Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front-End Strength of Cab Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives, 42016-42041 [07-3736]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 147 (Wednesday, August 1, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 42016-42041]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-3736]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Part 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AB80


Passenger Equipment Safety Standards; Front-End Strength of Cab 
Cars and Multiple-Unit Locomotives

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: FRA is proposing to further the safety of passenger train 
occupants by amending existing regulations to enhance structural 
strength requirements for the front end of cab cars and multiple-unit 
locomotives. These enhancements would include the addition of 
deformation and energy absorption requirements specified in revised 
American Public Transportation Association (APTA) standards for front-
end collision posts and corner posts for this equipment. FRA is also 
proposing to make miscellaneous clarifying amendments to current 
regulations for the structural strength of passenger equipment.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by October 1, 2007. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a 
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a 
public, oral hearing prior to August 31, 2007, one will be scheduled, 
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to 
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such 
hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25268, 
Notice No. 1, may be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web Site: https://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department 
of

[[Page 42017]]

Transportation, 1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground 
Floor, Room W12-140, Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday 
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without 
change to https://dms.dot.gov including any personal information. Please 
see the Privacy Act heading in the Supplementary Information section of 
this document for Privacy Act information related to any submitted 
comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to the 
Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 1200 New 
Jersey Avenue, SE., West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except 
Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Gary G. Fairbanks, Specialist, Motive 
Power and Equipment Division, Office of Safety, RRS-14, Mail Stop 25, 
Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, 
DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6282); Eloy E. Martinez, Program Manager, 
Equipment and Operating Practices Division, Office of Railroad 
Development, RDV-32, Federal Railroad Administration, 55 Broadway, 
Cambridge, MA 02142 (telephone 617-494-2243); or Daniel L. Alpert, 
Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone 202-493-6026).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Proceedings To Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate
    B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking
    C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
    D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
    E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force
    F. Development of the NPRM
III. Technical Background
    A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service
    B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    C. Accident History
    D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of 
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
    E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU 
Locomotives
    1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
    2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
    3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
    4. Comparative Analyses
    F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements
    G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Frame 
Structures of Cab Cars and MU Locomotives
IV. Section-by-Section Analysis
V. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Trade Impact
    I. Privacy Act

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation convened a 
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with 
the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising 
from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would 
begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a 
five-year period. In November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's 
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations 
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994 (the Act), Pub. L. No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 
(November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult 
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for 
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as 
issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at 
49 U.S.C. 20133.

II. Proceedings to Date

A. Proceedings to Carry Out the Initial Rulemaking Mandate

    The Secretary of Transportation delegated these rulemaking 
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator, see 49 CFR 
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group to provide FRA advice in developing the regulations. On 
June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) concerning the establishment of comprehensive safety standards 
for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 FR 30672. The ANPRM provided 
background information on the need for such standards, offered 
preliminary ideas on approaching passenger safety issues, and presented 
questions on various passenger safety topics. Following consideration 
of comments received on the ANPRM and advice from FRA's Passenger 
Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, FRA published an NPRM on 
September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive safety standards for 
railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In addition to 
requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited oral comment 
at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA considered the 
comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule establishing 
comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, which was 
published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed 
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements 
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the 
following subject areas: structural design; fire safety; training; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective 
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final 
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue, 
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the 
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and 
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response 
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of 
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions 
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised 
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those 
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, 
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by 
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning 
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more 
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's 
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The

[[Page 42018]]

product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 
(part 238) and also at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency 
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 
FR 24629; May 4, 1998. The rule addresses passenger train emergencies 
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains. 
The rule requires railroads that operate intercity or commuter 
passenger train service or that host the operation of such service to 
adopt and comply with written emergency preparedness plans. The 
emergency preparedness plans must address subjects such as 
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations, 
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency 
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each 
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable 
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is 
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires 
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency 
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency 
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could 
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, the rule contains 
requirements for the identification and usage of emergency window 
exits, rescue access windows, and door exits.

B. Key Issues Identified for Future Rulemaking

    Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified 
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be 
addressed following the completion of additional research, the 
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of 
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned enhancing 
the requirements for corner posts on cab cars and MU locomotives. See 
64 FR 25607; May 12, 1999. Current FRA requirements for corner posts 
are based on conventional industry practice at the time, which had not 
proven adequate in then-recent side swipe collisions with cab cars 
leading. Id. FRA explained that the current requirements were being 
adopted as an interim measure to prevent the introduction of equipment 
not meeting the requirements, that FRA was assisting APTA in preparing 
an industry standard for corner post arrangements on cab cars and MU 
locomotives, and that adoption of a suitable Federal standard would be 
an immediate priority. Id. In broader terms, this issue concerned the 
behavior of cab car and MU locomotive end frames when overloaded, as 
during an impact with maintenance-of-way equipment or with a highway 
vehicle at a highway-rail grade crossing, and thus concerned collision 
post strength as well. FRA and interested industry members also began 
identifying other issues related to the passenger equipment safety 
standards and the passenger train emergency preparedness regulations. 
FRA decided to address these issues with the assistance of FRA's 
Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.

C. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview

    In March 1996 FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. A list of current member groups follows:
     American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners 
(AARPCO);
     American Association of State Highway and Transportation 
Officials (AASHTO);
     American Chemistry Council;
     American Petroleum Institute;
     APTA;
     American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association 
(ASLRRA);
     American Train Dispatchers Association;
     Association of American Railroads (AAR);
     Association of Railway Museums;
     Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
     Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
     Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division;
     Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
     Chlorine Institute;
     Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*;
     Fertilizer Institute;
     High Speed Ground Transportation Association;
     Institute of Makers of Explosives;
     International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers;
     International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
     Labor Council for Latin American Advancement*;
     League of Railway Industry Women*;
     National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
     National Association of Railway Business Women*;
     National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
     National Railroad Construction and Maintenance 
Association;
     National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
     National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*;
     Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
     Safe Travel America (STA);
     Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte*;
     Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
     Tourist Railway Association, Inc.;
     Transport Canada*;
     Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
     Transportation Communications International Union/BRC 
(TCIU/BRC);
     Transportation Security Administration*; and
     United Transportation Union (UTU).
    *Indicates associate, non-voting membership.
    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The task force then provides that information to the 
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous 
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to 
the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple 
majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then 
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff 
play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues 
and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA 
is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However, 
FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency 
exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule 
achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly

[[Page 42019]]

supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements. 
Often, FRA varies in some respects from the RSAC recommendation in 
developing the actual regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such 
variations would be noted and explained in the rulemaking document 
issued by FRA. If the working group or RSAC is unable to reach 
consensus on recommendations for action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the 
issue through traditional rulemaking proceedings.

D. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established 
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task 
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of 
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company, CSX 
Transportation, Inc., and Union Pacific Railroad Company;
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., LDK 
Engineering, Herzog Transit Services, Inc., Long Island Rail Road 
(LIRR), Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company (Metro-North), Northeast 
Illinois Regional Commuter Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southern 
California Regional Rail Authority (Metrolink), and Southeastern 
Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA);
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     HSGTA;
     IBEW;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with 
the Working Group when possible. The Working Group has held nine 
meetings on the following dates and locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004, in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 7, 2005, in Chicago, IL;
     March 21-22, 2006, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL;
     September 12-13, 2006, in Orlando, FL; and
     April 17-18, 2007, in Orlando, FL.
    At the meetings in Chicago and Ft. Lauderdale in 2005, FRA met with 
representatives of Tri-County Commuter Rail and Metra, respectively, 
and toured their passenger equipment. The visits were open to all 
members of the Working Group, and FRA believes they have added to the 
collective understanding of the Group in identifying and addressing 
passenger equipment safety issues.

E. Establishment of the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task Force

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting 
the Working Group established four task forces--smaller groups to 
develop recommendations on specific issues within each group's 
particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces include 
various representatives from the respective organizations that were 
part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was assigned 
the job of identifying and developing issues and recommendations 
specifically related to the inspection, testing, and operation of 
passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the attachment of 
safety appliances on passenger equipment. An NPRM on these topics was 
published on December 8, 2005, see 70 FR 73069, and a final rule was 
published on October 19, 2006, see 71 FR 61835. Another of these task 
forces was established to identify issues and develop recommendations 
related to emergency systems, procedures, and equipment, and helped to 
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on August 24, 2006, 
see 71 FR 50276. Another task force, the Crashworthiness/Glazing Task 
Force (Task Force), was assigned the job of developing recommendations 
related to glazing integrity, structural crashworthiness, and the 
protection of occupants during accidents and incidents. Specifically, 
this Task Force was charged with developing recommendations for glazing 
qualification testing and for cab car/MU locomotive end frame 
optimization. Although being developed by the same Task Force, the 
glazing and cab car/MU locomotive end frame recommendations are being 
handled separately, and glazing is not a subject of this NPRM. The Task 
Force was also given the responsibility of addressing a number of other 
issues related to glazing, structural crashworthiness, and occupant 
protection and recommending any research necessary to facilitate their 
resolution. Members of the Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the 
following:
     AAR;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Inc., General 
Electric Transportation Systems, General Motors--Electro-Motive 
Division, Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK 
Engineering Services, Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts 
Bay Commuter Rail Corporation (MBCR), Metrolink, Metro-North, Northern 
Indiana Commuter Transportation District (NICTD), Rotem Company, Saint 
Gobian Sully NA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad (Coaster), SEPTA, 
and STV, Inc.;
     BLET;
     California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
     NARP;
     RSI; and
     UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from 
the NTSB attended certain of the meetings and contributed to the 
discussions of the Task Force. In addition, staff from the Volpe Center 
attended all of the meetings and contributed to the technical 
discussions.
    The Task Force held six meetings on the following dates and 
locations:
     March 17-18, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
     May 13, 2004, in Schaumberg, IL;
     November 9, 2004, in Boston, MA;
     February 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     April 21-22, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
     August 11, 2005, in Cambridge, MA.

F. Development of the NPRM

    This NPRM was developed to address concerns raised and issues 
discussed about cab car and MU locomotive front-end frame structures 
during the Task Force meetings and pertinent Working Group meetings. 
Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the docket in 
this proceeding and are available for public inspection. With the 
exception discussed below, the Working

[[Page 42020]]

Group reached consensus on the principal regulatory provisions 
contained in this NPRM at its meeting in September 2005. After the 
September 2005 meeting, the Working Group presented its recommendations 
to the full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting in October 2005. All of 
the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its October 2005 meeting 
accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the Working Group. 
Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the full RSAC's 
recommendations to FRA in this matter. After reviewing the full RSAC's 
recommendations, FRA agreed that the recommendations provided a good 
basis for a proposed rule, but that test standards and performance 
criteria more suitable to cab cars and MU locomotives without a flat 
forward end or with energy absorbing structures used as part of a crash 
energy management design (CEM), or both, should be specified. As 
discussed below, the NPRM provides an option for the dynamic testing of 
cab cars and MU locomotives as a means of demonstrating compliance with 
the rule. However, FRA makes clear that this proposal was not the 
result of an RSAC recommendation. Otherwise, FRA has adopted the RSAC's 
recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes of clarity 
and formatting in the Federal Register.
    Overall, this NPRM is the product of FRA's review, consideration, 
and acceptance of the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, 
and full RSAC. In the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA refers 
to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by members of 
the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, as they are identified or 
contained in the minutes of their meetings. FRA does so to show the 
origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions concerning those 
issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC level. FRA 
believes this serves to illuminate factors it has weighed in making its 
regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those decisions. The 
reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the full RSAC makes 
recommendations to FRA. However, as noted above, FRA is in no way bound 
to follow the recommendations, and the agency exercises its independent 
judgment on whether the recommendations achieve the agency's regulatory 
goal(s), are soundly supported, and are in accordance with policy and 
legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Transporting passengers by rail is very safe. Since 1978, more than 
11.2 billion passengers have traveled by rail, based on reports filed 
monthly with FRA. The number of rail passengers has steadily increased 
over the years, and since the year 2000 has averaged more than 500 
million per year. On a passenger-mile basis, with an average of about 
15.5 billion passenger-miles per year, rail travel is about as safe as 
scheduled airline service and intercity bus transportation, and it is 
far safer than private motor vehicle travel. Passenger rail accidents--
while always to be avoided--have a very high passenger survival rate.
    Yet, as in any form of transportation, there are risks inherent in 
passenger rail travel. Although no passengers died in train collision 
or derailments in 2006, 12 passengers did in 2005. For this reason, FRA 
continually works to improve the safety of passenger rail operations. 
FRA's efforts include sponsoring the research and development of safety 
technology, providing technical support for industry specifications and 
standards, and engaging in cooperative rulemaking efforts with key 
industry stakeholders. FRA has focused in particular on enhancing the 
crashworthiness of passenger trains.
    In a passenger train collision or derailment, the principal 
crashworthiness risks that occupants face are the loss of safe space 
inside the train from crushing of the train structure and, as the train 
decelerates, the risk of secondary impacts with interior surfaces. 
Therefore, the principal goals of the crashworthiness research 
sponsored by FRA are twofold: First, to preserve a safe space in which 
occupants can ride out the collision or derailment, and, then, to 
minimize the physical forces to which occupants are subjected when 
impacting surfaces inside a passenger car as the train decelerates. 
Though not a part of this NPRM, other crashworthiness research focuses 
on related issues such as fuel tank safety, for equipment with a fuel 
tank, and the associated risk of fire if the fuel tank is breached 
during the collision or derailment.
    The results of ongoing research on cab car and MU locomotive front-
end frame structures help demonstrate both the effectiveness and the 
practicality of the structural enhancements proposed in this NPRM to 
make this equipment more crashworthy. This research is discussed below, 
along with other technical information providing the background for 
FRA's proposal.

A. Predominant Types of Passenger Rail Service

    FRA's focus on cab car and MU locomotive crashworthiness should be 
considered in the context of the predominant types of passenger rail 
service in North America. The first involves operation of passenger 
trains with conventional locomotives in the lead, typically pulling 
consists of passenger coaches and other cars such as baggage cars, 
dining cars, and sleeping cars. Such trains are common on long-
distance, intercity rail routes operated by Amtrak. On a daily basis, 
however, most passenger rail service is provided by commuter railroads, 
which typically operate one or both of the two most predominant types 
of service: Push-pull service and MU locomotive service.
    Push-pull service is passenger train service typically operated in 
one direction of travel with a conventional locomotive in the rear of 
the train pushing the consist (the ``push mode'') and with a cab car in 
the lead position of the train; and, in the opposite direction of 
travel, the service is operated with the conventional locomotive in the 
lead position of the train pulling the consist (the ``pull mode'') and 
with the cab car in the rear of the train. (A cab car is both a 
passenger car, in that it has seats for passengers, and a locomotive, 
in that it has a control cab from which the engineer can operate the 
train.) Control cables run the length of the train, as do electrical 
lines providing power for heat, lights, and other purposes.
    MU locomotive service is passenger rail service involving trains 
consisting of self-propelled electric or diesel MU locomotives. MU 
locomotives typically operate semi-permanently coupled together as a 
pair or triplet with a control cab at each end of the consist. During 
peak commuting hours, multiple pairs or triplets of MU locomotives, or 
a combination of both, are typically operated together as a single 
passenger train in MU service. This type of service does not make use 
of a conventional locomotive as a primary means of motive power. MU 
locomotive service is very similar to push-pull service as operated in 
the push mode with the cab car in the lead.
    By focusing on enhancements to cab car and MU locomotive 
crashworthiness, FRA seeks to enhance the safety of the two most 
typical forms of passenger rail service in the U.S.

[[Page 42021]]

B. Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives

    Structurally, MU locomotives and cab cars built in the same period 
are very similar, and both are designed to transport and be occupied by 
passengers. The principal distinction is that cab cars do not have 
motors to propel themselves. Unlike MU locomotives and cab cars, 
conventional locomotives are not designed to be occupied by 
passengers--only by operating crewmembers. Concern has been raised 
about the safety of cab car-led and MU locomotive train service due to 
the closer proximity of the engineer and passengers to the leading end 
of the train than in conventional locomotive-led service.
    The principal purpose of cab car and MU locomotive end frame 
structures is to provide protection for the engineer and passengers in 
the event of a collision where the superstructure of the vehicle is 
directly engaged and the underframe is either not engaged or only 
indirectly engaged in the collision. In the event of impacts with 
objects above the underframe of a cab car or MU locomotive, the end 
frame members are the primary source of protection for the engineer and 
the passengers. There are various types of cab cars and MU locomotives 
in current use. As discussed below, a flat-nosed, single-level cab car 
has been used for purposes of FRA-sponsored crashworthiness research. 
(The cab car was originally constructed as an MU locomotive but had its 
traction motors removed for testing.) Flat-nosed designs are 
representative of a large proportion of the cab car and MU locomotive 
fleet.
    In a typical flat-nosed cab car, the end frame is composed of 
several structural elements that act together to resist inward 
deformations under load. The base of the end frame structure is 
composed of the end/buffer beam, which is directly connected to the 
draft sill of the vehicle. For cars that include stepwells, the side 
sills of the underframe generally do not directly connect to the end/
buffer beam. There are four major vertical members connected to the 
end/buffer beam: two collision posts located approximately at the one-
third points along the length of the beam, and two corner posts located 
at the outermost points of the beam. These structural elements are also 
connected together through two additional lateral members: a lateral 
member/shelf located just below the window frame structure, and an 
anti-telescoping plate at the top. The attachment of the end frame 
structure to the rest of the vehicle typically occurs at three 
locations. The first location is at the draft sill at the level of the 
underframe. This is the main connection where a majority of any 
longitudinal load applied to the end frame is reacted into the 
underframe of the vehicle. There are two other connections at the cant/
roof rail located at either side of the car just below the level of the 
roof. When a longitudinal load is applied to the end frame, it is 
reacted by the draft sill and the cant rails into the main carbody 
structure. A schematic of a typical arrangement is depicted in Figure 
1.

[[Page 42022]]

[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.000

C. Accident History

    In a collision involving the front end of a cab car or an MU 
locomotive, it is vitally important that the end frame behaves in a 
ductile manner, absorbing some of the collision energy in order to 
maintain sufficient space in which the engineer and passengers can ride 
out the event. An example of a collision where the end frame did not 
effectively absorb collision energy occurred in Portage, IN, in 1998 
when a NICTD train consisting of MU locomotives struck a tractor-tandem 
trailer carrying steel coils that had become immobilized on a grade 
crossing.\1\ The leading MU locomotive impacted a steel coil at a point 
centered on one of its collision posts, the collision post failed, and 
the steel coil penetrated into the interior of the locomotive, 
resulting in three fatalities. Little of the collision energy was 
absorbed by the collision post, because the post had failed before it 
could deform in any significant way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision of 
Northern Indiana Commuter Transportation District Train 102 with a 
Tractor-Trailer Portage, Indiana, June 18, 1998,'' RAR-99-03, 07/26/
1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    There are additional examples of incidents where the end frame of a 
cab car or an MU locomotive was engaged during a collision and a loss 
of survivable volume ensued due to the failure of end frame structures. 
As detailed in the NTSB accident reports referenced below, one such 
incident was the 1996 Secaucus, NJ collision between a cab car-led 
consist with a conventional locomotive-led consist,\2\ in which the 
right corner post of the cab car and its supporting end frame structure 
had separated from the car.

[[Page 42023]]

Another such incident was the 1996 Silver Spring, MD collision between 
a cab car-led consist with a locomotive-led consist, in which the cab 
car's left corner post and its supporting end frame structure had 
separated from the car.\3\ Although the speeds associated with certain 
past events are greater than what can be fully protected against, and 
even though enhancements to passenger train emergency features and 
other requirements unrelated to crashworthiness, such as fire safety, 
may overall do as much or more to prevent or mitigate the consequences 
of these types of events, they do provide indicative loading conditions 
for developing structural enhancements that can improve crashworthiness 
performance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Railroad Accident 
Report: Near Head-On Collision and Derailment of Two New Jersey 
Transit Commuter Trains Near Secaucus, New Jersey, February 9, 
1996,'' RAR-97-01, 03/25/1997.
    \3\ National Transportation Safety Board, ``Collision and 
Derailment of Maryland Rail Commuter MARC Train 286 and National 
Railroad Passenger Corporation AMTRAK Train 29 Near Silver Spring, 
Maryland, February 16, 1996,'' RAR-97-02, 06/17/1997.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    FRA also notes that on January 26, 2005 in Glendale, CA, a 
collision involving an unoccupied sport utility vehicle (SUV) that was 
parked on the track, two Metrolink commuter trains, and a standing 
freight train resulted in 11 deaths and numerous injuries. Eight of the 
fatalities occurred on a cab car-led passenger train which derailed 
after striking the SUV, causing the cab car to be guided down a 
railroad siding, which resulted in an impact at an approximate speed of 
49 mph with the standing freight train. After the collision with the 
standing freight train, the rear end of the lead cab car buckled 
laterally, obstructing the right-of-way of an oncoming, conventional 
locomotive-led passenger train. The rear end of the cab car raked the 
side of the conventional locomotive-led train, which was moving at an 
approximate speed of 51 mph, crushing occupied areas of that train. 
This incident involved enormous quantities of kinetic energy, and the 
underframe of the leading cab car crushed more than 20 feet inward. 
Because the strength of the end frame is ultimately dependent on the 
strength of the underframe, which failed, stronger collision posts and 
corner posts on the front end of the leading cab car would have been, 
in themselves, of little benefit in absorbing the collision energy. For 
this reason, as discussed below, FRA has been exploring other 
crashworthiness strategies, such as CEM, to help mitigate the effects 
of collisions involving higher impact speeds. Nevertheless, CEM will 
also require proper end frame performance in order to function as 
intended.

D. FRA and Industry Standards for Front-End Frame Structures of Cab 
Cars and MU Locomotives

    Both the Federal government and the passenger railroad industry 
have been working together to improve the crashworthiness of cab cars 
and MU locomotives. As noted above, in 1999, after several years of 
development and in consultation with a working group comprised of key 
industry stakeholders, FRA promulgated the Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards final rule. The rule included end frame structure 
requirements and other crashworthiness-related requirements for cab 
cars, MU locomotives, and other passenger equipment. In particular, the 
final rule provided for strengthened collision posts for new cab cars 
and MU locomotives (i.e., those ordered on or after September 8, 2000, 
or placed in service for the first time on or after September 9, 2002).
    APTA also issued industry standards in 1999, in furtherance of its 
initiative to continue the development and maintenance of voluntary 
industry standards for the safety of railroad passenger equipment. In 
particular, APTA Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 included 
provisions on end frame designs for cab cars and MU locomotives.\4\ 
Specifically, APTA's standards included increased industry requirements 
for the strength of cab car and MU locomotive vertical end frame 
members--collision posts and corner posts. The 1999 APTA standards also 
included industry requirements for the deformation of these end frame 
vertical members, specifying that they must be able to sustain ``severe 
deformation'' before failure of the connections to the underframe and 
roof structures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Services 
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for 
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of July 1, 1999.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In January 2000, APTA requested that FRA develop information on the 
effectiveness of APTA's then-recently introduced Manual of Standards 
and Recommended Practices for passenger rail equipment, which included 
APTA SS-C&S-013-99 and APTA SS-C&S-014-99, and FRA's then-recently 
issued Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule. This review was 
intended to look in particular at what increase in crashworthiness was 
obtained for cab cars and MU locomotives through the combination of 
these standards and regulations. FRA shared APTA's interest and 
included full-scale impact tests and associated planning and analysis 
activities in its overall research plan to gather this information. FRA 
then developed the details of the testing process in conjunction with 
APTA's Passenger Rail Equipment Safety Standards (PRESS) Construction-
Structural (C&S) Subcommittee.
    Around this same time, questions arose in the passenger rail 
industry in applying the APTA standards for collision posts and corner 
posts to new cab cars and MU locomotives. Views differed as to what the 
standards actually specified-namely, the meaning of ``severe 
deformation'' in the provisions calling for corner and collision posts 
to sustain ``severe deformation'' before failure of the posts' 
attachments. Consequently, there was not common agreement as to whether 
particular designs met the standards. On May 22, 2003, APTA's PRESS 
Committee accepted the recommendation of its C&S Subcommittee to 
replace these provisions in the standards with a recommended practice 
that the corner and collision post attachments be able to sustain 
minimum prescribed loads with negligible deformation.\5\ Both APTA 
Standards SS-C&S-013-99 and SS-C&S-014-99 were then otherwise 
incorporated in their entirety into APTA SS-C&S-034-99, Standard for 
the Design and Construction of Passenger Railroad Rolling Stock. (APTA 
combined these and other structural standards for the design of rail 
passenger equipment into a single document, for ease of reference for 
railroads and car builders.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ American Public Transportation Association, Member Service 
Department, Manual of Standards and Recommended Practices for 
Passenger Rail Equipment, Issue of May 1, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Nevertheless, when the decision to turn these provisions into a 
recommended practice was made, ongoing research from full-scale impact 
tests was showing that a substantial increase in cab car and MU 
locomotive crashworthiness could be achieved by designing the posts to 
first deform and, thereby, absorb collision energy before failing.\6\ 
As discussed below, in August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee 
accepted a revised ``severe deformation'' standard for collision and 
corner posts. The standard includes requirements for minimum energy 
absorption and maximum deflection. The standard thereby eliminates a 
deficiency in the 1999 APTA standards by specifying test criteria to 
objectively measure ``severe

[[Page 42024]]

deformation.'' This NPRM proposes to codify this standard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \6\ Mayville, R., Johnson, K., Tyrell, D., Stringfellow, R., 
``Rail Vehicle Cab Car Collision and Corner Post Designs According 
to APTA S-034 Requirements,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. MECE2003-44114, November 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

E. Testing of Front-End Frame Structures of Cab Cars and MU locomotives

    This section summarizes the work done by FRA and the passenger rail 
industry on developing the technical information to make 
recommendations for regulations requiring that corner and collision 
posts in cab car and MU locomotive front-end frames fail in a 
controlled manner when overloaded. Due to the collaborative work of FRA 
with the passenger rail industry, APTA's current passenger rail 
equipment standards include deformation requirements, which prescribe 
how these vertical members should perform when overloaded.
1. Designs Evaluated by FRA
    Two end frame designs were developed for purposes of evaluating 
incremental improvements in the crashworthiness performance, in 
highway-rail grade crossing collision scenarios, of modern corner and 
collision post designs when compared against the performance of older 
designs. The first end frame design was representative of typical 
designs of passenger rail vehicles in the 1990s prior to 1999. (The 
first end frame design is referred to as the ``1990s design.'') The 
second end frame design incorporated all the enhancements required 
beginning in 1999 by FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards rule in 
part 238 and also recommended beginning in 1999 by APTA's standards for 
corner post and collision post structures, respectively, SS-C&S-013 and 
SS-C&S-014. (The second end frame design is referred to as the State-
of-the-Art (SOA) design.) The two end frame designs developed were then 
retrofitted onto two Budd Pioneer passenger rail cars for testing.
    The SOA design differed principally from the 1990s design by having 
higher values for static loading of the end structure and by 
specifically addressing the performance of the collision and corner 
posts when overloaded. As noted above, the 1999 APTA standards for cab 
car and MU locomotive end structures included the following statement 
for both corner and collision posts:

    [The] post and its supporting structure shall be designed so 
that when it is overloaded * * * failure shall begin as bending or 
buckling in the post. The connections of the post to the supporting 
structure, and the supporting car body structure, shall support the 
post up to its ultimate capacity. The ultimate shear and tensile 
strength of the connecting fasteners or welds shall be sufficient to 
resist the forces causing the deformation, so that shear and tensile 
failure of the fasteners or welds shall not occur, even with severe 
deformation of the post and its connecting and supporting structural 
elements.

    (See paragraph 4.1 of APTA SS-C&S-013-99, and paragraph 3.1 of APTA 
SS-C&S-014-99.) Although the term ``severe deformation'' was not 
specifically defined in the APTA standards, discussions with APTA 
technical staff led to specifying ``severe deformation'' in the SOA 
design as a horizontal crush of the corner and collisions posts for a 
distance equal to the posts' depth. Some failure of the parent material 
in the posts was allowable, but no failure would be allowed in the 
welded connections, as the integrity of the welded connections prevents 
complete separation of the posts from their connections.
    An additional difference in the designs was the exclusion of the 
stepwells for the SOA design, to allow for extended side sills from the 
body bolster to the end/buffer beam. By bringing the side sills forward 
to support the end/buffer beam directly at the corners, the end/buffer 
beam can be developed to a size similar to the one for the 1990s 
design. In fact, recent cab car procurements have provided for 
elimination of the stepwells at the ends of the cars.
    As compared to the 1990s design, the SOA design had the following 
enhancements: More substantial corner posts; a bulkhead sheet 
connecting the collision and corner posts, extending from the floor to 
the transverse member connecting the posts; and a longer side sill that 
extended along the engineer's compartment to the end beam, removing the 
presence of a stepwell. In addition to changes in the cross-sectional 
sizes and thickness of some structural members, another change in the 
SOA design was associated with the connection details for the corner 
posts. In comparison to the corner posts, the collision posts of both 
the 1990s and SOA designs penetrated both the top and bottom flanges of 
both the end/buffer beam and the anti-telescoping plate. This was based 
upon typical practice in the early 1990s for the 1990s design, and a 
provision in the APTA standard for the SOA design. Yet, the corner 
posts differed in that the corner posts for the 1990s design did not 
penetrate both top and bottom flanges of the end/buffer and anti-
telescoping beams, while those in the SOA design did. The SOA design 
therefore had a significantly stiffer connection that was better able 
to resist torsional loads transferred to the anti-telescoping plate.
2. FRA Dynamic Impact Testing
    Two full-scale, grade crossing impact tests were conducted as part 
of an ongoing series of crashworthiness tests of passenger rail 
equipment. The grade crossing tests were designed to address the 
concern of occupant vulnerability to bulk crushing resulting from 
offset/oblique collisions where the primary load-resisting-structure is 
the equipment's end frame design. Both tests were conducted in June 
2002, and in each test a single cab car impacted a 40,000-lb steel coil 
resting on a frangible table at a nominal speed of 14 mph. The steel 
coil was situated such that it impacted the corner post above the cab 
car's end sill. The principal difference between the two tests involved 
the end frame design tested: in one test, the cab car was fitted with 
the 1990s end frame design; in the other, the cab car was fitted with 
the SOA end frame design.
    Prior to the tests, the crush behaviors of the cars and their 
dynamic responses were simulated with car crush and collision dynamics 
models. The car crush model was used to determine the force/crush 
characteristics of the corner posts, as well as their modes of 
deformation.\7\ The collision dynamics model was used to predict the 
extent of crush of the corner posts as a function of impact velocity, 
as well as the three-dimensional accelerations, velocities, and 
displacements of the cars and coil.\8\ Pre-test analyses of the models 
were used in determining the initial test conditions and 
instrumentation test requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \7\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J., ``Rail-Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Car Crush,'' American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1656, April 2003.
    \8\ Jacobsen, K., Tyrell, D., Perlman, A.B., ``Rail-Car Impact 
Tests with Steel Coil: Collision Dynamics,'' American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. JRC2003-1655, April 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The impact speed of approximately 14 mph for both tests was chosen 
so that there would be significant intrusion (more than 12 inches) into 
the engineer's cab in the test of the 1990s design, and limited 
intrusion (less than 12 inches) in the test of the SOA design. This 12-
inch deformation metric was chosen to demarcate the amount of intrusion 
that leaves sufficient space for the engineer to ride out the collision 
safely.
    During the full-scale tests, the impact force transmitted to the 
1990s design end structure exceeded the corner post's predicted 
strength, and the corner post separated from its upper attachment. Upon 
impact, the corner post began to hinge near the contact point with the 
coil; subsequently, tearing at the upper connection occurred. The 
intensity of

[[Page 42025]]

the impact ultimately resulted in the failure of the upper connection 
of the corner post to the anti-telescoping plate. More than 30 inches 
of deformation occurred.
    The SOA design performed very closely to pre-test predictions made 
by the finite element and collision dynamics models. See Figure 2. The 
SOA design crushed approximately 9 inches in the longitudinal 
direction.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.001

    Pre-test analyses for the 1990s design using the car crush model 
and collision dynamics model were in close agreement with the 
measurements taken during the actual testing of the cab car end frame 
built to this design. The pre-test analyses also nearly overlay the 
test results for the force/crush characteristic of the SOA design. As a 
result, FRA believes that both sets of models are capable of predicting 
the modes of structural deformation and the total amount of energy 
consumed during a collision. Careful application of finite-element 
modeling allows accurate prediction of the crush behavior of rail car 
structures.
    Both the methodologies used to design the cab car end frames and 
the results of the tests show that significant increases in rail 
passenger equipment crashworthiness can be achieved if greater 
consideration is given to the manner in which structural elements 
deform when overloaded. Modern methods of analysis can accurately 
predict structural crush (severe deformation) and consequently can be 
used with confidence to develop structures that collapse in a 
controlled manner. Modern testing techniques allow the verification of 
the crush behavior of such structures.
3. Industry Quasi-Static Testing
    While FRA's full-scale, dynamic testing program was being planned 
and conducted with input from key industry representatives, several 
passenger railroads were incorporating in procurement specifications 
the then-newly promulgated Federal regulations and industry standards 
issued in 1999. Specifically, both LIRR and Metro-North had contracted 
with Bombardier for the development of a new MU locomotive design, the 
M7 series. Bombardier conducted a series of qualifying quasi-static 
tests on a mock-up, front-end structure of an M7, including a severe 
deformation test of the collision post. In addition to the severe 
deformation test, the other end frame members were also tested 
elastically at the enhanced loads specified in the APTA standards. The 
severe deformation qualification test was conducted on February 20, 
2001.
    The quasi-static testing of the M7 collision post was conducted on 
a mock-up test article. The first 19.25 feet of the car structure was 
fabricated, from the car's body bolster to the front end, so that the 
mock-up contained all structural elements. Load was applied at 
incrementally increasing levels with hydraulic jacks while being 
measured by load cells at the rear of the longitudinal end frame 
members. Initially, the elastic limit was determined for the post, and 
then the large deformation test was conducted. The test was stopped, 
for safety considerations, prior to full separation of the collision 
post with the end/buffer beam.
    The maximum deflection in the collision post before yielding 
occurred at a position 42 inches above the end beam, near the top of 
the plates used to reinforce the collision post. The plastic shape the 
collision post acquired during testing was `V'-shaped, with a plastic 
hinge occurring at 42 inches above the end beam. Some cracking and 
material failure occurred at the connection of the post with the end 
beam. The anti-telescoping plate was pulled down roughly three inches, 
and load was shed to the corner post via the shelf member and the 
bulkhead sheet. The shape that the collision post experienced is very 
similar to what was observed from the dynamic testing of the SOA corner 
post, as discussed above.
4. Comparative Analyses
    Under FRA sponsorship, the Volpe Center, with cooperation from 
Bombardier, conducted non-linear, large deformation analyses to 
evaluate the performance of the cab car corner and collision posts of 
the SOA end frame design and the Bombardier M7 design under dynamic 
test conditions. One of the purposes of this research was to determine 
whether the level of crashworthiness demonstrated by the SOA prototype 
design could actually be achieved by a general production design--here, 
the M7 design. Pre-test

[[Page 42026]]

analysis predictions of the dynamic performance of the SOA corner post 
closely matched test measurements.\9\ A similar analysis of the corner 
post was performed on the M7 design, and the results compared closely 
with the SOA design test and analysis results. Overall, the 
crashworthiness performance of the collision posts of the SOA and M7 
designs were found to be essentially the same, and the M7 corner post 
design was even found to perform better than the SOA corner post 
design. This latter difference in performance is attributable to the 
sidewall support in the M7 design, which is not present in the SOA 
design.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ Martinez, E., Tyrell, D., Zolock, J. Brassard, J., ``Review 
of Severe Deformation Recommended Practice Through Analyses--
Comparison of Two Cab Car End Frame Designs,'' American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Paper No. IMECE2005-70043, March 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Having established the fidelity of the models and modeling 
approach, a number of comparative simulations were conducted of both 
the SOA end frame and the M7 end frame under both dynamic and quasi-
static test conditions to assess the equivalency of the two different 
tests for demonstrating compliance with the severe deformation 
standard. For both sets of tests, the modes of deformation were very 
similar at the same extent of longitudinal displacement, and the 
locations where material failure occurred were also similar. In 
addition, the predicted force-crush characteristics showed reasonable 
agreement within the repeatability of the tests. Figure 3, below, shows 
a comparison of the deformation modes for the M7, as observed from the 
quasi-static testing and as predicted for the dynamic coil loading 
condition.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TP01AU07.002

F. Approaches for Specifying Large Deformation Requirements

    As discussed above, APTA's initial ``severe deformation'' standard, 
published in 1999, did not contain specific methodologies or criteria 
for demonstrating compliance with the standard. Consequently, the 
dynamic tests performed by FRA and the Volpe Center, static tests 
performed by members of the rail industry, and analyses conducted by 
the Volpe Center and its contractors all helped to develop the base of 
information needed to identify the types of analyses and test 
methodologies to use. Further, evaluation of the test data, with the 
analyses providing a supporting framework, allowed development of 
appropriate criteria to demonstrate compliance.
    The principal criteria developed involve energy absorption through 
end frame deformation and the maximum amount of that deformation. As 
shown by FRA and industry testing, energy can be imparted to 
conventional flat-nosed cab cars and MU locomotives either dynamically 
or quasi-statically. As shown by Volpe Center analyses, currently 
available engineering tools can be used to predict the results of such 
tests. Given the complexity of such analyses, and commensurate 
uncertainties, there is a benefit to maintaining dynamic testing as an 
option for evaluating compliance with any ``severe deformation'' 
standard.
    There are tradeoffs between quasi-static and dynamic end frame 
testing of cab cars and MU locomotives. Both sets of tests prescribe a 
minimum amount of energy for end frame deformation. However, the manner 
in which the energy is applied is different, and the setup of the two 
types of tests is different. As demonstrated by the tests

[[Page 42027]]

conducted by Bombardier, quasi-static tests can be conducted by rail 
equipment manufacturers at their own facilities. Dynamic tests require 
a segment of railroad track with appropriate wayside facilities; there 
are few such test tracks available. Nevertheless, dynamic tests do not 
require detailed knowledge of the car structure to be tested, and allow 
for a wide range of structural designs. Quasi-static tests require 
intimate knowledge of the structure being tested, to assure appropriate 
support and loading conditions, and development of quasi-static test 
protocols requires assumptions about the layout of the structure, 
confining structural designs. In addition, dynamic tests more closely 
approximate accident conditions than quasi-static tests do.
    In August 2005, APTA's PRESS C&S Subcommittee accepted a revised 
``severe deformation'' standard for collision and corner posts. The 
standard includes requirements for minimum energy absorption and 
maximum deflection. The form of the standard is largely based on the 
testing done by Bombardier, and therefore is quasi-static. The standard 
eliminates a deficiency of the 1999 standards by specifying test 
criteria to objectively measure ``severe deformation.'' The standard 
can be readily applied to conventional flat-end cab cars and MU 
locomotives, but is more difficult to apply to shaped-nosed cab cars 
and MU locomotives or those with crash energy management designs.
    In addition, APTA as well as several equipment manufacturers have 
expressed an interest in maintaining the presence of a stairwell on the 
side of the cab car or MU locomotive opposite from where the locomotive 
engineer is situated. This feature enables multi-level boarding from 
both low and higher platforms. As such, FRA and the APTA PRESS C&S 
group worked together to develop language associated with providing a 
safety equivalent to the requirements stipulated for cab car and MU 
locomotive corner posts in terms of energy absorption and graceful 
deformations. The group agreed that for this arrangement there is 
sufficient protection afforded by the presence of two corner posts (an 
end corner post and an internal adjacent body corner post) that are 
situated in front of the occupied space. The load requirements 
stipulated for such posts differ in that longitudinal requirements are 
not equal to the transverse requirements. This in effect changes the 
shape of these posts so that they are not equal in both width and 
height. For the end corner post the longitudinal loads are smaller than 
the transverse loads. The opposite is true for the body corner post. 
Despite the changes in the loading requirements from longitudinal to 
transverse, it was agreed to allow for the combined contribution of 
both sets of corner posts to provide an equivalent level of protection 
to that required for corner posts in other cab car and MU locomotive 
configurations. See the discussion in the section-by-section on the 
structural requirements for cab cars and MU locomotives with a 
stairwell located on the side of the equipment opposite from where the 
locomotive engineer is situated.

G. Crash Energy Management and the Design of Front-End Structures of 
Cab Cars and MU Locomotives

    Research has shown that passenger rail equipment crashworthiness in 
train-to-train collisions can be significantly increased if the 
equipment structure is engineered to crush in a controlled manner. One 
manner of doing so is to design sacrificial crush zones into unoccupied 
locations in the equipment. These crush zones are designed to crush 
gracefully, with a lower initial force and increased average force. 
With such crush zones, energy absorption is shared by multiple cars 
during the collision, consequently helping to preserve the integrity of 
the occupied areas. While developed principally to protect occupants in 
train-to-train collisions, such crush zones can also potentially 
significantly increase crashworthiness in highway-rail grade-crossing 
collisions.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \10\ Tyrell, D.C., Perlman, A.B., ``Evaluation of Rail Passenger 
Equipment Crashworthiness Strategies,'' Transportation Research 
Record No. 1825, pp. 8-14, National Academy Press, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The approach of including crush zones in passenger rail equipment 
is termed CEM, and it extends from current, conventional practice. 
Current practice for passenger equipment operated at speeds not 
exceeding 125 mph (i.e., Tier I passenger equipment under part 238) 
requires that the equipment be able to support large loads without 
permanent deformation or failure, but doe