Mylan Laboratories and E. Merck oHG; Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment, 57579-57581 [E7-19892]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 195 / Wednesday, October 10, 2007 / Notices
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sandra M. Peay, Contact Representative
or Renee Hallman, Contact
Representative.
Federal Trade Commission, Premerger
Notification Office, Bureau of
Competition, Room H–303, Washington,
DC 20580, (202) 326–3100.
By direction of the Commission.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 07–4969 Filed 10–9–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6750–01–M
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[File No. 071 0164]
Mylan Laboratories and E. Merck oHG;
Analysis of Agreement Containing
Consent Orders to Aid Public
Comment
Federal Trade Commission.
Proposed Consent Agreement.
AGENCY:
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this
matter settles alleged violations of
federal law prohibiting unfair or
deceptive acts or practices or unfair
methods of competition. The attached
Analysis to Aid Public Comment
describes both the allegations in the
draft complaint and the terms of the
consent order—embodied in the consent
agreement—that would settle these
allegations.
Comments must be received on
or before October 27, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties are
invited to submit written comments.
Comments should refer to ‘‘Mylan/
Merck, File No. 071 0164,’’ to facilitate
the organization of comments. A
comment filed in paper form should
include this reference both in the text
and on the envelope, and should be
mailed or delivered to the following
address: Federal Trade Commission/
Office of the Secretary, Room 135-H,
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20580. Comments
containing confidential material must be
filed in paper form, must be clearly
labeled ‘‘Confidential,’’ and must
comply with Commission Rule 4.9(c).
16 CFR 4.9(c) (2005).1 The FTC is
requesting that any comment filed in
paper form be sent by courier or
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
DATES:
1 The comment must be accompanied by an
explicit request for confidential treatment,
including the factual and legal basis for the request,
and must identify the specific portions of the
comment to be withheld from the public record.
The request will be granted or denied by the
Commission’s General Counsel, consistent with
applicable law and the public interest. See
Commission Rule 4.9(c), 16 CFR 4.9(c).
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overnight service, if possible, because
U.S. postal mail in the Washington area
and at the Commission is subject to
delay due to heightened security
precautions. Comments that do not
contain any nonpublic information may
instead be filed in electronic form as
part of or as an attachment to email
messages directed to the following email box: consentagreement@ftc.gov.
The FTC Act and other laws the
Commission administers permit the
collection of public comments to
consider and use in this proceeding as
appropriate. All timely and responsive
public comments, whether filed in
paper or electronic form, will be
considered by the Commission, and will
be available to the public on the FTC
Web site, to the extent practicable, at
https://www.ftc.gov. As a matter of
discretion, the FTC makes every effort to
remove home contact information for
individuals from the public comments it
receives before placing those
commentson the FTC Web site. More
information, including routine uses
permitted by the Privacy Act, may be
found in the FTC’s privacy policy,
athttps://www.ftc.gov/ftc/privacy.htm.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kari
A. Wallace (202) 326-3085, Bureau of
Competition, Room NJ-5108, 600
Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20580.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant
to section 6(f) of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721, 15 U.S.C.
46(f), and § 2.34 of the Commission
Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 2.34, notice is
hereby given that the above-captioned
consent agreement containing a consent
order to cease and desist, having been
filed with and accepted, subject to final
approval, by the Commission, has been
placed on the public record for a period
of thirty (30) days. The following
Analysis to Aid Public Comment
describes the terms of the consent
agreement, and the allegations in the
complaint. An electronic copy of the
full text of the consent agreement
package can be obtained from the FTC
Home Page (for September 27, 2007), on
the World Wide Web, at https://
www.ftc.gov/os/2007/09/index.htm. A
paper copy can be obtained from the
FTC Public Reference Room, Room 130–
H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW.,
Washington, DC 20580, either in person
or by calling (202) 326-2222.
Public comments are invited, and may
be filed with the Commission in either
paper or electronic form. All comments
should be filed as prescribed in the
ADDRESSES section above, and must be
received on or before the date specified
in the DATES section.
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57579
Analysis of Agreement Containing
Consent Order to Aid Public Comment
The Federal Trade Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) has accepted, subject to
final approval, an Agreement
Containing Consent Orders (‘‘Consent
Agreement’’) from Mylan Laboratories
(‘‘Mylan’’) and E. Merck oHG (‘‘Merck’’)
which is designed to remedy the
anticompetitive effects of the
acquisition of certain assets of Merck by
Mylan. Under the terms of the proposed
Consent Agreement, the companies
would be required to assign and divest
the Merck rights and assets necessary to
manufacture and market generic: (1)
Acebutolol hydrochloride capsules; (2)
flecainide acetate tablets; (3) guanfacine
hydrochloride tablets; (4) nicardipine
hydrochloride capsules; and (5) sotalol
hydrochloride AF tablets to Amneal
Pharmaceuticals LLC (‘‘Amneal’’).
The proposed Consent Agreement has
been placed on the public record for
thirty (30) days for receipt of comments
by interested persons. Comments
received during this period will become
part of the public record. After thirty
(30) days, the Commission will again
review the proposed Consent Agreement
and the comments received, and will
decide whether it should withdraw from
the proposed Consent Agreement,
modify it, or make final the Decision
and Order (‘‘Order’’).
Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of
Merger executed on May 12 and 13,
2007, Mylan proposes to acquire
Merck’s generic subsidiary (‘‘Merck
Generics’’) and all subsidiaries held
directly or indirectly by Merck Generics,
by acquiring 100 percent of the issued
shares of those subsidies for
approximately $6.6 billion. The
Commission’s Complaint alleges that
the proposed acquisition, if
consummated, would violate section 7
of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 18, and section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 45, by lessening competition in
the U.S. markets for the manufacture
and sale of the following generic
pharmaceutical products: (1) Acebutolol
hydrochloride capsules; (2) flecainide
acetate tablets; (3) guanfacine
hydrochloride tablets; (4) nicardipine
hydrochloride capsules; and (5) sotalol
hydrochloride AF tablets (the
‘‘Products’’). The proposed Consent
Agreement will remedy the alleged
violations by replacing the lost
competition that would result from the
acquisition in each of these markets.
Mylan is a leading developer,
manufacturer, marketer, and distributor
of generic pharmaceutical drugs.
Headquartered in Pennsylvania, Mylan
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sells generic pharmaceuticals in the
United States and has manufacturing
facilities throughout the country. Merck
is a German pharmaceutical company
that develops and manufactures
pharmaceutical products for sale in the
United States. Merck sells generic
pharmaceutical products directly to
customers in the United States through
its subsidiary Genpharm L.P., as well as
indirectly through distribution
agreements with other generic
companies, including Par
Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc. (‘‘Par’’).
The Products and Structure of the
Markets
The proposed acquisition of certain
assets of Merck by Mylan would
strengthen Mylan’s worldwide position
in generic pharmaceuticals and provide
Mylan with a stronger pipeline of
generic products. The companies
overlap in a number of generic
pharmaceutical markets, and if
consummated, the transaction likely
would lead to anticompetitive effects in
five of these markets.
The transaction would reduce the
number of competing generic suppliers
in the overlap markets. The number of
generic suppliers has a direct and
substantial effect on generic pricing as
each additional generic supplier can
have a competitive impact on the
market. Because there are multiple
generic equivalents for each of the
products at issue here, the branded
versions no longer significantly
constrain the generics’ pricing.
In the market for generic acebutolol
capsules, Mylan and Merck are the only
companies manufacturing and selling
products in the United States. For the
four other generic products, Mylan and
Merck currently are two of a small
number of suppliers offering the
product. In each of these markets, there
are a limited number of competitors.
Generic acebutolol hydrochloride is a
beta blocker used to treat hypertension.
Mylan and Merck/Par are the only
suppliers of generic acebutolol capsules
in the United States, with respective
market shares of approximately 59 and
41 percent. Therefore, the proposed
transaction would give Mylan a
monopoly in this market.
Generic flecainide acetate is an antiarrhythmia drug used to treat heart
problems. Flecainide is produced and
sold by five companies in the United
States: Mylan, Merck/Par, Roxane
Laboratories Inc. (‘‘Roxane’’), Barr
Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Ranbaxy
Pharmaceuticals Inc. Mylan is the
market leader with nearly 57 percent
share, followed by Merck/Par with 21
percent, and Roxane with 19 percent.
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After Mylan’s acquisition of Merck
Generics, Mylan’s market share would
increase to approximately 78 percent
and the number of suppliers of generic
flecainide would decrease from five to
four.
Guanfacine hydrochloride, the generic
version of the branded drug Tenex, is an
alpha blocker used to treat hypertension
that comes in both 1 mg and 2 mg
strengths. Mylan is the market leader
with nearly 53 percent share. Watson
Pharmaceuticals Inc. (‘‘Watson’’),
Merck/Par, Actavis Group hf.
(‘‘Actavis’’), Major Pharmaceuticals Inc.
and Qualitest Pharmaceuticals Inc. also
manufacture and sell generic guanfacine
tablets in the United States, although
not all six suppliers are capable of
supplying all formulations. For
instance, Mylan, Merck/Par, Watson and
Actavis, are the only suppliers of the 2
mg formulation of guanfacine. Because
many customers prefer to purchase the
1 mg and 2 mg formulations of the
product from one supplier, the
competitive significance of the other
four suppliers who do not sell these
formulations is limited.
Nicardipine hydrochloride is a
calcium channel blocker used to treat
hypertension. Mylan, Merck, and Teva
Pharmaceutical Industries Ltd. (‘‘Teva’’)
are the only manufacturers of generic
nicardipine capsules in the United
States, with respective market shares of
54 percent, 32 percent and 14 percent.
The proposed transaction would thus
result in an increase in Mylan’s market
share to approximately 86 percent and
reduce the number of suppliers from
three to two.
Generic sotalol AF is a beta blocker
used to treat hypertension. The market
for sotalol AF is led by Apotex Inc.
(‘‘Apotex’’). Merck and Mylan are the
only other significant competitors to
Apotex in the generic sotalol AF tablet
market. Merck launched its sotalol AF
product in late 2006, followed by Mylan
in the spring of 2007. Therefore, the
proposed transaction would reduce the
number of suppliers from three to two.
Entry
Entry into the markets for the
manufacture and sale of the Products
would not be timely, likely or sufficient
in its magnitude, character, and scope to
deter or counteract the anticompetitive
effects of the acquisition. Entry would
not take place in a timely manner
because the combination of generic drug
development times and FDA drug
approval requirements takes at least two
years. Entry would not be likely because
the relevant markets are relatively small
and in decline, so the limited sales
opportunities available to a new entrant
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are likely insufficient to warrant the
time and investment necessary to enter.
Effects
The proposed acquisition would
cause significant anticompetitive harm
to consumers in the U.S. markets for the
manufacture and sale of generic
acebutolol hydrochloride capsules,
flecainide acetate tablets, guanfacine
hydrochloride tablets, nicardipine
hydrochloride capsules, and sotalol
hydrochloride AF tablets. In generic
pharmaceutical markets, pricing is
heavily influenced by the number of
competitors that participate in a given
market. Here, the evidence shows that,
given the small number of suppliers, the
prices of the generic pharmaceutical
products at issue decrease with the
entry of each additional competitor.
Evidence gathered during our
investigation indicates that
anticompetitive effects—whether
unilateral or coordinated—are likely to
result from the proposed transaction
due to a decrease in the number of
independent competitors in the markets
at issue.
The acquisition of Merck by Mylan
would create a monopoly in the market
for generic acebutolol hydrochloride
tablets. The evidence indicates that the
presence of more than one competitor
allows customers to negotiate lower
prices and that the reduction in the
number of competitors in this market
would allow the merged entity to
unilaterally exercise market power with
a resulting increase in prices. In the
markets for generic flecainide acetate
tablets, generic nicardipine
hydrochloride capsules, and generic
sotalol AF tablets, the proposed
acquisition would leave only two
significant current competitors: the
combined firm and one other company.
The evidence indicates that the
presence of three or more independent
competitors in these markets allows
customers to negotiate lower prices, and
that a reduction in the number of
competitors in these markets would
allow the merged entity and other
market participants to raise prices.
Likewise, in the generic guanfacine
hydrochloride tablet market, the
reduction in the number of competitors
also would likely lead to higher prices.
The competitive concerns can be
characterized as both unilateral and
coordinated in nature. The homogenous
nature of the products involved, the
minimal incentives to deviate, and the
relatively predictable prospects of
gaining new business all indicate that
the firms in the market will find it
profitable to coordinate their pricing.
The impact that a reduction in the
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 195 / Wednesday, October 10, 2007 / Notices
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number of firms would have on pricing
can also be explained in terms of
unilateral effects, as the likelihood that
the merging parties would be the first
and second choices in a significant
number of bidding situations is
enhanced where the number of firms
participating in the market decreases
substantially.
The Consent Agreement
The proposed Consent Agreement
effectively remedies the proposed
acquisition’s anticompetitive effects in
the relevant product markets. Pursuant
to the Consent Agreement, Mylan and
Merck are required to divest certain
rights and assets related to the Products
to a Commission-approved acquirer no
later than ten (10) days after the
acquisition. Specifically, the proposed
Consent Agreement requires that Merck
divest its assets in the Products to
Amneal.
The acquirer of the divested assets
must receive the prior approval of the
Commission. The Commission’s goal in
evaluating a possible purchaser of
divested assets is to maintain the
competitive environment that existed
prior to the acquisition. A proposed
acquirer of divested assets must not
itself present competitive problems.
Amneal, a small but growing generic
manufacturer, is particularly wellpositioned to manufacture and market
its acquired products and compete
effectively in those markets. Amneal
develops, manufacturers, sells, and
distributes generic pharmaceuticals
within the United States. Moreover,
Amneal will not present competitive
problems in any of the markets in which
it will acquire a divested asset because
it currently does not compete in those
markets. With its resources, capabilities,
good reputation, and experience
marketing generic products, Amneal is
well-positioned to replicate the
competition that would be lost with the
proposed acquisition.
If the Commission determines that
Amneal is not an acceptable acquirer of
the assets to be divested, or that the
manner of the divestitures to Amneal is
not acceptable, the parties must unwind
the sale and divest the assets within six
(6) months of the date the Order
becomes final to another Commissionapproved acquirer. If the parties fail to
divest within six (6) months, the
Commission may appoint a trustee to
divest the Products.
The proposed remedy contains
several provisions to ensure that the
divestitures are successful. The Order
requires Mylan and Merck to provide
transitional services to enable the
Commission-approved acquirer to
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19:46 Oct 09, 2007
Jkt 211001
obtain all of the necessary approvals
from the FDA. These transitional
services include technology transfer
assistance to manufacture the Products
in substantially the same manner and
quality employed or achieved by Merck.
The Commission has appointed R.
Owen Richards of Quantic Regulatory
Services, LLC (‘‘Quantic’’) to oversee the
asset transfer and to ensure Mylan and
Merck’s compliance with all of the
provisions of the proposed Consent
Agreement. Mr. Richards is President of
Quantic and has several years of
experience in the pharmaceutical
industry. He is a highly-qualified expert
on FDA regulatory matters and currently
advises Quantic clients on achieving
satisfactory regulatory compliance and
interfacing with the FDA. In order to
ensure that the Commission remains
informed about the status of the
proposed divestitures and the transfers
of assets, the proposed Consent
Agreement requires Mylan and Merck to
file reports with the Commission
periodically until the divestitures and
transfers are accomplished.
The purpose of this analysis is to
facilitate public comment on the
proposed Consent Agreement, and it is
not intended to constitute an official
interpretation of the proposed Order or
to modify its terms in any way.
By direction of the Commission.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7–19892 Filed 10–9–07: 8:45 am]
[BILLING CODE 6750–01–S]
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES
Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention
[30–Day–08–07AY]
Agency Forms Undergoing Paperwork
Reduction Act Review
The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) publishes a list of
information collection requests under
review by the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) in compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C.
Chapter 35). To request a copy of these
requests, call the CDC Reports Clearance
Officer at (404) 639–5960 or send an
e-mail to omb@cdc.gov. Send written
comments to CDC Desk Officer, Office of
Management and Budget, Washington,
DC or by fax to (202) 395–6974. Written
comments should be received within 30
days of this notice.
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57581
Proposed Project
Long-Term Efficacy of a Program to
Prevent Beryllium Disease—New—
National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
Background and Brief Description
Beryllium is a lightweight metal with
many applications. Exposed workers
may be found in the primary
production, nuclear power and
weapons, aerospace, scrap metal
reclamation, specialty ceramics, and
electronics industries, among others.
The size of the USA workforce at risk
of chronic beryllium disease (CBD),
from either current or past work-related
exposure to the metal, may be as high
as one million. Demand for beryllium is
growing worldwide, which means that
increasing numbers of workers are likely
to be exposed.
Exposure to beryllium can lead to
sensitization and cause an immunologic
granulomatous lung disease.
Sensitization is a cell-mediated allergictype response that may be detected in
the peripheral blood with the beryllium
lymphocyte proliferation test (BeLPT),
which is used by the industry as a
surveillance tool. Workers found to be
sensitized may be clinically evaluated
for CBD with tests including
bronchoalveolar lavage and
transbronchial biopsy. Cross-sectional
studies in various beryllium workplace
populations have identified
sensitization in the range of less than
1% to 14% of workers. The proportion
of sensitized workers who have
beryllium disease at initial clinical
evaluation has varied from 10 to 100%
in different workplaces. Sensitized
workers not initially diagnosed with
CBD are often diagnosed with the
disease upon follow-up, but whether all
sensitized workers will eventually
develop beryllium disease is unknown.
Industry screening programs have
enabled the identification of CBD in
persons without apparent symptoms,
often early in disease progression (often
referred to as ‘‘subclinical disease’’).
Progression from sensitization to
subclinical disease to clinical
impairment, while difficult to predict
for any one individual, is not
uncommon.
Currently, there are no preventive
programs that have been demonstrated
to have long-term effectiveness in
preventing beryllium sensitization and
CBD among beryllium-exposed workers.
In the United States, recent short-term
evidence (i.e., average work tenure 16
months, maximum four years) at one
facility suggests that the comprehensive
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 195 (Wednesday, October 10, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 57579-57581]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-19892]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION
[File No. 071 0164]
Mylan Laboratories and E. Merck oHG; Analysis of Agreement
Containing Consent Orders to Aid Public Comment
AGENCY: Federal Trade Commission.
ACTION: Proposed Consent Agreement.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The consent agreement in this matter settles alleged
violations of federal law prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or
practices or unfair methods of competition. The attached Analysis to
Aid Public Comment describes both the allegations in the draft
complaint and the terms of the consent order--embodied in the consent
agreement--that would settle these allegations.
DATES: Comments must be received on or before October 27, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Interested parties are invited to submit written comments.
Comments should refer to ``Mylan/Merck, File No. 071 0164,'' to
facilitate the organization of comments. A comment filed in paper form
should include this reference both in the text and on the envelope, and
should be mailed or delivered to the following address: Federal Trade
Commission/Office of the Secretary, Room 135-H, 600 Pennsylvania
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20580. Comments containing confidential
material must be filed in paper form, must be clearly labeled
``Confidential,'' and must comply with Commission Rule 4.9(c). 16 CFR
4.9(c) (2005).\1\ The FTC is requesting that any comment filed in paper
form be sent by courier or overnight service, if possible, because U.S.
postal mail in the Washington area and at the Commission is subject to
delay due to heightened security precautions. Comments that do not
contain any nonpublic information may instead be filed in electronic
form as part of or as an attachment to email messages directed to the
following e-mail box: consentagreement@ftc.gov. The FTC Act and other
laws the Commission administers permit the collection of public
comments to consider and use in this proceeding as appropriate. All
timely and responsive public comments, whether filed in paper or
electronic form, will be considered by the Commission, and will be
available to the public on the FTC Web site, to the extent practicable,
at https://www.ftc.gov. As a matter of discretion, the FTC makes every
effort to remove home contact information for individuals from the
public comments it receives before placing those commentson the FTC Web
site. More information, including routine uses permitted by the Privacy
Act, may be found in the FTC's privacy policy, athttps://www.ftc.gov/
ftc/privacy.htm.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kari A. Wallace (202) 326-3085, Bureau
of Competition, Room NJ-5108, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20580.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The comment must be accompanied by an explicit request for
confidential treatment, including the factual and legal basis for
the request, and must identify the specific portions of the comment
to be withheld from the public record. The request will be granted
or denied by the Commission's General Counsel, consistent with
applicable law and the public interest. See Commission Rule 4.9(c),
16 CFR 4.9(c).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 6(f) of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 721, 15 U.S.C. 46(f), and Sec. 2.34 of
the Commission Rules of Practice, 16 CFR 2.34, notice is hereby given
that the above-captioned consent agreement containing a consent order
to cease and desist, having been filed with and accepted, subject to
final approval, by the Commission, has been placed on the public record
for a period of thirty (30) days. The following Analysis to Aid Public
Comment describes the terms of the consent agreement, and the
allegations in the complaint. An electronic copy of the full text of
the consent agreement package can be obtained from the FTC Home Page
(for September 27, 2007), on the World Wide Web, at https://www.ftc.gov/
os/2007/09/index.htm. A paper copy can be obtained from the FTC Public
Reference Room, Room 130-H, 600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW., Washington,
DC 20580, either in person or by calling (202) 326-2222.
Public comments are invited, and may be filed with the Commission
in either paper or electronic form. All comments should be filed as
prescribed in the ADDRESSES section above, and must be received on or
before the date specified in the DATES section.
Analysis of Agreement Containing Consent Order to Aid Public Comment
The Federal Trade Commission (``Commission'') has accepted, subject
to final approval, an Agreement Containing Consent Orders (``Consent
Agreement'') from Mylan Laboratories (``Mylan'') and E. Merck oHG
(``Merck'') which is designed to remedy the anticompetitive effects of
the acquisition of certain assets of Merck by Mylan. Under the terms of
the proposed Consent Agreement, the companies would be required to
assign and divest the Merck rights and assets necessary to manufacture
and market generic: (1) Acebutolol hydrochloride capsules; (2)
flecainide acetate tablets; (3) guanfacine hydrochloride tablets; (4)
nicardipine hydrochloride capsules; and (5) sotalol hydrochloride AF
tablets to Amneal Pharmaceuticals LLC (``Amneal'').
The proposed Consent Agreement has been placed on the public record
for thirty (30) days for receipt of comments by interested persons.
Comments received during this period will become part of the public
record. After thirty (30) days, the Commission will again review the
proposed Consent Agreement and the comments received, and will decide
whether it should withdraw from the proposed Consent Agreement, modify
it, or make final the Decision and Order (``Order'').
Pursuant to an Agreement and Plan of Merger executed on May 12 and
13, 2007, Mylan proposes to acquire Merck's generic subsidiary (``Merck
Generics'') and all subsidiaries held directly or indirectly by Merck
Generics, by acquiring 100 percent of the issued shares of those
subsidies for approximately $6.6 billion. The Commission's Complaint
alleges that the proposed acquisition, if consummated, would violate
section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 18, and
section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
Sec. 45, by lessening competition in the U.S. markets for the
manufacture and sale of the following generic pharmaceutical products:
(1) Acebutolol hydrochloride capsules; (2) flecainide acetate tablets;
(3) guanfacine hydrochloride tablets; (4) nicardipine hydrochloride
capsules; and (5) sotalol hydrochloride AF tablets (the ``Products'').
The proposed Consent Agreement will remedy the alleged violations by
replacing the lost competition that would result from the acquisition
in each of these markets.
Mylan is a leading developer, manufacturer, marketer, and
distributor of generic pharmaceutical drugs. Headquartered in
Pennsylvania, Mylan
[[Page 57580]]
sells generic pharmaceuticals in the United States and has
manufacturing facilities throughout the country. Merck is a German
pharmaceutical company that develops and manufactures pharmaceutical
products for sale in the United States. Merck sells generic
pharmaceutical products directly to customers in the United States
through its subsidiary Genpharm L.P., as well as indirectly through
distribution agreements with other generic companies, including Par
Pharmaceutical Companies, Inc. (``Par'').
The Products and Structure of the Markets
The proposed acquisition of certain assets of Merck by Mylan would
strengthen Mylan's worldwide position in generic pharmaceuticals and
provide Mylan with a stronger pipeline of generic products. The
companies overlap in a number of generic pharmaceutical markets, and if
consummated, the transaction likely would lead to anticompetitive
effects in five of these markets.
The transaction would reduce the number of competing generic
suppliers in the overlap markets. The number of generic suppliers has a
direct and substantial effect on generic pricing as each additional
generic supplier can have a competitive impact on the market. Because
there are multiple generic equivalents for each of the products at
issue here, the branded versions no longer significantly constrain the
generics' pricing.
In the market for generic acebutolol capsules, Mylan and Merck are
the only companies manufacturing and selling products in the United
States. For the four other generic products, Mylan and Merck currently
are two of a small number of suppliers offering the product. In each of
these markets, there are a limited number of competitors.
Generic acebutolol hydrochloride is a beta blocker used to treat
hypertension. Mylan and Merck/Par are the only suppliers of generic
acebutolol capsules in the United States, with respective market shares
of approximately 59 and 41 percent. Therefore, the proposed transaction
would give Mylan a monopoly in this market.
Generic flecainide acetate is an anti-arrhythmia drug used to treat
heart problems. Flecainide is produced and sold by five companies in
the United States: Mylan, Merck/Par, Roxane Laboratories Inc.
(``Roxane''), Barr Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Ranbaxy Pharmaceuticals
Inc. Mylan is the market leader with nearly 57 percent share, followed
by Merck/Par with 21 percent, and Roxane with 19 percent. After Mylan's
acquisition of Merck Generics, Mylan's market share would increase to
approximately 78 percent and the number of suppliers of generic
flecainide would decrease from five to four.
Guanfacine hydrochloride, the generic version of the branded drug
Tenex, is an alpha blocker used to treat hypertension that comes in
both 1 mg and 2 mg strengths. Mylan is the market leader with nearly 53
percent share. Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc. (``Watson''), Merck/Par,
Actavis Group hf. (``Actavis''), Major Pharmaceuticals Inc. and
Qualitest Pharmaceuticals Inc. also manufacture and sell generic
guanfacine tablets in the United States, although not all six suppliers
are capable of supplying all formulations. For instance, Mylan, Merck/
Par, Watson and Actavis, are the only suppliers of the 2 mg formulation
of guanfacine. Because many customers prefer to purchase the 1 mg and 2
mg formulations of the product from one supplier, the competitive
significance of the other four suppliers who do not sell these
formulations is limited.
Nicardipine hydrochloride is a calcium channel blocker used to
treat hypertension. Mylan, Merck, and Teva Pharmaceutical Industries
Ltd. (``Teva'') are the only manufacturers of generic nicardipine
capsules in the United States, with respective market shares of 54
percent, 32 percent and 14 percent. The proposed transaction would thus
result in an increase in Mylan's market share to approximately 86
percent and reduce the number of suppliers from three to two.
Generic sotalol AF is a beta blocker used to treat hypertension.
The market for sotalol AF is led by Apotex Inc. (``Apotex''). Merck and
Mylan are the only other significant competitors to Apotex in the
generic sotalol AF tablet market. Merck launched its sotalol AF product
in late 2006, followed by Mylan in the spring of 2007. Therefore, the
proposed transaction would reduce the number of suppliers from three to
two.
Entry
Entry into the markets for the manufacture and sale of the Products
would not be timely, likely or sufficient in its magnitude, character,
and scope to deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects of the
acquisition. Entry would not take place in a timely manner because the
combination of generic drug development times and FDA drug approval
requirements takes at least two years. Entry would not be likely
because the relevant markets are relatively small and in decline, so
the limited sales opportunities available to a new entrant are likely
insufficient to warrant the time and investment necessary to enter.
Effects
The proposed acquisition would cause significant anticompetitive
harm to consumers in the U.S. markets for the manufacture and sale of
generic acebutolol hydrochloride capsules, flecainide acetate tablets,
guanfacine hydrochloride tablets, nicardipine hydrochloride capsules,
and sotalol hydrochloride AF tablets. In generic pharmaceutical
markets, pricing is heavily influenced by the number of competitors
that participate in a given market. Here, the evidence shows that,
given the small number of suppliers, the prices of the generic
pharmaceutical products at issue decrease with the entry of each
additional competitor. Evidence gathered during our investigation
indicates that anticompetitive effects--whether unilateral or
coordinated--are likely to result from the proposed transaction due to
a decrease in the number of independent competitors in the markets at
issue.
The acquisition of Merck by Mylan would create a monopoly in the
market for generic acebutolol hydrochloride tablets. The evidence
indicates that the presence of more than one competitor allows
customers to negotiate lower prices and that the reduction in the
number of competitors in this market would allow the merged entity to
unilaterally exercise market power with a resulting increase in prices.
In the markets for generic flecainide acetate tablets, generic
nicardipine hydrochloride capsules, and generic sotalol AF tablets, the
proposed acquisition would leave only two significant current
competitors: the combined firm and one other company. The evidence
indicates that the presence of three or more independent competitors in
these markets allows customers to negotiate lower prices, and that a
reduction in the number of competitors in these markets would allow the
merged entity and other market participants to raise prices. Likewise,
in the generic guanfacine hydrochloride tablet market, the reduction in
the number of competitors also would likely lead to higher prices.
The competitive concerns can be characterized as both unilateral
and coordinated in nature. The homogenous nature of the products
involved, the minimal incentives to deviate, and the relatively
predictable prospects of gaining new business all indicate that the
firms in the market will find it profitable to coordinate their
pricing. The impact that a reduction in the
[[Page 57581]]
number of firms would have on pricing can also be explained in terms of
unilateral effects, as the likelihood that the merging parties would be
the first and second choices in a significant number of bidding
situations is enhanced where the number of firms participating in the
market decreases substantially.
The Consent Agreement
The proposed Consent Agreement effectively remedies the proposed
acquisition's anticompetitive effects in the relevant product markets.
Pursuant to the Consent Agreement, Mylan and Merck are required to
divest certain rights and assets related to the Products to a
Commission-approved acquirer no later than ten (10) days after the
acquisition. Specifically, the proposed Consent Agreement requires that
Merck divest its assets in the Products to Amneal.
The acquirer of the divested assets must receive the prior approval
of the Commission. The Commission's goal in evaluating a possible
purchaser of divested assets is to maintain the competitive environment
that existed prior to the acquisition. A proposed acquirer of divested
assets must not itself present competitive problems.
Amneal, a small but growing generic manufacturer, is particularly
well-positioned to manufacture and market its acquired products and
compete effectively in those markets. Amneal develops, manufacturers,
sells, and distributes generic pharmaceuticals within the United
States. Moreover, Amneal will not present competitive problems in any
of the markets in which it will acquire a divested asset because it
currently does not compete in those markets. With its resources,
capabilities, good reputation, and experience marketing generic
products, Amneal is well-positioned to replicate the competition that
would be lost with the proposed acquisition.
If the Commission determines that Amneal is not an acceptable
acquirer of the assets to be divested, or that the manner of the
divestitures to Amneal is not acceptable, the parties must unwind the
sale and divest the assets within six (6) months of the date the Order
becomes final to another Commission-approved acquirer. If the parties
fail to divest within six (6) months, the Commission may appoint a
trustee to divest the Products.
The proposed remedy contains several provisions to ensure that the
divestitures are successful. The Order requires Mylan and Merck to
provide transitional services to enable the Commission-approved
acquirer to obtain all of the necessary approvals from the FDA. These
transitional services include technology transfer assistance to
manufacture the Products in substantially the same manner and quality
employed or achieved by Merck.
The Commission has appointed R. Owen Richards of Quantic Regulatory
Services, LLC (``Quantic'') to oversee the asset transfer and to ensure
Mylan and Merck's compliance with all of the provisions of the proposed
Consent Agreement. Mr. Richards is President of Quantic and has several
years of experience in the pharmaceutical industry. He is a highly-
qualified expert on FDA regulatory matters and currently advises
Quantic clients on achieving satisfactory regulatory compliance and
interfacing with the FDA. In order to ensure that the Commission
remains informed about the status of the proposed divestitures and the
transfers of assets, the proposed Consent Agreement requires Mylan and
Merck to file reports with the Commission periodically until the
divestitures and transfers are accomplished.
The purpose of this analysis is to facilitate public comment on the
proposed Consent Agreement, and it is not intended to constitute an
official interpretation of the proposed Order or to modify its terms in
any way.
By direction of the Commission.
Donald S. Clark,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. E7-19892 Filed 10-9-07: 8:45 am]
[BILLING CODE 6750-01-S]