Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.; Notice of Publication of Confirmatory Order and Opportunity for Hearing, 41528-41531 [07-3702]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 145 / Monday, July 30, 2007 / Notices
of, the procedures described in 21 CFR
1301.34(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f). As noted
in a previous notice published in the
Federal Register on September 23, 1975,
(40 FR 43745–46), all applicants for
registration to import a basic class of
any controlled substances in schedule I
or II are and will continue to be required
to demonstrate to the Deputy Assistant
Administrator, Office of Diversion
Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, that the requirements
for such registration pursuant to 21
U.S.C. 958(a); 21 U.S.C. 823(a); and 21
CFR 1301.34(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) are
satisfied.
Dated: July 24, 2007.
Joseph T. Rannazzisi,
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration.
[FR Doc. E7–14648 Filed 7–27–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Office of the Secretary
Submission for OMB Review:
Comment Request
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July 19, 2007.
The Department of Labor has
submitted the following public
information collection requests (ICR) to
the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) for review and approval in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104–13,
44 U.S.C. chapter 35). Copies of these
ICRs, with applicable supporting
documentation; including inter alia a
description of the likely respondents,
proposed frequency of response, and
estimated total burden may be obtained
from the RegInfo.gov Web site at
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
PRAMain or by contacting Darrin King
on 202–693–4129 (this is not a toll-free
number) / e-mail: king.darrin@dol.gov.
Comments should be sent to Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attn: John Kraemer, OMB Desk Officer
for the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA), Office of
Management and Budget, 725 17th
Street, NW., Room 10235, Washington,
DC 20503, Telephone: 202–395–4816 /
Fax: 202–395–6974 (these are not a tollfree numbers), E-mail:
John_Kraemer@omb.eop.gov within 30
days from the date of this publication in
the Federal Register. In order to ensure
the appropriate consideration,
comments should reference the
applicable OMB Control Number (see
below).
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The OMB is particularly interested in
comments which:
• Evaluate whether the proposed
collection of information is necessary
for the proper performance of the
functions of the agency, including
whether the information will have
practical utility;
• Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
• Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
• Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including through the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology,
e.g., permitting electronic submission of
responses.
AGENCY: Department of Labor /
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of currently approved collection.
Title: Crawler, Locomotive, and Truck
Cranes Standard (29 CFR 1910.180).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0221.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
20,000.
Estimated Total Burden Hours:
174,062.
Affected Public: Private sector:
Business or other for-profits.
Description: The information
collection requirements contained in 29
CFR 1910.180 require that monthly
inspections be performed on cranes and
running ropes and that a certification
record be prepared. Ropes which have
been idle for a month or more are
required to undergo a thorough
inspection and a certification record
must be generated. The purpose of each
of these requirements is to prevent
employees from using unsafe cranes and
ropes, thereby, reducing their risk of
death or serious injury caused by a
crane or rope failure during material
handling.
AGENCY: Department of Labor /
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of currently approved collection.
Title: Overhead and Gantry Cranes
Standard (29 CFR 1910.179).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0224.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
35,000.
Estimated Total Burden Hours:
360,144.
Affected Public: Private sector:
Business or other for-profits.
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Description: The purpose of the
information collection requirements in
29 CFR 1910.179 is to prevent death and
serious injuries among employees by
ensuring that all critical components of
the crane are inspected and tested on a
periodic basis and that the crane is not
used to lift loads beyond its rated
capacity.
AGENCY: Department of Labor /
Occupational Safety and Health
Administration.
Type of Review: Extension without
change of currently approved collection.
Title: Standard on Mechanical Power
Presses (29 CFR 1910.217(e)(1)(i) and
(e)(1)(ii)).
OMB Control Number: 1218–0229.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
295,000.
Estimated Total Burden Hours:
1,373,054.
Affected Public: Private sector:
Business or other for-profits.
Description: The inspection and
certification records required by the
Mechanical Power Presses Standard are
intended to ensure that mechanical
power presses are in safe operating
condition, and that all safety devices are
working properly. The failure of these
safety devices could cause serious
injury or death to an employee.
Darrin A. King,
Acting Departmental Clearance Officer.
[FR Doc. E7–14349 Filed 7–27–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4510–26–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 70–143, License No. SNM–124]
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.; Notice of
Publication of Confirmatory Order and
Opportunity for Hearing
The attached Confirmatory Order was
issued on February 21, 2007. Although,
originally, designated as Official Use
Only, upon further review by NRC Staff,
it has been determined that this
Confirmatory Order can now be released
publicly in its entirety, given that it
does not identify current security issues.
Accordingly, it is being published in the
Federal Register to ensure that adequate
notice has been given of an opportunity
to request a hearing on the Confirmatory
Order. The effective date of the
Confirmatory Order remains February
21, 2007, and its publication in the
Federal Register does not impose any
new or different requirements on the
licensee. Requests for hearing from
anyone other than the licensee must be
filed within 20 days of the date of
publication of this Notice in accordance
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 145 / Monday, July 30, 2007 / Notices
with Section VI of the Confirmatory
Order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 18th day of July 2007.
William D. Travers,
Regional Administrator.
Attachment—In the Matter of Nuclear
Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin, Tennessee;
Confirmatory Order Modifying License
(Effective Immediately)
I
Nuclear Fuel Services, Incorporated
(Licensee) is the holder of Special
Nuclear Materials License No. SNM–124
issued by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC or Commission)
pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 on July 2,
1999. The license authorizes the
operation of NFS (facility) in accordance
with the conditions specified therein.
The facility is located on the Licensee’s
site in Erwin, Tennessee.
This Confirmatory Order is the result
of an agreement reached during
alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
sessions conducted on September 28
and November 30, 2006.
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II
Recent NRC inspections and
investigations at NFS have resulted in
the identification of the following
apparent violations for which escalated
enforcement action is being considered:
A. On June 22, 2005, an NFS
supervisor willfully failed to wear a full
face respirator while performing
maintenance and repairs on a Building
302 calciner as required by Safety
Condition S–1 of Special Nuclear
Materials License No. SNM–124,
Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the License
Application, Procedure NFS–GH–03,
‘‘Radiation Work Permits, Revision 11,
and Standard Radiation Work Permit
(RWP # 05–04–032) (EA–06–129).
B. On March 8, 2006, NFS failed to
meet the performance requirements of
Section IV of a July 2000 Confirmatory
Order Modifying License and NFS
Safeguards Contingency Response Plan,
Revision 0; dated October 26, 2004;
Section 3.3, Module 3, subparagraph
3.3.1, during a force-on-force exercise
(EA–06–133).
C. On May 31, 2005, an NFS acting
building manager willfully transferred
solvent extraction raffinate waste
solution to the condensate waste storage
area, Tank–5A01, without the approval
of Building Supervision, Industrial
Safety or NCS through work
instructions, as required by Safety
Condition S–1 of Special Nuclear
Materials License No. SNM–124,
Section 2.7 of the License Application,
and Standard Operating Procedure
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(SOP) 409, Caustic and Condensate
Discard Tank, Revision 2 (EA–06–141).
D. On March 4, June 30, and
November 9, 2005, and on May 13,
2006, NFS failed to secure or properly
attend Special Nuclear Material, as
required by the NFS Physical Protection
Plan (PPP), Revision 2, Section 5.8;
Storage of Strategic SNM, Subsection
5.8.3, Process Material Access Areas
(EA–06–160).
E. On March 6, 2006, NFS
inadvertently transferred high enriched
uranyl nitrate (HEUN) solution into an
enclosure that was not approved for
operation. The violations involved: (1)
The failure to establish management
measures for the solvent extraction tray
dissolver filter enclosure drain system
as required by 10 CFR 70.62(d), which
resulted in the failure to ensure that the
filter enclosure met performance
requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(d) for
limiting the risk of a nuclear criticality
accident under the credible abnormal
condition; (2) the failure to notify the
NRC within one hour of discovery of an
event that constituted a condition
whereby the licensee recognized that a
spill of HEUN solution had occurred
into an unapproved and unfavorable
geometry enclosure and that no safety
controls or items relied on for safety
(IROFS) were available and reliable to
prevent a nuclear criticality accident, as
required by 10 CFR 70, Appendix A,
(a)(4)(ii); (3) the failure to establish a
configuration management system to
evaluate, implement, and track changes
to the filter enclosure M205 as required
by 10 CFR 70.72(a); (4) the failure to
verify proper installation of the solvent
extraction tray dissolver filter enclosure
drains, as required by Safety Condition
S–1 of the license and license
application License Application Section
4.1.1.1.3; (5) the failure to assume in
NCS analysis for the tray dissolver
system as required by the license and
license application Section 4.1.1, that a
credible abnormal condition could
occur, specifically fissile solution being
misdirected from the solvent extraction
feed transfer line to the tray dissolver
filter enclosure, as required by the
license and license application Section
4.1.1; (6) the failure to conduct SNM
operations and safety function activities
with procedures, as required by Safety
Condition S–1 of the license and
Section 2.7 of the license application;
(7) the failure to report to plant
management, the discovery of previous
instances of yellow solution in
enclosure 2M05, in accordance with
Safety Condition S–1 of the license,
Section 2.7 of the license application,
Procedure NFS–HS–CL–26, Nuclear
Criticality Safety for the BLEU
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Preparation Facility, Revision 3, April
29, 2005, Section 4.1.2, and Procedure
NFS–GH–65, Problem Identification,
Revision 3, October 6, 2005, Section 5.1;
and (8) the failure to assure the
requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(d) were
met, in that the solvent extraction room
did not meet performance requirements
for criticality safety with respect to the
credible abnormal condition of fissile
solution accumulation on the solvent
extraction room floor because there
were no controls available to prevent a
spill of fissile solution from
accumulating into an unsafe geometry
in the elevator pit (EA–06–179).
F. On August 1, 2005, two security
officers willfully failed to conduct a
vehicle search, as required by NRC
Interim Compensatory Measure Order,
Attachment 1, Section B, dated August
21, 2002, and the NFS PPP, Revision 2,
Module 6, Access Control Subsystems
and Procedures, Subsection 6.2, Access
Control at the Owner Controlled Area
(EA–06–182).
III
On September 28 and November 30,
2006, the NRC and NFS met in ADR
sessions facilitated by a professional
mediator, arranged through Cornell
University’s Institute on Conflict
Resolution. ADR is a process by which
a neutral mediator, with no decisionmaking authority, assists the parties in
reaching an agreement to resolve their
differences regarding a dispute.
During the ADR sessions, the parties
discussed the apparent violations and
NFS’s overall enforcement history.
Given the number and repetitive nature
of some of the apparent violations, the
parties acknowledged that: (1) Past
disposition of violations via the
enforcement policy had not resulted in
NFS’s development of corrective actions
capable of preventing recurrence of
violations; (2) a deficient safety culture
at NFS appeared to be a contributor to
the recurrence of violations; and (3) a
comprehensive, third party review and
assessment of the safety culture at NFS
represented the best approach for the
identification and development of
focused, relevant and lasting corrective
actions.
With these considerations in mind,
the following agreement was reached as
documented in this Confirmatory Order:
A. NFS will conduct, via a thirdparty, an independent safety culture
assessment(s) within the parameters
described in Section V below.
B. Within 60 days of the date of this
Order, NFS will submit, for NRC
approval, a request to amend the license
to revise the configuration management
(CM) program. The amendment request
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will include a plan and schedule for
implementation of the revised program.
C. The NRC agrees, based on the terms
of the agreement, that exercise of
Enforcement Discretion is warranted for
the EAs listed in Section II.A through F
above, and the violations will not be
cited.
D. With respect to any potential
enforcement action related to securing
SNM after the process line shutdown, to
the extent the NRC determines that a
violation occurred, it will be included
in the group of apparent violations for
which discretion will be exercised, and
the violation will not be cited.
E. The proposed settlement excludes
other potential escalated enforcement
actions, including those that could
result from issues previously identified
in inspection reports and issues under
review by the NRC’s Office of
Investigations. However, as part of its
deliberations, the NRC will consider the
extent to which violations that occur
prior to or during implementation of the
safety culture assessment, but no longer
than 24 months from the date of this
Order, are the result of safety culture
deficiencies, such that NFS’s
implementation of the comprehensive
safety culture initiative warrants
mitigation or other adjustment in any
resultant enforcement actions.
On January 9, 2007, the Licensee
consented to issuance of this Order with
the commitments, as described in
Section V below. The Licensee further
agreed that this Order is to be effective
upon issuance and the Licensee has
waived its right to a hearing.
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IV
Since the licensee has agreed to take
additional actions to address NRC
concerns, as set forth in Section III
above, the NRC has concluded that its
concerns can be resolved through
confirmation of the Licensee’s
commitments as outlined in this Order.
I find that the Licensee’s
commitments as set forth in Section V
are acceptable and necessary and
conclude that with these commitments,
the public health and safety are
reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public
health and safety require that the
Licensee’s commitments be confirmed
by this Order. Based on the above and
the Licensee’s consent, this Order is
immediately effective upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 51,
53, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended,
and the Commission’s regulations in 10
CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 70, it is
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22:24 Jul 27, 2007
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hereby ordered, effective immediately,
that license no. SNM–124 is modified as
follows:
1. For purposes of this agreement,
NFS does not dispute the apparent
violations listed in Section II above.
Within 60 days of the date of this Order,
NFS will provide NRC written
documentation of the reasons for the
violations, the corrective actions taken
and planned to prevent recurrence, and
the completion dates for each corrective
action.
2. The apparent violations associated
with EA–06–179 raise concerns about
configuration management (CM) that
should be within the scope of the safety
culture improvement program. Within
60 days of the date of the Order
confirming this agreement, NFS will
submit, for NRC approval, a request to
amend the license to revise the CM
management program. The amendment
request will include a plan and
schedule for implementation of the
revised program.
3. NFS will conduct, via a third-party,
an independent safety culture
assessment(s), which includes nuclear
material security, within the following
parameters:
a. Within 90 days of the date of the
order confirming this agreement, NFS
will identify contractor(s) for
performing the independent third party
safety culture assessment, will submit to
NRC the name(s) and qualifications of
the contractor(s) specifically, the
experience of the contractor(s) in
conducting a safety culture assessment,
and will submit a plan and schedule for
performing the safety culture
assessment developed by the
independent third party. The
assessment shall include the 13 safety
culture components discussed in the
NRC’s Regulatory Issue Summary 2006–
013, dated July 31, 2006, and the
commitments NFS made at the
management meeting with NRC on
September 18, 2006. The NRC will
inform its review of NFS’s submittal
using the relevant guidance contained
in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP) 95003
specifically, Sections 02.07–02.09,
03.07–03.09, and Enclosures A–F. NFS
will not be bound by any specific
provision of the NRC guidance
document.
b. Within 270 days of the date of this
Confirmatory Order, the independent
third party will complete its safety
culture assessment.
c. Ninety (90) days following
completion (i.e., upon the third party’s
issuance of the report to NFS) of the
safety culture assessment, NFS shall
provide NRC the third party contractor’s
report documenting its findings and
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assessment of the safety culture at NFS
and a plan and schedule for
implementing assessment
recommendations and actions to
address identified issues. Upon request
by NRC, NFS shall also make available
the supporting documentation and data
compiled by and/or relied upon by the
third party contractor in making its
assessment.
d. An acceptable safety culture
implementation plan must include
performance-based metrics that will be
used to measure the success of the
program.
e. NFS will conduct an additional
third-party safety culture assessment
approximately 24 months following the
completion (i.e., upon the third party’s
issuance of the report to NFS) of the
initial assessment, and provide the
report to the NRC.
The Director, Office of Enforcement,
or the Regional Administrator, Region II,
may, in writing, relax or rescind any of
the above conditions upon
demonstration by the Licensee of good
cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this
Confirmatory Order, other than the
Licensee, may request a hearing within
20 days of its issuance. Where good
cause is shown, consideration will be
given to extending the time to request a
hearing. A request for extension of time
must be made in writing to the Director,
Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001, and include a
statement of good cause for the
extension. Any request for a hearing
shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Chief, Rulemaking and Adjudications
Staff, Washington, DC 20555–0001.
Copies of the hearing request shall also
be sent to the Director, Office of
Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555–
0001, to the Assistant General Counsel
for Materials Litigation and Enforcement
at the same address, to the Regional
Administrator, NRC Region II, 61
Forsyth Street, SW., Atlanta, Georgia
30303, and to the Licensee. Because of
potential disruptions in delivery of mail
to United States Government offices, it
is requested that answers and requests
for hearing be transmitted to the
Secretary of the Commission either by
means of facsimile transmission to 301–
415–1101 or by e-mail to
hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the
Office of the General Counsel either by
means of facsimile transmission to 301–
415–3725 or by e-mail to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person
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other than the licensee requests a
hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this
Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d) and (f).
If the hearing is requested by a person
whose interest is adversely affected, the
Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any
hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to
be considered at such hearing shall be
whether this Confirmatory Order should
be sustained.
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section V above shall be final 20 days
from the date of this Order without
further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section V shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing
shall not stay the immediate
effectiveness of this order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 21st day of February 2007.
Victor M. McCree for William D. Travers,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. 07–3702 Filed 7–27–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Solicitation of Interest for Participation
in U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission/Nuclear Energy Institute
Working Groups
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Solicitation of interest in
working group participation.
AGENCY:
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
James Smith, Project Manager,
Technical Support Branch, Special
Projects and Technical Support
Directorate, Division of Fuel Cycle
Safety and Safeguards, Office of Nuclear
Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, MS
EBB2–C40M, Washington, DC 20555–
0001. Telephone: (301) 492–3234; fax
number: (301) 492–6521; e-mail:
jas4@nrc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
I. Introduction
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) held a public
workshop with the Nuclear Energy
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22:24 Jul 27, 2007
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Institute (NEI) and other stakeholders on
June 14, 2007, to discuss certain issues
related to implementation of Subpart H
of 10 CFR Part 70: (1) Appendix A to
Part 70, Reportable safety events, (2)
refinement of the definition of uranium
solubility under Part 70, 3) use of digital
instrumentation and control (I&C) in
safety and process settings, (4) § 70.72
Facility changes and change process,
and (5) possible revisions to the NRC
Enforcement Policy.
Small working groups comprised of
NRC and industry representatives, as
well as members of the public, will be
formed to address four of the five issues.
The use of digital I&C in fuel cycle
safety and process settings will not be
addressed since it is part of a larger
NRC/NEI effort involving use of digital
I&C in the commercial nuclear industry.
The goal of the working groups is to
develop regulatory guidance which
would ultimately be approved by the
NRC.
II. Summary
The purpose of this notice is to
provide the public an opportunity to
participate as members of the working
groups. The number of persons
participating in these groups will be
limited to one or two; therefore, the first
one or two person expressing interest in
a particular group will have priority for
participation. However, all meetings of
these working groups will be open to
the public and notice of these meetings
will be posted on the NRC Web site. To
express interest in participating in one
or more of these working groups, please
respond to the staff contact listed above
by August 20, 2007.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 19th day
of July 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Margie Kotzalas,
Chief, MOX Branch, Special Projects and
Technical Support Directorate, Division of
Fuel Cycle Safety, and Safeguards, Office of
Nuclear Material Safety, and Safeguards.
[FR Doc. E7–14649 Filed 7–27–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
POSTAL REGULATORY COMMISSION
Sunshine Act Meetings
NAME OF AGENCY:
Postal Regulatory
Commission.
Tuesday, July 31, 2007
at 11:45 a.m.
PLACE: Commission conference room
901 New York Avenue, NW., Suite 200,
Washington, DC 20268–0001.
STATUS: Open.
TIME AND DATE:
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41531
Agency
organization—whether to alter names of
the Office of Rates, Analysis and
Planning and Office of Public Affairs
and Governmental Relations to better
reflect functions and responsibilities.
CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:
Stephen L. Sharfman, General Counsel,
Postal Regulatory Commission, 901 New
York Avenue, NW., Suite 200,
Washington, DC 20268–0001, 202–789–
6820.
MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:
Dated: Thursday, July 26, 2007.
Garry J. Sikora
Acting Secretary.
[FR Doc. 07–3721 Filed 7–26–07; 12:52 pm]
BILLING CODE 7710–FW–M
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
Proposed Collection; Comment
Request
Extension:
Form N–8F; SEC File No. 270–136; OMB
Control No. 3235–0157.
Notice is hereby given that pursuant
to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995
(44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.) the Securities
and Exchange Commission
(‘‘Commission’’) is soliciting comments
on the collection of information
summarized below. The Commission
plans to submit this existing collection
of information to the Office of
Management and Budget (‘‘OMB’’) for
extension and approval.
Form N–8F (17 CFR 274.218) is the
form prescribed for use by registered
investment companies in certain
circumstances to request orders of the
Commission declaring that the
registration of that investment company
ceases to be in effect. The form requests,
from investment companies seeking a
deregistration order, information about
(i) The investment company’s identity,
(ii) the investment company’s
distributions, (iii) the investment
company’s assets and liabilities, (iv) the
events leading to the request to
deregister, and (v) the conclusion of
business. The information is needed by
the Commission to determine whether
an order of deregistration is appropriate.
The Form takes approximately 3
hours on average to complete. It is
estimated that approximately 251
investment companies file Form N–8F
annually, so that the total annual
burden for the form is estimated to be
753 hours. The estimate of average
burden hours is made solely for the
purposes of the Paperwork Reduction
Act and is not derived from a
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 145 (Monday, July 30, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 41528-41531]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 07-3702]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 70-143, License No. SNM-124]
Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.; Notice of Publication of
Confirmatory Order and Opportunity for Hearing
The attached Confirmatory Order was issued on February 21, 2007.
Although, originally, designated as Official Use Only, upon further
review by NRC Staff, it has been determined that this Confirmatory
Order can now be released publicly in its entirety, given that it does
not identify current security issues. Accordingly, it is being
published in the Federal Register to ensure that adequate notice has
been given of an opportunity to request a hearing on the Confirmatory
Order. The effective date of the Confirmatory Order remains February
21, 2007, and its publication in the Federal Register does not impose
any new or different requirements on the licensee. Requests for hearing
from anyone other than the licensee must be filed within 20 days of the
date of publication of this Notice in accordance
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with Section VI of the Confirmatory Order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 18th day of July 2007.
William D. Travers,
Regional Administrator.
Attachment--In the Matter of Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc., Erwin,
Tennessee; Confirmatory Order Modifying License (Effective Immediately)
I
Nuclear Fuel Services, Incorporated (Licensee) is the holder of
Special Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-124 issued by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) pursuant to 10 CFR Part 70 on
July 2, 1999. The license authorizes the operation of NFS (facility) in
accordance with the conditions specified therein. The facility is
located on the Licensee's site in Erwin, Tennessee.
This Confirmatory Order is the result of an agreement reached
during alternative dispute resolution (ADR) sessions conducted on
September 28 and November 30, 2006.
II
Recent NRC inspections and investigations at NFS have resulted in
the identification of the following apparent violations for which
escalated enforcement action is being considered:
A. On June 22, 2005, an NFS supervisor willfully failed to wear a
full face respirator while performing maintenance and repairs on a
Building 302 calciner as required by Safety Condition S-1 of Special
Nuclear Materials License No. SNM-124, Section 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 of the
License Application, Procedure NFS-GH-03, ``Radiation Work Permits,
Revision 11, and Standard Radiation Work Permit (RWP 05-04-
032) (EA-06-129).
B. On March 8, 2006, NFS failed to meet the performance
requirements of Section IV of a July 2000 Confirmatory Order Modifying
License and NFS Safeguards Contingency Response Plan, Revision 0; dated
October 26, 2004; Section 3.3, Module 3, subparagraph 3.3.1, during a
force-on-force exercise (EA-06-133).
C. On May 31, 2005, an NFS acting building manager willfully
transferred solvent extraction raffinate waste solution to the
condensate waste storage area, Tank-5A01, without the approval of
Building Supervision, Industrial Safety or NCS through work
instructions, as required by Safety Condition S-1 of Special Nuclear
Materials License No. SNM-124, Section 2.7 of the License Application,
and Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) 409, Caustic and Condensate
Discard Tank, Revision 2 (EA-06-141).
D. On March 4, June 30, and November 9, 2005, and on May 13, 2006,
NFS failed to secure or properly attend Special Nuclear Material, as
required by the NFS Physical Protection Plan (PPP), Revision 2, Section
5.8; Storage of Strategic SNM, Subsection 5.8.3, Process Material
Access Areas (EA-06-160).
E. On March 6, 2006, NFS inadvertently transferred high enriched
uranyl nitrate (HEUN) solution into an enclosure that was not approved
for operation. The violations involved: (1) The failure to establish
management measures for the solvent extraction tray dissolver filter
enclosure drain system as required by 10 CFR 70.62(d), which resulted
in the failure to ensure that the filter enclosure met performance
requirements of 10 CFR 70.61(d) for limiting the risk of a nuclear
criticality accident under the credible abnormal condition; (2) the
failure to notify the NRC within one hour of discovery of an event that
constituted a condition whereby the licensee recognized that a spill of
HEUN solution had occurred into an unapproved and unfavorable geometry
enclosure and that no safety controls or items relied on for safety
(IROFS) were available and reliable to prevent a nuclear criticality
accident, as required by 10 CFR 70, Appendix A, (a)(4)(ii); (3) the
failure to establish a configuration management system to evaluate,
implement, and track changes to the filter enclosure M205 as required
by 10 CFR 70.72(a); (4) the failure to verify proper installation of
the solvent extraction tray dissolver filter enclosure drains, as
required by Safety Condition S-1 of the license and license application
License Application Section 4.1.1.1.3; (5) the failure to assume in NCS
analysis for the tray dissolver system as required by the license and
license application Section 4.1.1, that a credible abnormal condition
could occur, specifically fissile solution being misdirected from the
solvent extraction feed transfer line to the tray dissolver filter
enclosure, as required by the license and license application Section
4.1.1; (6) the failure to conduct SNM operations and safety function
activities with procedures, as required by Safety Condition S-1 of the
license and Section 2.7 of the license application; (7) the failure to
report to plant management, the discovery of previous instances of
yellow solution in enclosure 2M05, in accordance with Safety Condition
S-1 of the license, Section 2.7 of the license application, Procedure
NFS-HS-CL-26, Nuclear Criticality Safety for the BLEU Preparation
Facility, Revision 3, April 29, 2005, Section 4.1.2, and Procedure NFS-
GH-65, Problem Identification, Revision 3, October 6, 2005, Section
5.1; and (8) the failure to assure the requirements in 10 CFR 70.61(d)
were met, in that the solvent extraction room did not meet performance
requirements for criticality safety with respect to the credible
abnormal condition of fissile solution accumulation on the solvent
extraction room floor because there were no controls available to
prevent a spill of fissile solution from accumulating into an unsafe
geometry in the elevator pit (EA-06-179).
F. On August 1, 2005, two security officers willfully failed to
conduct a vehicle search, as required by NRC Interim Compensatory
Measure Order, Attachment 1, Section B, dated August 21, 2002, and the
NFS PPP, Revision 2, Module 6, Access Control Subsystems and
Procedures, Subsection 6.2, Access Control at the Owner Controlled Area
(EA-06-182).
III
On September 28 and November 30, 2006, the NRC and NFS met in ADR
sessions facilitated by a professional mediator, arranged through
Cornell University's Institute on Conflict Resolution. ADR is a process
by which a neutral mediator, with no decision-making authority, assists
the parties in reaching an agreement to resolve their differences
regarding a dispute.
During the ADR sessions, the parties discussed the apparent
violations and NFS's overall enforcement history. Given the number and
repetitive nature of some of the apparent violations, the parties
acknowledged that: (1) Past disposition of violations via the
enforcement policy had not resulted in NFS's development of corrective
actions capable of preventing recurrence of violations; (2) a deficient
safety culture at NFS appeared to be a contributor to the recurrence of
violations; and (3) a comprehensive, third party review and assessment
of the safety culture at NFS represented the best approach for the
identification and development of focused, relevant and lasting
corrective actions.
With these considerations in mind, the following agreement was
reached as documented in this Confirmatory Order:
A. NFS will conduct, via a third-party, an independent safety
culture assessment(s) within the parameters described in Section V
below.
B. Within 60 days of the date of this Order, NFS will submit, for
NRC approval, a request to amend the license to revise the
configuration management (CM) program. The amendment request
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will include a plan and schedule for implementation of the revised
program.
C. The NRC agrees, based on the terms of the agreement, that
exercise of Enforcement Discretion is warranted for the EAs listed in
Section II.A through F above, and the violations will not be cited.
D. With respect to any potential enforcement action related to
securing SNM after the process line shutdown, to the extent the NRC
determines that a violation occurred, it will be included in the group
of apparent violations for which discretion will be exercised, and the
violation will not be cited.
E. The proposed settlement excludes other potential escalated
enforcement actions, including those that could result from issues
previously identified in inspection reports and issues under review by
the NRC's Office of Investigations. However, as part of its
deliberations, the NRC will consider the extent to which violations
that occur prior to or during implementation of the safety culture
assessment, but no longer than 24 months from the date of this Order,
are the result of safety culture deficiencies, such that NFS's
implementation of the comprehensive safety culture initiative warrants
mitigation or other adjustment in any resultant enforcement actions.
On January 9, 2007, the Licensee consented to issuance of this
Order with the commitments, as described in Section V below. The
Licensee further agreed that this Order is to be effective upon
issuance and the Licensee has waived its right to a hearing.
IV
Since the licensee has agreed to take additional actions to address
NRC concerns, as set forth in Section III above, the NRC has concluded
that its concerns can be resolved through confirmation of the
Licensee's commitments as outlined in this Order.
I find that the Licensee's commitments as set forth in Section V
are acceptable and necessary and conclude that with these commitments,
the public health and safety are reasonably assured. In view of the
foregoing, I have determined that public health and safety require that
the Licensee's commitments be confirmed by this Order. Based on the
above and the Licensee's consent, this Order is immediately effective
upon issuance.
V
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 51, 53, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and
186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202 and 10 CFR Part 70, it is hereby ordered,
effective immediately, that license no. SNM-124 is modified as follows:
1. For purposes of this agreement, NFS does not dispute the
apparent violations listed in Section II above. Within 60 days of the
date of this Order, NFS will provide NRC written documentation of the
reasons for the violations, the corrective actions taken and planned to
prevent recurrence, and the completion dates for each corrective
action.
2. The apparent violations associated with EA-06-179 raise concerns
about configuration management (CM) that should be within the scope of
the safety culture improvement program. Within 60 days of the date of
the Order confirming this agreement, NFS will submit, for NRC approval,
a request to amend the license to revise the CM management program. The
amendment request will include a plan and schedule for implementation
of the revised program.
3. NFS will conduct, via a third-party, an independent safety
culture assessment(s), which includes nuclear material security, within
the following parameters:
a. Within 90 days of the date of the order confirming this
agreement, NFS will identify contractor(s) for performing the
independent third party safety culture assessment, will submit to NRC
the name(s) and qualifications of the contractor(s) specifically, the
experience of the contractor(s) in conducting a safety culture
assessment, and will submit a plan and schedule for performing the
safety culture assessment developed by the independent third party. The
assessment shall include the 13 safety culture components discussed in
the NRC's Regulatory Issue Summary 2006-013, dated July 31, 2006, and
the commitments NFS made at the management meeting with NRC on
September 18, 2006. The NRC will inform its review of NFS's submittal
using the relevant guidance contained in NRC Inspection Procedure (IP)
95003 specifically, Sections 02.07-02.09, 03.07-03.09, and Enclosures
A-F. NFS will not be bound by any specific provision of the NRC
guidance document.
b. Within 270 days of the date of this Confirmatory Order, the
independent third party will complete its safety culture assessment.
c. Ninety (90) days following completion (i.e., upon the third
party's issuance of the report to NFS) of the safety culture
assessment, NFS shall provide NRC the third party contractor's report
documenting its findings and assessment of the safety culture at NFS
and a plan and schedule for implementing assessment recommendations and
actions to address identified issues. Upon request by NRC, NFS shall
also make available the supporting documentation and data compiled by
and/or relied upon by the third party contractor in making its
assessment.
d. An acceptable safety culture implementation plan must include
performance-based metrics that will be used to measure the success of
the program.
e. NFS will conduct an additional third-party safety culture
assessment approximately 24 months following the completion (i.e., upon
the third party's issuance of the report to NFS) of the initial
assessment, and provide the report to the NRC.
The Director, Office of Enforcement, or the Regional Administrator,
Region II, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause.
VI
Any person adversely affected by this Confirmatory Order, other
than the Licensee, may request a hearing within 20 days of its
issuance. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to
extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of
time must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Enforcement,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, and
include a statement of good cause for the extension. Any request for a
hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, ATTN: Chief, Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Copies of the hearing request shall also be
sent to the Director, Office of Enforcement, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, to the Assistant General Counsel
for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at the same address, to the
Regional Administrator, NRC Region II, 61 Forsyth Street, SW., Atlanta,
Georgia 30303, and to the Licensee. Because of potential disruptions in
delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested
that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-415-
1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of
the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission to 301-
415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person
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other than the licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10
CFR 2.309(d) and (f).
If the hearing is requested by a person whose interest is adversely
affected, the Commission will issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered
at such hearing shall be whether this Confirmatory Order should be
sustained.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section V above shall be final 20 days from the date of
this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of
time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions
specified in Section V shall be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate
effectiveness of this order.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Dated this 21st day of February 2007.
Victor M. McCree for William D. Travers,
Regional Administrator.
[FR Doc. 07-3702 Filed 7-27-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
