In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately), 30870-30877 [E7-10698]
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30870
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deficiency, or to explain any matter in
the record, the individual may initiate
challenge procedures. These procedures
include either direct application by the
individual challenging the record to the
agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)
that contributed the questioned
information, or direct challenge as to the
accuracy or completeness of any entry
on the criminal history record to the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Identification Division,
Washington, DC 20537–9700 (as set
forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In
the latter case, the FBI forwards the
challenge to the agency that submitted
the data and requests that agency to
verify or correct the challenged entry.
Upon receipt of an official
communication directly from the agency
that contributed the original
information, the FBI Identification
Division makes any changes necessary
in accordance with the information
supplied by that agency. The Licensee
must provide at least ten (10) days for
an individual to initiate an action
challenging the results of an FBI
criminal history records check after the
record is made available for his/her
review. The Licensee may make a final
determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order based upon the criminal history
record only upon receipt of the FBI’s
ultimate confirmation or correction of
the record. Upon a final adverse
determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order, the Licensee shall provide the
individual its documented basis for
denial. Access to SGI or unescorted
access to radioactive materials equal to
or greater than the quantities used in
Attachment 2 to this Order shall not be
granted to an individual during the
review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a
criminal history record on an individual
pursuant to this Order shall establish
and maintain a system of files and
procedures for protecting the record and
the personal information from
unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the
record or personal information collected
and maintained to persons other than
the subject individual, his/her
representative, or to those who have a
need to access the information in
performing assigned duties in the
process of determining access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
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materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order. No individual authorized to have
access to the information may redisseminate the information to any
other individual who does not have a
need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained
on an individual from a criminal history
record check may be transferred to
another Licensee if the Licensee holding
the criminal history record receives the
individual’s written request to redisseminate the information contained
in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee
verifies information such as the
individual’s name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other
applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal
history records, obtained under this
section, available for examination by an
authorized representative of the NRC to
determine compliance with the
regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all
fingerprint and criminal history records
received from the FBI, or a copy if the
individual’s file has been transferred,
for three (3) years after termination of
employment or denial to access SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order. After the required three (3) year
period, these documents shall be
destroyed by a method that will prevent
reconstruction of the information in
whole or in part.
[FR Doc. E7–10691 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[EA–07–003]
In the Matter of Certain Licensees
Authorized To Possess and Transfer
Items Containing Radioactive Material
Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing
Additional Security Measures
(Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in
Attachment A 1 to this Order, hold
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) or an Agreement State, in
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Parts
30, 32, 70 and 71, or equivalent
Agreement State regulations. The
1 Attachment A contains sensitive information
and will not be released to the public.
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licenses authorize them to possess and
transfer items containing radioactive
material quantities of concern. This
Order is being issued to all such
Licensees who may transport
radioactive material quantities of
concern under the NRC’s authority to
protect the common defense and
security, which has not been
relinquished to the Agreement States.
The Orders require compliance with
specific additional security measures to
enhance the security for transport of
certain radioactive material quantities of
concern.
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists
simultaneously attacked targets in New
York, NY, and Washington, DC,
utilizing large commercial aircraft as
weapons. In response to the attacks and
intelligence information subsequently
obtained, the Commission issued a
number of Safeguards and Threat
Advisories to Licensees in order to
strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and
readiness to respond to a potential
attack on this regulated activity. The
Commission has also communicated
with other Federal, State and local
government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate
the current threat environment in order
to assess the adequacy of the current
security measures. In addition, the
Commission commenced a
comprehensive review of its safeguards
and security programs and
requirements.
As a result of its initial consideration
of current safeguards and security
requirements, as well as a review of
information provided by the intelligence
community, the Commission has
determined that certain security
measures are required to be
implemented by Licensees as prudent,
interim measures to address the current
threat environment in a consistent
manner. Therefore, the Commission is
imposing requirements, as set forth in
Attachment B 2 of this Order, on all
Licensees identified in Attachment A of
this Order. These additional security
measures, which supplement existing
regulatory requirements, will provide
the Commission with reasonable
assurance that the common defense and
security continue to be adequately
protected in the current threat
environment. Attachment C of this
2 Attachment B contains some requirements that
are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and can not be
released to the public, and have therefore been
redacted. The remainder of the requirements
contained in Attachment B that are not
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to
the public.
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Order contains the requirements for
fingerprinting and criminal history
record checks for individuals when
licensee’s reviewing official is
determining access to Safeguards
Information or unescorted access to the
radioactive materials. These
requirements will remain in effect until
the Commission determines otherwise.
The Commission recognizes that
Licensees may have already initiated
many of the measures set forth in
Attachment B to this Order in response
to previously issued Safeguards and
Threat Advisories or on their own. It is
also recognized that some measures may
not be possible or necessary for all
shipments of radioactive material
quantities of concern, or may need to be
tailored to accommodate the Licensees’
specific circumstances to achieve the
intended objectives and avoid any
unforeseen effect on the safe transport of
radioactive material quantities of
concern.
Although the security measures
implemented by Licensees in response
to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories
have been adequate to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate
protection of common defense and
security, in light of the continuing threat
environment, the Commission
concludes that the security measures
must be embodied in an Order,
consistent with the established
regulatory framework. The Commission
has determined that some of the security
measures contained in Attachment B of
this Order contain Safeguards
Information and will not be released to
the public as per Order entitled,
‘‘Issuance of Order Imposing
Requirements for Protecting Certain
Safeguards Information,’’ issued
specifically to the Licensees identified
in Attachment A to this Order. Access
to Safeguards Information is limited to
those persons who have established a
need-to-know the information, are
considered to be trustworthy and
reliable, have been fingerprinted and
undergone a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) identification and
criminal history records check in
accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA–
06–155). A need-to-know means a
determination by a person having
responsibility for protecting Safeguards
Information that a proposed recipient’s
access to Safeguards Information is
necessary in the performance of official,
contractual, or licensee duties of
employment. Individuals who have
been fingerprinted and granted access to
Safeguards Information by the reviewing
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official under the NRC’s ‘‘Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA–
06–155) do not need to be fingerprinted
again for purposes of being considered
for unescorted access.
To provide assurance that Licensees
are implementing prudent measures to
achieve a consistent level of protection
to address the current threat
environment, all Licensees identified in
Attachment A to this Order shall
implement the requirements identified
in Attachments B and C to this Order.
In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202,
I find that in light of the common
defense and security matters identified
above, which warrant the issuance of
this Order, the public health and safety
require that this Order be immediately
effective.
III.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53,
63, 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182
and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, and the
Commission’s regulations in 10 CFR
§ 2.202 and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 70 and
71, It is hereby ordered, effective
immediately, that all licensees
identified in Attachment A to this order
shall comply with the following:
A. All Licensees shall,
notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State
regulation or license to the contrary,
comply with the requirements described
in Attachments B and C to this Order.
The Licensees shall immediately start
implementation of the requirements in
Attachments B and C to the Order and
shall complete implementation by
November 18, 2007, or before the first
shipment of radioactive material
quantities of concern, whichever is
sooner. This Order supersedes the
additional transportation security
measures prescribed in Attachment 2,
Section 7.d. of the Manufacturer and
Distributor Order issued January 12,
2004.
B.1. All Licensees shall, within
twenty (20) days of the date of this
Order, notify the Commission, (1) if they
are unable to comply with any of the
requirements described in Attachments
B or C, (2) if compliance with any of the
requirements is unnecessary in their
specific circumstances, or (3) if
implementation of any of the
requirements would cause the Licensee
to be in violation of the provisions of
any Commission or Agreement State
regulation or its license. The
notification shall provide the Licensees
justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
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2. Any Licensee that considers that
implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachments
B or C to this Order would adversely
impact the safe transport of radioactive
material quantities of concern must
notify the Commission, within twenty
(20) days of this Order, of the adverse
safety impact, the basis for its
determination that the requirement has
an adverse safety impact, and either a
proposal for achieving the same
objectives specified in the Attachment B
or requirement in question, or a
schedule for modifying the activity to
address the adverse safety condition. If
neither approach is appropriate, the
Licensee must supplement its response
to Condition B.1 of this Order to
identify the condition as a requirement
with which it cannot comply, with
attendant justifications as required in
Condition B.1.
C.1. In accordance with the NRC’s
‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check
Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information’’ (EA–06–155) issued on
August 21, 2006, only the NRCapproved reviewing official shall review
results from an FBI criminal history
records check. The reviewing official
shall determine whether an individual
may have, or continue to have,
unescorted access to radioactive
materials that equal or exceed the
quantities listed in Attachment B to this
Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI
identification and criminal history
records check are not required for
individuals exempted from
fingerprinting requirements under 10
CFR 73.61 [72 FR 4945 (February 2,
2007)]. In addition, individuals who
have a favorably decided U.S.
Government criminal history records
check within the last five (5) years, or
have an active federal security clearance
(provided in each case that the
appropriate documentation is made
available to the Licensee’s reviewing
official), have satisfied the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 fingerprinting
requirement and need not be
fingerprinted again for purposes of
being considered for unescorted access.
2. No person may have access to
Safeguards Information or unescorted
access to radioactive materials if the
NRC has determined, in accordance
with its administrative review process
based on fingerprinting and an FBI
identification and criminal history
records check, either that the person
may not have access to Safeguards
Information or that the person may not
have unescorted access to a utilization
facility, or radioactive material or other
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property subject to regulation by the
NRC.
D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and
reviewed in accordance with the
procedures described in Attachment C
to this Order. Individuals who have
been fingerprinted and granted access to
Safeguards Information by the reviewing
official under Order EA–06–155 do not
need to be fingerprinted again for
purposes of being considered for
unescorted access.
E. The Licensee may allow any
individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive
materials, in accordance with this
Order, to continue to have unescorted
access without being fingerprinted,
pending a decision by the reviewing
official (based on fingerprinting, an FBI
criminal history records check and a
trustworthy and reliability
determination) that the individual may
continue to have unescorted access to
radioactive materials that equal or
exceed the quantities listed in
Attachment B to this Order. The
licensee shall complete implementation
of the requirements of Attachments B
and C to this Order by November 18,
2007.
F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Order,
submit to the Commission a schedule
for completion of each requirement
described in Attachments B and C.
The Licensee shall report to the
Commission when they have achieved
full compliance with the requirements
described in Attachments B and C.
G. Notwithstanding any provisions of
the Commission’s or an Agreement
State’s regulations to the contrary, all
measures implemented or actions taken
in response to this Order shall be
maintained until the Commission
determines otherwise.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1,
B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall be
submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555. In addition,
Licensee submittals that contain
Safeguards Information shall be
properly marked and handled in
accordance with Licensees’ Safeguards
Information or Safeguards Information—
Modified Handling program.
The Director, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, may, in writing,
relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration by the
Licensee of good cause.
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IV
In accordance with 10 CFR § 2.202,
the Licensee must, and any other person
adversely affected by this Order may,
submit an answer to this Order, and
may request a hearing on this Order,
within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending
the time to request a hearing. A request
for extension of time in which to submit
an answer or request a hearing must be
made in writing to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and include a
statement of good cause for the
extension. The answer may consent to
this Order. Unless the answer consents
to this Order, the answer shall, in
writing and under oath or affirmation,
specifically set forth the matters of fact
and law on which the Licensee or other
person adversely affected relies and the
reasons as to why the Order should not
have been issued. Any answer or
request for a hearing shall be submitted
to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary
of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also
shall be sent to the Director, Office of
Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant
General Counsel for Materials Litigation
and Enforcement, to the Office of
Enforcement at the same address, to the
Regional Administrator for NRC Region
I, II, III, or IV, at the respective
addresses specified in Appendix A to 10
CFR Part 73, appropriate for the specific
facility, and to the Licensee if the
answer or hearing request is by a person
other than the Licensee. Because of
possible delays in delivery of mail to
United States Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for
hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101
or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov
and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile to
301–415–3725 or by e-mail to
OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person
other than the Licensee requests a
hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his
interest is adversely affected by this
Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR § 2.309.
If a hearing is requested by the
Licensee or a person whose interest is
adversely affected, the Commission will
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issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such
hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR § 2.202(c)(2)(I),
the Licensee, may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the
answer is filed or sooner, move the
presiding officer to set aside the
immediate effectiveness of the Order on
the grounds that the Order, including
the need for immediate effectiveness, is
not based on adequate evidence but on
mere suspicion, unfounded allegations,
or error.
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section III above shall be final twenty
(20) days from the date of this Order
without further order or proceedings. If
an extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall
not stay the immediate effectiveness of
this order.
Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials
and Environmental Management Programs.
Attachment A: List of Licensees—
Redacted
Attachment B: Additional Security
Measures for Transportation of
Radioactive Material Quantities of
Concern—Revision 2
A. General Basis Criteria
These Additional Security Measures
(ASMs) are established to delineate
licensee responsibility in response to
the current threat environment. The
following security measures apply to
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
and Agreement States licensees, who
ship Radioactive Material Quantities of
Concern (RAMQC) as defined in Section
A .1. Shipments of RAMQC that do not
fall within the NRC’s jurisdiction under
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, are not subject to the
provisions of these ASMs.
1. Licensees who are subject to this
Order shall ensure that the requirements
listed in Section B below are in effect
when they ship radioactive materials
that meet the following criterion:
a. Radionuclides listed in Table A,
greater than or equal to the quantities
specified,
b. For mixtures of radionuclides listed
in Table A, the sum of the fractions of
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those radionuclides if greater than or
equal to 1, or
c. For shipments of spent nuclear fuel
containing greater than or equal to 1000
Terabecquerels (TBq) (27,000 Curies)
but less than or equal to 100 grams of
spent nuclear fuel.
For shipments containing greater than
100 grams of spent nuclear fuel,
licensees shall follow the ASMs for
‘‘Transportation of Spent Nuclear Fuel
Greater than 100 Grams,’’ dated October
3, 2002.
These ASMs supercede Safeguards
Advisories SA–01–01, Rev. 1, and SA–
03–02. For radioactive materials
shipments containing radionuclides not
addressed by this ASM guidance will be
provided by Safeguards Advisory.
2. The requirements of these ASMs
apply to a conveyance (i.e., the
requirements apply irrespective of
whether the RAMQC is shipped in a
single package or in multiple packages
in a single conveyance).
3. Licensees are not responsible for
complying with the requirements of
these ASMs if a carrier aggregates,
during transport or storage incident to
transport, radioactive material from two
or more conveyances from separate
licensees which individually do not
exceed the limits of Paragraph A.1. but
which together meet or exceed any of
the criteria in Paragraph A.1.
4. The requirements of these ASMs
only apply to RAMQC shipments using
highway or rail modes of transportation.
For multi-mode shipments, the
requirements of these ASMs apply only
to the portion of shipments that are
made using highway or rail modes of
transportation, as appropriate.
5. For domestic highway and rail
shipments of materials in quantities
greater than or equal to the quantities in
Paragraph A.1. per conveyance, the
licensee shall ensure that:
a. Only carriers are used which:
(1) Use established package tracking
systems,
(2) Implement methods to assure
trustworthiness and reliability of
personnel associated with the
transportation of RAMQC,
(3) Maintain constant control and/or
surveillance during transit, and
(4) Have the capability for immediate
communication to summon appropriate
response or assistance.
b. The licensee shall verify and
document that the carrier employs the
measures listed above.
6. The preplanning, coordination, and
tracking requirements of these ASMs are
intended to reduce unnecessary delays
and shipment duration and to facilitate
the transfer of the RAMQC shipment
and any escorts at State borders.
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7. Unless specifically noted
otherwise, the requirements of these
ASMs do not apply to local law
enforcement agencies’ (LLEA) personnel
performing escort duties.
8. The requirements of these ASMs
apply to RAMQC domestic shipments
within the United States (U.S.), imports
into the U.S., or exports from the U.S.
The requirements of these ASMs do not
apply to transshipments through the
U.S. Licensees are responsible for
complying with the requirements of
Section B for the highway and rail
shipment portion of an import or export
which occurs inside of the U.S.
For import and export RAMQC
shipments, while located at the port or
shipments on U.S. navigable waterways,
the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation security regulations will
be in effect and these ASMs are not
applicable. For RAMQC shipments
while located at the air freight terminal,
security requirements will be performed
in accordance with the Transportation
Security Administration security
regulations.
For import and export RAMQC
shipments, the licensee shall ensure that
the requirements of these ASMs are
implemented after the transportation
package has been loaded onto the
highway or rail vehicle (except for the
advance notification requirements in
section B.4) and the package begins the
domestic portion of the shipment to or
from the U.S. port of entry (i.e., the
package(s) departs for or from the port
of entry facility or the airfreight
terminal).
B. Specific Requirements
Licensees who ship RAMQC in
quantities that meet the criteria of
Paragraph A.1. shall ensure that carriers
used have developed and implemented
transportation security plans that
embody the additional security
measures imposed by this Order.
1. Licensee Verification
Before transfer of radioactive
materials in quantities which meet the
criterion of Paragraph A.1, per
conveyance, the licensee shall:
a. For new recipient(s), verify that the
intended recipient’s license authorizes
receipt of the regulated material by
direct contact with the regulatory
authority that issued the license (NRC
Region or Agreement State) prior to
transferring the material,
b. Verify the validity of unusual
orders or changes (if applicable) that
depart from historical patterns of
ordering by existing recipients,
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c. Verify the material is shipped to an
address authorized in the license and
that the address is valid,
d. Verify the address for a delivery to
a temporary job site is valid,
e. Document the verification and
validation process, and
f. Coordinate departure and arrival
times with the recipient.
2. Background Investigations
a. Background investigations are
intended to provide high assurance that
individuals performing assigned duties
associated with the transport of
RAMQC, are trustworthy and reliable,
and do not constitute an unreasonable
risk to the common defense and
security, including the potential to
commit radiological sabotage.
b. For highway shipments only, the
licensee shall ensure background
investigations for all drivers,
accompanying individuals,
communications center managers, and
other appropriate communications
center personnel have been performed.
The NRC only has the authority to
impose a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) criminal history
check, which includes fingerprinting,
on those individuals who seek access to
Safeguards Information (SGI) or
unescorted access to licensed material.
c. For rail shipments, the licensee
shall ensure background investigations
for employees filling the positions of
communications center managers and
other appropriate communications
center personnel have been performed.
The NRC only has the authority to
impose a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) criminal history
check, which includes fingerprinting,
on those individuals who seek access to
SGI or unescorted access to licensed
material.
d. Licensees shall document the basis
for concluding that there is high
assurance that individuals granted
access to safeguards information or
unescorted access to licensed material
are trustworthy and reliable, and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk for
malevolent use of the regulated
material. ‘‘Access’’ means that an
individual could exercise some physical
control over the material or device
containing radioactive material.
(1) The trustworthiness, reliability,
and verification of an individual’s true
identity shall be determined based on a
background investigation. The
background investigation shall address
at least the past three (3) years, and as
a minimum, include fingerprinting and
an FBI criminal history check,
verification of employment history,
education, employment eligibility, and
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personal references. If an individual’s
employment has been less then the
required three (3) years period,
educational references may be used in
lieu of employment history.
(2) Fingerprints shall be submitted
and reviewed in accordance with the
procedures described in Attachment C
to this Order.
(3) A reviewing official that the
licensee nominated and has been
approved by the NRC, in accordance
with NRC ‘‘Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Records Check Requirements for Access
to Safeguards Information,’’ is the only
individual that may make
trustworthiness and reliability
determinations.
e. Licensees’ background investigation
requirements may also be satisfied for
an individual that has:
(1) current access authorization
permitting unescorted access to a power
reactor facility or access to Safeguards
Information,
(2) current U.S. government-issued
security clearance (based upon a
national agency check, at a minimum),
or
(3) satisfactorily completed a
background investigation under an
NRC-approved access authorization
program.
f. Individuals shall not perform
assigned duties associated with the
transport of RAMQC until the licensee
has confirmed that a determination of
trustworthiness and reliability, based on
the appropriate background
investigation requirements in B.2.d. and
B.2.e., has been performed and
documented.
3. Preplanning and Coordination
a. As part of the shipment planning
process, the licensee shall ensure that
appropriate security information is
provided to and is coordinated with
affected States through which the
shipment will pass to ensure minimal
delays. These discussions shall include
whether a State intends to provide
escorts for a shipment.
b. The licensee shall ensure States are
provided with position information on a
shipment (see Paragraph B.5.a), if
requested and practical.
c. For shipments by highway, the
licensees’s coordination required in
Paragraph B.3.a. shall include
identification of Highway Route
Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) shipments
of material and safe havens.3
4. Notifications
a. The licensee shall ensure an
advance notification of a shipment is
provided, or of a series of shipments, of
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20:34 Jun 01, 2007
Jkt 211001
RAMQC to the NRC. The licensee shall
ensure the notification is submitted
sufficiently in advance to ensure it is
received by NRC at least seven (7) days,
where practicable, before the shipment
commences physically within the U.S.
For written notifications, the notice
should be addressed to: (10 CFR 2.390)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
ATTN: Director, Division of Nuclear
Security M/S: T–4–D–8. Office of
Nuclear Security and Incident
Response. 11555 Rockville Pike.
Rockville, MD 20852–2738.
Notifications may also be submitted
electronically via e-mail to
RAMQC_SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or via
fax to (301) 816–5151. (10 CFR 2.390)
b. The advance notification shall
contain the following information:
(1) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(2) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(3) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(4) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(5) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(6) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(7) [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
Refer to Paragraph B.7.c. for
determination of information
designation of advance notifications
during preplanning, coordinating, and
reporting information activities.
c. The licensee shall ensure the
information required by Paragraph
B.4.b. is provided to each State through
which the shipment will pass. The
licensee shall ensure that the
notification is received at least seven (7)
days, where practicable, before the U.S.
highway or railroad portion of a
shipment commences.
d. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
5. Communications
a. (1) For highway shipments, monitor
each RAMQC shipment with a
telemetric position monitoring system
that communicates with a
communication center or is equipped
with an alternative tracking system that
communicates position information to a
communications center.
(2) For rail shipments, monitor each
RAMQC shipment with either: (i) a
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
telemetric position monitoring system
that communicates with a licensee or
third-party communication center, (ii) a
railroad track-side car location
monitoring systems tracking system that
relays a car’s position to a railroad
communications center (which can
provide position information to any
separate licensee communications
center per Paragraph B.5.b), or (iii)
alternate licensee monitoring system.
Additionally, licensees may use a
railroad communications center to
monitor the rail portion of a shipment,
in lieu of using a separate
communications center.
b. (1) For highway shipments, provide
for a communication center that has the
capability to continuously and actively
monitor in-progress shipments to ensure
positive confirmation of the location,
status, and control over the shipment
and implement pre-planned procedures
in response to deviations from the
authorized route or notification of
actual, attempted, or suspicious
activities related to theft, loss, diversion,
or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
These procedures shall include
identification of the designated LLEA
contact(s) along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, provide for a
communication center that has the
capability to periodically monitor inprogress shipments to ensure positive
confirmation of the location of the
shipment and implement pre-planned
procedures in response to notification of
actual, attempted, or suspicious
activities related to theft, loss, diversion,
or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
These procedures shall include
identification of the designated LLEA
contact(s) along the shipment route.
Licensees may use a railroad
communications center in lieu of
establishing a separate communications
center.
c. (1) For highway shipments, ensure
that a two-way telecommunication
capability is available for the transport
and any escort vehicles allowing them
to communicate with each other with
the communications center, and with
designated LLEAs along the route. The
communications center must be capable
of contacting the designated authorities
along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, ensure that a
two-way telecommunication capability
is available between the train and the
communications center and between
any escort vehicles and the
communications center. The
communications center must be capable
of contacting the designated authorities
along the shipment route.
d. A licensee may utilize a carrier or
third-party communications center in
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lieu of establishing such a facility itself.
A commercial communications center
must have the capabilities, necessary
procedures, training, and personnel
background investigations to meet the
applicable requirements of these ASMs.
e. (1) For highway shipments, provide
a backup means for the transport and
any escort vehicle to communicate with
the communications center, using a
diverse method not subject to the same
interference factors as the primary
capability selected for compliance with
Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or
portable telephone).
(2) For rail shipments, provide a
backup means for the train to talk with
the communications center, using a
diverse method not subject to the same
interference factors as the primary
capability selected for compliance with
Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or
portable telephone).
f. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
(1) Not later than one hour after the
time when, through the course of the
investigation, it is determined the
shipment is lost or stolen, the licensee
shall ensure the appropriate local law
enforcement agency, the NRC
Operations Center at (301) 816–5100,
and the appropriate Agreement State
regulatory agency, if any, are notified.
(2) If after 24 hours of initiating the
investigation, the radioactive material
cannot be located, licensee shall ensure
the NRC Operations Center and, for
Agreement State licensees, the
appropriate Agreement State regulatory
agency are immediately notified.
g. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
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6. Drivers and Accompanying
Individuals
a. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
b. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
c. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
d. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed.]
7. Procedures, Training, and Control of
Information
a. (1) For highway shipments the
licensee shall ensure that normal and
contingency procedures have been
developed, including, for example:
notifications, communications
protocols, loss of communications, and
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response to actual, attempted, or
suspicious activities related to theft,
loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage
of a shipment. Communication
protocols must include a strategy for use
of authentication and duress codes,
provision for refueling or other stops,
detours, and locations where
communication is expected to be
temporarily lost.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee
shall ensure that normal and
contingency procedures have been
developed, including, for example:
notifications, communications
protocols, loss of communications, and
response to actual, attempted, or
suspicious activities related to theft,
loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage
of a shipment. Communication
protocols must include a strategy for use
of authentication and duress codes,
provision for stops, and locations where
communication is expected to be
temporarily lost.
b. (1) For highway shipments, the
licensee shall ensure that personnel,
including drivers, accompanying
individuals, responsible communication
center managers, and other appropriate
communication center personnel are
trained in and understand the normal
and contingency procedures.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee
shall ensure that personnel, including
the appropriate train crew members and
responsible railroad communication
center managers, and other appropriate
railroad communication center
personnel are trained in and understand
the normal and contingency procedures.
c. Information to be protected as
Safeguards Information—Modified
Handling, shall include, but is not
limited to:
(1) Integrated transportation physical
security plans.
(2) Schedules and itineraries for
shipments. For shipments that are not
inherently self disclosing, schedule and
itineraries information may be
decontrolled 2 days after a shipment is
completed. For shipments that are
inherently self disclosing, schedule may
be released as necessary after departure.
(3) Details of alarm and
communications systems,
communication protocols and duress
codes, and security contingency
response procedures.
(4) Arrangements with designated
LLEA (i.e., Federal, State Police, and/or
local police departments) and
information on whether a State intends
to provide armed escorts for a shipment.
For preplanning; coordinating, for
example with States (organizations and
carriers); reporting information as
described in B.1., B.4., and B.5. related
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
to shipments of radioactive material,
and the radionuclides identified in
Paragraph A.1, the licensee shall ensure
the information is protected at least as
sensitive information (for example,
proprietary or business financial
information). Licensees shall ensure
access is restricted to this information to
those licensee and contractor personnel
with a need to know. Licensees shall
ensure all parties receiving this
information protect it similarly.
Information may be transmitted either
in writing or electronically and shall be
marked as ‘‘Sensitive Information—Not
for Public Disclosure.’’
C. Implementation Schedule
1. Licensees shall implement the
requirements of this ASM within 180
days of the date of issuance of the Order
or before the first shipment of RAMQC,
whichever is sooner.
TABLE A.—RADIONUCLIDES OF
CONCERN
Radionuclide
Am-241 .........
Am-241/Be ....
Cf-252 ...........
Cm-244 .........
Co-60 ............
Cs-137 ..........
Gd-153 ..........
Ir-192 ............
Pm-147 .........
Pu-238 ..........
Pu-239/Be .....
Ra-226 1 ........
Se-75 ............
Sr-90 (Y-90) ..
Tm-170 .........
Yb-169 ..........
Quantity of
concern
(TBq)
threshold
limit
Quantity of
concern (Ci)
information
only—rounded
after conversion
60
60
20
50
30
100
1,000
80
40,000
60
60
40
200
1000
20,000
300
1,600
1,600
540
1,400
810
2,700
27,000
2,200
1,100,000
1,600
1,600
1,100
5,400
27,000
540,000
8,100
1 The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by
the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes
NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the
process of amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
Notes:
1. The regulatory standard values to be
used are given in Terabecquerels (TBq). Curie
(Ci) values are provided for practical
usefulness only and are rounded after
conversion.
2. If several radionuclides are present, the
sum of the fractions of the activity of each
radionuclide must be determined. Using the
equation below calculate the ratio by
inserting the actual activity of each
radionuclide as the numerator and the
corresponding activity limit in Table A as the
denominator. Ensure the numerator and the
denominator are in Terabecquerels.
R1 = activity for radionuclide number 1.
R2 = activity for radionuclide number 2.
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R3, R4, R5......etc.
AR1 = activity limit for radionuclide number
1.
AR2 = activity limit for radionuclide number
2.
AR3, AR4, AR5......etc.
R1 + R2 + R3 + Rn 1.
AR1 AR2 AR3 ARn.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
Attachment C: Requirements for
Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee’s
Reviewing Official Is Determining
Access to Safeguards Information or
Unescorted Access to Radioactive
Materials
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the
following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the
provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is
seeking or permitted access to
safeguards information (SGI) or
unescorted access to RAMQC. The
Licensee shall review and use the
information received from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ensure
that the provisions contained in this
Order and this attachment are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each
affected individual that the fingerprints
will be used to secure a review of his/
her criminal history record and inform
the individual of the procedures for
revising the record or including an
explanation in the record, as specified
in the ‘‘Right to Correct and Complete
Information’’ section of this attachment.
3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or
unescorted access need not be taken if
an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee
employee, contractor, manufacturer, or
supplier) is relieved from the
fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR
73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61
for unescorted access, has a favorablydecided U.S. Government criminal
history check within the last five (5)
years, or has an active federal security
clearance. Written confirmation from
the Agency/employer which granted the
federal security clearance or reviewed
the criminal history check must be
provided for either of the latter two
cases. The Licensee must retain this
documentation for a period of three (3)
years from the date the individual no
longer requires access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials associated with the Licensee’s
activities.
4. All fingerprints obtained by the
Licensee pursuant to this Order must be
submitted to the Commission for
transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the
information received from the FBI and
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Jkt 211001
consider it, in conjunction with the
trustworthy and reliability requirements
of this Order, in making a determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow,
access to SGI or unescorted access to
radioactive materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any
information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for
the purpose of determining an
individual’s suitability for access to SGI
or unescorted access to RAMQC.
7. The Licensee shall document the
basis for its determination whether to
grant, or continue to allow, access to
SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC.
Prohibitions
A Licensee shall not base a final
determination to deny an individual
access to radioactive materials solely on
the basis of information received from
the FBI involving: An arrest more than
one (1) year old for which there is no
information of the disposition of the
case, or an arrest that resulted in
dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
A Licensee shall not use information
received from a criminal history check
obtained pursuant to this Order in a
manner that would infringe upon the
rights of any individual under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, nor shall the Licensee use
the information in any way which
would discriminate among individuals
on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint
Checks
For the purpose of complying with
this Order, Licensees shall, using an
appropriate method listed in 10 CFR
73.4, submit to the NRC’s Division of
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T–
6E46, one completed, legible standard
fingerprint card (Form FD–258,
ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for
each individual seeking access to SGI or
unescorted access to RAMQC, to the
Director of the Division of Facilities and
Security, marked for the attention of the
Division’s Criminal History Check
Section. Copies of these forms may be
obtained by writing the Office of
Information Services, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington,
DC 20555–0001, by calling (301) 415–
5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov.
Practicable alternative formats are set
forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall
establish procedures to ensure that the
quality of the fingerprints taken results
in minimizing the rejection rate of
fingerprint cards due to illegible or
incomplete cards.
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Sfmt 4703
The NRC will review submitted
fingerprint cards for completeness. Any
Form FD–258 fingerprint record
containing omissions or evident errors
will be returned to the Licensee for
corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one resubmission if the initial submission is
returned by the FBI because the
fingerprint impressions cannot be
classified. The one free re-submission
must have the FBI Transaction Control
Number reflected on the re-submission.
If additional submissions are necessary,
they will be treated as initial submittals
and will require a second payment of
the processing fee.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks
are due upon application. Licensees
shall submit payment with the
application for processing fingerprints
by corporate check, certified check,
cashier’s check, money order, or
electronic payment, made payable to
‘‘U.S. NRC.’’ [For guidance on making
electronic payments, contact the
Facilities Security Branch, Division of
Facilities and Security, at (301) 415–
7404.] Combined payment for multiple
applications is acceptable. The
application fee (currently $27) is the
sum of the user fee charged by the FBI
for each fingerprint card or other
fingerprint record submitted by the NRC
on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC
processing fee, which covers
administrative costs associated with
NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint
submissions. The Commission will
directly notify Licensees who are
subject to this regulation of any fee
changes.
The Commission will forward to the
submitting Licensee all data received
from the FBI as a result of the Licensee’s
application(s) for criminal history
checks, including the FBI fingerprint
record.
Right To Correct and Complete
Information
Prior to any final adverse
determination, the Licensee shall make
available to the individual the contents
of any criminal records obtained from
the FBI for the purpose of assuring
correct and complete information.
Written confirmation by the individual
of receipt of this notification must be
maintained by the Licensee for a period
of one (1) year from the date of the
notification.
If, after reviewing the record, an
individual believes that it is incorrect or
incomplete in any respect and wishes to
change, correct, or update the alleged
deficiency, or to explain any matter in
the record, the individual may initiate
challenge procedures. These procedures
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
include either direct application by the
individual challenging the record to the
agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)
that contributed the questioned
information, or direct challenge as to the
accuracy or completeness of any entry
on the criminal history record to the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Identification Division,
Washington, DC 20537–9700 (as set
forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30 through
16.34). In the latter case, the FBI
forwards the challenge to the agency
that submitted the data and requests
that agency to verify or correct the
challenged entry. Upon receipt of an
official communication directly from
the agency that contributed the original
information, the FBI Identification
Division makes any changes necessary
in accordance with the information
supplied by that agency. The Licensee
must provide at least ten (10) days for
an individual to initiate an action
challenging the results of an FBI
criminal history records check after the
record is made available for his/her
review. The Licensee may make a final
determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access RAMQC based upon
the criminal history record only upon
receipt of the FBI’s ultimate
confirmation or correction of the record.
Upon a final adverse determination on
access to SGI or unescorted access to
RAMQC, the Licensee shall provide the
individual its documented basis for
denial. Access to SGI or unescorted
access to RAMQC shall not be granted
to an individual during the review
process.
disseminate the information contained
in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee
verifies information such as the
individual’s name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other
applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal
history records, obtained under this
section, available for examination by an
authorized representative of the NRC to
determine compliance with the
regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all
fingerprint and criminal history records
received from the FBI, or a copy if the
individual’s file has been transferred,
for three (3) years after termination of
employment or denial to access SGI or
unescorted access to RAMQC. After the
required three (3) year period, these
documents shall be destroyed by a
method that will prevent reconstruction
of the information in whole or in part.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a
criminal history record on an individual
pursuant to this Order shall establish
and maintain a system of files and
procedures for protecting the record and
the personal information from
unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the
record or personal information collected
and maintained to persons other than
the subject individual, his/her
representative, or to those who have a
need to access the information in
performing assigned duties in the
process of determining access to SGI or
unescorted access to RAMQC. No
individual authorized to have access to
the information may re-disseminate the
information to any other individual who
does not have a need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained
on an individual from a criminal history
record check may be transferred to
another Licensee if the Licensee holding
the criminal history record receives the
individual’s written request to re-
I
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[FR Doc. E7–10698 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[EA 07–002]
In the Matter of all Panoramic and
Underwater Irradiators Authorized To
Possess Greater Than 370
Terabecquerels (10,000 Curies)
Byproduct Material in the Form of
Sealed Sources; Order Imposing
Compensatory Measures (Effective
Immediately)
The Licensees identified in
Attachment 1 to this Order hold licenses
issued in accordance with the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 and 10 CFR part 36
or comparable Agreement State
regulations by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) or an Agreement State
authorizing possession of greater than
370 terabecquerels (10,000 curies) of
byproduct material in the form of sealed
sources either in panoramic irradiators
that have dry or wet storage of the
sealed sources or in underwater
irradiators in which both the source and
the product being irradiated are under
water. Commission regulations at 10
CFR 20.1801 or equivalent Agreement
State regulations, require Licensees to
secure, from unauthorized removal or
access, licensed materials that are stored
in controlled or unrestricted areas.
Commission regulations at 10 CFR
20.1802 or equivalent Agreement States
regulations, require Licensees to control
and maintain constant surveillance of
PO 00000
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Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
30877
licensed material that is in a controlled
or unrestricted area and that is not in
storage.
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists
simultaneously attacked targets in New
York, NY, and Washington, DC,
utilizing large commercial aircraft as
weapons. In response to the attacks and
intelligence information subsequently
obtained, the Commission issued a
number of Safeguards and Threat
Advisories to its Licensees in order to
strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and
readiness to respond to a potential
attack on a nuclear facility. The
Commission has also communicated
with other Federal, State and local
government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate
the current threat environment in order
to assess the adequacy of security
measures at licensed facilities. In
addition, the Commission has been
conducting a review of its safeguards
and security programs and
requirements.
As a result of its consideration of
current safeguards and license
requirements, as well as a review of
information provided by the intelligence
community, the Commission has
determined that certain compensatory
measures are required to be
implemented by Licensees as prudent
measures to address the current threat
environment. Therefore, the
Commission is imposing the
requirements, as set forth in Attachment
2 1 on all Licensees identified in
Attachment 1 2 of this Order who
currently possess, or have near term
plans to possess, greater than 370
terabecquerels (10,000 curies) of
byproduct material in the form of sealed
sources. These requirements, which
supplement existing regulatory
requirements, will provide the
Commission with reasonable assurance
that the public health and safety and
common defense and security continue
to be adequately protected in the current
threat environment.
Attachment 3 of this Order contains
the requirements for fingerprinting and
criminal history record checks for
individuals when licensee’s reviewing
official is determining access to
Safeguards Information or unescorted
1 Attachment 2 contains some requirements that
are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and can not be
released to the public, and have therefore been
redacted. The remainder of the requirements
contained in Attachment 2 that are not
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to
the public.
2 Attachment 1 contains sensitive information
and will not be released to the public.
E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 106 (Monday, June 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30870-30877]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-10698]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[EA-07-003]
In the Matter of Certain Licensees Authorized To Possess and
Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern;
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in Attachment A \1\ to this Order, hold
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) or an Agreement State, in accordance with the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32, 70 and 71, or
equivalent Agreement State regulations. The licenses authorize them to
possess and transfer items containing radioactive material quantities
of concern. This Order is being issued to all such Licensees who may
transport radioactive material quantities of concern under the NRC's
authority to protect the common defense and security, which has not
been relinquished to the Agreement States. The Orders require
compliance with specific additional security measures to enhance the
security for transport of certain radioactive material quantities of
concern.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Attachment A contains sensitive information and will not be
released to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets
in New York, NY, and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial
aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence
information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of
Safeguards and Threat Advisories to Licensees in order to strengthen
Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a potential attack
on this regulated activity. The Commission has also communicated with
other Federal, State and local government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat environment
in order to assess the adequacy of the current security measures. In
addition, the Commission commenced a comprehensive review of its
safeguards and security programs and requirements.
As a result of its initial consideration of current safeguards and
security requirements, as well as a review of information provided by
the intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain
security measures are required to be implemented by Licensees as
prudent, interim measures to address the current threat environment in
a consistent manner. Therefore, the Commission is imposing
requirements, as set forth in Attachment B \2\ of this Order, on all
Licensees identified in Attachment A of this Order. These additional
security measures, which supplement existing regulatory requirements,
will provide the Commission with reasonable assurance that the common
defense and security continue to be adequately protected in the current
threat environment. Attachment C of this
[[Page 30871]]
Order contains the requirements for fingerprinting and criminal history
record checks for individuals when licensee's reviewing official is
determining access to Safeguards Information or unescorted access to
the radioactive materials. These requirements will remain in effect
until the Commission determines otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Attachment B contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION, and can not be released to the public, and have
therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained
in Attachment B that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released
to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated
many of the measures set forth in Attachment B to this Order in
response to previously issued Safeguards and Threat Advisories or on
their own. It is also recognized that some measures may not be possible
or necessary for all shipments of radioactive material quantities of
concern, or may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees'
specific circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any
unforeseen effect on the safe transport of radioactive material
quantities of concern.
Although the security measures implemented by Licensees in response
to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate to provide
reasonable assurance of adequate protection of common defense and
security, in light of the continuing threat environment, the Commission
concludes that the security measures must be embodied in an Order,
consistent with the established regulatory framework. The Commission
has determined that some of the security measures contained in
Attachment B of this Order contain Safeguards Information and will not
be released to the public as per Order entitled, ``Issuance of Order
Imposing Requirements for Protecting Certain Safeguards Information,''
issued specifically to the Licensees identified in Attachment A to this
Order. Access to Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who
have established a need-to-know the information, are considered to be
trustworthy and reliable, have been fingerprinted and undergone a
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal
history records check in accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-155). A need-to-know means a
determination by a person having responsibility for protecting
Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards
Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual,
or licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been
fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the
reviewing official under the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-06-155) do not need to be fingerprinted again for
purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the
current threat environment, all Licensees identified in Attachment A to
this Order shall implement the requirements identified in Attachments B
and C to this Order. In addition, pursuant to 10 CFR Sec. 2.202, I
find that in light of the common defense and security matters
identified above, which warrant the issuance of this Order, the public
health and safety require that this Order be immediately effective.
III.
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 53, 63, 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i,
161o, 182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR Sec. 2.202 and 10 CFR Parts 30, 32,
70 and 71, It is hereby ordered, effective immediately, that all
licensees identified in Attachment A to this order shall comply with
the following:
A. All Licensees shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary,
comply with the requirements described in Attachments B and C to this
Order. The Licensees shall immediately start implementation of the
requirements in Attachments B and C to the Order and shall complete
implementation by November 18, 2007, or before the first shipment of
radioactive material quantities of concern, whichever is sooner. This
Order supersedes the additional transportation security measures
prescribed in Attachment 2, Section 7.d. of the Manufacturer and
Distributor Order issued January 12, 2004.
B.1. All Licensees shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if they are unable to comply
with any of the requirements described in Attachments B or C, (2) if
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in their
specific circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the
requirements would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the
provisions of any Commission or Agreement State regulation or its
license. The notification shall provide the Licensees justification for
seeking relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
2. Any Licensee that considers that implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachments B or C to this Order would
adversely impact the safe transport of radioactive material quantities
of concern must notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of this
Order, of the adverse safety impact, the basis for its determination
that the requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a
proposal for achieving the same objectives specified in the Attachment
B or requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the activity
to address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is
appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition B.1
of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it
cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition
B.1.
C.1. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting
and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-155) issued on August 21, 2006, only
the NRC-approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI
criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall determine
whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access
to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities listed in
Attachment B to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification
and criminal history records check are not required for individuals
exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 [72 FR
4945 (February 2, 2007)]. In addition, individuals who have a favorably
decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last
five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided
in each case that the appropriate documentation is made available to
the Licensee's reviewing official), have satisfied the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted
again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or
unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined,
in accordance with its administrative review process based on
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records
check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards
Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a
utilization facility, or radioactive material or other
[[Page 30872]]
property subject to regulation by the NRC.
D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order. Individuals who
have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by
the reviewing official under Order EA-06-155 do not need to be
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted
access.
E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy
and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the
quantities listed in Attachment B to this Order. The licensee shall
complete implementation of the requirements of Attachments B and C to
this Order by November 18, 2007.
F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each
requirement described in Attachments B and C.
The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have achieved
full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments B and C.
G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission's or an
Agreement State's regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented
or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until
the Commission determines otherwise.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall
be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee submittals that contain
Safeguards Information shall be properly marked and handled in
accordance with Licensees' Safeguards Information or Safeguards
Information--Modified Handling program.
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind
any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good
cause.
IV
In accordance with 10 CFR Sec. 2.202, the Licensee must, and any
other person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to
this Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20)
days of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending the time to request a hearing.
A request for extension of time in which to submit an answer or request
a hearing must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal
and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued.
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement, to
the Office of Enforcement at the same address, to the Regional
Administrator for NRC Region I, II, III, or IV, at the respective
addresses specified in Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 73, appropriate for
the specific facility, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing
request is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible
delays in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission
to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile to 301-415-
3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person other than the
Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth with
particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely affected by
this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10 CFR Sec.
2.309.
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR Sec. 2.202(c)(2)(I), the Licensee, may, in
addition to demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or
sooner, move the presiding officer to set aside the immediate
effectiveness of the Order on the grounds that the Order, including the
need for immediate effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but
on mere suspicion, unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs.
Attachment A: List of Licensees--Redacted
Attachment B: Additional Security Measures for Transportation of
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern--Revision 2
A. General Basis Criteria
These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) are established to
delineate licensee responsibility in response to the current threat
environment. The following security measures apply to Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Agreement States licensees, who ship
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern (RAMQC) as defined in
Section A .1. Shipments of RAMQC that do not fall within the NRC's
jurisdiction under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, are not
subject to the provisions of these ASMs.
1. Licensees who are subject to this Order shall ensure that the
requirements listed in Section B below are in effect when they ship
radioactive materials that meet the following criterion:
a. Radionuclides listed in Table A, greater than or equal to the
quantities specified,
b. For mixtures of radionuclides listed in Table A, the sum of the
fractions of
[[Page 30873]]
those radionuclides if greater than or equal to 1, or
c. For shipments of spent nuclear fuel containing greater than or
equal to 1000 Terabecquerels (TBq) (27,000 Curies) but less than or
equal to 100 grams of spent nuclear fuel.
For shipments containing greater than 100 grams of spent nuclear
fuel, licensees shall follow the ASMs for ``Transportation of Spent
Nuclear Fuel Greater than 100 Grams,'' dated October 3, 2002.
These ASMs supercede Safeguards Advisories SA-01-01, Rev. 1, and
SA-03-02. For radioactive materials shipments containing radionuclides
not addressed by this ASM guidance will be provided by Safeguards
Advisory.
2. The requirements of these ASMs apply to a conveyance (i.e., the
requirements apply irrespective of whether the RAMQC is shipped in a
single package or in multiple packages in a single conveyance).
3. Licensees are not responsible for complying with the
requirements of these ASMs if a carrier aggregates, during transport or
storage incident to transport, radioactive material from two or more
conveyances from separate licensees which individually do not exceed
the limits of Paragraph A.1. but which together meet or exceed any of
the criteria in Paragraph A.1.
4. The requirements of these ASMs only apply to RAMQC shipments
using highway or rail modes of transportation. For multi-mode
shipments, the requirements of these ASMs apply only to the portion of
shipments that are made using highway or rail modes of transportation,
as appropriate.
5. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in
quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in Paragraph A.1.
per conveyance, the licensee shall ensure that:
a. Only carriers are used which:
(1) Use established package tracking systems,
(2) Implement methods to assure trustworthiness and reliability of
personnel associated with the transportation of RAMQC,
(3) Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit,
and
(4) Have the capability for immediate communication to summon
appropriate response or assistance.
b. The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs
the measures listed above.
6. The preplanning, coordination, and tracking requirements of
these ASMs are intended to reduce unnecessary delays and shipment
duration and to facilitate the transfer of the RAMQC shipment and any
escorts at State borders.
7. Unless specifically noted otherwise, the requirements of these
ASMs do not apply to local law enforcement agencies' (LLEA) personnel
performing escort duties.
8. The requirements of these ASMs apply to RAMQC domestic shipments
within the United States (U.S.), imports into the U.S., or exports from
the U.S. The requirements of these ASMs do not apply to transshipments
through the U.S. Licensees are responsible for complying with the
requirements of Section B for the highway and rail shipment portion of
an import or export which occurs inside of the U.S.
For import and export RAMQC shipments, while located at the port or
shipments on U.S. navigable waterways, the U.S. Coast Guard Maritime
Transportation security regulations will be in effect and these ASMs
are not applicable. For RAMQC shipments while located at the air
freight terminal, security requirements will be performed in accordance
with the Transportation Security Administration security regulations.
For import and export RAMQC shipments, the licensee shall ensure
that the requirements of these ASMs are implemented after the
transportation package has been loaded onto the highway or rail vehicle
(except for the advance notification requirements in section B.4) and
the package begins the domestic portion of the shipment to or from the
U.S. port of entry (i.e., the package(s) departs for or from the port
of entry facility or the airfreight terminal).
B. Specific Requirements
Licensees who ship RAMQC in quantities that meet the criteria of
Paragraph A.1. shall ensure that carriers used have developed and
implemented transportation security plans that embody the additional
security measures imposed by this Order.
1. Licensee Verification
Before transfer of radioactive materials in quantities which meet
the criterion of Paragraph A.1, per conveyance, the licensee shall:
a. For new recipient(s), verify that the intended recipient's
license authorizes receipt of the regulated material by direct contact
with the regulatory authority that issued the license (NRC Region or
Agreement State) prior to transferring the material,
b. Verify the validity of unusual orders or changes (if applicable)
that depart from historical patterns of ordering by existing
recipients,
c. Verify the material is shipped to an address authorized in the
license and that the address is valid,
d. Verify the address for a delivery to a temporary job site is
valid,
e. Document the verification and validation process, and
f. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient.
2. Background Investigations
a. Background investigations are intended to provide high assurance
that individuals performing assigned duties associated with the
transport of RAMQC, are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute
an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security, including the
potential to commit radiological sabotage.
b. For highway shipments only, the licensee shall ensure background
investigations for all drivers, accompanying individuals,
communications center managers, and other appropriate communications
center personnel have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to
impose a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check,
which includes fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to
Safeguards Information (SGI) or unescorted access to licensed material.
c. For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure background
investigations for employees filling the positions of communications
center managers and other appropriate communications center personnel
have been performed. The NRC only has the authority to impose a Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) criminal history check, which includes
fingerprinting, on those individuals who seek access to SGI or
unescorted access to licensed material.
d. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is
high assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards
information or unescorted access to licensed material are trustworthy
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent
use of the regulated material. ``Access'' means that an individual
could exercise some physical control over the material or device
containing radioactive material.
(1) The trustworthiness, reliability, and verification of an
individual's true identity shall be determined based on a background
investigation. The background investigation shall address at least the
past three (3) years, and as a minimum, include fingerprinting and an
FBI criminal history check, verification of employment history,
education, employment eligibility, and
[[Page 30874]]
personal references. If an individual's employment has been less then
the required three (3) years period, educational references may be used
in lieu of employment history.
(2) Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment C to this Order.
(3) A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been
approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information,'' is the only individual that may
make trustworthiness and reliability determinations.
e. Licensees' background investigation requirements may also be
satisfied for an individual that has:
(1) current access authorization permitting unescorted access to a
power reactor facility or access to Safeguards Information,
(2) current U.S. government-issued security clearance (based upon a
national agency check, at a minimum), or
(3) satisfactorily completed a background investigation under an
NRC-approved access authorization program.
f. Individuals shall not perform assigned duties associated with
the transport of RAMQC until the licensee has confirmed that a
determination of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the
appropriate background investigation requirements in B.2.d. and B.2.e.,
has been performed and documented.
3. Preplanning and Coordination
a. As part of the shipment planning process, the licensee shall
ensure that appropriate security information is provided to and is
coordinated with affected States through which the shipment will pass
to ensure minimal delays. These discussions shall include whether a
State intends to provide escorts for a shipment.
b. The licensee shall ensure States are provided with position
information on a shipment (see Paragraph B.5.a), if requested and
practical.
c. For shipments by highway, the licensees's coordination required
in Paragraph B.3.a. shall include identification of Highway Route
Controlled Quantity (HRCQ) shipments of material and safe havens.3
4. Notifications
a. The licensee shall ensure an advance notification of a shipment
is provided, or of a series of shipments, of RAMQC to the NRC. The
licensee shall ensure the notification is submitted sufficiently in
advance to ensure it is received by NRC at least seven (7) days, where
practicable, before the shipment commences physically within the U.S.
For written notifications, the notice should be addressed to: (10
CFR 2.390) U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Director, Division
of Nuclear Security M/S: T-4-D-8. Office of Nuclear Security and
Incident Response. 11555 Rockville Pike. Rockville, MD 20852-2738.
Notifications may also be submitted electronically via e-mail to
RAMQC--SHIPMENTS@nrc.gov or via fax to (301) 816-5151. (10 CFR 2.390)
b. The advance notification shall contain the following
information:
(1) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(2) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(3) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(4) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(5) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(6) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(7) [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
Refer to Paragraph B.7.c. for determination of information
designation of advance notifications during preplanning, coordinating,
and reporting information activities.
c. The licensee shall ensure the information required by Paragraph
B.4.b. is provided to each State through which the shipment will pass.
The licensee shall ensure that the notification is received at least
seven (7) days, where practicable, before the U.S. highway or railroad
portion of a shipment commences.
d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
5. Communications
a. (1) For highway shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with a
telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a
communication center or is equipped with an alternative tracking system
that communicates position information to a communications center.
(2) For rail shipments, monitor each RAMQC shipment with either:
(i) a telemetric position monitoring system that communicates with a
licensee or third-party communication center, (ii) a railroad track-
side car location monitoring systems tracking system that relays a
car's position to a railroad communications center (which can provide
position information to any separate licensee communications center per
Paragraph B.5.b), or (iii) alternate licensee monitoring system.
Additionally, licensees may use a railroad communications center to
monitor the rail portion of a shipment, in lieu of using a separate
communications center.
b. (1) For highway shipments, provide for a communication center
that has the capability to continuously and actively monitor in-
progress shipments to ensure positive confirmation of the location,
status, and control over the shipment and implement pre-planned
procedures in response to deviations from the authorized route or
notification of actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These
procedures shall include identification of the designated LLEA
contact(s) along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, provide for a communication center that has
the capability to periodically monitor in-progress shipments to ensure
positive confirmation of the location of the shipment and implement
pre-planned procedures in response to notification of actual,
attempted, or suspicious activities related to theft, loss, diversion,
or radiological sabotage of a shipment. These procedures shall include
identification of the designated LLEA contact(s) along the shipment
route. Licensees may use a railroad communications center in lieu of
establishing a separate communications center.
c. (1) For highway shipments, ensure that a two-way
telecommunication capability is available for the transport and any
escort vehicles allowing them to communicate with each other with the
communications center, and with designated LLEAs along the route. The
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated
authorities along the shipment route.
(2) For rail shipments, ensure that a two-way telecommunication
capability is available between the train and the communications center
and between any escort vehicles and the communications center. The
communications center must be capable of contacting the designated
authorities along the shipment route.
d. A licensee may utilize a carrier or third-party communications
center in
[[Page 30875]]
lieu of establishing such a facility itself. A commercial
communications center must have the capabilities, necessary procedures,
training, and personnel background investigations to meet the
applicable requirements of these ASMs.
e. (1) For highway shipments, provide a backup means for the
transport and any escort vehicle to communicate with the communications
center, using a diverse method not subject to the same interference
factors as the primary capability selected for compliance with
Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable telephone).
(2) For rail shipments, provide a backup means for the train to
talk with the communications center, using a diverse method not subject
to the same interference factors as the primary capability selected for
compliance with Paragraph B.5.c. (e.g., two-way radio or portable
telephone).
f. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
(1) Not later than one hour after the time when, through the course
of the investigation, it is determined the shipment is lost or stolen,
the licensee shall ensure the appropriate local law enforcement agency,
the NRC Operations Center at (301) 816-5100, and the appropriate
Agreement State regulatory agency, if any, are notified.
(2) If after 24 hours of initiating the investigation, the
radioactive material cannot be located, licensee shall ensure the NRC
Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate
Agreement State regulatory agency are immediately notified.
g. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
6. Drivers and Accompanying Individuals
a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
d. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed.]
7. Procedures, Training, and Control of Information
a. (1) For highway shipments the licensee shall ensure that normal
and contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example:
notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of
authentication and duress codes, provision for refueling or other
stops, detours, and locations where communication is expected to be
temporarily lost.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that normal and
contingency procedures have been developed, including, for example:
notifications, communications protocols, loss of communications, and
response to actual, attempted, or suspicious activities related to
theft, loss, diversion, or radiological sabotage of a shipment.
Communication protocols must include a strategy for use of
authentication and duress codes, provision for stops, and locations
where communication is expected to be temporarily lost.
b. (1) For highway shipments, the licensee shall ensure that
personnel, including drivers, accompanying individuals, responsible
communication center managers, and other appropriate communication
center personnel are trained in and understand the normal and
contingency procedures.
(2) For rail shipments, the licensee shall ensure that personnel,
including the appropriate train crew members and responsible railroad
communication center managers, and other appropriate railroad
communication center personnel are trained in and understand the normal
and contingency procedures.
c. Information to be protected as Safeguards Information--Modified
Handling, shall include, but is not limited to:
(1) Integrated transportation physical security plans.
(2) Schedules and itineraries for shipments. For shipments that are
not inherently self disclosing, schedule and itineraries information
may be decontrolled 2 days after a shipment is completed. For shipments
that are inherently self disclosing, schedule may be released as
necessary after departure.
(3) Details of alarm and communications systems, communication
protocols and duress codes, and security contingency response
procedures.
(4) Arrangements with designated LLEA (i.e., Federal, State Police,
and/or local police departments) and information on whether a State
intends to provide armed escorts for a shipment.
For preplanning; coordinating, for example with States
(organizations and carriers); reporting information as described in
B.1., B.4., and B.5. related to shipments of radioactive material, and
the radionuclides identified in Paragraph A.1, the licensee shall
ensure the information is protected at least as sensitive information
(for example, proprietary or business financial information). Licensees
shall ensure access is restricted to this information to those licensee
and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall ensure
all parties receiving this information protect it similarly.
Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and
shall be marked as ``Sensitive Information--Not for Public
Disclosure.''
C. Implementation Schedule
1. Licensees shall implement the requirements of this ASM within
180 days of the date of issuance of the Order or before the first
shipment of RAMQC, whichever is sooner.
Table A.--Radionuclides of Concern
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity of
Quantity of concern (Ci)
concern information
Radionuclide (TBq) only--rounded
threshold after
limit conversion
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241..................................... 60 1,600
Am-241/Be.................................. 60 1,600
Cf-252..................................... 20 540
Cm-244..................................... 50 1,400
Co-60...................................... 30 810
Cs-137..................................... 100 2,700
Gd-153..................................... 1,000 27,000
Ir-192..................................... 80 2,200
Pm-147..................................... 40,000 1,100,000
Pu-238..................................... 60 1,600
Pu-239/Be.................................. 60 1,600
Ra-226 \1\................................. 40 1,100
Se-75...................................... 200 5,400
Sr-90 (Y-90)............................... 1000 27,000
Tm-170..................................... 20,000 540,000
Yb-169..................................... 300 8,100
------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of
amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
Notes:
1. The regulatory standard values to be used are given in
Terabecquerels (TBq). Curie (Ci) values are provided for practical
usefulness only and are rounded after conversion.
2. If several radionuclides are present, the sum of the
fractions of the activity of each radionuclide must be determined.
Using the equation below calculate the ratio by inserting the actual
activity of each radionuclide as the numerator and the corresponding
activity limit in Table A as the denominator. Ensure the numerator
and the denominator are in Terabecquerels.
R1 = activity for radionuclide number 1.
R2 = activity for radionuclide number 2.
[[Page 30876]]
R3, R4, R5......etc.
AR1 = activity limit for radionuclide number 1.
AR2 = activity limit for radionuclide number 2.
AR3, AR4, AR5......etc.
R1 + R2 + R3 + Rn 1.
AR1 AR2 AR3 ARn.
Attachment C: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining
Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive
Materials
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to
safeguards information (SGI) or unescorted access to RAMQC. The
Licensee shall review and use the information received from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and ensure that the provisions contained
in this Order and this attachment are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this
attachment.
3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be
taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor,
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for
unescorted access, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal
history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal
security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which
granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history
check must be provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee
must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the
date the individual no longer requires access to SGI or unescorted
access to radioactive materials associated with the Licensee's
activities.
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability
requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant,
or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive
materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an
individual's suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to
RAMQC.
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted
access to RAMQC.
Prohibitions
A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of
information received from the FBI involving: An arrest more than one
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an
acquittal.
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks
For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall,
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed,
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC, to the Director of the
Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the attention of the
Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of these forms may be
obtained by writing the Office of Information Services, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, by calling (301) 415-
5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative formats
are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The Licensee shall establish procedures
to ensure that the quality of the fingerprints taken results in
minimizing the rejection rate of fingerprint cards due to illegible or
incomplete cards.
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness.
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident
errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for
processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application.
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check,
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For
guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security
Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404.]
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The
application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by
the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted
by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which
covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees
who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.
Right To Correct and Complete Information
Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make
available to the individual the contents of any criminal records
obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete
information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1)
year from the date of the notification.
If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct,
or update the alleged deficiency, or to explain any matter in the
record, the individual may initiate challenge procedures. These
procedures
[[Page 30877]]
include either direct application by the individual challenging the
record to the agency (i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed
the questioned information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or
completeness of any entry on the criminal history record to the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification
Division, Washington, DC 20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR Part 16.30
through 16.34). In the latter case, the FBI forwards the challenge to
the agency that submitted the data and requests that agency to verify
or correct the challenged entry. Upon receipt of an official
communication directly from the agency that contributed the original
information, the FBI Identification Division makes any changes
necessary in accordance with the information supplied by that agency.
The Licensee must provide at least ten (10) days for an individual to
initiate an action challenging the results of an FBI criminal history
records check after the record is made available for his/her review.
The Licensee may make a final determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access RAMQC based upon the criminal history record only
upon receipt of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the
record. Upon a final adverse determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to RAMQC, the Licensee shall provide the individual
its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to
RAMQC shall not be granted to an individual during the review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal
information from unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual,
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining
access to SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. No individual authorized
to have access to the information may re-disseminate the information to
any other individual who does not have a need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment
or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to RAMQC. After the
required three (3) year period, these documents shall be destroyed by a
method that will prevent reconstruction of the information in whole or
in part.
[FR Doc. E7-10698 Filed 6-1-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P