Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes, 46545-46549 [E7-16106]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 161 / Tuesday, August 21, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
46545
Actions
Compliance
Procedures
(1) Reduce the maximum deflection of the elevator nose-down trim to a 1-degree to 3-degree range.
(i) For Category 1 airplanes: Within the next
100 hours time-in-service (TIS) after April
11, 1994 (the effective date of AD 94–04–
16).
(ii) For Category 2 airplanes: Within the next
100 hours TIS after June 1, 1993 (the effective date of AD 93–07–11).
(2) Modify the elevator trim indicator scale dial
Within the next 100 hours TIS after September 25, 2007 (the effective date of this
AD).
(A) For Category 1 airplanes: Follow
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service
Bulletin No. 216, dated September 11,
1992.
(B) For Category 2 airplanes: Follow
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service
Bulletin No. 079/27–010, dated August 28,
1992.
(i) For Category 1 airplanes: Follow Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service Bulletin No.
228, dated July 13, 1998.
(ii) For Category 2 airplanes: Follow
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service
Bulletin No. 091/27–011, dated August 6,
1998.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(f) The Manager, Fort Worth Airplane
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, ATTN:
Werner G. Koch, Aerospace Engineer, Fort
Worth ACO, ASW–150, Rotorcraft
Directorate, FAA, 2601 Meacham Boulevard,
Fort Worth, Texas 76137–4298; telephone:
(817) 222–5133; fax: (817) 222–5960, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested using the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19. Before using any approved AMOC
on any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector
(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
(g) AMOCs approved for AD 93–07–11,
Amendment 39–8543 and AD 94–04–16,
Amendment 39–8836 are approved for this
AD.
800, Addison, Texas 75001; telephone: 972–
934–5480; facsimile: 972–934–5488.
(5) You may review copies at the FAA,
Central Region, Office of the Regional
Counsel, 901 Locust, Kansas City, Missouri
64106; or at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at NARA, call 202–741–6030, or go
to: https://www.archives.gov/federal_register/
code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on August
14, 2007.
Terry L. Chasteen,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E7–16288 Filed 8–20–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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Material Incorporated by Reference
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(h) You must use Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 216,
dated September 11, 1992; Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 079/27–
010, dated August 28, 1992; Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service Bulletin No.
228, dated July 13, 1998; and Mitsubishi
Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service Bulletin No.
091/27–011, dated August 6, 1998; to do the
actions required by this AD, unless the AD
specifies otherwise.
(1) The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference of
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service
Bulletin No. 228, dated July 13, 1998; and
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd., Service
Bulletin No. 091/27–011, dated August 6,
1998; under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part
51.
(2) On June 1, 1993, the Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation
by reference of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 079/27–010, dated
August 28, 1992, listed in this AD.
(3) On April 11, 1994, the Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation
by reference of Mitsubishi Heavy Industries,
Ltd., Service Bulletin No. 216, dated
September 11, 1992, listed in this AD.
(4) For service information identified in
this AD, contact Mitsubishi Heavy Industries
America, Inc., 4951 Airport Parkway, Suite
Federal Aviation Administration
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15:05 Aug 20, 2007
Jkt 211001
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–24952; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–107–AD; Amendment
39–15157; AD 2007–16–18]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing
Model 767 Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for all
Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD
requires repetitive detailed inspections
of the wire bundles, power drive unit
(PDU) wiring, and wire attaching
hardware, supports, and sleeving
located in the forward and aft lower
lobe cargo compartments, and corrective
actions as necessary. This AD results
from a fire in the forward lower lobe
cargo compartment found shortly after
airplane arrival. We are issuing this AD
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to detect and correct damage to wires in
the forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments, which could result in a
potential short circuit and consequent
fire in the forward and aft lower lobe
cargo compartments.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
September 25, 2007.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in the AD
as of September 25, 2007.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at the U.S.
Department of Transportation, Docket
Operations, M–30, West Building
Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington,
DC.
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207, for service
information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Elias Natsiopoulos, Aerospace Engineer,
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM–
130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington 98055–4056; telephone
(425) 917–6478; fax (425) 917–6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Examining the Docket
You may examine the airworthiness
directive (AD) docket on the Internet at
https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the
Docket Operations office between 9 a.m.
and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The Docket
Operations office (telephone (800) 647–
5527) is located on the ground floor of
the West Building at the street address
stated in the ADDRESSES section.
Discussion
The FAA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would
apply to all Boeing Model 767 airplanes.
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That NPRM was published in the
Federal Register on June 6, 2006 (71 FR
32489). That NPRM proposed to require
repetitive detailed inspections of the
wire bundles, power drive unit (PDU)
wiring, and wire attaching hardware,
supports, and sleeving located in the
forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments, and corrective actions as
necessary.
Actions Since NPRM Was Issued
Since we issued the NPRM, Boeing
has published Service Bulletin 767–25–
0376, Revision 1, dated February 9,
2007, for Model 767–200, –300, and
–300F series airplanes; and Service
Bulletin 767–25–0377, Revision 1, dated
February 9, 2007, for Model 767–400ER
series airplanes. In the NPRM, we
referred to the original issue of Boeing
Service Bulletin 767–25–0376 and
Boeing Service Bulletin 767–25–0377,
both dated November 17, 2005, as
appropriate sources of service
information for accomplishing the
repetitive inspections and corrective
actions. The procedures in Revision 1 of
the service bulletins are essentially the
same as the procedures in the original
issue of the service bulletins, except that
the revised service bulletins replace all
references to Task 25–52–00, ‘‘Cargo
Compartment—Cleaning/Painting,’’ of
the Boeing 767 Airplane Maintenance
Manual (AMM) with references to Task
20–60–02, ‘‘Cleaning to Remove
Combustible Material Around Wiring.’’
Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f)
of this AD to refer to Revision 1 of the
service bulletins as appropriate sources
of service information for accomplishing
the actions required by this AD. We
have also added a new paragraph (g) to
this AD allowing credit for actions
accomplished before the effective date
of this AD in accordance with the
original issue of the service bulletins.
Comments
We provided the public the
opportunity to participate in the
development of this AD. We have
considered the comments received.
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Support for the NPRM
Air Transport Association (ATA),
American Airlines, and United Airlines
agree with the intent of the NPRM.
Request To Clarify the Cleaning
Procedure
ATA, on behalf of its member United
Airlines, states that Boeing Service
Bulletin 767–25–0376, dated November
17, 2005, specifies cleaning the cargo
compartments using Task 25–52–00–
701 of the Boeing 767 AMM. United
Airlines further states that Task 25–52–
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00–701 specifies cleaning the entire
compartment using solvents while
removing insulation. United Airlines,
therefore, requests the AMM task be
clarified, since it believes that this task
does not address the intent of the
NPRM.
We agree, since the intent of the
NPRM was to propose cleaning only
wiring, wiring components, and the
small area contacting the wiring in order
to detect and correct damage that could
be concealed by debris. As we
mentioned previously, Boeing has
issued Revision 1 to Service Bulletin
767–25–0376, which refers instead to
Task 20–60–02, ‘‘Cleaning to Remove
Combustible Material Around Wiring,’’
of the Boeing 767 AMM. Paragraph (f)
of this AD refers to Revision 1 of the
service bulletin as the appropriate
source of service information for Model
767–200, –300, and –300F series
airplanes. No additional change to this
AD is necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise Summary
Boeing requests that we revise the
Summary section of the NPRM to
specify that PDU stands for ‘‘power
drive unit.’’ Boeing states that PDU was
incorrectly defined as ‘‘power display
unit’’ in the NPRM. We agree and have
revised this AD as requested.
Request To Increase the Estimated
Work Hours
Boeing requests that we increase the
estimated work hours from 6 hours to 20
hours for an airplane with a partial
cargo compartment floor and to 22
hours for an airplane with a full cargo
compartment floor. Boeing states that
these numbers were provided in Boeing
Service Bulletins 767–25–0376 and
767–25–0377, both dated November 17,
2005.
Although we agree with revising the
estimated work hours found in the Costs
of Compliance section of this AD, we
disagree with using the estimate
provided by the commenter. The cost
impact figures discussed in AD
rulemaking actions represent only the
time necessary to perform the specific
actions actually required by the AD.
These figures typically do not include
incidental costs, such as the time
required to gain access and close up.
The original issue and Revision 1 of
Boeing Service Bulletins 767–25–0376
and 767–25–0377 state that the
examination of the forward lower lobe
cargo compartment takes 3 hours and
the examination of the aft lower lobe
cargo compartment takes 3 hours. The
service bulletins also state that cleaning
the forward and aft lobe cargo
compartments takes 2 hours each.
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However, the NPRM did not include
time to accomplish the cleaning.
Therefore, we have updated the
estimated work hours to 10 hours per
airplane in this AD and have updated
the estimated costs accordingly.
Request To Clarify the Unsafe
Condition
Boeing requests we revise the
Discussion section of the NPRM to
clarify that crushed and chafed PDU
power supply cables ‘‘along with other
wire and wire support damage,’’ if not
corrected, could result in a potential
short circuit and consequent fire in the
forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments. Boeing states that the
statements in the Discussion section of
the NPRM could lead a reader to believe
that the fire occurred at the location of
the crushed and chafed PDU power
supply cables. Boeing further states that
the fire occurred in the bilge
approximately two feet below the PDUs,
at a location where the airplane wiring
is installed in close proximity to the
insulation blankets.
We agree that the statement as written
in the NPRM could lead a reader to
believe that inspection and corrective
actions should only be limited to the
PDU power supply cables. The intent of
the NPRM was to propose inspecting all
wiring in the forward and aft lower lobe
cargo compartment, not just the wiring
associated with the PDU. Any wire or
wiring components found to be
damaged must be repaired to adequately
address the unsafe condition of this AD.
However, we have not revised this AD
since the Discussion section of the
NPRM is not carried over into a final
rule.
Request To Reduce Compliance Time
and Add Terminating Action
ATA, on behalf of its member United
Airlines, requests that the FAA and
Boeing pursue a more conclusive
method of resolving the damage to wires
in the cargo compartments. United
Airlines states that the actions proposed
in the NPRM are of limited value and
do not address the root cause of the
problem; the service bulletins provide
procedures for cleaning and routinely
inspecting the subject wire bundles, but
do not provide any preventive or
terminating action. United Airlines
further states that even though it
implemented the requirements of this
AD into its maintenance program two
years ago, it has found three additional
occurrences on airplanes that have been
cleaned and inspected. United Airlines
states that the industry would benefit if
the airplane manufacturer could lead a
collaborative effort to (1) implement a
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way to prevent cargo debris from falling
onto and into the high-voltage wiring
runs and (2) address failures that have
occurred under the clamps where debris
was not the issue, including those
failures that have occurred soon after
cleaning and inspection. United
Airlines, therefore, requests that we
revise the NPRM to reduce the
inspection and cleaning interval to 18
months, and that Boeing develop a
terminating action.
We appreciate the commenter’s
concern to have the inspection and
cleaning done more frequently. In
developing an appropriate compliance
time for this action, we considered the
urgency associated with the subject
unsafe condition, the practical aspect of
accomplishing the required inspections
within a period of time that corresponds
to the normal scheduled maintenance
for most affected operators, and the
recommendations of the manufacturer.
In light of these items, we have
determined that the compliance time
proposed in the NPRM is appropriate.
Operators are always permitted to
accomplish the requirements of an AD
earlier than the specified compliance
time. We have not changed this AD in
this regard.
We agree with United Airline’s
suggestion for a collaborative effort to
investigate the feasibility and
implementation of preventive actions
because preventive actions will more
effectively address the root cause of the
wiring damage. The FAA and Boeing
have considered the following actions,
and their feasibility, in preventing
debris from falling onto wiring:
• Installing the full complement of
floor panels.
• Installing conduit or sleeving over
wire bundles.
• Rerouting the wire bundles to
locations that are less exposed to debris.
• Performing good maintenance
practices.
The full complement of floor panels is
currently available as an option to
operators, if they choose to have them
installed. However, even if the full
complement of floor panels is installed,
the wiring is still susceptible to damage
when the panels are removed for
maintenance or other actions.
Conduit or sleeving over wire bundles
is not a viable option, since the conduit/
sleeving would be exposed to step-ons
and dropped tools, which may crush the
conduit/sleeving and damage the wires
inside. Further, the conduit/sleeving
would conceal any damage, making it
less likely for the maintenance crew to
detect the damage.
Rerouting the wire bundles to
locations that are less exposed to debris
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is not feasible or recommended because
it would be a major change. The
modification would require structural
changes to provide bundle supports, as
well as require lengthening the wire
bundles.
Good maintenance practices would
substantially reduce the exposure of
wiring to falling debris and minimize
the occurrence of wire damage.
At this time, we have determined that
repetitive inspections and cleaning will
adequately address the unsafe
condition. To delay this action would be
inappropriate, since we have
determined that an unsafe condition
exists and that inspections must be
conducted to ensure continued safety.
We might consider additional
rulemaking, however, if a preventive
modification is developed by the
airplane manufacturer. Operators may
also request, under the provisions of
paragraph (h) of this AD, an alternative
method of compliance (AMOC) if
sufficient data are submitted to
substantiate that such a design change
would provide an acceptable level of
safety. Therefore, we have not revised
this AD in this regard.
We also agree that the cable clamps
should be inspected, since history has
shown that the wires under the cable
clamps can be damaged not only by
falling debris but also by other
conditions. The commenter’s statement
regarding clamp failures implies that the
NPRM and service bulletins only
address wiring damage caused by falling
debris. However, the procedures in the
service bulletins, which are mandated
by this AD, specify to inspect all wiring
components to detect and correct
damage caused by any environmental
condition, not just falling debris. The
inspection applies to all wire cable
clamps, regardless of location. Further,
experience has shown that wiring
damage is often caused by poor
maintenance practices. The corrective
actions for the cable clamps are part of
routine maintenance per the Boeing 767
Standard Wiring Practices Manual,
which is referenced in the applicable
service bulletin. We have not revised
this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Discussion
Boeing requests that we revise the
Discussion section of the NPRM to state
that the source of the fire was near the
bottom of the bilge below the 13L and
14L PDUs. As justification, Boeing states
that this is the location where the
airplane wiring for the suspect PDUs is
installed. Boeing also requests that we
revise the Discussion section of the
NPRM to state that investigation
revealed that the flammable debris had
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46547
accumulated ‘‘(in the bilge)’’ below the
13L and 14L PDUs.
Although we agree that a portion of
the suspect PDU wiring is routed near
the bottom of the bilge, none of the
reports specified the exact point of
initiation of the fires. Further, the
Boeing service bulletins state that: ‘‘It
was found that flammable debris
collected below the 13L and 14L PDUs;
but the source of ignition was not
positively identified.’’ The NPRM
correctly identified the location of the
accumulated debris as being in the area
below the 13L and 14L PDUs, which
includes the bilge. Therefore, no change
to this AD is necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise the Applicability
ABX Air states that the PDUs and
associated wiring have been removed on
24 of its airplanes in accordance with a
supplemental type certificate. ABX Air
asserts these airplanes are not
susceptible to the unsafe condition
identified in the NPRM. Therefore, ABX
Air requests that we revise the
applicability to as follows:
This AD applies to all Boeing Model 767–
200, –300, –300F, and –400ER series
airplanes equipped with a powered cargo
handling system in the forward or aft lower
lobe compartment, certificated in any
category.
We disagree with limiting the
applicability of the AD as proposed by
the commenter. To adequately address
the unsafe condition, this AD requires
an inspection of all wires and wiring
components in the forward and aft
lower cargo compartments, not just the
PDU and associated wiring. If the PDU,
associated wiring, and all other wires
and wiring components have also been
removed on the commenter’s airplanes,
then no further action is required by this
AD. However, the operator must still
apply for an AMOC for relief from the
requirements of this AD. Under the
provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD,
we may consider requests for approval
of an AMOC if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that such a
design change would provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend Compliance Time
ATA, on behalf of its member
American Airlines, requests that we
extend the compliance time for the
repetitive inspection to 74 months or
30,000 flight hours, whichever occurs
first. In the NPRM, we proposed a
repetitive interval of 72 months or
24,000 flight hours, whichever occurs
first. American Airlines states that it
schedules main base visits (MBVs) every
18 months for Model 767 airplanes. It
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also uses flex scheduling, which allows
for scheduling an extra 10 percent
calendar time depending on the history
of the airplane. American Airlines states
the NPRM proposes the repetitive
inspection every fourth MBV, and that
it accomplishes the fourth MBV at a
maximum of 4 times 18 plus 10 percent,
which is equal to 73.8 months.
American Airlines further states that it
can fly an airplane almost 27,800 flight
hours between fourth MBVs, which
includes the extra 10 percent due to flex
scheduling. American Airlines asserts
that the compliance time it proposes
will keep airplanes safe for the flying
public. American Airlines states that the
FAA can avoid the cost of processing a
request for an AMOC if the compliance
time is extended as it proposes.
We disagree with extending the
compliance time. In developing an
appropriate compliance time for this
action, we considered the urgency
associated with the subject unsafe
condition, the practical aspect of
accomplishing the required inspections
within a period of time that corresponds
to the normal scheduled maintenance
for most affected operators, and the
recommendations of the manufacturer.
In light of these items, we have
determined that the compliance time
proposed in the NPRM is appropriate.
However, according to the provisions of
paragraph (h) of this AD, we might
approve requests to adjust the
compliance time if the request includes
data that prove that the new compliance
time would provide an acceptable level
of safety. We have not changed this AD
in this regard.
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Request To Revise Costs of Compliance
American Airlines estimates that the
cost of complying with the NPRM will
require approximately 6 work hours per
airplane at a cost of $563, every six
years. We infer the commenter would
like us to revise the estimated costs in
this AD.
We disagree with revising the
estimated costs for this AD. In
determining those costs we used the
estimated work hours provided in the
Boeing service bulletins. As stated
previously, we have updated the
estimated work hours in this AD to
reflect a higher cost for accomplishing
the cleaning and inspections required
by this AD. Therefore, we have not
changed this AD in this regard.
Clarification of AMOC Paragraph
We have revised this action to clarify
the appropriate procedure for notifying
the principal inspector before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies.
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Jkt 211001
Conclusion
We have carefully reviewed the
available data, including the comments
received, and determined that air safety
and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described
previously. We have determined that
these changes will neither increase the
economic burden on any operator nor
increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 857 airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet.
This AD affects about 374 airplanes of
U.S. registry. The required inspections
take about 10 work hours per airplane,
at an average labor rate of $80 per work
hour. Based on these figures, the
estimated cost of the AD for U.S.
operators is $299,200, or $800 per
airplane, per inspection cycle.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
Section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will
not have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
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under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
See the ADDRESSES section for a location
to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
I
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
I
2007–16–18 Boeing: Amendment 39–15157.
Docket No. FAA–2006–24952;
Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–107–AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective September
25, 2007.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Model 767–200,
–300, –300F, and –400ER series airplanes,
certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a fire in the
forward lower lobe cargo compartment found
shortly after airplane arrival. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct damage to wires
in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments, which could result in a
potential short circuit and consequent fire in
the forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Repetitive Inspections and Corrective
Actions if Applicable
(f) Within 36 months after the effective
date of this AD, do detailed inspections for
damage to the wire bundles, power drive unit
wiring, and wire attaching hardware,
supports, and sleeving located in the forward
and aft lower lobe cargo compartments; and
do all applicable corrective actions before
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further flight after the inspections; by
accomplishing all of the actions specified in
the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Service Bulletin 767–25–0376, Revision 1,
dated February 9, 2007 (for Model 767–200,
–300, and –300F series airplanes); or Boeing
Service Bulletin 767–25–0377, Revision 1,
dated February 9, 2007 (for Model 767–
400ER series airplanes); as applicable. Repeat
the inspections thereafter at intervals not to
exceed 24,000 flight hours or 72 months,
whichever occurs first.
Credit for Actions Accomplished According
to Previous Issues of Service Bulletins
(g) Actions accomplished before the
effective date of this AD in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 767–25–0376, dated
November 17, 2005 (for Model 767–200,
–300, and –300F series airplanes); or Boeing
Service Bulletin 767–25–0377, dated
November 17, 2005 (for Model 767–400ER
series airplanes); are considered acceptable
for compliance with the corresponding
actions specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of
compliance or a different compliance time
for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR
39.19. Before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies,
notify your appropriate principal inspector
(PI) in the FAA Flight Standards District
Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
Material Incorporated by Reference
rmajette on PROD1PC64 with RULES
(i) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin
767–25–0376, Revision 1, dated February 9,
2007; or Boeing Service Bulletin 767–25–
0377, Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007; as
applicable; to perform the actions that are
required by this AD, unless the AD specifies
otherwise. The Director of the Federal
Register approved the incorporation by
reference of these documents in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O.
Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207,
for a copy of this service information. You
may review copies at the FAA, Transport
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue,
SW., Renton, Washington; or at the National
Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at NARA, call 202–741–6030,
or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federalregister/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August
2, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E7–16106 Filed 8–20–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:05 Aug 20, 2007
Jkt 211001
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2007–27974 Directorate
Identifier 2007–CE–040–AD; Amendment
39–15164; AD 2007–17–06]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Diamond
Aircraft Industries GmbH Model DA 40
and DA 40F Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final Rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: We are adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for the
products listed above. This AD results
from mandatory continuing
airworthiness information (MCAI)
issued by an aviation authority of
another country to identify and correct
an unsafe condition on an aviation
product. The MCAI describes the unsafe
condition as:
A nose landing gear leg failed in area of the
nose gear leg pivot axle. This airplane was
mostly operated on grass runways and
training operations. This failure was based on
a fatigue crack developed in the pivot axle.
Material inspections figured out that this
cracks may also develop on other serial No.
pending the type of operation.
We are issuing this AD to require
actions to correct the unsafe condition
on these products.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
September 25, 2007.
On September 25, 2007, the Director
of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of certain
publications listed in this AD.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at Document
Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, Docket Operations,
M–30, West Building Ground Floor,
Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey
Avenue, SE., Washington, DC 20590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Sarjapur Nagarajan, Aerospace Engineer,
FAA, Small Airplane Directorate, 901
Locust, Room 301, Kansas City,
Missouri 64106; telephone: (816) 329–
4145; fax: (816) 329–4090.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
We issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would
apply to the specified products. That
NPRM was published in the Federal
PO 00000
Frm 00011
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
46549
Register on May 17, 2007 (72 FR 27768).
That NPRM proposed to correct an
unsafe condition for the specified
products. The MCAI states:
A nose landing gear leg failed in area of the
nose gear leg pivot axle. This airplane was
mostly operated on grass runways and
training operations. This failure was based on
a fatigue crack developed in the pivot axle.
Material inspections figured out that this
cracks may also develop on other serial No.
pending the type of operation.
The MCAI requires repetitively
inspecting the nose landing gear leg for
cracks and replacing the nose landing
gear leg if cracks are found.
Comments
We gave the public the opportunity to
participate in developing this AD. We
considered the comments received.
Comment Issue No. 1: Change the
Compliance Time for the Initial and
Repetitive Inspections
Colin Summers, Dan Montgomery,
Michael A. Rigg, and Van A. Lupo state
that the NPRM is based on a single
incident where the airplane was used
for training on a grass strip, and
Diamond Aircraft issued a mandatory
service bulletin requiring inspection of
the nosewheel pivot pin for airplanes
flying out of grass runways.
Two of the commenters state that they
operate their airplane out of paved
runways and fly less than 500 hours a
year. Requiring inspections every 200
hours seems more than what the
situation warrants.
We infer the commenters feel the
proposed initial inspection compliance
time of ‘‘within the next 100 hours timein-service (TIS) after the effective date of
this AD’’ and the repetitive inspection
requirement of ‘‘every 200 hours TIS
thereafter’’ is unwarranted and too
burdensome.
The commenters request the
compliance time for the initial and
repetitive inspections be changed to the
next annual inspection.
We partially agree with the
commenters. We cannot enforce a
compliance time of ‘‘at the next annual
inspection after the effective date of this
AD.’’ Such a compliance time could
cause an increased burden on the
owner/operator if their annual
inspection came due the day after this
AD becomes effective, which would
ground the airplane. Unless it is
determined to be an urgent safety of
flight condition, we are required to give
owner/operators a grace period after the
AD becomes effective to schedule the
airplane for maintenance. We can
provide a compliance time of 12 months
to coincide with annual inspections.
E:\FR\FM\21AUR1.SGM
21AUR1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 161 (Tuesday, August 21, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 46545-46549]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-16106]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-24952; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-107-AD;
Amendment 39-15157; AD 2007-16-18]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all
Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This AD requires repetitive detailed
inspections of the wire bundles, power drive unit (PDU) wiring, and
wire attaching hardware, supports, and sleeving located in the forward
and aft lower lobe cargo compartments, and corrective actions as
necessary. This AD results from a fire in the forward lower lobe cargo
compartment found shortly after airplane arrival. We are issuing this
AD to detect and correct damage to wires in the forward and aft lower
lobe cargo compartments, which could result in a potential short
circuit and consequent fire in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartments.
DATES: This AD becomes effective September 25, 2007.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of September 25,
2007.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at the U.S. Department of Transportation,
Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200
New Jersey Avenue, SE., Washington, DC.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Elias Natsiopoulos, Aerospace
Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-
4056; telephone (425) 917-6478; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Examining the Docket
You may examine the airworthiness directive (AD) docket on the
Internet at https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Operations
office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Operations office (telephone (800) 647-5527) is
located on the ground floor of the West Building at the street address
stated in the ADDRESSES section.
Discussion
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to all Boeing Model 767
airplanes.
[[Page 46546]]
That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on June 6, 2006 (71 FR
32489). That NPRM proposed to require repetitive detailed inspections
of the wire bundles, power drive unit (PDU) wiring, and wire attaching
hardware, supports, and sleeving located in the forward and aft lower
lobe cargo compartments, and corrective actions as necessary.
Actions Since NPRM Was Issued
Since we issued the NPRM, Boeing has published Service Bulletin
767-25-0376, Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007, for Model 767-200, -
300, and -300F series airplanes; and Service Bulletin 767-25-0377,
Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007, for Model 767-400ER series
airplanes. In the NPRM, we referred to the original issue of Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-25-0376 and Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25-0377,
both dated November 17, 2005, as appropriate sources of service
information for accomplishing the repetitive inspections and corrective
actions. The procedures in Revision 1 of the service bulletins are
essentially the same as the procedures in the original issue of the
service bulletins, except that the revised service bulletins replace
all references to Task 25-52-00, ``Cargo Compartment--Cleaning/
Painting,'' of the Boeing 767 Airplane Maintenance Manual (AMM) with
references to Task 20-60-02, ``Cleaning to Remove Combustible Material
Around Wiring.'' Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this AD to
refer to Revision 1 of the service bulletins as appropriate sources of
service information for accomplishing the actions required by this AD.
We have also added a new paragraph (g) to this AD allowing credit for
actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in accordance
with the original issue of the service bulletins.
Comments
We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the
development of this AD. We have considered the comments received.
Support for the NPRM
Air Transport Association (ATA), American Airlines, and United
Airlines agree with the intent of the NPRM.
Request To Clarify the Cleaning Procedure
ATA, on behalf of its member United Airlines, states that Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-25-0376, dated November 17, 2005, specifies
cleaning the cargo compartments using Task 25-52-00-701 of the Boeing
767 AMM. United Airlines further states that Task 25-52-00-701
specifies cleaning the entire compartment using solvents while removing
insulation. United Airlines, therefore, requests the AMM task be
clarified, since it believes that this task does not address the intent
of the NPRM.
We agree, since the intent of the NPRM was to propose cleaning only
wiring, wiring components, and the small area contacting the wiring in
order to detect and correct damage that could be concealed by debris.
As we mentioned previously, Boeing has issued Revision 1 to Service
Bulletin 767-25-0376, which refers instead to Task 20-60-02, ``Cleaning
to Remove Combustible Material Around Wiring,'' of the Boeing 767 AMM.
Paragraph (f) of this AD refers to Revision 1 of the service bulletin
as the appropriate source of service information for Model 767-200, -
300, and -300F series airplanes. No additional change to this AD is
necessary in this regard.
Request To Revise Summary
Boeing requests that we revise the Summary section of the NPRM to
specify that PDU stands for ``power drive unit.'' Boeing states that
PDU was incorrectly defined as ``power display unit'' in the NPRM. We
agree and have revised this AD as requested.
Request To Increase the Estimated Work Hours
Boeing requests that we increase the estimated work hours from 6
hours to 20 hours for an airplane with a partial cargo compartment
floor and to 22 hours for an airplane with a full cargo compartment
floor. Boeing states that these numbers were provided in Boeing Service
Bulletins 767-25-0376 and 767-25-0377, both dated November 17, 2005.
Although we agree with revising the estimated work hours found in
the Costs of Compliance section of this AD, we disagree with using the
estimate provided by the commenter. The cost impact figures discussed
in AD rulemaking actions represent only the time necessary to perform
the specific actions actually required by the AD. These figures
typically do not include incidental costs, such as the time required to
gain access and close up. The original issue and Revision 1 of Boeing
Service Bulletins 767-25-0376 and 767-25-0377 state that the
examination of the forward lower lobe cargo compartment takes 3 hours
and the examination of the aft lower lobe cargo compartment takes 3
hours. The service bulletins also state that cleaning the forward and
aft lobe cargo compartments takes 2 hours each. However, the NPRM did
not include time to accomplish the cleaning. Therefore, we have updated
the estimated work hours to 10 hours per airplane in this AD and have
updated the estimated costs accordingly.
Request To Clarify the Unsafe Condition
Boeing requests we revise the Discussion section of the NPRM to
clarify that crushed and chafed PDU power supply cables ``along with
other wire and wire support damage,'' if not corrected, could result in
a potential short circuit and consequent fire in the forward and aft
lower lobe cargo compartments. Boeing states that the statements in the
Discussion section of the NPRM could lead a reader to believe that the
fire occurred at the location of the crushed and chafed PDU power
supply cables. Boeing further states that the fire occurred in the
bilge approximately two feet below the PDUs, at a location where the
airplane wiring is installed in close proximity to the insulation
blankets.
We agree that the statement as written in the NPRM could lead a
reader to believe that inspection and corrective actions should only be
limited to the PDU power supply cables. The intent of the NPRM was to
propose inspecting all wiring in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo
compartment, not just the wiring associated with the PDU. Any wire or
wiring components found to be damaged must be repaired to adequately
address the unsafe condition of this AD. However, we have not revised
this AD since the Discussion section of the NPRM is not carried over
into a final rule.
Request To Reduce Compliance Time and Add Terminating Action
ATA, on behalf of its member United Airlines, requests that the FAA
and Boeing pursue a more conclusive method of resolving the damage to
wires in the cargo compartments. United Airlines states that the
actions proposed in the NPRM are of limited value and do not address
the root cause of the problem; the service bulletins provide procedures
for cleaning and routinely inspecting the subject wire bundles, but do
not provide any preventive or terminating action. United Airlines
further states that even though it implemented the requirements of this
AD into its maintenance program two years ago, it has found three
additional occurrences on airplanes that have been cleaned and
inspected. United Airlines states that the industry would benefit if
the airplane manufacturer could lead a collaborative effort to (1)
implement a
[[Page 46547]]
way to prevent cargo debris from falling onto and into the high-voltage
wiring runs and (2) address failures that have occurred under the
clamps where debris was not the issue, including those failures that
have occurred soon after cleaning and inspection. United Airlines,
therefore, requests that we revise the NPRM to reduce the inspection
and cleaning interval to 18 months, and that Boeing develop a
terminating action.
We appreciate the commenter's concern to have the inspection and
cleaning done more frequently. In developing an appropriate compliance
time for this action, we considered the urgency associated with the
subject unsafe condition, the practical aspect of accomplishing the
required inspections within a period of time that corresponds to the
normal scheduled maintenance for most affected operators, and the
recommendations of the manufacturer. In light of these items, we have
determined that the compliance time proposed in the NPRM is
appropriate. Operators are always permitted to accomplish the
requirements of an AD earlier than the specified compliance time. We
have not changed this AD in this regard.
We agree with United Airline's suggestion for a collaborative
effort to investigate the feasibility and implementation of preventive
actions because preventive actions will more effectively address the
root cause of the wiring damage. The FAA and Boeing have considered the
following actions, and their feasibility, in preventing debris from
falling onto wiring:
Installing the full complement of floor panels.
Installing conduit or sleeving over wire bundles.
Rerouting the wire bundles to locations that are less
exposed to debris.
Performing good maintenance practices.
The full complement of floor panels is currently available as an
option to operators, if they choose to have them installed. However,
even if the full complement of floor panels is installed, the wiring is
still susceptible to damage when the panels are removed for maintenance
or other actions.
Conduit or sleeving over wire bundles is not a viable option, since
the conduit/sleeving would be exposed to step-ons and dropped tools,
which may crush the conduit/sleeving and damage the wires inside.
Further, the conduit/sleeving would conceal any damage, making it less
likely for the maintenance crew to detect the damage.
Rerouting the wire bundles to locations that are less exposed to
debris is not feasible or recommended because it would be a major
change. The modification would require structural changes to provide
bundle supports, as well as require lengthening the wire bundles.
Good maintenance practices would substantially reduce the exposure
of wiring to falling debris and minimize the occurrence of wire damage.
At this time, we have determined that repetitive inspections and
cleaning will adequately address the unsafe condition. To delay this
action would be inappropriate, since we have determined that an unsafe
condition exists and that inspections must be conducted to ensure
continued safety. We might consider additional rulemaking, however, if
a preventive modification is developed by the airplane manufacturer.
Operators may also request, under the provisions of paragraph (h) of
this AD, an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) if sufficient data
are submitted to substantiate that such a design change would provide
an acceptable level of safety. Therefore, we have not revised this AD
in this regard.
We also agree that the cable clamps should be inspected, since
history has shown that the wires under the cable clamps can be damaged
not only by falling debris but also by other conditions. The
commenter's statement regarding clamp failures implies that the NPRM
and service bulletins only address wiring damage caused by falling
debris. However, the procedures in the service bulletins, which are
mandated by this AD, specify to inspect all wiring components to detect
and correct damage caused by any environmental condition, not just
falling debris. The inspection applies to all wire cable clamps,
regardless of location. Further, experience has shown that wiring
damage is often caused by poor maintenance practices. The corrective
actions for the cable clamps are part of routine maintenance per the
Boeing 767 Standard Wiring Practices Manual, which is referenced in the
applicable service bulletin. We have not revised this AD in this
regard.
Request To Revise Discussion
Boeing requests that we revise the Discussion section of the NPRM
to state that the source of the fire was near the bottom of the bilge
below the 13L and 14L PDUs. As justification, Boeing states that this
is the location where the airplane wiring for the suspect PDUs is
installed. Boeing also requests that we revise the Discussion section
of the NPRM to state that investigation revealed that the flammable
debris had accumulated ``(in the bilge)'' below the 13L and 14L PDUs.
Although we agree that a portion of the suspect PDU wiring is
routed near the bottom of the bilge, none of the reports specified the
exact point of initiation of the fires. Further, the Boeing service
bulletins state that: ``It was found that flammable debris collected
below the 13L and 14L PDUs; but the source of ignition was not
positively identified.'' The NPRM correctly identified the location of
the accumulated debris as being in the area below the 13L and 14L PDUs,
which includes the bilge. Therefore, no change to this AD is necessary
in this regard.
Request To Revise the Applicability
ABX Air states that the PDUs and associated wiring have been
removed on 24 of its airplanes in accordance with a supplemental type
certificate. ABX Air asserts these airplanes are not susceptible to the
unsafe condition identified in the NPRM. Therefore, ABX Air requests
that we revise the applicability to as follows:
This AD applies to all Boeing Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -
400ER series airplanes equipped with a powered cargo handling system
in the forward or aft lower lobe compartment, certificated in any
category.
We disagree with limiting the applicability of the AD as proposed
by the commenter. To adequately address the unsafe condition, this AD
requires an inspection of all wires and wiring components in the
forward and aft lower cargo compartments, not just the PDU and
associated wiring. If the PDU, associated wiring, and all other wires
and wiring components have also been removed on the commenter's
airplanes, then no further action is required by this AD. However, the
operator must still apply for an AMOC for relief from the requirements
of this AD. Under the provisions of paragraph (h) of this AD, we may
consider requests for approval of an AMOC if sufficient data are
submitted to substantiate that such a design change would provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Extend Compliance Time
ATA, on behalf of its member American Airlines, requests that we
extend the compliance time for the repetitive inspection to 74 months
or 30,000 flight hours, whichever occurs first. In the NPRM, we
proposed a repetitive interval of 72 months or 24,000 flight hours,
whichever occurs first. American Airlines states that it schedules main
base visits (MBVs) every 18 months for Model 767 airplanes. It
[[Page 46548]]
also uses flex scheduling, which allows for scheduling an extra 10
percent calendar time depending on the history of the airplane.
American Airlines states the NPRM proposes the repetitive inspection
every fourth MBV, and that it accomplishes the fourth MBV at a maximum
of 4 times 18 plus 10 percent, which is equal to 73.8 months. American
Airlines further states that it can fly an airplane almost 27,800
flight hours between fourth MBVs, which includes the extra 10 percent
due to flex scheduling. American Airlines asserts that the compliance
time it proposes will keep airplanes safe for the flying public.
American Airlines states that the FAA can avoid the cost of processing
a request for an AMOC if the compliance time is extended as it
proposes.
We disagree with extending the compliance time. In developing an
appropriate compliance time for this action, we considered the urgency
associated with the subject unsafe condition, the practical aspect of
accomplishing the required inspections within a period of time that
corresponds to the normal scheduled maintenance for most affected
operators, and the recommendations of the manufacturer. In light of
these items, we have determined that the compliance time proposed in
the NPRM is appropriate. However, according to the provisions of
paragraph (h) of this AD, we might approve requests to adjust the
compliance time if the request includes data that prove that the new
compliance time would provide an acceptable level of safety. We have
not changed this AD in this regard.
Request To Revise Costs of Compliance
American Airlines estimates that the cost of complying with the
NPRM will require approximately 6 work hours per airplane at a cost of
$563, every six years. We infer the commenter would like us to revise
the estimated costs in this AD.
We disagree with revising the estimated costs for this AD. In
determining those costs we used the estimated work hours provided in
the Boeing service bulletins. As stated previously, we have updated the
estimated work hours in this AD to reflect a higher cost for
accomplishing the cleaning and inspections required by this AD.
Therefore, we have not changed this AD in this regard.
Clarification of AMOC Paragraph
We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.
Conclusion
We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the
comments received, and determined that air safety and the public
interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously.
We have determined that these changes will neither increase the
economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 857 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. This AD affects about 374 airplanes of U.S. registry.
The required inspections take about 10 work hours per airplane, at an
average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these figures, the
estimated cost of the AD for U.S. operators is $299,200, or $800 per
airplane, per inspection cycle.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866;
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
2007-16-18 Boeing: Amendment 39-15157. Docket No. FAA-2006-24952;
Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-107-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective September 25, 2007.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to all Model 767-200, -300, -300F, and -
400ER series airplanes, certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from a fire in the forward lower lobe cargo
compartment found shortly after airplane arrival. We are issuing
this AD to detect and correct damage to wires in the forward and aft
lower lobe cargo compartments, which could result in a potential
short circuit and consequent fire in the forward and aft lower lobe
cargo compartments.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Repetitive Inspections and Corrective Actions if Applicable
(f) Within 36 months after the effective date of this AD, do
detailed inspections for damage to the wire bundles, power drive
unit wiring, and wire attaching hardware, supports, and sleeving
located in the forward and aft lower lobe cargo compartments; and do
all applicable corrective actions before
[[Page 46549]]
further flight after the inspections; by accomplishing all of the
actions specified in the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-25-0376, Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007
(for Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes); or Boeing
Service Bulletin 767-25-0377, Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007
(for Model 767-400ER series airplanes); as applicable. Repeat the
inspections thereafter at intervals not to exceed 24,000 flight
hours or 72 months, whichever occurs first.
Credit for Actions Accomplished According to Previous Issues of Service
Bulletins
(g) Actions accomplished before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25-0376, dated November
17, 2005 (for Model 767-200, -300, and -300F series airplanes); or
Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25-0377, dated November 17, 2005 (for
Model 767-400ER series airplanes); are considered acceptable for
compliance with the corresponding actions specified in paragraph (f)
of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(h)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) To request a different method of compliance or a different
compliance time for this AD, follow the procedures in 14 CFR 39.19.
Before using any approved AMOC on any airplane to which the AMOC
applies, notify your appropriate principal inspector (PI) in the FAA
Flight Standards District Office (FSDO), or lacking a PI, your local
FSDO.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(i) You must use Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25-0376, Revision
1, dated February 9, 2007; or Boeing Service Bulletin 767-25-0377,
Revision 1, dated February 9, 2007; as applicable; to perform the
actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies
otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with 5
U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for a copy
of this service information. You may review copies at the FAA,
Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton,
Washington; or at the National Archives and Records Administration
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: https://www.archives.gov/federal-
register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 2, 2007.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E7-16106 Filed 8-20-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
