Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs, 56287-56308 [07-4886]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 191 (Wednesday, October 3, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 56287-56308]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-4886]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

10 CFR Part 52

RIN 3150-AI19


Consideration of Aircraft Impacts for New Nuclear Power Reactor 
Designs

AGENCY: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) 
is proposing to amend its regulations to require applicants for new 
standard design certifications that do not reference a standard design 
approval; new standard design approvals; combined licenses that do not 
reference a standard design certification, standard design approval, or 
manufactured reactor; and new manufacturing licenses that do not 
reference a standard design certification or standard design approval 
to assess the effects of the impact of a large, commercial aircraft on 
the nuclear power plant. Based on the insights gained from this 
assessment, the applicant shall include in its application a 
description and evaluation of design features, functional capabilities, 
and strategies to avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the 
effects of the aircraft impact with reduced reliance on operator 
actions. The impact of a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-
basis event, and the NRC's requirements applicable to the design, 
construction, testing, operation, and maintenance of design features, 
functional capabilities, and strategies for design basis events would 
not be applicable to design features, functional capabilities, or 
strategies selected by the applicant solely to meet the requirements of 
this rule. The objective of this rule is to require nuclear power plant 
designers to perform a rigorous assessment of design features that 
could provide additional inherent protection to avoid or mitigate, to 
the extent practicable, the effects of an aircraft impact, with reduced 
reliance on operator actions.

DATES: Submit comments on this proposed rule by December 17, 2007. 
Submit comments on the information collection aspects on this proposed 
rule by November 2, 2007. Comments received after the above dates will 
be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of 
consideration cannot be given to comments received after these dates.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments by any one of the following methods. 
Please include the following number RIN 3150-AI19 in the subject line 
of your comments. Comments on rulemakings submitted in writing or in 
electronic form will be made available to the public in their entirety 
on the NRC rulemaking Web site. Personal information, such as your 
name, address, telephone number, e-mail address, etc., will not be 
removed from your submission.
    Submit comments via the Federal eRulemaking Portal https://
www.regulations.gov.
    Mail comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff.
    E-mail comments to: SECY@nrc.gov. If you do not receive a reply e-
mail confirming that we have received your comments, contact us 
directly at 301-415-1966.
    Hand deliver comments to: 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 
20852, between 7:30 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. (Telephone 
301-415-1966).
    Fax comments to: Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission at 
301-415-1101.
    You may submit comments on the information collections by the 
methods indicated in the Paperwork Reduction Act Statement.
    Publicly available documents related to this rulemaking may be 
viewed electronically on the public computers located at the NRC's 
Public Document Room (PDR), O1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland. The PDR reproduction contractor 
will copy documents for a fee.
    Publicly available documents created or received at the NRC after 
November 1, 1999, are available electronically at the NRC's Electronic 
Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. From this 
site, the public can gain entry into ADAMS, which provides text and 
image files of NRC's public documents. If you do not have access to 
ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in 
ADAMS, contact the PDR Reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737 
or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr. Stewart Schneider, Office of 
Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 301-415-1462; e-mail: sxs4@nrc.gov 
or Ms. Nanette Gilles, Office of New Reactors, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission,

[[Page 56288]]

Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone 301-415-1180; e-mail: nvg@nrc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Introduction
II. Currently Operating Power Reactors
III. Currently Approved Standard Design Certifications
IV. Renewal of a Standard Design Certification, Combined License, or 
Manufacturing License
V. Newly Designed Power Reactors
    A. Introduction
    B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impact
    C. Aircraft Impact Assessment
    D. Evaluation of Design Features, Functional Capabilities, and 
Strategies
VI. Section-by-Section Analysis
VII. Guidance
VIII. Specific Request for Comments
IX. Availability of Documents
X. Plain Language
XI. Agreement State Compatibility
XII. Voluntary Consensus Standards
XIII. Finding of No Significant Environmental Impact: Availability
XIV. Paperwork Reduction Act Statement
XV. Regulatory Analysis
XVI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification
XVII. Backfit Analysis

I. Introduction

    The Commission believes that it is prudent for nuclear power plant 
designers to take into account the potential effects of the impact of a 
large, commercial aircraft. The Commission has determined that the 
impact of a large, commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event 
and has chosen an approach consistent with NRC's previous approach to 
such events. The overriding objective of this rule is to require 
nuclear power plant designers to perform a rigorous assessment of 
design and other features that could provide additional inherent 
protection to avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the effects 
of an aircraft impact, with reduced reliance on operator actions. In 
this manner, this rule would result in newly designed power reactor 
facilities being more inherently robust with regard to a potential 
aircraft impact than if they were designed in the absence of this rule. 
This rule thus provides an enhanced level of protection beyond that 
which is provided by the existing adequate protection requirements, 
which all operating power reactors are required to meet, and which 
would be provided by the proposed adequate protection requirements that 
the facilities will be required to meet when finalized (see the 
proposed 10 CFR part 73, ``Physical Protection of Plants and 
Materials,'' power reactor security requirements (71 FR 62663; October 
26, 2006)).
    The proposed rule would require applicants for new standard design 
certifications that do not reference a standard design approval; new 
standard design approvals; combined licenses that do not reference a 
standard design certification, standard design approval, or 
manufactured reactor; and new manufacturing licenses that do not 
reference a standard design certification or standard design approval, 
and those applicants with applications pending on the effective date of 
this rule (relevant applicants), to perform an aircraft impact 
assessment of the effects on the designed facility of the impact of a 
large, commercial aircraft. Based on the insights derived from that 
assessment, the application would have to include a description and 
evaluation of the design features, functional capabilities, and 
strategies to avoid or mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact, 
addressing core cooling capability, containment integrity and spent 
fuel pool integrity. The applicant would be required to describe how 
such design and other features avoid or mitigate, to the extent 
practicable, the aircraft impact effects with reduced reliance on 
operator actions.
    The Commission has determined that the impact of a large, 
commercial aircraft is a beyond-design-basis event. For this reason, 
the Commission-approved final design basis threat (DBT) does not 
include an aircraft attack. The NRC published its final DBT rule, Title 
10, Section 73.1, ``Purpose and Scope,'' of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR 73.1), in the Federal Register on March 19, 2007 
(72 FR 12705). Two well-established bases support the exclusion of 
aircraft attacks from the DBT. First, it is not reasonable to expect a 
licensee with a private security force using weapons legally available 
to it to be able to defend against such an attack. Second, such an act 
is in the nature of an attack by an enemy of the United States. Power 
reactor licensees are not required to design their facilities or 
otherwise provide measures to defend against such an attack, as 
provided by 10 CFR 50.13, ``Attacks and Destructive Acts by Enemies of 
the United States; and Defense Activities.''
    The Commission has addressed aircraft attacks by regulatory means 
other than the DBT rule in 10 CFR 73.1. By Order dated February 25, 
2002 (Interim Compensatory Measures (ICM) Order), the Commission 
required all operating power reactor licensees to develop and adopt 
mitigative strategies to cope with large fires and explosions from any 
cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR 9792; 
March 4, 2002). The Commission has proposed incorporating the 
continuing requirement to provide for such mitigative measures in the 
NRC's regulations in the proposed 10 CFR part 73 power reactor security 
requirements, specifically the proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55, 
``Requirements for Physical Protection of Licensed Activities in 
Nuclear Power Reactors Against Radiological Sabotage,'' and Appendix C, 
``Licensee Safeguards Contingency Plans,'' to 10 CFR part 73. If these 
requirements, which are promulgated on the basis of adequate protection 
of public health and safety and common defense and security, are 
finalized, all current and future power reactors must satisfy them.
    The current requirements, in conjunction with the currently 
proposed revisions to the security regulations in 10 CFR 73.55 and 
Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, will continue to provide adequate 
protection of the public health and safety and the common defense and 
security. Nevertheless, the Commission has decided to require relevant 
applicants to evaluate possible additional features to avoid or 
mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact beyond satisfying the 
current regulations and the proposed 10 CFR part 73 regulations 
(assuming they become final).
    The Commission's DBT requirements (both orders and existing rules) 
are based on adequate protection of the public health and safety and 
common defense and security. As such, they are excepted from the cost-
benefit analysis that otherwise would be required under 10 CFR 50.109, 
``Backfitting.'' This new proposed rule to address the capability of 
newly designed power reactors relative to a potential aircraft impact 
is based both on enhanced public health and enhanced safety and common 
defense and security but is not necessary for adequate protection. 
Rather, it would be to enhance the facility's inherent robustness.
    Requiring applicants for new reactor designs to perform a rigorous 
aircraft impact assessment and describe design features to address the 
effects of a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact is consistent with the 
NRC's historic approach to beyond-design-basis events and is consistent 
with the NRC's position in its ``Policy Statement on Severe Reactor 
Accidents Regarding Future Designs and Existing Plants'' (50 FR 32138; 
August 8, 1985) (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS) Accession No. ML003711521). The policy statement notes, ``The 
Commission expects that vendors engaged in designing new standard [or 
custom] plants will achieve a higher standard of severe accident safety 
performance than their prior designs.'' The NRC reiterated that

[[Page 56289]]

regulatory approach in its ``Policy Statement on the Regulation of 
Advanced Nuclear Power Plants,'' dated July 8, 1986 (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML051660651), ``The Commission expects that advanced reactors would 
provide more margin prior to exceeding safety limits and/or utilize 
simplified, inherent, passive, or other innovative means to reliably 
accomplish their safety functions.'' This regulatory approach has 
demonstrated its success, as all designs subsequently submitted to and 
certified by the Commission represent substantial improvement in safety 
for operational events and accidents. Therefore, the NRC is proposing 
to require applicants for newly designed facilities to assess the 
effects of an aircraft impact on the designed facility.
    The Commission considered the appropriate location for requirements 
on an aircraft impact assessment during its deliberations on the 
security assessment rulemaking (10 CFR 73.62) proposed by the NRC staff 
in SECY-06-0204, ``Proposed Rulemaking--Security Assessment 
Requirements for New Nuclear Power Reactor Designs (RIN 3150-AH92),'' 
dated September 26, 2006 (ADAMS Accession No. ML062300068). In its 
Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-06-0204, dated April 24, 2007 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML071140119), the Commission disapproved the 
staff's recommended rulemaking as described in SECY-06-0204. The 
Commission directed the NRC staff to include the aircraft impact 
assessment requirements in 10 CFR part 52, ``Licenses, Approvals, and 
Certifications for Nuclear Power Plants,'' (72 FR 49352, August 28, 
2007) to encourage reactor designers to incorporate practicable 
measures at an early stage in the design process. This proposed rule is 
the result of that effort.
    This proposed rule would revise 10 CFR part 52 to require 
applicants for new standard design certifications that do not reference 
a standard design approval; new standard design approvals; combined 
licenses that do not reference a standard design certification, 
standard design approval, or manufactured reactor; and new 
manufacturing licenses that do not reference a standard design 
certification or standard design approval to assess aircraft impact 
assessments and describe the design features and other means to avoid 
or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the effects of an aircraft 
impact with reduced reliance on operator actions. This proposed rule 
renders as duplicative and therefore unnecessary the staff's proposed 
10 CFR 73.62 rule to require security assessments. That rule would have 
required a security assessment which would include mitigation of large 
fires and explosions, a target set analysis, and design features to 
protect target sets against DBTs. The large fires and explosions 
provisions of that rule would be subsumed by this proposed 10 CFR part 
52 aircraft impact rule. Sufficient target set provisions are included 
in the NRC's proposed changes to 10 CFR 73.55, which applicants for new 
facilities would have to satisfy if that rule is made final. Designers 
of new facilities are encouraged to account for the provisions of 10 
CFR 73.55 in the facility design so as to minimize more costly, post-
design features to meet those requirements. Accordingly, the proposed 
10 CFR 73.62 is not necessary because the Commission is proposing a new 
10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact assessment rule.
    In contrast to its relation to a possible security assessment rule, 
however, the new 10 CFR part 52 aircraft impact assessment rule would 
complement the proposed revisions to 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 
CFR part 73, to mitigate the effects of large fires and explosions. The 
proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 provisions on 
mitigating large fires and explosions codify the adequate protection 
requirement imposed on existing operating reactors by ICM Order, Item 
B.5.b. These provisions of the proposed 10 CFR part 73 rule, therefore, 
are necessary for adequate protection and must remain in regulations 
\1\ that are applicable to all currently operating reactors and must be 
satisfied by all newly licensed reactors.
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    \1\ By Order dated February 25, 2002 (ICM Order), the Commission 
required all operating power reactors to develop and adopt 
mitigative strategies to cope with large fires and explosions from 
any cause, including beyond-design-basis aircraft impacts (67 FR 
9792; March 4, 2002).
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    Regarding large fires and explosions, which are two likely effects 
of an aircraft impact, the proposed Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 is 
limited to mitigative strategies ``using existing or readily-available 
resources,'' which effectively can be adapted to existing facilities. 
For example, certain facility features might be virtually cost-free if 
designed into the facility (e.g., spatially diverse containment 
penetrations) but effectively impossible to retrofit. Thus, strategies 
that were not required by ICM Order, Item B.5.b, and are not required 
by proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73 because they 
do not use existing or readily available resources, might be 
implemented in new reactor designs because of the aircraft impact 
assessment rule. The proposed aircraft impact assessment rule does not 
deal with a design basis event but would result in facilities with 
additional features to avoid or mitigate the effects of an aircraft 
impact because they would be designed into the facility. Such features 
would reduce reliance on operator actions to cope with an aircraft 
impact event. Thus, this proposed rule is not necessary for adequate 
protection, but rather is an enhancement that will result in newly 
designed facilities being more inherently robust against aircraft 
impacts than the facilities not subject to this proposed rule.
    In contrast to the adequate protection requirements of proposed 10 
CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73, a proposed rule that would 
enhance safety and security by requiring an evaluation of newly 
designed facilities to avoid or mitigate the effects of aircraft 
impacts is appropriate for inclusion in 10 CFR part 52. The NRC is 
therefore proposing to require applicants for newly designed reactors, 
which will have to satisfy the revised 10 CFR part 73 provisions if the 
rule is made final, to also perform an aircraft impact assessment under 
this proposed rule. However, the NRC expects that, compared to a 
licensee for a facility that was not designed to meet the requirements 
of the proposed rule, licensees for facilities that are designed to 
comply with the proposed rule would have much less of a need to develop 
specific procedures, guidance, or other strategies to cope with the 
loss of large areas of the plant due to explosions or fires in order to 
comply with the requirements in the proposed 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix 
C to 10 CFR part 73. The Commission sees this as a significant benefit 
of this proposed rule; namely, that features to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of an aircraft impact are designed into the facility and will 
result in much less reliance on operator actions for such protection.
    Consideration of a rule to require applicants for newly designed 
reactors to perform an aircraft impact assessment and describe design 
and other features addressing such impacts, which are beyond-design-
basis scenarios, is similar to the Commission's consideration in the 
mid-1980's of new rules addressing accidents more severe than design 
basis accidents. The 1985 ``Policy Statement on Severe Reactor 
Accidents'' explained the Commission's conclusion that, although it was 
proposing criteria to show new reactor designs to be acceptable for 
severe accident concerns, then-existing plants posed no undue risk to 
public health

[[Page 56290]]

and safety, and thus, there was no need for action on operating 
reactors based on severe accident risks. The Commission's reasoning in 
the severe accident context supports its conclusion that although new 
reactor designs should be assessed for aircraft impacts and designed to 
avoid or mitigate the effects of an aircraft impact, existing reactors 
and designs provide adequate protection of the public health and safety 
and common defense and security.

II. Currently Operating Power Reactors

    The Commission has determined that the existing designs of 
currently operating nuclear power plants, together with the security 
program actions mandated by the NRC's orders (some of which are 
codified in the NRC's final DBT rulemaking and others of which are 
being incorporated into other NRC regulations), as well as the 
protection provided by other Federal, State, and local entities, 
provide an adequate level of protection to public health and safety and 
common defense and security against aircraft impacts. As a result of 
the events of September 11, 2001, the NRC has undertaken a series of 
actions to provide continued reasonable assurance of adequate 
protection to public health and safety and common defense and security 
at the United States commercial nuclear power facilities. The NRC has 
assessed the potential vulnerabilities of operating nuclear power 
reactors to aircraft impact, and it has issued orders and provided 
associated guidance to licensees for implementing a range of mitigative 
strategies. The results of these aircraft impact assessments were 
derived from detailed calculations of plant damage mechanisms (e.g., 
structural failures, shock and vibration effects, and fire effects). 
The NRC ensured that implementation of the February 25, 2002, ICM Order 
included measures to mitigate such scenarios.
    The Commission's ICM Order, Item B.5.b, first established the 
requirement for licensees to implement certain mitigation measures at 
existing power reactors for these beyond-design-basis events. This 
requirement was specifically intended to address ``losses of large 
areas of a (reactor) plant due to fires and explosions.'' The 
Commission has since incorporated this requirement into the proposed 
rulemaking for 10 CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73. Under the 
proposed 10 CFR part 73 rulemaking, future license applicants must 
identify and implement mitigative measures similar to those required 
for currently operating plants.
    Most recently, the Commission published a final rule on March 19, 
2007 (72 FR 12705), amending the DBT in 10 CFR 73.1. The DBT rule 
describes general attributes that nuclear power plant licensees must 
defend against with high assurance. This rulemaking enhanced the DBT by 
codifying generically applicable security requirements similar to those 
previously imposed by the Commission's April 29, 2003, DBT Orders.
    On the basis of the previous information, the NRC concludes that 
existing power reactors pose no undue risk to public health and safety 
or common defense and security from the effects of an aircraft impact 
based on the Commission's specified aircraft characteristics. 
Therefore, the NRC is not applying the aircraft impact assessment 
requirement in this rulemaking to existing operating nuclear power 
plants.

III. Currently Approved Standard Design Certifications

    The Commission has concluded that the proposed rule need not be 
applied to the four currently approved standard design certifications 
in Appendices A through D to 10 CFR part 52.\2\ Therefore, applicants 
would not need to recertify these standard designs to meet this 
proposed rule. This follows from the Commission's determination that 
the aircraft impact rule is an enhancement above and beyond what is 
necessary for adequate protection and that the aircraft impact 
scenario, as previously explained, is a beyond-design-basis event. Just 
as the currently operating power reactor facilities continue to meet 
adequate protection requirements and do not need to meet this new 
aircraft impact rule, so too are the already certified standard designs 
sufficient to meet adequate protection design requirements. Any reactor 
facility built to one of these already-certified designs will, of 
course, have to satisfy all adequate protection requirements applicable 
to operating power reactors.
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    \2\ The four standard design certifications currently in effect 
are the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor (ABWR) design (Appendix 
A), the System 80+ design (Appendix B), the AP600 design (Appendix 
C), and the AP1000 design (Appendix D).
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    The original applicant (or successor in interest of any of the four 
current standard design certifications) may voluntarily seek to amend 
the standard design certification to add design features, functional 
capabilities, or strategies in accordance with the requirements of 
proposed 10 CFR 52.500, ``Aircraft Impact Assessment.'' The NRC 
encourages voluntary enhancement by the applicants for the four current 
standard design certifications because it will increase the already 
high levels of safety and security provided by these reactor designs. 
Applicants may implement these design modifications in different ways, 
including:
     Applications to amend the existing design certifications.
     Application for a new design certification based on the 
existing certification, but containing the design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies identified as a result of this rule.
     Requests submitted by combined license applicants for 
plant-specific departures from the standard design, where the departure 
implements the modifications developed by the original design 
certification applicant's voluntary implementation of the provisions of 
the proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (these requests may be submitted by each 
individual combined license applicant, or they may be submitted by a 
group of combined license applicants under the provisions of Appendix 
N, ``Standardization of Nuclear Power Plant Designs: Combined Licenses 
to Construct and Operate Nuclear Power Reactors of Identical Design at 
Multiple Sites,'' to 10 CFR part 52 and subpart D, ``Additional 
Procedures Applicable to Proceedings for the Issuance of Licenses to 
Construct and/or Operate Nuclear Power Plants of Identical Design at 
Multiple Sites,'' to 10 CFR part 2, ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings and Issuance of Orders.''

IV. Renewal of a Standard Design Certification, Combined License, or 
Manufacturing License

    The NRC's proposed rulemaking does not require updating of the 
assessment of aircraft impacts required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500 as 
part of an application for either a renewed design certification under 
10 CFR 52.57, ``Application for Renewal,'' a renewed combined license 
under 10 CFR 52.107, ``Application for Renewal,'' and 10 CFR part 54, 
``Requirements for Renewal of Operating Licenses for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' or a renewed manufacturing license under 10 CFR 52.177, 
``Application for Renewal.'' The NRC's requirement for assessment of 
large, commercial aircraft impacts is not an aging-related matter, nor 
is it based on time-limited considerations. Hence, aircraft impacts 
under the proposed rule are outside the scope of any combined license 
renewal proceeding under 10 CFR part 54 and combined license holders do 
not need to update the assessment required by 10 CFR 52.500(b) at the 
license renewal stage. Similarly, aircraft impacts under

[[Page 56291]]

the proposed rule are outside the scope of any manufacturing license 
renewal proceeding under 10 CFR 52.177.

V. Newly Designed Power Reactors

A. Introduction

    Under this proposed rule, relevant applicants for newly designed 
power reactors would be required to undertake the following:
     Perform an assessment of the effects on the designed 
facility of a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact
     Evaluate potential design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies for avoiding or mitigating the effects of 
a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact on the key safety functions of 
the facility
     Describe how such design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 
practicable, the effects of the applicable aircraft impact with reduced 
reliance on operator actions
    The proposed rule is based on the premise that it is desirable for 
future power reactors to avoid or mitigate the effects of the 
applicable aircraft impact through design features that reduce or 
eliminate the need for operator actions. Because this type of 
consideration needs to occur during the development of the design 
itself, the NRC directs the requirements at plant designers.
    The NRC does not expect plant designers to demonstrate that design 
features alone, without any operator action or mitigative response 
activity, will practicably avoid or mitigate the effects of the beyond-
design-basis aircraft impact. The NRC recognizes that the decision to 
rely on design features (as opposed to operator action or mitigative 
strategies) is complex, and often involves a set of trade-offs between 
competing considerations. The NRC's goal is that the designer implement 
a rigorous assessment process to ensure that the design process 
constitutes a reasoned approach for assessing the plant design to 
identify practicable design or other features that either minimize the 
effects of, or mitigate, a beyond-design-basis aircraft impact.

B. Description of Beyond-Design-Basis Aircraft Impact

    Since September 11, 2001, the Commission has used state-of-the art 
technology to assess the effects of aircraft impacts on nuclear power 
plants. As part of a comprehensive review of security for NRC-licensed 
facilities, the NRC conducted detailed, site-specific engineering 
studies of a limited number of nuclear power plants to assess potential 
vulnerabilities of deliberate attacks involving large, commercial 
aircraft. In conducting these studies, the NRC consulted national 
experts from several Department of Energy laboratories using state-of-
the-art structural and fire analyses. The agency also used realistic 
predictions of accident progression and radiological consequences.
    The proposed rule sets forth a general description of the aircraft 
characteristics that are required to be used to perform the beyond-
design-basis aircraft impact assessment. The assessment must be based 
on the Commission's specified aircraft characteristics used to define 
the beyond-design-basis impact of a large, commercial aircraft used for 
long distance flights in the United States, with aviation fuel loading 
typically used in such flights, and an impact speed and angle of impact 
considering the ability of both experienced and inexperienced pilots to 
control large, commercial aircraft at the low altitude representative 
of a nuclear power plant's low profile.
    Beyond these general characteristics, the Commission will specify 
for plant designers in a Safeguards Information (SGI) guidance document 
more detailed characteristics of the large, commercial aircraft that 
should be used in the required assessment. Although the detailed 
aircraft characteristics will be described in an SGI guidance document 
and will not be publicly available because of their potential value to 
terrorists, the description of some of the factors used in selecting 
the parameters is offered to foster a better understanding of this 
rulemaking:
    1. The aircraft used by the terrorists on September 11, 2001. The 
staff has reviewed the results of the September 11, 2001, attacks on 
the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The NRC has used these reviews 
in previous studies for operating reactors. The NRC also used these 
reviews to make its decisions with respect to this rulemaking.
    2. Communications with other U.S. Government agencies. Since 
September 11, 2001, the NRC has worked closely with the Department of 
Homeland Security, the Department of Defense, and other agencies both 
to understand their information on terrorist threats and to communicate 
the NRC's study results.
    3. Communications with foreign governments. A number of foreign 
governments are considering the construction of new nuclear power 
plants. The NRC is communicating with the regulatory authorities in 
these countries to understand their requirements and to convey its own 
results and plans.
    4. Evaluations of commercial aircraft. The NRC has studied the 
types, numbers, and characteristics of commercial aircraft flown in 
U.S. airspace.
    Because this proposed rule is intended to provide added features to 
avoid or mitigate the effects of a beyond-design-basis event, the 
choice of aircraft characteristics and the scenario used for this 
analysis will not be linked to threat assessments or to any evolution 
of aircraft design. The proposed rule would require that the design-
specific impact assessment use the Commission-specified aircraft 
characteristics as described in proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b). As stated 
previously, more specific details about the aircraft characteristics 
specified by the Commission will be contained in a separate guidance 
document under SGI controls. Because the guidance containing the more 
detailed aircraft characteristics will be SGI, the document will only 
be made available to those individuals with a need-to-know and who are 
otherwise qualified to have access to SGI. Plant designers (including 
their employees and agents) who meet the Commission's requirements for 
access to SGI would have access to the guidance document containing 
these more detailed characteristics in order to perform the assessments 
required by the proposed rule.
    The Commission has carefully balanced the public interest in 
knowing the characteristics of the specific aircraft to be used in the 
aircraft impact assessment and the need for meaningful comment on 
specific details of the aircraft impact assessment. The result is an 
aircraft impact assessment proposed rule that describes the general 
aircraft characteristics which applicants are required to use in their 
aircraft impact assessments. The text of this proposed rule and the 
associated supplementary information, provide ample information to 
enable meaningful comment on what the aircraft impact assessment should 
entail. No additional information is necessary to understand or to 
comment on the proposed aircraft impact assessment rule. Members of the 
public can provide the Commission their views on this rulemaking 
regarding the design areas to be addressed in the assessment, functions 
to be evaluated for possible enhancement, and criteria for assessing 
practicability without having access to the more detailed SGI aircraft 
characteristics. Therefore, access to the proposed SGI aircraft 
characteristics contained in the regulatory guidance is not necessary 
to enable meaningful public comment on the proposed aircraft impact 
assessment rule.

[[Page 56292]]

    This regulatory approach is similar to that used by the NRC in 
describing the DBT against which security programs under 10 CFR part 73 
must defend. The general characteristics of the DBT appear in 10 CFR 
73.1. More detailed information of a sensitive nature is contained in 
adversary characteristics documents. As is the case with the 
Commission's aircraft characteristics, the technical bases for these 
documents derive largely from intelligence information and contain SGI 
that must be withheld from public disclosure. They are available only 
on a need-to-know basis to those who are approved for access. In the 
final DBT rule, the NRC was careful to set forth rule text that does 
not compromise licensee security, but it also acknowledges the need to 
keep the public informed of the types of attacks against which nuclear 
power plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities are required to 
defend. The NRC is taking a similar approach in this proposed aircraft 
impact rule. This approach strikes the appropriate balance between 
public disclosure of the regulatory requirements governing nuclear 
power plants, and protection of public health and safety and common 
defense and security.

C. Aircraft Impact Assessment

Technical Issues
    Because the aircraft impact is a beyond-design-basis event, the 
methods and acceptance criteria used should be based on realistic 
assumptions. The aircraft impact assessment would include the items 
detailed in the following paragraphs:
    1. Consideration of aircraft characteristics. The assessment must 
consider a large, commercial aircraft of the type currently in use for 
long distance flights in the United States as described previously in 
this document and in 10 CFR 52.500(b). More detailed characteristics of 
the large, commercial aircraft to be used in this assessment will be 
contained in a separate guidance document under SGI controls.
    2. Plant functions, structures, systems, components, and locations 
to be assessed. The critical functions required to be evaluated in the 
aircraft impact assessment include core cooling, containment integrity, 
and spent fuel pool integrity. Evaluation of the survivability of these 
functions, should consider not only the key components, but also power 
supplies, cable runs, and other components that support these 
functions. The evaluation may take credit for the availability of both 
safety and non-safety equipment. The assessment should evaluate whether 
the structures containing equipment that provides needed functions are 
likely to be affected by the specified large, commercial aircraft 
impact. Factors to be considered in the evaluation include the size and 
location of the structures and the presence of external impediments to 
impact.
    3. Damage mechanisms. The assessment should model the structural 
response, shock and vibration effects, and fire effects of the 
postulated aircraft impact.
    a. Structural assessment. The structural assessment should be based 
on a detailed structural model of the plant taking into account the 
nonlinear materials and geometric behavior. The assessment should 
consider both local and global (plant-wide) behavior, as well as 
thermal effects resulting from fire.
    b. Shock assessment. The assessment should evaluate the local and 
global (plant-wide) shock and vibration effects resulting from the 
postulated impact.
    c. Fire assessment. The fire assessment should consider the extent 
of structural damage and aviation fuel deposition, if any, and spread 
within the impacted buildings. The assessment should consider both 
short- and long-term fire effects.
Regulatory Treatment of the Assessment
    The impact assessment is subject to audit and review by the NRC 
and, therefore, must be maintained by the applicant along with the rest 
of the information that forms the basis for the relevant application, 
consistent with paragraph (b) of 10 CFR 52.0, ``Scope; Applicability of 
10 CFR Chapter I Provisions,'' 10 CFR 50.70, ``Inspections,'' and 10 
CFR 50.71, ``Maintenance of Records, Making of Reports.'' The applicant 
does not need to submit the impact assessment--as opposed to the 
``description and evaluation of the design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies'' required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c)--
to the NRC in its application.
    Under the proposed rule, the NRC will confirm that the impact 
assessment was performed consistent with the regulatory requirements 
and related guidance documents. The NRC may take appropriate 
enforcement action for any violations of applicable NRC requirements, 
including, but not limited to, proposed 10 CFR 52.500, 10 CFR 52.4, 
``Deliberate Misconduct,'' and 10 CFR 52.6, ``Completeness and Accuracy 
of Information.'' A failure to perform the assessment would be a 
violation of the rule. The NRC expects the assessment to be rigorous. 
Any assessment that is inadequate to reasonably assess the aircraft 
impact; to identify practicable design features, functional 
capabilities, or strategies; or to justify non-adoption of potentially 
advantageous design features, functional capabilities, or strategies, 
could be considered a violation of the rule.
    The NRC's decision on an application subject to proposed 10 CFR 
52.500 would be separate from any NRC determination that may be made 
with respect to the adequacy of the impact assessment which the rule 
does not require be submitted to the NRC. Applicants would only be 
required to submit a description and evaluation of the design features, 
functional capabilities, and strategies to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of the applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft impact in their 
final safety analysis report (FSAR) with the understanding that the 
complete aircraft impact assessment would be available for NRC audit 
and review at the applicant's offices, if needed. The NRC expects that, 
generally, the information that it needs to perform its review of the 
application to assess the applicant's compliance with 10 CFR 52.500 
would be that information contained in the applicant's FSAR. Therefore, 
the adequacy of the impact assessment would not be a matter which may 
be the subject of a contention submitted as part of a petition to 
intervene under 10 CFR 2.309, ``Hearing Requests, Petitions to 
Intervene, Requirements for Standing, and Contentions.'' A person who 
seeks NRC rulemaking action with respect to a proposed standard design 
certification on the basis that the impact assessment is inadequate 
could submit comments in the notice and comment phase of that 
rulemaking. A person who seeks rulemaking action after the NRC has 
adopted a final design certification rule on the basis that the impact 
assessment performed for that design certification is inadequate could 
submit a petition for rulemaking under 10 CFR 2.802, ``Petition for 
Rulemaking,'' and 10 CFR 2.803, ``Determination of Petition,'' seeking 
to amend the standard design certification. A person who seeks agency 
enforcement-related action on a combined license or manufacturing 
license on the basis of an inadequate impact assessment could file a 
petition under 10 CFR 2.206, ``Requests for Action Under This 
Subpart.''
    Once the applicant completes the impact assessment, accomplishes 
the evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) based on insights 
gained from the proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) assessment, and includes the 
description and evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) in the 
FSAR,

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the purpose of the impact assessment would be achieved. Accordingly, 
the proposed rule would not require the impact assessment to be 
updated, by either: (1) The design certification applicant whose 
application references a design approval, (2) the design certification 
applicant following the NRC's adoption of a final standard design 
certification rule, (3) a design approval holder, (4) a manufacturing 
license applicant or holder whose application references a design 
certification or design approval, (5) a combined license applicant or 
holder whose application references a design certification, design 
approval, or manufactured reactor, or (6) a combined license holder 
whose application does not reference a design certification, design 
approval, or manufactured reactor and is required to prepare its own 
assessment.
    The provisions of 10 CFR 50.71(c) require that records that are 
required by the regulations in 10 CFR part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of 
Production and Utilization Facilities,'' or 10 CFR part 52 must be 
retained for the period specified by the appropriate regulation. If a 
retention period is not otherwise specified, the licensee must retain 
these records until the Commission terminates the facility license. 
Because proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b) would require the performance of the 
aircraft impact assessment, it falls under the category of ``records 
that are required by the regulations'' and therefore, the licensee 
would be required to retain the assessment until the Commission 
terminates the facility license. The NRC also expects to add specific 
provisions to each standard design certification rule for a design 
covered by proposed 10 CFR 52.500 governing retention of the aircraft 
impact assessment by both the applicant for the design certification 
(including an applicant after the Commission has adopted a final 
standard design certification rule) and a licensee who references that 
design certification. The NRC expects to require applicants and 
licensees to retain the assessment required by 10 CFR 52.500(b) 
throughout the pendency of the application and for the term of the 
certification or license (including any period of renewal). An example 
of such requirements can be found in any of the current design 
certification rules, Section X, ``Records and Reporting,'' of 
Appendices A through D of 10 CFR part 52.
    As discussed in Section VIII, ``Specific Request for Comments,'' of 
this document, the NRC is requesting comments on whether, in lieu of 
the specific design certification rule provisions or reliance on 10 CFR 
50.71(c), it should adopt as part of the final 10 CFR 52.500 rulemaking 
a specific provision that would explicitly mandate the retention of the 
assessment. Such a provision, to be included in an additional paragraph 
of proposed 10 CFR 52.500, would also set forth the proposed period of 
retention for the assessment as the term of the design certification, 
combined license, or manufacturing license.

D. Evaluation of Design Features, Functional Capabilities, and 
Strategies

Technical Issues
    The proposed rule would require designers of new facilities to 
describe how the design features, functional capabilities, and 
strategies adopted based on the insights of the aircraft impact 
assessment avoid or mitigate the effects of the aircraft impact. Plant 
structures critical to maintaining facility safety functions should be 
designed, if practicable, such that an impact does not result in 
structural failure, and aircraft parts and jet fuel do not enter the 
structures. In circumstances in which an impact results in aircraft 
parts and jet fuel entering structures or affecting equipment, plant 
structures and layouts should be evaluated with respect to maintaining 
key safety functions by addressing equipment survivability following 
the entry of aircraft parts and jet fuel and key safety functions are 
accomplished notwithstanding the resulting internal damage resulting 
from structural loads, shock and vibration, and fire.
    As discussed previously, the Commission has issued orders to 
operating plants requiring mitigation of the effects of losing large 
areas of the plant from fires and explosions. These requirements 
include some reliance on operator actions, such as realigning systems 
to ensure continued core cooling following the loss of a large area. 
Because this proposed rule would apply to newly designed facilities 
before construction of the facility, the Commission expects that 
improvements can be made in the plant's design that have the same 
result as operator actions credited in operating plants. Thus, these 
designs should have reduced reliance, relative to current operating 
plants, on operator actions.
    The proposed rule would require applicants to describe how the 
design features, functional capabilities, and strategies avoid or 
mitigate, ``to the extent practicable,'' the effects of the applicable 
aircraft impact with reduced reliance on operator actions. The NRC 
intends this standard to include those design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies that are realistically and reasonably 
feasible from a technical engineering perspective. For example, the NRC 
believes it may be practicable to employ new technologies currently in 
use in the commercial nuclear power industry or in another industry. 
Alternatively, it would not be practicable to introduce a design 
feature that could have adverse safety or security consequences under a 
different operational or accident scenario. This consideration of 
practicability allows the designers to evaluate potential competing 
technical factors, such as the response to earthquakes, while at the 
same time addressing aircraft impacts.
    Nuclear power plants are inherently very robust, secure structures 
designed to withstand tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes, floods, and 
other severe events. They have redundant and diverse safety equipment 
so that if an active component becomes unavailable, another component 
or system will satisfy its function. The results of the Commission's 
evaluation of postulated aircraft impacts on operating reactors 
reinforced the value of design features such as the following:
     Reinforced concrete walls
     Redundancy and spatial separation of key systems, 
structures and components
     Diversity of power supplies
     Compartmentalization of interior structures with pressure 
resisting concrete walls and doors
    The NRC expects the required evaluation to consider the value of 
such design features and of possible improvements in these and other 
features. The applicant must base the evaluation on insights gained 
from the impact assessment performed under proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b).
Regulatory Treatment of the Evaluation
    The NRC will confirm that the evaluation required by 10 CFR 
52.500(c) was performed and that the FSAR includes the necessary 
description and evaluation of the design and other features adopted to 
avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the potential effects of 
the applicable, beyond-design-basis aircraft impact. The NRC will 
review the evaluation contained in the application and reach a 
conclusion as to whether the applicant has conducted an evaluation 
reasonably formulated to identify practicable design and other features 
to avoid or mitigate the potential effects of the applicable, beyond-
design-basis aircraft impact. However, NRC's review of the adequacy of 
the evaluation, and the effectiveness and practicability of the 
applicant-

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selected features, capabilities, and strategies, are separate and 
distinct from the NRC's determination whether to issue a final standard 
design certification rule, a final design approval, a combined license, 
or a manufacturing license. Therefore, as is the case with the impact 
assessment, the NRC will use its established audit and review process 
to ensure the evaluation and determination of practicability was 
performed consistent with the regulatory requirements and related 
guidance documents. The NRC may take appropriate enforcement action for 
any violation of applicable NRC requirements. Inasmuch as the adequacy 
of the evaluation and the practicability of the applicant-selected 
features, capabilities, and strategies, are separate and distinct from 
the approval of the final design in the design certification, design 
approval, combined license, or manufacturing license, there would be no 
issue resolution associated with the assessment regarding the lack of 
effectiveness or practicability of potential design features, 
functional capabilities, and strategies not selected by the applicant 
for inclusion in the certified design.
    The NRC is proposing that the design features, functional 
capabilities, or strategies credited for avoiding or mitigating the 
effects of an aircraft impact be described in Chapter 19 of the FSAR, 
which addresses severe accidents. The design features may include 
structures or features unchanged from the plant design as it existed 
before the aircraft impact assessment (e.g., an existing wall is found 
to be effective), structures or features included in the plant design 
but enhanced to improve the response to an aircraft impact (e.g., an 
existing wall is made stronger), or new structures or features added 
solely to address aircraft impacts (e.g., a new wall). The regulatory 
treatment of the design features (e.g., how changes to the features are 
controlled) depends on which of the above categories apply. For 
example, a design feature added specifically to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of an aircraft impact would be controlled only by requirements 
specifically for control of those design features added in this 
proposed rule or requirements that the NRC expects to add to future 
design certifications that would be subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500. 
A safety-related structure credited in the aircraft impact assessment 
as a design feature would continue to be controlled by Appendix B to 10 
CFR part 50, ``Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and 
Fuel Reprocessing Plants;'' 10 CFR part 21, ``Reporting of Defects and 
Noncompliance;'' and other regulations establishing technical and 
administrative requirements on the non-aircraft impact functions, in 
addition to the proposed requirements for control of features to 
address aircraft impacts.
    For combined licenses not referencing a certified design, the NRC 
is proposing to have change control governed by the requirements in a 
new 10 CFR 52.502, ``Control of Changes to FSAR Information,'' to 
address changes to any design features, functional capabilities, or 
strategies credited for avoiding or mitigating the effects of an 
aircraft impact for a combined license that does not reference a 
certified design. Specifically, the proposed 10 CFR 52.502(c) would 
require that, if the licensee changes the information required by 10 
CFR 52.79(a)(47) to be included in the FSAR, the licensee re-perform 
that portion of the evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) 
that addresses the changed feature, capability, or strategy. The 
licensee would also be required to describe, in the re-evaluation, how 
the modified design features, functional capabilities, and strategies 
avoid or mitigate, to the extent practicable, the effects of the 
applicable aircraft impact with reduced reliance on operator actions. 
Because this rule is being proposed to address a beyond-design-basis 
event, the NRC has determined that it is appropriate to apply the same 
standard to any licensee-proposed changes to features, capabilities, 
and strategies that would be applied during the original evaluation of 
those design features, functional capabilities, and strategies.
    A combined license holder subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 (i.e., 
a licensee whose application does not reference a standard design 
certification, standard design approval, or manufactured reactor) may 
change the design features, functional capabilities, and strategies 
incorporated into the design, in accordance with proposed 10 CFR 
52.502, without prior NRC review and approval, as long as the licensee 
re-performs that portion of the evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 
52.500(c) addressing the changed feature, capability, or strategy. The 
licensee must also describe, in the re-evaluation documented in a 
change to the FSAR, how the modified design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 
practicable, the effects of the applicable aircraft impact with reduced 
reliance on operator actions. Licensees' submittal of this updated 
information to the NRC will be governed by the existing FSAR update 
requirements in 10 CFR 50.71(e).
    A design feature, functional capability, or strategy described in a 
standard design certification may not be changed generically except by 
notice and comment rulemaking, see 10 CFR 52.63, ``Finality of Standard 
Design Certifications,'' paragraphs (a)(1) and (2), and such a change 
must meet one of the criteria in 10 CFR 52.63(a)(1). All referencing 
combined licenses must implement any generic change to a design 
certification rule, as required by 10 CFR 52.63(a)(3).
    The NRC expects to add a new change control provision to future 
design certification rules subject to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 to govern 
combined license holders referencing the design certification that 
request a departure from the design features, functional capabilities, 
or strategies in the referenced design certification. The new change 
control provision would require that, if the licensee changes the 
information required by 10 CFR 52.47(a)(28) to be included in the FSAR 
for the standard design certification, then the licensee must re-
perform that portion of the evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 
52.500(c) addressing the changed feature, capability, or strategy. The 
licensee must also describe, in the re-evaluation documented in a 
change to the FSAR (i.e., a plant-specific departure from the generic 
design control document), how the modified design features, functional 
capabilities, and strategies avoid or mitigate, to the extent 
practicable, the effects of the applicable aircraft impact with reduced 
reliance on operator actions. Licensees' submittal of this updated 
information to the NRC will be governed by the reporting requirements 
in the applicable design certification rule. The NRC expects to 
continue, in future standard design certification rulemakings, its 
practice of adopting reporting requirements analogous to Section X.B of 
the four existing standard design certification rules. Licensees making 
changes to design features, capabilities, or strategies included in the 
certified design or in the plant-specific FSAR may also need to develop 
alternate means to cope with the loss of large areas of the plant from 
explosions or fires to comply with the requirements in the proposed 10 
CFR 73.55 and Appendix C to 10 CFR part 73.
    A design feature, functional capability, or strategy described in a 
standard design approval may not be changed generically except under an 
application for a new design approval. There are no provisions in 10 
CFR part 52 for making generic changes to a

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standard design approval. Paragraph (a) of Section 52.145, ``Finality 
of Standard Design Approvals; Information Requests,'' states that an 
approved design must be used by and relied upon by the NRC staff and 
the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards in their review of any 
individual facility license application that incorporates by reference 
a standard design approval unless there exists significant new 
information that substantially affects the earlier determination or 
other good cause. Therefore, any changes to a design feature, 
functional capability, or strategy described in a standard design 
approval would be subject to review by the NRC in any application that 
references the design approval. Note that 10 CFR 52.131, ``Scope of 
Subpart,'' states that the an applicant may submit standard designs for 
a nuclear power reactor or major portions thereof. To the extent that a 
standard design approval is issued for only portion of a nuclear power 
reactor, any applicant referencing that design approval will have to 
separately comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.500 for any 
portion of the design not addressed in the design approval issued by 
the NRC.
    Under the provisions of 10 CFR 52.171, ``Finality of Manufacturing 
Licenses; Information Requests,'' the holder of a manufacturing license 
may not make changes to the design features, functional capabilities, 
or strategies described in the FSAR without prior Commission approval. 
The request for a change to the design must be in the form of an 
application for a license amendment, and must meet the requirements of 
10 CFR 50.90, ``Application for Amendment of License, Construction 
Permit, or Early Site Permit,'' and 10 CFR 50.92, ``Issuance of 
Amendment.''
    Under the provisions of 10 CFR 52.171(b)(2), a combined license 
applicant or licensee who references or uses a nuclear power reactor 
manufactured under a manufacturing license under this subpart may 
request a departure from the design features, functional capabilities, 
or strategies described in the FSAR for the manufactured reactor. The 
Commission will grant such a request only if it determines that the 
departure will comply with the requirements of 10 CFR 52.7, ``Specific 
Exemptions,'' and that the special circumstances outweigh any decrease 
in safety that may result from the reduction in standardization caused 
by the departure.
    Once the evaluation required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) is 
completed and the application includes descriptions of the design 
features, functional capabilities, and strategies, the purpose of the 
evaluation would be largely achieved. Thus, as with the assessment 
required by proposed 10 CFR 52.500(b), the applicant or licensee would 
not be required to update the paragraph (c) evaluation after the design 
certification, design approval, combined license, or manufacturing 
license is issued, or in an application for renewal under either 10 CFR 
52.57, 10 CFR 52.107 and 10 CFR part 54, or 52.177. However, licensees 
would be required to maintain the paragraph (c) evaluation, inasmuch as 
proposed 10 CFR 52.79(a)(47) and 10 CFR 52.157(f)(32) require the 
proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) evaluation and description to be included in 
the FSAR portion of the application.
    Following issuance of a final design certification rule, the design 
certification applicant would not be required to update the evaluation 
so long as it does not request a significant change to any of the 
design features, functional capabilities, or strategies in the design 
certification. Similarly, the holder of a combined license or 
manufacturing license would not be required to update the evaluation so 
long as the licensee makes no significant change to the design 
features, functional capabilities, or strategies described in the FSAR.
    As with the aircraft impact assessment required by proposed 10 CFR 
52.500(b), in accordance with 10 CFR 50.71(c), each combined license 
holder and manufacturing license holder whose application was subject 
to proposed 10 CFR 52.500 would be required to retain the documentation 
supporting the proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) evaluation for NRC review. 
With respect to a standard design certification, proposed 10 CFR 
52.47(a)(28) would require the proposed 10 CFR 52.500(c) evaluation to 
be included in the FSAR submitted as part of the design certification 
application. The NRC acknowledges that the applicant for a standard 
design certification is not, per se, responsible for maintaining the 
FSAR information once a final design certification rule is adopted by 
the NRC. Nonetheless, the NRC continues to believe, for the reasons set 
forth in the statement of considerations for the first design 
certification rulemaking, see 62 FR 25800, May 19,1997, at 25813-25814, 
25826, that the original standard design certification applicant should 
be required to maintain the accuracy of the design certification 
information. Therefore, in future standard design certification 
rulemakings, the NRC expects to continue its practice of adopting a 
records management requirement analogous to Section X.A of the four 
existing standard design certification rules. In addition to the 
information included in the FSAR for the design certification or 
combined license, the supporting documentation retained onsite should 
describe the methodology used in identifying and evaluating the 
practicability of potential features, capabilities, and strategies for 
inclusion in the design; and list the features, capabilities, and 
strategies that were considered but rejected, along with the basis for 
their rejection.

VI. Section-by-Section Analysis

Section 52.11 Information Collection Requirements: OMB Approval

    Section 52.11 identifies the information collection requirements 
contained in 10 CFR part 52 approved by the Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 
et seq.). The NRC is proposing to modify paragraph (b) to include 
proposed 10 CFR 52.500 in the list of requirements with approved 
information collections.

Section 52.47 Contents of Applications; Technical Information

    Section 52.47 identifies the required technical information to be 
included in an application for a standard design certification. The 
proposed rule would revise this section by adding a ne