Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations, 54471-54485 [E7-18634]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 185 (Tuesday, September 25, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 54471-54485]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-18634]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Biweekly Notice; Applications and Amendments to Facility 
Operating Licenses Involving No Significant Hazards Considerations

I. Background

    Pursuant to section 189a.(2) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as 
amended (the Act), the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the 
Commission or NRC staff) is publishing this regular biweekly notice. 
The Act requires the Commission publish notice of any amendments 
issued, or proposed to be issued and grants the Commission the 
authority to issue and make immediately effective any amendment to an 
operating license upon a determination by the Commission that such 
amendment involves no significant hazards consideration, 
notwithstanding the pendency before the Commission of a request for a 
hearing from any person.
    This biweekly notice includes all notices of amendments issued, or 
proposed to be issued from August 30, 2007 to September 12, 2007. The 
last biweekly notice was published on September 11, 2007 (72 FR 51852).

Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendments to Facility Operating 
Licenses, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, 
and Opportunity for a Hearing

    The Commission has made a proposed determination that the following 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration. Under 
the Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation 
of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1) 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an 
accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated; 
or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. The basis 
for this proposed determination for each amendment request is shown 
below.
    The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed 
determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of 
publication of this notice will be considered in making any final 
determination. Within 60 days after the date of publication of this 
notice, the licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to 
issuance of the amendment to the subject facility operating license and 
any person whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who 
wishes to participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written 
request for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene.
    Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the 
expiration of 60 days after the date of publication of this notice. The 
Commission may issue the license amendment before expiration of the 60-
day period provided that its final determination is that the amendment 
involves no significant hazards consideration. In addition, the 
Commission may issue the amendment prior to the expiration of the 30-
day comment period should circumstances change during the 30-day 
comment period such that failure to act in a timely way would result, 
for example in derating or shutdown of the facility. Should the 
Commission take action prior to the expiration of either the comment 
period or the notice period, it will publish in the Federal Register a 
notice of issuance. Should the Commission make a final No Significant 
Hazards Consideration Determination, any hearing will take place after 
issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this action will 
occur very infrequently.
    Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Chief, Rulemaking, 
Directives and Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, 
Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, and should cite the publication date and 
page number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also 
be delivered to Room 6D22, Two White Flint North, 11545 Rockville Pike, 
Rockville, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays. 
Copies of written comments received may be examined at the Commission's 
Public Document Room (PDR), located at One White Flint North, Public 
File Area O1F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, 
Maryland. The filing of requests for a hearing and petitions for leave 
to intervene is discussed below.
    Within 60 days after the date of publication of this notice, the 
licensee may file a request for a hearing with respect to issuance of 
the amendment to the subject facility operating license and any person 
whose interest may be affected by this proceeding and who wishes to 
participate as a party in the proceeding must file a written request 
for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene. Requests for a 
hearing and a petition for leave to intervene shall be filed in 
accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice for Domestic 
Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR part 2. Interested persons should 
consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.309, which is available at the 
Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File Area 
01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the Agencywide 
Documents Access and Management System's (ADAMS) Public Electronic 
Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://www.nrc.gov/
reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/. If a request for a hearing or petition 
for leave to intervene is filed within 60 days, the Commission or a 
presiding officer designated by the Commission or by the Chief 
Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel, 
will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or the 
Chief Administrative Judge of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 
will issue a notice of a hearing or an appropriate order.
    As required by 10 CFR 2.309, a petition for leave to intervene 
shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in 
the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of 
the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons 
why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the 
following general requirements: (1) The name, address, and telephone 
number of the requestor or petitioner; (2) the nature of the 
requestor's/petitioner's right under the Act to be made a party to the 
proceeding; (3) the nature and extent of the requestor's/petitioner's 
property, financial, or other interest in the proceeding; and (4) the 
possible effect of any decision or order which may be entered in the 
proceeding on the requestor's/petitioner's interest. The petition must 
also set forth the specific contentions which the petitioner/requestor 
seeks to have litigated at the proceeding.
    Each contention must consist of a specific statement of the issue 
of law or fact to be raised or controverted. In addition, the 
petitioner/requestor shall provide a brief explanation of the bases for 
the contention and a concise statement of the alleged facts or expert 
opinion which support the contention and on which the petitioner/
requestor intends to rely in proving the contention

[[Page 54472]]

at the hearing. The petitioner/requestor must also provide references 
to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is 
aware and on which the petitioner/requestor intends to rely to 
establish those facts or expert opinion. The petition must include 
sufficient information to show that a genuine dispute exists with the 
applicant on a material issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be 
limited to matters within the scope of the amendment under 
consideration. The contention must be one which, if proven, would 
entitle the petitioner/requestor to relief. A petitioner/requestor who 
fails to satisfy these requirements with respect to at least one 
contention will not be permitted to participate as a party.
    Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding, 
subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene, 
and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the 
hearing.
    If a hearing is requested, and the Commission has not made a final 
determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration, the 
Commission will make a final determination on the issue of no 
significant hazards consideration. The final determination will serve 
to decide when the hearing is held. If the final determination is that 
the amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration, 
the Commission may issue the amendment and make it immediately 
effective, notwithstanding the request for a hearing. Any hearing held 
would take place after issuance of the amendment. If the final 
determination is that the amendment request involves a significant 
hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place before the 
issuance of any amendment.
    A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must 
be filed by: (1) First class mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001, Attention: Rulemaking and Adjudications 
Staff; (2) courier, express mail, and expedited delivery services: 
Office of the Secretary, Sixteenth Floor, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland, 20852, Attention: Rulemaking and 
Adjudications Staff; (3) e-mail addressed to the Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, HearingDocket@nrc.gov; 
or (4) facsimile transmission addressed to the Office of the Secretary, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC, Attention: 
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff at (301) 415-1101, verification 
number is (301) 415-1966. A copy of the request for hearing and 
petition for leave to intervene should also be sent to the Office of 
the General Counsel, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001, and it is requested that copies be transmitted either by 
means of facsimile transmission to (301) 415-3725 or by e-mail to 
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. A copy of the request for hearing and petition 
for leave to intervene should also be sent to the attorney for the 
licensee.
    Nontimely requests and/or petitions and contentions will not be 
entertained absent a determination by the Commission or the presiding 
officer of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the petition, 
request and/or the contentions should be granted based on a balancing 
of the factors specified in 10 CFR 2.309(a)(1)(i)-(viii).
    For further details with respect to this action, see the 
application for amendment which is available for public inspection at 
the Commission's PDR, located at One White Flint North, Public File 
Area 01F21, 11555 Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. 
Publicly available records will be accessible from the ADAMS Public 
Electronic Reading Room on the Internet at the NRC Web site, https://
www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. If you do not have access to ADAMS 
or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, 
contact the PDR Reference staff at 1 (800) 397-4209, (301) 415-4737 or 
by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov.

Detroit Edison Company, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy Center, 
Linn County, Iowa

    Date of amendment request: July 20, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Technical Specification (TS) 3.7.5 to add an Action Statement 
for two inoperable control building chiller (CBC) subsystems. The 
proposed new Action Statement would allow 72 hours to restore one CBC 
subsystem to operable status and require verification once every 4 
hours that control room temperature remains less than 90 [deg]F. The 
proposed changes are consistent, with certain variations, with TS Task 
Force (TSTF) Change Traveler TSTF-477, Revision 3, ``Adding an Action 
Statement for Two Inoperable Control Room Air Conditioning 
Subsystems.''
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration by a reference to a generic analysis published in the 
Federal Register on December 18, 2006 (71 FR 75774), which is presented 
below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is described in Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Standard TS Change Traveler TSTF-477 adds an action 
statement for two inoperable control room subsystems.
    The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (no new or different type of equipment will be installed). 
The proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable 
control room subsystems. The equipment qualification temperature of 
the control room equipment is not affected. Future changes to the 
Bases or licensee-controlled document will be evaluated pursuant to 
the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, test and experiments,'' 
to ensure that such changes do not result in more than a minimal 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    The proposed changes do not adversely affect accident initiators 
or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, and 
configuration of the facility or the manner in which the plant is 
operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not adversely 
affect the ability of structures, systems and components (SSCs) to 
perform their intended safety function to mitigate the consequences 
of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The 
proposed changes do not affect the source term, containment 
isolation, or radiological consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase the types 
and the amounts of radioactive effluent that may be released, nor 
significantly increase individual or cumulative occupation/public 
radiation exposures.
    Therefore, the changes do not involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of any accident previously 
evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable 
control room subsystems. The changes do not involve a physical 
altering of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment 
will be installed) or a change in methods governing normal p[l]ant 
operation. The requirements in the TS continue to require 
maintaining the control room temperature within the design limits.
    Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable 
control room subsystems. Instituting the proposed changes

[[Page 54473]]

will continue to maintain the control room temperature within design 
limits. Changes to the Bases or license[e-] controlled document are 
performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This approach provides an 
effective level of regulatory control and ensures that the control 
room temperature will be maintained within design limits.
    The proposed changes maintain sufficient controls to preserve 
the current margins of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Marjan Mashhadi, Florida Power & Light 
Company, 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 220, Washington, DC 20004.
    NRC Acting Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.

Entergy Operations, Inc., System Energy Resources, Inc., South 
Mississippi Electric Power Association, and Entergy Mississippi, Inc., 
Docket No. 50-416, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station, Unit 1, Claiborne 
County, Mississippi

    Date of amendment request: July 17, 2007, as supplemented by letter 
dated August 7, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the facility operating license (FOL), paragraph 2.C, and 
technical specifications (TS) 3.7.2 and TS 5.5 for Grand Gulf Nuclear 
Station, Unit 1.
    The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075), on possible 
amendments to revise the plant specific TS, to strengthen TS 
requirements regarding control room envelope (CRE) habitability by 
changing the action and surveillance requirements associated with the 
limiting condition for operation operability requirements for the CRE 
emergency ventilation system, and by adding a new TS administrative 
controls program on CRE habitability, including a model safety 
evaluation and model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) 
determination, using the consolidated line item improvement process. 
The NRC staff subsequently issued a notice of availability of the 
models for referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal 
Register on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model NSHC determination in its application dated 
July 17, 2007, as supplemented by letter dated August 7, 2007.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request 
involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: Terence A. Burke, Associate General 
Council--Nuclear Entergy Services, Inc., 1340 Echelon Parkway, Jackson, 
Mississippi 39213.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Entergy Operations Inc., Docket No. 50-382, Waterford Steam Electric 
Station, Unit 3 (Waterford 3), St. Charles Parish, Louisiana

    Date of amendment request: August 16, 2007.
    Description of amendment requests: A change is proposed to the 
Waterford 3 Control
    Room Emergency Air Filtration System technical specifications (TSs) 
using the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) notice of availability 
regarding Control Room Envelope (CRE) Habitability using the 
Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. The proposed amendment is 
consistent with the NRC approved Industry/Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) change to the Standard Technical Specifications (STS), 
TSTF-448, Revision 3, ``Control Room Habitability.''
    The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075), on possible 
amendments adopting TSTF-448, including a model safety evaluation and 
model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using 
the consolidated line item improvement process. The NRC staff 
subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for 
referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register 
on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022). The licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the following NSHC determination in its application 
dated August 16, 2007.

[[Page 54474]]

    TSTF-448, Revision 3 is formatted to the Improved Technical 
Specification (ITS) plants while the Waterford 3 TSs are based on the 
CE standard technical specifications. Therefore, the information 
contained in TSTF-448, Revision 3 has been modified to the Waterford 3 
TS format.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment requests involve no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Douglas K. Porter, Esquire, Southern 
California Edison Company,2244 Walnut Grove Avenue, Rosemead, 
California 91770.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

FPL Energy Duane Arnold, LLC, Docket No. 50-331, Duane Arnold Energy 
Center, Linn County, Iowa

    Date of amendment request: June 29, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
change Technical Specifications (TS) sections 3.7.4 and 5.5.13 to 
strengthen TS requirements regarding control building envelope (CBE) 
habitability. The proposed amendment would change the action and 
surveillance requirements associated with the limiting condition for 
operation operability requirements for the CBE standby filter unit and 
add a new TS administrative controls program on CBE habitability. The 
proposed changes to the TS and associated Bases are consistent with 
certain exceptions with standard technical specifications (STS) as 
revised by TS Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-448, Revision 3, 
``Control Room Envelope Habitability'' to the extent that the amendment 
request adopts by reference certain model TSTF-448 content, where 
applicable.
    The NRC staff issued a notice of opportunity for comment in the 
Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075), on possible 
amendments adopting TSTF-448, including a model safety evaluation and 
model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, using 
the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process. The NRC staff 
subsequently issued a notice of availability of the models for 
referencing in license amendment applications in the Federal Register 
on January 17, 2007 (72 FR 2022).
    The licensee affirmed the applicability of the following NSHC 
determination in its application dated June 29, 2007.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident 
initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change 
does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and 
components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the 
consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency 
ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to 
minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE 
atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents 
previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify 
the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to 
assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological 
consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that 
the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the 
consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.

[[Page 54475]]

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new 
surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does 
not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or 
different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant 
change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed 
change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is 
consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this 
change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The 
proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to 
safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe 
shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve 
a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Marjan Mashhadi, Florida Power & Light 
Company, 801 Pennsylvania Avenue, Suite 220, Washington, DC 20004.
    NRC Acting Branch Chief: Travis L. Tate.

Indiana Michigan Power Company, Docket Nos. 50-315 and 50-316, Donald 
C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, Berrien County, Michigan

    Date of amendment request: July 30, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise the Technical Specifications (TS) by adding a new Surveillance 
Requirement (SR) 3.8.2.2 that would be applicable when onsite 
electrical power is supplied to a unit via backfeed through the main 
transformer, and the unit is in either Mode 5 or Mode 6, or during 
movement of irradiated fuel. The proposed SR would correct a non-
conservatism in the TS and will assure the capability to transfer the 
required safety-related loads from the backfeed source to the qualified 
offsite circuit.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed change involve a significant increase in 
the probability of occurrence or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change will add a new Technical Specification 
Surveillance Requirement applicable during shutdown conditions when 
a backfeed configuration is used to provide power from the offsite 
transmission network to required safety equipment via the main 
transformer. The new Surveillance Requirement will require that 
portions of an existing Surveillance Requirement be met. If not met, 
the existing Surveillance Requirement must be performed before 
establishing a backfeed configuration. It is highly unlikely that 
the proposed change will necessitate performance of the existing 
Surveillance Requirement more frequently than is currently required. 
Even if more frequent performance of the existing Surveillance 
Requirement were required, its performance would not significantly 
increase the probability of a loss of offsite power. Consequently, 
there is no significant change in the likelihood of any accident 
associated with verifying the existing Surveillance Requirement has 
been met. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a previously 
evaluated accident will not be significantly increased.
    The verifications required by the new Surveillance Requirement 
will assure that a unit's required safety-related equipment can be 
transferred to a qualified offsite circuit while the equipment is 
being provided power from the offsite transmission network using a 
backfeed configuration while the unit is shutdown or while 
irradiated fuel is [being] moved. This will provide assurance that 
the systems needed to mitigate the consequences of the accidents in 
these conditions will be provided with electrical power if the 
systems are needed to perform their specified safety function. 
Therefore, the consequences of a previously evaluated accident will 
not be significantly increased.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed change create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The addition of a new Technical Specification Surveillance 
Requirement to verify that an existing Surveillance Requirement has 
been met, or to perform that Surveillance Requirement if not met, 
would not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident because the Surveillance Requirement has previously existed 
and previously been performed. Therefore, the proposed change does 
not involve any new systems, structures, or components, or any 
different mode of operation of any existing systems, structures, or 
components.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not create the possibility 
of a new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety associated with the proposed change 
involves the availability of offsite electrical power to support 
required safety equipment when a unit is shut down or during the 
movement of irradiated fuel. The proposed change provides assurance 
that the single required qualified offsite circuit from the 
transmission network remains available while the required safety 
equipment is powered by a different circuit from that network. 
Consequently, the proposed change does not reduce the margin of 
safety provided by the required qualified offsite circuit, and 
enhances the margin of safety by acknowledging use of an additional 
offsite circuit.
    Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant 
reduction in the margin of safety.

    The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has reviewed the 
licensee's analysis and, based on this review, it appears that the 
three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC 
staff proposes to determine that the amendment requests involve no 
significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Kimberly Harshaw, Esquire, One Cook Place, 
Bridgman, MI 49106
    NRC Acting Branch Chief: Travis Tate.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: August 10, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed change to Technical 
Specification 2.1.1.2 will revise two recirculation loop and single 
recirculation loop safety limit minimum critical power ratio (SLMCPR) 
values to reflect results of a cycle-specific calculation.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:


[[Page 54476]]


    1. Do the proposed changes involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Four accidents have been evaluated previously as reflected in 
the CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] Updated Safety Analysis Report 
(USAR). These four accidents are (1) loss-of-coolant, (2) control 
rod drop, (3) main steamline break, and (4) fuel handling. The 
probability of an evaluated accident is derived from the 
probabilities of the individual precursors to that accident. 
Changing the SLMCPR does not increase the probability of an 
evaluated accident. The change does not require any physical plant 
modifications to the plant or any components, nor does it require a 
change in plant operation. Therefore, no individual precursors of an 
accident are affected.
    The consequences of an evaluated accident are determined by the 
operability of plant systems designed to mitigate those 
consequences. This proposed change makes no modification to the 
design or operation of the systems that are used in mitigation of 
accidents. Limits have been established, consistent with NRC 
approved methods, to ensure that fuel performance during normal, 
transient, and accident conditions is acceptable. The proposed 
change to the value of the SLMCPR continues to conservatively 
establish this safety limit such that the fuel is protected during 
normal operation and during any plant transients or anticipated 
operational occurrences.
    Based on the above NPPD [Nebraska Public Power District] 
concludes that the proposed change does not involve a significant 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated.
    2. Do the proposed changes create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    Creation of the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from an accident previously evaluated would require 
creation of precursors of that accident. New accident precursors may 
be created by modification of the plant configuration or changes in 
how the plant is operated. The proposed change does not involve a 
modification of the plant configuration or in how the plant is 
operated. The proposed change to the SLMCPR assures that safety 
criteria are maintained.
    Based on the above, NPPD concludes that the proposed change does 
not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident 
from any previously evaluated.
    3. Do the proposed changes involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The value of the proposed SLMCPR provides a margin of safety by 
ensuring that no more than 0.1% of the rods are expected to be in 
boiling transition if the Minimum Critical Power Ratio limit is not 
violated. The proposed change will ensure the appropriate level of 
fuel protection is maintained. Additionally, operational limits are 
established based on the proposed SLMCPR to ensure that the SLMCPR 
is not violated during all modes of operation. This will ensure that 
the fuel design safety criteria (i.e., that at least 99.9% of the 
fuel rods do not experience transition boiling during normal 
operation as well as anticipated operational occurrences) are met.
    Based on the above, NPPD concludes that the proposed changes do 
not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power 
District, Post Office Box 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Nebraska Public Power District, Docket No. 50-298, Cooper Nuclear 
Station, Nemaha County, Nebraska

    Date of amendment request: August 16, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment revises 
Technical Specification 5.5.6, ``Inservice Testing Program,'' to allow 
a one-time extension of the five-year frequency requirement for 
setpoint testing of safety valve MS-RV-70ARV.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has 
provided its analysis of the issue of no significant hazards 
consideration, which is presented below:

    1. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant increase in 
the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The function of SRVs [safety relief valves] and SVs [safety 
valves] is to prevent overpressurization of the reactor coolant 
system (RCS) during transients and abnormal operation that could 
cause increases in RCS pressure. They are also used to depressurize 
the RCS when needed to allow injection of water from the high-
volume, low-pressure Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Low 
Pressure Coolant Injection mode of the Residual Heat Removal System 
into the reactor pressure vessel (RPV) as part of mitigation of an 
accident. Actuation or failure to actuate of a SRV or SV is not an 
initiator of any accident previously evaluated. Thus, this proposed 
amendment would not result in a significant increase in the 
probability of an accident previously evaluated.
    A range or tolerance of plus-or-minus three percent of the 
setpoint pressure is acceptable for the results of setpoint testing. 
A 90-day extension of the interval for setpoint testing of one SV is 
not expected to result in actuation of the SV outside of its 
acceptable setpoint range. However, even if the single SV whose test 
interval is being extended did actuate outside of its acceptable 
range, it is not expected that this would result in a significant 
degradation in the ability of the Nuclear System Pressure Relief 
System to perform its safety function, since the remaining eight 
SRVs and two other SVs would be unaffected by the proposed extension 
of the testing interval for the single SV. The proposed change does 
not modify the design of or alter the operation of systems or 
components used in mitigating design basis accidents. Thus, this 
proposed amendment would not result in a significant increase in the 
consequences of any accident previously evaluated.
    Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed change 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the proposed amendment create the possibility of a new 
or different kind of accident from any accident previously 
evaluated?
    Response: No.
    A new or different kind of accident from any previously 
evaluated might result from a modification of the plant design by 
either addition of a new system or removal of an existing system, or 
a change in how any of the plant systems function during the 
operation of the plant. The proposed change does not modify the 
plant design, nor does it alter the operation of the plant or 
equipment involved in either routine plant operation or in the 
mitigation of the design basis accidents.
    Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed change 
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from any accident previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed amendment involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The margin of safety applicable to this issue would be the 
margin between the pressure at which the SRVs and SVs would actuate 
and the allowable ASME [American Society of Mechanical Engineers] 
Code overpressure limit of 1,375 psig [pounds per square inch gauge] 
(110 percent of vessel design pressure, 1250 psig). This margin 
would be impacted if the setpoint at which the applicable SV 
actuated experienced drift greater than the allowable plus-or-minus 
three percent of the setpoint pressure. This is not expected to 
occur based on the results demonstrated by the setpoint testing 
conducted over the last ten years. Those results were two actuations 
of the SV at a pressure below the nameplate rating with less than 
two percent deviation, and one actuation at a pressure above the 
nameplate rating with less than one percent deviation. However, even 
if this one SV did experience setpoint drift greater than the 
allowable plus-or-minus three percent, there would not be a 
significant reduction in the margin since it is expected that the 
remaining eight SRVs and the two other SVs would actuate within the 
allowable setpoint tolerance and begin to reduce RCS pressure as 
needed. Furthermore, the proposed extension will not result in a 
change to the steam discharge capacity and characteristics of the 
applicable SV.

[[Page 54477]]

    Based on the above, it is concluded that the proposed change 
does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on 
this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are 
satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the 
amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mr. John C. McClure, Nebraska Public Power 
District, Post OfficeBox 499, Columbus, NE 68602-0499.
    NRC Branch Chief: Thomas G. Hiltz.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS), LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: July 23, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify a footnote in NMP2 Technical Specification (TS) Table 3.3.2.1-1, 
``Control Rod Block Instrumentation,'' such that a new banked position 
withdrawal sequence (BPWS) shutdown sequence could be utilized. The 
proposed change is consistent with TS Task Force (TSTF) change TSTF-
476, Revision 1, ``Improved BPWS Control Rod Insertion Process (NEDO-
33091).'' The availability of the TS change was published in the 
Federal Register on May 23, 2007 (72 FR 29004) as part of the 
consolidated line item improvement process. The licensee affirmed the 
applicability of the model no significant hazards consideration 
determination in its application.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed changes modify the TS to allow the use of the 
improved banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) during shutdowns 
if the conditions of NEDO-33091-A, Revision 2, ''Improved BPWS 
Control Rod Insertion Process,'' July 2004, have been satisfied. The 
[NRC] staff finds that the licensee's justifications to support the 
specific TS changes are consistent with the approved topical report 
and TSTF-476, Revision 1. Since the change only involves changes in 
control rod sequencing, the probability of an accident previously 
evaluated is not significantly increased, if at all. The 
consequences of an accident after adopting TSTF-476 are no different 
than the consequences of an accident prior to adopting TSTF-476. 
Therefore, the consequences of an accident previously evaluated are 
not significantly affected by this change. Therefore, this change 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any [Accident] Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change will not introduce new failure modes or 
effects and will not, in the absence of other unrelated failures, 
lead to an accident whose consequences exceed the consequences of 
accidents previously evaluated. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) 
is the design basis accident for the subject TS changes. This change 
does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of 
accident from [any] accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the [a] Margin of Safety

    The proposed change, TSTF-476, Revision 1, incorporates the 
improved BPWS, previously approved in NEDO-33091-A, into the 
improved TS. The control rod drop accident (CRDA) is the design 
basis accident for the subject TS changes. In order to minimize the 
impact of a CRDA, the BPWS process was developed to minimize control 
rod reactivity worth for BWR plants. The proposed improved BPWS 
further simplifies the control rod insertion process, and in order 
to evaluate it, the [NRC] staff followed the guidelines of Standard 
Review Plan Section 15.4.9, and referred to General Design Criterion 
28 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 as its regulatory requirement. 
The TSTF stated the improved BPWS provides the following benefits: 
(1) Allows the plant to reach the all-rods-in condition prior to 
significant reactor cool down, which reduces the potential for re-
criticality as the reactor cools down; (2) reduces the potential for 
an operator reactivity control error by reducing the total number of 
control rod manipulations; (3) minimizes the need for manual scrams 
during plant shutdowns, resulting in less wear on control rod drive 
(CRD) system components and CRD mechanisms; and (4) eliminates 
unnecessary control rod manipulations at low power, resulting in 
less wear on reactor manual control and CRD system components. The 
addition of procedural requirements and verifications specified in 
NEDO-33091-A, along with the proper use of the BPWS will prevent a 
control rod drop accident (CRDA) from occurring while power is below 
the low power setpoint (LPSP). The net change to the margin of 
safety is insignificant. Therefore, this change does not involve a 
significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & 
Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

Nine Mile Point Nuclear Station (NMPNS), LLC, Docket No. 50-410, Nine 
Mile Point Nuclear Station Unit No. 2 (NMP2), Oswego County, New York

    Date of amendment request: July 30, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
modify Technical Specifications (TS) 3.7.3, ``Control Room Envelope Air 
Conditioning (AC) System,'' by adding an Action Statement to the 
Limiting Conditions for Operation. The new Action Statement allows a 
finite time to restore one control room envelope AC subsystem to 
operable status and requires verification that the control room 
temperature remains < 90 [deg]F every 4 hours. The proposed changes are 
consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved TS Task 
Force (TSTF) TSTF-477, Revision 3, ``Adding an Action Statement for Two 
Inoperable Control Room Air Conditioning Subsystems.'' The availability 
of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on March 
26, 2007 (72 FR 14143) as part of the consolidated line item 
improvement process. The licensee affirmed the applicability of the 
model no significant hazards consideration determination in its 
application.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change is described in Technical Specification Task 
Force (TSTF) Standard TS Change Traveler TSTF-477 [and] adds an 
action statement for two inoperable control room subsystems. The 
proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant 
(no new or different type of equipment will be installed). The 
proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable control 
room subsystems. The equipment qualification temperature of the 
control room equipment is not affected. Future changes to the Bases 
or licensee controlled documents will be evaluated pursuant to the 
requirements of 10 CFR 50.59, ``Changes, test and experiments'', to 
ensure that such changes do not result in more than a minimal 
increase in the probability or consequences of an accident 
previously evaluated. The proposed changes do not adversely affect 
accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, 
conditions, and configuration of the facility or the manner in which 
the plant is operated and maintained. The proposed changes do not 
adversely affect the ability of structures, systems and components 
(SSCs) to perform their intended safety function to mitigate the

[[Page 54478]]

consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance 
limits. The proposed changes do not affect the source term, 
containment isolation, or radiological consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated. Further, the proposed changes do not increase 
the types and the amounts of radioactive effluent that may be 
released, nor significantly increase individual or cumulative 
occupation/public radiation exposures. Therefore, the changes do not 
involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of 
an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any [Accident] Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable 
control room subsystems. The changes do not involve a physical 
altering of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment 
will be installed) or a change in methods governing normal plant 
operation. The requirements in the TS continue to require 
maintaining the control room temperature within the design limits. 
Therefore, the changes do not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from any [accident] previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the [a] Margin of Safety

    The proposed changes add an action statement for two inoperable 
control room subsystems. Instituting the proposed changes will 
continue to maintain the control room temperature within design 
limits. Changes to the Bases or license[e-]controlled document[s] 
are performed in accordance with 10 CFR 50.59. This approach 
provides an effective level of regulatory control and ensures that 
the control room temperature will be maintained within design 
limits. The proposed changes maintain sufficient controls to 
preserve the current margins of safety.

    The NRC staff proposes to determine that the amendment request 
involves no significant hazards consideration.
    Attorney for licensee: Mark J. Wetterhahn, Esquire, Winston & 
Strawn, 1700 K Street, NW., Washington, DC 20006.
    NRC Branch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam 
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (SSES 1 and 2), Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: June 7, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
delete the license conditions that require reporting of violations of 
other requirements (e.g., conditions listed in Sections 2.C and 2.F for 
Unit 1 and Section 2.C for Unit 2) in the operating licenses. This 
change is in accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-
approved Technical Specification (TS) Task Force (TSTF) change traveler 
TSTF-372, Revision 4. The NRC staff issued a notice of availability of 
a model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination in 
the Federal Register on August 29, 2005 (70 FR 51098). The notice 
included a model safety evaluation, a model NSHC determination, and a 
model license amendment request. In its application dated June 7, 2007, 
the licensee affirmed the applicability of the model NSHC determination 
which is presented below.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below:

    1. Does the change involve a significant increase in the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change involves the deletion of a reporting 
requirement. The change does not affect plant equipment or operating 
practices and therefore does not significantly increase the 
probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
    2. Does the change create the possibility of a new or different 
kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change is administrative in that it deletes a 
reporting requirement. The change does not add new plant equipment, 
change existing plant equipment, or affect the operating practices 
of the facility. Therefore, the change does not create the 
possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident 
previously evaluated.
    3. Does the proposed change involve a significant reduction in a 
margin of safety?
    Response: No.
    The proposed change deletes a reporting requirement. The change 
does not affect plant equipment or operating practices and therefore 
does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

    The NRC staff has reviewed the analysis adopted by the licensee 
and, based on this review, it appears that the standards of 10 CFR 
50.92(c) are satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine 
that the request for amendments involves NSHC.
    Attorney for licensee: Bryan A. Snapp, Esquire, Assoc. General 
Counsel, PPL Services Corporation, 2 North Ninth St., GENTW3, 
Allentown, PA 18101-1179.
    NRCBranch Chief: Mark G. Kowal.

PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Docket Nos. 50-387 and 50-388, Susquehanna Steam 
Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (SSES 1 and 2), Luzerne County, 
Pennsylvania

    Date of amendment request: June 8, 2007.
    Description of amendment request: The proposed amendment would 
revise Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.10.1, and the 
associated Bases, to expand its scope to include provisions for 
temperature excursion greater than 200 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F) as a 
consequence of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and as a 
consequence of scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an 
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while considering operational 
conditions to be in Mode 4 for SSES 1 and 2. This change is in 
accordance with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)-approved Technical 
Specification (TS) Task Force (TSTF) change traveler TSTF-484, ``Use of 
TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing Activities.'' The NRC staff issued a 
notice of opportunity to comment and notice of availability of a model 
no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination in the 
Federal Register on August 21, 2006 (71 FR 48561) and October 27, 2006 
(71 FR 63050), respectively. The notices included a model safety 
evaluation, a model NSHC determination, and a model license amendment 
request. In its application dated June 8, 2007, the licensee affirmed 
the applicability of the model NSHC determination which is presented 
below.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of NSHC adopted by the licensee is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does not Involve a Significant 
Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    Technical Specifications currently allow for operation at 
greater than 200 degrees Fahrenheit ([deg]F) while imposing MODE 4 
requirements in addition to the secondary containment requirements 
required to be met. Extending the activities that can apply this 
allowance will not adversely impact the probability or consequences 
of an accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the proposed change 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    Technical Specifications currently allow for operation at 
greater than 200 [deg]F while imposing MODE 4 requirements in 
addition to the secondary containment requirements required to be 
met. No new operational conditions beyond those currently allowed by 
LCO 3.10.1 are introduced. The changes do not involve a physical 
alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment 
will be installed) or a change in the methods governing normal plant 
operation. In addition, the changes do not impose any new or 
different requirements or

[[Page 54479]]

eliminate any existing requirements. The changes do not alter 
assumptions made in the safety analysis. The proposed changes are 
consistent with the safety analysis assumptions and current plant 
operating practice. Therefore, the proposed change does not create 
the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any 
accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not