In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately), 30870-30877 [E7-10698]

Download as PDF 30870 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537–9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI’s ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order, the Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order shall not be granted to an individual during the review process. Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure. 2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive VerDate Aug<31>2005 21:19 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order. No individual authorized to have access to the information may redisseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a need-to-know. 3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the individual’s written request to redisseminate the information contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies information such as the individual’s name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for identification purposes. 4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under this section, available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws. 5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual’s file has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order. After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part. [FR Doc. E7–10691 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [EA–07–003] In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately) I The Licensees identified in Attachment A 1 to this Order, hold licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 70 and 71, or equivalent Agreement State regulations. The 1 Attachment A contains sensitive information and will not be released to the public. PO 00000 Frm 00128 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 licenses authorize them to possess and transfer items containing radioactive material quantities of concern. This Order is being issued to all such Licensees who may transport radioactive material quantities of concern under the NRC’s authority to protect the common defense and security, which has not been relinquished to the Agreement States. The Orders require compliance with specific additional security measures to enhance the security for transport of certain radioactive material quantities of concern. II On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets in New York, NY, and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of Safeguards and Threat Advisories to Licensees in order to strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack on this regulated activity. The Commission has also communicated with other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment in order to assess the adequacy of the current security measures. In addition, the Commission commenced a comprehensive review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements. As a result of its initial consideration of current safeguards and security requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain security measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in a consistent manner. Therefore, the Commission is imposing requirements, as set forth in Attachment B 2 of this Order, on all Licensees identified in Attachment A of this Order. These additional security measures, which supplement existing regulatory requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat environment. Attachment C of this 2 Attachment B contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and can not be released to the public, and have therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained in Attachment B that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to the public. E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices Order contains the requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history record checks for individuals when licensee’s reviewing official is determining access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to the radioactive materials. These requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines otherwise. The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated many of the measures set forth in Attachment B to this Order in response to previously issued Safeguards and Threat Advisories or on their own. It is also recognized that some measures may not be possible or necessary for all shipments of radioactive material quantities of concern, or may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees’ specific circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any unforeseen effect on the safe transport of radioactive material quantities of concern. Although the security measures implemented by Licensees in response to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of common defense and security, in light of the continuing threat environment, the Commission concludes that the security measures must be embodied in an Order, consistent with the established regulatory framework. The Commission has determined that some of the security measures contained in Attachment B of this Order contain Safeguards Information and will not be released to the public as per Order entitled, ‘‘Issuance of Order Imposing Requirements for Protecting Certain Safeguards Information,’’ issued specifically to the Licensees identified in Attachment A to this Order. Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who have established a need-to-know the information, are considered to be trustworthy and reliable, have been fingerprinted and undergone a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check in accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA– 06–155). A need-to-know means a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient’s access to Safeguards Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, or licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the reviewing VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 official under the NRC’s ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA– 06–155) do not need to be fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access. To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the current threat environment, all Licensees identified in Attachment A to this Order shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments B and C to this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202, I find that in light of the common defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public health and safety require that this Order be immediately effective. III. Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 63, 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR § 2.202 and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 70 and 71, It is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all licensees identified in Attachment A to this order shall comply with the following: A. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary, comply with the requirements described in Attachments B and C to this Order. The Licensees shall immediately start implementation of the requirements in Attachments B and C to the Order and shall complete implementation by November 18, 2007, or before the first shipment of radioactive material quantities of concern, whichever is sooner. This Order supersedes the additional transportation security measures prescribed in Attachment 2, Section 7.d. of the Manufacturer and Distributor Order issued January 12, 2004. B.1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if they are unable to comply with any of the requirements described in Attachments B or C, (2) if compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in their specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any Commission or Agreement State regulation or its license. The notification shall provide the Licensees justification for seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement. PO 00000 Frm 00129 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 30871 2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the requirements described in Attachments B or C to this Order would adversely impact the safe transport of radioactive material quantities of concern must notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for its determination that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the Attachment B or requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the activity to address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition B.1 of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition B.1. C.1. In accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA–06–155) issued on August 21, 2006, only the NRCapproved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall determine whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in Attachment B to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification and criminal history records check are not required for individuals exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 [72 FR 4945 (February 2, 2007)]. In addition, individuals who have a favorably decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided in each case that the appropriate documentation is made available to the Licensee’s reviewing official), have satisfied the Energy Policy Act of 2005 fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access. 2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined, in accordance with its administrative review process based on fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a utilization facility, or radioactive material or other E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES 30872 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices property subject to regulation by the NRC. D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order. Individuals who have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the reviewing official under Order EA–06–155 do not need to be fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access. E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in Attachment B to this Order. The licensee shall complete implementation of the requirements of Attachments B and C to this Order by November 18, 2007. F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each requirement described in Attachments B and C. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments B and C. G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission’s or an Agreement State’s regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until the Commission determines otherwise. Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee submittals that contain Safeguards Information shall be properly marked and handled in accordance with Licensees’ Safeguards Information or Safeguards Information— Modified Handling program. The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good cause. VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 IV In accordance with 10 CFR § 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement, to the Office of Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional Administrator for NRC Region I, II, III, or IV, at the respective addresses specified in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73, appropriate for the specific facility, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible delays in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile to 301–415–3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR § 2.309. If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose interest is adversely affected, the Commission will PO 00000 Frm 00130 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 issue an Order designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order should be sustained. Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(I), the Licensee, may, in addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the Order on the grounds that the Order, including the need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error. In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this order. Dated this 22nd day of May 2007. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Charles L. Miller, Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs. Attachment A: List of Licensees— Redacted Attachment B: Additional Security Measures for Transportation of Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern—Revision 2 A. General Basis Criteria These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) are established to delineate licensee responsibility in response to the current threat environment. The following security measures apply to Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement States licensees, who ship Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) as defined in Section A .1. Shipments of RAMQC that do not fall within the NRC’s jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are not subject to the provisions of these ASMs. 1. Licensees who are subject to this Order shall ensure that the requirements listed in Section B below are in effect when they ship radioactive materials that meet the following criterion: a. Radionuclides listed in Table A, greater than or equal to the quantities specified, b. For mixtures of radionuclides listed in Table A, the sum of the fractions of E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices those radionuclides if greater than or equal to 1, or c. For shipments of spent nuclear fuel containing greater than or equal to 1000 Terabecquerels (TBq) (27,000 Curies) but less than or equal to 100 grams of spent nuclear fuel. For shipments containing greater than 100 grams of spent nuclear fuel, licensees shall follow the ASMs for ‘‘Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel Greater than 100 Grams,’’ dated October 3, 2002. These ASMs supercede Safeguards Advisories SA–01–01, Rev. 1, and SA– 03–02. For radioactive materials shipments containing radionuclides not addressed by this ASM guidance will be provided by Safeguards Advisory. 2. The requirements of these ASMs apply to a conveyance (i.e., the requirements apply irrespective of whether the RAMQC is shipped in a single package or in multiple packages in a single conveyance). 3. Licensees are not responsible for complying with the requirements of these ASMs if a carrier aggregates, during transport or storage incident to transport, radioactive material from two or more conveyances from separate licensees which individually do not exceed the limits of Paragraph A.1. but which together meet or exceed any of the criteria in Paragraph A.1. 4. The requirements of these ASMs only apply to RAMQC shipments using highway or rail modes of transportation. For multi-mode shipments, the requirements of these ASMs apply only to the portion of shipments that are made using highway or rail modes of transportation, as appropriate. 5. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in Paragraph A.1. per conveyance, the licensee shall ensure that: a. Only carriers are used which: (1) Use established package tracking systems, (2) Implement methods to assure trustworthiness and reliability of personnel associated with the transportation of RAMQC, (3) Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit, and (4) Have the capability for immediate communication to summon appropriate response or assistance. b. The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs the measures listed above. 6. The preplanning, coordination, and tracking requirements of these ASMs are intended to reduce unnecessary delays and shipment duration and to facilitate the transfer of the RAMQC shipment and any escorts at State borders. VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 7. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the requirements of these ASMs do not apply to local law enforcement agencies’ (LLEA) personnel performing escort duties. 8. The requirements of these ASMs apply to RAMQC domestic shipments within the United States (U.S.), imports into the U.S., or exports from the U.S. The requirements of these ASMs do not apply to transshipments through the U.S. Licensees are responsible for complying with the requirements of Section B for the highway and rail shipment portion of an import or export which occurs inside of the U.S. For import and export RAMQC shipments, while located at the port or shipments on U.S. navigable waterways, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime Transportation security regulations will be in effect and these ASMs are not applicable. For RAMQC shipments while located at the air freight terminal, security requirements will be performed in accordance with the Transportation Security Administration security regulations. For import and export RAMQC shipments, the licensee shall ensure that the requirements of these ASMs are implemented after the transportation package has been loaded onto the highway or rail vehicle (except for the advance notification requirements in section B.4) and the package begins the domestic portion of the shipment to or from the U.S. port of entry (i.e., the package(s) departs for or from the port of entry facility or the airfreight terminal). B. Specific Requirements Licensees who ship RAMQC in quantities that meet the criteria of Paragraph A.1. shall ensure that carriers used have developed and implemented transportation security plans that embody the additional security measures imposed by this Order. 1. Licensee Verification Before transfer of radioactive materials in quantities which meet the criterion of Paragraph A.1, per conveyance, the licensee shall: a. For new recipient(s), verify that the intended recipient’s license authorizes receipt of the regulated material by direct contact with the regulatory authority that issued the license (NRC Region or Agreement State) prior to transferring the material, b. Verify the validity of unusual orders or changes (if applicable) that depart from historical patterns of ordering by existing recipients, PO 00000 Frm 00131 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 30873 c. Verify the material is shipped to an address authorized in the license and that the address is valid, d. Verify the address for a delivery to a temporary job site is valid, e. Document the verification and validation process, and f. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient. 2. Background Investigations a. Background investigations are intended to provide high assurance that individuals performing assigned duties associated with the transport of RAMQC, are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage. b. For highway shipments only, the licensee shall ensure background investigations for all drivers, accompanying individuals, communications center managers, and other appropriate communications center personnel have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to impose a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check, which includes fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to Safeguards Information (SGI) or unescorted access to licensed material. c. For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure background investigations for employees filling the positions of communications center managers and other appropriate communications center personnel have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to impose a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check, which includes fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to SGI or unescorted access to licensed material. d. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is high assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards information or unescorted access to licensed material are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent use of the regulated material. ‘‘Access’’ means that an individual could exercise some physical control over the material or device containing radioactive material. (1) The trustworthiness, reliability, and verification of an individual’s true identity shall be determined based on a background investigation. The background investigation shall address at least the past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting and an FBI criminal history check, verification of employment history, education, employment eligibility, and E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 30874 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES personal references. If an individual’s employment has been less then the required three (3) years period, educational references may be used in lieu of employment history. (2) Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order. (3) A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards Information,’’ is the only individual that may make trustworthiness and reliability determinations. e. Licensees’ background investigation requirements may also be satisfied for an individual that has: (1) current access authorization permitting unescorted access to a power reactor facility or access to Safeguards Information, (2) current U.S. government-issued security clearance (based upon a national agency check, at a minimum), or (3) satisfactorily completed a background investigation under an NRC-approved access authorization program. f. Individuals shall not perform assigned duties associated with the transport of RAMQC until the licensee has confirmed that a determination of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the appropriate background investigation requirements in B.2.d. and B.2.e., has been performed and documented. 3. Preplanning and Coordination a. As part of the shipment planning process, the licensee shall ensure that appropriate security information is provided to and is coordinated with affected States through which the shipment will pass to ensure minimal delays. These discussions shall include whether a State intends to provide escorts for a shipment. b. The licensee shall ensure States are provided with position information on a shipment (see Paragraph B.5.a), if requested and practical. c. For shipments by highway, the licensees’s coordination required in Paragraph B.3.a. shall include identification of Highway Route Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) shipments of material and safe havens.3 4. Notifications a. The licensee shall ensure an advance notification of a shipment is provided, or of a series of shipments, of VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 RAMQC to the NRC. The licensee shall ensure the notification is submitted sufficiently in advance to ensure it is received by NRC at least seven (7) days, where practicable, before the shipment commences physically within the U.S. For written notifications, the notice should be addressed to: (10 CFR 2.390) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Director, Division of Nuclear Security M/S: T–4–D–8. Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response. 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville, MD 20852–2738. Notifications may also be submitted electronically via e-mail to RAMQC_SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or via fax to (301) 816–5151. (10 CFR 2.390) b. The advance notification shall contain the following information: (1) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (2) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (3) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (4) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (5) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (6) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (7) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] Refer to Paragraph B.7.c. for determination of information designation of advance notifications during preplanning, coordinating, and reporting information activities. c. The licensee shall ensure the information required by Paragraph B.4.b. is provided to each State through which the shipment will pass. The licensee shall ensure that the notification is received at least seven (7) days, where practicable, before the U.S. highway or railroad portion of a shipment commences. d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] 5. Communications a. (1) For highway shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with a telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a communication center or is equipped with an alternative tracking system that communicates position information to a communications center. (2) For rail shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with either: (i) a PO 00000 Frm 00132 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a licensee or third-party communication center, (ii) a railroad track-side car location monitoring systems tracking system that relays a car’s position to a railroad communications center (which can provide position information to any separate licensee communications center per Paragraph B.5.b), or (iii) alternate licensee monitoring system. Additionally, licensees may use a railroad communications center to monitor the rail portion of a shipment, in lieu of using a separate communications center. b. (1) For highway shipments, provide for a communication center that has the capability to continuously and actively monitor in-progress shipments to ensure positive confirmation of the location, status, and control over the shipment and implement pre-planned procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These procedures shall include identification of the designated LLEA contact(s) along the shipment route. (2) For rail shipments, provide for a communication center that has the capability to periodically monitor inprogress shipments to ensure positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and implement pre-planned procedures in response to notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These procedures shall include identification of the designated LLEA contact(s) along the shipment route. Licensees may use a railroad communications center in lieu of establishing a separate communications center. c. (1) For highway shipments, ensure that a two-way telecommunication capability is available for the transport and any escort vehicles allowing them to communicate with each other with the communications center, and with designated LLEAs along the route. The communications center must be capable of contacting the designated authorities along the shipment route. (2) For rail shipments, ensure that a two-way telecommunication capability is available between the train and the communications center and between any escort vehicles and the communications center. The communications center must be capable of contacting the designated authorities along the shipment route. d. A licensee may utilize a carrier or third-party communications center in E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 30875 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices lieu of establishing such a facility itself. A commercial communications center must have the capabilities, necessary procedures, training, and personnel background investigations to meet the applicable requirements of these ASMs. e. (1) For highway shipments, provide a backup means for the transport and any escort vehicle to communicate with the communications center, using a diverse method not subject to the same interference factors as the primary capability selected for compliance with Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable telephone). (2) For rail shipments, provide a backup means for the train to talk with the communications center, using a diverse method not subject to the same interference factors as the primary capability selected for compliance with Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable telephone). f. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] (1) Not later than one hour after the time when, through the course of the investigation, it is determined the shipment is lost or stolen, the licensee shall ensure the appropriate local law enforcement agency, the NRC Operations Center at (301) 816–5100, and the appropriate Agreement State regulatory agency, if any, are notified. (2) If after 24 hours of initiating the investigation, the radioactive material cannot be located, licensee shall ensure the NRC Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate Agreement State regulatory agency are immediately notified. g. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES 6. Drivers and Accompanying Individuals a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be publicly disclosed.] 7. Procedures, Training, and Control of Information a. (1) For highway shipments the licensee shall ensure that normal and contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example: notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of authentication and duress codes, provision for refueling or other stops, detours, and locations where communication is expected to be temporarily lost. (2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that normal and contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example: notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of authentication and duress codes, provision for stops, and locations where communication is expected to be temporarily lost. b. (1) For highway shipments, the licensee shall ensure that personnel, including drivers, accompanying individuals, responsible communication center managers, and other appropriate communication center personnel are trained in and understand the normal and contingency procedures. (2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that personnel, including the appropriate train crew members and responsible railroad communication center managers, and other appropriate railroad communication center personnel are trained in and understand the normal and contingency procedures. c. Information to be protected as Safeguards Information—Modified Handling, shall include, but is not limited to: (1) Integrated transportation physical security plans. (2) Schedules and itineraries for shipments. For shipments that are not inherently self disclosing, schedule and itineraries information may be decontrolled 2 days after a shipment is completed. For shipments that are inherently self disclosing, schedule may be released as necessary after departure. (3) Details of alarm and communications systems, communication protocols and duress codes, and security contingency response procedures. (4) Arrangements with designated LLEA (i.e., Federal, State Police, and/or local police departments) and information on whether a State intends to provide armed escorts for a shipment. For preplanning; coordinating, for example with States (organizations and carriers); reporting information as described in B.1., B.4., and B.5. related PO 00000 Frm 00133 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 to shipments of radioactive material, and the radionuclides identified in Paragraph A.1, the licensee shall ensure the information is protected at least as sensitive information (for example, proprietary or business financial information). Licensees shall ensure access is restricted to this information to those licensee and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall ensure all parties receiving this information protect it similarly. Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and shall be marked as ‘‘Sensitive Information—Not for Public Disclosure.’’ C. Implementation Schedule 1. Licensees shall implement the requirements of this ASM within 180 days of the date of issuance of the Order or before the first shipment of RAMQC, whichever is sooner. TABLE A.—RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERN Radionuclide Am-241 ......... Am-241/Be .... Cf-252 ........... Cm-244 ......... Co-60 ............ Cs-137 .......... Gd-153 .......... Ir-192 ............ Pm-147 ......... Pu-238 .......... Pu-239/Be ..... Ra-226 1 ........ Se-75 ............ Sr-90 (Y-90) .. Tm-170 ......... Yb-169 .......... Quantity of concern (TBq) threshold limit Quantity of concern (Ci) information only—rounded after conversion 60 60 20 50 30 100 1,000 80 40,000 60 60 40 200 1000 20,000 300 1,600 1,600 540 1,400 810 2,700 27,000 2,200 1,100,000 1,600 1,600 1,100 5,400 27,000 540,000 8,100 1 The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226. Notes: 1. The regulatory standard values to be used are given in Terabecquerels (TBq). Curie (Ci) values are provided for practical usefulness only and are rounded after conversion. 2. If several radionuclides are present, the sum of the fractions of the activity of each radionuclide must be determined. Using the equation below calculate the ratio by inserting the actual activity of each radionuclide as the numerator and the corresponding activity limit in Table A as the denominator. Ensure the numerator and the denominator are in Terabecquerels. R1 = activity for radionuclide number 1. R2 = activity for radionuclide number 2. E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 30876 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices R3, R4, R5......etc. AR1 = activity limit for radionuclide number 1. AR2 = activity limit for radionuclide number 2. AR3, AR4, AR5......etc. R1 + R2 + R3 + Rn 1. AR1 AR2 AR3 ARn. rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES Attachment C: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History Checks of Individuals When Licensee’s Reviewing Official Is Determining Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive Materials General Requirements Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this attachment. 1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to safeguards information (SGI) or unescorted access to RAMQC. The Licensee shall review and use the information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained in this Order and this attachment are satisfied. 2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/ her criminal history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in the ‘‘Right to Correct and Complete Information’’ section of this attachment. 3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for unescorted access, has a favorablydecided U.S. Government criminal history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history check must be provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the date the individual no longer requires access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials associated with the Licensee’s activities. 4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI. 5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI and VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials. 6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an individual’s suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. 7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. Prohibitions A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one (1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an acquittal. A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age. Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall, using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC’s Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T– 6E46, one completed, legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD–258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC, to the Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the Division’s Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555–0001, by calling (301) 415– 5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards. PO 00000 Frm 00134 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. Any Form FD–258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for processing fingerprint checks includes one resubmission if the initial submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee. Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier’s check, money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ‘‘U.S. NRC.’’ [For guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415– 7404.] Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes. The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee’s application(s) for criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record. Right To Correct and Complete Information Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make available to the individual the contents of any criminal records obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1) year from the date of the notification. If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These procedures E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES include either direct application by the individual challenging the record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC 20537–9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the agency that contributed the original information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final determination on access to SGI or unescorted access RAMQC based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt of the FBI’s ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC, the Licensee shall provide the individual its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC shall not be granted to an individual during the review process. disseminate the information contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies information such as the individual’s name, date of birth, social security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for identification purposes. 4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under this section, available for examination by an authorized representative of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws. 5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual’s file has been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or in part. Protection of Information 1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal information from unauthorized disclosure. 2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. No individual authorized to have access to the information may re-disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a need-to-know. 3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the individual’s written request to re- I VerDate Aug<31>2005 20:34 Jun 01, 2007 Jkt 211001 [FR Doc. E7–10698 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [EA 07–002] In the Matter of all Panoramic and Underwater Irradiators Authorized To Possess Greater Than 370 Terabecquerels (10,000 Curies) Byproduct Material in the Form of Sealed Sources; Order Imposing Compensatory Measures (Effective Immediately) The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and 10 CFR part 36 or comparable Agreement State regulations by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement State authorizing possession of greater than 370 terabecquerels (10,000 curies) of byproduct material in the form of sealed sources either in panoramic irradiators that have dry or wet storage of the sealed sources or in underwater irradiators in which both the source and the product being irradiated are under water. Commission regulations at 10 CFR 20.1801 or equivalent Agreement State regulations, require Licensees to secure, from unauthorized removal or access, licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas. Commission regulations at 10 CFR 20.1802 or equivalent Agreement States regulations, require Licensees to control and maintain constant surveillance of PO 00000 Frm 00135 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 30877 licensed material that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that is not in storage. II On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets in New York, NY, and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of Safeguards and Threat Advisories to its Licensees in order to strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack on a nuclear facility. The Commission has also communicated with other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment in order to assess the adequacy of security measures at licensed facilities. In addition, the Commission has been conducting a review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements. As a result of its consideration of current safeguards and license requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain compensatory measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as prudent measures to address the current threat environment. Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements, as set forth in Attachment 2 1 on all Licensees identified in Attachment 1 2 of this Order who currently possess, or have near term plans to possess, greater than 370 terabecquerels (10,000 curies) of byproduct material in the form of sealed sources. These requirements, which supplement existing regulatory requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the public health and safety and common defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat environment. Attachment 3 of this Order contains the requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history record checks for individuals when licensee’s reviewing official is determining access to Safeguards Information or unescorted 1 Attachment 2 contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and can not be released to the public, and have therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained in Attachment 2 that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to the public. 2 Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be released to the public. E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM 04JNN1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 106 (Monday, June 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30870-30877]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-10698]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[EA-07-003]


In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and 
Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; 
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)

I

    The Licensees identified in Attachment A \1\ to this Order, hold 
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or 
Commission) or an Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 70 and 71, or 
equivalent Agreement State regulations. The licenses authorize them to 
possess and transfer items containing radioactive material quantities 
of concern. This Order is being issued to all such Licensees who may 
transport radioactive material quantities of concern under the NRC's 
authority to protect the common defense and security, which has not 
been relinquished to the Agreement States. The Orders require 
compliance with specific additional security measures to enhance the 
security for transport of certain radioactive material quantities of 
concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \1\ Attachment A contains sensitive information and will not be 
released to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

II

    On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets 
in New York, NY, and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial 
aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence 
information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of 
Safeguards and Threat Advisories to Licensees in order to strengthen 
Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack 
on this regulated activity. The Commission has also communicated with 
other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry 
representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment 
in order to assess the adequacy of the current security measures. In 
addition, the Commission commenced a comprehensive review of its 
safeguards and security programs and requirements.
    As a result of its initial consideration of current safeguards and 
security requirements, as well as a review of information provided by 
the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain 
security measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as 
prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in 
a consistent manner. Therefore, the Commission is imposing 
requirements, as set forth in Attachment B \2\ of this Order, on all 
Licensees identified in Attachment A of this Order. These additional 
security measures, which supplement existing regulatory requirements, 
will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the common 
defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current 
threat environment. Attachment C of this

[[Page 30871]]

Order contains the requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history 
record checks for individuals when licensee's reviewing official is 
determining access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to 
the radioactive materials. These requirements will remain in effect 
until the Commission determines otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \2\ Attachment B contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS 
INFORMATION, and can not be released to the public, and have 
therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained 
in Attachment B that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released 
to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated 
many of the measures set forth in Attachment B to this Order in 
response to previously issued Safeguards and Threat Advisories or on 
their own. It is also recognized that some measures may not be possible 
or necessary for all shipments of radioactive material quantities of 
concern, or may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees' 
specific circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any 
unforeseen effect on the safe transport of radioactive material 
quantities of concern.
    Although the security measures implemented by Licensees in response 
to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate to provide 
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of common defense and 
security, in light of the continuing threat environment, the Commission 
concludes that the security measures must be embodied in an Order, 
consistent with the established regulatory framework. The Commission 
has determined that some of the security measures contained in 
Attachment B of this Order contain Safeguards Information and will not 
be released to the public as per Order entitled, ``Issuance of Order 
Imposing Requirements for Protecting Certain Safeguards Information,'' 
issued specifically to the Licensees identified in Attachment A to this 
Order. Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who 
have established a need-to-know the information, are considered to be 
trustworthy and reliable, have been fingerprinted and undergone a 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal 
history records check in accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for 
Access to Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-155). A need-to-know means a 
determination by a person having responsibility for protecting 
Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards 
Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual, 
or licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been 
fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the 
reviewing official under the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and 
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards 
Information'' (EA-06-155) do not need to be fingerprinted again for 
purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
    To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent 
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the 
current threat environment, all Licensees identified in Attachment A to 
this Order shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments B 
and C to this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR Sec.  2.202, I 
find that in light of the common defense and security matters 
identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public 
health and safety require that this Order be immediately effective.

III.

    Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 63, 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 
161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the 
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Sec.  2.202 and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 
70 and 71, It is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all 
licensees identified in Attachment A to this order shall comply with 
the following:
    A. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any 
Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary, 
comply with the requirements described in Attachments B and C to this 
Order. The Licensees shall immediately start implementation of the 
requirements in Attachments B and C to the Order and shall complete 
implementation by November 18, 2007, or before the first shipment of 
radioactive material quantities of concern, whichever is sooner. This 
Order supersedes the additional transportation security measures 
prescribed in Attachment 2, Section 7.d. of the Manufacturer and 
Distributor Order issued January 12, 2004.
    B.1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if they are unable to comply 
with any of the requirements described in Attachments B or C, (2) if 
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in their 
specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the 
requirements would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the 
provisions of any Commission or Agreement State regulation or its 
license. The notification shall provide the Licensees justification for 
seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
    2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the 
requirements described in Attachments B or C to this Order would 
adversely impact the safe transport of radioactive material quantities 
of concern must notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of this 
Order, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for its determination 
that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a 
proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the Attachment 
B or requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the activity 
to address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is 
appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition B.1 
of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it 
cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition 
B.1.
    C.1. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting 
and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to 
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-155) issued on August 21, 2006, only 
the NRC-approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI 
criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall determine 
whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access 
to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in 
Attachment B to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification 
and criminal history records check are not required for individuals 
exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 [72 FR 
4945 (February 2, 2007)]. In addition, individuals who have a favorably 
decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last 
five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided 
in each case that the appropriate documentation is made available to 
the Licensee's reviewing official), have satisfied the Energy Policy 
Act of 2005 fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted 
again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
    2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or 
unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined, 
in accordance with its administrative review process based on 
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records 
check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards 
Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a 
utilization facility, or radioactive material or other

[[Page 30872]]

property subject to regulation by the NRC.
    D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with 
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order. Individuals who 
have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by 
the reviewing official under Order EA-06-155 do not need to be 
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted 
access.
    E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has 
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this 
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being 
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on 
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy 
and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have 
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the 
quantities listed in Attachment B to this Order. The licensee shall 
complete implementation of the requirements of Attachments B and C to 
this Order by November 18, 2007.
    F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of 
this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each 
requirement described in Attachments B and C.
    The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have achieved 
full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments B and C.
    G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission's or an 
Agreement State's regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented 
or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until 
the Commission determines otherwise.
    Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall 
be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee submittals that contain 
Safeguards Information shall be properly marked and handled in 
accordance with Licensees' Safeguards Information or Safeguards 
Information--Modified Handling program.
    The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and 
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind 
any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good 
cause.

IV

    In accordance with 10 CFR Sec.  2.202, the Licensee must, and any 
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to 
this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) 
days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, 
consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. 
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request 
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal 
and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of 
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order. 
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing 
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of 
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected 
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued. 
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the 
Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, 
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office 
of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the 
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement, to 
the Office of Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional 
Administrator for NRC Region I, II, III, or IV, at the respective 
addresses specified in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73, appropriate for 
the specific facility, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing 
request is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible 
delays in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is 
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the 
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission 
to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the 
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile to 301-415-
3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the 
Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with 
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by 
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR Sec.  
2.309.
    If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose 
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order 
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held, 
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order 
should be sustained.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR Sec.  2.202(c)(2)(I), the Licensee, may, in 
addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or 
sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate 
effectiveness of the Order on the grounds that the Order, including the 
need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but 
on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error.
    In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of 
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions 
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the 
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an 
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the 
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension 
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a 
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this 
order.

    Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental 
Management Programs.

Attachment A: List of Licensees--Redacted

Attachment B: Additional Security Measures for Transportation of 
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern--Revision 2

A. General Basis Criteria

    These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) are established to 
delineate licensee responsibility in response to the current threat 
environment. The following security measures apply to Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement States licensees, who ship 
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) as defined in 
Section A .1. Shipments of RAMQC that do not fall within the NRC's 
jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are not 
subject to the provisions of these ASMs.
    1. Licensees who are subject to this Order shall ensure that the 
requirements listed in Section B below are in effect when they ship 
radioactive materials that meet the following criterion:
    a. Radionuclides listed in Table A, greater than or equal to the 
quantities specified,
    b. For mixtures of radionuclides listed in Table A, the sum of the 
fractions of

[[Page 30873]]

those radionuclides if greater than or equal to 1, or
    c. For shipments of spent nuclear fuel containing greater than or 
equal to 1000 Terabecquerels (TBq) (27,000 Curies) but less than or 
equal to 100 grams of spent nuclear fuel.
    For shipments containing greater than 100 grams of spent nuclear 
fuel, licensees shall follow the ASMs for ``Transportation of Spent 
Nuclear Fuel Greater than 100 Grams,'' dated October 3, 2002.
    These ASMs supercede Safeguards Advisories SA-01-01, Rev. 1, and 
SA-03-02. For radioactive materials shipments containing radionuclides 
not addressed by this ASM guidance will be provided by Safeguards 
Advisory.
    2. The requirements of these ASMs apply to a conveyance (i.e., the 
requirements apply irrespective of whether the RAMQC is shipped in a 
single package or in multiple packages in a single conveyance).
    3. Licensees are not responsible for complying with the 
requirements of these ASMs if a carrier aggregates, during transport or 
storage incident to transport, radioactive material from two or more 
conveyances from separate licensees which individually do not exceed 
the limits of Paragraph A.1. but which together meet or exceed any of 
the criteria in Paragraph A.1.
    4. The requirements of these ASMs only apply to RAMQC shipments 
using highway or rail modes of transportation. For multi-mode 
shipments, the requirements of these ASMs apply only to the portion of 
shipments that are made using highway or rail modes of transportation, 
as appropriate.
    5. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in 
quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in Paragraph A.1. 
per conveyance, the licensee shall ensure that:
    a. Only carriers are used which:
    (1) Use established package tracking systems,
    (2) Implement methods to assure trustworthiness and reliability of 
personnel associated with the transportation of RAMQC,
    (3) Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit, 
and
    (4) Have the capability for immediate communication to summon 
appropriate response or assistance.
    b. The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs 
the measures listed above.
    6. The preplanning, coordination, and tracking requirements of 
these ASMs are intended to reduce unnecessary delays and shipment 
duration and to facilitate the transfer of the RAMQC shipment and any 
escorts at State borders.
    7. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the requirements of these 
ASMs do not apply to local law enforcement agencies' (LLEA) personnel 
performing escort duties.
    8. The requirements of these ASMs apply to RAMQC domestic shipments 
within the United States (U.S.), imports into the U.S., or exports from 
the U.S. The requirements of these ASMs do not apply to transshipments 
through the U.S. Licensees are responsible for complying with the 
requirements of Section B for the highway and rail shipment portion of 
an import or export which occurs inside of the U.S.
    For import and export RAMQC shipments, while located at the port or 
shipments on U.S. navigable waterways, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime 
Transportation security regulations will be in effect and these ASMs 
are not applicable. For RAMQC shipments while located at the air 
freight terminal, security requirements will be performed in accordance 
with the Transportation Security Administration security regulations.
    For import and export RAMQC shipments, the licensee shall ensure 
that the requirements of these ASMs are implemented after the 
transportation package has been loaded onto the highway or rail vehicle 
(except for the advance notification requirements in section B.4) and 
the package begins the domestic portion of the shipment to or from the 
U.S. port of entry (i.e., the package(s) departs for or from the port 
of entry facility or the airfreight terminal).

B. Specific Requirements

    Licensees who ship RAMQC in quantities that meet the criteria of 
Paragraph A.1. shall ensure that carriers used have developed and 
implemented transportation security plans that embody the additional 
security measures imposed by this Order.
1. Licensee Verification
    Before transfer of radioactive materials in quantities which meet 
the criterion of Paragraph A.1, per conveyance, the licensee shall:
    a. For new recipient(s), verify that the intended recipient's 
license authorizes receipt of the regulated material by direct contact 
with the regulatory authority that issued the license (NRC Region or 
Agreement State) prior to transferring the material,
    b. Verify the validity of unusual orders or changes (if applicable) 
that depart from historical patterns of ordering by existing 
recipients,
    c. Verify the material is shipped to an address authorized in the 
license and that the address is valid,
    d. Verify the address for a delivery to a temporary job site is 
valid,
    e. Document the verification and validation process, and
    f. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient.
2. Background Investigations
    a. Background investigations are intended to provide high assurance 
that individuals performing assigned duties associated with the 
transport of RAMQC, are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute 
an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, including the 
potential to commit radiological sabotage.
    b. For highway shipments only, the licensee shall ensure background 
investigations for all drivers, accompanying individuals, 
communications center managers, and other appropriate communications 
center personnel have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to 
impose a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check, 
which includes fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to 
Safeguards Information (SGI) or unescorted access to licensed material.
    c. For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure background 
investigations for employees filling the positions of communications 
center managers and other appropriate communications center personnel 
have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to impose a Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check, which includes 
fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to SGI or 
unescorted access to licensed material.
    d. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is 
high assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards 
information or unescorted access to licensed material are trustworthy 
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent 
use of the regulated material. ``Access'' means that an individual 
could exercise some physical control over the material or device 
containing radioactive material.
    (1) The trustworthiness, reliability, and verification of an 
individual's true identity shall be determined based on a background 
investigation. The background investigation shall address at least the 
past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting and an 
FBI criminal history check, verification of employment history, 
education, employment eligibility, and

[[Page 30874]]

personal references. If an individual's employment has been less then 
the required three (3) years period, educational references may be used 
in lieu of employment history.
    (2) Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with 
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order.
    (3) A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been 
approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ``Order Imposing 
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for 
Access to Safeguards Information,'' is the only individual that may 
make trustworthiness and reliability determinations.
    e. Licensees' background investigation requirements may also be 
satisfied for an individual that has:
    (1) current access authorization permitting unescorted access to a 
power reactor facility or access to Safeguards Information,
    (2) current U.S. government-issued security clearance (based upon a 
national agency check, at a minimum), or
    (3) satisfactorily completed a background investigation under an 
NRC-approved access authorization program.
    f. Individuals shall not perform assigned duties associated with 
the transport of RAMQC until the licensee has confirmed that a 
determination of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the 
appropriate background investigation requirements in B.2.d. and B.2.e., 
has been performed and documented.
3. Preplanning and Coordination
    a. As part of the shipment planning process, the licensee shall 
ensure that appropriate security information is provided to and is 
coordinated with affected States through which the shipment will pass 
to ensure minimal delays. These discussions shall include whether a 
State intends to provide escorts for a shipment.
    b. The licensee shall ensure States are provided with position 
information on a shipment (see Paragraph B.5.a), if requested and 
practical.
    c. For shipments by highway, the licensees's coordination required 
in Paragraph B.3.a. shall include identification of Highway Route 
Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) shipments of material and safe havens.3
4. Notifications
    a. The licensee shall ensure an advance notification of a shipment 
is provided, or of a series of shipments, of RAMQC to the NRC. The 
licensee shall ensure the notification is submitted sufficiently in 
advance to ensure it is received by NRC at least seven (7) days, where 
practicable, before the shipment commences physically within the U.S.
    For written notifications, the notice should be addressed to: (10 
CFR 2.390) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Director, Division 
of Nuclear Security M/S: T-4-D-8. Office of Nuclear Security and 
Incident Response. 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
    Notifications may also be submitted electronically via e-mail to 
RAMQC--SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or via fax to (301) 816-5151. (10 CFR 2.390)
    b. The advance notification shall contain the following 
information:
    (1) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (2) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (3) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (4) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (5) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (6) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (7) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    Refer to Paragraph B.7.c. for determination of information 
designation of advance notifications during preplanning, coordinating, 
and reporting information activities.
    c. The licensee shall ensure the information required by Paragraph 
B.4.b. is provided to each State through which the shipment will pass. 
The licensee shall ensure that the notification is received at least 
seven (7) days, where practicable, before the U.S. highway or railroad 
portion of a shipment commences.
    d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
5. Communications
    a. (1) For highway shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with a 
telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a 
communication center or is equipped with an alternative tracking system 
that communicates position information to a communications center.
    (2) For rail shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with either: 
(i) a telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a 
licensee or third-party communication center, (ii) a railroad track-
side car location monitoring systems tracking system that relays a 
car's position to a railroad communications center (which can provide 
position information to any separate licensee communications center per 
Paragraph B.5.b), or (iii) alternate licensee monitoring system. 
Additionally, licensees may use a railroad communications center to 
monitor the rail portion of a shipment, in lieu of using a separate 
communications center.
    b. (1) For highway shipments, provide for a communication center 
that has the capability to continuously and actively monitor in-
progress shipments to ensure positive confirmation of the location, 
status, and control over the shipment and implement pre-planned 
procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or 
notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to 
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These 
procedures shall include identification of the designated LLEA 
contact(s) along the shipment route.
    (2) For rail shipments, provide for a communication center that has 
the capability to periodically monitor in-progress shipments to ensure 
positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and implement 
pre-planned procedures in response to notification of actual, 
attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion, 
or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These procedures shall include 
identification of the designated LLEA contact(s) along the shipment 
route. Licensees may use a railroad communications center in lieu of 
establishing a separate communications center.
    c. (1) For highway shipments, ensure that a two-way 
telecommunication capability is available for the transport and any 
escort vehicles allowing them to communicate with each other with the 
communications center, and with designated LLEAs along the route. The 
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated 
authorities along the shipment route.
    (2) For rail shipments, ensure that a two-way telecommunication 
capability is available between the train and the communications center 
and between any escort vehicles and the communications center. The 
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated 
authorities along the shipment route.
    d. A licensee may utilize a carrier or third-party communications 
center in

[[Page 30875]]

lieu of establishing such a facility itself. A commercial 
communications center must have the capabilities, necessary procedures, 
training, and personnel background investigations to meet the 
applicable requirements of these ASMs.
    e. (1) For highway shipments, provide a backup means for the 
transport and any escort vehicle to communicate with the communications 
center, using a diverse method not subject to the same interference 
factors as the primary capability selected for compliance with 
Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable telephone).
    (2) For rail shipments, provide a backup means for the train to 
talk with the communications center, using a diverse method not subject 
to the same interference factors as the primary capability selected for 
compliance with Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable 
telephone).
    f. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    (1) Not later than one hour after the time when, through the course 
of the investigation, it is determined the shipment is lost or stolen, 
the licensee shall ensure the appropriate local law enforcement agency, 
the NRC Operations Center at (301) 816-5100, and the appropriate 
Agreement State regulatory agency, if any, are notified.
    (2) If after 24 hours of initiating the investigation, the 
radioactive material cannot be located, licensee shall ensure the NRC 
Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate 
Agreement State regulatory agency are immediately notified.
    g. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
6. Drivers and Accompanying Individuals
    a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
    d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be 
publicly disclosed.]
7. Procedures, Training, and Control of Information
    a. (1) For highway shipments the licensee shall ensure that normal 
and contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example: 
notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and 
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to 
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. 
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of 
authentication and duress codes, provision for refueling or other 
stops, detours, and locations where communication is expected to be 
temporarily lost.
    (2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that normal and 
contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example: 
notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and 
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to 
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. 
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of 
authentication and duress codes, provision for stops, and locations 
where communication is expected to be temporarily lost.
    b. (1) For highway shipments, the licensee shall ensure that 
personnel, including drivers, accompanying individuals, responsible 
communication center managers, and other appropriate communication 
center personnel are trained in and understand the normal and 
contingency procedures.
    (2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that personnel, 
including the appropriate train crew members and responsible railroad 
communication center managers, and other appropriate railroad 
communication center personnel are trained in and understand the normal 
and contingency procedures.
    c. Information to be protected as Safeguards Information--Modified 
Handling, shall include, but is not limited to:
    (1) Integrated transportation physical security plans.
    (2) Schedules and itineraries for shipments. For shipments that are 
not inherently self disclosing, schedule and itineraries information 
may be decontrolled 2 days after a shipment is completed. For shipments 
that are inherently self disclosing, schedule may be released as 
necessary after departure.
    (3) Details of alarm and communications systems, communication 
protocols and duress codes, and security contingency response 
procedures.
    (4) Arrangements with designated LLEA (i.e., Federal, State Police, 
and/or local police departments) and information on whether a State 
intends to provide armed escorts for a shipment.
    For preplanning; coordinating, for example with States 
(organizations and carriers); reporting information as described in 
B.1., B.4., and B.5. related to shipments of radioactive material, and 
the radionuclides identified in Paragraph A.1, the licensee shall 
ensure the information is protected at least as sensitive information 
(for example, proprietary or business financial information). Licensees 
shall ensure access is restricted to this information to those licensee 
and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall ensure 
all parties receiving this information protect it similarly. 
Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and 
shall be marked as ``Sensitive Information--Not for Public 
Disclosure.''

C. Implementation Schedule

    1. Licensees shall implement the requirements of this ASM within 
180 days of the date of issuance of the Order or before the first 
shipment of RAMQC, whichever is sooner.

                   Table A.--Radionuclides of Concern
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                            Quantity of
                                             Quantity of   concern (Ci)
                                               concern      information
                Radionuclide                    (TBq)      only--rounded
                                              threshold        after
                                                limit       conversion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241.....................................           60           1,600
Am-241/Be..................................           60           1,600
Cf-252.....................................           20             540
Cm-244.....................................           50           1,400
Co-60......................................           30             810
Cs-137.....................................          100           2,700
Gd-153.....................................        1,000          27,000
Ir-192.....................................           80           2,200
Pm-147.....................................       40,000       1,100,000
Pu-238.....................................           60           1,600
Pu-239/Be..................................           60           1,600
Ra-226 \1\.................................           40           1,100
Se-75......................................          200           5,400
Sr-90 (Y-90)...............................         1000          27,000
Tm-170.....................................       20,000         540,000
Yb-169.....................................          300          8,100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
  authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of
  amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.


Notes:

    1. The regulatory standard values to be used are given in 
Terabecquerels (TBq). Curie (Ci) values are provided for practical 
usefulness only and are rounded after conversion.
    2. If several radionuclides are present, the sum of the 
fractions of the activity of each radionuclide must be determined. 
Using the equation below calculate the ratio by inserting the actual 
activity of each radionuclide as the numerator and the corresponding 
activity limit in Table A as the denominator. Ensure the numerator 
and the denominator are in Terabecquerels.

R1 = activity for radionuclide number 1.
R2 = activity for radionuclide number 2.

[[Page 30876]]

R3, R4, R5......etc.
AR1 = activity limit for radionuclide number 1.
AR2 = activity limit for radionuclide number 2.
AR3, AR4, AR5......etc.
R1 + R2 + R3 + Rn 1.
AR1 AR2 AR3 ARn.

Attachment C: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History 
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining 
Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive 
Materials

General Requirements

    Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this 
attachment.
    1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall 
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to 
safeguards information (SGI) or unescorted access to RAMQC. The 
Licensee shall review and use the information received from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained 
in this Order and this attachment are satisfied.
    2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the 
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal 
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising 
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in 
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this 
attachment.
    3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be 
taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor, 
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting 
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for 
unescorted access, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal 
history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal 
security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which 
granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history 
check must be provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee 
must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the 
date the individual no longer requires access to SGI or unescorted 
access to radioactive materials associated with the Licensee's 
activities.
    4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order 
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
    5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI 
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability 
requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant, 
or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive 
materials.
    6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a 
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an 
individual's suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to 
RAMQC.
    7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination 
whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted 
access to RAMQC.

Prohibitions

    A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an 
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of 
information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one 
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of 
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an 
acquittal.
    A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal 
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would 
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to 
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the 
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on 
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.

Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks

    For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall, 
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's 
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed, 
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where 
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking 
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC, to the Director of the 
Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the 
Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be 
obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-
5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative formats 
are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures 
to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in 
minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or 
incomplete cards.
    The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness. 
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident 
errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for 
processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial 
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions 
cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI 
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If 
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial 
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
    Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application. 
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing 
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check, 
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For 
guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security 
Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404.] 
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The 
application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by 
the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted 
by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which 
covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee 
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees 
who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
    The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data 
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for 
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.

Right To Correct and Complete Information

    Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make 
available to the individual the contents of any criminal records 
obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete 
information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this 
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1) 
year from the date of the notification.
    If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is 
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct, 
or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the 
record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These 
procedures

[[Page 30877]]

include either direct application by the individual challenging the 
record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed 
the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or 
completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the 
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification 
Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30 
through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to 
the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify 
or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official 
communication directly from the agency that contributed the original 
information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes 
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency. 
The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to 
initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history 
records check after the record is made available for his/her review. 
The Licensee may make a final determination on access to SGI or 
unescorted access RAMQC based upon the criminal history record only 
upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the 
record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI or 
unescorted access to RAMQC, the Licensee shall provide the individual 
its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to 
RAMQC shall not be granted to an individual during the review process.

Protection of Information

    1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an 
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system 
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal 
information from unauthorized disclosure.
    2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information 
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual, 
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the 
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining 
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. No individual authorized 
to have access to the information may re-disseminate the information to 
any other individual who does not have a need-to-know.
    3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a 
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if 
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the 
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information 
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies 
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social 
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for 
identification purposes.
    4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under 
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative 
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
    5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history 
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has 
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment 
or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. After the 
required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a 
method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or 
in part.

[FR Doc. E7-10698 Filed 6-1-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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