Special Conditions: DynCorp International, Supplemental Type Certificate (STC), Project Number ST2902RC-R, Installation of Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6-67D Engine With Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC) on Global Helicopter Technology, Inc. (GHTI), Restricted Category Model UH-1H Helicopters, Type Certificate (TC) Number R00002RC, 64529-64532 [07-5698]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 221 / Friday, November 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
10 CFR Parts 2 and 13
RIN 3150–AH74
Use of Electronic Submissions in
Agency Hearings; Correction
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Final rule; correction.
AGENCY:
This document corrects a
final rule appearing in the Federal
Register on August 28, 2007 (72 FR
49139), that requires the use of
electronic submissions in all agency
hearings, consistent with the existing
practice for the high-level radioactive
waste repository application. This
document is necessary to correct two
typographical errors.
DATES: This correction is effective
November 16, 2007, and is applicable to
October 15, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Darani Reddick, Office of the General
Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, telephone 301–415–3841, e-mail
dmr@nrc.gov, or Steven Hamrick, Office
of the General Counsel, telephone 301–
415–4106, e-mail sch1@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: As
published, the final regulations contain
errors which may prove to be
misleading and need to be clarified.
SUMMARY:
List of Subjects
10 CFR Part 2
Administrative practice and
procedure, Classified information,
Confidential business information,
Freedom of information, Hazardous
waste, Nuclear materials, Nuclear power
plants and reactors, Penalties, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements, Sex
discrimination.
10 CFR Part 13
Administrative practice and
procedure, Claims, Fraud, Penalties.
I Accordingly, 10 CFR part 2 is
corrected by making the following
correcting amendment:
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with RULES
2. In the definition for ‘‘participant,’’
in the second sentence, remove
‘‘§ 2,315(b)’’ and add in its place
‘‘§ 2.315(c).’’
I
PART 13—PROGRAM FRAUD CIVIL
REMEDIES
Authority: Public Law 99–509, secs. 6101–
6104, 100 Stat. 1874 (31 U.S.C. 3801–3812);
sec. 1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504
note). Sections 13.13 (a) and (b) also issued
under section Pub. L. 101–410, 104 Stat. 890,
as amended by section 31001(s), Pub. L. 104–
134, 110 Stat. 1321–373 (28 U.S.C. 2461
note).
§ 13.2
1. The authority citation for part 2
continues to read as follows:
[Corrected]
4. In the definition for ‘‘participant,’’
in the second sentence, remove
‘‘§ 2,315(b)’’ and add in its place
‘‘§ 2.315(c).’’
I
Authority: Secs. 161, 181, 68 Stat. 948,
953, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201, 2231); sec.
191, as amended, Pub. L. 87–615, 76 Stat. 409
(42 U.S.C. 2241); sec. 201, 88 Stat. 1242, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 5841); 5 U.S.C. 552; sec.
1704, 112 Stat. 2750 (44 U.S.C. 3504 note).
Jkt 214001
[Corrected]
3. The authority citation for part 13
continues to read as follows:
I
14:52 Nov 15, 2007
§ 2.4
I
PART 2—RULES OF PRACTICE FOR
DOMESTIC LICENSING PROCEEDINGS
AND ISSUANCE OF ORDERS
VerDate Aug<31>2005
Section 2.101 also issued under secs. 53,
62, 63, 81, 103, 104, 105, 68 Stat. 930, 932,
933, 935, 936, 937, 938, as amended (42
U.S.C. 2073, 2092, 2093, 2111, 2133, 2134,
2135); sec. 114(f); Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat.
2213, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10143(f); sec.
102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83 Stat. 853, as amended
(42 U.S.C. 4332); sec. 301, 88 Stat. 1248 (42
U.S.C. 5871). Sections 2.102, 2.103, 2.104,
2.105, 2.321 also issued under secs. 102, 103,
104, 105, 183i, 189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 938,
954, 955, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2132, 2133,
2134, 2135, 2233, 2239). Section 2.105 also
issued under Pub. L. 97–415, 96 Stat. 2073
(42 U.S.C. 2239). Sections 2.200–2.206 also
issued under secs. 161b, i, o, 182, 186, 234,
68 Stat. 948–951, 955, 83 Stat. 444, as
amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b), (i), (o), 2236,
2282); sec. 206, 88 Stat. 1246 (42 U.S.C.
5846). Section 2.205(j) also issued under Pub.
L. 101–410, 104 Stat. 90, as amended by
section 3100(s), Pub. L. 104–134, 110 Stat.
1321–373 (28 U.S.C. 2461 note). Subpart C
also issued under sec. 189, 68 Stat. 955 (42
U.S.C. 2239). Sections 2.600–2.606 also
issued under sec. 102, Pub. L. 91–190, 83
Stat. 853, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4332).
Section 2.301 also issued under 5 U.S.C. 554.
Sections 2.343, 2.346, 2.712, also issued
under 5 U.S.C. 557. Section 2.340 also issued
under secs. 135, 141, Pub. L. 97–425, 96 Stat.
2232, 2241 (42 U.S.C. 10155, 10161). Section
2.390 also issued under sec. 103, 68 Stat. 936,
as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133) and 5 U.S.C.
552. Sections 2.800 and 2.808 also issued
under 5 U.S.C. 553. Section 2.809 also issued
under 5 U.S.C. 553, and sec. 29, Pub. L. 85–
256, 71 Stat. 579, as amended (42 U.S.C.
2039). Subpart K also issued under sec. 189,
68 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2239); sec. 134, Pub.
L. 97–425, 96 Stat. 2230 (42 U.S.C. 10154).
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 8th day
of November 2007.
PO 00000
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64529
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Annette L. Vietti-Cook,
Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E7–22378 Filed 11–15–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 21 and 29
[Docket No. SW015; Special Condition No.
29–015–SC]
Special Conditions: DynCorp
International, Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC), Project Number
ST2902RC–R, Installation of Pratt &
Whitney Canada PT6–67D Engine With
Full Authority Digital Engine Control
(FADEC) on Global Helicopter
Technology, Inc. (GHTI), Restricted
Category Model UH–1H Helicopters,
Type Certificate (TC) Number
R00002RC
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special condition; request
for comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This special condition is
issued for Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC), Project Number
ST2902RC–R, for the installation of a
Pratt and Whitney PT6–67D Turbine
Engine on Global Helicopter Technology
Inc. (GHTI), Restricted Category, U.S.
Army military surplus helicopters,
Model UH–1H, type certificated under
type certificate (TC) R00002RC. The
installation of the PT6–67D on the
Restricted Category UH–1H will have a
novel or unusual design feature
associated with the installation of the
Full Authority Digital Engine Control
(FADEC). The applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards to protect
systems that perform critical control
functions from the effects of a highintensity radiated field (HIRF). This
special condition contains the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
ensure that critical control functions of
systems will be maintained when
exposed to HIRF.
DATES: The effective date of this special
condition is November 7, 2007. We
must receive your comments by January
15, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies
of your comments to: Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Rotorcraft
Directorate, Attention: Rules Docket
(ASW–111), Docket No. SW015, Fort
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 221 / Friday, November 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
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Worth, Texas 76193–0111. You may
deliver two copies to the Rotorcraft
Directorate at the above address. You
must mark your comments: Docket No.
SW015. You can inspect comments in
the Rules Docket weekdays, except
Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and
4 p.m. The Rules Docket for special
conditions is maintained at the Federal
Aviation Administration, Rotorcraft
Directorate, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room
448, Fort Worth, Texas 76137.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Tyrone D. Millard, FAA, Rotorcraft
Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards Staff,
Fort Worth, Texas 76193–0110;
telephone 817–222–5439, fax 817–222–
5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA
has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment
hereon are unnecessary because the
substance of this special condition has
been subject to the public comment
process in several prior instances with
no substantive comments received. We
are satisfied that new comments are
unlikely. The FAA therefore finds that
good cause exists for making this special
condition effective upon issuance.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take
part in this rulemaking by sending
written comments, views, or data. The
most helpful comments reference a
specific portion of the special condition,
explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include
supporting data.
We will file in the docket all
comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive
public contact with FAA personnel
about this special condition. You can
inspect the docket before and after the
comment closing date. If you wish to
review the docket in person, go to the
address in the ADDRESSES section of this
preamble between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m.,
Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. We will consider all
comments we receive by the closing
date for comments. We will consider
comments filed late if it is possible to
do so without incurring additional
expense or delay. We may change this
special condition based on the
comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we
received your comments on this special
condition, send us a pre-addressed,
stamped postcard on which the docket
number appears. We will stamp the date
on the postcard and mail it back to you.
Background
On January 9, 2007, DynCorp
International applied for an STC for the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:52 Nov 15, 2007
Jkt 214001
installation of a Pratt & Whitney PT6–
67D Turbine Engine on the GHTI, U.S.
Army UH–1H, Restricted Category
Helicopter, type certificated under Type
Certificate R00002RC. This UH–1H
Restricted Category helicopter is a
utility/heavy lift helicopter with a twobladed teetering main rotor system. It is
to be powered by a single Pratt and
Whitney PT6–67D engine that
incorporates a full authority digital
engine control (FADEC). The maximum
gross weight of the aircraft is 9,500
pounds.
Supplemental Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR
21.101, DynCorp International must
show that the Engine Installation meets
the applicable provisions of the
regulations as listed below:
• 14 CFR part 29 as amended through
and including Amendment 29–1,
effective August 12, 1965.
• 14 CFR part 29.1529, Instructions
for Continued Airworthiness,
Amendment Number 20, effective
September 11, 1980.
In accordance with 14 CFR part
36.1(a)(4), compliance with the noise
requirements was not shown for the
aircraft. Therefore, the engine
installations under this supplemental
type certificate are only eligible for
external load operations excepted by
§ 36.1(a)(4) and defined under
§ 133.1(b). Any alteration to the aircraft
for special purpose not identified above
will require further FAA approval and
in addition, may require noise testing,
flight testing, or a combination of noise
and flight testing.
In addition, the certification basis
includes an equivalent safety finding
pertaining to a limitation associated
with repetitive high torque cycle events
that is not relevant to this special
condition.
If the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for this STC because of
a novel or unusual design feature,
special conditions are prescribed under
the provisions of § 21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions as
defined in § 11.19, and issued in
accordance with § 11.38, and they
become part of the STC certification
basis under § 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model, the
modification, or a combination of the
model and the modification for which
they are issued. Should this STC be
revised to include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, this special condition
PO 00000
Frm 00008
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
would also apply to the other model
under the provisions of § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The GHTI UH–1H Restricted Category
Helicopter with a Pratt & Whitney PT6–
67D engine installed will incorporate
the following novel or unusual design
features: Electrical, electronic, or a
combination of electrical and electronic
(electrical/electronic) systems,
specifically a FADEC, that will be
performing critical control functions for
the continued safe flight and landing of
the helicopter. A FADEC is an electronic
device that performs the critical
functions of engine control during flight
operations.
Discussion
The DynCorp International
installation of the PT6–67D in the UH–
1H helicopter, at the time of application,
was identified as incorporating an
electronic FADEC system. After the
design is finalized, DynCorp
International will provide the FAA with
a preliminary hazard analysis. This
analysis will identify the critical control
functions that are required for safe flight
and landing that are performed by the
FADEC system.
Recent advances in technology have
given rise to the application in aircraft
designs of advanced electrical/
electronic systems that perform critical
control functions. These advanced
systems respond to the transient effects
of induced electrical current and voltage
caused by HIRF incidents on the
external surface of the helicopter. These
induced transient currents and voltages
can degrade the performance of the
electrical/electronic systems by
damaging the components or by
upsetting the systems’ functions.
Furthermore, the electromagnetic
environment has undergone a
transformation not envisioned by the
current application of § 29.1309(a).
Higher energy levels radiate from
operational transmitters currently used
for radar, radio, and television. Also, the
number of transmitters has increased
significantly.
Existing aircraft or alteration
certification requirements are
inappropriate in view of these
technological advances. In addition, the
FAA has received reports of some
significant safety incidents and
accidents involving military aircraft
equipped with advanced electrical/
electronic systems when they were
exposed to electromagnetic radiation.
The combined effects of the
technological advances in helicopter
design and the changing environment
have resulted in an increased level of
E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM
16NOR1
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 221 / Friday, November 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
vulnerability of the electrical/electronic
systems required for the continued safe
flight and landing of the helicopter. The
design and installation of these systems
will provide effective measures to
protect this engine installation on this
helicopter against the adverse effects of
exposure to HIRF. The following
primary factors contributed to the
current conditions: (1) Increased use of
sensitive electronics that perform
critical control functions; (2) reduced
electromagnetic shielding afforded
helicopter systems by advanced
technology airframe materials; (3)
adverse service experience of military
aircraft using these technologies; and (4)
an increase in the number and power of
radio frequency emitters and the
expected increase in the future.
On July 30, 2007, we issued a final
HIRF rule (72 FR 44016, August 6,
2007). This rule provides standards to
protect aircraft electrical and electronic
systems from HIRFs. It was effective
September 5, 2007. However, that rule
included provisions that provide relief
from the new testing requirements for
equipment previously certificated under
HIRF special conditions issued in
accordance with 14 CFR § 21.16. To
obtain this relief, the applicant must be
able to—
(1) Provide evidence that the system
was the subject of HIRF special
conditions issued before December 1,
2007;
(2) Show that there have been no
system design changes that would
invalidate the HIRF immunity
characteristics originally demonstrated
under the previously issued HIRF
special conditions; and
(3) Provide the data used to
demonstrate compliance with the HIRF
special conditions under which the
system was previously approved.
DynCorp’s FADEC installation is
eligible for this relief provided in 14
CFR § 29.1317(d) of the final HIRF rule.
However, to meet their HIRF
requirements, they must comply with
this Special Condition, which is based
on similar, historical HIRF protections
requirements.
These special conditions will require
the systems that perform critical control
functions, as installed in the aircraft, to
meet certain standards based on either
a defined HIRF environment or a fixed
value using laboratory tests.
The applicant may demonstrate that
the operation and operational
capabilities of the installed electrical/
electronic systems that perform critical
control functions are not adversely
affected when the aircraft is exposed to
the defined HIRF test environment. The
FAA has determined that the test
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:52 Nov 15, 2007
Jkt 214001
environment defined in Table 1 is
acceptable for critical control functions
in helicopters.
The applicant may also demonstrate
by a laboratory test that the electrical/
electronic systems that perform critical
control functions can withstand a peak
electromagnetic field strength in a
frequency range of 10 KHz to 18 GHz.
If a laboratory test is used to show
compliance with the defined HIRF
environment, no credit will be given for
signal attenuation due to installation. A
level of 200 volts per meter (v/m) is
more appropriate for critical functions
during VFR operations. Laboratory test
levels are defined according to RTCA/
DO–160D Section 20 Category Y (200
v/m and 300 mA). As defined in DO–
160D Section 20, the test levels are
defined as the peak of the root means
squared (rms) envelope. As a minimum,
the modulations required for RTCA/
DO–160D Section 20 Category Y will be
used. Other modulations should be
selected as the signal most likely to
disrupt the operation of the system
under test, based on its design
characteristics. For example, flight
control systems may be susceptible to 3
Hz square wave modulation while the
video signals for electronic display
systems may be susceptible to 400 Hz
sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case
modulation is unknown or cannot be
determined, default modulations may be
used. Suggested default values are a 1
KHz sine wave with 80 percent depth of
modulation in the frequency range from
10 KHz to 400 MHz and 1 KHz square
wave with greater than 90 percent depth
of modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz.
For frequencies where the unmodulated
signal would cause deviations from
normal operation, several different
modulating signals with various
waveforms and frequencies should be
applied.
Applicants must perform a
preliminary hazard analysis to identify
electrical/electronic systems that
perform critical control functions. The
term ‘‘critical control’’ means those
functions whose failure would
contribute to or cause an unsafe
condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the
helicopter. The FADEC system
identified by the hazard analysis as
performing critical control functions is
required to have HIRF protection.
Compliance with HIRF requirements
will be demonstrated by tests, analysis
models, similarity with existing
systems, or a combination of these
methods. The two basic options of
either testing the FADEC system to the
defined environment or laboratory
testing may not be combined. The
PO 00000
Frm 00009
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
64531
laboratory test allows some frequency
areas to be undertested and requires
other areas to have some safety margin
when compared to the defined
environment. The areas required to have
some safety margin are those shown, by
past testing, to exhibit greater
susceptibility to adverse effects from
HIRF; and laboratory tests, in general,
do not accurately represent the aircraft
installation. Service experience alone
will not be acceptable since such
experience in normal flight operations
may not include an exposure to HIRF.
Reliance on a system with similar
design features for redundancy, as a
means of protection against the effects
of external HIRF, is generally
insufficient because all elements of a
redundant system are likely to be
concurrently exposed to the radiated
fields.
The modulation that represents the
signal most likely to disrupt the
operation of the system under test,
based on its design characteristics
should be selected. For example, flight
control systems may be susceptible to 3
Hz square wave modulation. If the
worst-case modulation is unknown or
cannot be determined, default
modulations may be used. Suggested
default values are a 1 KHz sine wave
with 80 percent depth of modulation in
the frequency range from 10 KHz to 400
MHz, and 1 KHz square wave with
greater than 90 percent depth of
modulation from 400 MHz to 18 GHz.
For frequencies where the unmodulated
signal would cause deviations from
normal operation, several different
modulating signals with various
waveforms and frequencies should be
applied.
Acceptable system performance
would be attained by demonstrating that
the critical control function components
of the system under consideration
continue to perform their intended
function during and after exposure to
required electromagnetic fields.
Deviations from system specifications
may be acceptable but must be
independently assessed by the FAA on
a case-by-case basis.
TABLE 1.—FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/
METER
Frequency
10–100 KHz ..............
100–500 KHz ............
500–2000 KHz ..........
2–30 MHz .................
30–100 MHz .............
100–200 MHz ...........
200–400 MHz ...........
400–700 MHz ...........
700–1000 MHz .........
E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM
16NOR1
Peak
150
200
200
200
200
200
200
730
1400
Average
150
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
240
64532
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 221 / Friday, November 16, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
TABLE 1.—FIELD STRENGTH VOLTS/
METER—Continued
Frequency
1–2 GHz ...................
2–4 GHz ...................
4–6 GHz ...................
6–8 GHz ...................
8–12 GHz .................
12–18 GHz ...............
18–40 GHz ...............
Peak
Average
5000
6000
7200
1100
5000
2000
1000
250
490
400
170
330
330
420
Applicability
As discussed previously, this special
condition is applicable to Supplemental
Type Certificate (STC) Project Number
ST2902RC–R, for the installation of a
Pratt & Whitney PT6–67D turbine
engine in GHTI UH–1H military surplus
helicopters type certificated under TC
R00002RC. Should DynCorp
International apply at a later date for a
change to the STC to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design feature, the special
condition would apply to that STC
modification as well under the
provisions of § 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features associated
with this STC project. It is not a rule of
general applicability and affects only
the applicant who applied to the FAA
for approval of these features on the
helicopter.
The substance of this special
condition has been subjected to a notice
and comment period in several prior
instances and has been derived without
substantive change from those
previously issued. It is unlikely that
prior public comment would result in a
significant change from the substance
contained herein. For this reason, the
FAA has determined that prior public
notice and comment are unnecessary,
and good cause exists for adopting this
special condition upon issuance. The
FAA is requesting comments to allow
interested persons to submit views that
may not have been submitted in
response to the prior opportunities for
comment.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and
29
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with RULES
Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation
safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.
The authority citation for this special
condition is as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C.
106(g), 40105, 40113, 44701–44702, 44704,
44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:52 Nov 15, 2007
Jkt 214001
The Special Condition
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
condition is issued as part of the
supplemental type certification basis for
STC Project ST2902RC–R, installation of
PT6–67D on Global Helicopter
Technology, Inc. (GHTI), Model UH–1H,
Restricted Category Helicopters, type
certificated under TC R00002RC.
Protection for Electrical and
Electronic Systems From High Intensity
Radiated Fields.
1. Each system that performs critical
control functions must be designed and
installed to ensure that the operation
and operational capabilities of these
critical control functions are not
adversely affected when the helicopter
is exposed to high intensity radiated
fields external to the helicopter.
2. For the purpose of this special
condition, critical control functions are
defined as those functions, whose
failure would contribute to, or cause, an
unsafe condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the
aircraft.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November
7, 2007.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Aircraft Certification
Service, Rotorcraft Directorate.
[FR Doc. 07–5698 Filed 11–15–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2007–0076; Directorate
Identifier 2007–NM–241–AD; Amendment
39–15246; AD 2007–22–10]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model
A330–200, A330–300, A340–200, A340–
300, A340–500, and A340–600 Series
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; correction.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA is correcting a
typographical error in an existing
airworthiness directive (AD) that was
published in the Federal Register on
November 1, 2007 (72 FR 61796). The
error resulted in an error in an airplane
series number identified in Table 2 of
the AD. This AD applies to all Airbus
Model A330–200, A330–300, A340–200,
A340–300, A340–500, and A340–600
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
series airplanes. This AD requires
repetitive detailed visual inspections for
cracking of the LH (left hand) and RH
(right hand) wing MLG (main landing
gear) rib 6 aft bearing lugs, and repair or
replacement of the MLG rib 6 fitting, if
necessary.
DATES: Effective November 16, 2007.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
www.regulations.gov; or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The AD docket
contains this AD, the regulatory
evaluation, any comments received, and
other information. The street address for
the Docket Operations office (telephone
(800) 647–5527) is the Document
Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim
Backman, Aerospace Engineer,
International Branch, ANM–116,
Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA,
1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057–3356; telephone
(425) 227–2797; fax (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On
October 24, 2007, the FAA issued AD
2007–22–10, amendment 39–15246 (72
FR 61796, November 1, 2007), for all
Airbus Model A330–200, A330–300,
A340–200, A340–300, A340–500, and
A340–600 series airplanes. The AD
requires repetitive detailed visual
inspections for cracking of the LH (left
hand) and RH (right hand) wing MLG
(main landing gear) rib 6 aft bearing
lugs, and repair or replacement of the
MLG rib 6 fitting, if necessary.
As published, Table 2 of the AD states
that certain repetitive inspection
intervals apply to Model ‘‘A300–300
series airplanes, except WV27.’’ That
sentence contains a typographical error
and, instead, should state that those
repetitive inspection intervals apply to
Model ‘‘A340–300 series airplanes,
except WV27.’’
No other part of the regulatory
information has been changed;
therefore, the final rule is not
republished in the Federal Register.
The effective date of this AD remains
November 16, 2007.
§ 39.13
[Corrected]
I In the Federal Register of November
1, 2007, on page 61799, Table 2 of AD
2007–22–10 is corrected to read as
follows:
*
*
*
*
*
E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM
16NOR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 221 (Friday, November 16, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 64529-64532]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-5698]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Parts 21 and 29
[Docket No. SW015; Special Condition No. 29-015-SC]
Special Conditions: DynCorp International, Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC), Project Number ST2902RC-R, Installation of Pratt &
Whitney Canada PT6-67D Engine With Full Authority Digital Engine
Control (FADEC) on Global Helicopter Technology, Inc. (GHTI),
Restricted Category Model UH-1H Helicopters, Type Certificate (TC)
Number R00002RC
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special condition; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: This special condition is issued for Supplemental Type
Certificate (STC), Project Number ST2902RC-R, for the installation of a
Pratt and Whitney PT6-67D Turbine Engine on Global Helicopter
Technology Inc. (GHTI), Restricted Category, U.S. Army military surplus
helicopters, Model UH-1H, type certificated under type certificate (TC)
R00002RC. The installation of the PT6-67D on the Restricted Category
UH-1H will have a novel or unusual design feature associated with the
installation of the Full Authority Digital Engine Control (FADEC). The
applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards to protect systems that perform critical
control functions from the effects of a high-intensity radiated field
(HIRF). This special condition contains the additional safety standards
that the Administrator considers necessary to ensure that critical
control functions of systems will be maintained when exposed to HIRF.
DATES: The effective date of this special condition is November 7,
2007. We must receive your comments by January 15, 2008.
ADDRESSES: You must mail two copies of your comments to: Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), Rotorcraft Directorate, Attention: Rules
Docket (ASW-111), Docket No. SW015, Fort
[[Page 64530]]
Worth, Texas 76193-0111. You may deliver two copies to the Rotorcraft
Directorate at the above address. You must mark your comments: Docket
No. SW015. You can inspect comments in the Rules Docket weekdays,
except Federal holidays, between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m. The Rules Docket
for special conditions is maintained at the Federal Aviation
Administration, Rotorcraft Directorate, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 448,
Fort Worth, Texas 76137.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tyrone D. Millard, FAA, Rotorcraft
Directorate, Rotorcraft Standards Staff, Fort Worth, Texas 76193-0110;
telephone 817-222-5439, fax 817-222-5961.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA has determined that notice and
opportunity for prior public comment hereon are unnecessary because the
substance of this special condition has been subject to the public
comment process in several prior instances with no substantive comments
received. We are satisfied that new comments are unlikely. The FAA
therefore finds that good cause exists for making this special
condition effective upon issuance.
Comments Invited
We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by
sending written comments, views, or data. The most helpful comments
reference a specific portion of the special condition, explain the
reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data.
We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel
about this special condition. You can inspect the docket before and
after the comment closing date. If you wish to review the docket in
person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section of this preamble
between 8:30 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date
for comments. We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to
do so without incurring additional expense or delay. We may change this
special condition based on the comments we receive.
If you want us to let you know we received your comments on this
special condition, send us a pre-addressed, stamped postcard on which
the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the postcard and
mail it back to you.
Background
On January 9, 2007, DynCorp International applied for an STC for
the installation of a Pratt & Whitney PT6-67D Turbine Engine on the
GHTI, U.S. Army UH-1H, Restricted Category Helicopter, type
certificated under Type Certificate R00002RC. This UH-1H Restricted
Category helicopter is a utility/heavy lift helicopter with a two-
bladed teetering main rotor system. It is to be powered by a single
Pratt and Whitney PT6-67D engine that incorporates a full authority
digital engine control (FADEC). The maximum gross weight of the
aircraft is 9,500 pounds.
Supplemental Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101, DynCorp International must
show that the Engine Installation meets the applicable provisions of
the regulations as listed below:
14 CFR part 29 as amended through and including Amendment
29-1, effective August 12, 1965.
14 CFR part 29.1529, Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness, Amendment Number 20, effective September 11, 1980.
In accordance with 14 CFR part 36.1(a)(4), compliance with the
noise requirements was not shown for the aircraft. Therefore, the
engine installations under this supplemental type certificate are only
eligible for external load operations excepted by Sec. 36.1(a)(4) and
defined under Sec. 133.1(b). Any alteration to the aircraft for
special purpose not identified above will require further FAA approval
and in addition, may require noise testing, flight testing, or a
combination of noise and flight testing.
In addition, the certification basis includes an equivalent safety
finding pertaining to a limitation associated with repetitive high
torque cycle events that is not relevant to this special condition.
If the Administrator finds that the applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for
this STC because of a novel or unusual design feature, special
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of Sec. 21.16.
The FAA issues special conditions as defined in Sec. 11.19, and
issued in accordance with Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the STC
certification basis under Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model, the
modification, or a combination of the model and the modification for
which they are issued. Should this STC be revised to include any other
model that incorporates the same novel or unusual design feature, this
special condition would also apply to the other model under the
provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The GHTI UH-1H Restricted Category Helicopter with a Pratt &
Whitney PT6-67D engine installed will incorporate the following novel
or unusual design features: Electrical, electronic, or a combination of
electrical and electronic (electrical/electronic) systems, specifically
a FADEC, that will be performing critical control functions for the
continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. A FADEC is an
electronic device that performs the critical functions of engine
control during flight operations.
Discussion
The DynCorp International installation of the PT6-67D in the UH-1H
helicopter, at the time of application, was identified as incorporating
an electronic FADEC system. After the design is finalized, DynCorp
International will provide the FAA with a preliminary hazard analysis.
This analysis will identify the critical control functions that are
required for safe flight and landing that are performed by the FADEC
system.
Recent advances in technology have given rise to the application in
aircraft designs of advanced electrical/electronic systems that perform
critical control functions. These advanced systems respond to the
transient effects of induced electrical current and voltage caused by
HIRF incidents on the external surface of the helicopter. These induced
transient currents and voltages can degrade the performance of the
electrical/electronic systems by damaging the components or by
upsetting the systems' functions.
Furthermore, the electromagnetic environment has undergone a
transformation not envisioned by the current application of Sec.
29.1309(a). Higher energy levels radiate from operational transmitters
currently used for radar, radio, and television. Also, the number of
transmitters has increased significantly.
Existing aircraft or alteration certification requirements are
inappropriate in view of these technological advances. In addition, the
FAA has received reports of some significant safety incidents and
accidents involving military aircraft equipped with advanced
electrical/electronic systems when they were exposed to electromagnetic
radiation.
The combined effects of the technological advances in helicopter
design and the changing environment have resulted in an increased level
of
[[Page 64531]]
vulnerability of the electrical/electronic systems required for the
continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. The design and
installation of these systems will provide effective measures to
protect this engine installation on this helicopter against the adverse
effects of exposure to HIRF. The following primary factors contributed
to the current conditions: (1) Increased use of sensitive electronics
that perform critical control functions; (2) reduced electromagnetic
shielding afforded helicopter systems by advanced technology airframe
materials; (3) adverse service experience of military aircraft using
these technologies; and (4) an increase in the number and power of
radio frequency emitters and the expected increase in the future.
On July 30, 2007, we issued a final HIRF rule (72 FR 44016, August
6, 2007). This rule provides standards to protect aircraft electrical
and electronic systems from HIRFs. It was effective September 5, 2007.
However, that rule included provisions that provide relief from the new
testing requirements for equipment previously certificated under HIRF
special conditions issued in accordance with 14 CFR Sec. 21.16. To
obtain this relief, the applicant must be able to--
(1) Provide evidence that the system was the subject of HIRF
special conditions issued before December 1, 2007;
(2) Show that there have been no system design changes that would
invalidate the HIRF immunity characteristics originally demonstrated
under the previously issued HIRF special conditions; and
(3) Provide the data used to demonstrate compliance with the HIRF
special conditions under which the system was previously approved.
DynCorp's FADEC installation is eligible for this relief provided
in 14 CFR Sec. 29.1317(d) of the final HIRF rule. However, to meet
their HIRF requirements, they must comply with this Special Condition,
which is based on similar, historical HIRF protections requirements.
These special conditions will require the systems that perform
critical control functions, as installed in the aircraft, to meet
certain standards based on either a defined HIRF environment or a fixed
value using laboratory tests.
The applicant may demonstrate that the operation and operational
capabilities of the installed electrical/electronic systems that
perform critical control functions are not adversely affected when the
aircraft is exposed to the defined HIRF test environment. The FAA has
determined that the test environment defined in Table 1 is acceptable
for critical control functions in helicopters.
The applicant may also demonstrate by a laboratory test that the
electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions
can withstand a peak electromagnetic field strength in a frequency
range of 10 KHz to 18 GHz. If a laboratory test is used to show
compliance with the defined HIRF environment, no credit will be given
for signal attenuation due to installation. A level of 200 volts per
meter (v/m) is more appropriate for critical functions during VFR
operations. Laboratory test levels are defined according to RTCA/DO-
160D Section 20 Category Y (200 v/m and 300 mA). As defined in DO-160D
Section 20, the test levels are defined as the peak of the root means
squared (rms) envelope. As a minimum, the modulations required for
RTCA/DO-160D Section 20 Category Y will be used. Other modulations
should be selected as the signal most likely to disrupt the operation
of the system under test, based on its design characteristics. For
example, flight control systems may be susceptible to 3 Hz square wave
modulation while the video signals for electronic display systems may
be susceptible to 400 Hz sinusoidal modulation. If the worst-case
modulation is unknown or cannot be determined, default modulations may
be used. Suggested default values are a 1 KHz sine wave with 80 percent
depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 KHz to 400 MHz and 1
KHz square wave with greater than 90 percent depth of modulation from
400 MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the unmodulated signal would
cause deviations from normal operation, several different modulating
signals with various waveforms and frequencies should be applied.
Applicants must perform a preliminary hazard analysis to identify
electrical/electronic systems that perform critical control functions.
The term ``critical control'' means those functions whose failure would
contribute to or cause an unsafe condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the helicopter. The FADEC system
identified by the hazard analysis as performing critical control
functions is required to have HIRF protection.
Compliance with HIRF requirements will be demonstrated by tests,
analysis models, similarity with existing systems, or a combination of
these methods. The two basic options of either testing the FADEC system
to the defined environment or laboratory testing may not be combined.
The laboratory test allows some frequency areas to be undertested and
requires other areas to have some safety margin when compared to the
defined environment. The areas required to have some safety margin are
those shown, by past testing, to exhibit greater susceptibility to
adverse effects from HIRF; and laboratory tests, in general, do not
accurately represent the aircraft installation. Service experience
alone will not be acceptable since such experience in normal flight
operations may not include an exposure to HIRF. Reliance on a system
with similar design features for redundancy, as a means of protection
against the effects of external HIRF, is generally insufficient because
all elements of a redundant system are likely to be concurrently
exposed to the radiated fields.
The modulation that represents the signal most likely to disrupt
the operation of the system under test, based on its design
characteristics should be selected. For example, flight control systems
may be susceptible to 3 Hz square wave modulation. If the worst-case
modulation is unknown or cannot be determined, default modulations may
be used. Suggested default values are a 1 KHz sine wave with 80 percent
depth of modulation in the frequency range from 10 KHz to 400 MHz, and
1 KHz square wave with greater than 90 percent depth of modulation from
400 MHz to 18 GHz. For frequencies where the unmodulated signal would
cause deviations from normal operation, several different modulating
signals with various waveforms and frequencies should be applied.
Acceptable system performance would be attained by demonstrating
that the critical control function components of the system under
consideration continue to perform their intended function during and
after exposure to required electromagnetic fields. Deviations from
system specifications may be acceptable but must be independently
assessed by the FAA on a case-by-case basis.
Table 1.--Field Strength Volts/Meter
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Frequency Peak Average
------------------------------------------------------------------------
10-100 KHz........................................ 150 150
100-500 KHz....................................... 200 200
500-2000 KHz...................................... 200 200
2-30 MHz.......................................... 200 200
30-100 MHz........................................ 200 200
100-200 MHz....................................... 200 200
200-400 MHz....................................... 200 200
400-700 MHz....................................... 730 200
700-1000 MHz...................................... 1400 240
[[Page 64532]]
1-2 GHz........................................... 5000 250
2-4 GHz........................................... 6000 490
4-6 GHz........................................... 7200 400
6-8 GHz........................................... 1100 170
8-12 GHz.......................................... 5000 330
12-18 GHz......................................... 2000 330
18-40 GHz......................................... 1000 420
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Applicability
As discussed previously, this special condition is applicable to
Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) Project Number ST2902RC-R, for the
installation of a Pratt & Whitney PT6-67D turbine engine in GHTI UH-1H
military surplus helicopters type certificated under TC R00002RC.
Should DynCorp International apply at a later date for a change to the
STC to include another model incorporating the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special condition would apply to that STC
modification as well under the provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
associated with this STC project. It is not a rule of general
applicability and affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for
approval of these features on the helicopter.
The substance of this special condition has been subjected to a
notice and comment period in several prior instances and has been
derived without substantive change from those previously issued. It is
unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change
from the substance contained herein. For this reason, the FAA has
determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary, and
good cause exists for adopting this special condition upon issuance.
The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit
views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior
opportunities for comment.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Parts 21 and 29
Aircraft, Air transportation, Aviation safety, Rotorcraft, Safety.
The authority citation for this special condition is as follows:
Authority: 42 U.S.C. 7572; 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40105, 40113,
44701-44702, 44704, 44709, 44711, 44713, 44715, 45303.
The Special Condition
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special condition is issued as part of the
supplemental type certification basis for STC Project ST2902RC-R,
installation of PT6-67D on Global Helicopter Technology, Inc. (GHTI),
Model UH-1H, Restricted Category Helicopters, type certificated under
TC R00002RC.
Protection for Electrical and Electronic Systems From High
Intensity Radiated Fields.
1. Each system that performs critical control functions must be
designed and installed to ensure that the operation and operational
capabilities of these critical control functions are not adversely
affected when the helicopter is exposed to high intensity radiated
fields external to the helicopter.
2. For the purpose of this special condition, critical control
functions are defined as those functions, whose failure would
contribute to, or cause, an unsafe condition that would prevent the
continued safe flight and landing of the aircraft.
Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on November 7, 2007.
Mark R. Schilling,
Acting Manager, Aircraft Certification Service, Rotorcraft Directorate.
[FR Doc. 07-5698 Filed 11-15-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P