In the Matter of FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately), 46668-46670 [E7-16463]

Download as PDF 46668 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 21, 2007 / Notices • Based on the sample analysis of FY06 data (the 247 sample organizations), it can be concluded that: • 93.1% of organizations that submitted proposals to NSF in FY06 are already registered in CCR. • 6.9% of organizations that submitted proposals to NSF in FY06 are not registered in CCR. • Of the 2,677 organizations that submitted proposals to NSF in FY06, 184 organizations (6.9%) would be impacted by this policy change. The amount of additional burden associated with this policy change is 230 hours (184 organizations * 1.25 hour to register = 230 hours). On average, it takes CCR three days to process a registration submission. Respondents: Not-for-profit institutions, for-profit institutions, individuals. Number of Respondents: 184. Burden on the Public: 230 additional hours. Dated: August 15, 2007. Suzanne H. Plimpton, Reports Clearance Officer, National Science Foundation. [FR Doc. 07–4087 Filed 8–20–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7555–01–M NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50–346, 50–440, 50–334, and 50–412; License Nos. NPF–3, NPF–58, DPR– 66 and NPF–73; EA 07–199] In the Matter of FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately) rmajette on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES I FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or licensee) is the holder of four NRC Facility Operating Licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 50, which authorizes the operation of the specifically-named facilities in accordance with the conditions specified in each license. License No. NPF–3 was issued on April 22, 1977, to operate the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. License No. NPF– 58 was issued on November 13, 1986, to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit No. 1. License Nos. DPR–66 and NPF–73 to operate the Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 1 and 2, were issued on July 2, 1976, and August 14, 1987, respectively. Davis-Besse is located near Toledo, Ohio; Perry is VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:08 Aug 20, 2007 Jkt 211001 located near Painesville, Ohio; and Beaver Valley is located near McCandless, Pennsylvania. II The events leading up to this Confirmatory Order date back several years. In 2005, the NRC took enforcement action against FENOC, imposing a $5,450,000 civil penalty for regulatory violations associated with the 2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation event at the Davis-Besse Plant. In response to that event, FENOC performed root cause evaluations. Among other things, FENOC’s root cause reports determined that the reactor pressure vessel head degradation was the result of ongoing and undetected Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle leakage that had lasted more than four years. In February 2007, the licensee informed the NRC that Davis-Besse was initiating a condition report based on information contained in a letter received from Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL). The NEIL letter referenced a new analysis that FENOC had commissioned of the DavisBesse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. The new analysis, submitted to NEIL as expert testimony in an insurance arbitration on December 18, 2006, was performed by Exponent Failure Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent) and concluded that the time period between the beginning of substantial leakage from the reactor pressure vessel head nozzle and the development of the large cavity next to the nozzle may have been as short as four months. On April 2, 2007, after several conference calls with the licensee and Exponent to assess whether the Exponent Report raised any immediate safety concerns (it did not), the NRC requested FENOC to respond in writing to four questions regarding information and conclusions presented in the Exponent Report. Among other things, the NRC’s request for information asked FENOC to ‘‘discuss any differences between the Exponent Report information and conclusions drawn therein, and information previously provided in the Root Cause Analysis Report and Licensee Event Report for the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head wastage event.’’ In its May 2, 2007, response to the NRC’s request for information, FENOC stated that it ‘‘ha[d] not specifically evaluated all of the assumptions used by Exponent’’ but nevertheless concluded that the Exponent Report ‘‘more accurately characterizes the time line of the reactor head degradation event PO 00000 Frm 00070 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 based on [Exponent’s] use of more recently available test data in conjunction with detailed analytical modeling.’’ FENOC’s response did not include a detailed discussion of the differences between the operational experience data and the Exponent Report assumptions. Consequently, on May 14, 2007, the NRC issued FENOC a Demand for Information (DFI) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.204 to determine whether further enforcement action was necessary to provide reasonable assurance that FENOC would continue to operate its licensed facilities in accordance with the terms of its licenses and the Commission’s regulations. The DFI required FENOC to provide a detailed discussion of the process used to determine if the Exponent Report assumptions, analyses, conclusions, or other related information should have been reported to the NRC in a more prompt manner; a detailed discussion of the differences in assumptions, analyses, conclusions, and other related information of the Exponent Report and technical and programmatic root cause reports developed in 2002; and a position on whether FENOC endorsed the conclusions of a second contractor report prepared in connection with the NEIL insurance arbitration. FENOC responded to the DFI in writing on June 13, 2007. In that response, FENOC stated that its May 2, 2007, response ‘‘was primarily focused on the detailed analytical studies that form the basis for the Exponent Report’s time line for the crack growth and wastage phenomenon * * * and was not a comprehensive review of the differences between our root cause reports and the Exponent Report.’’ According to the June 13 response, FENOC ‘‘continues to believe’’ that its earlier root cause reports ‘‘provide a comprehensive explanation of the progression and causal factors of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event and, hence, contain the most appropriate information to have used in development and implementation of corrective actions to prevent recurrence.’’ FENOC’s June 13, 2007, response further acknowledged that it ‘‘should have communicated more effectively internally and more promptly with the NRC’’ about the Exponent Report, and included commitments to implement corrective actions in those areas. On June 27, 2007, the NRC held a public meeting with FENOC to discuss the DFI response. During the meeting, the NRC questioned the corporate safety culture at FirstEnergy and whether FENOC had changed its position E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 21, 2007 / Notices rmajette on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES regarding the root causes of the DavisBesse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. The NRC further questioned why FENOC had not immediately shared the Exponent Report with the NRC, given the importance of its subject matter and potential safety significance. The NRC also sought clarification regarding the licensee’s proposed corrective actions and FENOC agreed to provide clarification in a supplemental DFI response. On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided the NRC its supplemental response to the DFI, which elaborated on the commitments and corrective actions discussed at the public meeting. In general, FENOC’s commitments and corrective actions are designed to prevent recurrence of the events that culminated in the issuance of the NRC’s Demand for Information. Specifically, FENOC’s commitments are designed to ensure that information of potential regulatory significance is recognized by FENOC and FirstEnergy employees and communicated to the NRC in a timely and effective manner. In the short term, FENOC has implemented interim corrective actions to prevent recurrence of the events that culminated in the issuance of the NRC’s Demand for Information. Specifically, FENOC has developed criteria to be used in determining whether documents developed in support of commercial matters, including the pending insurance arbitration with NEIL, contain information of potential regulatory interest to the NRC. FENOC’s interim actions will remain in place until the procedural changes required by this Confirmatory Order are implemented. III On August 14, 2007, the Licensee consented to the issuance of this Order to confirm the commitments described in section IV below. The Licensee further agreed that this Order is effective upon issuance and has waived its right to a hearing. I find that the commitments set forth in Section IV are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the foregoing, I have determined that public health, safety, and interest require that the Licensee’s commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the above and the Licensee’s consent, this Order is immediately effective upon issuance. IV Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:08 Aug 20, 2007 Jkt 211001 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, it is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that the licensee shall implement the following: 1. The Licensee shall conduct regulatory sensitivity training for selected FENOC and non-FENOC FirstEnergy employees to ensure those employees identify and communicate information that has the potential for regulatory impact either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear industry to the NRC. At least 30 days prior to conducting the training, the Licensee shall submit by letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, a description of (1) the population to be trained, (2) the planned training methodology and materials, and (3) the training objectives. The Licensee shall complete its regulatory sensitivity training no later than November 30, 2007, and within 60 days following completion shall inform the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, by letter. 2. The Licensee shall conduct effectiveness reviews to determine if an appropriate level of regulatory sensitivity is evident among FirstEnergy employees including those who received regulatory sensitivity training. The first effectiveness review shall be conducted in January 2008 by an external consultant. A follow-up effectiveness review shall be conducted in January 2009. At least 45 days prior to starting each external effectiveness review, the Licensee shall inform, by letter, the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, of the identity of its external consultant, the qualifications of its external consultant, and the scope and depth of its plan for assessing effectiveness. Within 60 days following completion of each external effectiveness review, the Licensee shall inform, by letter, the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, of a summary of the results of the review and a description of any actions taken or planned in response to those results. 3. The Licensee shall develop a formal process to review technical reports prepared as part of a commercial matter. The process shall provide criteria for the Licensee to use in determining whether a report has the potential for regulatory implications, or impact on nuclear safety either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear industry. The Licensee shall implement the process no later than December 14, 2007, and within 30 days following implementation shall submit a description of the process by letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement. 4. The Licensee shall assess its Regulatory Communications policy and PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 46669 make process changes to its NRC Correspondence procedure to ensure specific questions are asked during the process relative to the experience gained from efforts to respond to the NRC’s May 14, 2007, Demand for Information. The Licensee shall complete any revisions to its NRC Correspondence procedure or Regulatory Communications policy no later than December 14, 2007, and within 30 days following completion shall submit a description of the policy and procedure changes, if any, or the basis for the determination that such revisions were not necessary, by letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement. 5. The Licensee shall provide an Operating Experience (OE) document to the nuclear industry through the industry’s established OE process. The document shall discuss the issues surrounding the NRC’s May 14, 2007, Demand for Information, including the review of technical reports prepared as part of a commercial matter. The OE document shall be provided to the nuclear industry, and to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, within 30 days of the date of this Order. 6. The Licensee shall complete a root cause evaluation of the events that culminated in the issuance of the NRC’s May 14, 2007, Demand for Information. The licensee shall make the root cause evaluation available for review by NRC inspectors and summarize the results of the evaluation in a letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, no later than December 14, 2007. The Licensee’s letter to the NRC shall document the results of an assessment as to whether the results of the root cause evaluation reflect a need for any corrective actions different from or in addition to the requirements of this Confirmatory Order. 7. The Licensee shall maintain the interim corrective actions, discussed, in part, in Section II of this Order and implemented as a result of the events leading up to the issuance of the NRC’s May 14, 2007, DFI, until the procedural changes described in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Section IV of this Confirmatory Order are implemented. The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause. V Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1 46670 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 21, 2007 / Notices rmajette on PROD1PC64 with NOTICES hearing. A request for extension of time in which to request a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and must include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator for NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, IL 60532–4351, to the Regional Administrator for NRC Region I, 475 Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406–1415, and to the Licensee. It is requested that requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f). If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be sustained. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in section IV above shall be final 20 days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in section IV shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. A request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order. Dated this 15th day of August 2007. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Cynthia A. Carpenter, Director, Office of Enforcement. [FR Doc. E7–16463 Filed 8–20–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:08 Aug 20, 2007 Jkt 211001 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket Nos. 50–387 and 50–388] PPL Susquehanna, LLC, Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2; Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact Related to the Proposed License Amendment To Increase the Maximum Reactor Power Level U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). ACTION: Notice of Opportunity for Public Comment. AGENCY: SUMMARY: The NRC has prepared a Draft Environmental Assessment as its evaluation of a request by PPL Susquehanna, LLC for a license amendment to increase the maximum thermal power at Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2 (SSES 1 and 2), from 3,489 megawatts-thermal (MWt) to 3,952 MWt at each unit. This represents a power increase of approximately 13 percent thermal power. As stated in the NRC staff’s position paper dated February 8, 1996, on the Boiling-Water Reactor Extended Power Uprate (EPU) Program, the NRC staff (the staff) will prepare an environmental impact statement if it believes a power uprate would have a significant impact on the human environment. The staff did not identify any significant impact from the information provided in the licensee’s EPU application for Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2, or the staff’s independent review; therefore, the staff is documenting its environmental review in an Environmental Assessment. Also, in accordance with the position paper, the Draft Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact is being published in the Federal Register with a 30-day public comment period. Environmental Assessment Plant Site and Environs SSES is located just west of the Susquehanna River approximately 5 miles northeast of Berwick, in Luzerne County, Pennsylvania. In total, SSES majority owner and licensed operator, PPL Susquehanna, LLC (PPL, the licensee), owns 2,355 acres of land on both sides of the Susquehanna River. Generally, this land is characterized by open deciduous woodlands interspersed with grasslands and orchards. Approximately 487 acres are used for generation facilities and associated maintenance facilities, laydown areas, parking lots, and roads. Approximately PO 00000 Frm 00072 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 130 acres are leased to local farmers. PPL maintains a 401-acre nature preserve, referred to as the Susquehanna Riverlands, which is located between SSES and the river; U.S. Route 11 separates the Susquehanna Riverlands from the plant site. West of the Susquehanna River, PPL and Allegheny Electric Cooperative jointly own 717 acres of mostly undeveloped land, which includes natural, recreational, and wildlife areas. Additionally, PPL and Allegheny Electric Cooperative own Gould Island, a 65-acre island just north of SSES on the Susquehanna River (Reference 10). SSES is a two-unit plant with General Electric boiling-water reactors and generators. NRC approved the Unit 1 operating license on July 17, 1982, and commercial operation began June 8, 1983. The Unit 2 operating license was issued on March 3, 1984, and commercial operation began February 12, 1985. Units 1 and 2 both currently operate at 3,489 MWt (Reference 8). The units share a common control room, refueling floor, turbine operating deck, radwaste system, and other auxiliary systems (Reference 9). SSES uses a closed-cycle heat dissipation system (two natural-draft cooling towers) to transfer waste heat from the circulating water system to the atmosphere. The circulating water and the service water systems draw water from, and discharge to, the Susquehanna River. The river intake structure is located on the western bank of the river and consists of two water entrance chambers with 1-inch, oncenter vertical trash bars and 3/8-inchmesh traveling screens. A low-pressure screen-wash system periodically operates to release aquatic organisms and debris impinged on the traveling screens to a pit with debris removal equipment that collects material into a dumpster for offsite disposal. Cooling tower blowdown, spray pond overflow, and other permitted effluents are discharged to the Susquehanna River through a buried pipe leading to a submerged discharge diffuser structure, approximately 600 feet downstream of the river intake structure. The diffuser pipe is 200 feet long, with the last 120 feet containing 72 four-inch portals that direct the discharge at a 45-degree angle upwards and downstream. Warm circulating water from the cooling towers can be diverted to the river intake structure to prevent icing; this usually occurs from November through March on an as-needed basis (Reference 10). For the specific purpose of connecting SSES to the regional transmission system, there are approximately 150 E:\FR\FM\21AUN1.SGM 21AUN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 21, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 46668-46670]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-16463]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-346, 50-440, 50-334, and 50-412; License Nos. NPF-3, 
NPF-58, DPR-66 and NPF-73; EA 07-199]


In the Matter of FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company; Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1; Beaver Valley Power Station, Units 
1 and 2; Confirmatory Order (Effective Immediately)

I

    FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC or licensee) is the 
holder of four NRC Facility Operating Licenses issued by the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR 
Part 50, which authorizes the operation of the specifically-named 
facilities in accordance with the conditions specified in each license. 
License No. NPF-3 was issued on April 22, 1977, to operate the Davis-
Besse Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1. License No. NPF-58 was issued 
on November 13, 1986, to operate the Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 
No. 1. License Nos. DPR-66 and NPF-73 to operate the Beaver Valley 
Power Station, Units 1 and 2, were issued on July 2, 1976, and August 
14, 1987, respectively. Davis-Besse is located near Toledo, Ohio; Perry 
is located near Painesville, Ohio; and Beaver Valley is located near 
McCandless, Pennsylvania.

II

    The events leading up to this Confirmatory Order date back several 
years. In 2005, the NRC took enforcement action against FENOC, imposing 
a $5,450,000 civil penalty for regulatory violations associated with 
the 2002 reactor pressure vessel head degradation event at the Davis-
Besse Plant. In response to that event, FENOC performed root cause 
evaluations. Among other things, FENOC's root cause reports determined 
that the reactor pressure vessel head degradation was the result of 
ongoing and undetected Control Rod Drive Mechanism nozzle leakage that 
had lasted more than four years.
    In February 2007, the licensee informed the NRC that Davis-Besse 
was initiating a condition report based on information contained in a 
letter received from Nuclear Electric Insurance Limited (NEIL). The 
NEIL letter referenced a new analysis that FENOC had commissioned of 
the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head degradation event. The new 
analysis, submitted to NEIL as expert testimony in an insurance 
arbitration on December 18, 2006, was performed by Exponent Failure 
Analysis Associates and Altran Solutions Corporation (Exponent) and 
concluded that the time period between the beginning of substantial 
leakage from the reactor pressure vessel head nozzle and the 
development of the large cavity next to the nozzle may have been as 
short as four months.
    On April 2, 2007, after several conference calls with the licensee 
and Exponent to assess whether the Exponent Report raised any immediate 
safety concerns (it did not), the NRC requested FENOC to respond in 
writing to four questions regarding information and conclusions 
presented in the Exponent Report. Among other things, the NRC's request 
for information asked FENOC to ``discuss any differences between the 
Exponent Report information and conclusions drawn therein, and 
information previously provided in the Root Cause Analysis Report and 
Licensee Event Report for the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head 
wastage event.''
    In its May 2, 2007, response to the NRC's request for information, 
FENOC stated that it ``ha[d] not specifically evaluated all of the 
assumptions used by Exponent'' but nevertheless concluded that the 
Exponent Report ``more accurately characterizes the time line of the 
reactor head degradation event based on [Exponent's] use of more 
recently available test data in conjunction with detailed analytical 
modeling.'' FENOC's response did not include a detailed discussion of 
the differences between the operational experience data and the 
Exponent Report assumptions.
    Consequently, on May 14, 2007, the NRC issued FENOC a Demand for 
Information (DFI) pursuant to 10 CFR 2.204 to determine whether further 
enforcement action was necessary to provide reasonable assurance that 
FENOC would continue to operate its licensed facilities in accordance 
with the terms of its licenses and the Commission's regulations. The 
DFI required FENOC to provide a detailed discussion of the process used 
to determine if the Exponent Report assumptions, analyses, conclusions, 
or other related information should have been reported to the NRC in a 
more prompt manner; a detailed discussion of the differences in 
assumptions, analyses, conclusions, and other related information of 
the Exponent Report and technical and programmatic root cause reports 
developed in 2002; and a position on whether FENOC endorsed the 
conclusions of a second contractor report prepared in connection with 
the NEIL insurance arbitration.
    FENOC responded to the DFI in writing on June 13, 2007. In that 
response, FENOC stated that its May 2, 2007, response ``was primarily 
focused on the detailed analytical studies that form the basis for the 
Exponent Report's time line for the crack growth and wastage phenomenon 
* * * and was not a comprehensive review of the differences between our 
root cause reports and the Exponent Report.'' According to the June 13 
response, FENOC ``continues to believe'' that its earlier root cause 
reports ``provide a comprehensive explanation of the progression and 
causal factors of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel head 
degradation event and, hence, contain the most appropriate information 
to have used in development and implementation of corrective actions to 
prevent recurrence.'' FENOC's June 13, 2007, response further 
acknowledged that it ``should have communicated more effectively 
internally and more promptly with the NRC'' about the Exponent Report, 
and included commitments to implement corrective actions in those 
areas.
    On June 27, 2007, the NRC held a public meeting with FENOC to 
discuss the DFI response. During the meeting, the NRC questioned the 
corporate safety culture at FirstEnergy and whether FENOC had changed 
its position

[[Page 46669]]

regarding the root causes of the Davis-Besse reactor pressure vessel 
head degradation event. The NRC further questioned why FENOC had not 
immediately shared the Exponent Report with the NRC, given the 
importance of its subject matter and potential safety significance. The 
NRC also sought clarification regarding the licensee's proposed 
corrective actions and FENOC agreed to provide clarification in a 
supplemental DFI response.
    On July 16, 2007, FENOC provided the NRC its supplemental response 
to the DFI, which elaborated on the commitments and corrective actions 
discussed at the public meeting. In general, FENOC's commitments and 
corrective actions are designed to prevent recurrence of the events 
that culminated in the issuance of the NRC's Demand for Information. 
Specifically, FENOC's commitments are designed to ensure that 
information of potential regulatory significance is recognized by FENOC 
and FirstEnergy employees and communicated to the NRC in a timely and 
effective manner.
    In the short term, FENOC has implemented interim corrective actions 
to prevent recurrence of the events that culminated in the issuance of 
the NRC's Demand for Information. Specifically, FENOC has developed 
criteria to be used in determining whether documents developed in 
support of commercial matters, including the pending insurance 
arbitration with NEIL, contain information of potential regulatory 
interest to the NRC. FENOC's interim actions will remain in place until 
the procedural changes required by this Confirmatory Order are 
implemented.

III

    On August 14, 2007, the Licensee consented to the issuance of this 
Order to confirm the commitments described in section IV below. The 
Licensee further agreed that this Order is effective upon issuance and 
has waived its right to a hearing.
    I find that the commitments set forth in Section IV are acceptable 
and necessary and conclude that with these commitments the public 
health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the foregoing, I 
have determined that public health, safety, and interest require that 
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the 
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective 
upon issuance.

IV

    Accordingly, pursuant to sections 103, 104b, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, it is hereby ordered, 
effective immediately, that the licensee shall implement the following:
    1. The Licensee shall conduct regulatory sensitivity training for 
selected FENOC and non-FENOC FirstEnergy employees to ensure those 
employees identify and communicate information that has the potential 
for regulatory impact either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear 
industry to the NRC. At least 30 days prior to conducting the training, 
the Licensee shall submit by letter to the Director, NRC Office of 
Enforcement, a description of (1) the population to be trained, (2) the 
planned training methodology and materials, and (3) the training 
objectives. The Licensee shall complete its regulatory sensitivity 
training no later than November 30, 2007, and within 60 days following 
completion shall inform the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, by 
letter.
    2. The Licensee shall conduct effectiveness reviews to determine if 
an appropriate level of regulatory sensitivity is evident among 
FirstEnergy employees including those who received regulatory 
sensitivity training. The first effectiveness review shall be conducted 
in January 2008 by an external consultant. A follow-up effectiveness 
review shall be conducted in January 2009. At least 45 days prior to 
starting each external effectiveness review, the Licensee shall inform, 
by letter, the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement, of the identity of 
its external consultant, the qualifications of its external consultant, 
and the scope and depth of its plan for assessing effectiveness. Within 
60 days following completion of each external effectiveness review, the 
Licensee shall inform, by letter, the Director, NRC Office of 
Enforcement, of a summary of the results of the review and a 
description of any actions taken or planned in response to those 
results.
    3. The Licensee shall develop a formal process to review technical 
reports prepared as part of a commercial matter. The process shall 
provide criteria for the Licensee to use in determining whether a 
report has the potential for regulatory implications, or impact on 
nuclear safety either at FENOC sites or within the nuclear industry. 
The Licensee shall implement the process no later than December 14, 
2007, and within 30 days following implementation shall submit a 
description of the process by letter to the Director, NRC Office of 
Enforcement.
    4. The Licensee shall assess its Regulatory Communications policy 
and make process changes to its NRC Correspondence procedure to ensure 
specific questions are asked during the process relative to the 
experience gained from efforts to respond to the NRC's May 14, 2007, 
Demand for Information. The Licensee shall complete any revisions to 
its NRC Correspondence procedure or Regulatory Communications policy no 
later than December 14, 2007, and within 30 days following completion 
shall submit a description of the policy and procedure changes, if any, 
or the basis for the determination that such revisions were not 
necessary, by letter to the Director, NRC Office of Enforcement.
    5. The Licensee shall provide an Operating Experience (OE) document 
to the nuclear industry through the industry's established OE process. 
The document shall discuss the issues surrounding the NRC's May 14, 
2007, Demand for Information, including the review of technical reports 
prepared as part of a commercial matter. The OE document shall be 
provided to the nuclear industry, and to the Director, NRC Office of 
Enforcement, within 30 days of the date of this Order.
    6. The Licensee shall complete a root cause evaluation of the 
events that culminated in the issuance of the NRC's May 14, 2007, 
Demand for Information. The licensee shall make the root cause 
evaluation available for review by NRC inspectors and summarize the 
results of the evaluation in a letter to the Director, NRC Office of 
Enforcement, no later than December 14, 2007. The Licensee's letter to 
the NRC shall document the results of an assessment as to whether the 
results of the root cause evaluation reflect a need for any corrective 
actions different from or in addition to the requirements of this 
Confirmatory Order.
    7. The Licensee shall maintain the interim corrective actions, 
discussed, in part, in Section II of this Order and implemented as a 
result of the events leading up to the issuance of the NRC's May 14, 
2007, DFI, until the procedural changes described in paragraphs 3 and 4 
of Section IV of this Confirmatory Order are implemented.
    The Director, Office of Enforcement, may, in writing, relax or 
rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee 
of good cause.

V

    Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other 
than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its 
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to 
extending the time to request a

[[Page 46670]]

hearing. A request for extension of time in which to request a hearing 
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and must include a 
statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a hearing 
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, DC 20555. Copies of the hearing request shall also be sent 
to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for 
Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the 
Regional Administrator for NRC Region III, 801 Warrenville Road, Lisle, 
IL 60532-4351, to the Regional Administrator for NRC Region I, 475 
Allendale Road, King of Prussia, PA 19406-1415, and to the Licensee. It 
is requested that requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary 
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of 
the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-
415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than 
the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with 
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by 
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d) 
and (f).
    If a hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely 
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and 
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered 
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be 
sustained. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written 
approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the 
provisions specified in section IV above shall be final 20 days from 
the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in section IV shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. A request for 
hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order.

    Dated this 15th day of August 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Cynthia A. Carpenter,
Director, Office of Enforcement.
[FR Doc. E7-16463 Filed 8-20-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P