In the Matter of Arizona Public Service Company; Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station; Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Effective Immediately), 61186-61188 [E7-21212]
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61186
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 208 / Monday, October 29, 2007 / Notices
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[FR Doc. E7–21165 Filed 10–26–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7537–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50–528; 50–529, 50–530; EA–
07–162]
In the Matter of Arizona Public Service
Company; Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station; Confirmatory
Order Modifying License (Effective
Immediately)
I
Arizona Public Service Company
(APS) (Licensee) is the holder of reactor
operating licenses, License Nos. NPF–
41, NPF–51, NPF–74, issued by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC
or Commission), pursuant to 10 CFR
Part 50, on June 6, 1985, April 24, 1986,
and November 25, 1987. The licenses
authorize the operation of Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) in
accordance with conditions specified
therein. The facility is located on the
Licensee’s site in Buckeye, Arizona.
This Confirmatory Order is the result of
an agreement reached during an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
mediation session conducted on August
27, 2007.
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II
On November 20, 2006, the NRC
Office of Investigations (OI) began an
investigation (OI Case No. 4–2007–009)
at PVNGS. As a result of the staff’s
review of the information, the NRC was
concerned that a senior reactor operator
(SRO), stationed as a reactor operator,
appeared to have engaged in deliberate
misconduct. Specifically, on November
8, 2006, the SRO had mistakenly
entered an incorrect blowdown constant
into the plant computer and
subsequently attempted to conceal the
mistake by falsifying the blowdown
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record. The NRC’s preliminary findings
were discussed in a letter to APS dated
July 12, 2007. That letter identified an
apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 that
was being considered for escalated
enforcement action, and identified the
NRC’s concern that the SRO actions may
have involved willfulness in the form of
deliberate misconduct. A predecisional
enforcement conference had been
scheduled to discuss the apparent
violation. However, prior to the
conference, APS requested ADR in an
attempt to resolve the issue. ADR is a
general term encompassing various
techniques for resolving conflict outside
of court using a neutral third party. The
technique that the NRC has decided to
employ is mediation.
On August 27, 2007, the NRC and
APS met in an ADR session mediated by
a professional mediator, arranged
through Cornell University’s Institute on
Conflict Resolution. At the conclusion
of the ADR session, APS and the NRC
did reach an Agreement in Principle.
This Confirmatory Order is issued
pursuant to the agreement reached
during the ADR process.
III
During that ADR session, a
preliminary settlement agreement was
reached. Pursuant to the NRC’s
Alternative Dispute Resolution program
(ADR), the following are the terms and
conditions agreed upon in principle by
APS and the NRC relating to the issues
described in the NRC’s letter to APS
dated July 12, 2007.
Whereas, APS and the NRC agree that
there were two issues: (1) A licensed
operator failed to self-report an error he
made in entering data into a plant
computer, and subsequently he
attempted to conceal his error, and (2)
a failure by APS to promptly notify
other licensees of a potential access
authorization issue with respect to this
individual, in violation of NRC
requirements;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed
operator, though unacceptable, were of
very low significance from a nuclear
safety perspective;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed
operator were identified by APS and
APS promptly informed the NRC;
Whereas the access authorization
issue is of very low safety significance;
Whereas, APS has completed
corrective actions to address the issues
described in the July 12, 2007, letter
issued by the NRC to APS, including
actions to correct the initial error made
by the plant licensed operator, to reduce
the likelihood of similar errors in the
future, to improve Independent
Verifications, to further improve the
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safety culture in the plant Operations
Department, and to improve APS’
processes for ensuring that pertinent
information regarding personnel access
authorization is appropriately
communicated to other nuclear power
plant licensees; and
Whereas, these terms and conditions
shall not be binding on either party
until memorialized in a confirmatory
order issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission to APS relating to this
matter.
APS planned to complete additional
corrective and improvement actions
with respect to these issues, and agrees
to take the following actions, which will
be included in a Confirmatory Order
from the NRC to APS:
1. APS will develop training on these
issues, using a case study. The training
will focus on the importance of selfreporting errors, the importance of
performing good independent
verifications, and deterring individuals
from concealing mistakes. APS will
provide this training to its Operations
Department within 6 months of the date
of the Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its
independent verification processes in
the Operations and Maintenance
Departments. The assessments will be
completed within 12 months of the date
of the Confirmatory Order, and
applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for
completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate
in a Quality Assurance (QA) audit plan
a follow-up assessment to ensure the
actions to improve the independent
verification processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of
this Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide training on both issues
identified above to its leaders and
managers. The intent of this training
will be to focus leaders and managers on
the importance of balancing
accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors and on the
importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that
potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
4. Within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will utilize the
case study identified in Item 3 in
evaluating its training for new leaders
with a goal towards ensuring that new
leaders are sensitized to balancing
accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors, on the
importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that
potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
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5. Within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will conduct a
follow-up safety culture review of its
Operations Department, in order to
determine the effectiveness of its actions
to improve the safety culture in the
Operations Department, and applicable
actions resulting from the review will be
tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will provide
the NRC with written communication
regarding the weaknesses found in its
process for identifying potential access
authorization issues to other licensees
through the Personnel Access Data
System (PADS). APS will describe its
corrective actions in this letter, and will
send the letter to the Document Control
Desk with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, NRC RIV and to the
Resident Inspector at the Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will develop a
generic communication for the industry
in the form of an Operating Experience
report regarding weaknesses it found in
its process for informing other licensees
of potential access authorization issues
concerning individuals who resign from
the plant before any disciplinary action
is taken against them.
The NRC agrees not to pursue any
further enforcement action in
connection with the issues described in
the NRC’s July 12, 2007, letter to APS,
including the access authorization issue
described in that letter, and will not
count these matters as previous
enforcement for the purposes of
assessing potential future enforcement
action civil penalty assessments in
accordance with section VI.C of the
Enforcement Policy.
The NRC agrees to provide APS with
48 hours notice prior to issuance of the
Confirmatory Order described in this
agreement.
On October 17, 2007, APS consented
to issuing this Order with the
commitments, as described in section V
below. APS further agreed that this
Order is to be affective upon issuance
and that it has waived its right to a
hearing.
IV
Since APS has agreed to take
additional actions to address NRC
concerns, as set forth in section III
above, the NRC has concluded that its
concerns can be resolved through
issuance of this Order.
I find that the Licensee’s
commitments as set forth in section V
are acceptable and necessary and
conclude that with these commitments
the public health and safety are
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reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public
health and safety require that the
Licensee’s commitments be confirmed
by this Order. Based on the above and
the Licensee’s consent, this Order is
immediately effective upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections
104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, the Commission’s regulations
in 10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR Part 50,
It is hereby ordered, effective
immediately, that license Nos. NPF–41,
NPF–51, NPF–74 are modified as
follows:
1. APS will develop training on the
issues described in the apparent
violation identified in the NRC’s letter
to APS dated July 12, 2007, using a case
study. The training will focus on the
importance of self-reporting errors, the
importance of performing good
independent verifications, and deterring
individuals from concealing mistakes.
APS will provide this training to its
Operations Department (permanent
employees and contractors scheduled to
work in the Operations Department for
1-year or more) within 6 months of the
date of the Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its
independent verification processes in
the Operations and Maintenance
Departments. The assessments will be
completed within 12 months of the date
of the Confirmatory Order, and
applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for
completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate
in a QA audit plan a follow-up
assessment to ensure the actions to
improve the independent verification
processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of
this Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide training to its leaders and
managers on the two issues in this case:
(1) A licensed operator failed to selfreport an error he made in entering data
into a plant computer, and subsequently
he attempted to conceal his error, and
(2) a failure by APS to promptly notify
other licensees of a potential access
authorization issue with respect to this
individual, in violation of NRC
requirements. The intent of this training
will be to focus leaders and managers on
the importance of balancing
accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors and on the
importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that
potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
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61187
4. Within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will utilize the
case study identified in Item 3 in
evaluating its training for new leaders
with a goal towards ensuring that new
leaders are sensitized to balancing
accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors, on the
importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that
potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
5. Within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will conduct a
follow-up safety culture review of its
Operations Department, in order to
determine the effectiveness of its actions
to improve the safety culture in the
Operations Department, and applicable
actions resulting from the review will be
tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will provide
the NRC with written communication
regarding the weaknesses found in its
process for identifying potential access
authorization issues to other licensees
through the Personnel Access Data
System (PADS). APS will describe its
corrective actions in this letter, and will
send the letter to the Document Control
Desk with a copy to the Regional
Administrator, NRC RIV, and to the
Resident Inspector at PVNGS.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, APS will develop a
generic communication for the industry
in the form of an Operating Experience
report regarding weaknesses it found in
its process for informing other licensees
of potential access authorization issues
concerning individuals who resign from
the plant before any disciplinary action
is taken against them.
The Regional Administrator, NRC
Region IV may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions
upon demonstration by the Licensee of
good cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this
Confirmatory Order, other than APS,
may request a hearing within 20 days of
its issuance. Where good cause is
shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing.
A request for extension of time must be
made in writing to the Director, Office
of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555,
and include a statement of good cause
for the extension. Any request for a
hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Attn: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC
20555–0001. Copies also shall be sent to
the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
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61188
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 208 / Monday, October 29, 2007 / Notices
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, to the
Assistant General Counsel for Materials
Litigation and Enforcement at the same
address, to the Regional Administrator,
NRC Region IV, 611 Ryan Plaza Drive,
Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and
to APS. Because of the possible
disruptions in delivery of mail to United
States Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for
hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101
or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov
and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If such
a person requests a hearing, that person
shall set forth with particularity the
manner in which his interest is
adversely affected by this Order and
shall address the criteria set forth in 10
CFR 2.309 (d) and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person
whose interest is adversely affected, the
Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any
hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be
whether this Confirmatory Order should
be sustained.
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
section V above shall be final 20 days
from the date of this Order without
further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in section V shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall
not stay the immediate effectiveness of
this order.
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or Commission). License No.
SOP–43795 (Docket No. 55–31662) was
granted to Mr. Sharp on December 6,
1996, and it expired, at the request of
Arizona Public Service Company, on
December 11, 2006. This senior operator
license allowed Mr. Sharp to direct the
licensed activities of licensed operators
at, and to manipulate the controls of the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,
Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3. Under the
provisions of 10 CFR Part 55, and while
his license was in effect, Mr. Sharp was
required to observe all applicable rules,
regulations, and orders of the
Commission.
II
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
On November 9, 2006, the managers
at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station informed the NRC that Mr. Mark
Sharp, a qualified senior operator, may
have falsified a record related to a steam
generator blowdown. Specifically, on
November 8, 2006, Mr. Sharp
mistakenly entered an incorrect
blowdown constant into the plant
computer and subsequently attempted
to cover up the mistake by falsifying the
blowdown record. As a result, the NRC
Office of Investigations (OI), Region IV,
conducted an investigation into the
circumstances surrounding this matter.
Based on the results of the OI
investigation, the NRC identified an
apparent violation to Mr. Sharp by letter
dated July 12, 2007. The letter informed
Mr. Sharp that the NRC was considering
the apparent violation for escalated
enforcement action in accordance with
the NRC Enforcement Policy.
Specifically, the apparent violation
involved Mr. Sharp’s failure to observe
license condition 10 CFR Part 55.53(d)
in that he engaged in deliberate
misconduct prohibited by 10 CFR 50.5
when he caused a required plant record
to be inaccurate, thereby causing
Arizona Public Service Company to be
in violation of 10 CFR 50.9.
In the NRC’s July 12, 2007, letter to
Mr. Sharp, the NRC offered Mr. Sharp
a choice to (1) attend a Pre-decisional
Enforcement Conference, or (2) request
Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)
with the NRC in an attempt to resolve
any disagreement.
[IA–07–039]
III
In the Matter of Mr. Mark Sharp;
Confirmatory Order (Effective
Immediately)
In response to the July 12 letter, Mr.
Sharp requested ADR to resolve the
matter with the NRC. ADR is a process
in which a neutral mediator, with no
decision-making authority, assists the
parties in reaching an agreement to
resolve any differences regarding the
dispute.
Dated this 19th day of October 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Elmo E. Collins,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7–21212 Filed 10–26–07; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
I
Mr. Mark Sharp was previously the
holder of a senior operator’s license
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 55 granted by
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An ADR session was conducted
between Mr. Mark Sharp and the NRC
in Arlington, Texas, on August 21, 2007.
During that ADR session, a settlement
agreement was reached. The elements of
the Agreement in Principle consisted of
the following.
Whereas, Mr. Mark Sharp and the
NRC agree that Mr. Sharp deliberately
violated NRC requirements on
November 8, 2006, by falsifying a steam
generator blowdown log to cover up a
mistake while licensed as a senior
reactor operator at Palo Verde Nuclear
Generating Station;
Whereas, the NRC has determined
that this was an anomalous, isolated
incident and is not reflective of his
performance in the industry, neither
NRC nor Mr. Sharp believe these factors
justify or minimize the significance of
deliberately falsifying a required record
to cover up his mistake. NRC
acknowledges Mr. Sharp’s 25 years of
performance in the nuclear industry
without a similar incident; and
Whereas, these terms and conditions
shall not be binding on either party
until memorialized in a Confirmatory
Order issued by the NRC to Mr. Sharp
relating to this matter.
Therefore, the parties agree to the
following terms and conditions:
1. Mr. Sharp will not participate in
activities requiring a 10 CFR Part 55
license until items 2–4 of this agreement
are completed. Mr. Sharp is not
prohibited from engaging in activities
related to training of operators or any
other 10 CFR Part 50 regulated
activities.
2. Mr. Sharp will submit a letter to the
NRC Region IV Regional Administrator,
to be docketed, articulating why the
NRC should have confidence that he can
be trusted to engage in activities under
NRC jurisdiction in the future with the
integrity such activities demand. This
letter will be submitted within 30 days
of the date of the Confirmatory Order.
3. Mr. Sharp agrees to submit an
article to the ‘‘Communicator’’ (a
publication of the Professional Reactor
Operator Society) articulating lessons
learned from this incident and
emphasizing the importance of selfreporting and not covering up errors.
This article will be submitted within 60
days of the date of the Confirmatory
Order with a copy submitted to the NRC
at least 7 days earlier.
4. Mr. Sharp agrees to prepare and
submit an operating experience report to
the Institute for Nuclear Power
Operations regarding his actions on
November 8, 2006, and the lessons
learned from that experience. This
report will be submitted within 60 days
of the date of the Confirmatory Order
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 208 (Monday, October 29, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61186-61188]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-21212]
=======================================================================
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket Nos. 50-528; 50-529, 50-530; EA-07-162]
In the Matter of Arizona Public Service Company; Palo Verde
Nuclear Generating Station; Confirmatory Order Modifying License
(Effective Immediately)
I
Arizona Public Service Company (APS) (Licensee) is the holder of
reactor operating licenses, License Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74, issued
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission), pursuant to
10 CFR Part 50, on June 6, 1985, April 24, 1986, and November 25, 1987.
The licenses authorize the operation of Palo Verde Nuclear Generating
Station (PVNGS) in accordance with conditions specified therein. The
facility is located on the Licensee's site in Buckeye, Arizona. This
Confirmatory Order is the result of an agreement reached during an
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mediation session conducted on
August 27, 2007.
II
On November 20, 2006, the NRC Office of Investigations (OI) began
an investigation (OI Case No. 4-2007-009) at PVNGS. As a result of the
staff's review of the information, the NRC was concerned that a senior
reactor operator (SRO), stationed as a reactor operator, appeared to
have engaged in deliberate misconduct. Specifically, on November 8,
2006, the SRO had mistakenly entered an incorrect blowdown constant
into the plant computer and subsequently attempted to conceal the
mistake by falsifying the blowdown record. The NRC's preliminary
findings were discussed in a letter to APS dated July 12, 2007. That
letter identified an apparent violation of 10 CFR 50.9 that was being
considered for escalated enforcement action, and identified the NRC's
concern that the SRO actions may have involved willfulness in the form
of deliberate misconduct. A predecisional enforcement conference had
been scheduled to discuss the apparent violation. However, prior to the
conference, APS requested ADR in an attempt to resolve the issue. ADR
is a general term encompassing various techniques for resolving
conflict outside of court using a neutral third party. The technique
that the NRC has decided to employ is mediation.
On August 27, 2007, the NRC and APS met in an ADR session mediated
by a professional mediator, arranged through Cornell University's
Institute on Conflict Resolution. At the conclusion of the ADR session,
APS and the NRC did reach an Agreement in Principle. This Confirmatory
Order is issued pursuant to the agreement reached during the ADR
process.
III
During that ADR session, a preliminary settlement agreement was
reached. Pursuant to the NRC's Alternative Dispute Resolution program
(ADR), the following are the terms and conditions agreed upon in
principle by APS and the NRC relating to the issues described in the
NRC's letter to APS dated July 12, 2007.
Whereas, APS and the NRC agree that there were two issues: (1) A
licensed operator failed to self-report an error he made in entering
data into a plant computer, and subsequently he attempted to conceal
his error, and (2) a failure by APS to promptly notify other licensees
of a potential access authorization issue with respect to this
individual, in violation of NRC requirements;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed operator, though
unacceptable, were of very low significance from a nuclear safety
perspective;
Whereas, the actions of this licensed operator were identified by
APS and APS promptly informed the NRC;
Whereas the access authorization issue is of very low safety
significance;
Whereas, APS has completed corrective actions to address the issues
described in the July 12, 2007, letter issued by the NRC to APS,
including actions to correct the initial error made by the plant
licensed operator, to reduce the likelihood of similar errors in the
future, to improve Independent Verifications, to further improve the
safety culture in the plant Operations Department, and to improve APS'
processes for ensuring that pertinent information regarding personnel
access authorization is appropriately communicated to other nuclear
power plant licensees; and
Whereas, these terms and conditions shall not be binding on either
party until memorialized in a confirmatory order issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to APS relating to this matter.
APS planned to complete additional corrective and improvement
actions with respect to these issues, and agrees to take the following
actions, which will be included in a Confirmatory Order from the NRC to
APS:
1. APS will develop training on these issues, using a case study.
The training will focus on the importance of self-reporting errors, the
importance of performing good independent verifications, and deterring
individuals from concealing mistakes. APS will provide this training to
its Operations Department within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its independent verification
processes in the Operations and Maintenance Departments. The
assessments will be completed within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, and applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate in a Quality Assurance (QA)
audit plan a follow-up assessment to ensure the actions to improve the
independent verification processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, APS
will provide training on both issues identified above to its leaders
and managers. The intent of this training will be to focus leaders and
managers on the importance of balancing accountability with encouraging
workers to self-report errors and on the importance of communicating
this with their workers, and on ensuring that potential access
authorization issues are promptly addressed.
4. Within 12 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
utilize the case study identified in Item 3 in evaluating its training
for new leaders with a goal towards ensuring that new leaders are
sensitized to balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors, on the importance of communicating this with their
workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
[[Page 61187]]
5. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
conduct a follow-up safety culture review of its Operations Department,
in order to determine the effectiveness of its actions to improve the
safety culture in the Operations Department, and applicable actions
resulting from the review will be tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide the NRC with written communication regarding the weaknesses
found in its process for identifying potential access authorization
issues to other licensees through the Personnel Access Data System
(PADS). APS will describe its corrective actions in this letter, and
will send the letter to the Document Control Desk with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, NRC RIV and to the Resident Inspector at the
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
develop a generic communication for the industry in the form of an
Operating Experience report regarding weaknesses it found in its
process for informing other licensees of potential access authorization
issues concerning individuals who resign from the plant before any
disciplinary action is taken against them.
The NRC agrees not to pursue any further enforcement action in
connection with the issues described in the NRC's July 12, 2007, letter
to APS, including the access authorization issue described in that
letter, and will not count these matters as previous enforcement for
the purposes of assessing potential future enforcement action civil
penalty assessments in accordance with section VI.C of the Enforcement
Policy.
The NRC agrees to provide APS with 48 hours notice prior to
issuance of the Confirmatory Order described in this agreement.
On October 17, 2007, APS consented to issuing this Order with the
commitments, as described in section V below. APS further agreed that
this Order is to be affective upon issuance and that it has waived its
right to a hearing.
IV
Since APS has agreed to take additional actions to address NRC
concerns, as set forth in section III above, the NRC has concluded that
its concerns can be resolved through issuance of this Order.
I find that the Licensee's commitments as set forth in section V
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective
upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 104, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, and 10 CFR Part 50, It is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that license Nos. NPF-41, NPF-51, NPF-74 are
modified as follows:
1. APS will develop training on the issues described in the
apparent violation identified in the NRC's letter to APS dated July 12,
2007, using a case study. The training will focus on the importance of
self-reporting errors, the importance of performing good independent
verifications, and deterring individuals from concealing mistakes. APS
will provide this training to its Operations Department (permanent
employees and contractors scheduled to work in the Operations
Department for 1-year or more) within 6 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order.
2. APS will perform assessments of its independent verification
processes in the Operations and Maintenance Departments. The
assessments will be completed within 12 months of the date of the
Confirmatory Order, and applicable actions resulting from the
assessment will be tracked for completion. In addition, within this
same time period, APS will incorporate in a QA audit plan a follow-up
assessment to ensure the actions to improve the independent
verification processes were effective.
3. Within 12 months of the date of this Confirmatory Order, APS
will provide training to its leaders and managers on the two issues in
this case: (1) A licensed operator failed to self-report an error he
made in entering data into a plant computer, and subsequently he
attempted to conceal his error, and (2) a failure by APS to promptly
notify other licensees of a potential access authorization issue with
respect to this individual, in violation of NRC requirements. The
intent of this training will be to focus leaders and managers on the
importance of balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors and on the importance of communicating this with
their workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization
issues are promptly addressed.
4. Within 12 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
utilize the case study identified in Item 3 in evaluating its training
for new leaders with a goal towards ensuring that new leaders are
sensitized to balancing accountability with encouraging workers to
self-report errors, on the importance of communicating this with their
workers, and on ensuring that potential access authorization issues are
promptly addressed.
5. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
conduct a follow-up safety culture review of its Operations Department,
in order to determine the effectiveness of its actions to improve the
safety culture in the Operations Department, and applicable actions
resulting from the review will be tracked for completion.
6. Within 30 days of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
provide the NRC with written communication regarding the weaknesses
found in its process for identifying potential access authorization
issues to other licensees through the Personnel Access Data System
(PADS). APS will describe its corrective actions in this letter, and
will send the letter to the Document Control Desk with a copy to the
Regional Administrator, NRC RIV, and to the Resident Inspector at
PVNGS.
7. Within 6 months of the date of the Confirmatory Order, APS will
develop a generic communication for the industry in the form of an
Operating Experience report regarding weaknesses it found in its
process for informing other licensees of potential access authorization
issues concerning individuals who resign from the plant before any
disciplinary action is taken against them.
The Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV may, in writing, relax or
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee
of good cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than APS, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where
good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time
to request a hearing. A request for extension of time must be made in
writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause
for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Attn: Rulemakings and
Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies also shall be
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S.
[[Page 61188]]
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, to the
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at
the same address, to the Regional Administrator, NRC Region IV, 611
Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 400, Arlington, Texas 76011, and to APS.
Because of the possible disruptions in delivery of mail to United
States Government offices, it is requested that answers and requests
for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by
means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to
hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General Counsel
either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail
to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If such a person requests a hearing, that
person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the
criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309 (d) and (f).
If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be
sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in section V above shall be final 20 days from the date of
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions
specified in section V shall be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 19th day of October 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Elmo E. Collins,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7-21212 Filed 10-26-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
