Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Lithium Ion Battery Installation, 57842-57844 [E7-19980]
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57842
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 196 / Thursday, October 11, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM375 Special Conditions No.
25–359–SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787–
8 Airplane; Lithium Ion Battery
Installation
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued for the Boeing Model 787–8
airplane. This airplane will have novel
or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category
airplanes. The Boeing Model 787–8
airplanes will use high capacity lithium
ion battery technology in on-board
systems. For these design features, the
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards. These special
conditions contain the additional safety
standards that the Administrator
considers necessary to establish a level
of safety equivalent to that established
by the existing standards. Additional
special conditions will be issued for
other novel or unusual design features
of the Boeing Model 787–8 airplanes.
DATES: Effective Date: November 13,
2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Nazih Khaouly, FAA, Airplane and
Flight Crew Interface, ANM–111,
Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft
Certification Service, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356; telephone (425) 227–2432;
facsimile (425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied
for an FAA type certificate for its new
Boeing Model 787–8 passenger airplane.
The Boeing Model 787–8 airplane will
be an all-new, two-engine jet transport
airplane with a two-aisle cabin. The
maximum takeoff weight will be
476,000 pounds, with a maximum
passenger count of 381 passengers.
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with RULES
Type Certification Basis
Under provisions of 14 Code of
Federal Regulations (CFR) 21.17, Boeing
must show that Boeing Model 787–8
airplanes (hereafter referred to as ‘‘the
787’’) meet the applicable provisions of
14 CFR part 25, as amended by
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:49 Oct 10, 2007
Jkt 211001
Amendments 25–1 through 25–117,
except §§ 25.809(a) and 25.812, which
will remain at Amendment 25–115. If
the Administrator finds that the
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the 787 because of
a novel or unusual design feature,
special conditions are prescribed under
provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the 787 must comply with
the fuel vent and exhaust emission
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the
noise certification requirements of 14
CFR part 36. The FAA must also issue
a finding of regulatory adequacy
pursuant to section 611 of Public Law
92–574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of
1972.’’
The FAA issues special conditions, as
defined in 14 CFR 11.19, under § 11.38,
and they become part of the type
certification basis under § 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
include any other model that
incorporates the same or similar novel
or unusual design feature, the special
conditions would also apply to the other
model under § 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The 787 will incorporate a number of
novel or unusual design features.
Because of rapid improvements in
airplane technology, the applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
for these design features. These special
conditions for the 787 contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards.
The 787 design includes planned use
of lithium ion batteries for the following
applications:
• Main and Auxiliary Power Unit
(APU) Battery/Battery Charger System.
• Flight Control Electronics.
• Emergency Lighting System.
• Recorder Independent Power
Supply.
Large, high capacity, rechargeable
lithium ion batteries are a novel or
unusual design feature in transport
category airplanes. This type of battery
has certain failure, operational, and
maintenance characteristics that differ
significantly from those of the nickelcadmium and lead-acid rechargeable
batteries currently approved for
installation on large transport category
airplanes. The FAA issues these special
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
conditions to require that (1) all
characteristics of the lithium ion battery
and its installation that could affect safe
operation of the 787 are addressed, and
(2) appropriate maintenance
requirements are established to ensure
the availability of electrical power from
the batteries when needed.
Background
The current regulations governing
installation of batteries in large
transport category airplanes were
derived from Civil Air Regulations
(CAR) part 4b.625(d) as part of the recodification of CAR 4b that established
14 CFR part 25 in February, 1965. The
new battery requirements, 14 CFR
25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), basically
reworded the CAR requirements.
Increased use of nickel-cadmium
batteries in small airplanes resulted in
increased incidents of battery fires and
failures. This led to additional
rulemaking affecting large transport
category airplanes as well as small
airplanes. On September 1, 1977, and
March 1, 1978, respectively, the FAA
issued 14 CFR 25.1353c(5) and c(6),
governing nickel-cadmium battery
installations on large transport category
airplanes.
The proposed use of lithium ion
batteries for the emergency lighting
system on the 787 has prompted the
FAA to review the adequacy of these
existing regulations. Our review
indicates that existing regulations do
not adequately address several failure,
operational, and maintenance
characteristics of lithium ion batteries
that could affect the safety and
reliability of the 787’s lithium ion
battery installations.
At present, there is limited experience
with use of rechargeable lithium ion
batteries in applications involving
commercial aviation. However, other
users of this technology, ranging from
wireless telephone manufacturing to the
electric vehicle industry, have noted
safety problems with lithium ion
batteries. These problems include
overcharging, over-discharging, and
flammability of cell components.
1. Overcharging
In general, lithium ion batteries are
significantly more susceptible to
internal failures that can result in selfsustaining increases in temperature and
pressure (thermal runaway) than their
nickel-cadmium or lead-acid
counterparts. This is especially true for
overcharging, which causes heating and
destabilization of the components of the
cell, leading to formation (by plating) of
highly unstable metallic lithium. The
metallic lithium can ignite, resulting in
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 196 / Thursday, October 11, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
a self-sustaining fire or explosion.
Finally, the severity of thermal runaway
from overcharging increases with
increasing battery capacity, because of
the higher amount of electrolytes in
large batteries.
ebenthall on PRODPC61 with RULES
2. Over-Discharging
Discharge of some types of lithium
ion batteries beyond a certain voltage
(typically 2.4 volts) can cause corrosion
of the electrodes of the cell, resulting in
loss of battery capacity that cannot be
reversed by recharging. This loss of
capacity may not be detected by the
simple voltage measurements
commonly available to flightcrews as a
means of checking battery status. This is
a problem shared with nickel-cadmium
batteries.
3. Flammability of Cell Components
Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid
batteries, some types of lithium ion
batteries use liquid electrolytes that are
flammable. The electrolytes can serve as
a source of fuel for an external fire, if
there is a breach of the battery
container.
These problems experienced by users
of lithium ion batteries raise concern
about use of these batteries in
commercial aviation. The intent of these
special conditions is to establish
appropriate airworthiness standards for
lithium ion battery installations in the
787 and to ensure, as required by 14
CFR 25.601, that these battery
installations are not hazardous or
unreliable. To address these concerns,
these special conditions adopt the
following requirements:
• Those sections of 14 CFR 25.1353
that are applicable to lithium ion
batteries.
• The flammable fluid fire protection
requirements of 14 CFR 25.863. In the
past, this rule was not applied to
batteries of transport category airplanes,
since the electrolytes used in lead-acid
and nickel-cadmium batteries are not
flammable.
• New requirements to address the
hazards of overcharging and overdischarging that are unique to lithium
ion batteries.
• New maintenance requirements to
ensure that batteries used as spares are
maintained in an appropriate state of
charge.
These special conditions are similar to
special conditions adopted for the
Airbus A380 (71 FR 74755; December
13, 2006).
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special
Conditions No. 25–07–10–SC for the
787 was published in the Federal
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:49 Oct 10, 2007
Jkt 211001
Register on April 30, 2007 (72 FR
21162). We received comments from the
Air Line Pilots Association,
International, which are discussed
below.
The Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA) conditionally supports the
FAA’s proposal for special conditions
for lithium ion batteries on the 787
aircraft, but ‘‘strongly maintains that
there need to be adequate protections
and procedures in place to ensure that
concerns regarding lithium ion batteries
are fully addressed and protected
against.’’ Appended to the ALPA
comments was a copy of FAA report
DOT/FAA/AR–06/38, September 2006,
Flammability Assessment of BulkPacked, Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells
In Transport Category Aircraft. With the
knowledge of the safety hazards
described in the appended report and by
others, ALPA requested that the FAA
consider the specific concerns discussed
below.
• ALPA Comment re Special
Condition (3): The commenter requested
that paragraph 3 of the special
conditions be revised to ensure that the
certification design of the 787 prevents
explosive or toxic gases emitted by a
lithium ion battery from entering the
cabin. The commenter also requested
that the FAA ensure that flightcrew
procedures and training are adequate to
protect both passengers and crew, if
explosive or toxic gases do enter the
cabin.
FAA Response: 14 CFR 25.857
prohibits hazardous quantities of smoke,
flames, or extinguishing agents from
cargo compartments from entering any
compartment occupied by the crew or
passengers. Paragraph (3) of these
special conditions specifies that
No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any
lithium ion battery in normal operation, or as
the result of any failure of the battery
charging system, monitoring system, or
battery installation not shown to be
extremely remote, may accumulate in
hazardous quantities within the airplane.
The special conditions require that any
explosive or toxic gases emitted by a
lithium ion battery be limited to less
than hazardous quantities everywhere
on the airplane. The FAA does not
expect the need for additional training
above and beyond the training that
crews receive today. We made no
change to these special conditions as a
result of this comment.
• ALPA Comment re Special
Condition (4): The commenter stated,
We are very concerned with a fire erupting
in flight, and being able to rapidly extinguish
it. The Special Conditions should require
that there be a means provided to apply
extinguishing agents by the flight (cabin)
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Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
57843
crew instead of promoting it as an option in
managing the threat posed by the use of
lithium-ion batteries. ALPA maintains that
the petitioner must provide means for
extinguishing fires that occur vs. listing it as
an option in § 25.863.
ALPA clarified this comment in the
following communication, sent by email on August 10, 2007.
The intent of our comments submitted to
the Docket for question [Special Condition]
Number 4 (see below) is to assure that the
FAA includes language or makes it clear in
the Special Conditions directing the OEM or
a potential STC applicant that a fire from
these devices, in any situation, is
unacceptable. ALPA requests the FAA
reiterate that preventing a fire and not
reacting to one, if one occurs, is critical. The
last sentence of our comments in this
Question [Special Condition] refers to the
potential for an ‘‘equivalent level of safety’’
being introduced or referenced in the
document that would negate the prevention
of a fire; ALPA finds this ‘‘option’’
unacceptable.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries
must meet the requirements of 14 CFR
25.863(a) through (d).
The proposal states that the certification
requirements of § 25.283 [§ 25.863] must be
complied with; however, the FAA report
(FAA report DOT/FAA/AR–06/38, September
2006) indicates that a relatively small fire
source is sufficient to heat the lithium-ion
cell above the temperature required to
activate the pressure release mechanism in
the cell. This causes the cell to forcefully
vent its electrolyte through the relief ports
near the positive terminal. The electrolyte is
highly flammable and easily ignites when
exposed to an open flame or hot surface.
Fully charged cells released small white
sparks along with the electrolyte.
FAA Response: The FAA shares the
commenter’s concern over a fire
erupting in flight. The regulations and
the rigid requirements defined in these
special conditions are intended to
prevent lithium battery fires on board
the aircraft. We have made no change as
a result of this comment.
• ALPA Comment re Special
Condition (7): The commenter suggested
that the special conditions address
means to ensure that the lithium ion
batteries do not overheat or overcharge
in the event of failure or malfunction of
the automatic disconnect function,
when a means of disconnecting the
batteries from the charging source is not
available.
FAA Response: The FAA agrees with
the commenter. Special Condition (7)
requires means to prevent overheating
or overcharging of lithium ion batteries
in the event of failure or malfunction of
the automatic disconnect function. The
issue of failure modes of the lithium ion
batteries is covered by Special
Conditions (1), (2), and (6). We made no
change as a result of this comment.
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 196 / Thursday, October 11, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
• ALPA Comment re Special
Condition (8): Finally, ALPA
commented on monitoring and warning
features that will indicate when the
state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen
below levels considered acceptable for
dispatch of the airplane. The commenter
suggested that the special conditions
address the location of the warning
indication; whether it is displayed to
the captain, the crew, or both; and the
training to be incorporated in the crew
training programs.
FAA Response: Flight deck warning
indicators associated with the state-ofcharge of the lithium ion battery and
appropriate training of the crew will be
addressed during certification as part of
the flight deck evaluation. As required
by § 25.1309(c), this evaluation will
ensure that the warning indication is
effective and appropriate for the hazard.
We made no change as a result of this
comment.
These special conditions are issued as
proposed.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the 787.
Should Boeing apply at a later date for
a change to the type certificate to
include another model on the same type
certificate incorporating the same novel
or unusual design features, these special
conditions would apply to that model as
well.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features of the 787. It
is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the following special conditions are
issued as part of the type certification
basis for the Boeing Model 787–8
airplane.
In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR
25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), the
following special conditions apply.
Lithium ion batteries on the Boeing
Model 787–8 airplane must be designed
and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and
pressures must be maintained during
any foreseeable charging or discharging
condition and during any failure of the
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I
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:49 Oct 10, 2007
Jkt 211001
charging or battery monitoring system
not shown to be extremely remote. The
lithium ion battery installation must
preclude explosion in the event of those
failures.
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries
must preclude the occurrence of selfsustaining, uncontrolled increases in
temperature or pressure.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases
emitted by any lithium ion battery in
normal operation, or as the result of any
failure of the battery charging system,
monitoring system, or battery
installation not shown to be extremely
remote, may accumulate in hazardous
quantities within the airplane.
(4) Installations of lithium ion
batteries must meet the requirements of
14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that
may escape from any lithium ion battery
may damage surrounding structure or
any adjacent systems, equipment, or
electrical wiring of the airplane in such
a way as to cause a major or more severe
failure condition, in accordance with 14
CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable
regulatory guidance.
(6) Each lithium ion battery
installation must have provisions to
prevent any hazardous effect on
structure or essential systems caused by
the maximum amount of heat the
battery can generate during a short
circuit of the battery or of its individual
cells.
(7) Lithium ion battery installations
must have a system to control the
charging rate of the battery
automatically, so as to prevent battery
overheating or overcharging, and,
(i) A battery temperature sensing and
over-temperature warning system with a
means for automatically disconnecting
the battery from its charging source in
the event of an over-temperature
condition, or,
(ii) A battery failure sensing and
warning system with a means for
automatically disconnecting the battery
from its charging source in the event of
battery failure.
(8) Any lithium ion battery
installation whose function is required
for safe operation of the airplane must
incorporate a monitoring and warning
feature that will provide an indication
to the appropriate flight crewmembers
whenever the state-of-charge of the
batteries has fallen below levels
considered acceptable for dispatch of
the airplane.
(9) The Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness required by 14 CFR
25.1529 must contain maintenance
requirements for measurements of
battery capacity at appropriate intervals
to ensure that batteries whose function
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Frm 00006
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
is required for safe operation of the
airplane will perform their intended
function as long as the battery is
installed in the airplane. The
Instructions for Continued
Airworthiness must also contain
procedures for the maintenance of
lithium ion batteries in spares storage to
prevent the replacement of batteries
whose function is required for safe
operation of the airplane with batteries
that have experienced degraded charge
retention ability or other damage due to
prolonged storage at a low state of
charge.
Note: These special conditions are not
intended to replace 14 CFR 25.1353(c) in the
certification basis of the Boeing 787–8
airplane. These special conditions apply only
to lithium ion batteries and their
installations. The requirements of 14 CFR
25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and
battery installations of the Boeing 787–8
airplane that do not use lithium ion batteries.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 28, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E7–19980 Filed 10–10–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM366 Special Conditions No.
25–348–SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787–
8 Airplane; Composite Wing and Fuel
Tank Structure—Fire Protection
Requirements
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued for the Boeing Model 787–8
airplane. This airplane will have novel
or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category
airplanes. These novel or unusual
design features are associated with
composite materials chosen for the
construction of the fuel tank skin and
structure. For these design features, the
applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for wing and fuel tank
structure with respect to postcrash fire
safety. These special conditions contain
the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 196 (Thursday, October 11, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 57842-57844]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-19980]
[[Page 57842]]
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM375 Special Conditions No. 25-359-SC]
Special Conditions: Boeing Model 787-8 Airplane; Lithium Ion
Battery Installation
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Boeing Model 787-8
airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category airplanes. The Boeing Model 787-8
airplanes will use high capacity lithium ion battery technology in on-
board systems. For these design features, the applicable airworthiness
regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards.
These special conditions contain the additional safety standards that
the Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing standards. Additional
special conditions will be issued for other novel or unusual design
features of the Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes.
DATES: Effective Date: November 13, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Nazih Khaouly, FAA, Airplane and
Flight Crew Interface, ANM-111, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 227-2432; facsimile (425) 227-
1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
On March 28, 2003, Boeing applied for an FAA type certificate for
its new Boeing Model 787-8 passenger airplane. The Boeing Model 787-8
airplane will be an all-new, two-engine jet transport airplane with a
two-aisle cabin. The maximum takeoff weight will be 476,000 pounds,
with a maximum passenger count of 381 passengers.
Type Certification Basis
Under provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 21.17,
Boeing must show that Boeing Model 787-8 airplanes (hereafter referred
to as ``the 787'') meet the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as
amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-117, except Sec. Sec. 25.809(a)
and 25.812, which will remain at Amendment 25-115. If the Administrator
finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the 787 because of a novel
or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under
provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the 787 must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission
requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements
of 14 CFR part 36. The FAA must also issue a finding of regulatory
adequacy pursuant to section 611 of Public Law 92-574, the ``Noise
Control Act of 1972.''
The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19,
under Sec. 11.38, and they become part of the type certification basis
under Sec. 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same or similar
novel or unusual design feature, the special conditions would also
apply to the other model under Sec. 21.101.
Novel or Unusual Design Features
The 787 will incorporate a number of novel or unusual design
features. Because of rapid improvements in airplane technology, the
applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or
appropriate safety standards for these design features. These special
conditions for the 787 contain the additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to establish a level of safety
equivalent to that established by the existing airworthiness standards.
The 787 design includes planned use of lithium ion batteries for
the following applications:
Main and Auxiliary Power Unit (APU) Battery/Battery
Charger System.
Flight Control Electronics.
Emergency Lighting System.
Recorder Independent Power Supply.
Large, high capacity, rechargeable lithium ion batteries are a novel or
unusual design feature in transport category airplanes. This type of
battery has certain failure, operational, and maintenance
characteristics that differ significantly from those of the nickel-
cadmium and lead-acid rechargeable batteries currently approved for
installation on large transport category airplanes. The FAA issues
these special conditions to require that (1) all characteristics of the
lithium ion battery and its installation that could affect safe
operation of the 787 are addressed, and (2) appropriate maintenance
requirements are established to ensure the availability of electrical
power from the batteries when needed.
Background
The current regulations governing installation of batteries in
large transport category airplanes were derived from Civil Air
Regulations (CAR) part 4b.625(d) as part of the re-codification of CAR
4b that established 14 CFR part 25 in February, 1965. The new battery
requirements, 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4), basically reworded
the CAR requirements.
Increased use of nickel-cadmium batteries in small airplanes
resulted in increased incidents of battery fires and failures. This led
to additional rulemaking affecting large transport category airplanes
as well as small airplanes. On September 1, 1977, and March 1, 1978,
respectively, the FAA issued 14 CFR 25.1353c(5) and c(6), governing
nickel-cadmium battery installations on large transport category
airplanes.
The proposed use of lithium ion batteries for the emergency
lighting system on the 787 has prompted the FAA to review the adequacy
of these existing regulations. Our review indicates that existing
regulations do not adequately address several failure, operational, and
maintenance characteristics of lithium ion batteries that could affect
the safety and reliability of the 787's lithium ion battery
installations.
At present, there is limited experience with use of rechargeable
lithium ion batteries in applications involving commercial aviation.
However, other users of this technology, ranging from wireless
telephone manufacturing to the electric vehicle industry, have noted
safety problems with lithium ion batteries. These problems include
overcharging, over-discharging, and flammability of cell components.
1. Overcharging
In general, lithium ion batteries are significantly more
susceptible to internal failures that can result in self-sustaining
increases in temperature and pressure (thermal runaway) than their
nickel-cadmium or lead-acid counterparts. This is especially true for
overcharging, which causes heating and destabilization of the
components of the cell, leading to formation (by plating) of highly
unstable metallic lithium. The metallic lithium can ignite, resulting
in
[[Page 57843]]
a self-sustaining fire or explosion. Finally, the severity of thermal
runaway from overcharging increases with increasing battery capacity,
because of the higher amount of electrolytes in large batteries.
2. Over-Discharging
Discharge of some types of lithium ion batteries beyond a certain
voltage (typically 2.4 volts) can cause corrosion of the electrodes of
the cell, resulting in loss of battery capacity that cannot be reversed
by recharging. This loss of capacity may not be detected by the simple
voltage measurements commonly available to flightcrews as a means of
checking battery status. This is a problem shared with nickel-cadmium
batteries.
3. Flammability of Cell Components
Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid batteries, some types of
lithium ion batteries use liquid electrolytes that are flammable. The
electrolytes can serve as a source of fuel for an external fire, if
there is a breach of the battery container.
These problems experienced by users of lithium ion batteries raise
concern about use of these batteries in commercial aviation. The intent
of these special conditions is to establish appropriate airworthiness
standards for lithium ion battery installations in the 787 and to
ensure, as required by 14 CFR 25.601, that these battery installations
are not hazardous or unreliable. To address these concerns, these
special conditions adopt the following requirements:
Those sections of 14 CFR 25.1353 that are applicable to
lithium ion batteries.
The flammable fluid fire protection requirements of 14 CFR
25.863. In the past, this rule was not applied to batteries of
transport category airplanes, since the electrolytes used in lead-acid
and nickel-cadmium batteries are not flammable.
New requirements to address the hazards of overcharging
and over-discharging that are unique to lithium ion batteries.
New maintenance requirements to ensure that batteries used
as spares are maintained in an appropriate state of charge.
These special conditions are similar to special conditions adopted for
the Airbus A380 (71 FR 74755; December 13, 2006).
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-07-10-SC for the 787
was published in the Federal Register on April 30, 2007 (72 FR 21162).
We received comments from the Air Line Pilots Association,
International, which are discussed below.
The Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) conditionally supports the
FAA's proposal for special conditions for lithium ion batteries on the
787 aircraft, but ``strongly maintains that there need to be adequate
protections and procedures in place to ensure that concerns regarding
lithium ion batteries are fully addressed and protected against.''
Appended to the ALPA comments was a copy of FAA report DOT/FAA/AR-06/
38, September 2006, Flammability Assessment of Bulk-Packed,
Rechargeable Lithium-Ion Cells In Transport Category Aircraft. With the
knowledge of the safety hazards described in the appended report and by
others, ALPA requested that the FAA consider the specific concerns
discussed below.
ALPA Comment re Special Condition (3): The commenter
requested that paragraph 3 of the special conditions be revised to
ensure that the certification design of the 787 prevents explosive or
toxic gases emitted by a lithium ion battery from entering the cabin.
The commenter also requested that the FAA ensure that flightcrew
procedures and training are adequate to protect both passengers and
crew, if explosive or toxic gases do enter the cabin.
FAA Response: 14 CFR 25.857 prohibits hazardous quantities of
smoke, flames, or extinguishing agents from cargo compartments from
entering any compartment occupied by the crew or passengers. Paragraph
(3) of these special conditions specifies that
No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery
in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery
charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not
shown to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities
within the airplane.
The special conditions require that any explosive or toxic gases
emitted by a lithium ion battery be limited to less than hazardous
quantities everywhere on the airplane. The FAA does not expect the need
for additional training above and beyond the training that crews
receive today. We made no change to these special conditions as a
result of this comment.
ALPA Comment re Special Condition (4): The commenter
stated,
We are very concerned with a fire erupting in flight, and being
able to rapidly extinguish it. The Special Conditions should require
that there be a means provided to apply extinguishing agents by the
flight (cabin) crew instead of promoting it as an option in managing
the threat posed by the use of lithium-ion batteries. ALPA maintains
that the petitioner must provide means for extinguishing fires that
occur vs. listing it as an option in Sec. 25.863.
ALPA clarified this comment in the following communication, sent by e-
mail on August 10, 2007.
The intent of our comments submitted to the Docket for question
[Special Condition] Number 4 (see below) is to assure that the FAA
includes language or makes it clear in the Special Conditions
directing the OEM or a potential STC applicant that a fire from
these devices, in any situation, is unacceptable. ALPA requests the
FAA reiterate that preventing a fire and not reacting to one, if one
occurs, is critical. The last sentence of our comments in this
Question [Special Condition] refers to the potential for an
``equivalent level of safety'' being introduced or referenced in the
document that would negate the prevention of a fire; ALPA finds this
``option'' unacceptable.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the
requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
The proposal states that the certification requirements of Sec.
25.283 [Sec. 25.863] must be complied with; however, the FAA report
(FAA report DOT/FAA/AR-06/38, September 2006) indicates that a
relatively small fire source is sufficient to heat the lithium-ion
cell above the temperature required to activate the pressure release
mechanism in the cell. This causes the cell to forcefully vent its
electrolyte through the relief ports near the positive terminal. The
electrolyte is highly flammable and easily ignites when exposed to
an open flame or hot surface. Fully charged cells released small
white sparks along with the electrolyte.
FAA Response: The FAA shares the commenter's concern over a fire
erupting in flight. The regulations and the rigid requirements defined
in these special conditions are intended to prevent lithium battery
fires on board the aircraft. We have made no change as a result of this
comment.
ALPA Comment re Special Condition (7): The commenter
suggested that the special conditions address means to ensure that the
lithium ion batteries do not overheat or overcharge in the event of
failure or malfunction of the automatic disconnect function, when a
means of disconnecting the batteries from the charging source is not
available.
FAA Response: The FAA agrees with the commenter. Special Condition
(7) requires means to prevent overheating or overcharging of lithium
ion batteries in the event of failure or malfunction of the automatic
disconnect function. The issue of failure modes of the lithium ion
batteries is covered by Special Conditions (1), (2), and (6). We made
no change as a result of this comment.
[[Page 57844]]
ALPA Comment re Special Condition (8): Finally, ALPA
commented on monitoring and warning features that will indicate when
the state-of-charge of the batteries has fallen below levels considered
acceptable for dispatch of the airplane. The commenter suggested that
the special conditions address the location of the warning indication;
whether it is displayed to the captain, the crew, or both; and the
training to be incorporated in the crew training programs.
FAA Response: Flight deck warning indicators associated with the
state-of-charge of the lithium ion battery and appropriate training of
the crew will be addressed during certification as part of the flight
deck evaluation. As required by Sec. 25.1309(c), this evaluation will
ensure that the warning indication is effective and appropriate for the
hazard. We made no change as a result of this comment.
These special conditions are issued as proposed.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
787. Should Boeing apply at a later date for a change to the type
certificate to include another model on the same type certificate
incorporating the same novel or unusual design features, these special
conditions would apply to that model as well.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
of the 787. It is not a rule of general applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Boeing Model 787-8 airplane.
In lieu of the requirements of 14 CFR 25.1353(c)(1) through (c)(4),
the following special conditions apply. Lithium ion batteries on the
Boeing Model 787-8 airplane must be designed and installed as follows:
(1) Safe cell temperatures and pressures must be maintained during
any foreseeable charging or discharging condition and during any
failure of the charging or battery monitoring system not shown to be
extremely remote. The lithium ion battery installation must preclude
explosion in the event of those failures.
(2) Design of the lithium ion batteries must preclude the
occurrence of self-sustaining, uncontrolled increases in temperature or
pressure.
(3) No explosive or toxic gases emitted by any lithium ion battery
in normal operation, or as the result of any failure of the battery
charging system, monitoring system, or battery installation not shown
to be extremely remote, may accumulate in hazardous quantities within
the airplane.
(4) Installations of lithium ion batteries must meet the
requirements of 14 CFR 25.863(a) through (d).
(5) No corrosive fluids or gases that may escape from any lithium
ion battery may damage surrounding structure or any adjacent systems,
equipment, or electrical wiring of the airplane in such a way as to
cause a major or more severe failure condition, in accordance with 14
CFR 25.1309(b) and applicable regulatory guidance.
(6) Each lithium ion battery installation must have provisions to
prevent any hazardous effect on structure or essential systems caused
by the maximum amount of heat the battery can generate during a short
circuit of the battery or of its individual cells.
(7) Lithium ion battery installations must have a system to control
the charging rate of the battery automatically, so as to prevent
battery overheating or overcharging, and,
(i) A battery temperature sensing and over-temperature warning
system with a means for automatically disconnecting the battery from
its charging source in the event of an over-temperature condition, or,
(ii) A battery failure sensing and warning system with a means for
automatically disconnecting the battery from its charging source in the
event of battery failure.
(8) Any lithium ion battery installation whose function is required
for safe operation of the airplane must incorporate a monitoring and
warning feature that will provide an indication to the appropriate
flight crewmembers whenever the state-of-charge of the batteries has
fallen below levels considered acceptable for dispatch of the airplane.
(9) The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness required by 14 CFR
25.1529 must contain maintenance requirements for measurements of
battery capacity at appropriate intervals to ensure that batteries
whose function is required for safe operation of the airplane will
perform their intended function as long as the battery is installed in
the airplane. The Instructions for Continued Airworthiness must also
contain procedures for the maintenance of lithium ion batteries in
spares storage to prevent the replacement of batteries whose function
is required for safe operation of the airplane with batteries that have
experienced degraded charge retention ability or other damage due to
prolonged storage at a low state of charge.
Note: These special conditions are not intended to replace 14
CFR 25.1353(c) in the certification basis of the Boeing 787-8
airplane. These special conditions apply only to lithium ion
batteries and their installations. The requirements of 14 CFR
25.1353(c) remain in effect for batteries and battery installations
of the Boeing 787-8 airplane that do not use lithium ion batteries.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 28, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E7-19980 Filed 10-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P