Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated Targeting System, 43567-43569 [E7-15198]

Agencies

• Office of the Secretary
• DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 150 (Monday, August 6, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 43567-43569]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-15198]


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Proposed Rules
                                                Federal Register
________________________________________________________________________

This section of the FEDERAL REGISTER contains notices to the public of 
the proposed issuance of rules and regulations. The purpose of these 
notices is to give interested persons an opportunity to participate in 
the rule making prior to the adoption of the final rules.

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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 150 / Monday, August 6, 2007 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 43567]]



DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Office of the Secretary

6 CFR Part 5

[Docket Number 2007-0043]


Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Automated 
Targeting System

AGENCY: Privacy Office, Office of the Secretary, DHS.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security is amending its 
regulations to exempt certain records from particular provisions of the 
Privacy Act. Specifically, the Department proposes to exempt certain 
records of the Automated Targeting System from one or more provisions 
of the Privacy Act because of criminal, civil, and administrative 
enforcement requirements. This notice is a republication of the 
Treasury Department exemption regulation (title 31, Code of Federal 
Regulations, part 1) which previously covered the Automated Targeting 
System as part of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System.

DATES: Written comments must be submitted on or before September 5, 
2007.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by DOCKET NUMBER DHS-
2007-0043 by one of the following methods:
     Federal e-Rulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Fax: 1-866-466-5370.
     Mail: Hugo Teufel III, Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy 
Office, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general questions please contact: 
Laurence E. Castelli (202-572-8790), Chief, Privacy Act Policy and 
Procedures Branch, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, Office of 
International Trade, Mint Annex, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW., 
Washington, DC 20229. For privacy issues please contact: Hugo Teufel 
III (703-235-0780), Chief Privacy Officer, Privacy Office, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), elsewhere in this 
edition of the Federal Register, published a Privacy Act system of 
records notice describing records in the Automated Targeting System 
(ATS). ATS performs screening of both inbound and outbound cargo, 
travelers, and conveyances. As part of this screening function and to 
facilitate DHS's border enforcement mission, ATS compares information 
received with CBP's law enforcement databases, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Terrorist Screening Center's the Terrorist Screening 
Database (TSDB), information on outstanding wants or warrants, 
information from other government agencies regarding high-risk parties, 
and risk-based rules developed by analysts using law enforcement data, 
intelligence, and past case experience. The modules also facilitate 
analysis of the screening results of these comparisons.
    ATS originally was designed as a rules-based program to identify 
such cargo; it did not apply to travelers. Today, ATS includes the 
following separate components: ATS-N, for screening inbound or imported 
cargo; ATS-AT, for outbound or exported cargo; ATS-L, for screening 
private passenger vehicles crossing at land border ports of entry using 
license plate data; ATS-I, for cooperating with international customs 
partners in shared cargo screening and supply chain security; ATS-TAP, 
for assisting tactical units in identifying anomalous trade activity 
and performing trend analysis; and ATS-P, for screening travelers and 
conveyances entering the United States in the air, sea, and rail 
environments.
    ATS-Passenger (ATS-P), one of six modules contained within ATS, 
maintains Passenger Name Record (PNR) data (data provided to airlines 
and travel agents by or on behalf of air passengers seeking to book 
travel) that has been collected by CBP as part of its border 
enforcement mission. ATS-P's screening relies upon information from the 
following databases: Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS), 
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), Non Immigrant Information 
System (NIIS), Suspect and Violator Indices (SAVI), and the Visa 
databases (maintained by the Department of State) with the PNR 
information that it maintains.
    With respect to ATS-P module exempt records are the risk assessment 
analyses and business confidential information received in the PNR from 
the air and vessel carriers. No exemption shall be asserted regarding 
PNR data about the requester, obtained from either the requester or by 
a booking agent, brokers, or another person on the requester's behalf. 
This information, upon request, may be provided to the requester in the 
form in which it was collected from the respective carrier, but may not 
include certain business confidential information of the air carrier 
that is also contained in the record, such as use and application of 
frequent flier miles, internal annotations to the air fare, etc. For 
other ATS modules the only information maintained in ATS is the risk 
assessment analyses and a pointer to the data from the source system of 
records.
    This system, however, may contain records or information recompiled 
from or created from information contained in other systems of records, 
which are exempt from certain provisions of the Privacy Act. For these 
records or information only, in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552a (j)(2), 
and (k)(2), DHS will claims the following exemptions for these records 
or information from subsections (c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and 
(4); (e)(1), (2), (3), (4)(G) through (I), (5), and (8); (f), and (g) 
of the Privacy Act of 1974, as amended, as necessary and appropriate to 
protect such information. Moreover, DHS will add these exemptions to 
Appendix C to 6 CFR part 5, DHS Systems of Records Exempt from the 
Privacy Act. Such exempt records or information are law enforcement or 
national security investigation records, law enforcement activity and 
encounter records, or terrorist screening records.
    DHS needs these exemptions in order to protect information relating 
to law enforcement investigations from disclosure to subjects of 
investigations

[[Page 43568]]

and others who could interfere with investigatory and law enforcement 
activities. Specifically, the exemptions are required to: preclude 
subjects of investigations from frustrating the investigative process; 
avoid disclosure of investigative techniques; protect the identities 
and physical safety of confidential informants and of law enforcement 
personnel; ensure DHS' and other federal agencies' ability to obtain 
information from third parties and other sources; protect the privacy 
of third parties; and safeguard sensitive information.
    Additionally, DHS needs these exemptions in order to protect 
information relating to law enforcement investigations from disclosure 
to subjects of such investigations and others who could interfere with 
investigatory activities. Specifically, the exemptions are required to: 
withhold information to the extent it identifies witnesses promised 
confidentiality as a condition of providing information during the 
course of the law enforcement investigation; prevent subjects of such 
investigations from frustrating the investigative process; avoid 
disclosure of investigative techniques; protect the privacy of third 
parties; ensure DHS's and other federal agencies' ability to obtain 
information from third parties and other sources; and safeguard 
sensitive information.
    The exemptions proposed here are standard law enforcement 
exemptions exercised by a large number of federal law enforcement 
agencies.
    Nonetheless, DHS will examine each separate request on a case-by-
case basis, and, after conferring with the appropriate component or 
agency, may waive applicable exemptions in appropriate circumstances 
and where it would not appear to interfere with or adversely affect the 
law enforcement purposes of the systems from which the information is 
recompiled or in which it is contained.

Regulatory Requirements

A. Regulatory Impact Analyses

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several analyses. In 
conducting these analyses, DHS has determined:
1. Executive Order 12866 Assessment
    This rule is not a significant regulatory action under Executive 
Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review'' (as amended). 
Accordingly, this rule has not been reviewed by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB). Nevertheless, DHS has reviewed this 
rulemaking, and concluded that there will not be any significant 
economic impact.
2. Regulatory Flexibility Act Assessment
    Pursuant to section 605 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 
U.S.C. 605(b), as amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement 
and Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA), DHS certifies that this rule will 
not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small 
entities. The rule would impose no duties or obligations on small 
entities. Further, the exemptions to the Privacy Act apply to 
individuals, and individuals are not covered entities under the RFA.
3. International Trade Impact Assessment
    This rulemaking will not constitute a barrier to international 
trade. The exemptions relate to criminal investigations and agency 
documentation and, therefore, do not create any new costs or barriers 
to trade.
4. Unfunded Mandates Assessment
    Title II of the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), (Pub. 
L. 104-4, 109 Stat. 48), requires Federal agencies to assess the 
effects of certain regulatory actions on State, local, and tribal 
governments, and the private sector. This rulemaking will not impose an 
unfunded mandate on State, local, or tribal governments, or on the 
private sector.

B. Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) 
requires that DHS consider the impact of paperwork and other 
information collection burdens imposed on the public and, under the 
provisions of PRA section 3507(d), obtain approval from the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) for each collection of information it 
conducts, sponsors, or requires through regulations. DHS has determined 
that there are no current or new information collection requirements 
associated with this rule.

C. Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    This action will not have a substantial direct effect on the 
States, on the relationship between the national Government and the 
States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of government, and therefore will not have federalism 
implications.

D. Environmental Analysis

    DHS has reviewed this action for purposes of the National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321-4347) and has 
determined that this action will not have a significant effect on the 
human environment.

E. Energy Impact

    The energy impact of this action has been assessed in accordance 
with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) Public Law 94-163, 
as amended (42 U.S.C. 6362). This rulemaking is not a major regulatory 
action under the provisions of the EPCA.

List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 5

    Freedom of information, Privacy, Sensitive information.

    For the reasons stated in the preamble, DHS proposes to amend 
Chapter I of Title 6, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

PART 5--DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS AND INFORMATION

    1. The authority citation for part 5 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: Pub. L. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135, 6 U.S.C. 101 et 
seq.; 5 U.S.C. 301. Subpart A also issued under 5 U.S.C. 552.

    2. At the end of Appendix C to part 5, add the following new 
paragraph 5:

Appendix C to Part 5--DHS Systems of Records Exempt From the Privacy 
Act

* * * * *
    5. DHS/CBP-006, Automated Targeting System. Certain records or 
information in the following system of records are exempt from 5 
U.S.C. 552a(c)(3) and (4); (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4); (e)(1), (2), 
(3), (4)(G) through (I), (e)(5), and (8); (f), and (g). With respect 
to the ATS-P module, exempt records are the risk assessment analyses 
and business confidential information received in the PNR from the 
air and vessel carriers. No exemption shall be asserted regarding 
PNR data about the requester, obtained from either the requester or 
by a booking agent, brokers, or another person on the requester's 
behalf. This information, upon request, may be provided to the 
requester in the form in which it was collected from the respective 
carrier, but may not include certain business confidential 
information of the air carrier that is also contained in the record, 
such as use and application of frequent flier miles, internal 
annotations to the air fare, etc. For other ATS modules the only 
information maintained in ATS is the risk assessment analyses and a 
pointer to the data from the source system of records. These 
exemptions also apply to the extent that information in this system 
of records is recompiled or is created from information contained in 
other systems of records subject to such exemptions pursuant to 5 
U.S.C. 552a(j)(2), and (k)(2). After conferring with the appropriate 
component or agency, DHS may waive applicable exemptions in 
appropriate circumstances and where it would not appear to interfere 
with or adversely affect the law enforcement purposes of the systems 
from which the information is recompiled or in

[[Page 43569]]

which it is contained. Exemptions from these particular subsections 
are justified, on a case-by-case basis to be determined at the time 
a request is made, for the following reasons: (a) From subsection 
(c)(3) (Accounting for Disclosure) because making available to a 
record subject the accounting of disclosures from records concerning 
him or her would specifically reveal any investigative interest in 
the individual. Revealing this information could reasonably be 
expected to compromise ongoing efforts to investigate a known or 
suspected terrorist by notifying the record subject that he or she 
is under investigation. This information could also permit the 
record subject to take measures to impede the investigation, e.g., 
destroy evidence, intimidate potential witnesses, or flee the area 
to avoid or impede the investigation.
    (b) From subsection (c)(4) (Accounting for Disclosure, notice of 
dispute) because certain records in this system are exempt from the 
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d), this requirement 
to inform any person or other agency about any correction or 
notation of dispute that the agency made with regard to those 
records, should not apply.
    (c) From subsections (d)(1), (2), (3), and (4) (Access to 
Records) because these provisions concern individual access to and 
amendment of certain records contained in this system, including law 
enforcement, counterterrorism, and investigatory records. Compliance 
with these provisions could alert the subject of an investigation to 
the fact and nature of the investigation, and/or the investigative 
interest of intelligence or law enforcement agencies; compromise 
sensitive information related to law enforcement, including matters 
bearing on national security; interfere with the overall law 
enforcement process by leading to the destruction of evidence, 
improper influencing of witnesses, fabrication of testimony, and/or 
flight of the subject; could identify a confidential source; reveal 
a sensitive investigative or intelligence technique; or constitute a 
potential danger to the health or safety of law enforcement 
personnel, confidential informants, and witnesses. Amendment of 
these records would interfere with ongoing counterterrorism or law 
enforcement investigations and analysis activities and impose an 
impossible administrative burden by requiring investigations, 
analyses, and reports to be continuously reinvestigated and revised.
    (d) From subsection (e)(1) (Relevancy and Necessity of 
Information) because it is not always possible for DHS or other 
agencies to know in advance what information is relevant and 
necessary for it to complete screening of cargo, conveyances, and 
passengers. Information relating to known or suspected terrorists is 
not always collected in a manner that permits immediate verification 
or determination of relevancy to a DHS purpose. For example, during 
the early stages of an investigation, it may not be possible to 
determine the immediate relevancy of information that is collected--
only upon later evaluation or association with further information, 
obtained subsequently, may it be possible to establish particular 
relevance to a law enforcement program. Lastly, this exemption is 
required because DHS and other agencies may not always know what 
information about an encounter with a known or suspected terrorist 
will be relevant to law enforcement for the purpose of conducting an 
operational response.
    (e) From subsection (e)(2) (Collection of Information from 
Individuals) because application of this provision could present a 
serious impediment to counterterrorism or law enforcement efforts in 
that it would put the subject of an investigation, study or analysis 
on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the subject to engage in 
conduct designed to frustrate or impede that activity. The nature of 
counterterrorism, and law enforcement investigations is such that 
vital information about an individual frequently can be obtained 
only from other persons who are familiar with such individual and 
his/her activities. In such investigations it is not feasible to 
rely solely upon information furnished by the individual concerning 
his own activities.
    (f) From subsection (e)(3) (Notice to Subjects), to the extent 
that this subsection is interpreted to require DHS to provide notice 
to an individual if DHS or another agency receives or collects 
information about that individual during an investigation or from a 
third party. Should the subsection be so interpreted, exemption from 
this provision is necessary to avoid impeding counterterrorism or 
law enforcement efforts by putting the subject of an investigation, 
study or analysis on notice of that fact, thereby permitting the 
subject to engage in conduct intended to frustrate or impede that 
activity.
    (g) From subsections (e)(4)(G), (H) and (I) (Agency 
Requirements) because portions of this system are exempt from the 
access and amendment provisions of subsection (d).
    (h) From subsection (e)(5) (Collection of Information) because 
many of the records in this system coming from other system of 
records are derived from other domestic and foreign agency record 
systems and therefore it is not possible for DHS to vouch for their 
compliance with this provision; however, the DHS has implemented 
internal quality assurance procedures to ensure that data used in 
its screening processes is as complete, accurate, and current as 
possible. In addition, in the collection of information for law 
enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, it is impossible to 
determine in advance what information is accurate, relevant, timely, 
and complete. With the passage of time, seemingly irrelevant or 
untimely information may acquire new significance as further 
investigation brings new details to light. The restrictions imposed 
by (e)(5) would limit the ability of those agencies' trained 
investigators and intelligence analysts to exercise their judgment 
in conducting investigations and impede the development of 
intelligence necessary for effective law enforcement and 
counterterrorism efforts.
    (i) From subsection (e)(8) (Notice on Individuals) because to 
require individual notice of disclosure of information due to 
compulsory legal process would pose an impossible administrative 
burden on DHS and other agencies and could alert the subjects of 
counterterrorism or law enforcement investigations to the fact of 
those investigations when not previously known.
    (j) From subsection (f) (Agency Rules) because portions of this 
system are exempt from the access and amendment provisions of 
subsection (d). Access to, and amendment of, system records that are 
not exempt or for which exemption is waived may be obtained under 
procedures described in the related SORN or Subpart B of this Part.
    (k) From subsection (g) (Civil Remedies) to the extent that the 
system is exempt from other specific subsections of the Privacy Act.

    Dated: July 31, 2007
Hugo Teufel III,
Chief Privacy Officer.
 [FR Doc. E7-15198 Filed 8-3-07; 8:45 am]
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