Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 37655-37673 [E7-13488]

Agencies

• FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 132 (Wednesday, July 11, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 37655-37673]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-13488]


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FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Part 12

[EB Docket No. 06-119; WC Docket No. 06-63; FCC 07-107]


Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of 
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks

AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission 
(Commission or FCC) directs the Public Safety and Homeland Security 
(PSHSB) to implement several of the recommendations made by the 
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on 
Communications Networks (Katrina Panel). The Commission also adopts 
rules requiring some communications providers to have emergency/back-up 
power and to conduct analyses and submit reports on the redundancy and 
resiliency of their 911 and E911 networks. Finally, the Commission 
extended limited regulatory relief from Section 272 of the 
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, accorded last year by the 
Wireline Competition Bureau (WCB).

DATES: Effective August 10, 2007, except for Sec.  12.3 which contains 
information collection requirements that have not been approved by the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB). The Commission will publish a 
document in the Federal Register announcing the effective date of this 
section. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce 
paperwork burdens, invites the general public to comment on the 
information collection requirements contained in this document as 
required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law 104-13. 
Public and agency comments are due September 10, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW., 
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. You may submit your Paperwork 
Reduction Act (PRA) comments by electronic mail or U.S. mail. To submit 
your PRA comments by electronic mail, send comments to: PRA@fcc.gov. To 
submit your PRA comments by U.S. mail, mark them to the attention of 
Judith B. Herman and address them to the Federal Communications 
Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20554.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jean Ann Collins, Deputy Chief, 
Communications Systems Analysis Division, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, Federal Communications Commission at (202) 418-2792. 
For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act 
information collection requirements contained in this document, send an 
e-mail to PRA@fcc.gov or contact Judith B. Herman at (202) 418-0214.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Commission further orders the PSHSB to 
report to it on PSHSB's efforts three months from the date of release 
of this Order and nine months from the date of release of this Order. 
This is a summary of the Commission's Order in EB Docket No. 06-119 and 
WC Docket No. 06-63, FCC 07-107, adopted May 31, 2007, and released 
June 8, 2007. The complete text of this document is available for 
inspection and copying during normal business hours in the FCC 
Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room 
CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may also be purchased from 
the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc., 
in person at 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, 
via telephone at (202) 488-5300, via facsimile at (202) 488-5563, or 
via e-mail at FCC@BCPIWEB.COM. Alternative formats (computer diskette, 
large print, audio cassette, and Braille) are available to persons with 
disabilities by sending an e-mail to FCC504@fcc.gov or calling the 
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530, TTY (202) 
418-0432. This document is also available on the Commission's Web site 
at https://www.fcc.gov.

Synopsis of the Order

Preparation for Disasters

    1. Readiness Checklists. The Katrina Panel recommended that the 
Commission work with and encourage each industry sector, through their 
organizations or associations, to develop and publicize sector-specific 
readiness recommendations. This recommendation further stated that 
``such a checklist should be based upon relevant industry best 
practices as set forth by groups such as the Media Security and 
Reliability Council (``MSRC'') and the Network Reliability and 
Interoperability Council (``NRIC''). The Katrina Panel also stated that 
such checklists should include: (i) Developing and implementing 
business continuity plans; (ii) conducting exercises to evaluate 
business continuity plans and train personnel; (iii) developing and 
practicing a communications plan to identify ``key players'' and 
multiple means of contacting them; and (iv) routinely archiving 
critical system backups and providing for their storage in ``secure 
off-site'' facilities.
    2. Commenters generally supported the creation of voluntary sector-
based readiness checklists with input from industry. Some commenters 
specifically encouraged development by industry trade associations with 
encouragement from the Commission. In fact, one such readiness 
checklist has already been developed for the telecommunications 
industry by the Alliance for Telecommunication Industry Solutions 
(``ATIS'') Network Reliability Steering Committee (``NRSC'').
    3. Testimony before the Katrina Panel revealed that industry 
sectors had not adequately prepared for a disaster of Hurricane 
Katrina's magnitude. We find that implementation of the Panel's 
recommendations in this area will improve the security and reliability 
of the Nation's communications infrastructure. Hence, we direct the 
Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau to work with the industry to 
develop voluntary industry-sector readiness checklists to ensure that 
industry is better prepared for future disasters and emergencies, 
including an influenza pandemic. MSRC and NRIC best practices and other 
materials should serve as a foundation for developing these checklists. 
To ensure that the checklists take into account the needs of different 
types of companies, we direct the Bureau to reach out to a variety of 
trade organizations including those representing small communications 
companies. The Bureau should also publicize and

[[Page 37656]]

promote implementation of the readiness checklists once developed, for 
example, by placing the readiness checklists on the Bureau's Web site 
and encouraging use of these checklists at summits and conferences.
    4. Awareness Program on Alternative Technologies. In the Notice, we 
sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation that we act to 
enhance the public safety community's awareness of non-traditional 
emergency alternative technologies that might be of value as back-up 
communications systems in a crisis. In particular, the Panel mentioned 
satellite systems and two-way paging systems as especially resilient to 
disaster. Other technologies, such as WiFi and WiMAX, were cited for 
their ability to restore service rapidly. In addition to a lack of 
knowledge about these alternatives, the Panel described the need that 
members of the public safety community be trained in their use prior to 
disasters. The Katrina Panel suggested that the lack of such training 
may have contributed to these technologies being overlooked during 
Katrina, and such training would have to occur prior to a crisis since 
the days following such an event are consumed with far more pressing 
issues.
    5. Commenting parties favored the Katrina Panel's recommendation 
that the Commission work to enhance the public safety community's 
awareness of alternative communications technologies. Many emphasized 
the importance of satellite technologies, with most of these commenters 
stressing the need for training in alternative technologies before 
disaster strikes. Motorola also emphasizes that ``* * * these important 
technologies will be of little help unless public safety trains on them 
frequently.'' SIA and USA Mobility suggested that the Commission 
improve awareness through a combination of fact sheets and web site 
distribution of relevant information about alternative technologies. 
Several commenters suggested that the public safety community be 
educated about the applicability of amateur radio in a crisis. MAET 
observed that digital television datacasting is an alternative 
technology that should not be overlooked for emergency communications.
    6. The Commission agrees that improving the public safety 
community's knowledge of, and training in, alternative technologies 
would improve preparedness for future crises. We direct PSHSB to 
develop and implement an awareness program to educate public safety 
agencies about alternative technologies and to encourage agencies to 
provide regular training on any alternative technologies to be used. 
The program could include: (i) Web pages describing alternative 
technologies and how they work; (ii) hosting summits and conferences 
that include discussion of alternative technologies; (iii) educating 
public safety agencies about alternative technologies at events 
sponsored by third parties; and (iv) making staff available to provide 
advice to public safety agencies on issues regarding specific 
technologies. Commenters have suggested a number of technologies be 
included in this program, including two-way paging, satellite, IP-based 
systems, WiFi and WiMAX. We agree that these technologies as well as 
others to be determined by PSHSB should be included.
    7. Outreach Program for Emergency Medical and Other Communities. 
The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work to assist the 
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and 
effectiveness of their emergency communications systems. Specifically, 
the Katrina Panel stated that the Commission should: (i) Educate the 
emergency medical community about emergency communications and help to 
coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts; (ii) work 
with Congress and other appropriate federal departments and agencies to 
ensure emergency medical personnel are treated as public safety 
personnel under the Stafford Act; and (iii) support the U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security's (DHS) efforts to make emergency medical 
providers eligible for funding for emergency communications equipment 
under the State Homeland Security Grant Program. In the Notice, we also 
sought comment on whether and how the Commission can assist 
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g. 
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities) with developing 
communications plans for an emergency. Commenters generally support 
these recommendations.
    8. The PSHSB provides guidance and assistance to state and local 
governments, health care providers and law enforcement agencies on the 
use of Land Mobile Radio (LMR) equipment and systems, licensing 
requirements, and spectrum and frequency use for public safety 
emergency communications. The PSHSB continues to provide assistance to 
various stakeholder groups in their efforts to ensure that they have 
operable, reliable, resilient and redundant emergency communications 
systems in place. In 2006, several state and regional hospital 
associations ran on-line articles describing the Commission's expanded 
outreach to the health care sector regarding emergency communications, 
noting that the PSHSB is committed to working closely with the nation's 
health care providers to further strengthen emergency response 
capabilities and preparedness. The Commission has also conducted 
outreach to encourage the emergency medical community and others to 
enroll in priority communications service programs.
    9. We direct PSHSB to continue these efforts, including its 
coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in 
the area of health care emergency preparedness as it relates to 
communications. PSHSB should continue to educate and encourage the 
ability of health care providers to employ a plurality of 
communications systems (e.g., land mobile relay systems, satellite 
communications, and/or high frequency communications) on premises, 
outside of their facility, and facility-to-facility. PSHSB should also 
work with DHS and other federal agencies to ensure emergency medical 
personnel are treated as public safety personnel under the Stafford 
Act. This recommendation is critical because the medical sector will be 
supporting first responders and potential disaster victims.
    10. We further direct PSHSB to work with the Nation's health care, 
education and business communities to include, in their business 
continuity planning, robust emergency communication plans that ensure 
that these entities will be able to function during emergencies such as 
an influenza pandemic. Such emergencies could result in sudden and 
significant shortages of personnel, changes in communications traffic, 
possible disruptions to communications networks (i.e., due to increased 
telecommuting by the nation's workforce and society in general during 
an influenza pandemic), and lack of manpower to immediately repair 
affected communications networks. PSHSB has already begun efforts to 
establish a new federal advisory committee that will replace NRIC and 
MSRC and will address, inter alia, communications issues related to an 
influenza pandemic. PSHSB has also started to assemble information 
regarding pandemic influenza to place on its Web site. We direct PSHSB 
to continue with these efforts. In particular, PSHSB should update its 
Web site as soon as possible to include information that addresses 
pandemic influenza and how to prepare communications systems for such 
an emergency. The Web site should include links to other relevant

[[Page 37657]]

government Web sites, such as https://www.pandemicflu.gov.
    11. Monitoring of Situational Awareness During Disasters. The 
Katrina Panel observed that there was often a lack of clarity about 
which federal agency was responsible for collecting outage information 
and that competing requests for such information at the federal, state 
and local levels was distracting to restoration efforts and added to 
confusion about agency roles. In the Notice, we sought comment on the 
Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission coordinate all 
federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times of 
crisis, functioning as a single repository and contact with consistent 
data collection procedures. We asked parties to comment on the 
appropriate content of such emergency outage reports, their format, 
frequency, distribution and related issues. We also asked parties to 
comment on whether additional safeguards should be put into effect to 
address the potential disclosure of commercially sensitive information 
to avoid potential harm to communications providers or others.
    12. The vast majority of commenting parties agreed with the Katrina 
Panel's recommendation that the Commission serve as a single repository 
for outage information and implement appropriate safeguards to protect 
sensitive information that would be provided in such instances. DHS 
agrees that a central repository for network outage information during 
a disaster is necessary and suggests that a rulemaking is necessary to 
facilitate outage reporting to such a repository to improve NS/EP 
programs. The National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration (NTIA) supports the Panel's recommendation to the extent 
that it does not include Federal communications system outages and 
suggests that the outage database be maintained by the Commission 
representative to the Joint Field Office (JFO). Several commenting 
parties urged the Commission to ensure that the data collection effort 
is coordinated with the National Communications System (NCS) and the 
National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications (NCC) and conducted 
in a way that does not alter the NCC's role as the ``primary entity in 
the federal government for coordinating communications network recovery 
and information sharing among affected industry members.'' Commenting 
parties urged the Commission to implement the steps necessary to 
protect network outage information from unauthorized disclosure. 
Commenters also encouraged the Commission to work proactively with 
state and local entities on a process to share outage information that 
preserves appropriate confidentiality safeguards, thereby minimizing 
duplicative requests for such information from different sources. 
Others encouraged the Commission to work with industry prior to the 
onset of a disaster to select data fields that are necessary to support 
emergency management and systems that facilitate data collection, and 
asserted that the decisions about what data to collect should be 
balanced against the burden that it would impose on communications 
providers that are actively engaged in restoration efforts. SIA 
suggested that reporting entities maintain a method of submitting 
outage data to the Commission during a disaster even if their primary 
reporting facility is impaired and urges the Commission to encourage 
the use of satellite technology for this purpose. NENA suggests that 
the Commission conduct detailed analyses of the 911 outage data that it 
routinely collects pursuant to part 4 and ``* * * work with appropriate 
entities to mitigate these conditions where appropriate.''
    13. We agree with the Katrina Panel that the Commission should 
serve as the central point of contact for communications outage 
information during major events and should provide access to this 
information to other agencies. The Commission has extensive experience 
in this area both through its collection of outage information pursuant 
to part 4 of the Commission's rules (outage reporting requirements) and 
from its efforts to collect situational awareness information from 
licensees in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. Moreover, we note 
that, prior to the Katrina Panel's Report, PSHSB staff had already 
begun working with the communications industry and the NCS on ways to 
streamline the process used to collect situational awareness 
information from FCC licensees during emergencies. Indeed, PSHSB is now 
in the late stages of developing a system and process for collection of 
this information. Under the process contemplated by the PSHSB staff, 
communications companies serving areas affected by disasters could 
voluntarily submit information regarding, inter alia, the status of 
their operations, the status of their restoration efforts, their power 
status (i.e., are they operating based on commercial power, a generator 
or battery power) and their use of fuel. The information submitted 
would be accorded confidential treatment, and would be shared with NCS 
on a confidential basis. This information would allow the Commission 
and other governmental agencies to not only track the status of 
communications companies' operations in the aftermath of a disaster, 
but also their restoration status. The information could also be used 
to determine communications companies' needs (e.g., generator, fuel).
    14. We direct PSHSB to continue working with NCS and the 
communications industry, including the broadcast and cable industries, 
to resolve any outstanding issues in order to facilitate the activation 
of the system as soon as possible. The Bureau should also work to 
obtain any necessary regulatory approvals for collection of this 
information as soon as possible. Finally, we direct the Bureau to work 
with the communications industry, NCS and state government agencies to 
address whether information submitted by the industry should be shared 
with state governments.
    15. We decline to initiate a rulemaking at this time to make the 
outage reporting process mandatory. The voluntary process that was put 
in place during Katrina provided the necessary information on a timely 
basis. Furthermore, a mandatory process would be less flexible and 
would not adapt well to the unique needs of a particular crisis. For 
these reasons we find that a voluntary situational awareness process is 
more effective during disasters. Finally, we note that PSHSB currently 
conducts the analyses of 911 outage data recommended by NENA, including 
coordination with appropriate entities and industry bodies to 
effectuate improvements in 911 reliability where appropriate.
    16. Automatic Special Temporary Authority and Waiver Relief. The 
Notice sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission establish a prioritized system by which affected parties 
could automatically be granted waivers of certain regulatory 
requirements, or be granted automatic Special Temporary Authority (STA) 
in a particular geographic area if the President declares that area to 
be a ``disaster area.'' The Katrina Panel stated that, as a condition 
of such waivers or STAs, the Commission could require verbal or written 
notification to Commission staff contemporaneously with activation or 
promptly after the fact. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the 
Commission examine expanding the on-line filing opportunities for STA 
requests. In this recommendation, the Katrina Panel also included a 
list of ``possible rule waivers and STAs to study for this treatment.'' 
For the reasons indicated below, we

[[Page 37658]]

have concluded not to automate the waiver and STA process.
    17. Although most commenters supported this recommendation, few 
commented on how such an automatic waiver/STA process would work or be 
structured. Further, no commenter asserted that the manner in which the 
Commission expedited the grant of waivers and STAs during the 2005 
hurricanes was not effective. We believe that, on balance, public 
safety would be better served by an expedited review, rather than a 
fully automated system. Although we wish to relieve all licensees of 
unnecessary regulatory burdens during an emergency, we are concerned 
that a general policy of allowing the automatic grant of STAs and 
waivers of operational requirements could have serious consequences.
    18. For example, without minimal Commission review, an automatic 
STA could allow operations of a new facility using spectrum already in 
use by an essential communications provider and thereby inadvertently 
cause essential communications to fail. We believe that it would be far 
easier, and more consistent with public safety to grant expedited 
review of an STA application than to try to undo an automatic STA once 
operations have begun. Further, the declaration of a ``presidential 
disaster area'' does not appear to be a sufficient basis, by itself, to 
grant an STA or waiver, whether automatically or otherwise. For 
example, there could be instances where the communications 
infrastructure in a Presidentially declared disaster area remains 
intact. In such a case, an STA or waiver may be unwarranted. On the 
other hand, there may be situations where there is damage to a 
telecommunications carrier's infrastructure in an area that is never 
declared a disaster area. Thus, an automatic STA or waiver process 
based on a Presidentially declared disaster area could be overinclusive 
in some cases and underinclusive in others. For the same reason we 
disagree that the triggering by a licensee of its emergency plan 
generally should act as a trigger for automatic STAs or waivers. There 
may also be legal impediments to automatic STAs for Title III 
authorizations under Sections 308(a) and 309(f) of the Communications 
Act. Finally, we agree with NTIA that, in an emergency, the close 
coordination that is required between the Commission and NTIA regarding 
the use of shared Federal/non-Federal bands and shared spectrum 
management responsibilities precludes a fully automated waiver/STA 
process. Accordingly, we conclude that some level of Commission review 
is necessary during an emergency to ensure that STAs or waivers are 
properly granted.
    19. We believe, at this time, the best approach would be to use an 
expedited process for acting on requests for STAs, waivers and other 
regulatory relief based on the particular circumstances of the disaster 
at hand. An expedited process would allow the Commission to ensure that 
there is a link between the relief being requested and the emergency at 
issue. During Hurricane Katrina, the Commission publicized its 
procedures for seeking regulatory relief, granted some relief on its 
own motion and otherwise processed requests for relief on an expedited 
basis. Many of these requests were processed within four hours and all 
were processed within 24 hours. Additionally, Commission rules permit 
the suspension or waiver of rule requirements on its own motion, STA 
requests by telephone during emergencies and the grant of station 
licenses, modification, renewal or STAs without the filing of formal 
applications in certain emergency situations. Other rules provide 
additional flexibility for licensees to adjust operations during 
emergency situations. Therefore, the Commission has procedures in place 
to ensure that waivers and STAs are promptly reviewed and granted 
during an emergency. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to work with other 
Bureaus and Offices, as necessary, to publicize emergency-related rules 
and procedures prior to disaster. This could be done by, among other 
things, providing relevant information on PSHSB's Web site as well as 
through outreach programs directed at public safety agencies and the 
industry.
    20. Other Pre-Positioning Recommendations From Commenters. Several 
commenters submitted additional suggestions for improving network 
resiliency and redundancy.
    21. Permanent Relief from InterLATA Restrictions. BellSouth 
recommends that the Commission grant the Bell Operating Companies 
(BOCs) permanent relief from interLATA boundary restrictions. It argues 
that such action would enhance network resiliency and redundancy. The 
BOCs have already raised the issue of relief from Section 272 and its 
implementing rules in a number of pending forbearance petitions and 
waiver requests. Accordingly, we will consider this issue in those 
proceedings as appropriate.
    22. One Year Section 272 Relief. Last year, WCB granted a one-year 
Special Temporary Authority from enforcement of Section 272 and its 
implementing rules to BOCs in order to allow them to share non-public, 
BOC network information with their Section 272 and other affiliates to 
engage in disaster planning. In addition, WCB granted Verizon a one-
year waiver of part 64 requirements to allow Verizon to engage in 
disaster planning with its former GTE company affiliates. The relief 
for disaster planning ends April 20, 2007 for AT&T and June 9, 2007 for 
BellSouth, Qwest and Verizon. Verizon and BellSouth argue that the 
Commission should reconsider the one-year limitation of this relief or 
change its rules so that an STA or waiver is not necessary. Verizon, 
for example, states that it will need to conduct disaster planning well 
beyond June 2007 to prepare for, among other things, next summer's 
hurricane season.
    23. In light of the upcoming hurricane season and the separate 
tornadoes that recently struck parts of Kansas and Alabama, we grant an 
extension of the regulatory relief granted by WCB last year to AT&T, 
Qwest and Verizon for a period of one-year from the date the 
originally-granted relief is due to expire. Specifically, we grant 
AT&T, Verizon and Qwest a one-year STA and waiver of Section 272 of the 
Act and the Commission's accounting and non-accounting structural 
separation safeguards. We also extend for an additional year, a waiver 
previously issued to Verizon to engage in integrated disaster recovery 
planning with its former GTE affiliates. Under the STA and waiver, 
AT&T, Qwest and Verizon will continue to be permitted to share non-
public BOC network information with its Section 272 affiliates (as well 
as other affiliates that adhere to the Section 272-like safeguards), as 
necessary to engage in integrated disaster planning.
    24. We find that an extension of the regulatory relief previously 
accorded these carriers serves the public interest. The unique 
circumstances of a hurricane, tornado or other disaster warrant a 
deviation from Section 272 and the accompanying rules, and such 
deviation will better serve the public interest in a time of emergency. 
This relief will allow AT&T, Verizon and Qwest to continue to develop 
risk mitigation strategies and contingency plans that will reduce the 
likelihood and duration of any service outage and will permit these 
carriers' networks to continue to operate in the event a ``choke 
point'' is compromised.

Recovery Coordination

    25. Credentialing Guidelines. In the Notice, we sought comment on 
the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission work with other 
appropriate federal departments and agencies and the communications

[[Page 37659]]

industry to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and 
process guidelines to enable communications infrastructure providers 
and their contracted workers access to affected areas after a disaster. 
The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committees (NSTAC) made similar recommendations to the President last 
year. The Panel advocated, however, expanding the NSTAC's credentialing 
recommendations to include repair workers of all communications 
infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless, Wireless Internet Service 
Providers (WISPs), cable, broadcasting, and satellite). Further, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with the 
communications industry to develop an appropriate basic NIMS training 
course for communications repair workers that can be completed online 
as a requirement for credentialing. Additionally, the Katrina Panel 
recommended that the Commission should: (i) Encourage states to develop 
and implement a credentialing program consistent with NSTAC guidelines 
as promptly as possible and encourage appropriate communications 
industry members to secure any necessary credentialing; (ii) encourage 
states to recognize and accept credentials issued by other states; and 
(iii) encourage, but not require, each regional, state and local EOC or 
JFO to develop credentialing requirements and procedures, consistent 
with any national credentialing guidelines, for purposes of allowing 
communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers and 
private security teams, if any, access to the affected areas post-
disaster.
    26. Most commenters generally supported credentialing 
communications personnel to access affected areas post-disaster. Many 
stressed that credentialing recommendations should apply to all 
communications providers, including their contracted workers. In fact, 
DHS noted that it is making significant efforts to advance the 
implementation of a national standard for the credentialing of 
telecommunications repair workers. Commenters were split regarding 
whether NIMS training should be required as a requirement for 
credentialing.
    27. The Commission's experience with Hurricane Katrina and the 
record in this proceeding reveal that access to affected areas post-
disaster was one of the most critical issues for the communications 
industry. As the National Response Plan makes clear, DHS has primary 
responsibility to coordinate federal incident management activities, 
including disaster site access and credentialing, for all emergency 
personnel. As such DHS, rather than the FCC, has jurisdiction and 
authority to adopt credentialing guidelines that apply to the 
communications industry.
    28. DHS and the states have taken a number of steps to develop 
credentialing guidelines that would allow communications providers 
access to disaster areas. For example, DHS/NCS worked with the State of 
Georgia and BellSouth to develop a pilot access program focused on 
priority access for critical response personnel, including 
telecommunications, which resulted in the publication of a Georgia 
Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for emergency access. This SOP has 
been distributed as suggested protocol to all 50 states and the 
territories. DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is also 
working on an access pilot program to give telecommunication repair 
crews better access to disaster areas and is aggregating documentation 
for emergency personnel nationwide into a National Emergency Responder 
Credentialing Program that DHS/FEMA expects to make operational this 
year.
    29. PSHSB staff is already working with DHS to help ensure that any 
credentialing program would encompass critical communications 
infrastructure repair crews and their contracting support staff and to 
support coordination with regional, state and local officials regarding 
the development of consistent credentialing programs for communications 
providers. We believe the issue of whether to require NIMS training as 
a requirement for credentialing is best addressed by DHS/NCS and 
regional, state and local authorities as they develop their 
credentialing programs. We agree with DHS's assertion that the 
Commission's credentialing efforts should complement, not supersede or 
duplicate, those of DHS/NCS. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with 
DHS and the states on these efforts.
    30. Emergency Responder Status for Communications Infrastructure 
Providers. In the Notice, we sought comment on the Katrina Panel's 
recommendations that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate 
federal departments and agencies to afford all communications 
infrastructure providers, including wireline, wireless, WISPs, 
satellite, cable and broadcast infrastructure providers and their 
contracted workers emergency responder status under the Stafford Act 
and to incorporate this designation into the National Response Plan 
(``NRP'') and state and local emergency response plans. Most commenters 
supported this recommendation and stressed that the emergency responder 
status should be afforded to all communications service providers.
    31. Section 607 of the recently enacted Warning, Alert and Response 
Network Act (WARN Act) amended the Stafford Act to add the term 
``essential service provider'' which includes entities that provide 
telecommunications service. This section of the WARN Act also states 
that, unless exceptional circumstances apply, in an emergency or major 
disaster, the head of a Federal agency, to the greatest extent 
practicable, shall not deny or impede access to the disaster site to an 
essential service provider whose access is necessary to restore and 
repair an essential service and shall not impede the restoration or 
repair of telecommunications services. We direct PSHSB to work with 
DHS, and all other relevant federal, state, tribal and local government 
agencies, to facilitate: (i) Access to disaster areas for 
communications provider personnel so that recovery efforts can be 
expedited; and (ii) the incorporation into the NRP and state, tribal 
and local emergency response plans of the designation of 
telecommunications service providers as ``essential service 
providers.'' PSHSB should also encourage DHS to seek Congressional 
action, if necessary, to ensure that the term ``essential service 
provider'' includes all communications service providers.
    32. Utilization of State/Regional Coordination Bodies. The Katrina 
Panel recommended that the Commission work with state and local 
governments and the communications industry (including wireline, 
wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to better utilize 
the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and local Emergency 
Operations Centers (EOCs), as well as the Joint Field Office (JFO). In 
particular, the Panel recommended that the Commission encourage, but 
not require, each regional, state and local EOC and JFO to: (i) 
Facilitate coordination between communications infrastructure providers 
and state and local emergency preparedness officials (such as the state 
EOC) in the state or region at the EOC or JFO; (ii) develop and 
facilitate inclusion in state emergency preparedness plans, where 
appropriate, one or more clearly identified post-disaster coordination 
areas for communications infrastructure providers, their contracted 
workers, and private security teams to gather post-disaster where 
credentialing, security, escorts and further coordination can be

[[Page 37660]]

achieved; and (iii) share information and coordinate resources to 
facilitate repair of key communications infrastructure post-disaster.
    33. Commenters generally support the recommendation that the 
Commission work with state and local governments and the communications 
industry to better facilitate coordination between emergency responders 
and the communications infrastructure providers. In its comments CTIA 
recommended that the Commission work with Federal, state and local 
governments to create a process to establish embarkation points for 
communications recovery efforts in the wake of a disaster. DHS agrees 
that it would be advantageous to engage the EOCs and JFOs in support of 
greater communications crisis preparedness and more effective response 
planning. DHS asserts, however, that it would be more appropriate, and 
consistent with mission responsibilities and existing relationships 
between the entities, for such activities to be coordinated jointly by 
NCS and DHS/FEMA in the first instance rather than by the FCC. Cingular 
asserts that the Commission should urge states to refrain from imposing 
emergency preparedness requirements on the industry. Cingular states 
that the adoption of state specific requirements, while well intended, 
hinder recovery efforts by eliminating flexibility and creating a 
patchwork of inconsistent requirements that carriers must follow.
    34. These recommendations generally fall under the jurisdiction of 
the NCS which, as the coordinator and primary agency for ESF 2 
(Communications) of the NRP, performs these functions. The Commission 
supports these efforts in its role as an ESF 2 support agency. 
ESF 2 coordinates Federal actions for the restoration of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and ensures the provision of Federal 
communications support to Federal, state, tribal, local and private 
sector response during an Incident of National Significance. NCS 
assists in the coordination of planning and provision of emergency 
preparedness communications for the Federal government under all 
circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack, recovery and 
reconstitution. The Commission and other government agencies such as 
FEMA have also taken a number of steps in this area. The Commission 
reached out to its licensees to determine their status and needs and 
provided the collected information to the NCS. The Commission then 
helped coordinate ESF 2 response efforts to aid the 
Commission's licensees (e.g., arranged for helicopter overflights, fuel 
shipments, access, curfew and airport information). The Commission is 
also working with DHS/NCS to encourage regional, state and local EOCs 
and/or JFOs to identify post-disaster coordination areas for 
communications providers and their contract workers and to create a 
process to establish embarkation points for communications recovery 
efforts. For example, the Commission assisted DHS with developing 
proposals making federal property available as a staging area for 
communications infrastructure providers under the Stafford Act.
    35. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, state, tribal and 
local governments and the communications industry on these issues. 
However, we decline to take action to urge the states to refrain from 
imposing emergency preparedness requirements on the communications 
industry as Cingular advocates.
    36. Priority Utility Restoration for Communications Providers. In 
its report, the Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission 
encourage, but not require, each regional, state and local EOC and JFO 
to facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of priority 
lists that include commercial communications providers for commercial 
power restoration. The Katrina Panel stated that power restoration 
activities should be coordinated with communications restoration. The 
majority of commenters support this recommendation.
    37. Other agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Energy, and 
state agencies, have primary jurisdiction and authority over this 
matter. Loss of power is a critical failure that DHS/NCS is aware of 
and focused on. For example, NCS coordinates priority lists with the 
agencies responsible for NRP's Emergency Support Function 12--
Energy. The communications sector is number two on the ESF 12 
priority lists. NCS also has tools that can identify communication 
sites. The agencies responsible for ESF 12 have tools that can 
locate energy sites near communications providers and determine whether 
there have been critical failures. Coordination of these priority lists 
between Emergency Support Functions 2 and 12 is ongoing. We direct 
PSHSB to support DHS/NCS and the other agencies addressing this issue 
in their efforts to ensure priority power and other relevant utility 
restoration for commercial communications providers during and after 
disasters.
    38. Expanding and Publicizing Priority Communications Service 
Programs. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with 
the NCS to promote the use of existing priority communications 
services, such as Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP), Government 
Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and Wireless Priority 
Service (WPS), to all eligible entities, particularly eligible 
government, public safety, emergency medical community, and critical 
industry groups. Further, the Katrina Panel stated that the Commission 
should work with NCS to clarify whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, and 
cable company repair crews are currently eligible for GETS and WPS and, 
if so, should also promote the availability of those priority services 
to those entities. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the 
Commission work with NCS and industry to establish and promote best 
practices to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are 
properly trained in how to use these services. Finally, the Katrina 
Panel recommended that the Commission work with NCS to explore whether 
it is technically and financially feasible for WPS calls to 
automatically receive GETS treatment when they reach landline 
facilities, thus avoiding the need for a WPS caller to also enter GETS 
information.
    39. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission work with NCS to promote wider use of GETS, WPS and TSP 
programs among government, public safety, and critical industry groups. 
Broadcasters that provided comments support granting broadcasters 
access to GETS and WPS. Other commenters state that promotion of these 
programs must be coordinated with industry to ensure that providers can 
absorb additional demands placed on their networks through increased 
participation in the programs.
    40. PSHSB staff members are actively engaged in priority services 
outreach. For example, PSHSB staff recently worked with the NCS TSP 
Program Office, various telecommunications carriers, and the State of 
New York to enroll over 2,000 circuits into the TSP program. 
Additionally, PSHSB staff is closely coordinating with the HHS to 
increase awareness among health care providers, particularly hospitals, 
about the benefits of enrollment and participation in federal priority 
service programs. This initiative includes expanded outreach in the 
health care sector and with state health departments to increase their 
understanding of TSP, GETS and WPS during and in the aftermath of a 
natural disaster or other emergency, such as an influenza pandemic. HHS 
is considering options

[[Page 37661]]

to better incorporate support for these federal priority service 
programs into their emergency preparedness funding streams. The 
Commission is also working with hospital associations to educate the 
medical community about priority communications services. In addition, 
PSHSB is working with NCS to enhance WPS and resolve the issue of 
whether it is feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS 
treatment when they reach landline facilities.
    41. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, including the NCS 
Committee of Principal's Priority Services Working Group (PSWG), to 
promote the priority communications services to all eligible entities, 
particularly eligible government, public safety, emergency medical 
community, and critical industry groups, including repair crews which 
could qualify under the eligibility criteria for both WPS and GETS 
under the category of disaster recovery. PSHSB should work with DHS to 
ensure that communications systems' capabilities are not overwhelmed by 
increased demands placed on networks by increased participation in 
these programs. We also direct PSHSB to support the creation and 
promotion of best practices to ensure proper training in how to use 
these services. Finally, we direct PSHSB to continue working with DHS 
and NCS's PSWG to enhance WPS and resolve the issue of whether it is 
feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS treatment when 
they reach landline facilities.
    42. Broadening NCC to Include All Communications Infrastructure 
Sectors. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with 
the NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC to include adequate 
representation of all types of communications systems, including 
broadcast, cable, satellite and other new technologies, as appropriate. 
The NCC is a government and industry organization within DHS/NCS. It 
functions at the operational level and assists in initiating, 
coordinating, restoring and reconstituting national security and 
emergency preparedness (NS/EP) telecommunications services or 
facilities under all conditions of crises and disasters.
    43. In January 2000, the NCC was designated an Information Sharing 
and Analysis Center (ISAC) for Telecommunications in accordance with 
Presidential Decision Directive 63. The NCC-ISAC facilitates the 
exchange among government and industry participants regarding 
vulnerability, threat, intrusion, and anomaly information affecting the 
telecommunications infrastructure. Since its creation, the NCC has 
coordinated the restoration and provisioning of national security and 
emergency preparedness telecommunication services and facilities during 
natural disasters and armed conflicts. The NCC leverages its unique 
joint government/industry structure and all-hazard emergency response 
capabilities to coordinate the initiation, restoration, and 
reconstitution of United States government national security and 
emergency preparedness telecommunications services both nationally and 
internationally.
    44. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the 
Commission work with NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC. DHS 
states that NCS is already working with the members of industry to 
explore expansion of NCC membership and would welcome the Commission's 
engagement in this area. Several additional commenters support this 
recommendation.
    45. In coordination with DHS/NCS, PSHSB is currently engaged in 
efforts to make the NCC more of an overall communications information 
sharing and analysis center instead of one focused solely on 
telecommunications. The Commission is working with communications trade 
groups and broadcasters, among others, to encourage them to consider 
NCC membership. Recently, a fiber optic provider the Commission 
introduced to the NCC signed up for membership as did APCO, COMPTEL, 
Global Crossing, and Cox Cable. We direct PSHSB to continue its efforts 
in this area.
    46. Web site for Emergency Coordination. The Katrina Panel 
recommended that the Commission create a Web site identifying the key 
state emergency management contacts, particularly for communications 
coordinating bodies, and post-disaster coordination areas for 
communications providers. Some commenters support the proposal that the 
Commission create a disaster response Web site for communications 
providers; other commenters state that this function is best suited for 
other agencies, such as FEMA or DHS.
    47. FEMA and many states already have publicly available 
information identifying key state emergency management contacts. FEMA's 
Web site has a compilation of state emergency contacts (https://
www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm) and the NCC Web site (https://
www.ncs.gov/ncc) has links to federal agencies. Accordingly, we do not 
believe it is necessary for the Commission to create a similar Web 
site.
    48. To facilitate access to this information by communications 
companies, we direct PSHSB to coordinate with FEMA to provide updated 
links to the relevant state emergency contact information contained on 
the FEMA Web site. Specifically, PSHSB should create a link on its Web 
site to FEMA's listing of state emergency contact information.
    49. FCC Web site for Emergency Response Team Information. The 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission create a Web site to 
publicize the Commission's emergency response team's contact 
information and procedures for facilitating disaster response and 
outage recovery. Commenters unanimously support the Katrina Panel's 
recommendation. Commenters contend that the Commission should maximize 
existing resources by developing and posting on the Commission's Web 
site the Commission's emergency response team's contact information and 
procedures.
    50. We agree that a Web site providing emergency contact 
information, procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage 
recovery, and procedures for obtaining regulatory relief during 
emergencies would be helpful. We direct PSHSB to work with other 
Bureaus and Offices, as appropriate, to do so.
    51. Other Recovery Coordination Recommendations. Commenters 
submitted the following suggestions for improving the recovery 
coordination process:
    52. Expedited Importation of Essential Communications Technology. 
Iridium Satellite LLC suggests that the Commission work with other 
federal agencies to establish a system that facilitates the delivery of 
replacement infrastructure and equipment during a disaster. 
Additionally, Inmarsat asserts that, as part of creating redundancy, 
the federal government should recognize the importance of, and 
encourage the building of, mobile units that can be deployed as needed 
to any given disaster zone to assist in rapid restoration of vital 
communications using Mobile Satellite Service. These functions are 
covered by ESF 2. The Commission is already working with other 
agencies to support these functions and will continue to coordinate 
with DHS/NCS and other agencies regarding these matters. Inmarsat also 
asserts that the Commission should work with U.S. Customs to ensure 
that bottlenecks do not slow the importation of essential 
communications technology in the aftermath of a disaster. Inmarsat and

[[Page 37662]]

other satellite operators apparently experienced a sharp rise in demand 
after Hurricane Katrina that could not be met by the existing stock of 
satellite terminals in the U.S. We direct PSHSB to coordinate with DHS/
NCS, U.S. Customs and other appropriate agencies to develop a 
systematic approach toward the importation of communications equipment 
needed for disaster response in the wake of disasters.
    53. Real Time Tracking of Progress and Shared Experiences. 
Champaign Urbana Wireless Network, The Texas ISP Association, The 
Association for Community Networking, and Acorn Active Media (CUWN, et 
al.) suggest that the Commission provide a means by which 
communications responders could record their progress, share 
experiences in real time and avoid accidental conflicts. This function 
is primarily a responsibility of DHS/NCS under ESF 2 and PSHSB 
should continue to coordinate with DHS/NCS regarding these matters.

First Responder Communications

    54. Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternative Inventory. 
To facilitate the restoration of public safety communications, the 
Panel recommended that the Commission: (i) Support the ongoing efforts 
of the NCC to develop and maintain a database of state and local public 
safety system information, including frequency usage, to allow for more 
efficient spectrum sharing, rapid on-site frequency coordination, and 
emergency provision of supplemental equipment in the event of system 
failures; (ii) support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory 
of available communications assets (including local, state, federal 
civilian and military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event of a 
catastrophic event and work with the NCC and the appropriate agencies 
to educate key state and local emergency response personnel on the 
availability of these assets and how to request them; and (iii) 
coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately following any 
large disaster, there is an efficient means by which federal, state and 
local officials can identify and locate private sector communications 
assets that can be made rapidly available to first responders and 
relief organizations. The Katrina Panel noted that one means by which 
to identify and locate private sector communications assets would be a 
Web site maintained by either the FCC or NCC through which the private 
sector could register available assets along with product information 
and stated that such a Web site should be designed with a special area 
for registering available equipment to assist persons with disabilities 
in their communications needs.
    55. Support NCC Efforts to Develop a Database of State and Local 
Public Safety System Information. PSHSB has already provided support 
for the NCC's ongoing efforts to develop and maintain a database of 
state and local public safety system information. With assistance from 
PSHSB, the NCC has developed a public safety first responder frequency 
sharing guide. PSHSB consulted private frequency coordinators and 
collected and coordinated information from them for this effort. 
Additionally, although it was only developed for the states affected by 
Hurricane Katrina, FEMA recently developed a Gulf Coast communications 
plan for use during emergencies that identifies all public safety 
equipment and spectrum currently in use.
    56. Coordinate with NCC to Facilitate the Availability of 
Communications Assets for First Responders Post-Disaster. The 
Commission already coordinates with the NCS/NCC to assure that, 
following any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which 
federal, state and local officials can identify and locate private 
sector communications assets that can be made rapidly available to 
first responders and relief organizations. PSHSB has been providing a 
supporting role to FEMA on this issue. For example, per FEMA's request, 
PSHSB recently set up a meeting between FEMA and communications 
industry representatives to discuss, among other things, contingency 
contracts for equipment and the identification of equipment that can be 
airlifted through the Department of Defense. PSHSB already supports the 
efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory of available communications 
assets, in 2006 the NCS began development of an inventory database of 
government and industry assets. This inventory database of available 
government and industry communications assets developed by NCC and 
available to ESF 2 addresses this recommendation. Regarding a 
Web site, a function already exists whereby industry can report their 
available assets directly to the NCC.
    57. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, NCS, NCC, FEMA, 
state governments, and industry on these issues. We also direct PSHSB 
to continue to work with NCC to address the Katrina Panel 
recommendation regarding the identification of private sector 
communications assets, including specifically identifying equipment 
available to assist persons with disabilities in their communications 
needs.
    58. Equipment Cache. Another Katrina Panel recommendation intended 
to facilitate the restoration of public safety communications includes 
that the Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain 
and maintain, including through arrangements with the private sector, a 
cache of equipment components that would be needed to immediately 
restore existing public safety communications within hours of a 
disaster. The Katrina Panel stated that the cache should: (i) Include 
the necessary equipment to quickly restore communications capabilities 
on all relevant mutual aid channels; (ii) be maintained as a regional 
or state-wide resource, and located in areas protected from disaster 
impacts; and (iii) be included as an element of the NRP. Further, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission encourage state and local 
jurisdictions to utilize the cache through training exercises on a 
regular basis.
    59. In its comments, DHS stated that it has reservations about the 
recommendation concerning the stockpiling of equipment. DHS noted that 
already limited budgets do not provide funding to procure additional 
equipment and, in many cases, the redundant equipment for network 
restoration is often unavailable because the systems at issue are 
legacy systems that are obsolete and no longer supported by 
manufacturers. We agree. The Commission is reluctant to encourage state 
and local jurisdictions to maintain such a cache of equipment unless 
funding for such an effort has been specifically identified. Many local 
jurisdictions do not have the requisite funds for this effort. Although 
some states have such equipment under ``mutual aid agreements,'' most 
states do not have funds for equipment not in use; their funds are used 
for equipment intended for immediate use. Further, there are already a 
number of training exercises for responders. For example, there are 
regional annual training exercises held to demonstrate equipment in a 
disaster and to show options for restoration.
    60. Facilitating First Responder Communications Capabilities. To 
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications, the 
Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission: (i) Maintain the 
schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions by January 28, 
2008 to fully fund the $1 billion public safety interoperability 
program, consistent with recent legislation; (ii) work with NTIA and 
DHS to establish appropriate

[[Page 37663]]

criteria for the distribution of the $1 billion in a manner that best 
promotes interoperability with the 700 MHz band--among other things, 
such criteria should mandate that any radios purchased with grant 
monies must be capable of operating on 700 MHz and 800 MHz channels 
established for mutual aid and interoperability voice communications; 
(iii) encourage the expeditious development of regional plans for the 
use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve such 
plans; (iv) expeditiously approve any requests by broadcasters to 
terminate analog service in the 700 MHz band before the end of the 
digital television transition in 2009 in order to allow public safety 
users immediate access to this spectrum; (v) work with the NTIA and DHS 
to develop strategies and policies to expedite allowing Federal 
(including the military), state and local agencies to share spectrum 
for emergency response purposes, particularly the Federal incident 
response channels and channels established for mutual aid and 
interoperability; and (vi) publicize interoperability successes and/or 
best practices by public safety entities to serve as models to further 
interoperability.
    61. Schedule for 700 MHz Spectrum Auction. We agree that the 
Commission should, consistent with recent legislation, maintain the 
schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions in the 700 MHz 
bands by January 28, 2008. Accordingly, the Commission should proceed 
with current plans for developing auction rules and procedures, 
including the conclusion of a pending rulemaking addressing the 
commercial 700 MHz spectrum. The Commission will commence auction of 
this spectrum in a manner consistent with the Digital Television 
Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005.
    62. Criteria for the Distribution of the $1 Billion Public Safety 
Interoperability Program. We direct PSHSB to offer to work with NTIA 
and DHS, as appropriate, to establish criteria for the distribution of 
the $1 billion interoperability fund in a manner that best promotes 
interoperability with the 700 MHz band. No commenter opposed the idea 
of the FCC offering to work with NTIA and DHS in this regard. Although 
the statute places responsibility for implementing this grant program 
upon NTIA and DHS, the Commission could provide helpful input. We 
believe, however, that such funds should not be limited to the 700 MHz 
and 800 MHz bands and that the PSHSB should encourage NTIA and DHS to 
explore ways to use IP technology to facilitate interoperability with 
VHF and UHF. An IP-based approach would allow legacy systems to evolve 
into a broadband communications system. Additionally, any action 
relating to the 700 MHz band should include consideration of DHS' 
concern that the Katrina Panel's recommendations are focused only on 
state and local communications with little standardization across 
regions and, therefore, fail to address the need to incorporate federal 
coordination with state and local first responders into the solution.
    63. Expeditious Development, Review and Approval of Regional Plans. 
We direct PSHSB to encourage, as part of their outreach efforts, the 
expeditious development of regional plans for use of 700 MHz systems 
and to promptly review and, where possible, approve such plans when 
submitted. This received strong support in the record. PSHSB should 
initiate outreach efforts to encourage states, tribal governments and 
localities to participate in the regional planning processes. PSHSB can 
work with regional planning committees in their efforts to develop 
regional plans and coordinate their plans with adjacent regions.
    64. Requests by Broadcasters to Terminate Analog Service in the 700 
MHz Band. Although we understand the importance of ensuring access to 
this spectrum by public safety agencies as quickly as possible, we must 
balance this goal with the need to protect consumers who could 
potentially lose service if they have not yet obtained digital 
televisions or converters. Accordingly, although we will endeavor to 
process requests from broadcasters to terminate analog service as 
quickly as possible, we will continue to review such requests pursuant 
to the policies previously adopted in Upper 700 MHz Memorandum Opinion 
and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.
    65. Sharing of Spectrum. We agree that implementation of the 
recommendation that the Commission work with NTIA and DHS to develop 
strategies and policies to expedite allowing Federal, state and local 
agencies to share spectrum for emergency response purposes would serve 
the public interest. We direct PSHSB, together with the Office of 
Engineering and Technology, to work with NTIA and DHS on this issue. 
There is record support for the Commission working with NTIA and DHS to 
allow Federal and non-Federal spectrum sharing for emergency response 
purposes, both in spectrum allocated for Federal and non-Federal uses. 
NTIA states in its comments that it and the Interdepartment Radio 
Advisory Committee (``IRAC'') already are considering a proposal to 
revise current rules to allow more flexible use by state and local 
governments, and to simplify the regulations governing the use of 
Federal interoperability channels. The Commission should assist in 
these ongoing efforts in the IRAC and its subcommittees and should 
consider other possible solutions for making spectrum available for 
shared use by federal, state, tribal and local agencies for emergency 
response purposes.
    66. Publicizing Interoperability Successes and Best Practices. We 
direct PSHSB to work with o