
being upgraded to a single-failure-proof design, consistent with 
applicable NRC-endorsed guidance. Lifting devices and interfacing 
lifting points associated with spent fuel cask handling will also be 
designed in accordance with applicable NRC guidance pertaining to 
single-failure-proof lifting systems. The result of these design 
upgrades is that the AB crane will retain the lifted load in the 
event of a single failure in the load path, including a failure of a 
wire rope. In addition, the crane will hold the load and the trolley 
and bridge will be designed to stay on their respective rails during 
a design basis seismic event.
    The relocation of TS 3.8.a.7 to the KPS Technical Requirements 
Manual (TRM) is an administrative change that does not affect plant 
operation or heavy load handling.
    Revised TS 3.8.a.7 and its associated Bases will be relocated to 
the TRM after approval of this amendment request. Changes to the KPS 
TRM are controlled by 10 CFR 50.59. Regulation 10 CFR 50.59 requires 
that NRC approval be obtained prior to any change that would result 
in more than a minimal increase in (1) the frequency of occurrence 
of an accident previously evaluated, (2) likelihood of occurrence of 
a malfunction of a SSC important to safety previously evaluated, or 
(3) consequences of a malfunction of a SSC important to safety 
previously evaluated. Accordingly, upon relocation of the 
requirements of TS 3.8.a.7 and associated Bases to the TRM, 
appropriate control of changes will be maintained, based on the 
criteria in 10 CFR 50.59. Administrative relocation of the 
requirements of TS 3.8.a.7 does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, configuration of KPS or the manner in which it is 
operated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not significantly increase 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Heavy load handling will continue to be conducted in accordance 
with the KPS heavy load handling program, which meets the NRC's 
guidance in NUREG-0612, as approved for KPS. Drops of heavy loads 
will continue to be very improbable events and the upgrade of the 
KPS AB crane lifting system to a single-failure-proof design 
provides additional defense-in-depth against such events. 
Notwithstanding the AB crane upgrade, heavy loads will still be 
prohibited from being suspended over irradiated fuel in the spent 
fuel pool storage racks under the revised requirements.
    Heavy load handling operations at KPS will continue to be 
conducted as they currently are and no new heavy load handling 
operations are required as a result of this amendment. The 
previously evaluated cask drop accident is not considered credible 
with the upgraded AB crane because the crane trolley is being 
upgraded to a single-failure-proof design, consistent with 
applicable NRC-endorsed guidance. Lifting devices and interfacing 
lifting points associated with spent fuel cask handling will also be 
designed in accordance with applicable NRC guidance pertaining to 
single-failure-proof lifting systems. The result

[[Page 71707]]

of these design upgrades is that the AB crane will retain the lifted 
load in the event of a single failure in the load path, including a 
failure of a wire rope. In addition, the crane will hold the load 
and the trolley and bridge will be designed to stay on their 
respective rails during a design basis seismic event.
    The relocation of TS 3.8.a.7 to the KPS Technical Requirements 
Manual (TRM) is an administrative change that does not affect plant 
operation or heavy load handling.
    Accordingly, upon relocation of the requirements of TS 3.8.a.7 
and associated Bases to the TRM, appropriate control of changes will 
be maintained, based on the criteria in 10 CFR 50.59. Modification 
of the requirements of TS 3.8.a.7 does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, configuration of KPS or the manner in which it is 
operated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed amendment revises KPS heavy load handling TS 
3.8.a.7 requirements consistent with modifications to the AB crane 
and the NRC's current guidance for single-failure-proof lifting 
systems.
    Heavy load handling will continue to be conducted in accordance 
with the KPS heavy load handling program, which meets the NRC's 
guidance in NUREG-0612, as approved for KPS. Drops of heavy loads 
will continue to be very improbable events and the upgrade of the 
KPS AB crane lifting system to a single-failure-proof design 
provides additional defense-in-depth against such events and an 
increase in overall design margin. Notwithstanding the AB crane 
upgrade, heavy loads will still be prohibited from being suspended 
over irradiated fuel in the spent fuel pool storage racks under the 
revised requirements.
    Further, the relocation of TS 3.8.a.7 to the KPS Technical 
Requirements Manual (TRM) is an administrative change that does not 
affect plant operation or heavy load handling.
    Heavy load handling operations at KPS will continue to be 
conducted as they currently are and no new heavy load handling 
operations are required as a result of this amendment. The 
previously evaluated cask drop accident is less probable with the 
upgraded AB crane because the crane trolley is being upgraded to a 
single-failure-proof design, consistent with applicable NRC-endorsed 
guidance. Lifting devices and interfacing lifting points associated 
with spent fuel cask handling will also be designed in accordance 
with applicable NRC guidance pertaining to single-failure-proof 
lifting systems. The result of these design upgrades is that the AB 
crane will retain the lifted load in the event of a single failure 
in the load path, including a failure of a wire rope. In addition, 
the crane will hold the load and the trolley and bridge will be 
designed to stay on their respective rails during a design basis 
seismic event.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion 
Resources Services, Inc., Counsel for Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., 
120 Tredegar Street, Richmond, VA 23219.
    NRC Acting Branch Chief: Cliff Munson.

Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc. Docket No. 50-305, Kewaunee Power 
Station, Kewaunee County, Wisconsin

    Date of amendment request: November 9, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the Kewaunee Power Station (KPS) Updated Safety Analysis Report 
(USAR) to modify the design and licensing basis for the auxiliary 
building (AB) crane. The proposed amendment would allow the use of a 
methodology for performing the seismic qualification analysis of the 
upgraded crane. The crane is being upgraded to become a single-failure-
proof design. The new methodology includes rolling of the crane bridge 
and trolley wheels during a seismic event.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This amendment request pertains solely to an analysis method 
supporting the upgrade of the KPS AB crane from a non-single-
failure-proof design to a single-failure-proof design. The AB crane 
is used to lift and handle loads in the KPS spent fuel pool and 
truck bay areas. The AB crane does not interface with operating 
plant equipment. The design rated load of the AB crane remains the 
same as previously approved. The proposed amendment does not change 
the current heavy load handling practices that are in use at KPS. 
Upgrading the AB crane to a single-failure-proof design will reduce 
the probability of a heavy load drop in the areas where the AB crane 
lifts and handles loads.
    The seismic analysis method proposed for use recognizes the 
inherent propensity for structures not fixed to one another (e.g., 
steel wheels on steel rails) to roll if sufficient lateral force is 
applied to either object. This seismic analysis method is proposed 
for use solely on the AB crane upgrade and not for any other plant 
structures, systems, or components. The recognition of wheel rolling 
between the AB crane trolley and bridge and their respective rails 
reflects the true nature of the installed equipment and its response 
to horizontal forces generated by a seismic event. Consideration of 
rolling reduces the projected analyzed loads on the crane and 
building structures and eliminates the need for unnecessary 
modifications to both.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    This amendment request pertains to an analysis method supporting 
the upgrade of an existing plant component. Specifically, the 
existing AB crane trolley is being replaced with a state-of-the-art 
design that is single-failure-proof. The AB crane does not interface 
with operating plant equipment. This seismic analysis method is 
proposed for use solely on the AB crane upgrade and not for any 
other plant structures, systems, or components.
    The design rated load of the AB crane remains the same at 125 
tons. This load controls the design and supporting analysis. The 
auxiliary hook design rated load is being increased from 10 tons to 
15 tons. The proposed amendment does not change the currently 
acceptable heavy load handling practices in use at KPS. The number 
and types of lifts made using this crane in support of KPS plant 
operations are not significantly changed from that contemplated 
during original plant licensing. Furthermore, the basic operations 
of the crane (i.e., hoisting and horizontal travel) remain the same, 
although the electronic controls will be upgraded to current 
standards.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not create a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated in 
the KPS licensing basis.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Although the proposed change is made specifically to support the 
upgrade of the KPS AB crane from a non-single-failure-proof to a 
single-failure-proof design, the margin of safety under 
consideration in this evaluation is mainly based on that contained 
within the safety analysis (seismic analysis).
    The purpose of this methodology is to determine the stress 
placed on the AB cranes' structural components. The stresses 
determined by this methodology are then compared to the yield 
strength values contained in CMAA-70. If the stresses the structural 
component are analyzed to receive during a postulated seismic event 
are less than the values contained in CMAA-70 the structural 
integrity of the crane is maintained and a suspended load will 
remain suspended during a seismic event. Additional margin has been 
added by reducing the analysis acceptance criteria to 90% of the 
acceptance criteria values contained in CMAA-70, modifying the crane 
support structure

[[Page 71708]]

through additional welds and material, and confirming the bolts are 
of the proper material.
    DEK [Dominion Energy Kewaunee] is modeling the AB crane to roll 
during a seismic event when the postulated forces exceed the brake 
holding force. This provides a more realistic approach because the 
crane trolley is not fixed to the bridge rails. DEK has provided 
additional conservatisms by doubling the calculated force needed to 
overcome the brake holding force.
    Therefore, the proposed amendment does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Lillian M. Cuoco, Senior Counsel, Dominion 
Resources Services, Inc., Counsel for Dominion Energy Kewaunee, Inc., 
120 Tredegar Street, Richmond, VA 23219.
    NRC Acting Branch Chief: Cliff Munson.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: October 22, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify the Technical Specification (TS) to establish more effective and 
appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements 
related to ensuring the habitability of the control room envelope (CRE) 
in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task 
Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change traveler TSTF-448, 
Revision 3, ``Control Room Habitability.'' Specifically, the proposed 
amendment would modify TS 3.7.9, ``Control Room Emergency Ventilation 
System (CREVS),'' and would establish a CRE habitability (CREH) program 
in TS Section 5.5, ``Administrative Controls--Programs and Manuals.'' 
The NRC staff issued a ``Notice of Availability of Technical 
Specification Improvement to Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room 
Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement 
Process'' associated with TSTF-448, Revision 3, in the Federal Register 
on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The notice included a model safety 
evaluation, a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) 
determination, and a model license amendment request. In its 
application dated October 22, 2007, the licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee 
and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the request for amendments involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
Council--Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: October 22, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify requirements of Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12, ``RCS 
Specific Activity,'' and TS 3.7.4, ``Secondary Specific Activity,'' as 
related to the use of an alternate source term (AST) associated with 
accident offsite and control room dose consequences. Implementation of 
AST supports adoption of the control room envelope habitability 
controls in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-
approved TS Task Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change 
traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3, ``Control Room Habitability.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.

[[Page 71709]]

    The use of an AST is recognized in 10 CFR 50.67 and guidance for 
its implementation is provided in RG [Regulatory Guide] 1.183. The 
AST involves quantities, isotopic composition, chemical and physical 
characteristics, and release timing of radioactive material for use 
as inputs to accident dose analyses. As such, the AST cannot affect 
the probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated accident. In 
addition, the reduction is specific activity limits within the TSs 
is unrelated to accident initiators. No facility equipment, 
procedure, or process changes are required in conjunction with 
implementing the AST that could increase the likelihood of a 
previously analyzed accident. The proposed changes in the source 
term and the methodology for the dose consequence analyses follow 
the guidance of RG 1.183. As a result, there is no increase in the 
likelihood of existing event initiators.
    Regarding accident consequences, the reduction in specific 
activity limits within the TSs is more restrictive (more 
conservative) and acts to support the analysis results given the 
application of an AST. The results of accident dose analyses using 
the AST are compared to TEDE [total effective dose equivalent] 
acceptance criteria that account for the sum of deep dose equivalent 
(for external exposure) and committed effective dose equivalent (for 
internal exposure). Dose results were previously compared to 
separate limits on whole body, thyroid, and skin doses as 
appropriate for the particular accident analyzed. The results of the 
revised dose consequences analyses demonstrate that the regulatory 
acceptance criteria are met for each analyzed event. Implementing 
the AST involves no facility equipment, procedure, or process 
changes that could affect the radioactive material actually released 
during an event. Consequently, no conditions have been created that 
could significantly increase the consequences of any of the events 
being evaluated.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of any of the events 
being evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The AST involves quantities, isotopic composition, chemical and 
physical characteristics, and release timing of radioactive material 
for use as inputs to accident dose analyses. As such, the AST cannot 
create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident. In 
addition, the reduction is specific activity limits within the TSs 
is unrelated to accident initiators. No facility equipment, 
procedure, or process changes have been made in conjunction with 
implementing the AST that could initiate or substantially alter the 
progression of an accident.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    Implementing the AST is relevant only to calculated accident 
dose consequences. The results of the revised dose consequences 
analyses demonstrate that the regulatory acceptance criteria are met 
for each analyzed event. In addition, the reduction is specific 
activity limits within the TSs is unrelated to accident initiators. 
No facility equipment, procedure, or process changes are required in 
conjunction with implementing the AST that could increase the 
exposure of control room or offsite individuals to radioactive 
material. The AST does not affect the transient behavior of non-
radiological parameters (e.g., Reactor Coolant System pressure, 
Containment pressure) that are pertinent to a margin of safety.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
Council--Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-313, Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 1, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: October 22, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify Technical Specifications (TS) requirements for mode change 
limitations in Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.0.4 and 
Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.0.4. The proposed TS changes are 
consistent with Revision 9 of Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-
approved Industry TS Task Force (TSTF) Standard TS (STS) change 
traveler, TSTF-359, ``Increase Flexibility in Mode Restraints.'' The 
amendment would also modify other TSs to reflect the revisions to LCO 
3.0.4. The spelling of the word ``not'' is corrected in Section 1.4 of 
the TSs.
    The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on August 2, 2002 (67 FR 50475), as part of the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP), on possible 
amendments to revise the plant-specific TS to modify requirements for 
model change limitations in LCO 3.0.4 and SR 3.0.4.
    The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the 
models for Safety Evaluation and No Significant Hazards Consideration 
Determination for referencing in license amendment applications in the 
Federal Register on April 4, 2003 (68 FR 16579). The licensee affirmed 
the applicability of the CLIIP, including the model No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, in its application dated October 
22, 2007.
    The proposed TS changes are consistent with NRC-approved Industry 
TSTF STS change, TSTF-359, Revision 8, as modified by 68 FR 16579. 
TSTF-359, Revision 8, was subsequently revised to incorporate the 
modifications discussed in the April 4, 2003, Federal Register notice 
and other minor changes. TSTF-359, Revision 9, was subsequently 
submitted to the NRC on April 28, 2003, and was approved by the NRC on 
May 9, 2003.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the NRC staff's analysis 
of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented 
below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated


    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition 
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. Being in a 
TS condition and the associated required actions is not an initiator 
of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of 
an accident previously evaluated is not significantly increased. The 
consequences of an accident while relying on required actions as 
allowed by proposed LCO 3.0.4, are no different than the 
consequences of an accident while entering and relying on the 
required actions while starting in a condition of applicability of 
the TS. Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously 
evaluated are not significantly affected by this change. The 
addition of a requirement to assess and manage the risk introduced 
by this change will further minimize possible concerns. Therefore, 
this change does not involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2 --The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). 
Entering into a mode or other specified condition in the 
applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition statement and the 
associated required actions of the TS, will not introduce new 
failure modes or effects and will not, in the absence of other 
unrelated failures, lead to an accident whose consequences exceed 
the consequences of

[[Page 71710]]

accidents previously evaluated. The addition of a requirement to 
assess and manage the risk introduced by this change will further 
minimize possible concerns. Thus, this change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 3 --The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change allows entry into a mode or other specified 
condition in the applicability of a TS, while in a TS condition 
statement and the associated required actions of the TS. The TS 
allow operation of the plant without the full complement of 
equipment through the conditions for not meeting the TS Limiting 
Conditions for Operation (LCO). The risk associated with this 
allowance is managed by the imposition of required actions that must 
be performed within the prescribed completion times. The net effect 
of being in a TS condition on the margin of safety is not considered 
significant. The proposed change does not alter the required actions 
or completion times of the TS. The proposed change allows TS 
conditions to be entered, and the associated required actions and 
completion times to be used in new circumstances. This use is 
predicated upon the licensee's performance of a risk assessment and 
the management of plant risk. The change also eliminates current 
allowances for utilizing required actions and completion times in 
similar circumstances, without assessing and managing risk. The net 
change to the margin of safety is insignificant. Therefore, this 
change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of 
safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the request for amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
Council--Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Entergy Operations, Inc., Docket Nos. 50-368, Arkansas Nuclear One, 
Unit 2*, Pope County, Arkansas

    Date of amendment request: October 22, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify the Technical Specification (TS) to establish more effective and 
appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements 
related to ensuring the habitability of the control room envelope (CRE) 
in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task 
Force (TSTF) Standard Technical Specification change traveler TSTF-448, 
Revision 3, ``Control Room Habitability.'' Specifically, the proposed 
amendment would modify TS 3.7.6.1, ``Control Room Emergency Ventilation 
and Air Condition System,'' and would establish a CRE habitability 
(CREH) program in TS Section 6.5, ``Administrative Controls--Programs 
and Manuals.'' The NRC staff issued a ``Notice of Availability of 
Technical Specification Improvement to Modify Requirements Regarding 
Control Room Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process'' associated with TSTF-448, Revision 3, in the 
Federal Register on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The notice included 
a model safety evaluation, a model no significant hazards consideration 
(NSHC) determination, and a model license amendment request. In its 
application dated October 22, 2007, the licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented below.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee 
and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the request for amendments involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
C