Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008; Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Reserved Prices, Upfront Payments and Other Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76, 62360-62392 [E7-21528]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
[AU Docket No. 07–157; Report No. AUC–
07–73–B (Auctions 73 and 76); DA 07–4171]
Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses
Scheduled for January 24, 2008; Notice
and Filing Requirements, Minimum
Opening Bids, Reserved Prices,
Upfront Payments and Other
Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: This document announces the
procedures and minimum opening bids
for the upcoming auction of certain 700
MHz Band Licenses (Auctions 73 and
76). This document is intended to
familiarize prospective bidders with the
procedures and minimum opening bids
for these auctions.
DATES: Applications to participate in
700 MHz Band Licenses Auctions 73
and 76 must be filed before 6 p.m. ET
on December 3, 2007. Bidding for
Auction No. 73 is scheduled to begin on
January 24, 2008. Contingent
subsequent bidding in Auction 76, if
necessary, will begin on a date to be
announced after Auction 73 has closed.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Auctions Spectrum and Access
Division: For legal questions: Scott
Mackoul, Stephen Johnson or Howard
Davenport at (202) 418–0660. For
general auction questions: Lisa Stover at
(717) 338–2868. Mobility Division: For
service rule questions: Erin McGraft
(legal), Keith Harper (engineering) and
Denise Walter (licensing) at (202) 418–
0620. To request materials in accessible
formats (Braille, large print, electronic
files or audio format) for people with
disabilities, send an e-mail to
fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer
and Governmental Affairs Bureau at
(202) 418–0530 or (202) 418–0432
(TTY).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice released on
October 5, 2007. The complete text of
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice, including attachments, as
well as related Commission documents
are available for public inspection and
copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern
Time (ET) Monday through Thursday or
from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at
the FCC Reference Information Center,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room
CY–A257, Washington, DC 20554. On
October 19, 2007, a Public Notice was
released announcing a change in the
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date of the bidders’ seminar for
Auctions 73 and 76 from November 19,
2007 to November 20, 2007. The
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice and related Commission
documents may also be purchased from
the Commission’s duplicating
contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc.
(BCPI), Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Room CY–B402, Washington, DC,
20554, telephone 202–488–5300,
facsimile 202–488–5563, or Web site:
https://www.BCPIWEB.com. When
ordering documents from BCPI, please
provide the appropriate FCC document
number, for example, DA 07–4171 for
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice. The Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice and related
documents are also available on the
Internet at the Commission’s Web site:
https://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/73/.
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. The Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau (the Bureau) announces the
procedures and minimum opening bid
amounts for the upcoming auction of
licenses for services in the 698-806 MHz
band (700 MHz Band) scheduled to
begin on January 24, 2008. This auction
is designated as Auction 73. Auction 73
will offer 700 MHz Band licenses for
initial bidding and the 700 MHz Band
licenses may be offered in contingent
subsequent bidding. In the event that
any licenses are offered in contingent
subsequent bidding, that event will be
designated as Auction 76. On August
17, 2007, in accordance with Section
309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, the Bureau released
a public notice seeking comment on
competitive bidding procedures for both
the initial bidding and the contingent
subsequent bidding for 700 MHz Band
licenses. Interested parties submitted 12
comments and 8 reply comments in
response to the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, 72 FR 48272, August 23, 2007,
as well as a number of ex parte
communications.
2. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed to include
all available, commercial 700 MHz Band
licenses (1,099 licenses) for initial
bidding in Auction 73 using the
Commission’s standard simultaneous
multiple-round (SMR) auction format
for the A, B, D, and E block licenses and
an auction design with hierarchical
package bidding (HPB) for the C Block
licenses. The 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice also proposed procedures for the
contingent subsequent bidding, now
designated Auction 76, on licenses for
spectrum associated with any initially
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offered licenses for which the Auction
73 results do not satisfy applicable
reserve prices. Based on the record and
after considering comments provided in
response to the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau hereby announces
the final procedures for Auctions 73 and
Auction 76.
3. The Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice provides, among other
things, procedures for the following: (1)
Anonymous bidding, to enhance
competition by safeguarding against
potential anti-competitive auction
strategies; (2) package bidding, to enable
bidders trying to combine multiple C
Block licenses to place bids on packages
of those licenses; (3) block-specific
aggregate reserve prices, to help assure
that the public recovers a portion of the
value of the spectrum resource; and (4)
prompt subsequent bidding in Auction
76, to offer licenses for relevant block(s)
in the event Auction 73 results do not
satisfy applicable reserve prices.
4. Anonymous Bidding. In the 700
MHz Second Report and Order, 65 FR
17594, April, 4, 2000, the Commission
found that the public interest would be
served if the auction for new 700 MHz
Band licenses is conducted using
anonymous (or limited information)
bidding procedures, regardless of any
pre-auction measurement of likely
auction competition. Such information
procedures are intended to reduce the
potential for anti-competitive bidding
behavior, including bidding activity that
aims to prevent the entry of new
competitors. Having proposed and
sought comment on more detailed
procedures for employing anonymous
bidding for the upcoming auction, the
Bureau now announces the anonymous
bidding procedures.
5. Package Bidding for C Block
Licenses. The Commission also
determined in the 700 MHz Second
Report and Order that providing for
package bidding for C Block licenses
would serve the public interest. The
Commission found that package bidding
for these licenses should facilitate the
entry of entities seeking to create a
nationwide footprint and whose
business plans require the economies of
scale that only can be obtained with
nationwide operation. At Commission
direction, the Bureau previously
proposed and sought comment on
detailed procedures for implementing
package bidding for the C Block licenses
and not for licenses in the other blocks
to be auctioned. In the Auctions 73 and
76 Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau
detailed the process for package bidding
for the C Block licenses.
6. Block-Specific Aggregate Reserve
Prices. The Commission also decided to
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provide for aggregate reserve prices for
licenses authorizing the use of each
block of the commercial 700 MHz Band
yet to be licensed. The Commission
concluded that, consistent with its
statutory mandate, disclosed reserve
prices would promote the recovery of a
portion of the value of the public
spectrum resource. The Commission
directed the Bureau to adopt aggregate
reserve prices reflecting the potential
market value of this spectrum based on
a variety of factors including, but not
limited to, the characteristics of this
band and the auction prices of other
recently auctioned licenses, such as
licenses for Advanced Wireless Services
in the 1710–1755 MHz and 2110–2155
MHz bands (AWS–1). Accordingly, the
Bureau proposed and sought comment
on the following block-specific
aggregate reserve prices: Block A,
$1.807380 billion; Block B, $1.374426
billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion;
Block D, $1.330000 billion; Block E,
$0.903690 billion. Further, the Bureau
proposed that if the sum of the
provisionally winning bids for the
licenses in a block does not satisfy the
relevant aggregate reserve price, none of
the relevant licenses for the particular
block will be assigned based on the
auction results. In the Auctions 73 and
76 Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau
adopted this proposal.
7. Auction 76 Overview. The
Commission decided that, if licenses
initially offered for the A, B, C, or E
Blocks are not assigned because the
auction results do not satisfy the
applicable aggregate reserve price(s) for
those licenses, the Commission
promptly will offer alternative licenses
for those blocks. More specifically, the
Commission will offer licenses for the
A, B, and E Blocks subject to alternative
performance requirements. With respect
to the C Block, the Commission will
offer alternative licenses without the
open platform conditions and based on
different geographic areas and spectrum
bandwidth. If the D Block license is not
assigned because the auction results do
not satisfy the D Block reserve price, the
Commission may re-offer that license
subject to the same rules or reconsider
the applicable rules. For administrative
purposes, the Bureau will designate as
Auction 76 any subsequent bidding for
alternative licenses for the A, B, C or E
Blocks or for the D Block license that
occurs because Auction 73 results for
licenses initially offered for the relevant
blocks do not satisfy the applicable
aggregate reserve price(s). In the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice, the Bureau announced detailed
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procedures for conducting Auction 76,
if necessary.
8. The Commission will conduct
bidding in Auction 73 and any
contingent subsequent bidding in
Auction 76 for 700 MHz Band licenses
as a single auction to the extent
possible, given the strong public interest
in promptly assigning all 700 MHz Band
licenses for recovered analog spectrum
and the related nature of the licenses
being offered in Auctions 73 and 76.
Thus, pursuant to the 700 MHz Second
Report and Order, the Bureau will
permit only qualified bidders in the
initial auction to participate in the
contingent subsequent auction. To
enable a prompt start to Auction 76 after
Auction 73, applicants must select any
licenses on which they may bid in
Auction 76 by the deadline for filing
their Auction 73 application. Applicants
must select those licenses by submitting
a separate abbreviated short-form
application to participate in Auction 76.
The abbreviated Auction 76 application
must be filed together with the
applicant’s standard application for
Auction 73, following procedures
described in the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice. In the event
that Auction 76 takes place, bidder
identity and other information on the
applicant’s completed Auction 73 shortform application will be combined with
the licenses selected in the abbreviated
Auction 76 application to create the
applicant’s Auction 76 application. This
process will minimize the time period
between auctions by eliminating any
need for applicants to take time
following Auction 73 to file new
applications or select additional
licenses, and for the Commission to
review newly-filed short-form
applications. Applicants in Auction 76,
however, will have an opportunity after
Auction 73 to obtain additional
eligibility for any licenses offered in
Auction 76 by supplementing their
upfront monies on deposit with the
Commission pursuant to the procedures
as provided for in the 700 MHz Second
Report and Order.
9. The Bureau also will use the
Auction 73 design in Auction 76,
including an aggregate reserve price for
each block that matches the applicable
initial reserve price. In the event that
alternative licenses for the C Block are
offered for Blocks C1 and C2, the Bureau
will conduct package bidding for the C2
Block only, using the pre-determined
packages. Alternative licenses for Blocks
C1 and C2 will be subject to reserve
prices. There will be a joint aggregate
reserve price equal to the initial auction
C Block aggregate reserve price, and
separate aggregate reserve prices for the
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C1 and C2 Blocks that add to the joint
aggregate reserve price. Licenses in both
blocks will be assigned if the joint
aggregate reserve price is met. If the
joint aggregate reserve price is not met
but one of the block-specific reserve
prices is met, licenses in the block for
which the reserve price is met will be
assigned. Licenses in the other block
will not be assigned. This will assure
the aggregate reserve price in the initial
auction continues to apply while
maximizing the opportunity for licenses
for either Block C1 or C2 to be assigned.
i. Background of Proceeding
10. The Commission is offering the
licenses in Auction 73 consistent with
the requirements of the Digital
Television Transition and Public Safety
Act of 2005 (DTV Act). Pursuant to the
DTV Act the Commission must conduct
the auction of licenses for recovered
analog spectrum by commencing the
bidding not later than January 28, 2008.
A number of incumbent broadcasters are
licensed and operating on these
frequencies (TV Channels 52–53, 56–58,
60–62, and 65–67) and adjacent
channels.
ii. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 73
11. Auction 73 will offer a total of
1,099 licenses: 176 Economic Area (EA)
licenses in each of the A and E Blocks,
734 Cellular Market Area (CMA)
licenses in the B Block, 12 Regional
Economic Area Grouping (REAG)
licenses in the C Block, and one
nationwide license, to be used as part of
the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership,
in the D Block.
B. Rules and Disclaimers
i. Relevant Authority
12. Prospective applicants must
familiarize themselves thoroughly with
the Commission’s general competitive
bidding rules set forth in Title 47, part
1, of the CFR, including recent
amendments and clarifications; rules
relating to the 700 MHz Band contained
in Title 47, part 27, of the CFR; rules
relating to the public/private
partnership applicable to the D Block
contained in Title 47, part 90, of the
CFR; and rules relating to applications,
environment, practice and procedure
contained in Title 47, part 1, of the CFR.
Prospective applicants must also be
thoroughly familiar with the
procedures, terms and conditions
(terms) contained in the Auctions 73
and 76 Procedures Public Notice and
the Commission’s decisions in
proceedings regarding competitive
bidding procedures, application
requirements, and obligations of
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Commission licensees. For example,
among other Commission orders,
prospective bidders should be familiar
with the 700 MHz First Report and
Order, 65 FR 3139, January 20, 2000,
and the 700 MHz Second Report and
Order.
13. The terms contained in the
Commission’s rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable.
The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained
in its public notices at any time, and
will issue public notices to convey any
new or supplemental information to
applicants. It is the responsibility of all
applicants to remain current with all
Commission rules and with all public
notices pertaining to Auctions 73 and
76.
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ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance
With Antitrust Laws
14. To ensure the competitiveness of
the auction process, § 1.2105(c) of the
Commission’s rules prohibits auction
applicants for licenses in any of the
same geographic license areas from
communicating with each other about
bids, bidding strategies, or settlements 9
unless such applicants have identified
each other on their short-form
applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties
with whom they have entered into
agreements pursuant to
§ 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
a. Entities Subject to Anti-Collusion
Rule
15. The anti-collusion rule will apply
to any applicants that submit short-form
applications for Auctions 73 or 76 and
select licenses in the same or
overlapping CMAs, EAs, REAGs or the
nationwide license in the D Block. For
example, assume that one applicant
applies for a REAG license and a second
applicant applies for an EA license
covering any area within that REAG.
The two entities will have applied for
licenses covering the same geographic
areas and would be precluded from
communicating with each other under
the rule. The rule also applies where
one applicant has selected a license in
Auction 73 and another applicant
selects a license in Auction 76 that
covers any of the same geographic area.
In addition, the rule precludes
applicants that apply to bid for the
nationwide license in the D Block, or all
the licenses in any other block, from
communicating with all other
applicants. Thus, applicants that have
applied for licenses covering the same
markets (unless they have identified
each other on their FCC Form 175
applications as parties with whom they
have entered into agreements under
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§ 1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must affirmatively
avoid all communications with or
disclosures to each other that affect or
have the potential to affect bids or
bidding strategy, which may include
communications regarding the postauction market structure. This
prohibition applies to all applicants
regardless of whether such applicants
become qualified bidders or actually
bid. Information concerning applicants’
license selections will not be available
to the public. Therefore, the
Commission will inform each applicant
by letter of the identity of each of the
other applicants that has applied for
licenses covering any of the same
geographic areas as the licenses that it
has selected in its short-form
application.
16. For purposes of this prohibition,
§ 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines applicant as
including all officers and directors of
the entity submitting a short-form
application to participate in the auction,
all controlling interests of that entity, as
well as all holders of partnership and
other ownership interests and any stock
interest amounting to 10 percent or
more of the entity, or outstanding stock,
or outstanding voting stock of the entity
submitting a short-form application.
17. Entities and parties subject to the
anti-collusion rule should take special
care in circumstances where their
employees may receive information
directly or indirectly from a competing
applicant relating to any competing
applicant’s bids or bidding strategies. In
situations where the anti-collusion rule
views the same person as the applicant
with respect to two different entities
filing competing applications, under
Bureau precedent the bids and bidding
strategies of one applicant are
necessarily conveyed to the other and,
absent a disclosed bidding agreement,
an apparent violation of the anticollusion rule occurs. The Bureau has
not addressed situations where
employees who do not qualify as the
applicant, (e.g., are not officers or
directors) receive information regarding
a competing applicant’s bids or bidding
strategies and whether that information
might be deemed to necessarily convey
to the applicant. The Bureau notes that
the exception to the anti-collusion rule
providing that non-controlling interest
holders may have interests in more than
one competing bidder without violating
the anti-collusion rule, provided
specified conditions are met (including
a certification that no prohibited
communications have occurred or will
occur), does not extend to controlling
interest holders.
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b. Prohibition Applies Until Down
Payment Deadline
18. Section 1.2105(c)’s anti-collusion
prohibition begins at the short-form
application filing deadline and ends at
the down payment deadline after the
auction. In recognition of the related
nature of the initial auction and any
contingent auction of alternative
licenses, the Commission concluded in
the 700 MHz Second Report and Order
that the provisions of the anti-collusion
rule would continue to apply until the
down payment deadline for the
subsequent auction.
19. Some commenters argue that the
Bureau should allow applicants to optout from the anti-collusion prohibition
in the event Auction 76 is conducted. A
commenter proposed that an applicant
that has no intention to bid in the
subsequent auction could inform the
Commission of its intent in writing with
a certification that its decision is not
based on any discussion with other
competing bidders of auction strategy or
post-auction market structure. As one
commenter acknowledges, changing the
application of the rule in this way is
beyond the Bureau’s delegated authority
and beyond the scope of this nonrulemaking proceeding and would
require action by the Commission to
reconsider its determination in the 700
MHz Second Report and Order. Thus,
the Bureau is unable to adopt the
proposed opt-out certification
procedure. If it is necessary to conduct
Auction 76, the provisions of the anticollusion rule will apply to all
applicants until the down payment
deadline, which will occur after the
close of bidding on licenses offered in
Auction 76.
c. Prohibited Communications
20. Prospective applicants for
upcoming Auctions 73 and 76 and other
parties that may be engaged in
discussion with such prospective
applicants are cautioned of the need to
comply with the Commission’s anticollusion rule, § 1.2105(c). The anticollusion rule prohibits not only a
communication about an applicant’s
own bids or bidding strategy, but also a
communication of another applicant’s
bids or bidding strategy. While the anticollusion rule provisions do not
prohibit business negotiations among
auction applicants, applicants must
remain vigilant so as not to
communicate directly or indirectly
information that affects, or could affect,
bids or bidding strategy, or the
negotiation of settlement agreements.
21. The Commission remains vigilant
about prohibited communications
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taking place in other situations. For
example, the Commission has warned
that prohibited communications
concerning bids and bidding strategies
may include communications regarding
capital calls or requests for additional
funds in support of bids or bidding
strategies to the extent such
communications convey information
concerning the bids and bidding
strategies directly or indirectly.
22. Applicants are hereby placed on
notice that public disclosure of
information relating to bidder interests
and bidder identities that is confidential
in both Auctions 73 and 76 at the time
of disclosure may violate the anticollusion rule. This is so even though
similar types of information were
revealed prior to and during other
Commission auctions subject to
different information procedures.
Bidders should use caution in their
dealings with other parties, such as
members of the press, financial analysts,
or others who might become a conduit
for the communication of prohibited
bidding information. For example,
where limited information disclosure
procedures are in place, as for Auctions
73 and 76, a qualified bidder’s statement
to the press that it has lost bidding
eligibility and stopped bidding in the
auction could give rise to a finding of
an anti-collusion rule violation.
Similarly, an applicant’s public
statement of intent not to participate in
Auction 76 bidding could also violate
the rule.
23. Applicants for licenses for any of
the same geographic license areas must
not communicate directly or indirectly
about bids or bidding strategy.
Accordingly, such applicants are
encouraged not to use the same
individual as an authorized bidder. A
violation of the anti-collusion rule could
occur if an individual acts as the
authorized bidder for two or more
competing applicants, and conveys
information concerning the substance of
bids or bidding strategies between such
applicants. Also, if the authorized
bidders are different individuals
employed by the same organization
(e.g., law firm or engineering firm or
consulting firm), a violation similarly
could occur. In such a case, at a
minimum, applicants should certify on
their applications that precautionary
steps have been taken to prevent
communication between authorized
bidders and that applicants and their
bidding agents will comply with the
anti-collusion rule. A violation of the
anti-collusion rule could occur in other
contexts, such as an individual serving
as an officer for two or more applicants.
Moreover, the Commission has found a
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violation of the anti-collusion rule
where a bidder used the Commission’s
bidding system to disclose its bidding
strategy in a manner that explicitly
invited other auction participants to
cooperate and collaborate in specific
markets, and has placed auction
participants on notice that the use of its
bidding system to disclose market
information to competitors will not be
tolerated and will subject bidders to
sanctions.
24. In addition, when completing
short-form applications, applicants
should avoid any statements or
disclosures that may violate the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule,
particularly in light of the Commission’s
procedures for limited information.
Specifically, applicants should avoid
including any information in their
short-form applications that might
convey information regarding their
license selection, such as using
applicant names that refer to licenses
being offered, referring to certain
licenses or markets in describing
bidding agreements, or including any
information in attachments that may
otherwise disclose applicants’ license
selections.
d. Disclosure of Bidding Agreements
and Arrangements
25. The Commission’s rules do not
prohibit applicants from entering into
otherwise lawful bidding agreements
before filing their short-form
applications, as long as they disclose the
existence of the agreement(s) in their
short-form application. If parties agree
in principle on all material terms prior
to the short-form filing deadline, each
party to the agreement must identify the
other party or parties to the agreement
on its short-form application under
§ 1.2105(c), even if the agreement has
not been reduced to writing. If the
parties have not agreed in principle by
the short-form filing deadline, they
should not include the names of parties
to discussions on their applications, and
they may not continue negotiations,
discussions or communications with
any other applicants for licenses
covering any of the same or overlapping
geographic areas after the short-form
filing deadline.
e. Anti-Collusion Certification
26. By electronically submitting a
short-form application following the
electronic filing procedures set forth in
Attachments D and E to the Auctions 73
and 76 Procedures Public Notice, each
applicant certifies its compliance with
§ 1.2105(c). However, the Bureau
cautions that merely filing a certifying
statement as part of an application will
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not outweigh specific evidence that
collusive behavior has occurred, nor
will it preclude the initiation of an
investigation when warranted. The
Commission has stated that it intends to
scrutinize carefully any instances in
which bidding patterns suggest that
collusion may be occurring. Any
applicant found to have violated the
anti-collusion rule may be subject to
sanctions.
f. Antitrust Laws
27. Applicants are also reminded that,
regardless of compliance with the
Commission’s rules, they remain subject
to the antitrust laws, which are designed
to prevent anticompetitive behavior in
the marketplace. Compliance with the
disclosure requirements of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule will
not insulate a party from enforcement of
the antitrust laws. For instance, a
violation of the antitrust laws could
arise out of actions taking place well
before any party submits a short-form
application. The Commission has cited
a number of examples of potentially
anticompetitive actions that would be
prohibited under antitrust laws: For
example, actual or potential competitors
may not agree to divide territories
horizontally in order to minimize
competition, regardless of whether they
split a market in which they both do
business, or whether they merely
reserve one market for one and another
for the other. Similarly, the Bureau has
long reminded potential applicants and
others that even where the applicant
discloses parties with whom it has
reached an agreement on the short-form
application, thereby permitting
discussions with those parties, the
applicant is nevertheless subject to
existing antitrust laws. To the extent the
Commission becomes aware of specific
allegations that suggest that violations of
the federal antitrust laws may have
occurred, the Commission may refer
such allegations to the United States
Department of Justice for investigation.
If an applicant is found to have violated
the antitrust laws or the Commission’s
rules in connection with its
participation in the competitive bidding
process, it may be subject to forfeiture
of its upfront payment, down payment,
or full bid amount and may be
prohibited from participating in future
auctions, among other sanctions.
28. One commenter urges the
Commission to adopt an auction rule
that states that a bidder cannot release
any bidding information to the public
during the course of the auction, and
provide notice that all parties remain
subject to the antitrust laws. As another
commenter points out, however, the
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Commission has consistently provided
such guidance in prior auctions. The
Bureau does so again here: All parties
remain subject to the antitrust laws.
Commission’s auction anti-collusion
Web page.
g. Duty to Report Prohibited
Communications
34. A number of incumbent
broadcasters are licensed and operating
on these frequencies (TV Channels 52–
53, 56–58, 60–62, and 65–67) and
adjacent channels. In accordance with
the Commission’s rules, 700 MHz Band
licensees must protect analog and
digital TV incumbents from harmful
interference through February 17, 2009,
the end of the DTV transition period.
After February 17, 2009, 700 MHz
licensees must continue to operate in
accordance with the Commission’s rules
to reduce the potential for interference
to public reception of the signals of DTV
broadcast stations transmitting on DTV
Channel 51. These limitations may
restrict the ability of such geographic
area licensees to use certain portions of
the electromagnetic spectrum or provide
service to some parts of their geographic
license areas.
35. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission
grandfathered an incumbent guard band
B Block licensee in Major Economic
Areas (MEAs) 21 and 39 at 761–763
MHz and 791–793 MHz of the D Block.
The new D Block licensee will be
authorized on a secondary basis at 761–
763 MHz and 791–793 MHz in these
markets, and it may not cause
interference to the primary operations of
the grandfathered licensee. If the
grandfathered licensee, or a successor or
assignee, cancels either of the
grandfathered licenses, or if either
license cancels automatically, is
terminated by the Commission, or
expires, then the licensed geographic
area will revert to the D Block licensee
automatically.
29. If an applicant makes or receives
a communication that appears to violate
the anti-collusion rule, it must report
such communication in writing to the
Commission immediately and in no case
later than five business days after the
communication occurs. The
Commission recently clarified that each
applicant’s obligation to report any such
communication continues beyond the
five-day period after the communication
is made, even if the report is not made
within the five day period.
30. Section 1.65 of the Commission’s
rules requires an applicant to maintain
the accuracy and completeness of
information furnished in its pending
application and to notify the
Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of
decisional significance to that
application. Thus, § 1.65 requires an
auction applicant to notify the
Commission of any substantial change
to the information or certifications
included in its pending short-form
application. Applicants are therefore
required by § 1.65 to report to the
Commission any communications they
have made to or received from another
applicant after the short-form filing
deadline that affect or have the potential
to affect bids or bidding strategy unless
such communications are made to or
received from parties to agreements
identified under § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
31. Applicants must be aware that
failure to comply with the
Commission’s rules can result in
enforcement action.
iii. Protection of Incumbent Operations
h. Winning Bidders Must Disclose
Terms of Agreements
a. International Coordination
32. Applicants that are winning
bidders will be required to disclose in
their long-form applications the specific
terms, conditions, and parties involved
in any bidding consortia, joint ventures,
partnerships, and other arrangements
entered into relating to the competitive
bidding process.
36. Potential bidders seeking licenses
for geographic areas that are near the
Canadian or Mexican borders are subject
to international agreements with Canada
and Mexico. Pursuant to these
agreements, the U.S. must protect the
signals of Canadian and Mexican
television broadcast stations located in
the border area. Unless otherwise
modified by international treaty,
licensees must not cause interference to,
and must accept harmful interference
from, television broadcast operations in
Mexico and Canada. Further, until such
time as existing agreements are replaced
or modified to reflect the new uses,
licensees in the band will be subject to
existing agreements.
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i. Additional Information Concerning
Anti-Collusion Rule
33. A summary listing of documents
issued by the Commission and the
Bureau addressing the application of the
anti-collusion rule may be found in
Attachment I of the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice. These
documents are available on the
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b. Quiet Zones
37. 700 MHz Band licensees must
protect the radio quiet zones set forth in
the Commission’s rules. Licensees are
cautioned that they must receive the
appropriate approvals directly from the
relevant quiet zone entity prior to
operating within the areas described in
the Commission’s rules.
iv. Due Diligence
38. The Bureau cautions potential
applicants formulating their bidding
strategies to investigate and consider the
extent to which 700 MHz Band
frequencies are occupied. Applicants
and their investors should also
understand that Commission rules and
requirements place limitations on the
ability of 700 MHz Band licensees to use
this spectrum. There are a number of
incumbent broadcast television
licensees already licensed and operating
in the band that will be subject to the
upcoming auction. Geographic area
licensees operating on the spectrum
associated with Channels 52–53, 56–58,
60–62, and 65–67 must comply with the
co-channel and the adjacent channel
provision of § 27.60 of the Commission’s
rules. These limitations may restrict the
ability of such geographic area licensees
to use certain portions of the
electromagnetic spectrum or provide
service to certain areas in their
geographic license areas. For example,
bidders should become familiar with
any petitions or other pleadings filed in
response to the 700 MHz First Report
and Order, 700 MHz Second Report and
Order, and any other orders that have
been or may be released affecting the
700 MHz Band.
39. Potential bidders are reminded
that they are solely responsible for
investigating and evaluating all
technical and marketplace factors that
may have a bearing on the value of 700
MHz Band licenses. The FCC makes no
representations or warranties about the
use of this spectrum for particular
services. Applicants should be aware
that an FCC auction represents an
opportunity to become an FCC licensee
in the 700 MHz Band subject to certain
conditions and regulations. An FCC
auction does not constitute an
endorsement by the FCC of any
particular service, technology, or
product, nor does an FCC license
constitute a guarantee of business
success. Applicants should perform
their individual due diligence before
proceeding as they would with any new
business venture.
40. Potential bidders are strongly
encouraged to conduct their own
research prior to the beginning of
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bidding in Auction 73 in order to
determine the existence of any pending
legislative, administrative or judicial
proceedings that might affect their
decision regarding participation in the
auction, including any subsequent
auction (if necessary). Participants in
Auctions 73 and 76 are strongly
encouraged to continue such research
throughout the auction. In addition,
potential bidders should perform
technical analyses sufficient to assure
themselves that, should they prevail in
competitive bidding for a specific
license, they will be able to build and
operate facilities that will fully comply
with the Commission’s technical and
legal requirements as well as other
applicable Federal, state, and local laws.
41. Applicants should also be aware
that certain pending and future
proceedings, including rulemaking
proceedings or petitions for rulemaking,
applications (including those for
modification), requests for special
temporary authority, waiver requests,
petitions to deny, petitions for
reconsideration, informal oppositions,
and applications for review, before the
Commission may relate to particular
applicants or incumbent licensees or the
licenses available in Auctions 73 and
76. For example, bidders should note
that petitions have been filed for
reconsideration of certain decisions
made in the 700 MHz First Report and
Order and the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order. In addition, applicants
should be aware that the Commission
has sought comment on a range of
proposals concerning consumer
education about the DTV transition,
including the possible imposition of
reporting requirements on winning
bidders for 700 MHz band licenses. Of
course, pending and future judicial
proceedings may relate to particular
applicants or incumbent licensees, or
the licenses available in Auctions 73
and 76. Prospective bidders are
responsible for assessing the likelihood
of the various possible outcomes, and
considering their potential impact on
spectrum licenses available in Auctions
73 and 76.
42. Applicants should perform due
diligence to identify and consider all
proceedings that may affect the
spectrum licenses being auctioned and
that could have an impact on the
availability of spectrum for Auction 73.
In addition, although the Commission
may continue to act on various pending
applications, informal objections,
petitions, and other requests for
Commission relief, some of these
matters may not be resolved by the
beginning of bidding in the auction.
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43. Applicants are solely responsible
for identifying associated risks and for
investigating and evaluating the degree
to which such matters may affect their
ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or
make use of licenses being offered.
44. Applicants may use the licensing
database for the Media Bureau on the
Internet in order to determine which
frequencies are already licensed to
incumbent licensees. Licensing records
for the Media Bureau are contained in
the Media Bureau’s Consolidated Data
Base System (CDBS) and may be
researched on the Internet at https://
www.fcc.gov/mb/cdbs.html. Potential
bidders should direct questions
regarding the search capabilities of
CDBS to the Media Bureau help line at
(202) 418–2662, or via e-mail at
cdbshelp@fcc.gov.
45. The Commission makes no
representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of
information in its databases or any third
party databases, including, for example,
court docketing systems. To the extent
the Commission’s databases may not
include all information deemed
necessary or desirable by an applicant,
applicants may obtain or verify such
information from independent sources
or assume the risk of any
incompleteness or inaccuracy in said
databases. Furthermore, the
Commission makes no representations
or guarantees regarding the accuracy or
completeness of information that has
been provided by incumbent licensees
and incorporated into its databases.
46. Potential applicants are strongly
encouraged to physically inspect any
prospective sites located in, or near, the
geographic area for which they plan to
bid, and also to familiarize themselves
with the environmental review
obligations.
v. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction
System
47. The Commission will make
available a browser-based bidding
system to allow bidders to participate in
Auction 73 over the Internet using the
Commission’s Integrated Spectrum
Auction System (ISAS or FCC Auction
System). The Commission makes no
warranty 21 whatsoever with respect to
the FCC Auction System. In no event
shall the Commission, or any of its
officers, employees or agents, be liable
for any damages whatsoever (including,
but not limited to, loss of business
profits, business interruption, loss of
business information, or any other loss)
arising out of or relating to the
existence, furnishing, functioning or use
of the FCC Auction System that is
accessible to qualified bidders in
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connection with Auctions 73 and 76.
Moreover, no obligation or liability will
arise out of the Commission’s technical,
programming or other advice or service
provided in connection with the FCC
Auction System.
vi. Fraud Alert
48. As is the case with many business
investment opportunities, some
unscrupulous entrepreneurs may
attempt to use Auction 73 to deceive
and defraud unsuspecting investors.
Information about deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes is
available from the Commission as well
as the FTC and SEC. Complaints about
specific deceptive telemarketing
investment schemes should be directed
to the FTC, the SEC, or the National
Fraud Information Center at (800) 876–
7060.
vii. Environmental Review
Requirements
49. Licensees must comply with the
Commission’s rules regarding
implementation of the National
Environmental Policy Act and other
federal environmental statutes. The
construction of a wireless antenna
facility is a federal action and the
licensee must comply with the
Commission’s environmental rules for
each such facility. The Commission’s
environmental rules require, among
other things, that the licensee consult
with expert agencies having
environmental responsibilities,
including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, the State Historic Preservation
Office, the Army Corps of Engineers and
the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (through the local authority
with jurisdiction over floodplains). In
assessing the effect of facilities
construction on historic properties, the
licensee must follow the provisions of
the Nationwide Programmatic
Agreement Regarding the Section 106
National Historic Preservation Act
Review Process. The licensee must
prepare environmental assessments for
facilities that may have a significant
impact in or on wilderness areas,
wildlife preserves, threatened or
endangered species or designated
critical habitats, historical or
archaeological sites, Indian religious
sites, floodplains, and surface features.
The licensee also must prepare
environmental assessments for facilities
that include high intensity white lights
in residential neighborhoods or
excessive radio frequency emission.
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C. Auction Specifics
i. Auction 73 Start Date
50. Bidding in Auction 73 will begin
on Thursday, January 24, 2008.
51. This change of the previouslyannounced start date for Auction 73 will
provide interested parties with
additional time after this announcement
of competitive bidding procedures to
develop business plans, assess market
conditions, and evaluate the availability
of equipment for new 700 MHz Band
services.
52. Some commenters had sought a
postponement of the previouslyannounced start date until January 25 or
28, 2008. Pursuant to the Congressional
mandate, the Commission must conduct
the auction of licenses for recovered
analog spectrum in the 700 MHz Band
by commencing the bidding not later
than January 28, 2008. Starting the
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v. Requirements for Participation in
Auction 73 and 76
58. Those wishing to participate in
Auction 73 and 76 (should any
subsequent auction become necessary),
must: (1) For Auction 73, submit a
short-form application (FCC Form 175)
electronically prior to 6 p.m. ET,
December 3, 2007, following the
electronic filing procedures set forth in
Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice; (2) for
Auction 76, submit short-form
applications (FCC Form 175)
electronically prior to 6 p.m. ET,
December 3, 2007, for each auction
following the electronic filing
procedures set forth in Attachments D
and E to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice. Bidding in
Auction 76 is open only to applicants
that qualify to participate in Auction 73,
and that comply with all of the
requirements for participating in
Auction 76, including submitting a
separate short-form application; (3) for
Auction 73, submit a sufficient upfront
payment and an FCC Remittance Advice
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iii. Bidding Methodology
55. The bidding methodology for
Auction 73 will be simultaneous
multiple round (SMR) bidding for the A,
B, D, and E Block licenses and an
auction design with hierarchical
package bidding (HPB) for the C Block
licenses. The Commission will conduct
Auctions 73 and 76 over the Internet
using the FCC Auction System, and
telephonic bidding will be available as
well. Qualified bidders are permitted to
bid electronically via the Internet or by
telephone. All telephone calls are
recorded.
ii. Auction Title
54. The auction in which the 700
MHz Band licenses will initially be
offered is designated as Auction 73—
700 MHz Band. In the event that any
licenses, including alternative licenses,
are offered in contingent subsequent
Auction Seminar ........................................................................................................................
Auction 73 and 76 Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens ..........
Auction 73 and 76 Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline ......
Auction 73 Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) ...................................................................
Mock Auction ............................................................................................................................
Auction 73 Begins .....................................................................................................................
57. If contingent subsequent bidding
is necessary, the Bureau intends to
announce the start date for Auction 76
and the deadline for additional upfront
payments within five business days
after the end of bidding in Auction 73.
The Bureau expects that Auction 76
would begin within three weeks of that
announcement.
bidding, that will be designated as
Auction 76.
auction on the statutory deadline for
commencing the auction, or one
business day prior to the deadline
would provide insufficient time to
address unexpected matters that might
arise just prior to the start of bidding.
53. The initial schedule for bidding
will be announced by public notice at
least one week before the start of the
auction. Moreover, unless otherwise
announced, bidding on all licenses and
packages will be conducted on each
business day until bidding has stopped
on all licenses and packages.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
56. The following dates and deadlines
apply:
November 20, 2007.
November 19, 2007; 12 noon ET.
December 3, 2007; prior to 6 p.m. ET.
December 28, 2007; 6 p.m. ET.
January 18, 2008.
January 24, 2008.
Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET,
December 28, 2007, following the
procedures and instructions set forth in
Attachment F to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice; (4) for
Auction 76 (if necessary), submit a
sufficient upfront payment and an FCC
Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form
159) by the deadline to be announced
following the end of bidding in Auction
73; and (5) comply with all provisions
outlined in this Public Notice and
applicable Commission rules.
D. Other Issues Raised by Commenters
59. Two commenters raised issues
that are unrelated to those raised in the
700 MHz Auction Public Notice. One
commenter proposes that the
Commission should require that all
licenses offered in Auction 73 be made
available to public safety personnel for
priority use during critical emergencies.
The commenter also suggests that such
a requirement be considered in the
event of a contingent auction, if any.
Another commenter urges the
Commission to require applicants to
disclose on their short-form applications
whether winning the licenses they have
selected would cause their spectrum
holdings to exceed 70 MHz of spectrum
in the markets of the selected licenses.
In the event that any applicants indicate
that their spectrum holdings would
exceed this amount, the commenter
proposed that their short-form
applications should be dismissed before
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the commencement of Auction 73. The
commenter also requests that the
Commission investigate alleged
violations of the Commission’s ex parte
rules by a wireless company concerning
policy on the open platform provisions
for C Block licenses, and proposes
excluding that company from Auction
73 as a possible sanction for violating
the Commission’s rules.
60. These issues are outside the scope
of this non-rulemaking proceeding,
which is confined to establishing
competitive bidding procedures for
Auction 73. The Bureau notes that some
of these issues have been presented to
the Commission in petitions for
reconsideration of the 700 MHz Second
Report and Order and will be addressed
in that proceeding.
II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form
175) Requirements
61. Entities seeking licenses available
in Auction 73 must file a short-form
application electronically via the FCC
Auction System prior to 6 p.m. ET on
December 3, 2007, following the
procedures prescribed in Attachment D
to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice. Applicants filing a shortform application are subject to the
Commission’s anti-collusion rules
beginning on the deadline for filing. For
Auctions 73 and 76, applicants filing a
short-form application for Auction 73
will remain subject to the Commission’s
anti-collusion rules through the
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completion of Auction 76, if conducted.
If an applicant claims eligibility for a
bidding credit, the information provided
in its FCC Form 175 will be used in
determining whether the applicant is
eligible for the claimed bidding credit.
Applicants bear full responsibility for
submitting accurate, complete and
timely short-form applications. All
applicants must certify on their shortform applications under penalty of
perjury that they are legally, technically,
financially and otherwise qualified to
hold a license. Applicants should read
the instructions set forth in Attachment
D to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice carefully and should
consult 26 the Commission’s rules to
ensure that all the information that is
required under the Commission’s rules
is included with their short-form
applications.
62. Entities seeking licenses that may
be offered in Auction 76, if Auction 76
is conducted, must file electronically
via the FCC Auction System prior to 6
p.m. ET on December 3, 2007 both a
short-form application for Auction 73,
following the procedures prescribed in
Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice, and an
abbreviated short-form application for
Auction 76, following the procedures
prescribed in Attachment E to the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice. Applicants filing short-form
applications for both Auctions 73 and
76 are subject to the Commission’s anticollusion rules beginning on the
deadline for filing both applications.
63. To streamline the application
process, other than license selection
requirements, all relevant information
for the application to participate in
Auction 76 must be submitted as part of
the application to participate in Auction
73. The Auction 76 abbreviated
application will request—and will
accept—only information that the FCC
Auction System requires in order to
enable applicants to submit license
selections for Auction 76. For example,
applicants seeking to submit
information regarding bidding
agreements with respect to licenses
offered in Auction 76 will not be able
to access the bidding agreement screens
that are usually part of the short-form
application in the Auction 76
abbreviated application. Instead, such
applicants must submit information
regarding those agreements as part of
their Auction 73 short-form application.
64. To comply with FCC Auction
System requirements, however,
applicants will be required to repeat
some information submitted in their
Auction 73 application, e.g., their FCC
Registration Number (FRN), their name
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and address, certification of the form’s
contents, etc. As noted in the
procedures for filing the abbreviated
short-form application for Auction 76,
applicants must provide the same
information submitted in their
application for Auction 73 as they
provide in their Auction 76 application.
Most importantly, if an entity wishes to
submit a short-form application for
Auction 76, it must do so using the
same FRN that it uses for its short-form
application for Auction 73. In addition,
the same person must certify both
applications, as the certification applies
to information submitted in both
applications.
65. An entity may not submit more
than one short-form application for
Auction 73. Similarly, an entity may not
submit more than one short-form
application for Auction 76. If a party
submits multiple short-form
applications for either Auction 73 or
Auction 76, only one application for
each will be accepted for filing.
66. Applicants also should note that
submission of a short-form application
(and any amendments thereto)
constitutes a representation by the
certifying official that he or she is an
authorized representative of the
applicant, that he or she has read the
form’s instructions and certifications,
and that the contents of the application,
its certifications, and any attachments
are true and correct. Applicants are not
permitted to make major modifications
to their applications; such
impermissible changes include a change
of the certifying official to the
application. Submission of a false
certification to the Commission may
result in penalties, including monetary
forfeitures, license forfeitures,
ineligibility to participate in future
auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
A. Preferences for Small Businesses and
Others
i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
67. A bidding credit represents the
amount by which a bidder’s winning
bid will be discounted. For Auction 73
and Auction 76, bidding credits will be
available to small businesses and very
small businesses, and consortia thereof,
as follows: (1) A bidder with attributed
average annual gross revenues that
exceed $15 million and do not exceed
$40 million for the preceding three
years (small business) will receive a 15
percent discount on its winning bid;
and (2) a bidder with attributed average
annual gross revenues that do not
exceed $15 million for the preceding
three years (very small business) will
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receive a 25 percent discount on its
winning bid.
68. Bidding credits are not
cumulative; a qualifying applicant
receives either the 15 percent or 25
percent bidding credit on its winning
bid, but not both.
69. Every applicant that claims
eligibility for a bidding credit as either
a small business or a very small
business, or a consortium of small
businesses or very small businesses,
will be required to provide information
regarding revenues attributable to the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests on its FCC Form
175 short-form application for Auction
73 to establish that it satisfies the
applicable eligibility requirement. An
applicant’s disclosure of this
information in the short-form
application for Auction 73 will become
part of the applicant’s Auction 76
application, in the event the
Commission conducts Auction 76.
Accordingly, applicants are not
required—and will not be able to—
submit this information in their
abbreviated Auction 76 application.
Applicants claiming eligibility as a
designated entity in Auction 73 and
Auction 76 should review carefully the
CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order, 71 FR
6992, February 10, 2006, the Designated
Entity Second Report and Order, 71 FR
26245, May 5, 2006, and the Order on
Reconsideration of the Designated
Entity Second Report and Order, 71 FR
34272, June 14, 2006. In that
connection, the Commission adopted
rules governing eligibility for designated
entity benefits in the Designated Entity
Second Report and Order. The
Commission’s rules regarding applicants
seeking eligibility for designated entity
benefits require the disclosure of: (1) All
parties with which the applicant has
entered into arrangements for the lease
or resale (including wholesale
agreements) of any of the capacity of
any of the applicant’s spectrum; and (2)
the gross revenues, separately and in the
aggregate, of entities with which the
applicant has an attributable material
relationship, as defined in
§ 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(B).
70. The Commission has adopted a
narrow exemption from the attribution
rule for the officers and directors of a
rural telephone cooperative pursuant to
which the gross revenues of the
affiliates of the cooperative’s officers
and directors are not attributed to the
applicant. An applicant (or controlling
interest) seeking to claim this exemption
must include in its short-form
application a certification that it is
validly organized under the most
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closely applicable organizing statute for
a cooperative, and that such
organization is reflected in its articles of
incorporation, bylaws, and/or other
relevant organic documents. Applicants
seeking to claim this exemption must
meet all of the conditions specified in
§ 1.2110(b)(3)(iii) of the Commission’s
rules. Additional guidance on
completing the FCC Form 175 to claim
this exemption may be found in
Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice.
ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
71. To encourage the growth of
wireless services in federally recognized
tribal lands, the Commission has
implemented a tribal lands bidding
credit. Applicants do not provide
information regarding tribal lands
bidding credits on their FCC Form 175
short-form applications. Instead,
winning bidders may apply for the tribal
lands bidding credit after the auction
when they file their FCC Form 601 longform applications.
iii. Installment Payments
72. Installment payment plans will
not be available in Auction 73 or in
Auction 76.
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B. License Selection
73. An applicant must select the
initially offered licenses on which it
wants to bid individually or as part of
a pre-defined package in Auction 73
from the Eligible Licenses list on its
short-form application for Auction 73.
An applicant interested in bidding on
licenses in the contingent subsequent
auction must select those licenses from
the Eligible Licenses list on its shortform application for Auction 76.
Applicants will be able to bid on predefined packages of initially offered C
Block licenses and alternative C2 Block
licenses, if offered in subsequent
bidding, pursuant to the package
bidding procedures, only if they have
selected all the individual licenses that
comprise the relevant package on their
respective short-form applications.
74. To assist applicants in identifying
licenses of interest that will be available
in Auctions 73 and 76, FCC Form 175
will include a filtering mechanism that
allows an applicant to filter the Eligible
Licenses list. The applicant will make
selections for one or more of the filter
criteria and the system will produce a
list of licenses satisfying the specified
criteria. The applicant may select all the
licenses in the customized list or select
individual licenses from the list.
Applicants also will be able to select
licenses from one customized list and
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then create additional customized lists
to select additional licenses.
75. Applicants will not be able to
change their license selections for either
Auction 73 or Auction 76 after the
short-form application filing deadline.
Applicants interested in participating in
Auctions 73 and 76 must have selected
license(s) available in the respective
auction by the short-form application
deadline. Applicants must confirm their
license selections before the deadline
for submitting FCC Form 175. The FCC
Auction System will not accept bids
from an applicant on individual licenses
that the applicant has not selected on its
FCC Form 175. In addition, the FCC
Auction System will not accept bids
from an applicant on a pre-defined
hierarchical package unless the
applicant selected on its FCC Form 175
all the individual licenses that comprise
the package.
applicants, provided that: (1) The
attributable interest holder certifies that
it has not and will not communicate
with any party concerning the bids or
bidding strategies of more than one of
the applicants in which it holds an
attributable interest, or with which it
has entered into a joint bidding
arrangement; and (2) the arrangements
do not result in a change in control of
any of the applicants. While the anticollusion rules do not prohibit nonauction-related business negotiations
among auction applicants, applicants
are reminded that certain discussions or
exchanges could touch upon
impermissible subject matters because
they may convey pricing information
and bidding strategies. Compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule will
not insulate a party from enforcement of
the antitrust laws.
C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements
76. Applicants will be required to
identify in their short-form application
for Auction 73 all parties with whom
they have entered into any agreements,
arrangements, or understandings of any
kind relating to the licenses being
auctioned in Auctions 73 and 76,
including any agreements relating to
post-auction market structure. The
agreements identified in the short-form
application for Auction 73 will become
part of the applicant’s Auction 76
application, in the event the 31
Commission conducts Auction 76.
Accordingly, applicants are not
required—and will not be able to—
disclose bidding agreements in their
abbreviated Auction 76 application.
77. Applicants also will be required to
certify under penalty of perjury in their
short-form applications that they have
not entered and will not enter into any
explicit or implicit agreements,
arrangements or understandings of any
kind with any parties, other than those
identified in the application to
participate in Auction 73, regarding the
amount of their bids, bidding strategies,
or the particular licenses on which they
will or will not bid. If an applicant has
had discussions, but has not reached an
agreement by the short-form application
filing deadline, it would not include the
names of parties to the discussions on
its application and may not continue
such discussions with any applicants
after the deadline.
78. After the filing of short-form
applications, the Commission’s rules do
not prohibit a party holding a noncontrolling, attributable interest in one
applicant from acquiring an ownership
interest in or entering into a joint
bidding arrangement with other
D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements
79. All applicants must comply with
the uniform part 1 ownership disclosure
standards and provide information
required by § 1.2105 and 1.2112 of the
Commission’s rules. Specifically, in
completing the short-form application
for Auction 73, applicants will be
required to fully disclose information on
the real party or parties-in-interest and
ownership structure of the applicant.
The ownership disclosure standards for
the short-form application are
prescribed in § 1.2105 and 1.2112 of the
Commission’s rules. Each applicant is
responsible for information submitted in
its short-form application being
complete and accurate. An applicant’s
disclosure of ownership information in
the short-form application for Auction
73 will become part of the applicant’s
Auction 76 application, in the event the
Commission conducts Auction 76.
Accordingly, applicants are not
required—and will not be able to—
submit ownership disclosure
information in their abbreviated
Auction 76 application.
80. An applicant’s most current
ownership information on file with the
Commission, if in an electronic format
compatible with the short-form
application (FCC Form 175) (such as
information submitted in an online FCC
Form 602 or in an FCC Form 175 filed
for a previous auction using ISAS) will
automatically be entered into the
applicant’s short-form application. An
applicant is responsible for ensuring
that the information submitted in its
short-form application for Auction 73 is
complete and accurate. Accordingly,
applicants should carefully review any
information automatically entered to
confirm that it is complete and accurate
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as of the deadline for filing the shortform application. Applicants can update
any information that was entered
automatically and needs to be changed
directly in the short-form application.
E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures
81. To determine which applicants
qualify for bidding credits as small
businesses or very small businesses, the
Commission considers the gross
revenues of the applicant, its affiliates,
its controlling interests, and the
affiliates of its controlling interests.
Therefore, entities applying to bid as
small businesses or very small
businesses (or consortia of small
businesses or very small businesses)
will be required to disclose on their
short-form applications for Auction 73
the gross revenues of the preceding
three years for each of the following: (1)
The applicant; (2) its 33 affiliates; (3) its
controlling interests; and (4) the
affiliates of its controlling interests.
Certification that the average annual
gross revenues of such entities and
individuals for the preceding three years
do not exceed the applicable limit is not
sufficient. Applicants must also disclose
the gross revenues of the entities with
which they have attributable material
relationships, as defined by the
Commission’s rules. Additionally, if an
applicant is applying as a consortium of
small businesses or very small
businesses, this information must be
provided for each consortium member.
An applicant’s disclosure of bidding
credit revenue information in the shortform application for Auction 73 will
become part of the applicant’s Auction
76 application, in the event the
Commission conducts Auction 76.
Accordingly, applicants are not required
and will not be able to submit bidding
credit revenue information in their
abbreviated Auction 76 application.
82. Controlling interests of an
applicant include individuals and
entities with either de facto or de jure
control of the applicant. Typically,
ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an
entity’s voting stock evidences de jure
control. De facto control is determined
on a case-by-case basis. The following
are some common indicia of de facto
control: (1) The entity constitutes or
appoints more than 50 percent of the
board of directors or management
committee; (2) the entity has authority
to appoint, promote, demote, and fire
senior executives that control the dayto-day activities of the licensee; and (3)
the entity plays an integral role in
management decisions.
83. Officers and directors of an
applicant are also considered to have
controlling interest in the applicant. The
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Commission does not impose specific
equity requirements on controlling
interest holders. Once the principals or
entities with a controlling interest are
determined, only the revenues of those
principals or entities; the affiliates of
those principals or entities; the
applicant and its affiliates; and any
parties having an attributable material
relationship with the applicant will be
counted in determining small business
eligibility.
84. In the Designated Entity Second
Report and Order, the Commission
adopted material relationship rules. The
Commission now requires the
consideration of certain leasing and
resale (including wholesale)
relationships—material relationships—
in determining designated entity
eligibility. Material relationships fall
into two categories: impermissible and
attributable. An applicant or licensee
has an impermissible material
relationship when it has agreements
with one or more other entities for the
lease or resale (including under a
wholesale agreement) of, on a
cumulative basis, more than 50 percent
of the spectrum capacity of any of its
licenses. If an applicant or a licensee
has an impermissible material
relationship, it is, as a result, (1)
ineligible for the award of designated
entity benefits, and (2) subject to unjust
enrichment on a license-bylicense basis.
85. An applicant or licensee has an
attributable material relationship when
it has one or more agreements with any
individual entity for the lease or resale
(including under a wholesale
agreement) of, on a cumulative basis,
more than 25 percent of the spectrum
capacity of any individual license held
by the applicant or licensee. The
attributable material relationship will
cause the gross revenues and, if
applicable, total assets of that entity and
its attributable interest holders to be
attributed to the applicant or licensee
for the purposes of determining the
applicant’s or licensee’s (1) eligibility
for designated entity benefits and (2)
liability for unjust enrichment on a
license-by-license basis.
86. The Commission grandfathered
material relationships in existence
before the release of the Designated
Entity Second Report and Order,
meaning that those preexisting
relationships would not alone cause the
Commission to examine a designated
entity’s ongoing eligibility for benefits
or its liability for unjust enrichment.
The Commission did not, however,
grandfather preexisting material
relationships for determinations of an
applicant’s or licensee’s designated
entity eligibility for future auctions or in
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the context of future assignments,
transfers of control, spectrum leases, or
other reportable eligibility events.
Rather, the occurrence of any of those
35 eligibility events after the release
date of the Designated Entity Second
Report and Order triggers a
reexamination of the applicant’s or
licensee’s designated entity eligibility,
taking into account all existing material
relationships, including those
previously grandfathered.
87. In recent years the Commission
has also made other modifications to its
rules governing the attribution of gross
revenues for purposes of determining
small business eligibility. These changes
include exempting the gross revenues of
the affiliates of a rural telephone
cooperative’s officers and directors from
attribution to the applicant if certain
specified conditions are met. The
Commission has also clarified that, in
calculating an applicant’s gross
revenues under the controlling interest
standard, it will not attribute the
personal net worth, including personal
income, of its officers and directors to
the applicant.
88. A consortium of small businesses
or very small businesses is a
conglomerate organization composed of
two or more entities, each of which
individually satisfies the definition of a
small business or very small business as
those terms are defined in the servicespecific rules. Thus, each member of a
consortium of small or very small
businesses that applies to participate in
Auction 73 must individually meet the
definition of small business or very
small business adopted by the
Commission for the 700 MHz Band.
Each consortium member must disclose
its gross revenues along with those of its
affiliates, its controlling interests, the
affiliates of its controlling interests, and
any entities having an attributable
material relationship with the member.
Although the gross revenues of the
consortium members will not be
aggregated for purposes of determining
the consortium’s eligibility as a small
business or very small business, this
information must be provided to ensure
that each individual consortium
member qualifies for any bidding credit
awarded to the consortium.
F. Provisions Regarding Former and
Current Defaulters
89. Each applicant must state under
penalty of perjury on its short-form
application whether or not the
applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
interests, and the affiliates of its 36
controlling interests, as defined by
§ 1.2110, have ever been in default on
any Commission licenses or have ever
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been delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency. In
addition, each applicant must certify
under penalty of perjury on its shortform application that, as of the shortform filing deadline, the applicant, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and
the affiliates of its controlling interests,
as defined by § 1.2110, are not in default
on any payment for Commission
licenses (including down payments) and
that they are not delinquent on any nontax debt owed to any Federal agency.
Prospective applicants are reminded
that submission of a false certification to
the Commission is a serious matter that
may result in severe penalties, including
monetary forfeitures, license
revocations, exclusion from
participation in future auctions, and/or
criminal prosecution. These statements
and certifications are prerequisites to
submitting an application in the FCC
Auction System. Accordingly,
applicants seeking licenses that may be
offered in Auction 76 will be required
to make these statements and
certifications in both their short-form
application for Auction 73 and their
abbreviated Auction 76 application.
90. Former defaulters—i.e.,
applicants, including any of their
affiliates, any of their controlling
interests, or any of the affiliates of their
controlling interests, that in the past
have defaulted on any Commission
licenses or been delinquent on any nontax debt owed to any Federal agency,
but that have since remedied all such
defaults and cured all of their
outstanding non-tax delinquencies—are
eligible to bid in Auctions 73 and 76,
provided that they are otherwise
qualified. Former defaulters are required
to pay upfront payments that are fifty
percent more than the normal upfront
payment amounts.
91. Current defaulters—i.e.,
applicants, including any of their
affiliates, any of their controlling
interests, or any of the affiliates of their
controlling interests, that are in default
on any payment for any Commission
licenses (including down payments) or
are delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency as of the
filing deadline for short-form
applications—are not eligible to bid in
either Auction 73 or Auction 76.
92. Applicants are encouraged to
review the Bureau’s previous guidance
on default and delinquency disclosure
requirements in the context of the shortform application process. For example,
it has been determined that to the extent
that Commission rules permit late
payment of regulatory or application
fees accompanied by late fees, such
debts will become delinquent for
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purposes of § 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a)
only after the expiration of a final
payment deadline. Therefore, with
respect to regulatory or application fees,
the provisions of § 1.2105(a) and
1.2106(a) regarding default and
delinquency in connection with
competitive bidding are limited to
circumstances in which the relevant
party has not complied with a final
Commission payment deadline.
93. The Commission considers
outstanding debts owed to the United
States Government, in any amount, to be
a serious matter. The Commission
adopted rules, including a provision
referred to as the red light rule, that
implement the Commission’s
obligations under the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996, which
governs the collection of claims owed to
the United States. Under the red light
rule, the Commission will not process
applications and other requests for
benefits filed by parties that have
outstanding debts owed to the
Commission. In the same rulemaking
order, the Commission explicitly
declared, however, that the
Commission’s competitive bidding rules
are not affected by the red light rule. As
a consequence, the Commission’s
adoption of the red light rule does not
alter the applicability of any of the
Commission’s competitive bidding
rules, including the provisions and
certifications of § 1.2105 and 1.2106,
with regard to current and former
defaults or delinquencies. Applicants
are reminded, however, that the
Commission’s Red Light Display
System, which provides information
regarding debts owed to the
Commission, may not be determinative
of an auction applicant’s ability to
comply with the default and
delinquency disclosure requirements of
§ 1.2105. Thus, while the red light rule
ultimately may prevent the processing
of long-form 38 applications by auction
winners, an auction applicant’s red light
status is not necessarily determinative
of its eligibility to participate in an
auction or of its upfront payment
obligation.
94. Prospective applicants should
note that any long-form applications
filed after the close of competitive
bidding will be reviewed for compliance
with the Commission’s red light rule,
and such review may result in the
dismissal of a winning bidder’s longform application.
G. Other Information
95. Applicants owned by members of
minority groups and/or women, as
defined in § 1.2110(c)(3), may identify
themselves in filling out their short-
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form applications regarding this status.
This applicant status information is
collected for statistical purposes only
and assists the Commission in
monitoring the participation of
designated entities in its auctions.
H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form
Applications (FCC Form 175)
96. Applicants are not permitted to
make major modifications to their shortform applications (e.g., change their
license selections, change control of the
applicant, change the certifying official,
or change their size to claim eligibility
for a higher bidding credit) after the
short-form application deadline. Thus,
any change in control of an applicant,
resulting from a merger for example,
will be considered a major modification
to the applicant’s FCC Form 175, which
will consequently be dismissed.
97. Applicants are, however,
permitted to make only minor changes
to their FCC Form 175 after the shortform application deadline. Permissible
minor changes include, for example,
deletion and addition of authorized
bidders (to a maximum of three) and
revision of addresses and telephone
numbers of the applicants and their
contact persons.
98. If an applicant wishes to make
permissible minor changes to its shortform application, such changes should
be made electronically to its Auction 73
short-form application using the FCC
Auction System. Applicants should not
make changes to short-form applications
39 associated with Auction 76.
Applicants are reminded to click on the
SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction
System for the changes to be submitted
and considered by the Commission.
After the revised application has been
submitted, a confirmation page will be
displayed that states the submission
time and date, along with a unique file
number.
99. In addition, during those periods
outside of the initial and resubmission
filing windows (i.e., when an applicant
cannot electronically update its FCC
Form 175), an applicant should submit
a letter briefly summarizing the changes
and subsequently update its short-form
applications in ISAS as soon as
possible. After the filing window has
closed, the auction system will not
permit applicants to make certain
changes, such as legal classification and
bidding credit. Any letter describing
changes to an applicant’s short-form
application should be submitted by
electronic mail to the following address:
auction73@fcc.gov. The electronic mail
summarizing the changes must include
a subject or caption referring to Auction
73 and the name of the applicant (e.g.,
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Application of ABC Corp.), and should
not reference Auction 76.
100. Applicants must not submit
application-specific material through
the Commission’s Electronic Comment
Filing System (ECFS).
I. Maintaining Current Information in
Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175)
101. Section 1.65 of the Commission’s
rules requires an applicant to maintain
the accuracy and completeness of
information furnished in its pending
application and to notify the
Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of
decisional significance to that
application. Changes that cause a loss of
or reduction in eligibility for a bidding
credit must be reported immediately. If
an amendment reporting substantial
changes is a major amendment as
defined by § 1.2105, the major
amendment will not be accepted and
may result in the dismissal of the shortform application.
102. After the short-form filing
deadline, applicants may make only
minor changes to their short-form
applications, such as deleting or adding
authorized bidders (to a maximum of
three). Applicants must click on the
SUBMIT button in the FCC Auction
System for the changes to be submitted
and considered by the Commission. In
addition, applicants must submit a
letter, briefly summarizing the changes,
by electronic mail at the following
address: auction73@fcc.gov. The
electronic mail summarizing the
changes must include a subject or
caption referring to Auction 73 and the
name of the applicant. Applicants must
not submit application-specific material
through ECFS.
III. Pre-Auction Procedures
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A. Auction Seminar—November 20,
2007
103. On Tuesday November 20, 2007,
the FCC will sponsor a free seminar for
parties interested in participating in
Auctions 73 and 76 at the FCC
headquarters, located at 445 12th Street,
SW., Washington, DC. The seminar will
provide attendees with information
about pre-auction procedures,
completing FCC Form 175, auction
conduct, the FCC Auction System,
auction rules, and the 700 MHz Band
service rules. The seminar will also
provide an opportunity for prospective
bidders to ask questions of FCC staff
concerning the auction, auction
procedures, filing requirements and
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other matters related to Auctions 73 and
76.
104. To register, please provide the
information listed on the Auctions 73
and 76 Public Notice released October
19, 2007 (DA 07–4236), by fax (717)
338–2850, e-mail Auchelp@fcc.gov or
telephone (717) 338–2868 to the FCC by
Friday, November 16, 2007. For
individuals who are unable to attend, an
Audio/Video webcast of this seminar
will be available from the FCC’s Auction
73 Web page at https://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/73/.
B. Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175)—Due Prior to 6 p.m. ET on
December 3, 2007
105. In order to be eligible to bid in
Auction 73 or Auction 76, applicants
must first follow the procedures set
forth in Attachments D and E to the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice to submit an FCC Form 175
application electronically via the FCC
Auction System. The application must
be received at the Commission prior to
6 p.m. ET on December 3, 2007. Late
applications will not be accepted. There
is no application fee required when
filing an FCC Form 175, but an
applicant must submit an upfront
payment to be eligible to bid.
106. Applications may generally be
filed at any time beginning at noon ET
on November 19, 2007, and the filing
window will close prior to 6 p.m. ET on
December 3, 2007. Applicants are
strongly encouraged to file early and are
responsible for allowing adequate time
for filing their applications. Applicants
may update or amend their applications
multiple times until the filing deadline
on December 3, 2007.
107. Applicants must always click on
the SUBMIT button on the Certify &
Submit screen of the electronic form to
successfully submit or modify their FCC
Form 175. Any form that is not
submitted will not be reviewed by the
FCC. Additional information about
accessing, completing, and viewing the
FCC Form 175 is included in
Attachments D and E of the Auctions 73
and 76 Procedures Public Notice. FCC
Auctions Technical Support is available
at (877) 480–3200, or (202) 414–1255
(text telephone (TTY)); hours of service
are Monday through Friday, from 8 a.m.
to 6 p.m. ET.
C. Application Processing and Minor
Corrections
108. After the deadline for filing
short-form applications, the
Commission will process all timely
submitted applications to determine
which are acceptable for filing, and
subsequently will issue a public notice
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identifying: (1) Those applications
accepted for filing; (2) those
applications rejected; and (3) those
applications which have minor defects
that may be corrected, and the deadline
for resubmitting corrected applications.
109. After the December 3, 2007,
short-form filing deadline, applicants
may make only minor corrections to
their applications. Applicants will not
be permitted to make major
modifications to their applications (e.g.,
change their license selections, change
control of the applicant, change
certifying official, or change their size to
claim eligibility for a higher bidding
credit). Accordingly, applicants
interested in participating in any
potential contingent subsequent bidding
must have selected license(s) available
in the initial bidding as well as licenses
that may be available in contingent
subsequent bidding, including
alternative licenses, by the deadline for
submitting their application to
participate in Auction 73. FCC
personnel will communicate regarding a
short-form application only with an
applicant’s contact person or certifying
official, as designated on the applicant’s
FCC Form 175, unless the applicant’s
certifying official or contact person
notifies the Commission in writing that
applicant’s counsel or other
representative is authorized to speak on
its behalf.
D. Upfront Payments—Due December
28, 2007
110. In order to be eligible to bid in
Auction 73 and any contingent
subsequent auction, applicants must
submit an upfront payment
accompanied by an FCC Remittance
Advice Form (FCC Form 159). Only
applicants that become qualified
bidders in Auction 73, by, among other
things, making upfront payments to be
eligible to bid in Auction 73, will be
eligible to participate in any contingent
subsequent auction. However, qualified
bidders in Auction 73 will be permitted
to make additional upfront payments
with respect to licenses being offered in
any contingent subsequent auction at a
later date. After completing the FCC
Form 175, filers will have access to an
electronic version of the FCC Form 159
that can be printed and sent by facsimile
to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA. All
upfront payments for Auction 73 must
be received in the proper account at
Mellon Bank by 6 p.m. ET on December
28, 2007.
i. Making Upfront Payments by Wire
Transfer
111. Wire transfer payments for
Auction 73 must be received by 6 p.m.
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ET on December 28, 2007. No other
payment method is acceptable. To avoid
untimely payments, applicants should
discuss arrangements (including bank
closing schedules) with their banker
several days before they plan to make
the wire transfer, and allow sufficient
time for the transfer to be initiated and
completed before the deadline. The BNF
and Lockbox number are specific to the
upfront payments for Auction 73. Do
not use BNF or Lockbox numbers from
previous auctions. Wire transfer
information for Auction 76 will be made
available in a future public notice.
112. At least one hour before placing
the order for the wire transfer (but on
the same business day), applicants must
send by facsimile a completed FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank
at (412) 209–6045. On the cover sheet of
the facsimile, write Wire Transfer—
Auction Payment for Auction 73. In
order to meet the Commission’s upfront
payment deadline, an applicant’s
payment must be credited to the
Commission’s account before the
deadline. Applicants are responsible for
obtaining confirmation from their
financial institution that Mellon Bank
has timely received their upfront
payment and deposited it in the proper
account.
113. Please note that: (1) All payments
must be made in U.S. dollars; (2) all
payments must be made by wire
transfer; (3) upfront payments for
Auction 73 go to a lockbox number
different from the lockboxes used in
previous FCC auctions, and different
from the lockbox number to be used for
post-auction payments; and (4) failure to
deliver the upfront payment as
instructed by the December 28, 2007,
deadline will result in dismissal of the
application and disqualification from
participation in the auction as well as
ineligibility for participation in any
contingent subsequent bidding for 700
MHz Band licenses.
ii. FCC Form 159
114. A completed FCC Remittance
Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/
03) must be sent by facsimile to Mellon
Bank to accompany each upfront
payment. Proper completion of FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is critical to
ensuring correct crediting of upfront
payments. Detailed instructions for
completion of FCC Form 159 are
included in Attachment F to the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice. An electronic pre-filled version
of the FCC Form 159 is available after
submitting the FCC Form 175. Payors
using a pre-filled FCC Form 159 are
responsible for ensuring that all of the
information on the form, including
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payment amounts, is accurate. The FCC
Form 159 can be completed
electronically, but must be filed with
Mellon Bank via facsimile.
iii. Upfront Payments and Bidding
Eligibility
115. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that the
amount of the upfront payment would
determine a bidder’s initial bidding
eligibility, the maximum number of
bidding units on which a bidder may
place bids. In addition, consistent with
the Commission’s direction in the 700
MHz Second Report and Order, the
Bureau proposed that qualified bidders
in Auction 73 would have an
opportunity to submit additional
upfront payments to obtain bidding
eligibility for licenses in any contingent
subsequent auction (Auction 76).
116. Under the Bureau’s proposal, in
order to bid on a particular license or
package, qualified bidders must have
selected the license(s) on FCC Form 175
and must have a current eligibility level
that meets or exceeds the number of
bidding units assigned to that license or
package. For a package, the bidding
units are calculated by adding together
the bidding units of the individual
licenses that make up the package. At a
minimum, therefore, an applicant’s total
upfront payment must be enough to
establish eligibility to bid on at least one
of the licenses selected on its FCC Form
175 for Auction 73, or else the applicant
will not be eligible to participate in
Auction 73 or in Auction 76. An
applicant does not have to make an
upfront 45 payment to cover all licenses
the applicant selected on its FCC Form
175, but rather to cover the maximum
number of bidding units that are
associated with licenses on which the
bidder wishes to place bids and hold
provisionally winning bids (via bids on
licenses and/or packages) at any given
time in Auction 73. If contingent
subsequent bidding is necessary,
qualified bidders for Auction 73 will be
given an opportunity to supplement
their upfront payments in order to
increase their bidding eligibility for
Auction 76.
117. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed to calculate
upfront payments as follows: (1) For
licenses covering CMAs in the 50 states
in which the licenses offered in Auction
66 were sold, $0.05 per MHz per
population (MHz-pop) for Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) licenses and
$0.03/MHz-pop for Rural Service Area
(RSA) licenses; (2) for licenses covering
EAs in the 50 states in which the
corresponding licenses in both EA
blocks offered in Auction 66 were sold,
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the sum of $0.05/MHz-pop for counties
contained within an MSA and $0.03/
MHz-pop for counties contained within
an RSA; (3) for licenses covering REAGs
in the 50 states in which the
corresponding licenses in all three
REAG blocks offered in Auction 66 were
sold, the sum of $0.05/MHz-pop for
counties contained within an MSA and
$0.03/MHz-pop for counties contained
within an RSA; (4)for licenses covering
geographic areas for which an Auction
66 license was unsold, $0.01/MHz-pop;
(5)for licenses covering the Gulf of
Mexico, $1,000 per MHz; and (6) for all
remaining licenses, $0.01/MHz-pop. For
all licenses, the results of the above
calculations are subject to a minimum of
$500 per license and are rounded using
its standard rounding procedure.
118. The Bureau set forth the specific
upfront payments and bidding units for
each license in Attachment A of the 700
MHz Auction Public Notice and sought
comment on this proposal. The Bureau
did not receive any comments in
response to the proposed upfront
payments, or on its proposal that the
upfront payment amount would
determine a bidder’s initial bidding
eligibility. Therefore, the Bureau adopt
the upfront payments and bidding units
for each 46 license in Auction 73 as
proposed and set forth in Attachment A
of the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice.
119. In calculating its upfront
payment amount, an applicant
interested in bidding only on individual
licenses should determine the
maximum number of bidding units on
which it may wish to be active (bid on
or hold provisionally winning bids on)
in any single round in Auction 73, and
submit an upfront payment amount
covering that number of bidding units.
Applicants interested in bidding on
packages should determine their upfront
payment amount by calculating the sum
of bidding units associated with each
discrete license they wish to include in
new bids (package or individual bids) or
have included in provisionally winning
bids in any single round. The bidding
units associated with a given license,
even if the license is included in more
than one bid, will be counted only once
per bidder per round. In order to make
this calculation, an applicant should
add together the upfront payments for
all licenses comprising all combinations
of licenses and packages of licenses on
which it seeks to be active in any given
round. If a bidder has enough eligibility
to bid on certain licenses, it can place
bids on the licenses individually and on
packages containing those licenses
without needing additional eligibility.
For example, if licenses A, B, and C
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each have 10,000 bidding units, and a
bidder wishes in a single round to be
able to bid on licenses A, B, and C
individually and on packages AB and
ABC, the bidder needs 30,000 bidding
units of eligibility. Applicants should
check their calculations carefully, as
there is no provision for increasing a
bidder’s eligibility for Auction 73 after
the upfront payment deadline.
120. The Bureau reiterates that, in the
event it is necessary to conduct Auction
76, bidders will have an opportunity to
supplement their upfront payments in
order to increase their bidding eligibility
for Auction 76. The instructions and
deadline for doing so would be
announced within five business days
after the end of bidding in Auction 73.
121. For Auction 73 and any
contingent subsequent auction, former
defaulters must calculate their upfront
payment for all licenses and packages
by multiplying the number of bidding
units on which they wish to be active
by 1.5. In order to calculate the number
of bidding units to assign to former
defaulters, the Commission will divide
the upfront payment received by 1.5 and
round the result up to the nearest
bidding unit.
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iv. Applicant’s Wire Transfer
Information for Purposes of Refunds of
Upfront Payments
122. To ensure that refunds of upfront
payments are processed in an
expeditious manner, the Commission is
requesting that all pertinent information
be supplied to the FCC. Applicants can
provide the information electronically
during the initial short-form application
filing window after the form has been
submitted. Applicants are reminded that
information submitted as part of an FCC
Form 175 will be available to the public;
for that reason, wire transfer
information should not be included in
an FCC Form 175.
E. Auction Registration
123. Approximately ten days before
the auction, the FCC will issue a public
notice announcing all qualified bidders
for Auction 73. Qualified bidders are
those applicants whose FCC Form 175
applications have been accepted for
filing and have timely submitted
upfront payments sufficient to make
them eligible to bid on license(s)
initially offered in Auction 73.
124. All qualified bidders are
automatically registered for the auction.
Registration materials will be
distributed prior to the auction by
overnight mail. The mailing will be sent
only to the contact person at the contact
address listed in the FCC Form 175 and
will include the SecurID tokens that
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will be required to place bids, the
Integrated Spectrum Auction System
(ISAS) Bidder’s Guide, and the Auction
Bidder Line phone number.
125. Qualified bidders that do not
receive this registration mailing will not
be able to submit bids. Therefore, any
qualified bidder that has not received
this mailing by noon on Tuesday,
January 15, 2008, should call (717) 338–
2868. Receipt of this registration mailing
is critical to participating in the auction,
and each applicant is responsible for
ensuring it has received all of the
registration material.
126. In the event that SecurID
tokens are lost or damaged, only a
person who has been designated as an
authorized bidder, the contact person,
or the certifying official on the
applicant’s short-form application may
request replacement registration
material. Qualified bidders requiring the
replacement of these items must call
Technical Support at (877) 480–3201 or
(202) 414–1255 (TTY).
F. Remote Electronic Bidding
127. The Commission will conduct
Auctions 73 and 76 over the Internet
and telephonic bidding will be available
as well. Qualified bidders are permitted
to bid electronically and telephonically.
Each applicant should indicate its
bidding preference—electronic or
telephonic—on the FCC Form 175. In
either case, each authorized bidder must
have its own SecurID token, which the
FCC will provide at no charge. Each
applicant with one authorized bidder
will be issued two SecurID tokens,
while applicants with two or three
authorized bidders will be issued three
tokens. For security purposes, the
SecurID tokens, the telephonic
bidding telephone number, and the
Integrated Spectrum Auction System
(ISAS) Bidder’s Guide are only mailed
to the contact person at the contact
address listed on the FCC Form 175.
Please note that each SecurID token is
tailored to a specific auction; therefore,
SecurID tokens issued for other
auctions or obtained from a source other
than the FCC will not work for Auction
73. In the event that it is necessary to
conduct Auction 76, qualified bidders
for Auction 76 will use the same
SecurID tokens as they used for
Auction 73.
128. Please note that the SecurID
tokens can be recycled, and the Bureau
encourages bidders to return the tokens
to the FCC. The Bureau will provide
pre-addressed envelopes that bidders
may use to return the tokens once the
auction is closed.
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G. Mock Auction—January 18, 2008
129. All qualified bidders will be
eligible to participate in a mock auction
on Friday, January 18, 2008. The mock
auction will enable applicants to
become familiar with the FCC Auction
System prior to the auction.
Participation by all bidders is strongly
recommended. Details will be
announced by public notice.
IV. Auction 73
130. The first round of bidding for
Auction 73 will begin on Thursday,
January 24, 2008. The initial bidding
schedule will be announced in a public
notice listing the qualified bidders,
which is to be released approximately
10 days before the start of the auction.
A. Auction 73 Structure
i. Simultaneous Multiple Round
Auction With Package Bidding on C
Block Licenses
131. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed using the
Commission’s standard simultaneous
multiple-round (SMR) auction format
for the A, B, D, and E Block licenses,
while enabling package bidding for C
Block licenses using an auction design
with hierarchical package bidding
(HPB). An SMR–HPB auction format
offers every license for bid at the same
time and consists of successive bidding
rounds in which eligible bidders may
place bids on individual licenses and on
certain pre-defined packages of
specified licenses, which, for Auction
73, only include C Block licenses. A
bidder may bid on, and potentially win,
any number of licenses and/or packages.
Typically, bidding remains open on all
licenses until bidding stops on every
license, unless an alternative version of
the stopping rule is invoked.
132. The 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice proposed pre-defined packages
for C Block licenses according to a
hierarchical structure. The initial level
consists of individual licenses, and the
next level consists of non-overlapping
packages of those licenses, such that a
given license is included only once in
each level. The winning set of bids
could therefore consist of bids from
various levels as long as each license is
included in only one winning bid. The
Bureau proposed to accept individual
bids on C Block licenses for REAGs 1–
12 (Level 1) and package bids on the
following combinations of C Block
REAG licenses (Level 2): (1) REAGs 1–
8 (the 50 States package); (2) REAGs 10
and 12, comprising Puerto Rico, the U.S.
Virgin Islands and the Gulf of Mexico
(the Atlantic package); and (3) REAGs 9
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and 11, comprising the U.S. Pacific
territories (the Pacific package).
133. The Bureau also sought comment
on alternative levels or alternative ways
of packaging licenses within levels.
Additionally, the Bureau proposed to
conduct the auction using standard
SMR procedures for all of the licenses,
including the C Block licenses in the
event that currently unforeseen
difficulties make it impracticable to
implement package bidding.
134. The majority of commenters
support package bidding for C Block
licenses either in general or for the HPB
auction format specifically. Some
commenters, however, urge the Bureau
to abandon package bidding for Auction
73 under the unforeseen difficulties
exception to the Commission’s directive
to use package bidding for the C Block
licenses. These parties assert that the
SMR-HPB format is too complex, will
disadvantage bidders interested in only
individual licenses, and will not be
fully understood by bidders or
implemented by the Bureau in time for
the start of the auction. When the
Commission directed the Bureau to
adopt package bidding for the C Block,
it noted that package bidding minimizes
exposure risk for applicants whose
business plans require the economies of
scale that only can be obtained with
nationwide operation, but would not
preclude the participation of entities
wishing to bid on individual licenses.
The HPB auction format was chosen in
part because it mitigates issues inherent
in some other package bidding formats
that give bidders interested in large
packages an advantage over bidders
interested in individual licenses. Of
course, to the extent that providing
bidders the option of package bidding
favors those bidders seeking packages
over those seeking individual licenses,
the Bureau notes that the same
argument could be applied in reverse to
the other 1,087 licenses in Auction 73
that bidders will not have the option to
package in order to decrease their
exposure risk. After review of the
record, the Bureau concluded that
considerations raised in the comments
opposing package bidding are not the
kinds of unforeseen difficulties
regarding the feasibility of package
bidding for the C Block licenses that the
Commission envisioned in the 700 MHz
Second Report and Order.
135. Therefore, the Bureau concludes
that the SMR format for A, B, E and D
Block licenses, and the HPB auction
format for the C Block licenses, will best
meet the needs of bidders in Auction 73,
and therefore adopt them as proposed.
As is typical with both formats, bids
will be accepted on all individual
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licenses and on pre-defined packages of
licenses in each round of the auction
until bidding stops on every license,
allowing bidders to take advantage of
synergies that exist among licenses.
136. With regard to the proposed predefined packages for C Block licenses,
the Bureau declines to adopt the
alternate packages suggested by two
commenters. One commenter asserts
that it sees value in adopting a 12 REAG
package or even allowing bidders to
choose their own package. The second
commenter proposed adopting packages
of regions larger than REAGs (e.g., East,
Midwest, West Coast) and a package of
only the lower 48 States. The
commenter bases its proposal for a
lower 48 State package on the premise
that prospective nationwide bidders
have limited interest in Hawaii and
Alaska, and that these states would be
better served if they are not included in
a nationwide package. The State of
Hawaii submitted reply comments
challenging the assertion that
nationwide carriers have little interest
in providing coverage to Hawaii, noting
several major carriers already do in fact
operate in Hawaii. The State of Hawaii
also asserts that any nationwide package
without Hawaii and Alaska unfairly
discriminates against these states and its
inhabitants, which would not only be
inconsistent with the Communications
Act, but also with Commission
precedent. The commenter also suggests
that the Bureau eliminate the Atlantic
and Pacific packages on the grounds
that bidders would not obtain any
benefits from bidding on the licenses as
packages. The Bureau sees no
disadvantages to including the
packages.
137. The Commission adopted
package bidding for C Block licenses to
reduce the exposure problem that might
otherwise inhibit bidders seeking to
create a nationwide footprint. At the
same time, the Commission directed the
Bureau to implement package bidding
without imposing disadvantages on
parties that wish to bid on individual
licenses comprising the nationwide
footprint. The Bureau finds that offering
three packages—the 50 States, Atlantic,
and Pacific packages—meets this
balance by reducing exposure risk of
bidders seeking to provide nationwide
coverage without disadvantaging those
bidders seeking individual licenses.
Therefore, the Bureau adopts the predefined packages as proposed in the 700
MHz Auction Public Notice.
ii. Information Available to Bidders
Before and During the Auctions
138. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission found that
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the public interest would be served if
the auction for new 700 MHz Band
licenses is conducted using anonymous
(or limited information) bidding
procedures, regardless of any preauction measurement of likely auction
competition. Such information
procedures are intended to reduce the
potential for anti-competitive bidding
behavior, including bidding activity that
aims to prevent the entry of new
competitors. The Commission therefore
directed the Bureau to propose and seek
comment on more detailed procedures
for employing anonymous bidding for
the 700 MHz auction.
139. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed to
withhold, until after the close of
bidding, public release of (1) bidders’
license selections on their short-form
applications, (2) the amounts of bidders’
upfront payments and bidding
eligibility, and (3) information that may
reveal the identities of bidders placing
bids and taking other bidding-related
actions. In contrast to procedures
implemented for anonymous bidding in
past auctions, and consistent with the
700 MHz Second Report and Order, the
Bureau proposed to withhold this
information irrespective of any preauction measurement of likely auction
competition.
140. Commenters generally support
the proposal to implement limited
information disclosure procedures for
the 700 MHz auction, though they differ
on the disclosure of specific data
elements. Some commenters suggest
that the Commission should inform
bidders of the license(s) or license
block(s) for which an overlap occurs
with other applicants, citing
fundamental differences between the
different 700 MHz license blocks and
the particular needs of small and rural
bidders to better identify those bidders
interested in nationwide/open access
licenses. A commenter opposes
disclosure of this information. The
Bureau finds that revealing information
on license blocks selected by competing
applicants would be inconsistent with
the goals of limiting information
disclosure. Thus, the Bureau will not
release information on licenses or
license blocks selected until after the
close of bidding.
141. Commenters also recommend
releasing each bidder’s upfront payment
amount and initial bidding eligibility
before the auction on the grounds that
this information would help small
companies better gauge the level of
competition. Some entities also seek
disclosure of an aggregate eligibility
ratio after each round. A commenter
advocates releasing the total number of
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active bidders and, for each license and
package, the number of bids and amount
of the bids after each round. While these
parties contend that release of this
information would not facilitate
anticompetitive practices and would not
disclose bidder identities, the Bureau
disagrees. As a commenter notes, release
of bidder eligibility before the auction
could be used by incumbents to block
new entrants or for other strategic
purposes. Similarly, a commenter
contends that release of this information
weakens anonymous bidding. This
information could potentially be used to
discern the identities of individual
bidders. Moreover, the Bureau is
particularly concerned that release of
such information could foster
anticompetitive bidding activity,
particularly in light of the use of reserve
prices in this auction.
142. Two commenters urge the
Commission to release names of auction
applicants and provide access to the
ownership information in applicants’
short form applications. This
information has been made publicly
available in past auctions even where
limited information procedures have
been implemented. The Bureau plans to
continue to make available the names of
applicants and their ownership
information, as release of that
information is necessary for other
applicants to comply with the anticollusion rules and does not undermine
the purpose of its anonymous bidding
procedures. To enable applicants to
comply with the Commission’s anticollusion rules, once the Bureau has
conducted its initial review of
applications to participate in Auction 73
and Auction 76, each applicant will
receive a letter that lists the other
applicants in Auction 73 and Auction
76 that have applied for licenses in any
of the same geographic areas as the
applicant.
143. The Bureau adopts the proposals
set out in the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice. Thus, the Bureau will disclose
after the conclusion of each round the
amount of every bid placed and whether
a bid was withdrawn. More generally,
the Bureau will disclose, after the
conclusion of each round, all relevant
information about all bids placed,
withdrawn, or dropped except for the
identities of the bidders performing the
actions and the net amounts of the bids
placed, withdrawn, or dropped. As in
past auctions conducted with limited
information procedures, for each license
the Bureau will indicate the minimum
acceptable bid amount for the next
round and whether the license has a
provisionally winning bid. After each
round, the Bureau will also release for
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each license the number of bidders that
placed a bid on the license.
Furthermore, the Bureau will indicate
whether any proactive waivers were
submitted in each round, and the
Bureau will release the stage transition
percentage—the percentages of licenses
(as measured in bidding units) on which
there were new bids—for the round. In
addition, after each round, bidders
logged in to the FCC Auction System
will be able to see whether their own
bids are provisionally winning. The
Bureau will provide samples of
publicly-available and bidder-specific
(non-public) results files prior to the
start of the auction.
144. Several commenters argue that
information about the initial auction
results (for Auction 73) should not be
withheld in the event that a contingent
auction (Auction 76) must be
conducted. Some commenters urge
disclosure of initial auction results for
blocks that meet their reserve prices
before the contingent auction, claiming
that such information may be necessary
to meet Securities and Exchange
Commission and other regulatory
requirements, to allow bidders to
communicate with financial
institutions, and to facilitate network
build-out. Similarly, other commenters
favor allowing bidders to announce that
they won licenses in a block that has
met its reserve price if required by law
or regulation. These parties do not,
however, cite any specific regulatory
requirements that would compel such
disclosures, and the Bureau is not aware
of any such regulations. To the extent
that any such requirements are related
to winning bidders’ payments, the
Bureau notes that if Auction 76 were to
be held, winning bidders in Auction 73
of licenses in the A, B, C, or E Blocks
will not be required to make down
payments until after the subsequent
bidding. The Bureau finds that
premature disclosure to financial
institutions, vendors, and others of
identities of successful bidders in
Auction 73 would undermine the
purposes of the limited information
procedures.
145. Regarding Auction 76 and the
timing of information disclosure, the
Bureau adopts its proposal not to release
until after the close of bidding in both
auctions: (a) Information on the winning
bidders for licenses in blocks for which
the reserve price was met in the first
auction, (b) information on bidder
license selections and eligibility, and (c)
any other information that may reveal
the identities of bidders placing bids
and taking other bidding-related actions
on licenses in all blocks. For the D
Block, however, in the event there is a
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winning bidder for the D Block license
in Auction 73, the Bureau will make
public before the close of bidding in an
Auction 76 only such information as
may be necessary to proceed with
promptly facilitating the D Block
winner’s obligations to negotiate a
Network Sharing Agreement with the
national Public Safety Broadband
Licensee in the adjacent spectrum block.
146. Commenting parties also urge the
Commission to allow applicants to optout of Auction 76 in order to be free of
anti-collusion prohibition, so long as
bidder certifies that its decision has not
been based on discussion with other
parties concerning auction strategy or
post-auction market structure. As one
commenter acknowledges, reversal of
the Commission’s determination on this
issue would need to be addressed by
full Commission. As such, the Bureau
cannot implement such a change in this
proceeding.
147. Other Issues. The Bureau
concluded in the rulemaking proceeding
that the information disclosure
procedures established for this auction
will not interfere with the
administration of or compliance with
the Commission’s anti-collusion rule.
Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the
Commission’s rules provides that after
the short-form application filing
deadline, all applicants for licenses in
any of the same geographic license areas
are prohibited from disclosing to each
other in any manner the substance of
bids or bidding strategies until after the
down payment deadline, subject to
specified exceptions. When limited
information procedures are not in effect
for a particular auction, each applicant’s
selection of licenses has been publicly
available through the Commission’s
online short-form application database.
In Auction 73 and Auction 76, however,
the Commission will not disclose
information regarding license selection
or the amounts of bidders’’ upfront
payments and bidding eligibility. As in
the past, the Commission will disclose
the other portions of applicants’’ shortform applications, through its online
database and certain application-based
information through public notices.
Thus, even without information
regarding license selection, applicants
would be able to comply with
§ 1.2105(c) by not disclosing bids or
bidding strategies to any other
applicants in the auction. This
approach, however, could inhibit
otherwise lawful communications with
applicants for licenses in other
geographic license areas, which the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule
permits.
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148. Consequently, the Bureau will
notify separately each applicant with
short-form applications to participate in
a pending auction whether applicants in
Auction 73 and Auction 76 have
applied for licenses in any of the same
geographic areas as that applicant.
Specifically, after the Bureau conducts
its initial review of applications to
participate in Auction 73 and Auction
76, each applicant with a pending shortform application will receive a letter
that lists the applicants in Auction 73
and Auction 76 that have applied for
licenses in any of the same geographic
areas as the applicant. The list will
identify the Auction 73 and Auction 76
applicant(s) by name but will not list
the license selections of the Auction 73
and Auction 76 applicant(s). As in past
auctions, additional information
regarding applicants in Auction 73 and
Auction 76 that is needed to comply
with § 1.2105(c), e.g., the identities of
controlling interest(s) in an applicant
and ownership interests greater than ten
percent, will be available through the
publicly accessible online short-form
application database.
149. When completing short-form
applications, applicants should avoid
any statements or disclosures that may
violate the Commission’s anti-collusion
rule, particularly in light of the
Commission’s procedures regarding the
availability of certain information in
Auction 73 and Auction 76. While
applicants’’ license selection will not be
disclosed until after Auction 73 and
Auction 76 close, the Commission will
disclose other portions of short-form
applications through its on-line
database and public notices.
Accordingly, applicants should avoid
including any information in their
short-form applications that might
convey information regarding license
selections. For example, applicants
should avoid using applicant names that
refer to licenses being offered, referring
to certain licenses or markets in
describing bidding agreements, or
including any information in
attachments that may otherwise disclose
applicants’’ license selections. If an
applicant is found to have violated the
Commission’s rules or antitrust laws in
connection with its participation in the
competitive bidding process, the
applicant may be subject to various
sanctions, including forfeiture of its
upfront payment, down payment, or full
bid amount and prohibition from
participating in future auctions.
iii. Eligibility and Activity Rules
150. The Bureau will use upfront
payments to determine initial
(maximum) eligibility (as measured in
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bidding units) for Auction 73. The
amount of the upfront payment
submitted by a bidder determines initial
bidding eligibility, the maximum
number of bidding units on which a
bidder may be active. Each license is
assigned a specific number of bidding
units listed in Attachment A of the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice. Bidding units for a given license
do not change as prices rise during the
auction. A bidder’s upfront payment is
not attributed to specific licenses or
packages. Rather, a bidder may place
bids on any of the licenses selected on
its FCC Form 175 as long as the total
number of bidding units associated with
those licenses does not exceed its
current eligibility. Eligibility cannot be
increased during Auction 73; it can only
remain the same or decrease. Thus, in
calculating its upfront payment amount,
an applicant must determine the
maximum number of bidding units it
may wish to bid on or hold
provisionally winning bids on in any
single round, and submit an upfront
payment amount covering that total
number of bidding units. At a
minimum, an applicant’s upfront
payment must cover the bidding units
for at least one of the licenses it selected
on its FCC Form 175 for Auction 73.
The total upfront payment does not
affect the total dollar amount a bidder
may bid on any given license or package
of licenses.
151. A bidder is eligible to bid on a
package of licenses if it selected all the
licenses in the package on its FCC Form
175 and has sufficient eligibility. The
bidding units for a package are
calculated by adding together the
bidding units of the individual licenses
that make up the package.
152. In order to ensure that an auction
closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to
bid actively throughout the auction,
rather than wait until late in the auction
before participating. Bidders are
required to be active on a specific
minimum percentage of their current
bidding eligibility during each round of
the auction.
153. A bidder’s activity level in a
round is the sum of the bidding units
associated with any licenses covered by
new and provisionally winning bids.
The bidding units associated with a
given license will be counted only once
in a bidder’s activity calculation for the
round, even if the bidder places a bid
on the license and a bid on a package
containing the license. For example,
consider two licenses, A and B, each
having 10,000 bidding units. Assuming
a bidder bids on license A as well as the
package AB in a given round, the
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bidder’s activity would be 20,000
bidding units, calculated as the sum of
the bidding units of licenses A and B.
Note that the bidding units for license
A are not counted twice. A bidder is
considered active on a license in the
current round if it is either the
provisionally winning bidder at the end
of the previous bidding round and does
not withdraw the provisionally winning
bid in the current round, or if it submits
a bid in the current round.
154. The minimum required activity
is expressed as a percentage of the
bidder’s current eligibility, and
increases by stage as the auction
progresses. Because these procedures
have proven successful in maintaining
the pace of previous auctions, the
Commission adopts them for Auction
73. Failure to maintain the requisite
activity level will result in the use of an
activity rule waiver, if any remain, or a
reduction in the bidder’s eligibility,
possibly curtailing or eliminating the
bidder’s ability to place additional bids
in the auction.
155. With package bidding in the C
Block, it is possible that a bidder may
have an activity level that exceeds its
eligibility, since the FCC Auction
System considers bids placed in 60
previous rounds when determining the
provisionally winning set. If a nonwinning bid placed in a previous round
later becomes provisionally winning,
the bidder will receive activity for the
newly provisionally winning bid. When
added to the activity for the bidder’s
provisionally winning bids from the
previous round and its new bids—
which were limited by the bidder’s
current bidding eligibility—the total
activity may exceed the bidder’s current
bidding eligibility. If this occurs, the
bidder’s current bidding eligibility will
not increase to accommodate the
additional activity. In subsequent
rounds, the bidder will not be permitted
to place new bids if its total activity
from provisionally winning bids
exceeds its bidding eligibility.
156. A commenter argues that the
Bureau should allow bidders limited
additional eligibility so that they can
continue to bid on licenses or packages
that become provisionally winning in
later rounds. The Bureau finds that
allowing maximum eligibility to be
increased in this way may provide an
incentive for bidders to intentionally
place bids that are likely to become
provisionally winning in later rounds,
so as to increase their eligibility outside
of the usual pre-auction process that
requires them to purchase eligibility
with upfront payments. Thus, the
Bureau will not modify its procedures
as suggested.
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157. A commenter proposes that the
Bureau modify the activity rules to
reduce the difference between the
number of bidding units associated with
the C Block licenses and the bidding
units associated with the D Block
license. It maintains that the C and D
Blocks are in many ways substitutes, but
notes that since the C Block has a
bandwidth of 22 MHz compared to 10
MHz for the D Block, the C Block has
many more bidding units. The
commenter contends that because of the
activity rule, the effect of this difference
is to harm bidders that alternatively bid
in the C and D Blocks. It therefore favors
the modification of the activity rules
through the attribution of a total
bandwidth of 22 MHz to the D Block.
The commenter maintains that this
would enable bidders to freely alternate
between the C and D Blocks, increasing
auction efficiency and revenues.
Another commenter criticizes this
proposal on several grounds, including
arguing that the proposal would depart
from established auction practice and is
inconsistent with the reserve prices. The
Bureau declines to adopt the proposal.
The Bureau finds that its current
method of determining bidding units,
combined with its activity and
eligibility rules, offer bidders adequate
opportunities to change bidding
strategies.
iv. Auction Stages
158. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed to conduct
the auction in two stages and employ an
activity rule. The Bureau further
proposed that, in each round of Stage
One, a bidder desiring to maintain its
current bidding eligibility would be
required to be active on licenses
representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility. Finally, the
Bureau proposed that in each round of
Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain
its current bidding eligibility would be
required to be active on at least 95
percent of its current bidding eligibility.
159. Some commenters favor the
addition of a third stage with either a
reduced eligibility threshold (before the
two proposed stages) or a higher
threshold (after the two proposed
stages). According to a commenter small
and regional bidders need time to
acquaint themselves with the many new
features and procedures in Auction 73.
Therefore, the commenter proposes
creating a new Stage One with a 60
percent activity threshold and moving
the 80 percent and 95 percent activity
thresholds to Stages Two and Three,
respectively. While some other
commenters support adopting a 60
percent activity threshold for Stage One,
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one commenter opposes any minimum
activity level decrease and instead
proposes a Stage Three with a 98
percent activity threshold.
160. The Bureau finds that adding a
new initial first stage with a lower
eligibility threshold is at this time
unnecessary. When determining the
bidding schedule, the Bureau needs to
balance the desirability of concluding
the auction reasonably swiftly with the
benefit in giving bidders sufficient time
for placing bids during rounds and for
analysis between rounds. The Bureau
finds no compelling reason to create a
new first stage that requires only a 60
percent eligibility requirement. Such a
lower activity requirement would
unnecessarily prolong the auction by
allowing bidders to postpone bidding
activity until the later rounds of the
auction. Establishing an 80 percent
activity threshold to start the auction,
and retaining the discretion to make
changes as circumstances warrant
represents the best compromise between
allowing auction participants time to
learn from the information revealed in
the auction, and requiring them to
participate actively throughout the
auction.
161. The Bureau likewise sees no
need to establish, at this time, a third
stage with a 98 percent eligibility
requirement, finding that a 95 percent
threshold should be a sufficiently high
activity requirement for the final stage
of the auction. In past auctions, the
Bureau established three stages using 80
percent, 90 percent, and 98 percent
activity requirements. In many of these
auctions, however, implementing Stage
Two had little effect in terms of
increasing bidding activity, and Stage
Three was implemented shortly
thereafter. Based on this experience, the
Bureau has generally moved away from
three-stage auctions in favor of twostage auctions. Moreover, a 95 percent
threshold allows bidders a little more
flexibility in fulfilling their activity
requirements during the final stage of
the auction. Therefore, the Bureau
declines to establish a 98 percent
activity threshold at this time. The
Bureau has the discretion to further alter
the activity requirements before and/or
during the auction as circumstances
warrant, and also has other mechanisms
by which it may influence the speed of
an auction. The Bureau finds that, for
now, two stages for an activity
requirement adequately balances the
desire to conclude the auction quickly
with giving sufficient time for bidders to
consider the status of the bidding and to
place bids. Therefore, the Bureau adopts
the two stages.
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162. Stage One: During the first stage
of the auction, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
will be required to be active on licenses
representing at least 80 percent of its
current bidding eligibility in each
bidding round. Failure to maintain the
required activity level will result in the
use of an activity rule waiver or, if the
bidder has no activity rule waivers
remaining, a reduction in the bidder’s
bidding eligibility in the next round.
During Stage One, reduced eligibility for
the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the bidder’s current round
activity (the sum of bidding units of the
bidder’s provisionally winning bids and
bids during the current round) by fivefourths (5/4).
163. Stage Two: During the second
stage of the auction, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current bidding eligibility
is required to be active on 95 percent of
its current bidding eligibility. Failure to
maintain the required activity level will
result in the use of an activity rule
waiver or, if the bidder has no activity
rule waivers remaining, a reduction in
the bidder’s bidding eligibility in the
next round. During Stage Two, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be
calculated by multiplying the bidder’s
current round activity (the sum of
bidding units of the bidder’s
provisionally winning bids and bids
during the current round) by twentynineteenths (20/19). Since activity
requirements increase in Stage Two,
bidders must carefully check their
activity during the first round following
a stage transition to ensure that they are
meeting the increased activity
requirement. This is especially critical
for bidders that have provisionally
winning bids and do not plan to submit
new bids. In past auctions, some bidders
have inadvertently lost bidding
eligibility or used an activity rule
waiver because they did not re-verify
their activity status at stage transitions.
Bidders may check their activity against
the required activity level by logging
into the FCC Auction System.
164. Because the foregoing procedures
have proven successful in maintaining
the proper pace in previous auctions,
the Bureau adopts them for Auction 73.
v. Stage Transitions
165. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that the
auction would advance to the next stage
(i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) after
considering a variety of measures of
auction activity, including, but not
limited to, the percentages of licenses
(as measured in bidding units) on which
there are new bids, the number of new
bids, and the increase in revenue. The
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Bureau further proposed that the Bureau
would retain the discretion to change
the activity requirements during the
auction. For example, the Bureau could
decide not to transition to Stage Two if
it believes the auction is progressing
satisfactorily under the Stage One
activity requirement, or to transition to
Stage Two with an activity requirement
that is higher or lower than the 95
percent. The Bureau proposed to alert
bidders of stage advancements by
announcement during the auction.
166. The Bureau adopts this proposal
for stage transitions. Thus, the auction
will start in Stage One. The Bureau will
regulate the pace of the auction by
announcement. The Bureau retains the
discretion to transition the auction to
Stage Two, add an additional stage with
a higher activity requirement, not to
transition to Stage Two, or to transition
to Stage Two with an activity
requirement that is higher or lower than
95 percent. This determination will be
based on a variety of measures of
auction activity, including, but not
limited to, the number of new bids and
the percentages of licenses (as measured
in bidding units) on which there are
new bids.
vi. Activity Rule Waivers
167. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that each
bidder in the auction be provided with
three activity rule waivers. Commenters
proposed two variations on the Bureau’s
proposal regarding activity rule waivers.
The Bureau declines to adopt these
alternatives and adopts the proposed
three activity rule waivers per bidder.
168. One commenter advocates
providing bidders with two additional
activity rule waivers to allow more time
for decision-making during the auction.
The commenter suggests that the two
additional waivers would provide
bidders, especially those that are
consortia, greater flexibility during the
auction. Another commenter opposes
any additional activity rule waivers
because, it argues, no clear connection
exists between having additional
waivers and decision-making. The
Bureau agrees with the opposing
commenter that the request for
additional waivers does not demonstrate
why the proposed three waivers are
insufficient, or why consortia might
have a greater need for flexibility than
any other bidder. The Bureau is satisfied
that providing three waivers over the
course of the auction will give bidders
a sufficient number of waivers and
flexibility, while also safeguarding the
integrity of the auction.
169. Another commenter proposes a
limit on activity rule waivers for bidders
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that are closely affiliated. That
commenter expresses concern with
bidders entering more than one entity in
the auction in order to receive more
than standard three activity rule
waivers, allowing it to preserve bidding
eligibility for later in the auction. The
commenter proposes a total limit of
three activity rule waivers for all closely
affiliated applicants, i.e., under common
control, applying for overlapping
licenses. Still another commenter
disagrees noting that, while affiliated
bidders may get twice the number of
waivers, they would use them twice as
fast as a single bidder in rounds in
which they were not bidding. The
Bureau agrees with the other commenter
that no clear advantage seems possible.
The Bureau also adds that entities are
prohibited from submitting more than
one application. This measure prevents
bidders from entering multiple entities
while permitting legitimate business
plans that entail common control among
more than one applicant.
170. Therefore, the Bureau adopts its
proposal to provide bidders with three
activity rule waivers. Bidders may use
an activity rule waiver in any round
during the course of the auction. Use of
an activity rule waiver preserves the
bidder’s current bidding eligibility
despite the bidder’s activity in the
current round being below the required
minimum activity level. An activity rule
waiver applies to an entire round of
bidding and not to a particular license.
Activity rule waivers can be either
applied proactively by the bidder (a
proactive waiver) or applied
automatically by the FCC Auction
System (an automatic waiver) and are
principally a mechanism for auction
participants to avoid the loss of bidding
eligibility in the event that exigent
circumstances prevent them from
placing a bid in a particular round.
171. The FCC Auction System
assumes that bidders with insufficient
activity would prefer to apply an
activity rule waiver (if available) rather
than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore,
the system will automatically apply a
waiver at the end of any bidding round
where a bidder’s activity level is below
the minimum required unless: (1) There
are no activity rule waivers available; or
(2) the bidder overrides the automatic
application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility. If a bidder has no waivers
remaining and does not satisfy the
activity requirement, the FCC Auction
System will permanently reduce the
bidder’s eligibility, possibly curtailing
or eliminating the bidder’s ability to
place additional bids in the auction.
172. A bidder with insufficient
activity that wants to reduce its bidding
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eligibility rather than use an activity
rule waiver must affirmatively override
the automatic waiver mechanism during
the bidding round by using the reduce
eligibility function in the FCC Auction
System. In this case, the bidder’s
eligibility is permanently reduced to
bring the bidder into compliance with
the activity rules. Once eligibility has
been reduced, a bidder will not be
permitted to regain its lost bidding
eligibility even if the round has not yet
ended.
173. Finally, a bidder may apply an
activity rule waiver proactively as a
means to keep the auction open without
placing a bid. If a bidder proactively
applies an activity waiver (using the
apply waiver function in the FCC
Auction System) during a bidding round
in which no bids are placed or
withdrawn, the auction will remain
open and the bidder’s eligibility will be
preserved. However, an automatic
waiver applied by the FCC Auction
System in a round in which there are no
new bids, withdrawals, or proactive
waivers will not keep the auction open.
A bidder cannot submit a proactive
waiver after submitting a bid in a round,
and submitting a proactive waiver will
preclude a bidder from placing any bids
in that round. It is important for bidders
to understand that applying a waiver is
irreversible. Once a bidder submits a
proactive waiver, the bidder cannot
unsubmit the waiver even if the round
has not yet ended.
vii. Auction Stopping Rules
174. For Auction 73, the Bureau
proposed to employ a simultaneous
stopping rule approach. A simultaneous
stopping rule means that all licenses
remain available for bidding until
bidding closes simultaneously on all
licenses. More specifically, bidding will
close simultaneously on all licenses and
packages after the first round in which
no bidder submits any new bids, applies
a proactive waiver, or withdraws any
provisionally winning bids.
175. The Bureau also sought comment
on alternative versions of the
simultaneous stopping rule for Auction
73: Option 1. The auction would close
for all licenses after the first round in
which no bidder applies a waiver,
withdraws a provisionally winning bid,
or places any new bids on any license
or package on which it is not the
provisionally winning bidder. Thus,
absent any other bidding activity, a
bidder placing a new bid on a license
or a package of licenses for which it is
the provisionally winning bidder would
not keep the auction open under this
modified stopping rule; Option 2. The
auction would end after a specified
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number of additional rounds. If the
Bureau invokes this special stopping
rule, it will accept bids in the specified
final round(s) and the auction will
close; and Option 3. The auction would
remain open even if no bidder places
any new bids, applies a proactive
waiver, or withdraws any provisionally
winning bids in a round. In this event,
the effect will be the same as if a bidder
had applied a waiver. Thus, the activity
rule will apply as usual, and a bidder
with insufficient activity will either use
an activity rule waiver (if it has any left)
or lose bidding eligibility.
176. The Bureau proposed to exercise
these options only in circumstances
such as where the auction is proceeding
unusually slowly or quickly, where
there is minimal overall bidding
activity, or where it appears likely that
the auction will not close within a
reasonable period of time or will close
prematurely, e.g., before bidders have
had an adequate opportunity to satisfy
any applicable reserve prices. The
Bureau noted that before exercising
these options, it is likely to attempt to
increase the pace of the auction by, for
example, changing the number of
bidding rounds per day and/or changing
the minimum acceptable bids.
177. One commenter advocates
explicitly adopting an alternate stopping
rule that would give bidders one final
opportunity to place bids that would
meet the reserve prices. The commenter
believes adopting this measure will curb
any incentive by some to bid in such a
way to avoid the reserves being met.
Another commenter opposes the
proposal, given the unique nature of this
auction and the complexity of the
eligibility management issues.
178. The Bureau finds that the
stopping rules as proposed are
appropriate for Auction 73. The
Bureau’s experience in prior auctions
demonstrates that these stopping rules
balance interests of administrative
efficiency and maximum bidder
participation. Therefore, Auction 73
will begin under the simultaneous
stopping rule approach.
179. While the Bureau declines to
adopt any of the alternate stopping rules
at this time, the Bureau retains the
discretion to employ the alternative
versions of the stopping rule, with or
without prior announcement during the
auction. The Bureau will not, however,
employ the first alternative (i.e., Option
1) until the reserve prices have been
met. This will allow bidders to continue
to place new bids even if they are the
provisional winning bidders. Bidders,
therefore, will continue to have the
opportunity to place bids until the
reserve prices are met.
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viii. Auction Delay, Suspension, or
Cancellation
180. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that, by
public notice or by announcement
during the auction, the Bureau may
delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in
the event of natural disaster, technical
obstacle, administrative or weather
necessity, evidence of an auction
security breach or unlawful bidding
activity, or for any other reason that
affects the fair and efficient conduct of
competitive bidding. The Bureau
received no comment on this issue.
181. Because the Bureau’s approach to
notification of delay during an auction
has proven effective in resolving exigent
circumstances in previous auctions, the
Bureau adopts its proposed rules
regarding auction delay, suspension, or
cancellation. By public notice or by
announcement during the auction, the
Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel
the auction in the event of natural
disaster, technical obstacle,
administrative or weather necessity,
evidence of an auction security breach
or unlawful bidding activity, or for any
other reason that affects the fair and
efficient conduct of competitive
bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its
sole discretion, may elect to resume the
auction starting from the beginning of
the current round, resume the auction
starting from some previous round, or
cancel the auction in its entirety.
Network interruption may cause the
Bureau to delay or suspend the auction.
The Bureau emphasize that exercise of
this authority is solely within the
discretion of the Bureau, and its use is
not intended to be a substitute for
situations in which bidders may wish to
apply their activity rule waivers.
B. Bidding Procedures
i. Round Structure
182. The initial schedule of bidding
rounds will be announced in the public
notice listing the qualified bidders,
which is released approximately 10
days before the start of the auction. Each
bidding round is followed by the release
of round results. Multiple bidding
rounds may be conducted in a given
day. Details regarding round results
formats and locations will also be
included in the qualified bidders public
notice.
183. The Bureau has discretion to
change the bidding schedule in order to
foster an auction pace that reasonably
balances speed with the bidders’’ need
to study round results and adjust their
bidding strategies. The Bureau may
increase or decrease the amount of time
for the bidding rounds, the amount of
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time between rounds, or the number of
rounds per day, depending upon
bidding activity and other factors.
184. A commenter advocates limiting
the number of rounds per day in the
first phase (Stage One) of Auction 73.
More than four rounds in the auction’s
early stage would place substantial
strains on consortia’s more deliberate
decision-making processes. The
commenter, however, suggests lifting
the limit for Stage Two. Another
commenter opposes limiting the number
of rounds per day. The Bureau agrees
with the opposing commenter that
lifting the limited for Stage Two fails to
demonstrate why consortia would be
`
disadvantaged vis-a-vis other bidders
unless Stage One had a maximum of
four rounds per day. The Bureau add
that the commenter does not provide
any rationale why, if a limit were
necessary to allow effective decisionmaking amongst consortia members, it
would not hold true in Stage Two of the
auction, particularly when the stakes are
even higher. Therefore, the Bureau
declines to adopt any limit on rounds
per day. Rather, the Bureau will
continue to exercise discretion with
regard to the number of rounds per day
under the particular circumstances of
the auction.
ii. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening
Bids
185. Section 309(j) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, calls upon the Commission to
prescribe methods by which a
reasonable reserve price will be required
or a minimum opening bid established
when applications for FCC licenses are
subject to auction (i.e., because they are
mutually exclusive), unless the
Commission determines that a reserve
price or minimum opening bid is not in
the public interest. Consistent with this
mandate, the Commission directed the
Bureau to seek comment on the use of
a minimum opening bid and/or reserve
price prior to the start of each auction.
Among other factors, the Bureau must
consider the amount of spectrum being
auctioned, levels of incumbency, the
availability of technology to provide
service, the size of the geographic
service areas, the extent of interference
with other spectrum bands, and any
other relevant factors that could have an
impact on the spectrum being
auctioned. The Commission concluded
that the Bureau should have the
discretion to employ either or both of
these mechanisms for future auctions.
a. Reserve Price
186. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission concluded
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that establishing separate aggregate
reserve prices for all the licenses in each
block of the 700 MHz Band spectrum to
be offered in Auction 73 will serve the
public interest. More specifically, the
Commission directed the Bureau to
adopt and publicly disclose blockspecific aggregate reserve prices,
pursuant to its existing delegated
authority and the regular pre-auction
process and consistent with the
Commission’s conclusions in the 700
MHz Second Report and Order. In the
700 MHz Auction Public Notice, the
Bureau proposed that the sum of the
provisionally winning gross bids for all
licenses in each block must equal or
exceed the disclosed aggregate reserve
price for the block before the
Commission will assign licenses in that
block. More specifically, the Bureau
proposed the following block-specific
aggregate reserve prices to be used
under this proposal: Block A, $1.807380
billion; Block B, $1.374426 billion;
Block C, $4.637854 billion; Block D,
$1.330000 billion; Block E, $0.903690
billion. The Bureau adopts this
proposal.
187. Background. In the 700 MHz
Second Report and Order, the
Commission concluded that the blockspecific aggregate prices should reflect
current assessments of the potential
market value of licenses for the 700
MHz Band. The Commission directed
that this assessment be based on various
factors including, but not limited to, the
characteristics of this band and the
value of other recently auctioned
licenses, such as licenses for Advanced
Wireless Services. The Commission
reasoned that using AWS–1 auction
results might be an appropriate guide
for setting block-specific reserve prices
reflecting a conservative estimate of
final market value. Spectrum in the 700
MHz Band possesses superior
propagation characteristics to AWS–1
spectrum. In addition, as of February 18,
2009, the 700 MHz Band spectrum will
be unencumbered, while full access to
AWS–1 spectrum requires the relocation
of both Government and commercial
incumbent users. Thus, other factors
aside, 700 MHz Band licenses with
comparable geographic service areas
and bandwidth should have a higher
market value than AWS–1 licenses.
188. The Commission expressly noted
that the detailed rules regarding the D
Block license, the D Block licensee’s
required construction of a network to be
shared by public safety service users,
and the resulting limitations on the
flexibility of the D Block licensee,
should be given weight in assessing the
D Block’s potential market value. Based
solely on geographic area and spectrum
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block size, AWS–1 auction results might
suggest a D Block reserve price of $1.7
billion. However, in light of the D Block
license conditions essential to the
public safety purpose of the public/
private partnership, it might be
appropriate to expect bidders to bid
only about 75 percent to 80 percent of
such an amount, or about $1.33 billion.
In addition, when determining relative
valuation of other blocks, the Bureau
should consider the relative valuation of
differing blocks in the recent auction of
AWS–1 licenses.
189. The Commission further noted
that in setting block-specific reserve
prices, the Bureau should also give
consideration to Congress’s view as to
the value of the spectrum, as reflected
in Congressional mandates regarding the
uses for revenues from this auction.
190. Comments. A commenter
contends that the proposed reserve
prices are excessive and proposes an
alternative set of reserve prices roughly
equal to one-fifth the reserve prices
proposed by the Bureau. The
commenter asserts that the Bureau’s
proposed reserve price represent an
estimate of final license values and that
establishing such a reserve, particularly
in light of the potential subsequent
auction of alternative licenses, is
misguided. The commenter further
argues that the Bureau’s reliance on
bidding for AWS licenses is misplaced
in that it does not take into account
subsequent changes in the credit
markets or significant differences
between AWS licenses and 700 MHz
licenses, which should reduce the
relative value of the 700 MHz licenses.
191. In reply, and in opposition to the
comments, two commenters echo the
Commission’s observation that that the
value of the 700 MHz licenses in fact
should be greater than the AWS licenses
and contend that the Bureau’s proposed
reserve prices reflect a conservative
estimate of the likely value of the 700
MHz licenses. As one commenter notes,
attempts to take into account the
fluctuating state of the credit market are
not appropriate, given the degree of
uncertainty inherent in such attempts.
While another commenter notes that the
Bureau’s proposal takes into account
conditions placed on the various blocks
of 700 MHz spectrum. Finally, the same
commenter notes that the proposed
reserves are consistent with
Congressional expectations.
192. Discussion. The Bureau does not
find the commenters arguments for
reducing the proposed reserve prices
persuasive. The commenter errs in
asserting that the Bureau’s proposed
reserves seek to estimate the final value
of the licenses. The Bureau has not
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attempted to determine the value of the
licenses but will rely on the auction
process to do so. Rather, pursuant to
statutory mandate and Commission
direction, the Bureau proposed reserve
prices intended to represent a likely low
end of the licenses’ potential value, in
order to assure that the public recovers
a portion of the value of the public
spectrum resource. Consistent with the
guidance of the Commission, the Bureau
adopts the proposal and will use the
following block-specific aggregate
reserve prices for Auction 73: Block A,
$1.807380 billion; Block B, $1.374426
billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion;
Block D, $1.330000 billion; Block E,
$0.903690 billion. Together, these
block-specific aggregate reserves sum to
$10.053350 billion.
193. The D Block reserve price of
$1.33 billion is discounted from an
amount based more closely on AWS–1
bids because of the unique service rules
and related obligations imposed upon
the D Block licensee. For the A, B, C,
and E Blocks, the Bureau based the
reserve prices on the respective market
value reflected in AWS–1 bids, adding
one percent, and rounding to the nearest
thousand dollars. Because of the valueenhancing propagation characteristics
and relatively unencumbered nature of
the 700 MHz Band spectrum, the Bureau
believes these are conservative
estimates, at the low end of the
spectrum’s potential value. Given this
approach, there is no need to further
reduce the proposed reserves based on
the specific rules applicable to licenses
for the A, B, C, and E Blocks.
194. As proposed in the 700 MHz
Auction Public Notice, the Bureau will
use gross bid amounts rather than net
bid amounts in determining whether the
block-specific reserve prices have been
met. No commenter suggested any
alternative to this aspect of the Bureau’s
reserve price procedures. Anonymous
bidding procedures that will be used in
Auction 73 preclude disclosing the
identity of bidders and the net amounts
of bids made until after the close of
bidding. Consequently, if net bids
determined whether or not reserves had
been met, publicly disclosing whether
reserves had been met might
inadvertently disclose whether
applicants eligible for bidding credits
held certain provisionally winning bids,
potentially disclosing the identity of the
bidders. For example, presuming net
bids determined whether or not the
reserve is met, for the reserve not to be
met when the provisionally winning bid
on the D Block license is for $1.5 billion
dollars, the party making the bid must
be an applicant eligible for a bidding
credit. Depending on the number of
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parties eligible for a bidding credit
competing for the D Block license, this
information might disclose the identity
of the provisionally winning bidder,
thwarting the Commission’s anonymous
bidding procedures. Moreover, net bid
amounts, unlike gross bid amounts, may
decline even as the gross bids increase.
For example, a party not eligible for a
bidding credit might hold a
provisionally winning bid of $1.4
billion on the D Block license, in which
case the reserve would be met.
However, in the next round, a party
eligible for a bidding credit might place
a provisionally winning bid of $1.5
billion, increasing the value bid for the
license. However, because the party
eligible for a bidding credit might have
a net bid less than the reserve, now the
reserve would not be met. The Bureau
believes that it serves the public interest
for bidders to know when the reserve is
met and to know that once a reserve is
met that fact will not change. This
certainty will give bidders greater
confidence in the significance of their
bids and therefore may enhance
competition. For these reasons, the
Bureau will use gross bid amounts
rather than net bid amounts in
determining whether block-specific
reserve prices have been met.
195. The Bureau will count the gross
amount of any withdrawn bids for
licenses toward meeting the reserve
prices for several reasons. First,
withdrawn bids presumably reflect
sincere valuations of the license,
notwithstanding the withdrawal and the
reserve is intended to measure that
valuation. Second, counting withdrawn
bids assures that once a reserve is met
that fact will not change. Third, if the
Bureau did not count withdrawn bids,
bidders could attempt to use bid
withdrawals as a strategic mechanism to
prevent auction results from satisfying a
reserve in order to force an auction of
alternative licenses.
196. The Commission’s rules and the
procedures for Auction 73 allow each
bidder one round in which the bidder
may withdraw provisionally winning
bids for licenses not subject to package
bidding. Allowing bidders to withdraw
provisionally winning bids enables
bidders to respond to price discovery as
the auction develops by adopting
alternative plans, thereby encouraging
bidders to compete at early stages in the
auction. Accordingly, the Bureau
presumes that bids placed and
withdrawn reflect bidders’ sincere
valuations of the relevant licenses.
Consistent with this presumption, the
Commission’s rules require bidders to
cover any shortfall if a subsequent
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winning bid for a license is less than a
withdrawn provisionally winning bid.
197. Second, counting withdrawn
bids is essential to assuring that once a
reserve price is met, that fact does not
change. With regards to bid
withdrawals, when a bid is withdrawn,
there is no provisionally winning bid on
that license until a new high bid is
placed on it in a subsequent round.
Accordingly, if the Bureau does not
count withdrawn bids, then the amount
counted for a particular license toward
meeting the reserve price could drop
from whatever the withdrawn bid is to
zero. For example, if a provisionally
winning bid on the D Block license of
$2.66 billion is withdrawn and only a
provisionally winning high bid is
counted toward the reserve, the reserve
will not be met, notwithstanding the
fact that a round before there was a
provisionally winning bid in an amount
equal to twice the reserve.
198. Third, if the Bureau does not
count a withdrawn bid toward meeting
the reserve, the Bureau would allow a
bidder’s decision to withdraw a bid to
affect whether or not the reserve price
has been met. As the foregoing example
indicates, a bidder could outbid rivals
for a license in amounts far in excess of
the reserve and then, at the last minute,
withdraw its bid in an attempt to
prevent the auction results from meeting
the applicable reserve price. If the
withdrawing bidder’s competitors had
moved to other blocks due to the
withdrawn bid, they may no longer have
an interest or the budget to return and
bid again on the license subject to the
withdrawal. In that event, the
withdrawal might succeed at preventing
the reserve from being met and at
forcing an auction of alternative
licenses.
199. The Bureau will count the gross
amount of either the provisionally
winning bid on a license, or on a
package that includes the license, or, if
higher, the highest withdrawn
provisionally winning bid on a license
when determining whether a reserve
price has been met. The Bureau will not
count more than one bid per license, be
it a provisionally winning or withdrawn
bid, towards meeting the relevant
reserve price. In the case of licenses
with multiple withdrawn bids or a
withdrawn bid and a provisionally
winning bid, the Bureau will count the
highest of the gross bid amounts toward
the reserve price. Other than the gross
amounts of withdrawn bids, licenses
without provisionally winning bids will
not count towards meeting a reserve
price.
200. Finally, the Bureau will issue an
announcement in the FCC Auction
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System stating that a reserve has been
met immediately following the first
round in which that occurs. Both the
registered bidders and the general
public will be able to view such
announcements through the
Commission’s Web site. The current
total of relevant provisionally winning
bids may not determine whether or not
the reserve has been met, given that the
Bureau also will count withdrawn bids
toward meeting the reserve. By making
an announcement when the reserve is
met, the Bureau will free auction
observers and participants therefore
from a need to monitor withdrawn bids
over the course of the auction in order
to determine whether the reserve has
been met and avoid any uncertainty.
b. Minimum Opening Bids
201. In addition to proposing
aggregate reserve prices, the Bureau
proposed in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice to establish minimum
opening bids for each license, while
retaining discretion to lower the
minimum opening bids. Specifically, for
Auction 73, the Bureau proposed to
calculate minimum opening bid
amounts as follows: (1) For licenses
covering geographic areas in the 50
states for which all of the corresponding
licenses offered in Auction 66 for the
exact same geographic area were sold,
25 percent of the dollars per MHz per
population (MHz-pop) of the net
amounts of the Auction 66 winning bids
for licenses covering the same
geographic license area, subject to a
minimum of $0.03/MHz-pop; (2) for
licenses covering geographic areas for
which a corresponding Auction 66
license was unsold, $0.01/MHz-pop; (3)
for licenses covering the Gulf of Mexico,
$1,000 per MHz; and (4)for all
remaining licenses, $0.01/MHz-pop. For
all licenses, the results of the above
calculations are subject to a minimum of
$500 per license and are rounded using
the Bureau’s standard rounding
procedure. The Bureau proposed to
calculate the minimum opening bid for
any package as the sum of the minimum
opening bids for the licenses in the
package. The Bureau sought comment
on this proposal and, in the alternative,
whether, consistent with Section 309(j),
the public interest would be served by
having no minimum opening bids.
202. The Bureau received a range of
comments concerning the proposed
minimum opening bids. One commenter
supports the Bureau’s proposed method
for establishing minimum opening bid
amounts. However, another commenter
advocates calculating minimum opening
bids on the same basis that was used for
Auction 66, rather than on one that uses
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the winning bids from that auction. A
third commenter opposes using
minimum opening bids based on
Auction 66 results, arguing that the 700
MHz Band spectrum is not readily
comparable to that offered in Auction
66. It maintains that some prices in that
auction resulted from one-time bidding
wars, so that RSA minimum opening
bids based on these prices would be
overly high and harm small and rural
carriers. A commenter also contends
that the proposed minimum opening
bids would discourage these carriers
from participating. It proposes that the
minimum opening bids from Auction 66
should generally be used. In addition,
the same commenter claims that
reducing the minimum opening bids
would prevent the auction from
proceeding at too rapid a pace. RTG
agrees that the proposed minimum
opening bids for some RSAs are too
high, and proposes that these be
reduced to either the same level as the
upfront payments or capped at 25
percent of the median net high bid for
all RSAs sold in Auction 66. Another
commenter generally criticizes as
arbitrary the proposals to lower the
minimum opening bids to the value of
the upfront payments, but agrees that
certain RSA minimum opening bids
may be overly high. A commenter
expresses support for the argument that
reducing the minimum opening bids
will make the auction less likely to
proceed overly quickly.
203. The Bureau finds that the
minimum opening bid amounts
proposed in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice are generally appropriate.
While the record indicates that the
proposed minimum opening bid
amounts are higher than many parties
would like, the proposed amounts better
enable the Commission to meet the
statutory objective of recovering for the
public a portion of the value of the
spectrum resource made available for
commercial use. The proposed
minimum opening bid amounts also
will help the Commission meet its
statutory deadlines for auctioning this
spectrum.
204. In response to comments,
however, the Bureau modifies the
proposed minimum opening bids for
certain rural licenses. The Bureau
recognize concerns commenters raised
regarding proposed minimum opening
bids and the potential for some licenses,
particularly those in rural areas, to
remain unsold after the auction. Thus,
for RSA licenses only (CMAs 307–734),
minimum opening bids will not be
greater than $0.10/MHz-pop.
Accordingly, the Bureau adopts the
revised minimum opening bid amounts
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and set the minimum opening bids
using the revised formulas as follows:
(1) For licenses covering geographic
areas in the 50 states for which all of the
corresponding licenses offered in
Auction 66 for the exact same
geographic area were sold, 25 percent of
the dollars per MHz per population
(MHz-pop) of the net amounts of the
Auction 66 winning bids for licenses
covering the same geographic license
area, subject to a minimum of $0.03/
MHz-pop, for RSA licenses only, subject
to a maximum of $0.10/MHz-pop; (2) for
licenses covering geographic areas for
which a corresponding Auction 66
license was unsold, $0.01/MHz-pop;
(3)for licenses covering the Gulf of
Mexico, $1,000 per MHz; and (4) for all
remaining licenses, $0.01/MHz-pop.
205. Two commenters suggest that the
minimum opening bid for the D Block
should be set at its reserve price since
it is only one license and will not be
assigned if the reserve is not met.
Another commenter opposes this
suggestion, arguing that setting the D
Block minimum opening bid at the
reserve bid would deny bidders the
opportunity to determine the relative
value of the D Block, and may even hurt
the winning bidder’s ability to finance
its bid for the D Block. The Bureau
agrees that there may be value, to
bidders and others, in accepting bids for
the D Block short of the reserve.
Therefore, the Bureau adopts the
minimum opening bid for the D Block
as proposed in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice.
206. The Commission did not receive
any comments addressing the proposal
that the Bureau retain the discretion to
reduce minimum opening bid amounts.
The Bureau adopts this proposal. The
minimum opening bid amounts are
reducible at the discretion of the
Bureau. The Bureau emphasize,
however, that such discretion will be
exercised, if at all, sparingly and early
in the auction, i.e., before bidders lose
all activity waivers. During the course of
the auction, the Bureau will not
entertain requests to reduce the
minimum opening bid amount on
specific licenses or packages.
207. The specific minimum opening
bid amounts for each license available
in Auction 73 calculated pursuant to the
procedures set forth in Attachment A of
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice.
iii. Bid Amounts
208. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that in
each round, eligible bidders be able to
place a bid on a given license or package
using one or more predefined bid
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amounts. Under the proposal, the FCC
Auction System interface will list the
acceptable bid amounts for each license
or package. A commenter proposed best
and final bid procedures to allow
bidders a chance to enter their own bid
amounts, if they wish to bid more for a
license but less than the minimum
acceptable bid increment would require.
The commenter believes adopting a best
and final bid procedure would give
bidders a better opportunity to bid up to
the full amount of their final license
valuations. Two commenters oppose
creating this best and final bid
procedure because it may encourage
gaming the auction system and would
be unfair to bidders that have a
provisionally winning bid. The Bureau
recognize that there may be
circumstances under which the
proposed procedure could enhance the
economical efficiency of the auction,
but find that the costs in terms of
increased auction complexity and
opportunity for anti-competitive
signaling would outweigh the benefits
in Auction 73. The Bureau adopts the
proposal set out in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice.
209. Minimum Acceptable Bids.
Under the Bureau’s proposed
procedures, the first of the acceptable
bid amounts is called the minimum
acceptable bid amount. The minimum
acceptable bid amount for a license will
be equal to its minimum opening bid
amount until there is a provisionally
winning bid for the license or package
that includes the license. The minimum
acceptable bid amount for a package
will be the sum of the minimum
acceptable bid amounts for the licenses
in the package. Minimum acceptable
bids are calculated based on current
price estimates and an activity-based
formula.
210. Current Price Estimates. Under
the proposed HPB auction procedures,
after there is a provisionally winning
bid for a license, the FCC will determine
a current price estimate (CPE) for each
license in each round as a basis for
calculating minimum acceptable bids.
For non-C Block licenses the CPE will
be the provisionally winning bid
amount, so that minimum acceptable
bids are based on provisionally winning
bid amounts, as in an SMR auction
without package bidding. For licenses in
the C Block subject to HPB, if a bid on
an individual license is provisionally
winning, the CPE for that license will be
the provisionally winning bid amount.
If a package bid is provisionally
winning, the CPEs for individual
licenses in the package will be
constructed by scaling up the bids on
individual licenses so that the sum of
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the license CPEs equals the
provisionally winning package bid. Bids
are scaled up by adding shares to the
highest bid received so far in the
auction for each license in the package.
These shares are proportional to the
bidding units associated with each
license relative to the total number of
bidding units in the package. The
proposed mechanism for determining
CPEs in an HPB auction format is
described in more detail in Attachment
H of the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice.
211. Commenters disagree on the
method for calculating the CPEs for C
Block packages. One commenter
suggests using current high bids as
weights when scaling up bids. Another
commenter advocates using
provisionally winning bids, not bidding
units, to determine CPEs for C Block
bids while other commenters support
the Bureaus proposed method of
calculating CPEs.
212. The Bureau does not agree that
it should scale up license prices using
current bid amounts, since doing so may
encourage undesirable strategic bidding.
Bidders would have an incentive to bid
up the prices of other licenses while
holding back on the licenses they are
interested in, in order to force other
license prices to bear a larger share of
the shortfall.
213. The Bureau also declines to
adopt the suggestions of commenters
that it base the minimum acceptable
bids for C Block REAG licenses directly
on the highest bids for those licenses.
Scaling up the minimum acceptable bid
amounts for licenses in a package, so
that the sum of bids on individual
licenses equals the minimum acceptable
bid on the package, mitigates the
coordination or threshold problem that
may face bidders trying to compete with
a large package bid in a package bidding
auction. Absent such a procedure,
package bid prices could become
disproportionately large relative to the
prices for the package components,
making it difficult for bidders on the
individual licenses to compete with the
package bid, especially since bidders on
the individual licenses may bid
cautiously, hoping that bidders on other
licenses will make up the difference
required to catch up with the package
bid.
214. The Bureau does not believe that
the proposed method of calculating
CPEs is overly complex. In fact, the
Bureau will use HPB in part because the
mechanism for calculating CPEs is
significantly simpler than other package
bidding pricing mechanisms that
adequately address coordination issues.
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215. Activity-Based Formula. Under
the Bureau’s proposal, once CPEs are
calculated, minimum acceptable bids
are then determined for each license as
the amount of the CPE plus a percentage
of the CPE. The percentage is calculated
using the activity-based formula. In
general, the percentage will be higher
when many bidders are bidding on a
license, or on a package containing a
license, than when few bidders are
bidding on a license.
216. The percentage of the
provisionally winning bid used to
establish the minimum acceptable bid
amount (the additional percentage) is
calculated at the end of each round,
based on an activity index which is a
weighted average of (a) the number of
distinct bidders placing a bid on the
license, including package bids, in that
round, and (b) the activity index from
the prior round. Specifically, the
activity index is equal to a weighting
factor times the number of bidders
placing a bid covering the license in the
most recent bidding round plus one
minus the weighting factor times the
activity index from the prior round. The
additional percentage is determined as
one plus the activity index times a
minimum percentage amount, with the
result not to exceed a given maximum.
The additional percentage is then
multiplied by the CPE amount to obtain
the minimum acceptable bid for the
next round.
217. The Bureau proposed initially to
set the weighting factor at 0.5, the
minimum percentage (floor) at 0.1
(10%), and the maximum percentage
(ceiling) at 0.2 (20%). At these initial
settings, the minimum acceptable bid
for a license will be between ten percent
and twenty percent higher than the CPE
(which for non-C Block licenses will
equal the provisionally winning bid),
depending upon the bidding activity
covering the license. Equations and
examples are shown in Attachment G of
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice.
218. A number of commenters
addressed the activity-based formula to
calculate minimum acceptable bids.
One advocates increasing the activity
weight factor from 0.5 to, for example,
0.75, so that the current round’s activity
has more weight in determining the next
rounds minimum acceptable bid and
further advocates modifying the
minimum acceptable bid formula by
decreasing the floor from the proposed
10 percent to 5 percent, and decreasing
the ceiling from the proposed 20 percent
to 10 percent. Other commenters
express support for the change in floor
and ceiling percentages.
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219. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau notes that it retains
discretion to limit the absolute amount
by which a minimum acceptable bid for
a license may increase over the previous
provisionally winning bid—for
example, the Bureau could set a $10
million cap on increases in minimum
acceptable bid amounts over
provisionally winning bids—and the
Bureau sought comment on the
circumstances under which the Bureau
should employ such a limit. A
commenter suggested a cap on bid
increments of $150 million per license
per round would help avoid problems
associated with bids rising more quickly
than bidders, especially new entrants,
can obtain approval for the additional
funds, and would not delay the auction
significantly.
220. The Bureau recognize bidder
concerns that very rapid increases in
minimum acceptable bids may
potentially discourage bidder
participation, inhibit price discovery,
and create bid approval issues,
especially since the minimum opening
bids in Auction 73 are higher than were
the Bureau’s starting bids, for example,
in Auction 66. At the same time, since
the licenses initially offered in Auction
73 will not be sold unless reserve prices
are met, it will be useful for the auction
to move at a reasonably fast pace at least
until reserve prices are satisfied. The
Bureau reiterates that it has the
discretion to modify minimum
acceptable bid amounts—by changing
the activity-based formula parameters or
by imposing or modifying a cap on the
dollar amount of bid increments—as it
sees fit during the auction. Taking
commenter concerns into account, the
Bureau determined that it will retain
initial floor and ceiling parameters at 10
and 20 percent, respectively, as
proposed, but the Bureau will begin the
auction with a $100 million cap on the
amount of the bid increment. That is,
minimum acceptable bids for the next
round generally will be between 10 and
20 percent higher than provisionally
winning bids, but they will not exceed
provisionally winning bids by more
than $100 million dollars.
221. Additional Bid Amounts. Any
additional bid amounts are calculated
using the minimum acceptable bid
amount and a bid increment percentage.
The first additional acceptable bid
amount equals the minimum acceptable
bid amount times one plus the bid
increment percentage, rounded. If, for
example, the bid increment percentage
is ten percent, the calculation is
(minimum acceptable bid amount) * (1
+ 0. 1), rounded, or (minimum
acceptable bid amount) * 1. 1, rounded;
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the second additional acceptable bid
amount equals the minimum acceptable
bid amount times one plus two times
the bid increment percentage, rounded,
or (minimum acceptable bid amount) *
1.2, rounded; etc. The Bureau will
round the results of these calculations
and the minimum acceptable bid
calculations using the Bureau’s standard
rounding procedures.
222. For Auction 73, the Bureau
proposed to set the bid increment
percentage at 0. 1, so that any additional
bid amounts above the minimum
acceptable bid would each be 10 percent
85 higher. For non-C Block licenses, the
Bureau proposed to begin the auction
with one acceptable bid amount per
license (the minimum acceptable bid
amount). For C Block licenses subject to
HPB, the Bureau proposed to begin the
auction with three acceptable bid
amounts per license (the minimum
acceptable bid amount and two
additional bid amounts) and one
acceptable bid amount per package (the
minimum acceptable bid amount and no
additional bid amounts).
223. The Bureau received no
comments on its proposal to set the bid
increment percentage at 0.1. The
Bureaus adopts the proposal to begin
the auction with a bid increment
percentage of 0.1.
224. Several commenters, however,
advocate providing more than one
acceptable bid amount per license for
the non-C Block licenses. The Bureau is
not persuaded that additional bid
amounts provide bidders with
significantly more flexibility to express
their valuations. The Bureau experience
with past auctions indicates that bidders
rarely use multiple increment bids as
the commenters suggest—to express
their final valuations more precisely—
but more frequently use jump bids as a
means of signaling other bidders. As
noted in the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed that
bidders on licenses in the C Block be
able to make multiple increment bids to
ensure that bidders on individual
licenses can effectively compete with
package bids, even when there are not
individual bids on one or more of the
licenses in the package. Absent that
need for multiple increment bids in the
non-package bidding blocks, the Bureau
will not modify its proposal. Therefore,
the Bureau will begin the auction with
one acceptable bid amount for each nonC Block license and C Block packages
and three acceptable bid amounts for
each C Block license.
225. The Bureau retains the discretion
to change the minimum acceptable bid
amounts, the additional bid amounts,
the dollar cap on bid increments, the
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number of acceptable bid amounts, and
the parameters of the formulas used to
calculate minimum acceptable bid 86
amounts and additional bid amounts if
it determines that circumstances so
dictate. Further, the Bureau retains the
discretion to do so on a license-bylicense and package-by-package basis.
iv. Provisionally Winning Bids
226. At the end of each bidding
round, a provisionally winning bid will
be determined based on which
combination of bids together provides
the greatest aggregate gross amount.
Provisionally winning bids at the end of
the auction become the winning bids,
provided that applicable reserve prices
are met. For the 1,087 licenses not
subject to package bidding, the FCC
Auction System determines a
provisionally winning bid for each
license based on the highest bid amount
received for the license, taking into
account the bids placed in the round
and the provisionally winning bids from
the previous round. For licenses in the
C Block subject to HPB, the FCC
Auction System will determine which
combination of individual and package
bids yields the highest aggregate gross
bid amount, taking into consideration
each bidder’s highest bid on each
license or package submitted up to that
point in the auction. These bids become
the provisionally winning bids for the
round. Bidders are reminded that
provisionally winning bids count
toward activity for purposes of the
activity rule.
227. In order to determine which
combination of bids on licenses and/or
packages yields the highest aggregate
bid amount in a HPB auction, the FCC
Auction System compares aggregate bid
amounts across the various levels in a
recursive process. It first compares, for
each package in the second level, the
sum of the highest individual license
bids from the first level with the highest
bids on packages in the second level
containing those licenses. Those bids
that generate the maximum total bid
amounts become provisionally winning.
Attachment H of the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice provides
additional detail on this procedure.
228. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau proposed to break
ties randomly. A commenter suggests
that because there will be at most a
single acceptable bid amount for all but
the individual C Block licenses, there
will be multiple ties, and that therefore,
87 the Bureau should consider alternate
means of breaking ties. Another
commenter opposes this proposal,
arguing that adopting such a procedure
for breaking ties would result in bidders
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feeling pressure to submit their bids
hastily which would raise bidding costs,
increase the potential for bidding errors,
and discourage proper analysis and
review before submitting bids.
229. In previous FCC auctions, even
though up to nine acceptable bid
amounts were permitted, multiple
increment bids accounted for only a
small fraction of the total number of
bids placed. The Bureau does not expect
that the frequency of tied bids will be
significantly different than in past
auctions, and the Bureau does not adopt
any changes to its tie-breaking
procedures. Hence, the Bureau adopts
the proposal. The FCC Auction System
will assign a random number to each
license in each bid upon submission. In
the event of ties among bids that
generate the highest aggregate gross bid
amount, the set of bids with the highest
sum of random numbers becomes
provisionally winning. Bidders,
regardless of whether they hold a
provisionally winning bid, can submit
higher bids in subsequent rounds.
However, if the auction were to end
with no other bids being placed, the
winning bidder would be the one that
placed the provisionally winning bid.
230. All bidding will take place
remotely either through the FCC
Auction System or by telephonic
bidding. There will be no on-site
bidding during Auction 73. Please note
that telephonic bid assistants are
required to use a script when entering
bids placed by telephone. Telephonic
bidders are therefore reminded to allow
sufficient time to bid by placing their
calls well in advance of the close of a
round. The length of a call to place a
telephonic bid may vary; please allow a
minimum of ten minutes.
231. A bidder’s ability to bid on
specific licenses or packages of licenses
is determined by two factors: (1) The
licenses selected on the bidder’s FCC
Form 175; and (2) the bidder’s
eligibility. The bid submission screens
will allow bidders to submit bids on
only those licenses the bidder selected
on its FCC Form 175.
232. In order to access the bidding
function of the FCC Auction System,
bidders must be logged in during the
bidding round using the passcode
generated by the SecurID token and a
personal identification number (PIN)
created by the bidder. Bidders are
strongly encouraged to print a round
summary for each round after they have
completed all of their activity for that
round.
233. In each round, eligible bidders
will be able to place bids on a given
license or package in one or more predefined bid amounts. For each license
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and package, the FCC Auction System
will list the acceptable bid amounts in
a drop-down box. Bidders use the dropdown box to select from among the
acceptable bid amounts. The FCC
Auction System also includes an upload
function that allows bidders to upload
text files containing bid information.
234. Until a bid has been placed on
a license or a package that includes the
license, the minimum acceptable bid
amount for that license will be equal to
its minimum opening bid amount. Once
there are bids on a license or a package
that includes the license, minimum
acceptable bids for a license.
235. During a round, an eligible
bidder may submit bids for as many
licenses as it wishes, remove bids
placed in the current bidding round,
withdraw provisionally winning bids
from previous rounds (in blocks without
package bidding), drop nonprovisionally winning bids (C-Block
licenses or packages), or permanently
reduce eligibility. If a bidder submits
multiple bids for the same license or
package in the same round—multiple
bids on the exact same license or
package, not one bid on a package and
one bid on a license in that package—
the system takes the last bid entered as
that bidder’s bid for the round. Bidders
should note that the bidding units
associated with licenses for which the
bidder has removed, dropped, or
withdrawn its bid do not count towards
the bidder’s current activity.
236. For licenses subject to package
bidding in HPB, the FCC Auction
System considers each bidder’s highest
bid on each license or package when
determining the 89 provisionally
winning bids. Consequently, for licenses
in the C Block, an individual license or
package bid that does not become a
provisionally winning bid at the
conclusion of the round in which it was
placed may become a provisionally
winning bid at the conclusion of a
subsequent round. This may occur even
if the bidder does not have the bidding
eligibility to cover the newlyprovisionally winning bid. This
contrasts with the SMR procedure used
for licenses not subject to package
bidding, in which only provisionally
winning bids from the previous round
and bids placed during the round are
considered when determining
provisionally winning bids.
237. A commenter requests that the
Bureau clarify that a bidder can win a
license or package that becomes
provisionally winning, after not having
been part of the winning set in the
previous rounds; the Bureau clarifies
that point here. Another commenter
opposes allowing a bidder to win
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licenses with bidding units exceeding
its eligibility at the auction’s end. The
commenters argue that winning
reactivated bids may force bidders to
win more licenses than they can afford.
The Bureau does not accept the
proposal that it not allow bidders to win
licenses with bidding units that exceed
its eligibility. The Bureau recognizes
that occasionally bidders may need to
change bid strategies as prices rise.
Accordingly, the Bureau provide limited
opportunities for bidders to withdraw
and drop bids, which if used carefully,
allow bidders to avoid winning licenses
they no longer wish to win. Thus, the
Bureau finds that the requested
restriction on winning bids that exceed
eligibility is unnecessary to protect
bidders from winning more than they
wish to win.
238. The Bureau encourages bidders
on licenses and packages in the C Block
to bear in mind that their highest bid on
each package or license will be
considered every time the FCC Auction
System determines a new set of
provisionally winning bids. This feature
allows bidders on individual licenses to
compete more effectively with package
bids, since their individual license bid
can combine with bids on other
individual licenses placed in previous
rounds, and stabilizes CPEs. Bidders
will be able to evaluate the extent to
which a bid placed in a previous 90
round is likely to become winning by
comparing the bid to the other
considered bids for the license or
package.
239. Finally, bidders are cautioned to
select their bid amounts carefully
because bidders that withdraw a
provisionally winning bid from a
previous round, even if the bid was
mistakenly or erroneously made, are
subject to bid withdrawal payments.
v. Bid Removal, Bid Withdrawal, and
Dropped Bids
240. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Commission proposed bid
removal, bid withdrawal, and dropped
bids procedures. The Bureau sought
comment on permitting a bidder to
remove a bid before the close of the
round in which the bid was placed.
With respect to bid withdrawals, the
Commission proposed limiting each
bidder to withdrawals of provisionally
winning bids on licenses not subject to
package bidding (i.e., all licenses except
in the C Block) in no more than two
rounds during the course of the auction.
The Bureau further proposed that
bidders be able to drop nonprovisionally winning bids on packages
and on licenses subject to package
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bidding in no more than one round of
the auction.
241. Bid Removal. Before the close of
a bidding round, a bidder has the option
of removing any bids placed in that
round. By using the remove bids
function in the FCC Auction System, a
bidder may effectively unsubmit any bid
placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same
round is not subject to withdrawal
payments. Removing a bid will affect a
bidder’s activity for the round in which
it is removed, i.e., a bid that is removed
does not count toward bidding activity.
These procedures will enhance bidder
flexibility during the auction, and
therefore the Bureau adopts them for
Auction 73.
242. Bid Withdrawal. Once a round
closes, a bidder may no longer remove
a bid. However, in a later round, a
bidder may withdraw provisionally
winning bids from previous rounds for
non-C Block licenses using the
withdraw bids function in the FCC
Auction System. A 91 provisionally
winning bidder that withdraws its
provisionally winning bid from a
previous round during the auction is
subject to the bid withdrawal payments
specified in 47 CFR 1.2104(g). Once a
withdrawal is submitted during a round,
that withdrawal cannot be unsubmitted
even if the round has not yet ended.
243. If a provisionally winning bid is
withdrawn, the minimum acceptable
bid amount will equal the amount of the
second highest bid received for the
license, which may be less than, or in
the case of tied bids, equal to, the
amount of the withdrawn bid. The
Commission will serve as a place holder
provisionally winning bidder on the
license until a new bid is submitted on
that license.
244. The 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice proposed limiting each bidder to
withdrawals in no more than two
rounds during the course of the auction.
The round in which withdrawals are
used would be at each bidder’s
discretion. The Bureau received no
comments on the number of proposed
withdrawal rounds.
245. The Bureau has decided, in
contrast to the proposal in the 700 MHz
Auction Public Notice, to limit each
bidder to withdrawing bids in only one
round of the auction. In recent auctions,
the Bureau has detected bidder conduct
that, arguably, may have constituted
anticompetitive behavior through the
use of bid withdrawals. While
continuing to recognize that bid
withdrawals may reduce risk associated
with efforts to secure various licenses in
combination, analysis of previous
auctions indicates that bidders rarely
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need two withdrawal rounds to avoid
aggregation risk. Therefore, the Bureau
concluded that, for Auction 73,
adoption of a limit on the use of
withdrawals to one round per bidder
will better balance the need for bidding
flexibility with the goal of discouraging
anti-competitive bidding behavior. The
Bureau will therefore limit the number
of rounds in which bidders may place
withdrawals to one round.
246. The Bureau received a number of
comments and replies addressing the
proposal not to allow withdrawals on
provisionally winning bids for licenses
in the C Block. One commenter urges
that bidders on C Block licenses should
have the same withdrawal options as
other bidders. It asserts that this would
reduce the exposure risk concerns for C
Block bidders. Another commenter
asserts that the Bureau’s proposal to not
allow withdrawals on C Block licenses
creates major financial risks for bidders.
A third commenter contends that the
proposed bid withdrawal rules should
be modified, because they could
discourage bidding in the C Block and
restrict bidders from seeking alternative
licenses in later rounds of the auction.
A commenter maintains that the highest
bids on individual C Block REAG
licenses should be subject to standard
bid withdrawal rules, rather than those
for dropped bids.
247. The Bureau proposed not to
permit withdrawals of provisionally
winning bids in the C Block because,
with package bidding, a withdrawn bid
can affect the composition of the
provisionally winning set of bids, thus
affecting the status of the bids of other
bidders. In addition, under the
mechanism used to determine CPEs in
HPB, a withdrawn bid can affect the
prices of other licenses. In SMR, in
contrast, license-by-license bidding
ensures that a withdrawn bid affects
only the status of the bidder placing the
withdrawal. Since bidders would be
able to use withdrawals in the C Block
to affect other bidders, permitting
withdrawals would facilitate
undesirable strategic bidding behavior.
Therefore, to avoid the potential for
gaming, the Bureau maintains its
position not to permit withdrawals of
provisionally winning bids in the C
Block.
248. A commenter suggests that
withdrawals not be permitted in the D
Block. Because the D Block license is
nationwide, bidders do not face the risk
of winning an incomplete aggregation of
licenses in the block. The Bureau will
permit that each bidder have only one
round in which to withdraw bids, but it
does not impose a special prohibition
on withdrawals in the D Block,
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recognizing that D Block bidders may
also need to consider their financial
commitment to bids in the C Block,
where they are unable to withdraw
provisionally winning bids.
249. Dropped Bids. A bid for a
package or a license in the C Block can
become provisionally winning many
rounds after it was placed, since HPB
considers bids made in previous rounds
when determining provisionally
winning bids. These non-provisionally
winning bids are useful to the auction
since they enhance the ability of bidders
interested in single licenses or smaller
packages to combine their bids with the
bids of others to compete with a large
package bid, and they provide stability
to the process for determining current
price estimates. It may be the case,
however, that a bidder wishes to focus
on alternative licenses instead, and no
longer wishes to win one of its previous
bids. In order to allow bidders to opt out
of non-provisionally winning bids that
they no longer wish to win, the Bureau
proposed that under HPB, for licenses
subject to package bidding, bidders be
allowed a limited number of
opportunities to drop non-provisionally
winning bids from further consideration
in the auction.
250. Eliminating non-provisionally
winning bids from consideration may
affect the current price estimates of
other licenses, thereby affecting other
bidders. This ability to affect the bids of
other bidders may lead to undesirable
strategic use of dropped bids. Therefore,
the 700 MHz Auction Public Notice
proposed to permit bidders to drop nonprovisionally winning bids on packages
and on licenses subject to package
bidding in no more than one round of
the auction. To discourage bidders from
dropping bids in order to disadvantage
their competitors, the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice also proposed the
following restrictions on the
circumstances under which bids may be
dropped and on the bidder’s subsequent
bidding activity: (1) A bidder that is a
provisionally winning bidder on a
package will not be permitted to drop
bids on licenses that are included in the
package; (2) a bidder that drops its bids
on a license or package will not be
permitted to submit further bids on that
particular license or package during the
auction; and (3) a bidder that drops its
bids on a license will not be permitted
to submit any bids on packages
containing that license for the duration
of the auction.
251. Under these proposals, if a
bidder drops a bid on a package, it will
be permitted to bid individually on the
licenses in the package. When a bid is
dropped, all of the bidder’s previous
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bids on that license or package are
removed from consideration.
252. No payments are associated with
dropped bids. The round in which a
bidder may drop non-provisionally
winning bids from consideration will be
at the bidder’s discretion. The Bureau
sought comment on these proposals,
and on the possibilities of not allowing
dropped bids, of allowing dropped bids
not subject to all the restrictions
proposed, and of imposing other
restrictions than proposed.
253. The Bureau received a number of
comments and reply comments
addressing dropped bids. Several
entities favor permitting bidders to rebid on licenses they previously
dropped, some also suggested that
dropped bids should be subject to
withdrawal payments that the Bureau
should consider disallowing dropped
bids, and that dropped bids should be
announced in advance. A commenter
argues that permitting dropped bids in
only one round favors package bidders,
and may discourage bidders interested
in individual licenses from competing
in the C Block.
254. Another commenter maintains
that the individual C Block REAG
licenses should be subject to standard
bid withdrawal rules, rather than those
for dropped bids. It also proposes that
bidders that are outbid on individual
REAG C Block licenses should not be
committed to their bids if the higher
bidder withdraws or drops its bid.
Instead, the commenter recommends
that the individual license should revert
to the Commission with a minimum
acceptable bid equal to the second
highest bid price.
255. The Bureau also received several
requests for clarification of its intended
procedures with respect to dropped
bids. A commenter suggests that the
Bureau allow bidders who drop a
package bid to be able to bid on the
individual licenses in the dropped
package. The Bureau clarifies that this is
its intention. The Bureau is not
persuaded that it should modify the 95
proposed procedures on dropped bids.
Dropped bid procedures in a package
bidding environment must be designed
to avoid creating disadvantages for other
bidders—intentionally or
unintentionally—when bids are pulled
out of consideration, and the Bureau’s
rules are designed with that goal in
mind. For example, since withdrawn
provisionally winning bids can affect
the winning bids of other bidders, the
Bureau permit drops on nonprovisionally winning bids only.
Because it is more difficult for bidders
on individual licenses to compete
against a package bid when only current
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round bids are considered, the Bureau
considers bids placed in all rounds,
including after a bid is dropped, in
order not to give an undue advantage to
package bidders.
256. In addition, the Bureau finds that
these dropped bids procedures, and
HPB procedures in general, strike a
careful balance between permitting
bidders adequate bidding flexibility and
discouraging insincere and anticompetitive bidding behavior. For
example, the prohibition against
rebidding on a license that has been
dropped will keep bidders from
strategically shifting off of a license so
that its price will fall relative to the
other licenses competing against a
package bid, and then rebidding at a
lower relative price. The Bureau adopts
the proposal to permit bidders on
licenses and packages in the C Block to
drop non-provisionally winning bids
during any one round of the auction.
257. Calculation of Bid Withdrawal
Payment. Generally, the Commission
imposes payments on bidders that
withdraw high bids during the course of
an auction. If a bidder withdraws its bid
and there is no higher bid in the same
or subsequent auction(s), the bidder that
withdrew its bid is responsible for the
difference between its withdrawn bid
and the provisionally winning bid in the
same or subsequent auction(s). In
Auction 73, if a bid is withdrawn on a
license in a block that does not meet the
reserve price in the initial auction,
withdrawal payments will be based on
the provisionally winning bid or bids
for the license in Auction 76, or in any
subsequent auction, consistent with the
Bureau’s usual withdrawal payment
rule. In the case of multiple bid
withdrawals on a single license, within
the same or subsequent auctions(s), the
96 payment for each bid withdrawal
will be calculated based on the
sequence of bid withdrawals and the
amounts withdrawn. No withdrawal
payment will be assessed for a
withdrawn bid if either the subsequent
winning bid or any subsequent
intervening withdrawn bid, in either the
same or subsequent auctions(s), equals
or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a
bidder that withdraws a bid will not be
responsible for any final withdrawal
payment if there is a subsequent higher
bid in the same or subsequent
auction(s).
258. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules
sets forth the payment obligations of a
bidder that withdraws a high bid on a
license during the course of an auction,
and provides for the assessment of
interim bid withdrawal payments. No
interim bid withdrawal payments will
be assessed until the conclusion of
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vii. Auction Announcements
261. The Commission will use auction
announcements to announce items such
as schedule changes and stage
transitions. All auction announcements
will be available by clicking a link in
the FCC Auction System.
for the relevant blocks in a subsequent
auction, as soon as possible after the
initial auction. Similarly, if the license
for the D Block is not assigned because
the reserve price for that license is not
met, the license for the D Block may be
offered again. For administrative
purposes, the Bureau designates any
such subsequent bidding as Auction 76.
263. As detailed in the 700 MHz
Second Report and Order, any
alternative A, B and E Block licenses
will be subject to alternative
performance requirements. Alternative
C Block licenses will be based on
different geographic areas and spectrum
bandwidth. In addition, the alternative
C Block licenses will not be subject to
the open platform conditions applicable
to the licenses initially offered for the C
Block.
264. The Commission concluded that
the public interest in prompt licensing
of 700 MHz spectrum and the related
nature of licenses in Auctions 73 and 76
made it appropriate to adopt auction
procedures treating Auctions 73 and 76
as a single auction for purposes of
assessing bidders’ qualifications and
applying the Commission’s anticollusion rule. The Commission
directed the Bureau to permit only
qualified bidders in Auction 73, to
participate in Auction 76, and to use the
same auction design, including the
applicable aggregate reserve price(s),
insofar as possible. The Commission
also required the Bureau to establish
procedures that give applicants an
opportunity to obtain bidding eligibility
specifically for licenses offered in a
contingent subsequent auction.
Accordingly, the Bureau sought
comment on specific procedures for
contingent subsequent bidding.
Generally, the Bureau will apply the
Commission’s competitive bidding rules
with a presumption that Auctions 73
and 76 should be considered to be a
single auction, subject to explicit
exceptions when necessary. With the
following detailed exceptions, the
Bureau will apply all of the previously
discussed procedures for Auction 73 to
Auction 76.
V. Auction 76
262. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission noted the
strong public interest in promptly
assigning all 700 MHz Band licenses for
recovered analog spectrum.
Accordingly, the Commission
concluded that if licenses for the A, B,
C or E Blocks are not assigned because
the auction results do not satisfy the
applicable aggregate reserve price(s) in
Auction 73, the public interest will be
served by offering alternative licenses
A. Announcement of Auction 76
265. If, at the close of bidding in
Auction 73, the aggregate reserve price
for any block has not been met, the
Bureau will issue an announcement that
bidding in Auction 73 has closed and
that Auction 76 will commence on a
date not later than three weeks
following the announcement. The
announcement of Auction 76 will
establish the deadline by which Auction
73 qualified bidders that selected
licenses to be offered in Auction 76 may
Auction 76. In the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
establish the percentage at ten percent
(10%) for the 700 MHz Band auction
and sought comment on the proposal.
259. The Bureau received no
comments on this issue and adopts its
proposal. The Commission will assess
an interim withdrawal payment equal to
ten percent (10%) of the amount of the
withdrawn bids. The ten percent (10%)
interim payment will be applied toward
any final bid withdrawal payment that
will be assessed after subsequent
auction of the license. Assessing an
interim bid withdrawal payment
ensures that the Commission receives a
minimal withdrawal payment pending
assessment of any final withdrawal
payment.
vi. Round Results
260. Limited information about the
results of a round will be made public
after the conclusion of the round.
Specifically, after a round closes, the
Bureau will make available for each
license, its current provisionally
winning bid amount, the minimum
acceptable bid amount for the following
round, the amounts of all bids placed on
the license during the round, and
whether the license is FCC held. If the
license is provisionally winning and
part of a larger package additional
details regarding the package that
contains the specific license will be 97
available. The system will also provide
an entire license history detailing all
activity that has taken place on a license
with the ability to sort by round
number. The reports will be publicly
accessible. Moreover, after the auction,
the Bureau will make available
complete reports of all bids placed
during each round of the auction,
including bidder identities.
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obtain additional bidding eligibility for
Auction 76 by supplementing their
upfront payments, if necessary. In the
event that the reserve price for the D
Block license is met during Auction 73,
a Closing Public Notice will be released
with respect to the D Block. In the event
that Auction 73 results meet the reserve
prices in all blocks, the Bureau will
proceed to issue a Closing Public Notice
and Auction 76 will not be held.
B. Licenses To Be Offered
266. Any licenses in the A, B, D and
E Blocks available in Auction 76 will
cover the same geographic areas and
frequencies as such licenses offered in
Auction 73. However, the alternative C
Block will include C1 Block licenses
offered in each of the 176 EAs and C2
Block licenses offered in each of the 12
REAGs. A complete list of licenses that
may be available in Auction 76 is
included as Attachment B of the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice.
C. Auction Structure
i. Licenses for Blocks A, B, D and/or E
267. If Auction 76 offers licenses in
blocks not subject to package bidding in
Auction 73—Blocks A, B, D, and/or E—
those block will not be subject to
package bidding in Auction 76, and will
be offered using the Commission’s
standard SMR auction design. The
procedures applicable to the auction
will be the same with respect to licenses
for Blocks A, B, D and E in Auction 73.
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ii. Alternative Licenses for C Block—
Available Packages
268. In the 700 MHz Auction
Comment Public Notice, the Bureau
sought comment on whether to accept
package bids for alternative licenses for
the C Block using the HPB auction
design for the initial C Block licenses.
One commenter proposed that package
bids be accepted on three potential
packages, one package of all C1 Block
licenses, one package of all C2 Block
licenses, and one package of all C 1 and
C2 Block licenses. Two other
commenters argue against accepting any
package bids for alternative C Block
licenses, contending that the complexity
that they believe should preclude
package bidding with respect to the
original 12 C Block licenses will be
further exacerbated should the
Commission offer 188 alternative C1
and C2 Block licenses in subsequent
bidding.
269. The Bureau concluded that it
will use non-package bidding SMR
procedures for licenses in the C1 Block
and HPB package bidding procedures
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for C2 Block licenses. This approach
balances the Commission’s interest in
providing opportunities for new
entrants competing on a nationwide
basis with its goal of offering alternative
licenses that may be of greater interest
to a different mix of bidders, including
smaller entities.
270. Accordingly, if there is
subsequent bidding on alternative
licenses in the C Block, the Bureau will
employ the HPB auction design for the
C2 Block only, with package bids
accepted on the packages. The
procedures applicable to the HPB
auction of C2 Block licenses will be the
same as those with respect to C Block
licenses in Auction 73, subject to the
differences.
271. Licenses in the C1 Block will be
auctioned using the SMR auction
procedures for licenses in Blocks A, B,
D and E in auctions 73 and 76. Bids for
alternative C1 Block licenses will be
accepted on individual EA Block
licenses only.
272. With respect to C2 Block
licenses, bids will be accepted on
individual REAG licenses, and on three
packages, consisting of a package of
REAGs 1–8 (the 50 States), REAGs 10 &
12 (the Atlantic territories), and REAGs
9 & 11 (the Pacific territories). The
hierarchical package structure for the C2
licenses is the same as was adopted for
the C Block licenses in auction 73.
D. Bidder Qualification
273. As directed by the Commission,
only applicants found qualified to bid in
Auction 73 may be eligible to bid in
Auction 76. To be eligible to bid in
Auction 76, an Auction 73 qualified
bidder also must have selected a license
offered in Auction 76 on the abbreviated
Auction 76 application filed together
with its application to participate in
Auction 73. The announcement that
Auction 73 bidding has ended without
one or more aggregate reserve prices 101
being met also will announce the
deadline by which such bidders may
submit supplemental upfront payments
to purchase bidding eligibility in the
subsequent auction.
274. In response to the 700 MHz
Auction Public Notice, a commenter
contends that the Commission’s
treatment of Auction 73 and any
contingent subsequent auction as a
single auction for purposes of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule
requires that applicants select all
licenses in which they may be
interested, including potential
alternative licenses, prior to bidding in
Auction 73. The commenter contends
that this result is compelled by the
§ 1.2105(b)(2) of the Commission’s
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competitive bidding rules, which
prohibits changes in license selection
after the initial application filing
deadline. Moreover, the commenter
contends that requiring applicants to
select potential alternative licenses prior
to Auction 73 will limit the amount of
time required between Auction 73 and
any contingent subsequent auction.
275. Given the presumption that
Auction 73 and any contingent
subsequent bidding on licenses should
be treated as a single auction, the
Bureau has concluded that applicants
should select both licenses offered in
Auction 73 and licenses that may be
offered in Auction 76 by the initial
deadline for filing an application to
participate in Auction 73. The Bureau
concluded that bidders will be able to
make informed selections prior to
Auction 73 of licenses, including
alternative licenses that may be offered
in contingent subsequent bidding.
Bidders will have the opportunity to
obtain additional bidding eligibility for
licenses to be offered subsequently.
These procedures will enable contingent
subsequent bidding, if necessary, to
proceed with minimal delay.
i. Bidder Status
276. To participate in Auction 76, a
potential bidder must: (1) Have become
qualified to bid for at least one license
offered in Auction 73 by selecting
license(s) offered in Auction 73 and
making an upfront payment sufficient to
establish eligibility to bid for at least
one of those license(s), and (2) file an
abbreviated Auction 76 application and
selected at least one license offered in
Auction 76. Qualified bidders in
Auction 73 need not bid on the licenses
offered in Auction 73 in order to be able
to become qualified to participate in
Auction 76.
ii. Auction 76 Initial Bidding Eligibility
277. For Auction 76, qualified bidders
will have their initial bidding eligibility
based on their initial bidding eligibility
in Auction 73 and will also have an
opportunity to purchase additional
bidding eligibility. However, qualified
bidders’’ initial bidding eligibility for
Auction 73 will be reduced for Auction
76 if they hold winning bids for any
licenses offered in Auction 73 in blocks
for which the reserve price was met in
Auction 73. For winning bidders of
licenses in the A, B, C, or E Blocks, the
amount of the reduction will be equal to
the number of bidding units associated
with the licenses won. For the winning
bidder of the D Block license, the
amount of the reduction will be equal to
the amount of any withdrawal payment
owed for withdrawn bid(s) on the D
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Block license plus the amount of the net
winning bid for the D Block license, up
to the amount of the winning bidder’s
initial Auction 73 bidding eligibility.
iii. Supplementing Upfront Payments
To Obtain Additional Eligibility
278. All bidders qualified to
participate in Auction 76 will have an
opportunity to purchase additional
bidding eligibility. Bidders will be able
to purchase additional bidding
eligibility for licenses to be offered in
Auction 76 by supplementing their
upfront payments pursuant to the
procedures for making upfront
payments by wire transfer set forth in
the Auction 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice, subject to a schedule to
be announced following the close of
bidding in Auction 73.
iv. Continuing Applicability of the AntiCollusion Rule
279. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission directed the
Bureau to adopt any procedures that
may enhance the effectiveness of an
auction of licenses in Auction 73 or any
contingent subsequent auction. In part,
the Commission found that the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule should
treat Auction 73 and any such
subsequent auction as a single auction,
given the related nature of the auctions.
Accordingly, the applicable down
payment deadline marking the end of
the anti-collusion period for Auction 73
and any subsequent auction shall be the
down payment deadline established
following the close of the subsequent
auction.
E. Bidding Procedures
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i. Aggregate Reserve Prices
280. As required by the Commission,
the licenses in subsequent bidding will
be subject to the same aggregate reserve
price(s) applicable in the initial auction.
A commenter argues in its comments
that the licenses in the second auction
should not be subject to any reserve
prices because using a reserve price in
the contingent subsequent auction runs
the risk that the licenses will not be
awarded prior to the June 30, 2008,
statutory deadline for filing auction
proceeds. As a commenter
acknowledges in its comments, the
Commission decision in the 700 MHz
Second Report and Order is binding,
absent reconsideration of that Order by
the Commission as a whole.
Consequently, the commenters proposal
is beyond the scope of the present nonrulemaking auctions procedures
process.
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281. In the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order, the Commission noted that
the Bureau has delegated authority to
determine how to allocate the C Block
reserve price upon auction of alternative
licenses. Accordingly, in the 700 MHz
Auction Comment Public Notice, the
Bureau proposed to apply the C Block
aggregate reserve price of $4.637854
billion to all of the alternative C Block
licenses. That is, the sum of the gross
bid amounts on the C1 and C2 Block
licenses must equal or exceed $4.637854
billion in order to meet the reserve
price. No commenters addressed this
proposal.
282. The Bureau adopts its proposal,
with one additional feature. In the event
that the sum of the gross bid amounts
on the C1 and C2 Block licenses does
not meet the reserve price 104 covering
both blocks, the Bureau then will
apportion the aggregate reserve price
between the two blocks based on their
respective bandwidth and apply those
aggregate reserve prices to the respective
blocks separately. More specifically, if
the aggregate reserve price of $4.637854
billion covering both Blocks C1 and C2
is not met, the Commission nevertheless
will assign licenses for the respective
block based on the auction results if the
gross bid amounts on the C 1 Block
licenses exceed $2.529739 billion or the
gross bid amounts on the C2 Block
licenses exceed $2.108115 billion.
Applying these separate aggregate
reserve prices will increase the
likelihood that licenses will be assigned
for the respective blocks in the
contingent subsequent auction, while
continuing to apply the aggregate
reserve price from the initial auction to
each block in proportion to the
megahertz in each block.
ii. Minimum Opening Bids
283. For Auction 76, the Bureau will
calculate minimum opening bid
amounts on a license-by-license basis
using the same approach as in Auction
73, drawing on the Auction 66 prices
that were bid on licenses for the exact
same geographic areas. For any licenses
that may be offered in Auction 76,
including alternative C1 and C2 Block
licenses, minimum opening bids are set
forth in Attachment B of the Auction 73
and 76 Procedures Public Notice.
F. Additional Procedures
284. In the 700 MHz Auction
Comment Public Notice, pursuant to
Commission direction, the Bureau
sought comment on the possibility of
denying bidding eligibility in a
contingent subsequent auction based on
bidder behavior in Auction 73, if that
behavior appeared designed to thwart
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the assignment of licenses. Specifically,
the Bureau proposed that bidders
defaulting on winning bids in Auction
73 should be denied eligibility in any
subsequent auction. The Bureau
declines to restrict the circumstances
under which it might deny bidding
eligibility in a contingent subsequent
auction to an otherwise qualified
bidder. The Commission retains the
authority to sanction bidders that are
found to have violated the antitrust laws
or the 105 Commission’s rules in
connection with competitive bidding by
requiring forfeiture of any upfront
payments, down payment or full bid
amounts, and by prohibiting the bidders
participation in future auctions. The
Commission intends to make full use of
this authority, including banning
participation in a contingent subsequent
auction, with respect to bidders that
seek to thwart the assignment of
licenses in Auction 73.
VI. Post-Auction Procedures
A. Considerations Relating to Certain
Post-Auction Payment Rules
i. Apportioning Package Bids
285. In package bidding, when a
bidder places an all-or-nothing bid on a
package of licenses, there will be no
identifiable bid amounts on the
individual licenses that comprise the
package. However, the Commission’s
competitive bidding rules and
procedures assume that the amount of
each bid on an individual license
always is known. For example, rules for
calculating the amount of small
business, new entrant, or tribal land
bidding credits presume that the
winning bid on the license is known.
Similarly, in determining the amount of
a default or withdrawal payment, which
involves a comparison between the
withdrawing or defaulting bidder’s bid
and a subsequent bid, the rules assume
that there are bid amounts for
individual licenses. Accordingly, the
Commission recently adopted a rule
providing that, in advance of each
auction with package bidding, the
Commission shall establish a
methodology for determining how to
estimate the price or bid on an
individual license included in a package
of licenses.
286. The Bureau proposed to
apportion package bids when regulatory
calculations require individual license
bid amounts by dividing the package
bid amount among the licenses
comprising the package in proportion to
the number of bidding units for each
license. Alternatively, the Bureau
proposed to use the final round CPEs for
each license to apportion package bids.
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The Bureau sought comment on these
proposals.
287. A commenter suggests that the
Bureau use a measure more closely
related to relative license values, such
as minimum opening bid amounts, to
apportion package bid amounts among
the licenses in the package. The Bureau
accepts the commenter’s
recommendation that relative license
values be used to apportion package
bids, but rather than use a pre-auction
estimate of value such as minimum
opening bids, the Bureau will use the
final CPEs of the licenses in the
package, as in its alternative proposal.
Final CPEs will reflect relative prices as
determined in Auction 73. Therefore,
when regulatory calculations require
individual license bid amounts, the
Bureau will divide the package bid
amount among the licenses comprising
the package in proportion to the final
round CPEs for the licenses.
ii. Interim Withdrawal Payment
Percentage
288. In general, the Commission’s
rules provide that a bidder that
withdraws a bid during an auction is
subject to a withdrawal payment equal
to the difference between the amount of
the withdrawn bid and the amount of
the winning bid in the same or a
subsequent auction. However, if a
license for which a bid has been
withdrawn does not receive a
subsequent higher bid or winning bid in
the same auction, the final withdrawal
payment cannot be calculated until a
corresponding license receives a higher
bid or winning bid in a subsequent
auction. When that final payment
cannot yet be calculated, the bidder
responsible for the withdrawn bid is
assessed an interim bid withdrawal
payment, which will be applied toward
any final bid withdrawal payment that
is ultimately assessed.
289. The Commission recently
amended its rules to provide that in
advance of the auction, the Commission
shall establish a percentage between
three percent and twenty percent of the
withdrawn bid to be assessed as an
interim bid withdrawal payment. When
it adopted the new rule, the
Commission indicated that it would
consider the nature of the service and
the inventory of the licenses being
offered when determining the level of
the interim withdrawal payment in a
particular auction.
290. In the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau noted that the 700
MHz auction will offer licenses under
several different geographic licensing
schemes and bandwidth sizes, and it
found that bidders may have a
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legitimate interest in using withdrawals
to facilitate their efforts to aggregate
licenses across potentially substitutable
blocks of licenses not subject to package
bidding. The Bureau also observed that
the likely significant bid amounts for
licenses in this auction (and resulting
absolute value of withdrawal payments)
will in themselves serve as a deterrent
to unnecessary withdrawals. Therefore,
the Bureau did not propose to set the
interim bid withdrawal payment at the
maximum rate of twenty percent. At the
same time, the Bureau noted that a rate
above the minimum three percent will
help deter undesirable strategic use of
withdrawals. Specifically, the Bureau
proposed to establish an interim bid
withdrawal payment of ten percent of
the withdrawn bid in the 700 MHz
auction and sought comment on this
issue.
291. No commenters suggested any
alternative to the Bureau’s proposed
percentage for interim withdrawal
payments. For the reasons set forth
above and in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice, the Bureau adopts its
proposal. The Commission will assess
an interim withdrawal payment equal to
ten percent (10%) of the amount of the
withdrawn bids. The ten percent (10%)
interim payment will be applied toward
any final bid withdrawal payment that
will be assessed after subsequent
auction of the license. Assessing an
interim bid withdrawal payment
ensures that the Commission receives a
minimal withdrawal payment pending
assessment of any final withdrawal
payment. Section 1.2104(g) provides
specific examples showing application
of the bid withdrawal payment rule.
iii. Additional Default Payment
Percentage
292. Any winning bidder that defaults
or is disqualified after the close of an
auction (i.e., fails to remit the required
down payment within the prescribed
period of time, fails to submit a timely
long-form application, fails to make full
payment, or is otherwise disqualified) is
liable for a default payment under
§ 1.2104(g)(2) of the Commission’s rules.
This payment consists of a deficiency
payment, equal to the difference
between the amount of the bidder’s bid
and the amount of the winning bid the
next time a license covering the same
spectrum is won in an auction, plus an
additional payment equal to a
percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of
the subsequent winning bid, whichever
is less. Until recently this additional
payment for non-combinatorial auctions
has been set at three percent of the
defaulter’s bid or of the subsequent
winning bid, whichever is less.
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293. The percentage of the bid that a
defaulting bidder must pay in addition
to the deficiency will depend on the
auction format ultimately chosen for a
particular auction. In non-package
auctions, the amount can range from
three percent up to a maximum of
twenty percent, established in advance
of the auction and based on the nature
of the service and the inventory of the
licenses being offered. In auctions with
package bidding, the additional
payment is set, pursuant to
§ 1.2104(g)(2)(ii), at 25 percent of the
applicable bid. This higher level reflects
the fact that a defaulted winning bid in
an auction with package bidding may
have affected which other bids were
winning other licenses.
294. The Bureau proposed to establish
an additional default payment of fifteen
percent with respect to bids on licenses
in Blocks A, B, D, and E, which are not
subject to package bidding. As
previously noted by the Commission,
defaults weaken the integrity of the
auction process and impede the
deployment of service to the public, and
an additional default payment of more
than three percent will be more effective
in deterring defaults. Moreover, the
Bureau concluded an additional default
payment greater than ten percent, which
the Commission has established in
several recent auctions, is appropriate
for the 700 MHz auction. Because no
licenses in Blocks A, B, or E will be sold
unless the aggregate reserve price for
that block is met, bidders may have an
additional incentive to bid on a license
and later default (after determination
that the reserve price has been met), in
order to help ensure that the reserve
price is met and other initial licenses in
the block are assigned. The Bureau
concluded that a higher additional
default 109 payment will help deter
such behavior. With respect to the D
Block, for which there is a single
nationwide license that will not be
assigned unless the D Block reserve
price is met, a default by the winning
bidder will delay the especially timesensitive process of establishing a
public-private partnership for the
provision of public safety services.
Given the unusually large public
interest benefits of timely licensing the
D Block, the Bureau proposed to deter
defaults by imposing a higher additional
default payment in that block as well.
Accordingly, it proposed an additional
default payment of fifteen percent on
licenses in the A, B, D, and E Blocks.
The Bureau sought comment on this
proposal. The Bureau stated that for
licenses in the C Block, because they are
subject to package bidding, the
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additional default payment will be
twenty-five percent as set forth in
§ 1.2104(g)(2)(ii). This additional default
payment will apply to all bids for
packages and for licenses that are
subject to package bidding.
295. While no comments were filed in
response to the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice focused on the appropriate
percentage for the additional default
payments, a commenter proposed in its
comments that the Commission impose
no default penalty in connection with
any defaults on a winning bid for the D
Block license. The commenter’s
argument focused particularly on a
scenario where the winning bidder is
unable to negotiate a Network Sharing
Agreement with the Public Safety
Licensee, even while negotiating in
good faith. Another commenter opposed
this proposal in its reply because it runs
counter to the Commission’s decision in
the 700 MHz Second Report and Order,
which held that [i]n the event that the
long-form application filed by the
winning bidder for the D Block license
is denied, the winning bidder of the D
Block licenses will be deemed to have
defaulted * * * [and] it will be liable
for the default payment set forth in the
Commission’s competitive bidding
rules. Accordingly, the commenter’s
proposal is beyond the scope of the
current non-rulemaking auction
procedures process.
296. The Bureau adopts its proposal
and sets the additional default payment
percentage at fifteen percent of the
defaulted bid for licenses in the A, B, D
and E Blocks. Pursuant to existing
Commission rules regarding licenses
subject to package bidding, the
additional default payment percentage
will be twenty-five percent of the
defaulted bid for licenses in the C Block.
These percentages are appropriate to
reduce the risk that bidders may default
on their winning bids.
B. Down Payments
297. After bidding has ended in
Auction 73 and Auction 76, the
Commission will issue a public notice
declaring the auction(s) closed and
identifying winning bidders, down
payments and final payments due. In
addition, if the D Block bidding satisfies
the reserve price and there is a winning
bidder for the D Block license in
Auction 73, the Commission will issue
a public notice identifying the winning
bidder, down payments and final
payments due after bidding ends in
Auction 73, even if Auction 76 will be
held for licenses in any other block(s).
298. Within ten business days after
release of the auction closing notice,
each winning bidder must submit
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sufficient funds (in addition to its
upfront payment) to bring its total
amount of money on deposit with the
Commission for licenses offered in
Auction 73 and Auction 76 to 20
percent of the net amount of its winning
bids (gross bids less any applicable
small business or very small business
bidding credits).
C. Final Payments
299. Each winning bidder will be
required to submit the balance of the net
amount of its winning bids within 10
business days after the applicable
deadline for submitting down payments.
D. Long-Form Application (FCC Form
601)
300. Within ten business days after
release of the auction closing notice,
winning bidders must electronically
submit a properly completed long-form
application (FCC Form 601) for each
license won through Auction 73 and/or
Auction 76. Winning bidders that are
small 111 businesses or very small
businesses must demonstrate their
eligibility for a small business or very
small business bidding credit. Further
filing instructions will be provided to
auction winners at the close of the
auction.
301. The CSEA/Part 1 Report and
Order, 71 FR 6214, February 7, 2006,
modified the procedure by which a
consortium that is a winning bidder in
Auction 73 and/or Auction 76 will
apply for a license. In particular, (a)
each member or group of members of a
winning consortium seeking separate
licenses will be required to file a
separate long-form application for its
respective license(s) and, in the case of
a license to be partitioned or
disaggregated, the member or group
filing the applicable long-form
application shall provide the parties’
partitioning or disaggregation agreement
in its long-form application; (b) two or
more consortium members seeking to be
licensed together shall first form a legal
business entity; and (c) any such entity
must meet the applicable eligibility
requirements for small business status.
Applicants applying as consortia should
review the CSEA/Part 1 Report and
Order in detail and monitor any relevant
future proceedings to understand how
the members of the consortia will apply
for a license in the event they are
winning bidders.
E. Ownership Disclosure Information
Report (FCC Form 602)
302. At the time it submits its longform application (FCC Form 601), each
winning bidder also must comply with
the ownership reporting requirements as
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set forth in 47 CFR 1.913, 1.919, and
1.2112. An ownership disclosure record
is automatically created in ULS for any
applicant that submits an FCC Form
175. However, winning bidders will be
required to review and confirm that it is
complete and accurate as of the date of
filing Form 601. Further instructions
will be provided to winning bidders at
the close of the auction.
F. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
303. A winning bidder that intends to
use its license(s) to deploy facilities and
provide services to federally recognized
tribal lands that are unserved by any
telecommunications carrier or that have
a wireline penetration rate equal to or
below 85 percent is eligible to receive a
tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in
47 CFR 1.2107 and 1.2110(f). A tribal
lands bidding credit is in addition to,
and separate from, any other bidding
credit for which a winning bidder may
qualify.
304. Unlike other bidding credits that
are requested prior to the auction, a
winning bidder applies for the tribal
lands bidding credit after winning the
auction when it files its long-form
application (FCC Form 601). When
initially filing the long-form application,
the winning bidder will be required to
advise the Commission whether it
intends to seek a tribal lands bidding
credit, for each license won in the
auction, by checking the designated
box(es). After stating its intent to seek a
tribal lands bidding credit, the applicant
will have 180 days from the close of the
long-form filing window to amend its
application to select the specific tribal
lands to be served and provide the
required tribal government
certifications. Licensees receiving a
tribal lands bidding credit are subject to
performance criteria as set forth in 47
CFR 1.2110(f)(3)(vi).
305. For additional information on the
tribal lands bidding credit, including
how the amount of the credit is
calculated, applicants should review the
Commission’s rule making proceeding
regarding tribal lands bidding credits
and related public notices. Relevant
documents can be viewed on the
Commission’s Web site by going to
https://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions and
clicking on the Tribal Land Credits link.
G. Default and Disqualification
306. Any winning bidder that defaults
or is disqualified after the close of the
auction (i.e., fails to remit the required
down payment within the prescribed
period of time, fails to submit a timely
long-form application, fails to make full
payment, or is otherwise disqualified)
will be subject to the payments
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described in 47 CFR 1.2104(g)(2). The
payments include both a deficiency
payment, equal to the difference
between the amount of the bidder’s bid
and the amount of the winning bid the
next time a license covering the same
spectrum is won in an auction, plus an
additional payment equal to a
percentage of the defaulter’s bid or of
the subsequent winning bid, whichever
is less.
307. Pursuant to recent modifications
to the rule governing default payments,
the percentage of the applicable bid to
be assessed as an additional payment for
defaults in a particular auction is
established in advance of the auction.
Accordingly, in the 700 MHz Auction
Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
set the additional default payment for
the auction of 700 MHz Band licenses
at fifteen percent of the applicable bid
with respect to bids on licenses in
Blocks A, B, D, and E, which are not
subject to package bidding. For licenses
in the C Block, because they are subject
to package bidding, the additional
default payment will be twenty-five
percent as set forth in § 1.2104(g)(2)(ii).
308. The Commission will apportion
package bids when regulatory
calculations require individual license
bid amounts by dividing the package
bid amount among the licenses
comprising the package in proportion to
the final round CPEs for the licenses.
Accordingly, in the event that a winning
bidder defaults on a package bid for C
Block licenses and the licenses
subsequently are won individually or in
a different combination, the Bureau will
apportion the defaulted package bid for
the C Block licenses based on the ratio
of the bidding units for the relevant
licenses to the bidding units for the
entire package.
309. The Bureau adopted its proposal
and sets the additional default payment
for the auction of 700 MHz Band
licenses at fifteen percent of the
applicable bid for licenses in Blocks A,
B, D, and E and at twenty-five percent
of the applicable bid for Block C
packages and licenses.
310. Finally, the Bureau notes that in
the event of a default, the Commission
may re-auction the license or offer it to
the next highest bidder (in descending
order) at its final bid amount. In
addition, if a default or disqualification
involves gross misconduct,
misrepresentation, or bad faith by an
applicant, the Commission may declare
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the applicant and its principals
ineligible to bid in future auctions, and
may take any other action that it deems
necessary, including institution of
proceedings to revoke any existing
licenses held by the applicant.
H. Refund of Remaining Upfront
Payment Balance
311. The Commission received two
sets of comments addressing the refund
of upfront payments. One commenter
urges that the Commission clarify that it
will promptly refund upfront payments
after the close of the initial auction,
prior to Auction 76. It maintains that
this would promote full participation in
the auction. Another commenter
advocates the adoption of procedures
for the refund of upfront payments, and
other deposits, after they are deposited
in the Digital Television Transition and
Public Safety Fund on June 30, 2008,
pursuant to the DTV Act. The
commenter argues that the lack of such
procedures would discourage the
participation of potential applicants.
312. The Commission concluded that
Auction 73 and Auction 76 are a single
auction event for purposes of the
Commission’s anti-collusion rule.
Applicants in Auction 73 are prohibited
from communicating bids or bidding
strategies prior to the conclusion of
Auction 76. Disclosing the activity of
applicants in Auction 73 or Auction 76
by providing for refunds of upfront
payments prior to the conclusion of
Auction 76 would conflict with this
conclusion. As a practical matter, the
Bureau notes that applicants in any
Commission auction must take into
account the fact that the Commission’s
auctions are of indefinite duration.
Thus, even if Auction 76 should not
prove necessary, applicants cannot
reasonably expect the return of funds by
any specific date and therefore cannot
reasonably require that funds be
refunded immediately after the
Commission announces that it will
make alternative licenses available for
Auction 76. Moreover, bidders in
Auction 73 subject to any liabilities
arising from Auction 73 may not have
the extent of their liability determined
prior to the close of Auction 76. For
example a bidder that withdrew a
provisionally winning bid in Auction 73
would be subject to a determination of
the extent of its liability only after the
conclusion of Auction 76. The
PO 00000
Frm 00034
Fmt 4701
Sfmt 4703
Commission has never provided for
refunds of upfront payments to such
bidders. In the past, the Commission has
provided for refunds of upfront payment
to bidders that have no auction
liabilities and no remaining bidding
eligibility prior to the competition of an
auction. Nevertheless, the Commission
has not made any such refunds in
auctions subject to anonymous bidding.
For all of these reasons, the Bureau
concluded that bidders reasonably
should be required to maintain their
upfront payments in Auction 73 and
Auction 76 on deposit with the
Commission until the conclusion of any
contingent subsequent auction.
313. All upfront payments submitted
by applicants in Auction 73 and all
upfront payments submitted by Auction
73 qualified bidders in connection with
Auction 76 may be available to be
refunded after the conclusion of any
contingent subsequent auction; subject
to any required payments (i.e. winning
bid, deficiency, withdrawal, and/or
default payments). All refunds will be
returned to the payer of record, as
identified on the FCC Form 159, unless
the payer submits written authorization
instructing otherwise.
314. Bidders are encouraged to file
their refund information electronically
using the Refund Information icon
found on the Auction Application
Manager page or through the Wire
Transfer for Refund Purposes link
available in various locations
throughout the FCC Auction System. If
an applicant has completed the refund
instructions electronically, the refund
will be sent automatically. If an
applicant has not completed the refund
instructions electronically, the applicant
may send a written request for the
refund, including wire transfer
instructions and FCC Registration
Number (FRN) by facsimile to the
Auctions Accounting Group at (202)
418–2843 or by mail to: Federal
Communications Commission,
Financial Operations Center, Auctions
Accounting Group, Gail Glasser, 445
12th Street, SW., Room 1–C864,
Washington, DC 20554.
Federal Communications Commission.
Gary D. Michaels,
Deputy Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access
Division, WTB.
[FR Doc. E7–21528 Filed 11–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P 117
E:\FR\FM\02NON2.SGM
02NON2
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 212 (Friday, November 2, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 62360-62392]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-21528]
[[Page 62359]]
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Part IV
Federal Communications Commission
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Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008; Notice
and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Reserved Prices, Upfront
Payments and Other Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76; Notice
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 212 / Friday, November 2, 2007 /
Notices
[[Page 62360]]
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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
[AU Docket No. 07-157; Report No. AUC-07-73-B (Auctions 73 and 76); DA
07-4171]
Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Scheduled for January 24, 2008;
Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Reserved Prices,
Upfront Payments and Other Procedures for Auctions 73 and 76
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice.
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SUMMARY: This document announces the procedures and minimum opening
bids for the upcoming auction of certain 700 MHz Band Licenses
(Auctions 73 and 76). This document is intended to familiarize
prospective bidders with the procedures and minimum opening bids for
these auctions.
DATES: Applications to participate in 700 MHz Band Licenses Auctions 73
and 76 must be filed before 6 p.m. ET on December 3, 2007. Bidding for
Auction No. 73 is scheduled to begin on January 24, 2008. Contingent
subsequent bidding in Auction 76, if necessary, will begin on a date to
be announced after Auction 73 has closed.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Auctions Spectrum and Access Division: For legal questions: Scott
Mackoul, Stephen Johnson or Howard Davenport at (202) 418-0660. For
general auction questions: Lisa Stover at (717) 338-2868. Mobility
Division: For service rule questions: Erin McGraft (legal), Keith
Harper (engineering) and Denise Walter (licensing) at (202) 418-0620.
To request materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print,
electronic files or audio format) for people with disabilities, send an
e-mail to fcc504@fcc.gov or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice released on October 5, 2007. The complete text
of the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice, including
attachments, as well as related Commission documents are available for
public inspection and copying from 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time
(ET) Monday through Thursday or from 8 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. on Friday at
the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. On October 19, 2007, a Public
Notice was released announcing a change in the date of the bidders'
seminar for Auctions 73 and 76 from November 19, 2007 to November 20,
2007. The Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice and related
Commission documents may also be purchased from the Commission's
duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc. (BCPI), Portals
II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC, 20554,
telephone 202-488-5300, facsimile 202-488-5563, or Web site: https://
www.BCPIWEB.com. When ordering documents from BCPI, please provide the
appropriate FCC document number, for example, DA 07-4171 for the
Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice. The Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice and related documents are also available on
the Internet at the Commission's Web site: https://wireless.fcc.gov/
auctions/73/.
I. General Information
A. Introduction
1. The Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (the Bureau) announces
the procedures and minimum opening bid amounts for the upcoming auction
of licenses for services in the 698-806 MHz band (700 MHz Band)
scheduled to begin on January 24, 2008. This auction is designated as
Auction 73. Auction 73 will offer 700 MHz Band licenses for initial
bidding and the 700 MHz Band licenses may be offered in contingent
subsequent bidding. In the event that any licenses are offered in
contingent subsequent bidding, that event will be designated as Auction
76. On August 17, 2007, in accordance with Section 309(j)(3) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Bureau released a public
notice seeking comment on competitive bidding procedures for both the
initial bidding and the contingent subsequent bidding for 700 MHz Band
licenses. Interested parties submitted 12 comments and 8 reply comments
in response to the 700 MHz Auction Public Notice, 72 FR 48272, August
23, 2007, as well as a number of ex parte communications.
2. In the 700 MHz Auction Public Notice, the Bureau proposed to
include all available, commercial 700 MHz Band licenses (1,099
licenses) for initial bidding in Auction 73 using the Commission's
standard simultaneous multiple-round (SMR) auction format for the A, B,
D, and E block licenses and an auction design with hierarchical package
bidding (HPB) for the C Block licenses. The 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice also proposed procedures for the contingent subsequent bidding,
now designated Auction 76, on licenses for spectrum associated with any
initially offered licenses for which the Auction 73 results do not
satisfy applicable reserve prices. Based on the record and after
considering comments provided in response to the 700 MHz Auction Public
Notice, the Bureau hereby announces the final procedures for Auctions
73 and Auction 76.
3. The Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice provides, among
other things, procedures for the following: (1) Anonymous bidding, to
enhance competition by safeguarding against potential anti-competitive
auction strategies; (2) package bidding, to enable bidders trying to
combine multiple C Block licenses to place bids on packages of those
licenses; (3) block-specific aggregate reserve prices, to help assure
that the public recovers a portion of the value of the spectrum
resource; and (4) prompt subsequent bidding in Auction 76, to offer
licenses for relevant block(s) in the event Auction 73 results do not
satisfy applicable reserve prices.
4. Anonymous Bidding. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 65 FR
17594, April, 4, 2000, the Commission found that the public interest
would be served if the auction for new 700 MHz Band licenses is
conducted using anonymous (or limited information) bidding procedures,
regardless of any pre-auction measurement of likely auction
competition. Such information procedures are intended to reduce the
potential for anti-competitive bidding behavior, including bidding
activity that aims to prevent the entry of new competitors. Having
proposed and sought comment on more detailed procedures for employing
anonymous bidding for the upcoming auction, the Bureau now announces
the anonymous bidding procedures.
5. Package Bidding for C Block Licenses. The Commission also
determined in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order that providing for
package bidding for C Block licenses would serve the public interest.
The Commission found that package bidding for these licenses should
facilitate the entry of entities seeking to create a nationwide
footprint and whose business plans require the economies of scale that
only can be obtained with nationwide operation. At Commission
direction, the Bureau previously proposed and sought comment on
detailed procedures for implementing package bidding for the C Block
licenses and not for licenses in the other blocks to be auctioned. In
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau detailed
the process for package bidding for the C Block licenses.
6. Block-Specific Aggregate Reserve Prices. The Commission also
decided to
[[Page 62361]]
provide for aggregate reserve prices for licenses authorizing the use
of each block of the commercial 700 MHz Band yet to be licensed. The
Commission concluded that, consistent with its statutory mandate,
disclosed reserve prices would promote the recovery of a portion of the
value of the public spectrum resource. The Commission directed the
Bureau to adopt aggregate reserve prices reflecting the potential
market value of this spectrum based on a variety of factors including,
but not limited to, the characteristics of this band and the auction
prices of other recently auctioned licenses, such as licenses for
Advanced Wireless Services in the 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz bands
(AWS-1). Accordingly, the Bureau proposed and sought comment on the
following block-specific aggregate reserve prices: Block A, $1.807380
billion; Block B, $1.374426 billion; Block C, $4.637854 billion; Block
D, $1.330000 billion; Block E, $0.903690 billion. Further, the Bureau
proposed that if the sum of the provisionally winning bids for the
licenses in a block does not satisfy the relevant aggregate reserve
price, none of the relevant licenses for the particular block will be
assigned based on the auction results. In the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice, the Bureau adopted this proposal.
7. Auction 76 Overview. The Commission decided that, if licenses
initially offered for the A, B, C, or E Blocks are not assigned because
the auction results do not satisfy the applicable aggregate reserve
price(s) for those licenses, the Commission promptly will offer
alternative licenses for those blocks. More specifically, the
Commission will offer licenses for the A, B, and E Blocks subject to
alternative performance requirements. With respect to the C Block, the
Commission will offer alternative licenses without the open platform
conditions and based on different geographic areas and spectrum
bandwidth. If the D Block license is not assigned because the auction
results do not satisfy the D Block reserve price, the Commission may
re-offer that license subject to the same rules or reconsider the
applicable rules. For administrative purposes, the Bureau will
designate as Auction 76 any subsequent bidding for alternative licenses
for the A, B, C or E Blocks or for the D Block license that occurs
because Auction 73 results for licenses initially offered for the
relevant blocks do not satisfy the applicable aggregate reserve
price(s). In the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice, the
Bureau announced detailed procedures for conducting Auction 76, if
necessary.
8. The Commission will conduct bidding in Auction 73 and any
contingent subsequent bidding in Auction 76 for 700 MHz Band licenses
as a single auction to the extent possible, given the strong public
interest in promptly assigning all 700 MHz Band licenses for recovered
analog spectrum and the related nature of the licenses being offered in
Auctions 73 and 76. Thus, pursuant to the 700 MHz Second Report and
Order, the Bureau will permit only qualified bidders in the initial
auction to participate in the contingent subsequent auction. To enable
a prompt start to Auction 76 after Auction 73, applicants must select
any licenses on which they may bid in Auction 76 by the deadline for
filing their Auction 73 application. Applicants must select those
licenses by submitting a separate abbreviated short-form application to
participate in Auction 76. The abbreviated Auction 76 application must
be filed together with the applicant's standard application for Auction
73, following procedures described in the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice. In the event that Auction 76 takes place, bidder
identity and other information on the applicant's completed Auction 73
short-form application will be combined with the licenses selected in
the abbreviated Auction 76 application to create the applicant's
Auction 76 application. This process will minimize the time period
between auctions by eliminating any need for applicants to take time
following Auction 73 to file new applications or select additional
licenses, and for the Commission to review newly-filed short-form
applications. Applicants in Auction 76, however, will have an
opportunity after Auction 73 to obtain additional eligibility for any
licenses offered in Auction 76 by supplementing their upfront monies on
deposit with the Commission pursuant to the procedures as provided for
in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order.
9. The Bureau also will use the Auction 73 design in Auction 76,
including an aggregate reserve price for each block that matches the
applicable initial reserve price. In the event that alternative
licenses for the C Block are offered for Blocks C1 and C2, the Bureau
will conduct package bidding for the C2 Block only, using the pre-
determined packages. Alternative licenses for Blocks C1 and C2 will be
subject to reserve prices. There will be a joint aggregate reserve
price equal to the initial auction C Block aggregate reserve price, and
separate aggregate reserve prices for the C1 and C2 Blocks that add to
the joint aggregate reserve price. Licenses in both blocks will be
assigned if the joint aggregate reserve price is met. If the joint
aggregate reserve price is not met but one of the block-specific
reserve prices is met, licenses in the block for which the reserve
price is met will be assigned. Licenses in the other block will not be
assigned. This will assure the aggregate reserve price in the initial
auction continues to apply while maximizing the opportunity for
licenses for either Block C1 or C2 to be assigned.
i. Background of Proceeding
10. The Commission is offering the licenses in Auction 73
consistent with the requirements of the Digital Television Transition
and Public Safety Act of 2005 (DTV Act). Pursuant to the DTV Act the
Commission must conduct the auction of licenses for recovered analog
spectrum by commencing the bidding not later than January 28, 2008. A
number of incumbent broadcasters are licensed and operating on these
frequencies (TV Channels 52-53, 56-58, 60-62, and 65-67) and adjacent
channels.
ii. Licenses To Be Offered in Auction 73
11. Auction 73 will offer a total of 1,099 licenses: 176 Economic
Area (EA) licenses in each of the A and E Blocks, 734 Cellular Market
Area (CMA) licenses in the B Block, 12 Regional Economic Area Grouping
(REAG) licenses in the C Block, and one nationwide license, to be used
as part of the 700 MHz Public/Private Partnership, in the D Block.
B. Rules and Disclaimers
i. Relevant Authority
12. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly
with the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in
Title 47, part 1, of the CFR, including recent amendments and
clarifications; rules relating to the 700 MHz Band contained in Title
47, part 27, of the CFR; rules relating to the public/private
partnership applicable to the D Block contained in Title 47, part 90,
of the CFR; and rules relating to applications, environment, practice
and procedure contained in Title 47, part 1, of the CFR. Prospective
applicants must also be thoroughly familiar with the procedures, terms
and conditions (terms) contained in the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures
Public Notice and the Commission's decisions in proceedings regarding
competitive bidding procedures, application requirements, and
obligations of
[[Page 62362]]
Commission licensees. For example, among other Commission orders,
prospective bidders should be familiar with the 700 MHz First Report
and Order, 65 FR 3139, January 20, 2000, and the 700 MHz Second Report
and Order.
13. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders,
and public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
supplement the information contained in its public notices at any time,
and will issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental
information to applicants. It is the responsibility of all applicants
to remain current with all Commission rules and with all public notices
pertaining to Auctions 73 and 76.
ii. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance With Antitrust Laws
14. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, Sec.
1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibits auction applicants for
licenses in any of the same geographic license areas from communicating
with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements 9 unless
such applicants have identified each other on their short-form
applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties with whom they have entered
into agreements pursuant to Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
a. Entities Subject to Anti-Collusion Rule
15. The anti-collusion rule will apply to any applicants that
submit short-form applications for Auctions 73 or 76 and select
licenses in the same or overlapping CMAs, EAs, REAGs or the nationwide
license in the D Block. For example, assume that one applicant applies
for a REAG license and a second applicant applies for an EA license
covering any area within that REAG. The two entities will have applied
for licenses covering the same geographic areas and would be precluded
from communicating with each other under the rule. The rule also
applies where one applicant has selected a license in Auction 73 and
another applicant selects a license in Auction 76 that covers any of
the same geographic area. In addition, the rule precludes applicants
that apply to bid for the nationwide license in the D Block, or all the
licenses in any other block, from communicating with all other
applicants. Thus, applicants that have applied for licenses covering
the same markets (unless they have identified each other on their FCC
Form 175 applications as parties with whom they have entered into
agreements under Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must affirmatively avoid all
communications with or disclosures to each other that affect or have
the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy, which may include
communications regarding the post-auction market structure. This
prohibition applies to all applicants regardless of whether such
applicants become qualified bidders or actually bid. Information
concerning applicants' license selections will not be available to the
public. Therefore, the Commission will inform each applicant by letter
of the identity of each of the other applicants that has applied for
licenses covering any of the same geographic areas as the licenses that
it has selected in its short-form application.
16. For purposes of this prohibition, Sec. 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines
applicant as including all officers and directors of the entity
submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction, all
controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of
partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest
amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock, or
outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form
application.
17. Entities and parties subject to the anti-collusion rule should
take special care in circumstances where their employees may receive
information directly or indirectly from a competing applicant relating
to any competing applicant's bids or bidding strategies. In situations
where the anti-collusion rule views the same person as the applicant
with respect to two different entities filing competing applications,
under Bureau precedent the bids and bidding strategies of one applicant
are necessarily conveyed to the other and, absent a disclosed bidding
agreement, an apparent violation of the anti-collusion rule occurs. The
Bureau has not addressed situations where employees who do not qualify
as the applicant, (e.g., are not officers or directors) receive
information regarding a competing applicant's bids or bidding
strategies and whether that information might be deemed to necessarily
convey to the applicant. The Bureau notes that the exception to the
anti-collusion rule providing that non-controlling interest holders may
have interests in more than one competing bidder without violating the
anti-collusion rule, provided specified conditions are met (including a
certification that no prohibited communications have occurred or will
occur), does not extend to controlling interest holders.
b. Prohibition Applies Until Down Payment Deadline
18. Section 1.2105(c)'s anti-collusion prohibition begins at the
short-form application filing deadline and ends at the down payment
deadline after the auction. In recognition of the related nature of the
initial auction and any contingent auction of alternative licenses, the
Commission concluded in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order that the
provisions of the anti-collusion rule would continue to apply until the
down payment deadline for the subsequent auction.
19. Some commenters argue that the Bureau should allow applicants
to opt-out from the anti-collusion prohibition in the event Auction 76
is conducted. A commenter proposed that an applicant that has no
intention to bid in the subsequent auction could inform the Commission
of its intent in writing with a certification that its decision is not
based on any discussion with other competing bidders of auction
strategy or post-auction market structure. As one commenter
acknowledges, changing the application of the rule in this way is
beyond the Bureau's delegated authority and beyond the scope of this
non-rulemaking proceeding and would require action by the Commission to
reconsider its determination in the 700 MHz Second Report and Order.
Thus, the Bureau is unable to adopt the proposed opt-out certification
procedure. If it is necessary to conduct Auction 76, the provisions of
the anti-collusion rule will apply to all applicants until the down
payment deadline, which will occur after the close of bidding on
licenses offered in Auction 76.
c. Prohibited Communications
20. Prospective applicants for upcoming Auctions 73 and 76 and
other parties that may be engaged in discussion with such prospective
applicants are cautioned of the need to comply with the Commission's
anti-collusion rule, Sec. 1.2105(c). The anti-collusion rule prohibits
not only a communication about an applicant's own bids or bidding
strategy, but also a communication of another applicant's bids or
bidding strategy. While the anti-collusion rule provisions do not
prohibit business negotiations among auction applicants, applicants
must remain vigilant so as not to communicate directly or indirectly
information that affects, or could affect, bids or bidding strategy, or
the negotiation of settlement agreements.
21. The Commission remains vigilant about prohibited communications
[[Page 62363]]
taking place in other situations. For example, the Commission has
warned that prohibited communications concerning bids and bidding
strategies may include communications regarding capital calls or
requests for additional funds in support of bids or bidding strategies
to the extent such communications convey information concerning the
bids and bidding strategies directly or indirectly.
22. Applicants are hereby placed on notice that public disclosure
of information relating to bidder interests and bidder identities that
is confidential in both Auctions 73 and 76 at the time of disclosure
may violate the anti-collusion rule. This is so even though similar
types of information were revealed prior to and during other Commission
auctions subject to different information procedures. Bidders should
use caution in their dealings with other parties, such as members of
the press, financial analysts, or others who might become a conduit for
the communication of prohibited bidding information. For example, where
limited information disclosure procedures are in place, as for Auctions
73 and 76, a qualified bidder's statement to the press that it has lost
bidding eligibility and stopped bidding in the auction could give rise
to a finding of an anti-collusion rule violation. Similarly, an
applicant's public statement of intent not to participate in Auction 76
bidding could also violate the rule.
23. Applicants for licenses for any of the same geographic license
areas must not communicate directly or indirectly about bids or bidding
strategy. Accordingly, such applicants are encouraged not to use the
same individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of the anti-
collusion rule could occur if an individual acts as the authorized
bidder for two or more competing applicants, and conveys information
concerning the substance of bids or bidding strategies between such
applicants. Also, if the authorized bidders are different individuals
employed by the same organization (e.g., law firm or engineering firm
or consulting firm), a violation similarly could occur. In such a case,
at a minimum, applicants should certify on their applications that
precautionary steps have been taken to prevent communication between
authorized bidders and that applicants and their bidding agents will
comply with the anti-collusion rule. A violation of the anti-collusion
rule could occur in other contexts, such as an individual serving as an
officer for two or more applicants. Moreover, the Commission has found
a violation of the anti-collusion rule where a bidder used the
Commission's bidding system to disclose its bidding strategy in a
manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to cooperate
and collaborate in specific markets, and has placed auction
participants on notice that the use of its bidding system to disclose
market information to competitors will not be tolerated and will
subject bidders to sanctions.
24. In addition, when completing short-form applications,
applicants should avoid any statements or disclosures that may violate
the Commission's anti-collusion rule, particularly in light of the
Commission's procedures for limited information. Specifically,
applicants should avoid including any information in their short-form
applications that might convey information regarding their license
selection, such as using applicant names that refer to licenses being
offered, referring to certain licenses or markets in describing bidding
agreements, or including any information in attachments that may
otherwise disclose applicants' license selections.
d. Disclosure of Bidding Agreements and Arrangements
25. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering
into otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form
applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the
agreement(s) in their short-form application. If parties agree in
principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing
deadline, each party to the agreement must identify the other party or
parties to the agreement on its short-form application under Sec.
1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not been reduced to writing. If
the parties have not agreed in principle by the short-form filing
deadline, they should not include the names of parties to discussions
on their applications, and they may not continue negotiations,
discussions or communications with any other applicants for licenses
covering any of the same or overlapping geographic areas after the
short-form filing deadline.
e. Anti-Collusion Certification
26. By electronically submitting a short-form application following
the electronic filing procedures set forth in Attachments D and E to
the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice, each applicant
certifies its compliance with Sec. 1.2105(c). However, the Bureau
cautions that merely filing a certifying statement as part of an
application will not outweigh specific evidence that collusive behavior
has occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an investigation
when warranted. The Commission has stated that it intends to scrutinize
carefully any instances in which bidding patterns suggest that
collusion may be occurring. Any applicant found to have violated the
anti-collusion rule may be subject to sanctions.
f. Antitrust Laws
27. Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance
with the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws,
which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the
marketplace. Compliance with the disclosure requirements of the
Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party from
enforcement of the antitrust laws. For instance, a violation of the
antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking place well before any
party submits a short-form application. The Commission has cited a
number of examples of potentially anticompetitive actions that would be
prohibited under antitrust laws: For example, actual or potential
competitors may not agree to divide territories horizontally in order
to minimize competition, regardless of whether they split a market in
which they both do business, or whether they merely reserve one market
for one and another for the other. Similarly, the Bureau has long
reminded potential applicants and others that even where the applicant
discloses parties with whom it has reached an agreement on the short-
form application, thereby permitting discussions with those parties,
the applicant is nevertheless subject to existing antitrust laws. To
the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific allegations that
suggest that violations of the federal antitrust laws may have
occurred, the Commission may refer such allegations to the United
States Department of Justice for investigation. If an applicant is
found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Commission's rules in
connection with its participation in the competitive bidding process,
it may be subject to forfeiture of its upfront payment, down payment,
or full bid amount and may be prohibited from participating in future
auctions, among other sanctions.
28. One commenter urges the Commission to adopt an auction rule
that states that a bidder cannot release any bidding information to the
public during the course of the auction, and provide notice that all
parties remain subject to the antitrust laws. As another commenter
points out, however, the
[[Page 62364]]
Commission has consistently provided such guidance in prior auctions.
The Bureau does so again here: All parties remain subject to the
antitrust laws.
g. Duty to Report Prohibited Communications
29. If an applicant makes or receives a communication that appears
to violate the anti-collusion rule, it must report such communication
in writing to the Commission immediately and in no case later than five
business days after the communication occurs. The Commission recently
clarified that each applicant's obligation to report any such
communication continues beyond the five-day period after the
communication is made, even if the report is not made within the five
day period.
30. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in its
pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days of any
substantial change that may be of decisional significance to that
application. Thus, Sec. 1.65 requires an auction applicant to notify
the Commission of any substantial change to the information or
certifications included in its pending short-form application.
Applicants are therefore required by Sec. 1.65 to report to the
Commission any communications they have made to or received from
another applicant after the short-form filing deadline that affect or
have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy unless such
communications are made to or received from parties to agreements
identified under Sec. 1.2105(a)(2)(viii).
31. Applicants must be aware that failure to comply with the
Commission's rules can result in enforcement action.
h. Winning Bidders Must Disclose Terms of Agreements
32. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to
disclose in their long-form applications the specific terms,
conditions, and parties involved in any bidding consortia, joint
ventures, partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to
the competitive bidding process.
i. Additional Information Concerning Anti-Collusion Rule
33. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the
Bureau addressing the application of the anti-collusion rule may be
found in Attachment I of the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice. These documents are available on the Commission's auction anti-
collusion Web page.
iii. Protection of Incumbent Operations
34. A number of incumbent broadcasters are licensed and operating
on these frequencies (TV Channels 52-53, 56-58, 60-62, and 65-67) and
adjacent channels. In accordance with the Commission's rules, 700 MHz
Band licensees must protect analog and digital TV incumbents from
harmful interference through February 17, 2009, the end of the DTV
transition period. After February 17, 2009, 700 MHz licensees must
continue to operate in accordance with the Commission's rules to reduce
the potential for interference to public reception of the signals of
DTV broadcast stations transmitting on DTV Channel 51. These
limitations may restrict the ability of such geographic area licensees
to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide
service to some parts of their geographic license areas.
35. In the 700 MHz Second Report and Order, the Commission
grandfathered an incumbent guard band B Block licensee in Major
Economic Areas (MEAs) 21 and 39 at 761-763 MHz and 791-793 MHz of the D
Block. The new D Block licensee will be authorized on a secondary basis
at 761-763 MHz and 791-793 MHz in these markets, and it may not cause
interference to the primary operations of the grandfathered licensee.
If the grandfathered licensee, or a successor or assignee, cancels
either of the grandfathered licenses, or if either license cancels
automatically, is terminated by the Commission, or expires, then the
licensed geographic area will revert to the D Block licensee
automatically.
a. International Coordination
36. Potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas that
are near the Canadian or Mexican borders are subject to international
agreements with Canada and Mexico. Pursuant to these agreements, the
U.S. must protect the signals of Canadian and Mexican television
broadcast stations located in the border area. Unless otherwise
modified by international treaty, licensees must not cause interference
to, and must accept harmful interference from, television broadcast
operations in Mexico and Canada. Further, until such time as existing
agreements are replaced or modified to reflect the new uses, licensees
in the band will be subject to existing agreements.
b. Quiet Zones
37. 700 MHz Band licensees must protect the radio quiet zones set
forth in the Commission's rules. Licensees are cautioned that they must
receive the appropriate approvals directly from the relevant quiet zone
entity prior to operating within the areas described in the
Commission's rules.
iv. Due Diligence
38. The Bureau cautions potential applicants formulating their
bidding strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which 700
MHz Band frequencies are occupied. Applicants and their investors
should also understand that Commission rules and requirements place
limitations on the ability of 700 MHz Band licensees to use this
spectrum. There are a number of incumbent broadcast television
licensees already licensed and operating in the band that will be
subject to the upcoming auction. Geographic area licensees operating on
the spectrum associated with Channels 52-53, 56-58, 60-62, and 65-67
must comply with the co-channel and the adjacent channel provision of
Sec. 27.60 of the Commission's rules. These limitations may restrict
the ability of such geographic area licensees to use certain portions
of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to certain areas in
their geographic license areas. For example, bidders should become
familiar with any petitions or other pleadings filed in response to the
700 MHz First Report and Order, 700 MHz Second Report and Order, and
any other orders that have been or may be released affecting the 700
MHz Band.
39. Potential bidders are reminded that they are solely responsible
for investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors
that may have a bearing on the value of 700 MHz Band licenses. The FCC
makes no representations or warranties about the use of this spectrum
for particular services. Applicants should be aware that an FCC auction
represents an opportunity to become an FCC licensee in the 700 MHz Band
subject to certain conditions and regulations. An FCC auction does not
constitute an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service,
technology, or product, nor does an FCC license constitute a guarantee
of business success. Applicants should perform their individual due
diligence before proceeding as they would with any new business
venture.
40. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own
research prior to the beginning of
[[Page 62365]]
bidding in Auction 73 in order to determine the existence of any
pending legislative, administrative or judicial proceedings that might
affect their decision regarding participation in the auction, including
any subsequent auction (if necessary). Participants in Auctions 73 and
76 are strongly encouraged to continue such research throughout the
auction. In addition, potential bidders should perform technical
analyses sufficient to assure themselves that, should they prevail in
competitive bidding for a specific license, they will be able to build
and operate facilities that will fully comply with the Commission's
technical and legal requirements as well as other applicable Federal,
state, and local laws.
41. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future
proceedings, including rulemaking proceedings or petitions for
rulemaking, applications (including those for modification), requests
for special temporary authority, waiver requests, petitions to deny,
petitions for reconsideration, informal oppositions, and applications
for review, before the Commission may relate to particular applicants
or incumbent licensees or the licenses available in Auctions 73 and 76.
For example, bidders should note that petitions have been filed for
reconsideration of certain decisions made in the 700 MHz First Report
and Order and the 700 MHz Second Report and Order. In addition,
applicants should be aware that the Commission has sought comment on a
range of proposals concerning consumer education about the DTV
transition, including the possible imposition of reporting requirements
on winning bidders for 700 MHz band licenses. Of course, pending and
future judicial proceedings may relate to particular applicants or
incumbent licensees, or the licenses available in Auctions 73 and 76.
Prospective bidders are responsible for assessing the likelihood of the
various possible outcomes, and considering their potential impact on
spectrum licenses available in Auctions 73 and 76.
42. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and
consider all proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being
auctioned and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum
for Auction 73. In addition, although the Commission may continue to
act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions,
and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may not
be resolved by the beginning of bidding in the auction.
43. Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated
risks and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or make
use of licenses being offered.
44. Applicants may use the licensing database for the Media Bureau
on the Internet in order to determine which frequencies are already
licensed to incumbent licensees. Licensing records for the Media Bureau
are contained in the Media Bureau's Consolidated Data Base System
(CDBS) and may be researched on the Internet at https://www.fcc.gov/mb/
cdbs.html. Potential bidders should direct questions regarding the
search capabilities of CDBS to the Media Bureau help line at (202) 418-
2662, or via e-mail at cdbshelp@fcc.gov.
45. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding
the accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any
third party databases, including, for example, court docketing systems.
To the extent the Commission's databases may not include all
information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant, applicants
may obtain or verify such information from independent sources or
assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in said databases.
Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations or guarantees
regarding the accuracy or completeness of information that has been
provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into its databases.
46. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically
inspect any prospective sites located in, or near, the geographic area
for which they plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the
environmental review obligations.
v. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System
47. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding
system to allow bidders to participate in Auction 73 over the Internet
using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS or FCC
Auction System). The Commission makes no warranty 21 whatsoever with
respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall the Commission, or
any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable for any damages
whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of business profits,
business interruption, loss of business information, or any other loss)
arising out of or relating to the existence, furnishing, functioning or
use of the FCC Auction System that is accessible to qualified bidders
in connection with Auctions 73 and 76. Moreover, no obligation or
liability will arise out of the Commission's technical, programming or
other advice or service provided in connection with the FCC Auction
System.
vi. Fraud Alert
48. As is the case with many business investment opportunities,
some unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction 73 to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Information about deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes is available from the Commission as
well as the FTC and SEC. Complaints about specific deceptive
telemarketing investment schemes should be directed to the FTC, the
SEC, or the National Fraud Information Center at (800) 876-7060.
vii. Environmental Review Requirements
49. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding
implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act and other
federal environmental statutes. The construction of a wireless antenna
facility is a federal action and the licensee must comply with the
Commission's environmental rules for each such facility. The
Commission's environmental rules require, among other things, that the
licensee consult with expert agencies having environmental
responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the
State Historic Preservation Office, the Army Corps of Engineers and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (through the local authority with
jurisdiction over floodplains). In assessing the effect of facilities
construction on historic properties, the licensee must follow the
provisions of the Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the
Section 106 National Historic Preservation Act Review Process. The
licensee must prepare environmental assessments for facilities that may
have a significant impact in or on wilderness areas, wildlife
preserves, threatened or endangered species or designated critical
habitats, historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites,
floodplains, and surface features. The licensee also must prepare
environmental assessments for facilities that include high intensity
white lights in residential neighborhoods or excessive radio frequency
emission.
[[Page 62366]]
C. Auction Specifics
i. Auction 73 Start Date
50. Bidding in Auction 73 will begin on Thursday, January 24, 2008.
51. This change of the previously-announced start date for Auction
73 will provide interested parties with additional time after this
announcement of competitive bidding procedures to develop business
plans, assess market conditions, and evaluate the availability of
equipment for new 700 MHz Band services.
52. Some commenters had sought a postponement of the previously-
announced start date until January 25 or 28, 2008. Pursuant to the
Congressional mandate, the Commission must conduct the auction of
licenses for recovered analog spectrum in the 700 MHz Band by
commencing the bidding not later than January 28, 2008. Starting the
auction on the statutory deadline for commencing the auction, or one
business day prior to the deadline would provide insufficient time to
address unexpected matters that might arise just prior to the start of
bidding.
53. The initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public
notice at least one week before the start of the auction. Moreover,
unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses and packages will
be conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all
licenses and packages.
ii. Auction Title
54. The auction in which the 700 MHz Band licenses will initially
be offered is designated as Auction 73--700 MHz Band. In the event that
any licenses, including alternative licenses, are offered in contingent
subsequent bidding, that will be designated as Auction 76.
iii. Bidding Methodology
55. The bidding methodology for Auction 73 will be simultaneous
multiple round (SMR) bidding for the A, B, D, and E Block licenses and
an auction design with hierarchical package bidding (HPB) for the C
Block licenses. The Commission will conduct Auctions 73 and 76 over the
Internet using the FCC Auction System, and telephonic bidding will be
available as well. Qualified bidders are permitted to bid
electronically via the Internet or by telephone. All telephone calls
are recorded.
iv. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines
56. The following dates and deadlines apply:
Auction Seminar........................ November 20, 2007.
Auction 73 and 76 Short-Form November 19, 2007; 12 noon ET.
Application (FCC Form 175) Filing
Window Opens.
Auction 73 and 76 Short-Form December 3, 2007; prior to 6 p.m. ET.
Application (FCC Form 175) Filing
Window Deadline.
Auction 73 Upfront Payments (via wire December 28, 2007; 6 p.m. ET.
transfer).
Mock Auction........................... January 18, 2008.
Auction 73 Begins...................... January 24, 2008.
57. If contingent subsequent bidding is necessary, the Bureau
intends to announce the start date for Auction 76 and the deadline for
additional upfront payments within five business days after the end of
bidding in Auction 73. The Bureau expects that Auction 76 would begin
within three weeks of that announcement.
v. Requirements for Participation in Auction 73 and 76
58. Those wishing to participate in Auction 73 and 76 (should any
subsequent auction become necessary), must: (1) For Auction 73, submit
a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior to 6 p.m.
ET, December 3, 2007, following the electronic filing procedures set
forth in Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public
Notice; (2) for Auction 76, submit short-form applications (FCC Form
175) electronically prior to 6 p.m. ET, December 3, 2007, for each
auction following the electronic filing procedures set forth in
Attachments D and E to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice.
Bidding in Auction 76 is open only to applicants that qualify to
participate in Auction 73, and that comply with all of the requirements
for participating in Auction 76, including submitting a separate short-
form application; (3) for Auction 73, submit a sufficient upfront
payment and an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by 6 p.m. ET,
December 28, 2007, following the procedures and instructions set forth
in Attachment F to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice; (4)
for Auction 76 (if necessary), submit a sufficient upfront payment and
an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) by the deadline to be
announced following the end of bidding in Auction 73; and (5) comply
with all provisions outlined in this Public Notice and applicable
Commission rules.
D. Other Issues Raised by Commenters
59. Two commenters raised issues that are unrelated to those raised
in the 700 MHz Auction Public Notice. One commenter proposes that the
Commission should require that all licenses offered in Auction 73 be
made available to public safety personnel for priority use during
critical emergencies. The commenter also suggests that such a
requirement be considered in the event of a contingent auction, if any.
Another commenter urges the Commission to require applicants to
disclose on their short-form applications whether winning the licenses
they have selected would cause their spectrum holdings to exceed 70 MHz
of spectrum in the markets of the selected licenses. In the event that
any applicants indicate that their spectrum holdings would exceed this
amount, the commenter proposed that their short-form applications
should be dismissed before the commencement of Auction 73. The
commenter also requests that the Commission investigate alleged
violations of the Commission's ex parte rules by a wireless company
concerning policy on the open platform provisions for C Block licenses,
and proposes excluding that company from Auction 73 as a possible
sanction for violating the Commission's rules.
60. These issues are outside the scope of this non-rulemaking
proceeding, which is confined to establishing competitive bidding
procedures for Auction 73. The Bureau notes that some of these issues
have been presented to the Commission in petitions for reconsideration
of the 700 MHz Second Report and Order and will be addressed in that
proceeding.
II. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Requirements
61. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction 73 must file a
short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System prior
to 6 p.m. ET on December 3, 2007, following the procedures prescribed
in Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice.
Applicants filing a short-form application are subject to the
Commission's anti-collusion rules beginning on the deadline for filing.
For Auctions 73 and 76, applicants filing a short-form application for
Auction 73 will remain subject to the Commission's anti-collusion rules
through the
[[Page 62367]]
completion of Auction 76, if conducted. If an applicant claims
eligibility for a bidding credit, the information provided in its FCC
Form 175 will be used in determining whether the applicant is eligible
for the claimed bidding credit. Applicants bear full responsibility for
submitting accurate, complete and timely short-form applications. All
applicants must certify on their short-form applications under penalty
of perjury that they are legally, technically, financially and
otherwise qualified to hold a license. Applicants should read the
instructions set forth in Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice carefully and should consult 26 the
Commission's rules to ensure that all the information that is required
under the Commission's rules is included with their short-form
applications.
62. Entities seeking licenses that may be offered in Auction 76, if
Auction 76 is conducted, must file electronically via the FCC Auction
System prior to 6 p.m. ET on December 3, 2007 both a short-form
application for Auction 73, following the procedures prescribed in
Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice, and an
abbreviated short-form application for Auction 76, following the
procedures prescribed in Attachment E to the Auctions 73 and 76
Procedures Public Notice. Applicants filing short-form applications for
both Auctions 73 and 76 are subject to the Commission's anti-collusion
rules beginning on the deadline for filing both applications.
63. To streamline the application process, other than license
selection requirements, all relevant information for the application to
participate in Auction 76 must be submitted as part of the application
to participate in Auction 73. The Auction 76 abbreviated application
will request--and will accept--only information that the FCC Auction
System requires in order to enable applicants to submit license
selections for Auction 76. For example, applicants seeking to submit
information regarding bidding agreements with respect to licenses
offered in Auction 76 will not be able to access the bidding agreement
screens that are usually part of the short-form application in the
Auction 76 abbreviated application. Instead, such applicants must
submit information regarding those agreements as part of their Auction
73 short-form application.
64. To comply with FCC Auction System requirements, however,
applicants will be required to repeat some information submitted in
their Auction 73 application, e.g., their FCC Registration Number
(FRN), their name and address, certification of the form's contents,
etc. As noted in the procedures for filing the abbreviated short-form
application for Auction 76, applicants must provide the same
information submitted in their application for Auction 73 as they
provide in their Auction 76 application. Most importantly, if an entity
wishes to submit a short-form application for Auction 76, it must do so
using the same FRN that it uses for its short-form application for
Auction 73. In addition, the same person must certify both
applications, as the certification applies to information submitted in
both applications.
65. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application
for Auction 73. Similarly, an entity may not submit more than one
short-form application for Auction 76. If a party submits multiple
short-form applications for either Auction 73 or Auction 76, only one
application for each will be accepted for filing.
66. Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form
application (and any amendments thereto) constitutes a representation
by the certifying official that he or she is an authorized
representative of the applicant, that he or she has read the form's
instructions and certifications, and that the contents of the
application, its certifications, and any attachments are true and
correct. Applicants are not permitted to make major modifications to
their applications; such impermissible changes include a change of the
certifying official to the application. Submission of a false
certification to the Commission may result in penalties, including
monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures, ineligibility to participate
in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.
A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others
i. Size Standards for Bidding Credits
67. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's
winning bid will be discounted. For Auction 73 and Auction 76, bidding
credits will be available to small businesses and very small
businesses, and consortia thereof, as follows: (1) A bidder with
attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed $15 million and do
not exceed $40 million for the preceding three years (small business)
will receive a 15 percent discount on its winning bid; and (2) a bidder
with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not exceed $15
million for the preceding three years (very small business) will
receive a 25 percent discount on its winning bid.
68. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant
receives either the 15 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its
winning bid, but not both.
69. Every applicant that claims eligibility for a bidding credit as
either a small business or a very small business, or a consortium of
small businesses or very small businesses, will be required to provide
information regarding revenues attributable to the applicant, its
affiliates, its controlling interests, and the affiliates of its
controlling interests on its FCC Form 175 short-form application for
Auction 73 to establish that it satisfies the applicable eligibility
requirement. An applicant's disclosure of this information in the
short-form application for Auction 73 will become part of the
applicant's Auction 76 application, in the event the Commission
conducts Auction 76. Accordingly, applicants are not required--and will
not be able to--submit this information in their abbreviated Auction 76
application. Applicants claiming eligibility as a designated entity in
Auction 73 and Auction 76 should review carefully the CSEA/Part 1
Report and Order, 71 FR 6992, February 10, 2006, the Designated Entity
Second Report and Order, 71 FR 26245, May 5, 2006, and the Order on
Reconsideration of the Designated Entity Second Report and Order, 71 FR
34272, June 14, 2006. In that connection, the Commission adopted rules
governing eligibility for designated entity benefits in the Designated
Entity Second Report and Order. The Commission's rules regarding
applicants seeking eligibility for designated entity benefits require
the disclosure of: (1) All parties with which the applicant has entered
into arrangements for the lease or resale (including wholesale
agreements) of any of the capacity of any of the applicant's spectrum;
and (2) the gross revenues, separately and in the aggregate, of
entities with which the applicant has an attributable material
relationship, as defined in Sec. 1.2110(b)(3)(iv)(B).
70. The Commission has adopted a narrow exemption from the
attribution rule for the officers and directors of a rural telephone
cooperative pursuant to which the gross revenues of the affiliates of
the cooperative's officers and directors are not attributed to the
applicant. An applicant (or controlling interest) seeking to claim this
exemption must include in its short-form application a certification
that it is validly organized under the most
[[Page 62368]]
closely applicable organizing statute for a cooperative, and that such
organization is reflected in its articles of incorporation, bylaws,
and/or other relevant organic documents. Applicants seeking to claim
this exemption must meet all of the conditions specified in Sec.
1.2110(b)(3)(iii) of the Commission's rules. Additional guidance on
completing the FCC Form 175 to claim this exemption may be found in
Attachment D to the Auctions 73 and 76 Procedures Public Notice.
ii. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit
71. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally
recognized tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands
bidding credit. Applicants do not provide information regarding tribal
lands bidding credits on their FCC Form 175 short-form applications.
Instead, winning bidders may apply for the tribal lands bidding credit
after the auction when they file their FCC Form 601 long-form
applications.
iii. Installment Payments
72. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction 73
or in Auction 76.
B. License Selection
73. An applicant must select the initially offered licenses on
which it wants to bid individually or as part of a pre-defined package
in Auction 73 from the Eligible Licenses list on its short-form
application for Auction 73. An applicant interested in bidding on
licenses in the contingent subsequent auction must select those
licenses from the Eligible Licenses list on its short-form application
for Auction 76. Applicants will be able to bid on pre-defined packages
of initially offered C Block licenses and alternative C2 Block
licenses, if offered in subsequent bidding, pursuant to the package
bidding procedures, only if they have selected all the individual
licenses that comprise the relevant package on their respective short-
form applications.
74. To assist applicants in identifying licenses of interest that
will be available in Auctions 73 and 76, FCC Form 175 will include a
filtering mechanism that allows an applicant to filter the Eligible
Licenses list. The applicant will make selections for one or more of
the filter criteria and the system will produce a list of licenses
satisfying the specified criteria. The applicant may select all the
licenses in the customized list or select individual licenses from the
list. Applicants also will be able to select licenses from one
customized list and then create additional customized lists to select
additional licenses.
75. Applicants will not be able to change their license selections
for either Auction 73 or Auction 76 after the short-form application
filing deadline. Applicants interested in participating in Auctions 73
and 76 must have selected license(s) available in the respective
auction by the short-form application deadline. Applicants must confirm
their license selections before the deadline for submitting FCC Form
175. The FCC Auction System will not accept bids from an applicant on
individual licenses that the applicant has not selected on its FCC Form
175. In addition, the FCC Auction System will not accept bids from an
applicant on a pre-defined hierarchical package unless the applicant
selected on its FCC Form 175 all the individual licenses that comprise
the package.
C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements
76. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form
application for Auction 73 all parties with whom they have entered into
any agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to
the licenses being auctioned in Auctions 73 and 76, including any
agreements relating to post-auction market structure. The agreements
identified in the short-form application for Auction 73 will become
part of the applicant's Auction 76 application, in the event the 31
Commission conducts Auction 76. Accordingly, applicants are not
required--and will not be able to--disclose bidding agreements in their
abbreviated Auction 76 application.
77. Applicants also will be required to certify under penalty of
perjury in their short-form applications that they have not entered and
will not enter into any explicit or implicit agreements, arrangements
or understandings of any kind with any parties, other than those
identified in the application to participate in Auction 73, regarding
the amount of their bids, bidding strategies, or the particular
licenses on which they will or will not bid. If an applicant has had
discussions, but has not reached an agreement by the short-form
application filing deadline, it would not include the names of parties
to the discussions on its application and may not continue such
discussions with any applicants after the deadline.
78. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's
rules do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable
interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or
entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants,
provided that: (1) The attributable interest holder certifies that it
has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids or
bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it holds
an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a joint
bidding arrangement; and (2) the arrangements do not result in a change
in control of any of the applicants. While the anti-collusion rules do
not prohibit non-auction-related business negotiations among auction
applicants, applicants are reminded that certain discussions or
exchanges could touch upon impermissible subject matters because they
may convey pricing information and bidding strategies. Compliance with
the disclosure requirements of the Commission's anti-collusion rule
will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust laws.
D. Ownership Disclosure Req