In the Matter of General Atomics; TRIGA Mark I and Mark F; Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check; Requirements for Unescorted Access to the General Atomics' Research and Test Reactors (Effective Immediately), 44590-44592 [E7-15494]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 152 / Wednesday, August 8, 2007 / Notices
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Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 30th day
of July 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Douglas V. Pickett,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch I–
1, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E7–15460 Filed 8–7–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
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Seeks Qualified Candidates for the
Advisory Committee on Reactor
Safeguards
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
´
´
ACTION: Request for resumes.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) seeks qualified
candidates for the Advisory Committee
on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS). Submit
´
´
resumes to: Ms. Angelina Chapeton,
Administrative Assistant, ACRS/
ACNW&M, Mail Stop T2E–26, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, or e-mail
AHC@NRC.GOV.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The ACRS
is a part-time advisory group which is
statutorily mandated by the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended. ACRS
provides independent expert advice on
matters related to the safety of existing
and proposed nuclear power plants and
on the adequacy of proposed reactor
safety standards. Of primary importance
are the safety issues associated with the
operation of 104 commercial nuclear
power plants in the United States and
regulatory initiatives, including riskinformed and performance-based
regulations, license renewal, power
uprates, and the use of mixed oxide and
high burnup fuels. An increased
emphasis is being given to safety issues
associated with new reactor designs and
technologies, including passive system
reliability and thermal hydraulic
phenomena, use of digital
instrumentation and control,
international codes and standards used
in multinational design certifications,
material and structural engineering, and
nuclear analysis and reactor core
performance. The ACRS also has some
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19:14 Aug 07, 2007
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involvement in security matters related
to the integration of safety and security
of commercial reactors. This work
involves technical issues associated
with consequence analyses and the
assessment of effective mitigation
strategies. See NRC Web site at https://
www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/
advisory/acrs.html for additional
information about ACRS.
Criteria used to evaluate candidates
include education and experience,
demonstrated skills in nuclear reactor
safety matters, the ability to solve
complex technical problems, and the
ability to work collegially on a board,
panel, or committee. The Commission,
in selecting its Committee members,
considers the need for a specific
expertise to accomplish the work
expected to be before the ACRS. ACRS
Committee members are appointed for
four-year terms and normally serve no
more than three terms. The Commission
hopes to fill three vacancies as a result
of this request. For these positions, the
expertise must be at least 10 years of
experience in one or more of the areas
of Materials Engineering, Digital
Instrumentation and Control, or plant
Operations. Candidates with pertinent
graduate level experience will be given
additional consideration. Consistent
with the requirements of the Federal
Advisory Committee Act, the
Commission seeks candidates with
diverse backgrounds, so that the
membership on the Committee will be
fairly balanced in terms of the points of
view represented and functions to be
performed by the Committee.
Candidates will undergo a through
security background check to obtain the
security clearance that is mandatory for
all ACRS members. The security
background check will involve the
completion and submission of
paperwork to NRC. Candidates for
ACRS appointments may be involved in
or have financial interests related to
NRC-regulated aspects of the nuclear
industry. Because conflict-of-interest
considerations may restrict the
participation of a candidate in ACRS
activities, the degree and nature of any
such restriction on an individual’s
activities as a member will be
considered in the selection process.
Each qualified candidate’s financial
interests must be reconciled with
applicable Federal and NRC rules and
regulations prior to final appointment.
This might require divestiture of
securities or discontinuance of certain
contracts or grants. Information
regarding these restrictions will be
provided upon request.
´
´
A resume describing the educational
and professional background of the
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
candidate, including any special
accomplishments, publications, and
professional references should be
provided. Candidates should provide
their current address, telephone
number, and e-mail address. All
candidates will receive careful
consideration. Appointment will be
made without regard to factors such as
race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, or disabilities.
Candidates must be citizens of the
United States and be able to devote
approximately 100 days per year to
´
´
Committee business. Resumes will be
accepted until November 30, 2007.
Dated: August 2, 2007.
Kenneth R. Hart,
Acting Secretary of the Commission.
[FR Doc. E7–15509 Filed 8–7–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[EA–07–098; Dockets: 50–89 and 50–163]
In the Matter of General Atomics;
TRIGA Mark I and Mark F; Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check; Requirements
for Unescorted Access to the General
Atomics’ Research and Test Reactors
(Effective Immediately)
General Atomics (GA or the licensee)
holds two licenses, R–38 and R–67, for
TRIGA reactors, that are classified as
research and test reactors (RTRs), issued
in accordance with the Atomic Energy
Act (AEA) of 1954, as amended, by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC or the Commission). On August 8,
2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of the
EPAct amended section 149 of the AEA
to require fingerprinting and a Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
identification and criminal history
records check of any person who is
permitted unescorted access to a
utilization facility, which includes the
GA RTRs.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the
Commission established physical
protection requirements applicable to
RTRs, which included storing and using
special nuclear material in controlled
access areas, monitoring the controlled
access areas for unauthorized activities,
and ensuring a response to all
unauthorized activities.
Subsequent to the terrorist events of
September 11, 2001, the NRC took
various actions to ensure the
acceptability of individuals for
unescorted access to RTRs. RTRs were
advised to consider taking additional
E:\FR\FM\08AUN1.SGM
08AUN1
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 152 / Wednesday, August 8, 2007 / Notices
precautions including observation of
activities within their facility.
Licensee’s precautions were evaluated
at specific RTR sites during the
remainder of 2001. From 2002 through
2004, RTRs implemented compensatory
measures (CMs), which included sitespecific background investigations or
checks. Additionally, in January 2003,
NRC sent the names of, and information
on, all individuals with unescorted
access at RTRs to U.S. intelligence
agencies for review. This review found
no issues. Individuals with unescorted
access since January 2003 have
undergone site-specific background
investigations or checks, which were
implemented as part of CMs
implemented at RTRs in response to
NRC initiatives.
The RTR site-specific background
investigations and checks were
established using a graded approach,
considering the specific configuration,
uses and radiological risk of each
facility, to provide acceptable protection
of the special nuclear material and any
associated radioactive materials. The
background investigations and checks,
at a minimum, verify identity,
nationality, immigration status (if
applicable), and determine whether the
individual demonstrates a pattern of
trustworthy and reliable behavior
through facility-specific verification of
various aspects of the person’s
background. This verification includes
consideration of educational, military,
employment and criminal histories.
With regard to criminal history, some of
the RTR facilities use FBI fingerprintbased criminal history records checks,
while others use either State fingerprintbased criminal history records checks or
criminal history records checks which
do not include fingerprints. These
background investigations or checks,
through a combination of various
elements, have provided additional
assurance for the protection of the
specific facility from insider threats.
Further, RTRs are required by Order
dated September 29, 2006, to have FBI
fingerprint-based identification and
criminal history records checks for
persons that are allowed access to
Safeguards Information (SGI).1 These
individuals are allowed access to the
details of security plans or procedures at
the specific facility and, as such, have
actual knowledge and ability to affect
facility security. This Order provides
additional assurance that security
1 ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for Access to
Safeguards Information (Effective Immediately),’’
(EA–06–203) dated September 29, 2006, (71 FR
59140, Oct. 6, 2006) (ML061510049).
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:14 Aug 07, 2007
Jkt 211001
information and the associated RTR
facilities are adequately protected.
Previously, AEA section 149 only
required fingerprinting and criminal
history records checks of persons
seeking unescorted access to facilities
licensed under sections 103 and 104b of
the AEA (i.e., power reactors). Power
reactors are required by 10 CFR 73.57 to
have fingerprint-based criminal history
records checks performed as part of the
granting of unescorted access to the
facility. RTRs have not been subject to
this requirement, and have only been
required to limit access to authorized
persons and to screen those persons for
access in accordance with their security
plans or procedures.
Congress left intact the Commission’s
authority to relieve persons by rule from
the fingerprinting, identification, and
criminal history records check
requirements of section 149 of the AEA
‘‘if the Commission finds that such
action is consistent with its obligations
to promote the common defense and
security and to protect the health and
safety of the public.’’ 2 Currently, the
NRC does not have a rule that would
provide relief from, or require, the
implementation of AEA section 149 for
fingerprinting for unescorted access to
RTRs.
The NRC is planning a rulemaking to
reexamine the extent of fingerprintbased criminal history records checks
for unescorted access to RTRs to ensure
adequate protection of the public health
and safety and common defense and
security. In the interim, the NRC has
decided to implement this requirement,
in part, prior to the completion of the
rulemaking to provide acceptable,
additional assurance that an individual
with unescorted access to an RTR
facility will not adversely impact the
common defense and security or the
public health and safety. Therefore, in
accordance with section 149 of the AEA,
as amended by the EPAct, the
Commission is imposing the FBI
criminal history records check
requirements, as set forth in this Order,
including the Attachment to this Order,
on RTR licensees, including GA. These
requirements will remain in effect until
the Commission determines otherwise.
The AEA requires fingerprint-based
criminal history records checks at
utilization facilities. Section 11cc of the
AEA defines a utilization facility as:
(1) Any equipment or device, except
an atomic weapon, determined by rule
of the Commission to be capable of
making use of special nuclear material
in such quantity as to be of significance
to the common defense and security, or
2 AEA
PO 00000
§ 149.b.
Frm 00109
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
44591
in such manner as to affect the health
and safety of the public, or peculiarly
adapted for making use of atomic energy
in such quantity as to be of significance
to the common defense and security, or
in such manner as to affect the health
and safety of the public; or
(2) any important component part
especially designed for such equipment
or device as determined by the
Commission.
The Commission’s rules, in 10 CFR
50.2, define a ‘‘[u]tilization facility’’ as
‘‘any nuclear reactor other than one
designed or used primarily for the
formation of plutonium or U–233.’’
Further, ‘‘Nuclear reactor’’ is defined as
‘‘an apparatus, other than an atomic
weapon, designed or used to sustain
nuclear fission in a self-supporting
chain reaction.’’ These definitions
include the GA RTRs.
For purposes of this Order, an
individual who is granted ‘‘unescorted
access’’ could exercise physical control
over the special nuclear material
possessed by the licensee, which would
be of significance to the common
defense and security or could adversely
affect the health and safety of the
public, such that the special nuclear
material could be used or removed in an
unauthorized manner without detection,
assessment, or response by systems or
persons designated to detect, assess or
respond to such unauthorized use or
removal. At RTRs, such individuals
include those with the capability and
knowledge to use the special nuclear
material in the utilization facility or
remove the special nuclear material
from the utilization facility in an
unauthorized manner without detection,
assessment, and response by the
physical protection system or related
provisions or persons.
In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202,
I find that in light of the common
defense and security matters identified
above, which warrant the issuance of
this Order, the public health, safety, and
interest require that this Order be
effective immediately.
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 53,
104, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182, and 186
of the AEA of 1954, as amended, and
the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR
2.202, 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part
73, It is hereby ordered, effective
immediately, that General Atomics shall
comply with the requirements set forth
in this order.
A. General Atomics shall comply with
the following requirements:
1. The Licensee shall, within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Order,
establish and maintain a fingerprinting
program for unescorted access that
E:\FR\FM\08AUN1.SGM
08AUN1
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
44592
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 152 / Wednesday, August 8, 2007 / Notices
meets the requirements of the
Attachment to this Order.
2. The Licensee shall, in writing,
within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission (1) of
receipt and confirmation that
compliance with the Order will be
achieved or (2) if it is unable to comply
with any of the requirements described
in the Attachment, or (3) if compliance
with any of the requirements is
unnecessary in its specific
circumstances. The notification shall
provide the Licensee’s justification for
seeking relief from or variation of any
specific requirement.
B. In accordance with the NRC’s
‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check
Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information (Effective Immediately)’’
(EA–06–203) issued on September 29,
2006, (71 FR 59140, October 6, 2006),
only the NRC-approved reviewing
official shall review results from a FBI
criminal history records check. In
accordance with all other applicable
requirements and the evaluation of the
results of the FBI criminal history
records check as specified in this Order,
the reviewing official shall determine
whether an individual may have, or
continue to have, unescorted access. No
person may have access to SGI or
unescorted access to any utilization
facility, or radioactive material or
property subject to regulation by the
NRC if the NRC has determined, in
accordance with its administrative
review process based on fingerprinting
and an FBI identification and criminal
history records check, either that the
person may not have access to SGI or
that the person may not have unescorted
access to a utilization facility, or
radioactive material or property subject
to regulation by the NRC.
C. Fingerprints shall be submitted and
reviewed in accordance with the
procedures described in the Attachment
to this Order. Individuals who have
been fingerprinted and granted access to
SGI by the NRC-approved reviewing
official in accordance with EA–06–203
(September 29, 2006), do not need to be
fingerprinted again for purposes of
authorizing unescorted access. In
addition, individuals who have a
favorably decided U.S. Government
criminal history records check within
the last five (5) years, or who have an
active Federal security clearance have
satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting
requirement and need not be
fingerprinted again, provided in each
case that the appropriate documentation
is made available to the Licensee’s
reviewing official. However, all other
applicable requirements must be
VerDate Aug<31>2005
19:14 Aug 07, 2007
Jkt 211001
satisfied to allow any individual
unescorted access to the facility.
D. The Licensee may allow any
individual who currently has
unescorted access, in accordance with
applicable requirements, to continue to
have unescorted access, pending a
decision by the reviewing official (based
on fingerprinting and a FBI criminal
history records check) that the
individual may continue to have
unescorted access. The licensee shall
complete implementation of the
requirements of the Attachment to this
Order by October 30, 2007.
Licensee responses to Condition A.2.
shall be submitted to the Director, Office
of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555.
The Director, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, may, in writing,
relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration of good
cause by the Licensee.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the
Licensee must, and any other person
adversely affected by this Order may,
submit an answer to this Order, and
may request a hearing on this Order,
within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending
the time to request a hearing. A request
for extension of time in which to submit
an answer or request a hearing must be
made in writing to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs ,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and include a
statement of good cause for the
extension. The answer may consent to
this Order. Unless the answer consents
to this Order, the answer shall, in
writing and under oath or affirmation,
specifically set forth the matters of fact
and law on which the Licensee or other
person adversely affected relies and the
reasons as to why the Order should not
have been issued. Any answer or
request for a hearing shall be submitted
to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications
Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant
General Counsel for Material Litigation
and Enforcement at the same address,
and to the Licensee if the answer or
hearing request is by a person other than
the Licensee. Because of possible delays
in delivery of mail to United States
Government offices, it is requested that
PO 00000
Frm 00110
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
answers and requests for hearing be
transmitted to the Secretary of the
Commission either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101
or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov
and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a
person other than the Licensee requests
a hearing, that person shall set forth
with particularity the manner in which
his/her interest is adversely affected by
this Order and shall address the criteria
set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by the
Licensee or a person whose interest is
adversely affected, the Commission will
issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such
hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the
Licensee may, in addition to demanding
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed
or sooner, move the presiding officer to
set aside the immediate effectiveness of
the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate
evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error. In the
absence of any request for hearing, or
written approval of an extension of time
in which to request a hearing, the
provisions as specified above in section
III shall be final twenty (20) days from
the date of this Order without further
Order or proceedings.
If an extension of time for requesting
a hearing has been approved, the
provisions as specified above in Section
III shall be final when the extension
expires, if a hearing request has not
been received. An answer or a request
for hearing shall not stay the immediate
effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 1st day of August, 2007.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George Pangburn,
Acting Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials. and Environmental Management
Programs.
[FR Doc. E7–15494 Filed 8–7–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Draft U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission FY 2007–FY 2012
Strategic Plan, NUREG–1614, Volume 4
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
AGENCY:
E:\FR\FM\08AUN1.SGM
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 152 (Wednesday, August 8, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 44590-44592]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-15494]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[EA-07-098; Dockets: 50-89 and 50-163]
In the Matter of General Atomics; TRIGA Mark I and Mark F; Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check;
Requirements for Unescorted Access to the General Atomics' Research and
Test Reactors (Effective Immediately)
General Atomics (GA or the licensee) holds two licenses, R-38 and
R-67, for TRIGA reactors, that are classified as research and test
reactors (RTRs), issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act (AEA)
of 1954, as amended, by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
the Commission). On August 8, 2005, the Energy Policy Act of 2005
(EPAct) was enacted. Section 652 of the EPAct amended section 149 of
the AEA to require fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) identification and criminal history records check of any person
who is permitted unescorted access to a utilization facility, which
includes the GA RTRs.
Prior to September 11, 2001, the Commission established physical
protection requirements applicable to RTRs, which included storing and
using special nuclear material in controlled access areas, monitoring
the controlled access areas for unauthorized activities, and ensuring a
response to all unauthorized activities.
Subsequent to the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, the NRC
took various actions to ensure the acceptability of individuals for
unescorted access to RTRs. RTRs were advised to consider taking
additional
[[Page 44591]]
precautions including observation of activities within their facility.
Licensee's precautions were evaluated at specific RTR sites during the
remainder of 2001. From 2002 through 2004, RTRs implemented
compensatory measures (CMs), which included site-specific background
investigations or checks. Additionally, in January 2003, NRC sent the
names of, and information on, all individuals with unescorted access at
RTRs to U.S. intelligence agencies for review. This review found no
issues. Individuals with unescorted access since January 2003 have
undergone site-specific background investigations or checks, which were
implemented as part of CMs implemented at RTRs in response to NRC
initiatives.
The RTR site-specific background investigations and checks were
established using a graded approach, considering the specific
configuration, uses and radiological risk of each facility, to provide
acceptable protection of the special nuclear material and any
associated radioactive materials. The background investigations and
checks, at a minimum, verify identity, nationality, immigration status
(if applicable), and determine whether the individual demonstrates a
pattern of trustworthy and reliable behavior through facility-specific
verification of various aspects of the person's background. This
verification includes consideration of educational, military,
employment and criminal histories. With regard to criminal history,
some of the RTR facilities use FBI fingerprint-based criminal history
records checks, while others use either State fingerprint-based
criminal history records checks or criminal history records checks
which do not include fingerprints. These background investigations or
checks, through a combination of various elements, have provided
additional assurance for the protection of the specific facility from
insider threats.
Further, RTRs are required by Order dated September 29, 2006, to
have FBI fingerprint-based identification and criminal history records
checks for persons that are allowed access to Safeguards Information
(SGI).\1\ These individuals are allowed access to the details of
security plans or procedures at the specific facility and, as such,
have actual knowledge and ability to affect facility security. This
Order provides additional assurance that security information and the
associated RTR facilities are adequately protected.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records
Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information (Effective
Immediately),'' (EA-06-203) dated September 29, 2006, (71 FR 59140,
Oct. 6, 2006) (ML061510049).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Previously, AEA section 149 only required fingerprinting and
criminal history records checks of persons seeking unescorted access to
facilities licensed under sections 103 and 104b of the AEA (i.e., power
reactors). Power reactors are required by 10 CFR 73.57 to have
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks performed as part of
the granting of unescorted access to the facility. RTRs have not been
subject to this requirement, and have only been required to limit
access to authorized persons and to screen those persons for access in
accordance with their security plans or procedures.
Congress left intact the Commission's authority to relieve persons
by rule from the fingerprinting, identification, and criminal history
records check requirements of section 149 of the AEA ``if the
Commission finds that such action is consistent with its obligations to
promote the common defense and security and to protect the health and
safety of the public.'' \2\ Currently, the NRC does not have a rule
that would provide relief from, or require, the implementation of AEA
section 149 for fingerprinting for unescorted access to RTRs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ AEA Sec. 149.b.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The NRC is planning a rulemaking to reexamine the extent of
fingerprint-based criminal history records checks for unescorted access
to RTRs to ensure adequate protection of the public health and safety
and common defense and security. In the interim, the NRC has decided to
implement this requirement, in part, prior to the completion of the
rulemaking to provide acceptable, additional assurance that an
individual with unescorted access to an RTR facility will not adversely
impact the common defense and security or the public health and safety.
Therefore, in accordance with section 149 of the AEA, as amended by the
EPAct, the Commission is imposing the FBI criminal history records
check requirements, as set forth in this Order, including the
Attachment to this Order, on RTR licensees, including GA. These
requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines
otherwise.
The AEA requires fingerprint-based criminal history records checks
at utilization facilities. Section 11cc of the AEA defines a
utilization facility as:
(1) Any equipment or device, except an atomic weapon, determined by
rule of the Commission to be capable of making use of special nuclear
material in such quantity as to be of significance to the common
defense and security, or in such manner as to affect the health and
safety of the public, or peculiarly adapted for making use of atomic
energy in such quantity as to be of significance to the common defense
and security, or in such manner as to affect the health and safety of
the public; or
(2) any important component part especially designed for such
equipment or device as determined by the Commission.
The Commission's rules, in 10 CFR 50.2, define a ``[u]tilization
facility'' as ``any nuclear reactor other than one designed or used
primarily for the formation of plutonium or U-233.'' Further, ``Nuclear
reactor'' is defined as ``an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon,
designed or used to sustain nuclear fission in a self-supporting chain
reaction.'' These definitions include the GA RTRs.
For purposes of this Order, an individual who is granted
``unescorted access'' could exercise physical control over the special
nuclear material possessed by the licensee, which would be of
significance to the common defense and security or could adversely
affect the health and safety of the public, such that the special
nuclear material could be used or removed in an unauthorized manner
without detection, assessment, or response by systems or persons
designated to detect, assess or respond to such unauthorized use or
removal. At RTRs, such individuals include those with the capability
and knowledge to use the special nuclear material in the utilization
facility or remove the special nuclear material from the utilization
facility in an unauthorized manner without detection, assessment, and
response by the physical protection system or related provisions or
persons.
In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the
common defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the
issuance of this Order, the public health, safety, and interest require
that this Order be effective immediately.
Accordingly, pursuant to sections 53, 104, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o,
182, and 186 of the AEA of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 73, It is
hereby ordered, effective immediately, that General Atomics shall
comply with the requirements set forth in this order.
A. General Atomics shall comply with the following requirements:
1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this
Order, establish and maintain a fingerprinting program for unescorted
access that
[[Page 44592]]
meets the requirements of the Attachment to this Order.
2. The Licensee shall, in writing, within twenty (20) days of the
date of this Order, notify the Commission (1) of receipt and
confirmation that compliance with the Order will be achieved or (2) if
it is unable to comply with any of the requirements described in the
Attachment, or (3) if compliance with any of the requirements is
unnecessary in its specific circumstances. The notification shall
provide the Licensee's justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
B. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information (Effective Immediately)'' (EA-06-203) issued on September
29, 2006, (71 FR 59140, October 6, 2006), only the NRC-approved
reviewing official shall review results from a FBI criminal history
records check. In accordance with all other applicable requirements and
the evaluation of the results of the FBI criminal history records check
as specified in this Order, the reviewing official shall determine
whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access.
No person may have access to SGI or unescorted access to any
utilization facility, or radioactive material or property subject to
regulation by the NRC if the NRC has determined, in accordance with its
administrative review process based on fingerprinting and an FBI
identification and criminal history records check, either that the
person may not have access to SGI or that the person may not have
unescorted access to a utilization facility, or radioactive material or
property subject to regulation by the NRC.
C. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in the Attachment to this Order. Individuals
who have been fingerprinted and granted access to SGI by the NRC-
approved reviewing official in accordance with EA-06-203 (September 29,
2006), do not need to be fingerprinted again for purposes of
authorizing unescorted access. In addition, individuals who have a
favorably decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within
the last five (5) years, or who have an active Federal security
clearance have satisfied the EPAct fingerprinting requirement and need
not be fingerprinted again, provided in each case that the appropriate
documentation is made available to the Licensee's reviewing official.
However, all other applicable requirements must be satisfied to allow
any individual unescorted access to the facility.
D. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has
unescorted access, in accordance with applicable requirements, to
continue to have unescorted access, pending a decision by the reviewing
official (based on fingerprinting and a FBI criminal history records
check) that the individual may continue to have unescorted access. The
licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements of the
Attachment to this Order by October 30, 2007.
Licensee responses to Condition A.2. shall be submitted to the
Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555.
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind
any of the above conditions upon demonstration of good cause by the
Licensee.
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration
will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for
extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management Programs , U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued.
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, Office of the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies
also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General
Counsel for Material Litigation and Enforcement at the same address,
and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request is by a person
other than the Licensee. Because of possible delays in delivery of mail
to United States Government offices, it is requested that answers and
requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission
either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail
to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General Counsel
either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail
to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the Licensee requests
a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in
which his/her interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall
address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to
request a hearing, the provisions as specified above in section III
shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without
further Order or proceedings.
If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved,
the provisions as specified above in Section III shall be final when
the extension expires, if a hearing request has not been received. An
answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate
effectiveness of this order.
Dated this 1st day of August, 2007.
For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
George Pangburn,
Acting Director, Office of Federal and State Materials. and
Environmental Management Programs.
[FR Doc. E7-15494 Filed 8-7-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
