Review by the Treasury Department of the Regulatory Structure Associated With Financial Institutions, 58939-58941 [E7-20433]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 200 / Wednesday, October 17, 2007 / Notices
Board decisions and notices are
available on our Web site at https://
www.stb.dot.gov.
Decided: October 10, 2007.
By the Board, David M. Konschnik,
Director, Office of Proceedings.
Vernon A. Williams,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7–20280 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4915–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
Departmental Offices; Debt
Management Advisory Committee
Meeting
Notice is hereby given, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. App. 2, § 10(a)(2), that a meeting
will be held at the Hay-Adams Hotel,
16th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue,
NW., Washington, DC, on October 30,
2007 at 11:30 a.m. of the following debt
management advisory committee:
Treasury Borrowing Advisory
Committee of The Securities Industry
and Financial Markets Association.
The agenda for the meeting provides
for a charge by the Secretary of the
Treasury or his designate that the
Committee discuss particular issues,
and a working session. Following the
working session, the committee will
present a written report of its
recommendations. The meeting will be
closed to the public, pursuant to 5
U.S.C. App. 2, § 10(d) and Public Law
103–202, § 202(c)(1)(B) (31 U.S.C. 3121
note).
This notice shall constitute my
determination, pursuant to the authority
placed in heads of agencies by 5 U.S.C.
App. 2, § 10(d) and vested in me by
Treasury Department Order No. 101–05,
that the meeting will consist of
discussions and debates of the issues
presented to the Committee by the
Secretary of the Treasury and the
making of recommendations of the
Committee to the Secretary, pursuant to
Public Law 103–202, § 202(c)(1)(B).
Thus, this information is exempt from
disclosure under that provision and 5
U.S.C. 552(b)(c)(3)(B). In addition, the
meeting is concerned with information
that is exempt from disclosure under 5
U.S.C. 552b(c)(9)(A). The public interest
requires that such meetings be closed to
the public because the Treasury
Department requires frank and full
advice from representatives of the
financial community prior to making its
final decisions on major financing
operations. Historically, this advice has
been offered by debt management
advisory committees established by the
several major segments of the financial
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19:05 Oct 16, 2007
Jkt 214001
community. When so utilized, such a
committee is recognized to be an
advisory committee under 5 U.S.C. App.
2, § 3.
Although the Treasury’s final
announcement of financing plans may
not reflect the recommendations
provided in reports of the Committee,
premature disclosure of the Committee’s
deliberations and reports would be
likely to lead to significant financial
speculation in the securities market.
Thus, this meeting falls within the
exemption covered by 5 U.S.C.
552b(c)(9)(A).
Treasury staff will provide a technical
briefing to the press on the day before
the Committee meeting, following the
release of a statement of economic
conditions, financing estimates and
technical charts. This briefing will give
the press an opportunity to ask
questions about financing projections
and technical charts. The day after the
Committee meeting, Treasury will
release the minutes of the meeting, any
charts that were discussed at the
meeting, and the Committee’s report to
the Secretary.
The Office of Debt Management is
responsible for maintaining records of
debt management advisory committee
meetings and for providing annual
reports setting forth a summary of
Committee activities and such other
matters as may be informative to the
public consistent with the policy of 5
U.S.C. 552(b). The Designated Federal
Officer or other responsible agency
official who may be contacted for
additional information is Karthik
Ramanathan, Director, Office of Debt
Management, at (202) 622–2042.
Dated: October 10, 2007.
Anthony W. Ryan,
Assistant Secretary, Financial Markets.
[FR Doc. 07–5106 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4810–25–M
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Review by the Treasury Department of
the Regulatory Structure Associated
With Financial Institutions
Department of the Treasury,
Departmental Offices.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Treasury Department is
undertaking a broad review of the
regulatory structure associated with
financial institutions. To assist in this
review and obtain a broad view of all
perspectives, the Treasury Department
is issuing this notice seeking public
comment.
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58939
Comments should be submitted
electronically and received by
Wednesday, November 21, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Please submit comments
electronically through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal—‘‘Regulations.gov.’’
Go to https://www.regulations.gov, select
‘‘Department of the Treasury—All’’ from
the agency drop-down menu, then click
‘‘Submit.’’ In the ‘‘Docket ID’’ column,
select ‘‘TREAS–DO–2007–0018’’ to
submit or view public comments and to
view supporting and related materials
for this notice. The ‘‘User Tips’’ link at
the top of the Regulations.gov home
page provides information on using
Regulations.gov, including instructions
for submitting or viewing public
comments, viewing other supporting
and related materials, and viewing the
docket after the close of the comment
period.
Please include your name, affiliation,
address, e-mail address and telephone
number(s) in your comment. Where
appropriate, comments should include a
short Executive Summary (no more than
five single-spaced pages). All
statements, including attachments and
other supporting materials, received are
part of the public record and subject to
public disclosure. You should submit
only information that you wish to make
available publicly.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Jeffrey Stoltzfoos, Senior Advisor, Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Financial
Institutions, (202) 622–2610 or Mario
Ugoletti, Director, Office of Financial
Institutions Policy, (202) 622–2730 (not
toll free numbers).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Treasury Department is currently
engaged in a number of initiatives
associated with maintaining the
competitiveness of United States capital
markets. One of those initiatives is
evaluating the regulatory structure
associated with financial institutions.
The regulatory structure for financial
institutions in the United States has
served us well over the course of our
history. Much of the basic regulatory
structure associated with financial
institutions was established decades
ago. While there have been important
changes over time in the way financial
institutions have been regulated, the
Treasury Department believes that it is
important to continue to evaluate our
regulatory structure and consider ways
to improve efficiency, reduce overlap,
strengthen consumer and investor
protection, and ensure that financial
institutions have the ability to adapt to
evolving market dynamics, including
the increasingly global nature of
financial markets.
DATES:
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
17OCN1
58940
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 200 / Wednesday, October 17, 2007 / Notices
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
The Treasury Department’s review of
regulatory structure will focus on all
types of financial institutions:
Commercial banks and other insured
depository institutions; insurance
companies; securities firms; futures
firms; and other types of financial
intermediaries.
The Treasury Department is soliciting
comments to assist in this review. The
Treasury Department would be
particularly interested in comments on
the specific questions set forth below, or
on other issues related to the regulatory
structure associated with financial
institutions. We are also interested in
specific ideas or recommendations as to
how we can improve our current
regulatory structure.
I. General Issues
1.1 What are the key problems or
issues that need to be addressed by our
review of the current regulatory
structure for financial institutions?
1.2 Over time, there has been an
increasing convergence of products
across the traditional ‘‘functional’’
regulatory lines of banking, insurance,
securities, and futures. What do you
view as the significant market
developments over the past two decades
(e.g. securitization, institutionalization,
financial product innovation and
globalization) and please describe what
opportunities and/or pressures, if any,
these developments have created in the
regulation of financial institutions?
1.2.1 Does the ‘‘functional’’
regulatory framework under which
banking, securities, insurance, and
futures are primarily regulated by
respective functional regulators lead to
inefficiencies in the provision of
financial services?
1.2.2 Does the ‘‘functional’’
regulatory framework pose difficulties
for considering overall risk to the
financial system? If so, to what extent
have these difficulties been resolved
through regulatory oversight at the
holding company level?
1.2.3 Many countries have moved
towards creating a single financial
market regulator (e.g., United Kingdom’s
Financial Services Authority; Japan’s
Financial Services Agency; and
Germany’s Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin)). Some
countries (e.g., Australia and the
Netherlands) have adopted a twin peaks
model of regulation, separating
prudential safety and soundness
regulation and conduct-of-business
regulation. What are the strengths and
weaknesses of these structural
approaches and their applicability in
the United States? What ideas can be
gleaned from these structures that
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19:05 Oct 16, 2007
Jkt 214001
would improve U.S. capital market
competitiveness?
1.3 What should be the key
objectives of financial institution
regulation? How could the framework
for the regulation of financial
institutions be more closely aligned
with the objectives of regulation? Can
our current regulatory framework be
improved, especially in terms of
imparting greater market discipline and
providing a more cohesive look at
overall financial system risk? If so, how
can it be improved to achieve these
goals? In regards to this set of questions,
more specifically:
1.3.1 How should the regulation of
financial institutions with explicit
government guarantees differ from
financial institutions without explicit
guarantees? Is the current system
adequate in this regard?
1.3.2 Is there a need for some type
of market stability regulation for
financial institutions without explicit
Federal Government guarantees? If so,
what would such regulation entail?
1.3.3 Does the current system of
regulating certain financial institutions
at the holding company level allow for
sufficient amounts of market discipline?
Are there ways to improve holding
company regulation to allow for
enhanced market discipline?
1.3.4 In recent years, debate has
emerged about ‘‘more efficient’’
regulation and the possibility of
adopting a ‘‘principles-based’’ approach
to regulation, rather than a ‘‘rulesbased’’ approach. Others suggest that a
proper balance between the two is
essential. What are the strengths,
weaknesses and feasibility of such
approaches, and could a more
‘‘principles-based’’ approach improve
U.S. competitiveness?
1.3.5 Would the U.S. financial
regulatory structure benefit if there was
a uniform set of basic principles of
regulation that were agreed upon and
adopted by each financial services
regulator?
1.4 Does the current regulatory
structure adequately address consumer
or investor protection issues? If not,
how could we improve our current
regulatory structure to address these
issues?
1.5 What role should the States have
in the regulation of financial
institutions? Is there a difference in the
appropriate role of the States depending
on financial system protection or
consumer and investor protection
aspects of regulation?
1.6 Europe is putting in place a more
integrated single financial market under
its Financial Services Action Plan.
Many Asian countries as well are
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
developing their financial markets.
Often, these countries or regions are
doing so on the basis of widely adopted
international regulatory standards.
Global businesses often cite concerns
about the costs associated with meeting
diverse regulatory standards in the
numerous countries in which they
operate. To address these issues, some
call for greater global regulatory
convergence and others call for mutual
recognition. To what extent should the
design of regulatory initiatives in the
United States be informed by the
competitiveness of U.S. institutions and
markets in the global marketplace?
Would the U.S. economy and capital
market competitiveness be better served
by pursuing greater global regulatory
convergence?
II. Specific Issues
2.1 Depository Institutions
2.1.1 Are multiple charters for
insured depository institutions the
optimal way to achieve regulatory
objectives? What are the strengths and
weaknesses of having charters tied to
specific activities or organizational
structures? Are these distinctions as
valid and important today as when
these charters were granted?
2.1.2 What are the strengths and
weaknesses of the dual banking system?
2.1.3 What is the optimal role for a
deposit insurer in depository institution
regulation and supervision? For
example, should the insurer be the
primary regulator for all insured
depository institutions, should it have
back-up regulatory authority, or should
its functions be limited to the pricing of
deposit insurance, or other functions?
2.1.4 What role should the central
bank have in bank regulation and
supervision? Is central bank regulatory
authority necessary for the development
of monetary policy?
2.1.5 Is the current framework for
regulating bank or financial holding
companies with depository institution
subsidiaries appropriate? Are there
other regulatory frameworks that could
or should be considered to limit the
transfer of the safety net associated with
insured depository institutions?
2.1.6 What are the key consumer
protection elements associated with
products offered by depository
institutions? What is the best regulatory
enforcement mechanism for these
elements?
2.2 Insurance
2.2.1 What are the costs and benefits
of State-based regulation of the
insurance industry?
2.2.2 What are the key Federal
interests for establishing a presence or
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 200 / Wednesday, October 17, 2007 / Notices
greater involvement in insurance
regulation? What regulatory structure
would best achieve these goals/
interests?
2.2.3 Should the States continue to
have a role (or the sole role) in
insurance regulation? Insurance
regulation is already somewhat
bifurcated between retail and wholesale
companies (e.g., surplus lines carriers).
Does the current structure work? How
could that structure be improved?
2.2.4 States have taken an active role
in some aspects of the insurance
marketplace (e.g., workers’
compensation and residual markets for
hard to place risks) for various policy
reasons. Are these policy reasons still
valid? Are these necessarily met through
State (as opposed to federal) regulation?
2.3
Securities and Futures
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
2.3.1 Is there a continued rationale
for distinguishing between securities
and futures products and their
respective intermediaries?
2.3.2 Is there a continued rationale
for having separate regulators for these
types of financial products and
institutions?
2.3.3 What type of regulation would
be optimal for firms that provide
financial services related to securities
and futures products? Should this
regulation be driven by the need to
protect customers or by the broader
issues of market integrity and financial
system stability?
2.3.4 What is the optimal role for the
states in securities and futures
regulation?
2.3.5 What are the key consumer/
investor protection elements associated
with products offered by securities and
futures firms? Should there be a
regulatory distinction among retail,
institutional, wholesale, commercial,
and hedging customers?
2.3.6 Would it be useful to apply
some of the principles of the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act
of 2000 to the securities regulatory
regime? Is a tiered system of regulation
appropriate? Is it appropriate to make
distinctions based on the relative
sophistication of the market participants
and/or the integrity of the market?
Dated: October 11, 2007.
Taiya Smith,
Executive Secretary of the Treasury.
[FR Doc. E7–20433 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4811–42–P
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DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Internal Revenue Service
Open Meeting of the Taxpayer
Assistance Center Committee of the
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
Treasury.
ACTION: Notice of meeting.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: An open meeting of the
Taxpayer Assistance Center Committee
of the Taxpayer Advocacy Panel will be
conducted (via teleconference). The
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel (TAP) is
soliciting public comments, ideas, and
suggestions on improving customer
service at the Internal Revenue Service.
DATES: The meeting will be held
Tuesday, November 20, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Dave Coffman at 1–888–912–1227 or
206–220–6096.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is
hereby given pursuant to Section
10(a)(2) of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, 5 U.S.C. App. (1988)
that an open meeting of the Taxpayer
Assistance Center Committee of the
Taxpayer Advocacy Panel will be held
Tuesday, November 20, 2007, from 10 to
11:30 a.m. Pacific Time via a telephone
conference call. If you would like to
have the TAP consider a written
statement, please call 1–888–912–1227
or 206–220–6096, or write to Dave
Coffman, TAP Office, 915 2nd Avenue,
MS W–406, Seattle, WA 98174, or you
can contact us at www.improveirs.org.
Due to limited conference lines,
notification of intent to participate in
the telephone conference call meeting
must be made with Dave Coffman. Mr.
Coffman can be reached at 1–888–912–
1227 or 206–220–6096.
The agenda will include the
following: Various IRS issues.
Dated: October 9, 2007.
Sandra L. McQuin,
Acting Director, Taxpayer Advocacy Panel.
[FR Doc. E7–20486 Filed 10–16–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4830–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Bureau of the Public Debt
Proposed Collection: Comment
Request
Notice and request for
comments.
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The Department of the
Treasury, as part of its continuing effort
to reduce paperwork and respondent
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58941
burden, invites the general public and
other Federal agencies to take this
opportunity to comment on proposed
and/or continuing information
collections, as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104–13 (44 U.S.C.
3506(c)(2)(A). Currently the Bureau of
the Public Debt within the Department
of the Treasury is soliciting comments
concerning the U.S. Treasury Auction
Submitter Agreement.
DATES: Written comments should be
received on or before December 18,
2007, to be assured of consideration.
ADDRESSES: Direct all written comments
to Bureau of the Public Debt, Judi
Owens, 200 Third Street, A4-A,
Parkersburg, WV 26106–5312, or
Judi.Owens@bpd.treas.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Requests for additional information or
copies of the form and instructions
should be directed to Judi Owens,
Bureau of the Public Debt, 200 Third
Street, A4–A, Parkersburg, WV 26106–
5312, (304) 480–8150.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Title: U.S.
Treasury Auctions Submitter
Agreement.
OMB Number: 1535–0137.
Form Number: PD F 5441.
Abstract: The information is
requested from entities wishing to
participate in U.S. Treasury Securities
Auctions via TAAPSLink.
Current Actions: None.
Type of Review: Extension.
Affected Public: Depository
Institutions, Brokers/Dealers,
Assessment Management Companies,
Pension Funds, and other Institutional
Investors.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
1000.
Estimated Time Per Respondent: 5
minutes.
Estimated Total Annual Burden
Hours: 80.
Request for Comments: Comments
submitted in response to this notice will
be summarized and/or included in the
request for OMB approval. All
comments will become a matter of
public record. Comments are invited on:
(a) Whether the collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
agency, including whether the
information shall have practical utility;
(b) the accuracy of the agency’s estimate
of the burden of the collection of
information; (c) ways to enhance the
quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
information on respondents, including
through the use of automated collection
E:\FR\FM\17OCN1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 200 (Wednesday, October 17, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58939-58941]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-20433]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
Review by the Treasury Department of the Regulatory Structure
Associated With Financial Institutions
AGENCY: Department of the Treasury, Departmental Offices.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Treasury Department is undertaking a broad review of the
regulatory structure associated with financial institutions. To assist
in this review and obtain a broad view of all perspectives, the
Treasury Department is issuing this notice seeking public comment.
DATES: Comments should be submitted electronically and received by
Wednesday, November 21, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Please submit comments electronically through the Federal
eRulemaking Portal--``Regulations.gov.'' Go to https://
www.regulations.gov, select ``Department of the Treasury--All'' from
the agency drop-down menu, then click ``Submit.'' In the ``Docket ID''
column, select ``TREAS-DO-2007-0018'' to submit or view public comments
and to view supporting and related materials for this notice. The
``User Tips'' link at the top of the Regulations.gov home page provides
information on using Regulations.gov, including instructions for
submitting or viewing public comments, viewing other supporting and
related materials, and viewing the docket after the close of the
comment period.
Please include your name, affiliation, address, e-mail address and
telephone number(s) in your comment. Where appropriate, comments should
include a short Executive Summary (no more than five single-spaced
pages). All statements, including attachments and other supporting
materials, received are part of the public record and subject to public
disclosure. You should submit only information that you wish to make
available publicly.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jeffrey Stoltzfoos, Senior Advisor,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions, (202)
622-2610 or Mario Ugoletti, Director, Office of Financial Institutions
Policy, (202) 622-2730 (not toll free numbers).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Treasury Department is currently engaged
in a number of initiatives associated with maintaining the
competitiveness of United States capital markets. One of those
initiatives is evaluating the regulatory structure associated with
financial institutions.
The regulatory structure for financial institutions in the United
States has served us well over the course of our history. Much of the
basic regulatory structure associated with financial institutions was
established decades ago. While there have been important changes over
time in the way financial institutions have been regulated, the
Treasury Department believes that it is important to continue to
evaluate our regulatory structure and consider ways to improve
efficiency, reduce overlap, strengthen consumer and investor
protection, and ensure that financial institutions have the ability to
adapt to evolving market dynamics, including the increasingly global
nature of financial markets.
[[Page 58940]]
The Treasury Department's review of regulatory structure will focus
on all types of financial institutions: Commercial banks and other
insured depository institutions; insurance companies; securities firms;
futures firms; and other types of financial intermediaries.
The Treasury Department is soliciting comments to assist in this
review. The Treasury Department would be particularly interested in
comments on the specific questions set forth below, or on other issues
related to the regulatory structure associated with financial
institutions. We are also interested in specific ideas or
recommendations as to how we can improve our current regulatory
structure.
I. General Issues
1.1 What are the key problems or issues that need to be addressed
by our review of the current regulatory structure for financial
institutions?
1.2 Over time, there has been an increasing convergence of products
across the traditional ``functional'' regulatory lines of banking,
insurance, securities, and futures. What do you view as the significant
market developments over the past two decades (e.g. securitization,
institutionalization, financial product innovation and globalization)
and please describe what opportunities and/or pressures, if any, these
developments have created in the regulation of financial institutions?
1.2.1 Does the ``functional'' regulatory framework under which
banking, securities, insurance, and futures are primarily regulated by
respective functional regulators lead to inefficiencies in the
provision of financial services?
1.2.2 Does the ``functional'' regulatory framework pose
difficulties for considering overall risk to the financial system? If
so, to what extent have these difficulties been resolved through
regulatory oversight at the holding company level?
1.2.3 Many countries have moved towards creating a single financial
market regulator (e.g., United Kingdom's Financial Services Authority;
Japan's Financial Services Agency; and Germany's Federal Financial
Supervisory Authority (BaFin)). Some countries (e.g., Australia and the
Netherlands) have adopted a twin peaks model of regulation, separating
prudential safety and soundness regulation and conduct-of-business
regulation. What are the strengths and weaknesses of these structural
approaches and their applicability in the United States? What ideas can
be gleaned from these structures that would improve U.S. capital market
competitiveness?
1.3 What should be the key objectives of financial institution
regulation? How could the framework for the regulation of financial
institutions be more closely aligned with the objectives of regulation?
Can our current regulatory framework be improved, especially in terms
of imparting greater market discipline and providing a more cohesive
look at overall financial system risk? If so, how can it be improved to
achieve these goals? In regards to this set of questions, more
specifically:
1.3.1 How should the regulation of financial institutions with
explicit government guarantees differ from financial institutions
without explicit guarantees? Is the current system adequate in this
regard?
1.3.2 Is there a need for some type of market stability regulation
for financial institutions without explicit Federal Government
guarantees? If so, what would such regulation entail?
1.3.3 Does the current system of regulating certain financial
institutions at the holding company level allow for sufficient amounts
of market discipline? Are there ways to improve holding company
regulation to allow for enhanced market discipline?
1.3.4 In recent years, debate has emerged about ``more efficient''
regulation and the possibility of adopting a ``principles-based''
approach to regulation, rather than a ``rules-based'' approach. Others
suggest that a proper balance between the two is essential. What are
the strengths, weaknesses and feasibility of such approaches, and could
a more ``principles-based'' approach improve U.S. competitiveness?
1.3.5 Would the U.S. financial regulatory structure benefit if
there was a uniform set of basic principles of regulation that were
agreed upon and adopted by each financial services regulator?
1.4 Does the current regulatory structure adequately address
consumer or investor protection issues? If not, how could we improve
our current regulatory structure to address these issues?
1.5 What role should the States have in the regulation of financial
institutions? Is there a difference in the appropriate role of the
States depending on financial system protection or consumer and
investor protection aspects of regulation?
1.6 Europe is putting in place a more integrated single financial
market under its Financial Services Action Plan. Many Asian countries
as well are developing their financial markets. Often, these countries
or regions are doing so on the basis of widely adopted international
regulatory standards. Global businesses often cite concerns about the
costs associated with meeting diverse regulatory standards in the
numerous countries in which they operate. To address these issues, some
call for greater global regulatory convergence and others call for
mutual recognition. To what extent should the design of regulatory
initiatives in the United States be informed by the competitiveness of
U.S. institutions and markets in the global marketplace? Would the U.S.
economy and capital market competitiveness be better served by pursuing
greater global regulatory convergence?
II. Specific Issues
2.1 Depository Institutions
2.1.1 Are multiple charters for insured depository institutions the
optimal way to achieve regulatory objectives? What are the strengths
and weaknesses of having charters tied to specific activities or
organizational structures? Are these distinctions as valid and
important today as when these charters were granted?
2.1.2 What are the strengths and weaknesses of the dual banking
system?
2.1.3 What is the optimal role for a deposit insurer in depository
institution regulation and supervision? For example, should the insurer
be the primary regulator for all insured depository institutions,
should it have back-up regulatory authority, or should its functions be
limited to the pricing of deposit insurance, or other functions?
2.1.4 What role should the central bank have in bank regulation and
supervision? Is central bank regulatory authority necessary for the
development of monetary policy?
2.1.5 Is the current framework for regulating bank or financial
holding companies with depository institution subsidiaries appropriate?
Are there other regulatory frameworks that could or should be
considered to limit the transfer of the safety net associated with
insured depository institutions?
2.1.6 What are the key consumer protection elements associated with
products offered by depository institutions? What is the best
regulatory enforcement mechanism for these elements?
2.2 Insurance
2.2.1 What are the costs and benefits of State-based regulation of
the insurance industry?
2.2.2 What are the key Federal interests for establishing a
presence or
[[Page 58941]]
greater involvement in insurance regulation? What regulatory structure
would best achieve these goals/interests?
2.2.3 Should the States continue to have a role (or the sole role)
in insurance regulation? Insurance regulation is already somewhat
bifurcated between retail and wholesale companies (e.g., surplus lines
carriers). Does the current structure work? How could that structure be
improved?
2.2.4 States have taken an active role in some aspects of the
insurance marketplace (e.g., workers' compensation and residual markets
for hard to place risks) for various policy reasons. Are these policy
reasons still valid? Are these necessarily met through State (as
opposed to federal) regulation?
2.3 Securities and Futures
2.3.1 Is there a continued rationale for distinguishing between
securities and futures products and their respective intermediaries?
2.3.2 Is there a continued rationale for having separate regulators
for these types of financial products and institutions?
2.3.3 What type of regulation would be optimal for firms that
provide financial services related to securities and futures products?
Should this regulation be driven by the need to protect customers or by
the broader issues of market integrity and financial system stability?
2.3.4 What is the optimal role for the states in securities and
futures regulation?
2.3.5 What are the key consumer/investor protection elements
associated with products offered by securities and futures firms?
Should there be a regulatory distinction among retail, institutional,
wholesale, commercial, and hedging customers?
2.3.6 Would it be useful to apply some of the principles of the
Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 to the securities
regulatory regime? Is a tiered system of regulation appropriate? Is it
appropriate to make distinctions based on the relative sophistication
of the market participants and/or the integrity of the market?
Dated: October 11, 2007.
Taiya Smith,
Executive Secretary of the Treasury.
[FR Doc. E7-20433 Filed 10-16-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4811-42-P
