Safety Advisory 2007-03, 51898-51901 [E7-17811]
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51898
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 11, 2007 / Notices
acknowledging mandatory directives is
established. Although use of digital
transmission has the advantage of
accuracy (avoidance of
misunderstandings) and efficiency,
insecure transmissions and lack of
proper authentication could introduce
new risks. FRA expects that, as this
technology fully matures, industry
standards will address these needs even
more suitably than at present within an
interoperable framework.
If Subpart H is applicable, the railroad
shall submit an RSPP and PSP required
by 49 CFR 236.905 and 236.907.
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Systems Performing Automatic
Generation and Electronic Transmission
of the Authorities to Roadway Workers
Without Dispatcher’s Involvement
The processor-based application (or
computer-based system) belongs to this
category if:
1. It serves as an autonomous office
(dispatching) system, in the absence of
a CAD system, or as an auxiliary system
interfaced or integrated with an existing
CAD system, and is used exclusively for
issuing authorities to roadway workers
to occupy controlled tracks;
2. It allows the employee in charge to
request, obtain, and release the
authority to occupy a controlled track
through wireless digital communication
without the dispatcher’s concurrence;
3. Upon receipt of an electronically
transmitted request from a roadway
worker to occupy track, the authority is
generated automatically by the CAD
system (or application system) and is
electronically transmitted by the
application system without the
dispatcher’s concurrence; and
4. The system server retains electronic
records of roadway workers’ requests for
authority and all granted authorities,
including those issued to trains.
Such systems are subject to
compliance with Subpart H. The
delivery of track occupancy authority to
roadway workers without the
dispatcher’s involvement is considered
a safety-critical function in the same
way that control of train movements is
safety-critical. This constitutes a basis
for these systems to comply with
Subpart H requirements. Railroads shall
submit an RSPP and PSP in accordance
with 49 CFR 236.905 and 236.907 prior
to implementing any such system. Relief
is also required from the requirements
of Part 214, Subpart C, related to
dispatcher involvement in the issuance
of roadway work authorities.
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Systems Performing Automatic
Generation and Digital Transmission of
Authorities to Trains Without
Dispatcher’s Involvement
The definition of this category of
processor-based applications (or
computer-based systems) coincides with
the definition given in a previous
section for RWP systems, except that the
delivery of authorities is extended to
trains.
Systems of this category are subject to
compliance with Subpart H because the
delivery of track occupancy authority to
roadway workers and trains without
dispatcher involvement is considered a
safety-critical function of a train control
system. Therefore, railroads shall
submit an RSPP and PSP in accordance
with 49 CFR 236.905 and 236.907 prior
to implementing any such system.
Those interested in implementing
systems that automatically generate
mandatory directives, roadway work
authorities, or other instructions or
commands (executed by persons or
equipment) bearing directly on the
safety of train operations, are
respectfully referred to Appendix C of
49 CFR Part 236, which outlines safety
assurance criteria and processes that are
relevant to such an undertaking.
FRA seeks comments on this notice
from interested parties. Please refer to
the Addresses section for additional
information regarding the submission of
comments.
Issued in Washington, DC on September 4,
2007.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. E7–17800 Filed 9–10–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2007–03
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory;
Railroad Bridge Safety—Explanation
and Amplification of FRA’s ‘‘Statement
of Agency Policy on the Safety of
Railroad Bridges.’’
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2007–03 recommending that
owners of track carried on one or more
railroad bridges adopt safety practices to
prevent the deterioration of railroad
bridges and reduce the risk of casualties
from train derailments caused by
structural failures of such bridges.
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge
Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance
and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont
Ave., NW., RRS–15, Mail Stop 25,
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202–
493–6320); or Sarah Grimmer, Trial
Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,
1120 Vermont Ave., NW., RCC–12, Mail
Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202–493–6390).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA
published its ‘‘Statement of Agency
Policy on the Safety of Railroad
Bridges’’ (‘‘Policy’’) on August 30, 2000
(65 FR 52667). The Policy Statement,
included in the Federal Track Safety
Standards (Title 49, Code of Federal
Regulations, Part 213) as Appendix C,
includes non-regulatory guidelines
based on good practices which were
prevalent in the railroad industry at the
time the Policy was issued.
FRA has examined reports from
January 1, 1982 through December 31,
2006 of 52 train accidents caused by the
catastrophic structural failure of railroad
bridges, an average of two per year.
During that twenty-five year period, two
people were injured and no fatalities
were attributed to structural bridge
failure. In addition, since the
examination of those reports in April of
2006, FRA has learned of four instances
where lack of adherence to the
guidelines in the Bridge Safety Policy
resulted in trains operating over
structural deficiencies in steel bridges
that could very easily have resulted in
serious train accidents. It should be
noted that FRA uses the term
‘‘catastrophic failure’’ to describe an
incident in which a bridge collapses or
directly causes a train accident. A
simple ‘‘bridge failure’’ is a situation in
which a bridge is no longer capable of
safely performing its intended function.
During the past sixteen months, three
train accidents occurred due to
catastrophic structural failures of
bridges, all of which were timber
trestles. The most recent bridge-related
train accident occurred on the M&B
Railroad near Myrtlewood, Alabama,
where a train of solid-fuel rocket motors
derailed when a timber trestle railroad
bridge collapsed under the train. Several
cars, including one car carrying a rocket
motor, rolled onto their sides and six
persons were injured. FRA has also
recently evaluated the bridge
management practices of several small
railroads, and found that some had no
bridge management or inspection
programs whatsoever.
FRA therefore issues this nonregulatory Safety Advisory to
supplement and re-emphasize the
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 11, 2007 / Notices
provisions of the Policy on the Safety of
Railroad Bridges. FRA recognizes the
potential impact of regulations related
to structural integrity of railroad
bridges. However, should these serious
incidents and failures continue and FRA
determines that the responsible track
owners are not conforming to accepted
engineering principles and procedures,
including those outlined herein and in
the Bridge Safety Policy, FRA might
have to change course and develop a
regulatory approach.
FRA Bridge Safety Evaluations
FRA has been evaluating bridge
management practices on a
representative sampling of the Nation’s
railroads, including class I, II and III
freight railroads, and passenger carriers.
The evaluations generally compare a
railroad’s program with the guidelines
in the FRA Bridge Safety Policy, and
include observations of individual
bridges to determine their general
condition, as well as the accuracy of the
railroad’s inspection reports.
Most large railroads generally
conform to the FRA guidelines, but FRA
has discovered instances where
management had not adequately
evaluated or addressed critical items
delineated in railroad bridge inspection
reports before they developed into
critical failures or near-failures. Many of
the smaller railroads evaluated also
conformed generally to the guidelines,
but a considerable number either fell
short by a large degree, or showed
absolutely no evidence of bridge
inspection, management or
maintenance.
This Safety Advisory
As serious gaps exist between the
FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines and the
actual practices on many railroads, and
because FRA has discovered some
extremely serious hazards as a result,
FRA is issuing this Safety Advisory. Its
purpose is to explain and amplify the
provisions of the Bridge Safety
Guidelines, and to discuss and make
recommendations concerning some
points in addition to the guidelines that
FRA has determined are critical to
bridge safety.
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Conformance with the FRA Bridge
Safety Guidelines
Certain provisions of the FRA Bridge
Safety Guidelines are critical from the
standpoint of immediate safety to the
development and implementation of a
railroad’s bridge management program.
These points are reiterated and
expanded below.
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Responsibility for the Safety of
Railroad Bridges
FRA has specified that the owner of
the track carried by a bridge is
responsible for the safety of trains that
operate over that track, and therefore the
track owner must know that the track is
being adequately supported by the
bridge. Even though the Guidelines are
published as an appendix in the Federal
Track Safety Standards for convenience,
that does not imply that the track owner
need only assure compliance with the
minimum requirements of the Track
Standards. Track conditions that are
well within the limits of the Track
Standards might also be valid
indications of imminent bridge failure.
The owner of the track supported by
a bridge is fully responsible for the
safety of trains that operate over that
bridge, regardless of any agreements, or
division of ownership or maintenance
expense, to the contrary. The track
owner must be able to control, and
restrict if necessary, the movement of
trains on any segment of its track,
including the track on a bridge.
Capacity of Railroad Bridges, and
Bridge Loads
The capacity of a bridge, and the
actual loads that it carries, are so
interrelated that they must be
considered together.
The load a bridge carries directly
affects its serviceable life and safety.
These loads, and various external
influences, impose forces on the various
components of the bridge. These
components, in turn, are each capable of
carrying a certain level of forces without
failing or rapidly deteriorating.
Every properly designed railroad
bridge is configured and proportioned
so that it will safely handle the forces
developed by a certain train load,
together with effects associated with
that load. That load, termed the ‘‘design
load,’’ is the general basis for
determining the safe capacity of a
bridge. The design load is, most
typically, a series of wheel loads of
defined weight, with spacings between
every pair of wheels of a defined
distance. The bridge must also be
capable of carrying its own weight, the
weight of other objects permanently
attached to the bridge, such as signals
and pipes, and other external forces,
such as wind and stream flow.
An engineer determining the capacity
of a bridge, a process termed ‘‘rating,’’
is fortunate if the original design
documents of the bridge are available,
together with documentation of repairs,
modifications and inspections. In that
case, the design load can be compared
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with the original dimensions of the
bridge and its components, including
inspection records that indicate the
actual condition of the components, and
the bridge can be given a rating in terms
of a common standard series of train
loads. Absent the design documents for
a bridge, an engineer should make a
detailed inspection of every member of
the bridge to record its actual
dimensions, material, and condition.
Every train moving over a bridge
causes forces to be developed in the
components of the bridge. The
magnitude of those forces in each
component are determined by the
weight carried on each wheel, the
spacing of the wheels within the train,
and associated effects, such as impact,
rocking, and lateral forces. The effect of
the actual load on a bridge can be
associated with the effect of the rated
load, and an engineer can determine if
the proposed or actual loads are within
the limits of the rated load, given any
operating conditions placed on an
actual load.
Several critical points are associated
with making a proper determination of
bridge capacities and loads. At a
minimum, each track owner should take
the following actions:
1. Ensure that a professional engineer
competent in the field of railroad bridge
engineering, or someone under his or
her supervision, determines bridge
capacity;
2. Maintain a record of the safe
capacity of every bridge which carries
its track;
3. Enforce a procedure that will
ensure that its bridges are not loaded
beyond their capacities; and
4. Ensure that regular comprehensive
inspections are conducted.
Bridge ratings will change with time,
and will seldom improve. Regular
comprehensive inspections are vital to
maintaining valid bridge ratings and to
performing timely bridge maintenance
and repairs.
The rating of timber trestles is a less
exact process than the rating of steel and
concrete bridges. Timber bridge
components can vary widely in their
composition, quality and condition. The
inherent redundancy in timber trestles
will partly compensate for a single substandard component, but the good parts
which pick up more than their share of
load from the weak member will
degrade at a more rapid rate. It is
essential that a weak timber member be
repaired or replaced in a reasonable
time; however, while it is still in place
in the bridge, it and its surrounding
members should be given extra attention
with more frequent, detailed
inspections.
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 175 / Tuesday, September 11, 2007 / Notices
Bridge Inspection
Railroad bridges are subjected to train
loads and associated effects, as noted
above. In addition, they are subjected to
both natural and non-natural effects.
Natural effects include decay, corrosion,
deterioration of concrete and masonry,
thermal expansion and contraction,
freezing and thawing of water, floods,
and growth of vegetation. Non-natural
effects include impacts from vehicles
and vessels, train derailments,
vandalism and fires. All of these effects
can severely and rapidly degrade the
capacity of a bridge to safely carry its
railroad traffic.
Railroad bridges also support much
heavier loads in relation to their own
weight (ratio of live load to dead load)
than do highway bridges. All of these
factors have led to a standard practice
in the railroad industry to inspect each
bridge carrying railroad tracks at a
frequency of not less than once per year.
Bridge inspection, unlike the
inspection of track, equipment and
other railroad property, is a multi-level
process. The inspector is a technician
who should be able to reach all parts of
the bridge to be inspected, detect
indications of deterioration or other
problems on the bridge, and accurately
record and report them. Most railroad
bridge inspection programs employ
inspectors with these qualifications, but
those inspectors are not expected to be
able to perform the engineering
calculations necessary to determine the
safe capacity of a bridge. That function
is performed by a competent engineer,
working from basic design and
historical records of the bridge and the
reports of the inspector-technicians.
While the engineer needs complete
and accurate information on the
condition of the bridge from the
inspector, the inspector can provide a
much more comprehensive inspection if
the engineer provides information back
regarding any critical points or
components on the bridge that might
call for more intensive investigation or
specialized inspection techniques.
These items might be discovered in the
bridge design documents, especially the
so-called ‘‘stress sheets,’’ or by review of
certain types of connections that have
been prone to trouble on other bridges.
This type of two-way communication
can prove invaluable.
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Protection of Train Operations
FRA did not address the issue of
protection of train operations from
potentially hazardous bridge conditions
in the guidelines because FRA did not
find it to be a problem at the time. Since
then, however, FRA has discovered
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several instances where a person who
was not fully qualified to determine the
safety of a bridge was dispatched to
resolve a report of trouble, and that
person approved the bridge for
continued service based on the criteria
in the Federal Track Safety Standards,
rather than a structural evaluation of the
bridge. In a typical case, a track owner
would have a railroad track inspector
investigate a report from a train crew of
rough track on a bridge. It is possible
that during such an investigation, even
a diligent track inspector would fail to
find a deviation from the requirements
of the Track Safety Standards for the
class of track on the bridge, or, in the
alternative, would find that the track
could be brought into compliance with
a temporary speed restriction. In this
situation, it is likely that, after possibly
placing a speed restriction, he would
have returned the bridge to service
while the structural condition that
caused the track anomaly still existed.
Without further attention, the anomaly
would continue to deteriorate, until the
bridge actually failed under load.
Recommended Action: FRA makes the
following specific recommendations to
owners of railroad track carried on one
or more bridges, in order to prevent the
deterioration of railroad bridges and
reduce the risk of human casualties,
environmental damage and disruption
to the Nation’s transportation system
that would result from a catastrophic
bridge failure.
(1) Inventory of Railroad Bridges.
Every owner of track carried on one or
more bridges should maintain an
accurate inventory of those bridges. The
inventory, or ‘‘bridge list,’’ should
identify the location of the bridge, its
configuration, type of construction,
number of spans, span lengths, and all
other information necessary to provide
for management of the bridges.
(2) Regular Comprehensive
Inspections. Every owner of track
carried on a bridge should ensure that
regular comprehensive inspections are
conducted, as these are vital to
maintaining valid bridge ratings and to
performing timely bridge maintenance
and repairs.
(3) Determination of Railroad Bridge
Capacities and Loads. Several critical
points are associated with making a
proper determination of bridge
capacities and loads. At a minimum,
each track owner should take the
following actions:
(a) Ensure that a professional engineer
competent in the field of railroad bridge
engineering, or someone under his or
her supervision, determines bridge
capacity;
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(b) Maintain a record of the safe
capacity of every bridge which carries
its track; and
(c) Enforce a procedure that will
ensure that its bridges are not loaded
beyond their capacities.
(4) Railroad Bridge Inspection
Procedures and Recordkeeping.
(a) Inspection frequency. Every bridge
which carries railroad traffic should be
inspected at least once per year. The
level of detail and the inspection
procedure should be appropriate to the
configuration of the bridge, conditions
found during previous inspections, and
the nature of the railroad traffic moved
over the bridge (car weights, train
frequency and length, levels of
passenger and hazardous materials
traffic, and vulnerability of the bridge to
damage).
(b) Inspection records. Every bridge
inspection should be recorded, and the
record of the inspection be available to
the engineer who is responsible for the
integrity of the bridge. The inspection
record should show the date on which
the inspection was actually performed,
the precise identification of the bridge
inspected, the items inspected and the
condition of those items. Any
inspection item that is found by the
inspector to be a potential problem
should be described in a narrative.
Many different systems are used to
ascribe condition values to bridges and
their components, but care should be
taken that the inspection reports do not
simply generate a number but, instead,
an accurate description of the condition
of the bridge components. It is
appropriate to use a valuation system
that serves to identify individual
inspection reports that should be
reviewed by the engineer or other
engineering managers.
(c) Prescribing inspection procedures.
The engineer responsible for the safety
of a group of railroad bridges should
prescribe the inspection procedures for
those bridges. Bridges of a common
configuration and no exceptional
conditions may be considered as a
group for a common procedure, but
uncommon bridges, those with critical
components and bridges which indicate
possible deterioration that could affect
their continued safety should be noted
to the inspector. The inspector should
be advised of any particular items of
concern on the bridge, and any specific
inspection procedure (frequency, detail
and method) that is necessary to
maintain the safety of the bridge.
(d) Review of inspection reports by a
competent engineer. Bridge inspection
reports should be reviewed by an
engineer who is competent in the field
of railroad bridge engineering. The
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engineer should determine whether the
bridges are being inspected according to
the applicable procedure and frequency,
and will review any items noted by the
inspector as exceptions. Often, the
individual exceptions would not
indicate a serious problem with a
bridge, but when considered together by
an engineer, they would show a more
serious problem developing on the
bridge.
(5) Protection of Train Operations. A
bridge owner should designate qualified
bridge inspectors or maintenance
personnel to authorize the operation of
trains on bridges following repairs,
damage or indications of potential
structural problems. Only a qualified
person should be permitted to authorize
train operation after such an occurrence.
Implementation of the FRA Bridge
Safety Program
FRA has been conducting evaluations
of railroad bridge management programs
since the 1980’s, before the Bridge
Safety Policy was first issued. The
Policy indicates that its guidelines will
be the basis for FRA’s evaluation of
bridge management. This Safety
Advisory essentially amplifies and
clarifies the criteria included in the
Policy guidelines. The
recommendations included in this
Safety Advisory will be reviewed by
FRA personnel when conducting
evaluations of railroad bridge
management. The same criteria, together
with other risk factors, will be
considered by FRA when selecting
small railroads for further evaluation.
FRA will maintain on-going evaluations
on the larger railroads and passenger
carriers.
FRA has been able to adhere to its
policy of not issuing specific regulations
governing bridge management, bridge
conditions and bridge capacities. If the
continuing evaluations show that the
railroad industry is essentially adhering
to the principles of good engineering
and the provisions of this Safety
Advisory, and also provided that no
significant train accidents are caused by
the structural failure of a railroad
bridge, FRA intends to continue with
this non-regulatory policy.
Owners of track carried on one or
more railroad bridges are encouraged to
voluntarily take action in accordance
with these recommendations. If
circumstances so warrant, FRA reserves
the authority to take other corrective
action, including: issuing an emergency
order to restrict operations over a
railroad bridge if necessary to protect
public safety, modifying this Safety
Advisory 2007–03, issuing additional
safety advisories, taking regulatory
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action, or taking other appropriate
action necessary to ensure the highest
level of safety on the Nation’s railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4,
2007.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. E7–17811 Filed 9–10–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
Safety Administration
[Docket: PHMSA–1998–4957]
Request for Public Comments and
Office of Management and Budget
Approval of an Existing Information
Collection (2137–0618)
Pipeline and Hazardous
Materials Safety Administration
(PHMSA), U.S. Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice and request for
comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In compliance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(PRA), this notice requests public
participation in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)
approval process for the renewal and
extension of an information collection:
‘‘Pipeline Safety: Periodic Underwater
Inspections.’’ PHMSA invites the public
to submit comments over the next 60
days on whether the existing
information collection is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of DOT.
DATES: Submit comments on or before
November 13, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Reference Docket PHMSA–
1998–4957 and submit comments in the
following ways:
• Electronic Submissions: Through
September 27, 2007, comments may be
submitted electronically on the e-Gov
Web site at https://www.regulations.gov
or on the DOT electronic docket site,
https://dms.dot.gov. To submit
comments on the DOT electronic
docket, click ‘‘Comment/Submissions,’’
click ‘‘Continue,’’ fill in the requested
information, click ‘‘Continue,’’ enter
your comment, then click ‘‘Submit.’’
Beginning on September 27, 2007,
electronic comment submissions may
only be made on the E-Gov Web site at
https://www.regulations.gov.
• Fax: 1–202–493–2251.
• Mail: Docket Management System:
U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Room W12–
140, Washington, DC 20590.
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51901
• Hand Delivery: DOT Docket
Management System; 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., West Building Ground
Floor, Room W12–140, Washington, DC
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Instructions: Identify the docket
number, PHMSA–1998–4957, at the
beginning of your comments. If you mail
your comments, send two copies. To
receive confirmation that PHMSA
received your comments, include a selfaddressed stamped postcard. Through
September 27, 2007, internet users may
access all comments received by DOT at
https://dms.dot.gov by performing a
simple search for the docket number.
Beginning September 30, 2007, internet
users may access all comments received
by DOT at https://www.regulations.gov.
(Please note that comments may not be
accessible on either Web site on
September 28–29, 2007, during system
migration). All comments are posted
electronically without changes or edits,
including any personal information
provided.
Privacy Act—Anyone can search the
electronic form of all comments
received in response to any of our
dockets by the name of the individual
submitting the comment (or signing the
comment, if submitted on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement
was published in the Federal Register
on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477), and is
on the Web at https://www.dot.gov/
privacy.html.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Roger Little at (202) 366–4569, or by email at roger.little@dot.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
notice concerns Periodic Underwater
Inspections, an existing information
collection in 49 CFR 192.612 and
195.413 of the pipeline safety
regulations. PHMSA requires each
operator of a natural gas or hazardous
liquid pipeline in the Gulf of Mexico
and its inlets to periodically inspect its
pipelines in waters less than 15 feet (4.6
meters) deep as measured from mean
low water that are at risk of being an
exposed underwater pipeline or a
hazard to navigation. If an operator
discovers that its pipeline is an exposed
underwater pipeline or poses a hazard
to navigation, the operator must
promptly report the location and, if
available, the geographic coordinates of
that pipeline to the National Response
Center.
PHMSA is now requesting that OMB
grant a three-year term of approval for
renewal of this information collection.
Pursuant to 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A) of
the PRA, PHMSA invites comments on
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 175 (Tuesday, September 11, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 51898-51901]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-17811]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2007-03
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Railroad Bridge Safety--Explanation
and Amplification of FRA's ``Statement of Agency Policy on the Safety
of Railroad Bridges.''
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2007-03 recommending that
owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges adopt safety
practices to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and reduce
the risk of casualties from train derailments caused by structural
failures of such bridges.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gordon A. Davids, P.E., Bridge
Engineer, Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, FRA, 1120 Vermont
Ave., NW., RRS-15, Mail Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-
493-6320); or Sarah Grimmer, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel,
FRA, 1120 Vermont Ave., NW., RCC-12, Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590
(telephone 202-493-6390).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: FRA published its ``Statement of Agency
Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges'' (``Policy'') on August 30,
2000 (65 FR 52667). The Policy Statement, included in the Federal Track
Safety Standards (Title 49, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 213) as
Appendix C, includes non-regulatory guidelines based on good practices
which were prevalent in the railroad industry at the time the Policy
was issued.
FRA has examined reports from January 1, 1982 through December 31,
2006 of 52 train accidents caused by the catastrophic structural
failure of railroad bridges, an average of two per year. During that
twenty-five year period, two people were injured and no fatalities were
attributed to structural bridge failure. In addition, since the
examination of those reports in April of 2006, FRA has learned of four
instances where lack of adherence to the guidelines in the Bridge
Safety Policy resulted in trains operating over structural deficiencies
in steel bridges that could very easily have resulted in serious train
accidents. It should be noted that FRA uses the term ``catastrophic
failure'' to describe an incident in which a bridge collapses or
directly causes a train accident. A simple ``bridge failure'' is a
situation in which a bridge is no longer capable of safely performing
its intended function.
During the past sixteen months, three train accidents occurred due
to catastrophic structural failures of bridges, all of which were
timber trestles. The most recent bridge-related train accident occurred
on the M&B Railroad near Myrtlewood, Alabama, where a train of solid-
fuel rocket motors derailed when a timber trestle railroad bridge
collapsed under the train. Several cars, including one car carrying a
rocket motor, rolled onto their sides and six persons were injured. FRA
has also recently evaluated the bridge management practices of several
small railroads, and found that some had no bridge management or
inspection programs whatsoever.
FRA therefore issues this non-regulatory Safety Advisory to
supplement and re-emphasize the
[[Page 51899]]
provisions of the Policy on the Safety of Railroad Bridges. FRA
recognizes the potential impact of regulations related to structural
integrity of railroad bridges. However, should these serious incidents
and failures continue and FRA determines that the responsible track
owners are not conforming to accepted engineering principles and
procedures, including those outlined herein and in the Bridge Safety
Policy, FRA might have to change course and develop a regulatory
approach.
FRA Bridge Safety Evaluations
FRA has been evaluating bridge management practices on a
representative sampling of the Nation's railroads, including class I,
II and III freight railroads, and passenger carriers. The evaluations
generally compare a railroad's program with the guidelines in the FRA
Bridge Safety Policy, and include observations of individual bridges to
determine their general condition, as well as the accuracy of the
railroad's inspection reports.
Most large railroads generally conform to the FRA guidelines, but
FRA has discovered instances where management had not adequately
evaluated or addressed critical items delineated in railroad bridge
inspection reports before they developed into critical failures or
near-failures. Many of the smaller railroads evaluated also conformed
generally to the guidelines, but a considerable number either fell
short by a large degree, or showed absolutely no evidence of bridge
inspection, management or maintenance.
This Safety Advisory
As serious gaps exist between the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines and
the actual practices on many railroads, and because FRA has discovered
some extremely serious hazards as a result, FRA is issuing this Safety
Advisory. Its purpose is to explain and amplify the provisions of the
Bridge Safety Guidelines, and to discuss and make recommendations
concerning some points in addition to the guidelines that FRA has
determined are critical to bridge safety.
Conformance with the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines
Certain provisions of the FRA Bridge Safety Guidelines are critical
from the standpoint of immediate safety to the development and
implementation of a railroad's bridge management program. These points
are reiterated and expanded below.
Responsibility for the Safety of Railroad Bridges
FRA has specified that the owner of the track carried by a bridge
is responsible for the safety of trains that operate over that track,
and therefore the track owner must know that the track is being
adequately supported by the bridge. Even though the Guidelines are
published as an appendix in the Federal Track Safety Standards for
convenience, that does not imply that the track owner need only assure
compliance with the minimum requirements of the Track Standards. Track
conditions that are well within the limits of the Track Standards might
also be valid indications of imminent bridge failure.
The owner of the track supported by a bridge is fully responsible
for the safety of trains that operate over that bridge, regardless of
any agreements, or division of ownership or maintenance expense, to the
contrary. The track owner must be able to control, and restrict if
necessary, the movement of trains on any segment of its track,
including the track on a bridge.
Capacity of Railroad Bridges, and Bridge Loads
The capacity of a bridge, and the actual loads that it carries, are
so interrelated that they must be considered together.
The load a bridge carries directly affects its serviceable life and
safety. These loads, and various external influences, impose forces on
the various components of the bridge. These components, in turn, are
each capable of carrying a certain level of forces without failing or
rapidly deteriorating.
Every properly designed railroad bridge is configured and
proportioned so that it will safely handle the forces developed by a
certain train load, together with effects associated with that load.
That load, termed the ``design load,'' is the general basis for
determining the safe capacity of a bridge. The design load is, most
typically, a series of wheel loads of defined weight, with spacings
between every pair of wheels of a defined distance. The bridge must
also be capable of carrying its own weight, the weight of other objects
permanently attached to the bridge, such as signals and pipes, and
other external forces, such as wind and stream flow.
An engineer determining the capacity of a bridge, a process termed
``rating,'' is fortunate if the original design documents of the bridge
are available, together with documentation of repairs, modifications
and inspections. In that case, the design load can be compared with the
original dimensions of the bridge and its components, including
inspection records that indicate the actual condition of the
components, and the bridge can be given a rating in terms of a common
standard series of train loads. Absent the design documents for a
bridge, an engineer should make a detailed inspection of every member
of the bridge to record its actual dimensions, material, and condition.
Every train moving over a bridge causes forces to be developed in
the components of the bridge. The magnitude of those forces in each
component are determined by the weight carried on each wheel, the
spacing of the wheels within the train, and associated effects, such as
impact, rocking, and lateral forces. The effect of the actual load on a
bridge can be associated with the effect of the rated load, and an
engineer can determine if the proposed or actual loads are within the
limits of the rated load, given any operating conditions placed on an
actual load.
Several critical points are associated with making a proper
determination of bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track
owner should take the following actions:
1. Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision,
determines bridge capacity;
2. Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which
carries its track;
3. Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not
loaded beyond their capacities; and
4. Ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are conducted.
Bridge ratings will change with time, and will seldom improve.
Regular comprehensive inspections are vital to maintaining valid bridge
ratings and to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
The rating of timber trestles is a less exact process than the
rating of steel and concrete bridges. Timber bridge components can vary
widely in their composition, quality and condition. The inherent
redundancy in timber trestles will partly compensate for a single sub-
standard component, but the good parts which pick up more than their
share of load from the weak member will degrade at a more rapid rate.
It is essential that a weak timber member be repaired or replaced in a
reasonable time; however, while it is still in place in the bridge, it
and its surrounding members should be given extra attention with more
frequent, detailed inspections.
[[Page 51900]]
Bridge Inspection
Railroad bridges are subjected to train loads and associated
effects, as noted above. In addition, they are subjected to both
natural and non-natural effects. Natural effects include decay,
corrosion, deterioration of concrete and masonry, thermal expansion and
contraction, freezing and thawing of water, floods, and growth of
vegetation. Non-natural effects include impacts from vehicles and
vessels, train derailments, vandalism and fires. All of these effects
can severely and rapidly degrade the capacity of a bridge to safely
carry its railroad traffic.
Railroad bridges also support much heavier loads in relation to
their own weight (ratio of live load to dead load) than do highway
bridges. All of these factors have led to a standard practice in the
railroad industry to inspect each bridge carrying railroad tracks at a
frequency of not less than once per year.
Bridge inspection, unlike the inspection of track, equipment and
other railroad property, is a multi-level process. The inspector is a
technician who should be able to reach all parts of the bridge to be
inspected, detect indications of deterioration or other problems on the
bridge, and accurately record and report them. Most railroad bridge
inspection programs employ inspectors with these qualifications, but
those inspectors are not expected to be able to perform the engineering
calculations necessary to determine the safe capacity of a bridge. That
function is performed by a competent engineer, working from basic
design and historical records of the bridge and the reports of the
inspector-technicians.
While the engineer needs complete and accurate information on the
condition of the bridge from the inspector, the inspector can provide a
much more comprehensive inspection if the engineer provides information
back regarding any critical points or components on the bridge that
might call for more intensive investigation or specialized inspection
techniques. These items might be discovered in the bridge design
documents, especially the so-called ``stress sheets,'' or by review of
certain types of connections that have been prone to trouble on other
bridges. This type of two-way communication can prove invaluable.
Protection of Train Operations
FRA did not address the issue of protection of train operations
from potentially hazardous bridge conditions in the guidelines because
FRA did not find it to be a problem at the time. Since then, however,
FRA has discovered several instances where a person who was not fully
qualified to determine the safety of a bridge was dispatched to resolve
a report of trouble, and that person approved the bridge for continued
service based on the criteria in the Federal Track Safety Standards,
rather than a structural evaluation of the bridge. In a typical case, a
track owner would have a railroad track inspector investigate a report
from a train crew of rough track on a bridge. It is possible that
during such an investigation, even a diligent track inspector would
fail to find a deviation from the requirements of the Track Safety
Standards for the class of track on the bridge, or, in the alternative,
would find that the track could be brought into compliance with a
temporary speed restriction. In this situation, it is likely that,
after possibly placing a speed restriction, he would have returned the
bridge to service while the structural condition that caused the track
anomaly still existed. Without further attention, the anomaly would
continue to deteriorate, until the bridge actually failed under load.
Recommended Action: FRA makes the following specific
recommendations to owners of railroad track carried on one or more
bridges, in order to prevent the deterioration of railroad bridges and
reduce the risk of human casualties, environmental damage and
disruption to the Nation's transportation system that would result from
a catastrophic bridge failure.
(1) Inventory of Railroad Bridges. Every owner of track carried on
one or more bridges should maintain an accurate inventory of those
bridges. The inventory, or ``bridge list,'' should identify the
location of the bridge, its configuration, type of construction, number
of spans, span lengths, and all other information necessary to provide
for management of the bridges.
(2) Regular Comprehensive Inspections. Every owner of track carried
on a bridge should ensure that regular comprehensive inspections are
conducted, as these are vital to maintaining valid bridge ratings and
to performing timely bridge maintenance and repairs.
(3) Determination of Railroad Bridge Capacities and Loads. Several
critical points are associated with making a proper determination of
bridge capacities and loads. At a minimum, each track owner should take
the following actions:
(a) Ensure that a professional engineer competent in the field of
railroad bridge engineering, or someone under his or her supervision,
determines bridge capacity;
(b) Maintain a record of the safe capacity of every bridge which
carries its track; and
(c) Enforce a procedure that will ensure that its bridges are not
loaded beyond their capacities.
(4) Railroad Bridge Inspection Procedures and Recordkeeping.
(a) Inspection frequency. Every bridge which carries railroad
traffic should be inspected at least once per year. The level of detail
and the inspection procedure should be appropriate to the configuration
of the bridge, conditions found during previous inspections, and the
nature of the railroad traffic moved over the bridge (car weights,
train frequency and length, levels of passenger and hazardous materials
traffic, and vulnerability of the bridge to damage).
(b) Inspection records. Every bridge inspection should be recorded,
and the record of the inspection be available to the engineer who is
responsible for the integrity of the bridge. The inspection record
should show the date on which the inspection was actually performed,
the precise identification of the bridge inspected, the items inspected
and the condition of those items. Any inspection item that is found by
the inspector to be a potential problem should be described in a
narrative.
Many different systems are used to ascribe condition values to
bridges and their components, but care should be taken that the
inspection reports do not simply generate a number but, instead, an
accurate description of the condition of the bridge components. It is
appropriate to use a valuation system that serves to identify
individual inspection reports that should be reviewed by the engineer
or other engineering managers.
(c) Prescribing inspection procedures. The engineer responsible for
the safety of a group of railroad bridges should prescribe the
inspection procedures for those bridges. Bridges of a common
configuration and no exceptional conditions may be considered as a
group for a common procedure, but uncommon bridges, those with critical
components and bridges which indicate possible deterioration that could
affect their continued safety should be noted to the inspector. The
inspector should be advised of any particular items of concern on the
bridge, and any specific inspection procedure (frequency, detail and
method) that is necessary to maintain the safety of the bridge.
(d) Review of inspection reports by a competent engineer. Bridge
inspection reports should be reviewed by an engineer who is competent
in the field of railroad bridge engineering. The
[[Page 51901]]
engineer should determine whether the bridges are being inspected
according to the applicable procedure and frequency, and will review
any items noted by the inspector as exceptions. Often, the individual
exceptions would not indicate a serious problem with a bridge, but when
considered together by an engineer, they would show a more serious
problem developing on the bridge.
(5) Protection of Train Operations. A bridge owner should designate
qualified bridge inspectors or maintenance personnel to authorize the
operation of trains on bridges following repairs, damage or indications
of potential structural problems. Only a qualified person should be
permitted to authorize train operation after such an occurrence.
Implementation of the FRA Bridge Safety Program
FRA has been conducting evaluations of railroad bridge management
programs since the 1980's, before the Bridge Safety Policy was first
issued. The Policy indicates that its guidelines will be the basis for
FRA's evaluation of bridge management. This Safety Advisory essentially
amplifies and clarifies the criteria included in the Policy guidelines.
The recommendations included in this Safety Advisory will be reviewed
by FRA personnel when conducting evaluations of railroad bridge
management. The same criteria, together with other risk factors, will
be considered by FRA when selecting small railroads for further
evaluation. FRA will maintain on-going evaluations on the larger
railroads and passenger carriers.
FRA has been able to adhere to its policy of not issuing specific
regulations governing bridge management, bridge conditions and bridge
capacities. If the continuing evaluations show that the railroad
industry is essentially adhering to the principles of good engineering
and the provisions of this Safety Advisory, and also provided that no
significant train accidents are caused by the structural failure of a
railroad bridge, FRA intends to continue with this non-regulatory
policy.
Owners of track carried on one or more railroad bridges are
encouraged to voluntarily take action in accordance with these
recommendations. If circumstances so warrant, FRA reserves the
authority to take other corrective action, including: issuing an
emergency order to restrict operations over a railroad bridge if
necessary to protect public safety, modifying this Safety Advisory
2007-03, issuing additional safety advisories, taking regulatory
action, or taking other appropriate action necessary to ensure the
highest level of safety on the Nation's railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on September 4, 2007.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
[FR Doc. E7-17811 Filed 9-10-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P