In the Matter of All Licensees Authorized To Manufacture or Initially Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material for Sale or Distribution and Possess High-Risk Radioactive Material of Concern; Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately), 30864-30870 [E7-10691]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices
justified with sufficient information/
documentation for each county
proposed in the petition.
(f) If the petition proposes to
designate additional counties to an
already established HIDTA region, the
petition shall include a letter from the
Chairman of that HIDTA’s Executive
Committee indicating that the Executive
Committee has reviewed the petition
and sets forth its position related to the
petition for designation.
(g) Petitions may be submitted to the
Executive Office of the President, Office
of National Drug Control Policy, Office
of State, Local and Tribal Affairs,
Washington, DC 20503 via facsimile at
(202) 395–6721 or electronic mail at
ondcp_hidta@ondcp.eop.gov.
Comments or questions regarding this
notice should be directed to Mr. Daniel
Grayson, ONDCP Policy Analyst at (202)
395–4582.
Sec. 3
Processing of Petitions
(a) Acknowledgements of Petitions.
Upon receipt of a petition, the Office
shall send an acknowledgement letter to
the requester to confirm receipt of the
petition and provide an assigned
number for further reference.
(b) Petitions will be reviewed by the
Office on a regular basis. The review
will include a recommendation
regarding the merit of the petition to the
Director by a panel of qualified,
independent experts who are designated
by the Director.
(c) Notification of merit of petition.
After the review is completed the
requestor will be notified in writing
regarding the disposition of the petition.
(d) The Director, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, is solely
responsible for making designation and
funding decisions relating to the HIDTA
Program.
Edward H. Jurith,
General Counsel, Office of National Drug
Control Policy.
[FR Doc. E7–10640 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am]
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BILLING CODE 3180–02–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[EA 07–019]
In the Matter of All Licensees
Authorized To Manufacture or Initially
Transfer Items Containing Radioactive
Material for Sale or Distribution and
Possess High-Risk Radioactive
Material of Concern; Order Imposing
Additional Security Measures
(Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in
Attachment 1 1 to this Order hold
licenses issued in accordance with the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC
or Commission) or an Agreement State
authorizing them to manufacture or
initially transfer items containing
radioactive material for sale or
distribution. Commission regulations at
10 CFR 20.1801 or equivalent
Agreement State regulations require
Licensees to secure, from unauthorized
removal or access, licensed materials
that are stored in controlled or
unrestricted areas. Commission
regulations at 10 CFR 20.1802 or
equivalent Agreement States regulations
require Licensees to control and
maintain constant surveillance of
licensed material that is in a controlled
or unrestricted area and that is not in
storage.
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists
simultaneously attacked targets in New
York, N.Y., and Washington, DC,
utilizing large commercial aircraft as
weapons. In response to the attacks and
intelligence information subsequently
obtained, the Commission issued a
number of Safeguards and Threat
Advisories to its Licensees in order to
strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and
readiness to respond to a potential
attack on a nuclear facility. The
Commission has also communicated
with other Federal, State and local
government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate
the current threat environment in order
to assess the adequacy of security
measures at licensed facilities. In
addition, the Commission has been
conducting a review of its safeguards
and security programs and
requirements.
As a result of its consideration of
current safeguards and license
requirements, as well as a review of
information provided by the intelligence
1 Attachment 1 contains sensitive information
and will not be released to the public.
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community, the Commission has
determined that certain additional
security measures are required to be
implemented by Licensees as prudent
measures to address the current threat
environment. Therefore, the
Commission is imposing the
requirements set forth in Attachment 2 2
on certain Manufacturing and
Distribution licensees identified in
Attachment 1 of this Order who
currently possess, or have near term
plans to possess, high-risk radioactive
material of concern. These
requirements, which supplement
existing regulatory requirements, will
provide the Commission with
reasonable assurance that the public
health and safety and common defense
and security continue to be adequately
protected in the current threat
environment. Attachment 3 of this
Order contains the requirements for
fingerprinting and criminal history
record checks for individuals when
licensee’s reviewing official is
determining access to Safeguards
Information or unescorted access to the
radioactive materials. These
requirements will remain in effect until
the Commission determines otherwise.
The Commission recognizes that
Licensees may have already initiated
many measures set forth in Attachment
2 to this Order in response to previously
issued advisories or on their own. It is
also recognized that some measures may
not be possible or necessary at some
sites, or may need to be tailored to
accommodate the Licensees’ specific
circumstances to achieve the intended
objectives and avoid any unforeseen
effect on the safe use and storage of the
sealed sources. Although the additional
security measures implemented by the
Licensees in response to the Safeguards
and Threat Advisories have been
adequate to provide reasonable
assurance of adequate protection of
public health and safety, the
Commission concludes that the security
measures must be embodied in an Order
consistent with the established
regulatory framework. Furthermore, the
Commission has determined that some
of the security measures contained in
Attachment 2 of this Order contain
Safeguards Information and will not be
released to the public as per the NRC’s
‘‘Order Imposing Requirements for the
Protection of Certain Safeguards
Information’’ (EA–06–241 or EA–06–289
2 Attachment 2 contains some requirements that
are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and cannot be
released to the public, and have therefore been
redacted. The remainder of the requirements
contained in Attachment 2 that are not
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to
the public.
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as applicable), regarding the protection
of Safeguards Information. The
Commission hereby provides notice that
it intends to treat all violations of the
requirements contained in Attachment 2
to the NRC’s ‘‘Order Imposing
Requirements for the Protection of
Certain Safeguards Information’’ (EA–
06–241 or EA–06–289 as applicable),
applicable to the handling and
unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards
Information as serious breaches of
adequate protection of the public health
and safety and the common defense and
security of the United States. Access to
Safeguards Information is limited to
those persons who have established a
need-to-know the information, are
considered to be trustworthy and
reliable, have been fingerprinted and
undergone a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) identification and
criminal history records check in
accordance with the NRC’s ‘‘Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA–
06–242 or EA–06–290 as applicable). A
need-to-know means a determination by
a person having responsibility for
protecting Safeguards Information that a
proposed recipient’s access to
Safeguards Information is necessary in
the performance of official, contractual,
or licensee duties of employment.
Individuals who have been
fingerprinted and granted access to
Safeguards Information by the reviewing
official under the NRC’s ‘‘Order
Imposing Fingerprinting and Criminal
History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information’’ (EA–
06–242 or EA–06–290 as applicable) do
not need to be fingerprinted again for
purposes of being considered for
unescorted access.
To provide assurance that Licensees
are implementing prudent measures to
achieve a consistent level of protection
to address the current threat
environment, Manufacturing and
Distribution Licensees identified in
Attachment 1 to this Order shall
implement the requirements identified
in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. In
addition, pursuant 10 CFR 2.202, I find
that in light of the common defense and
security matters identified above, which
warrant the issuance of this Order, the
public health, safety and interest require
that this Order be effective immediately.
III
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81,
147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o, 182 and 186
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as
amended, and the Commission’s
regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR
Part 30, and 10 CFR Part 32, It Is Hereby
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Ordered, effective immediately, that all
licensees identified in Attachment 1 to
this order shall comply with the
requirements of this order as follows:
A. The Licensee shall,
notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State
regulation or license to the contrary,
comply with the requirements described
in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order.
The Licensee shall immediately start
implementation of the requirements in
Attachments 2 and 3 to the Order and
shall complete implementation by
November 18, 2007, or the first day that
radionuclides of concern at or above
threshold limits (i.e., high-risk
radioactive material), also identified in
Attachment 2, are possessed, whichever
is later.
B.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Order, notify
the Commission, (1) if it is unable to
comply with any of the requirements
described in Attachments 2 or 3, (2) if
compliance with any of the
requirements is unnecessary in its
specific circumstances, or (3) if
implementation of any of the
requirements would cause the Licensee
to be in violation of the provisions of
any Commission or Agreement State
regulation or its license. The
notification shall provide the Licensee’s
justification for seeking relief from or
variation of any specific requirement.
2. If the Licensee considers that
implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachments
2 or 3 to this Order would adversely
impact safe operation of the facility, the
Licensee must notify the Commission,
within twenty (20) days of this Order, of
the adverse safety impact, the basis for
its determination that the requirement
has an adverse safety impact, and either
a proposal for achieving the same
objectives specified in Attachments 2 or
3 requirement in question, or a schedule
for modifying the facility to address the
adverse safety condition. If neither
approach is appropriate, the Licensee
must supplement its response to
Condition B.1 of this Order to identify
the condition as a requirement with
which it cannot comply, with attendant
justifications as required in Condition
B.1.
C.1. In accordance with the NRC’s
‘‘Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check
Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information’’ (EA–06–242 or EA–06–290
as applicable), only the NRC-approved
reviewing official shall review results
from an FBI criminal history records
check. The reviewing official shall
determine whether an individual may
have, or continue to have, unescorted
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access to radioactive materials that
equal or exceed the quantities in
Attachment 2 to this Order.
Fingerprinting and the FBI
identification and criminal history
records check are not required for
individuals exempted from
fingerprinting requirements under 10
CFR 73.61 [72 FR 4945 (February 2,
2007)]. In addition, individuals who
have a favorably decided U.S.
Government criminal history records
check within the last five (5) years, or
have an active federal security clearance
(provided in each case that the
appropriate documentation is made
available to the Licensee’s reviewing
official), have satisfied the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 fingerprinting
requirement and need not be
fingerprinted again for purposes of
being considered for unescorted access.
2. No person may have access to
Safeguards Information or unescorted
access to radioactive materials if the
NRC has determined, in accordance
with its administrative review process
based on fingerprinting and an FBI
identification and criminal history
records check, either that the person
may not have access to Safeguards
Information or that the person may not
have unescorted access to a utilization
facility or radioactive material or other
property subject to regulation by the
NRC.
D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and
reviewed in accordance with the
procedures described in Attachment 3
to this Order. Individuals who have
been fingerprinted and granted access to
Safeguards Information by the reviewing
official under Order EA–06–242 or EA–
06–290 as applicable, do not need to be
fingerprinted again for purposes of
being considered for unescorted access.
E. The Licensee may allow any
individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive
materials, in accordance with this
Order, to continue to have unescorted
access without being fingerprinted,
pending a decision by the reviewing
official (based on fingerprinting, an FBI
criminal history records check and a
trustworthy and reliability
determination) that the individual may
continue to have unescorted access to
radioactive materials that equal or
exceed the quantities listed in
Attachment 2. The licensee shall
complete implementation of the
requirements of Attachments 2 and 3 to
this Order by November 18, 2007.
F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty
(20) days of the date of this Order,
submit to the Commission a schedule
for completion of each requirement
described in Attachments 2 and 3.
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2. The Licensee shall report to the
Commission when they have achieved
full compliance with the requirements
described in Attachments 2 and 3.
G. Notwithstanding any provisions of
the Commission’s or an Agreement
State’s regulations to the contrary, all
measures implemented or actions taken
in response to this Order shall be
maintained until the Commission
determines otherwise.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1,
B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall be
submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555. In addition,
Licensee submittals that contain specific
physical protection or security
information considered to be Safeguards
Information shall be put in a separate
enclosure or attachment and, marked as
‘‘SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION—
MODIFIED HANDLING’’ and mailed (no
electronic transmittals i.e., no e-mail or
FAX) to the NRC.
The Director, Office of Federal and
State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs, may, in writing,
relax or rescind any of the above
conditions upon demonstration by the
Licensee of good cause.
IV
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the
Licensee must, and any other person
adversely affected by this Order may,
submit an answer to this Order, and
may request a hearing on this Order,
within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order. Where good cause is shown,
consideration will be given to extending
the time to request a hearing. A request
for extension of time in which to submit
an answer or request a hearing must be
made in writing to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, and include a
statement of good cause for the
extension. The answer may consent to
this Order. Unless the answer consents
to this Order, the answer shall, in
writing and under oath or affirmation,
specifically set forth the matters of fact
and law on which the Licensee or other
person adversely affected relies and the
reasons as to why the Order should not
have been issued. Any answer or
request for a hearing shall be submitted
to the Secretary, Office of the Secretary
of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN:
Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also
shall be sent to the Director, Office of
Federal and State Materials and
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Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555, to the Assistant
General Counsel for Materials Litigation
and Enforcement at the same address,
and to the Licensee if the answer or
hearing request is by a person other than
the Licensee. Because of possible
disruptions in delivery of mail to United
States Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for
hearing be transmitted to the Secretary
of the Commission either by means of
facsimile transmission to 301–415–1101
or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov
and also to the Office of the General
Counsel either by means of facsimile
transmission to 301–415–3725 or by email to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a
person other than the Licensee requests
a hearing, that person shall set forth
with particularity the manner in which
his interest is adversely affected by this
Order and shall address the criteria set
forth in 10 CFR 2.309(d).
If a hearing is requested by the
Licensee or a person whose interest is
adversely affected, the Commission will
issue an Order designating the time and
place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such
hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the
Licensee may, in addition to demanding
a hearing, at the time the answer is filed
or sooner, move the presiding officer to
set aside the immediate effectiveness of
the Order on the ground that the Order,
including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate
evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for
hearing, or written approval of an
extension of time in which to request a
hearing, the provisions specified in
Section III above shall be final twenty
(20) days from the date of this Order
without further order or proceedings. If
an extension of time for requesting a
hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall
be final when the extension expires if a
hearing request has not been received.
An answer or a request for hearing shall
not stay the immediate effectiveness of
this order.
Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.
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For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials
and Environmental Management Programs.
Attachment 1: Service List of Materials
Licensees—Redacted
Attachment 2: Additional Security
Measures for Manufacturing and
Distribution Materials Licensees (U)—
(Revision 1)
These Additional Security Measures
(ASMs) and new requirements are
established to delineate licensee
responsibility in response to the current
threat environment. The following
security measures apply to Radioactive
Material Manufacturing and
Distribution Licensees who, at any given
time, possess greater than or equal to the
quantities of concern of radioactive
material defined in Table 1 (unless the
licensee documents the basis for
concluding that radioactive material
possessed cannot be easily aggregated
into quantities in excess of the limits
defined in Table 1). As with the
additional security measures previously
provided to other licensees who possess
risk significant radioactive sources,
these increased security measures and
requirements address licensees who are
authorized to possess high-activity
radioactive material which poses a high
risk to human health if not managed
safely and securely.
1. Establish a security zone (or zones).
A security zone is an area, determined
by the licensee, that provides for both
isolation of radioactive material and
access control.
a. Only use and store the radioactive
material within the established security
zone(s); and
b. The licensee shall demonstrate for
each security zone, a means to deter,
detect and delay any attempt of
unauthorized access to licensed
material. The security zone is not
required to be the same as the restricted
area or controlled area, as defined in 10
CFR Part 20 or equivalent agreement
state regulations; and
c. Security zones can be permanent or
temporary to meet transitory or
intermittent business activities (such as
during periods of maintenance, source
delivery, source replacement, and
temporary job sites.). Different isolation/
access control measures may be used for
periods during which the security zone
is occupied versus unoccupied.
2. Control access at all times to the
security zone and limit admittance to
those individuals who are approved and
require access to perform their duties.
3. Implement a system to monitor,
detect, assess and respond to
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unauthorized entries into or activities in
the security zone.
a. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed]
b. Provide a positive measure to
detect unauthorized removal of the
radioactive material from the security
zone; and
c. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed]
4. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed]
5. Licensees shall document the basis
for concluding that there is reasonable
assurance that individuals granted
access to safeguards information or
unescorted access to the security zone
are trustworthy and reliable, and do not
constitute an unreasonable risk for
malevolent use of the regulated
material. ‘‘Access’’ means that an
individual could exercise some physical
control over the material or device
containing radioactive material.
a. The trustworthiness and reliability
of individuals shall be determined
based on a background investigation.
The background investigation shall
address at least the past 3 years and, as
a minimum, include fingerprinting and
a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
criminal history check, verification of
work or education references as
appropriate to the length of
employment, and confirmation of
employment eligibility.
b. Fingerprints shall be submitted and
reviewed in accordance with the
procedures described in Attachment 3
to this Order.
c. A reviewing official that the
licensee nominated and has been
approved by the NRC, in accordance
with NRC ‘‘Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Records Check Requirements for Access
to Safeguards Information,’’ is the only
individual that may make
trustworthiness and reliability
determinations.
d. Individuals for whom the licensee
has not made a determination of
trustworthiness and reliability, based on
the appropriate background
investigation above, shall be escorted
within the security zone to prevent
unauthorized access or actions to the
licensed radioactive material. The
licensee shall also ensure these
individuals are clearly identifiable as
needing an escort while in the security
zone.
6. Before transfer of radioactive
materials that exceed the quantities in
Table 1, Licensees shall:
a. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed]
b. [This paragraph contains
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and
will not be publicly disclosed]
c. Assure that the material is shipped
to an address authorized in the license
and that the address is valid,
d. Verify the address for deliveries to
temporary job site, and
e. Document the verification or
validation process.
7. For domestic highway and rail
shipments of materials in quantities
greater than or equal to the quantities in
Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee
shall:
a. Only use carriers who:
(1) Use established package tracking
systems,
(2) Implement methods to assure
trustworthiness of drivers,
(3) Maintain constant control and/or
surveillance during transit, and
(4) Have the capability for immediate
communication to summon appropriate
response or assistance.
The licensee shall verify and
document that the carrier employs the
measures listed above.
b. Coordinate departure and arrival
times with the recipient.
c. Immediately initiate an
investigation with the carrier and
intended recipient If the shipment does
not arrive by close of business on the
day of the previously coordinated
arrival time. Not later than one hour
after the time when, through the course
of the investigation, it is determined the
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shipment has become lost or stolen, the
licensee shall notify the appropriate
local law enforcement agency, the NRC
Operations Center at (301) 816–5100,
and the appropriate Agreement State
regulatory agency. If after 24 hours of
initiating the investigation, the
radioactive material cannot be located,
it shall be presumed lost and the
licensee shall immediately notify the
NRC Operations Center and, for
Agreement State licensees, the
appropriate Agreement State regulatory
agency.
d. In addition to a and b above, for
highway and rail shipments of material
in quantities greater than or equal to 100
times the quantities in Table 1, per
conveyance, the licensee shall
implement the NRC Order for
Additional Security Measures on the
Transportation of Radioactive Material
Quantities of Concern.
8. For imports and exports of material
in quantities greater than the quantities
in Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee
shall follow the requirements in the
Final Rule 10 CFR Part 110, July 1,
2005, (70 FR 37985 and 46066) Export
and Import of Radioactive Materials:
Security Policies.
9. The licensee shall protect preplanning, coordinating, and reporting
information required by ASM 7 related
to shipments of radioactive material,
and the radioisotopes identified in
Table 1 as sensitive information
(proprietary business financial or
confidential). Licensees shall restrict
access to this information to those
licensee and contractor personnel with
a need to know. Licensees shall require
all parties receiving this information to
protect it similarly. Information may be
transmitted either in writing or
electronically and shall be marked as
‘‘Security-Related Information—
Withhold Under 10 CFR 2.390.’’
10. The licensee shall maintain all
documentation required by these ASMs
for a period of not less than three (3)
years after the document is superceded
or no longer effective.
TABLE 1.—RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERN
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Radionuclide
Quantity of concern 1
(TBq)
Am-241 ......................................................................................................................................................
Am-241/BE .................................................................................................................................................
Cf-252 ........................................................................................................................................................
Cm-244 ......................................................................................................................................................
Co-60 .........................................................................................................................................................
Cs-137 .......................................................................................................................................................
Gd-153 .......................................................................................................................................................
Ir-192 ..........................................................................................................................................................
Pm-147 ......................................................................................................................................................
0.6 .............................
0.6 .............................
0.2 .............................
0.5 .............................
0.3 .............................
1 ................................
10 ..............................
0.8 .............................
400 ............................
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Quantity of
concern 2
(Ci)
16
16
5.4
14
8.1
27
270
22
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TABLE 1.—RADIONUCLIDES OF CONCERN—Continued
Radionuclide
Quantity of concern 1
(TBq)
Quantity of
concern 2
(Ci)
Pu-238 .......................................................................................................................................................
Pu-239/Be ..................................................................................................................................................
Ra-226 3 .....................................................................................................................................................
Se-75 .........................................................................................................................................................
Sr-90 (Y–90) ..............................................................................................................................................
Tm-170 .......................................................................................................................................................
Yb-169 .......................................................................................................................................................
Combinations of radioactive materials listed above 4 ................................................................................
0.6 .............................
0.6 .............................
0.4 .............................
2 ................................
10 ..............................
200 ............................
3 ................................
See Footnote Below 5.
16
16
11
54
270
5,400
81
1 The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included when the total activity equals or exceeds
the quantity of concern.
2 The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded to two significant figures for informational
purposes only.
3 The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and NRC is in the process of
amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
4 Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at
the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.
5 If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, i of radionuclide, n, A
(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) _ (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) _ (quantity of concern for radionuclide B)] + etc. . . . . ≥1.
Guidance for Aggregation of Sources
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NRC supports the use of the
International Atomic Energy
Association’s (IAEA) source
categorization methodology as defined
in IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
RS–G–1.9, ‘‘Categorization of
Radioactive Sources,’’ (2005) (see
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/ PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf)
and as endorsed by the agency’s Code of
Conduct for the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources, January 2004 (see
https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Code-2004_web.pdf).
The Code defines a three-tiered source
categorization scheme. Category 1
corresponds to the largest source
strength (equal to or greater than 100
times the quantity of concern values
listed in Table 1.) and Category 3, the
smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth
the quantity of concern values listed in
Table 1.). Additional security measures
apply to sources that are equal to or
greater than the quantity of concern
values listed in Table 1, plus
aggregations of smaller sources that are
equal to or greater than the quantities in
Table 1. Aggregation only applies to
sources that are collocated.
Licensees who possess individual
sources in total quantities that equal or
exceed the Table 1 quantities are
required to implement additional
security measures. Where there are
many small (less than the quantity of
concern values) collocated sources
whose total aggregate activity equals or
exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are
to implement additional security
measures.
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21:28 Jun 01, 2007
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Some source handling or storage
activities may cover several buildings,
or several locations within specific
buildings. The question then becomes,
‘‘When are sources considered
collocated for purposes of aggregation?’’
For purposes of the additional controls,
sources are considered collocated if
breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked
door at the entrance to a storage room)
would allow access to the sources.
Sources behind an outer barrier should
be aggregated separately from those
behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked
source safe inside the locked storage
room). However, if both barriers are
simultaneously open, then all sources
within these two barriers are considered
to be collocated. This logic should be
continued for other barriers within or
behind the inner barrier.
The following example illustrates the
point: A lockable room has sources
stored in it. Inside the lockable room,
there are two shielded safes with
additional sources in them. Inventories
are as follows:
The room has the following sources
outside the safes: Cf–252, 0.12 TBq (3.2
Ci); Co–60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu–
238, 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). Application of the
unity rule yields: (0.12l0.2) +
(0.18l0.3) + (0.3l0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5
= 1.7. Therefore, the sources would
require additional security measures.
Shielded safe #1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci)
Cs–137 source and a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci)
Am–241 source. In this case, the sources
would require additional security
measures, regardless of location,
because they each exceed the quantities
in Table 1.
PO 00000
Frm 00126
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Shielded safe #2 has two Ir–192
sources, each having an activity of 0.3
TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources
would not require additional security
measures while locked in the safe. The
combined activity does not exceed the
threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22 Ci).
Because certain barriers may cease to
exist during source handling operations
(e.g., a storage location may be unlocked
during periods of active source usage),
licensees should, to the extent
practicable, consider two modes of
source usage—‘‘operations’’ (active
source usage) and ‘‘shutdown’’ (source
storage mode). Whichever mode results
in the greatest inventory (considering
barrier status) would require additional
security measures for each location.
Use the following method to
determine which sources of radioactive
material require implementation of the
Additional Security Measures (ASMs):
• Include any single source equal to
or greater than the quantity of concern
in Table
• Include multiple collocated sources
of the same radionuclide when the
combined quantity equals or exceeds
the quantity of concern
• For combinations of radionuclides,
include multiple collocated sources of
different radionuclides when the
aggregate quantities satisfy the following
unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide
A)l(quantity of concern of
radionuclide A)] + [(amount of
radionuclide B)l(quantity of concern of
radionuclide B)] + etc.....≥1
E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices
Attachment 3: Requirements for
Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee’s
Reviewing Official Is Determining
Access to Safeguards Information or
Unescorted Access to Radioactive
Materials
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the
following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the
provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is
seeking or permitted access to
safeguards information (SGI) or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to, or greater than, the
quantities listed in Attachment 2 to this
Order. The Licensee shall review and
use the information received from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and ensure that the provisions
contained in this Order and this
attachment are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each
affected individual that the fingerprints
will be used to secure a review of his/
her criminal history record and inform
the individual of the procedures for
revising the record or including an
explanation in the record, as specified
in the ‘‘Right to Correct and Complete
Information’’ section of this attachment.
3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or
unescorted access need not be taken if
an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee
employee, contractor, manufacturer, or
supplier) is relieved from the
fingerprinting requirement by 10 CFR
73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61
for unescorted access, has a favorablydecided U.S. Government criminal
history check within the last five (5)
years, or has an active federal security
clearance. Written confirmation from
the Agency/employer which granted the
federal security clearance or reviewed
the criminal history check must be
provided for either of the latter two
cases. The Licensee must retain this
documentation for a period of three (3)
years from the date the individual no
longer requires access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials associated with the Licensee’s
activities.
4. All fingerprints obtained by the
Licensee pursuant to this Order must be
submitted to the Commission for
transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the
information received from the FBI and
consider it, in conjunction with the
trustworthy and reliability requirements
of this Order, in making a determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow,
VerDate Aug<31>2005
20:34 Jun 01, 2007
Jkt 211001
access to SGI or unescorted access to
radioactive materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any
information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for
the purpose of determining an
individual’s suitability for access to SGI
or unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order.
7. The Licensee shall document the
basis for its determination whether to
grant, or continue to allow, access to
SGI or unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order.
Prohibitions
A Licensee shall not base a final
determination to deny an individual
access to radioactive materials solely on
the basis of information received from
the FBI involving: an arrest more than
one (1) year old for which there is no
information of the disposition of the
case, or an arrest that resulted in
dismissal of the charge or an acquittal.
A Licensee shall not use information
received from a criminal history check
obtained pursuant to this Order in a
manner that would infringe upon the
rights of any individual under the First
Amendment to the Constitution of the
United States, nor shall the Licensee use
the information in any way which
would discriminate among individuals
on the basis of race, religion, national
origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint
Checks
For the purpose of complying with
this Order, Licensees shall, using an
appropriate method listed in 10 CFR
73.4, submit to the NRC’s Division of
Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T–
6E46, one completed, legible standard
fingerprint card (Form FD–258,
ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for
each individual seeking access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order, to the Director of the Division of
Facilities and Security, marked for the
attention of the Division’s Criminal
History Check Section. Copies of these
forms may be obtained by writing the
Office of Information Services, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, by calling
(301) 415–5877, or by e-mail to
forms@nrc.gov. Practicable alternative
formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The
Licensee shall establish procedures to
ensure that the quality of the
PO 00000
Frm 00127
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
30869
fingerprints taken results in minimizing
the rejection rate of fingerprint cards
due to illegible or incomplete cards.
The NRC will review submitted
fingerprint cards for completeness. Any
Form FD–258 fingerprint record
containing omissions or evident errors
will be returned to the Licensee for
corrections. The fee for processing
fingerprint checks includes one resubmission if the initial submission is
returned by the FBI because the
fingerprint impressions cannot be
classified. The one free re-submission
must have the FBI Transaction Control
Number reflected on the re-submission.
If additional submissions are necessary,
they will be treated as initial submittals
and will require a second payment of
the processing fee.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks
are due upon application. Licensees
shall submit payment with the
application for processing fingerprints
by corporate check, certified check,
cashier’s check, money order, or
electronic payment, made payable to
‘‘U.S. NRC.’’ [For guidance on making
electronic payments, contact the
Facilities Security Branch, Division of
Facilities and Security, at (301) 415–
7404]. Combined payment for multiple
applications is acceptable. The
application fee (currently $27) is the
sum of the user fee charged by the FBI
for each fingerprint card or other
fingerprint record submitted by the NRC
on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC
processing fee, which covers
administrative costs associated with
NRC handling of Licensee fingerprint
submissions. The Commission will
directly notify Licensees who are
subject to this regulation of any fee
changes.
The Commission will forward to the
submitting Licensee all data received
from the FBI as a result of the Licensee’s
application(s) for criminal history
checks, including the FBI fingerprint
record.
Right To Correct and Complete
Information
Prior to any final adverse
determination, the Licensee shall make
available to the individual the contents
of any criminal records obtained from
the FBI for the purpose of assuring
correct and complete information.
Written confirmation by the individual
of receipt of this notification must be
maintained by the Licensee for a period
of one (1) year from the date of the
notification.
If, after reviewing the record, an
individual believes that it is incorrect or
incomplete in any respect and wishes to
change, correct, or update the alleged
E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM
04JNN1
30870
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 106 / Monday, June 4, 2007 / Notices
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
deficiency, or to explain any matter in
the record, the individual may initiate
challenge procedures. These procedures
include either direct application by the
individual challenging the record to the
agency (i.e., law enforcement agency)
that contributed the questioned
information, or direct challenge as to the
accuracy or completeness of any entry
on the criminal history record to the
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation Identification Division,
Washington, DC 20537–9700 (as set
forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In
the latter case, the FBI forwards the
challenge to the agency that submitted
the data and requests that agency to
verify or correct the challenged entry.
Upon receipt of an official
communication directly from the agency
that contributed the original
information, the FBI Identification
Division makes any changes necessary
in accordance with the information
supplied by that agency. The Licensee
must provide at least ten (10) days for
an individual to initiate an action
challenging the results of an FBI
criminal history records check after the
record is made available for his/her
review. The Licensee may make a final
determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order based upon the criminal history
record only upon receipt of the FBI’s
ultimate confirmation or correction of
the record. Upon a final adverse
determination on access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order, the Licensee shall provide the
individual its documented basis for
denial. Access to SGI or unescorted
access to radioactive materials equal to
or greater than the quantities used in
Attachment 2 to this Order shall not be
granted to an individual during the
review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a
criminal history record on an individual
pursuant to this Order shall establish
and maintain a system of files and
procedures for protecting the record and
the personal information from
unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the
record or personal information collected
and maintained to persons other than
the subject individual, his/her
representative, or to those who have a
need to access the information in
performing assigned duties in the
process of determining access to SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
VerDate Aug<31>2005
21:19 Jun 01, 2007
Jkt 211001
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order. No individual authorized to have
access to the information may redisseminate the information to any
other individual who does not have a
need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained
on an individual from a criminal history
record check may be transferred to
another Licensee if the Licensee holding
the criminal history record receives the
individual’s written request to redisseminate the information contained
in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee
verifies information such as the
individual’s name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other
applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal
history records, obtained under this
section, available for examination by an
authorized representative of the NRC to
determine compliance with the
regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all
fingerprint and criminal history records
received from the FBI, or a copy if the
individual’s file has been transferred,
for three (3) years after termination of
employment or denial to access SGI or
unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the
quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order. After the required three (3) year
period, these documents shall be
destroyed by a method that will prevent
reconstruction of the information in
whole or in part.
[FR Doc. E7–10691 Filed 6–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[EA–07–003]
In the Matter of Certain Licensees
Authorized To Possess and Transfer
Items Containing Radioactive Material
Quantities of Concern; Order Imposing
Additional Security Measures
(Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in
Attachment A 1 to this Order, hold
licenses issued by the U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC or
Commission) or an Agreement State, in
accordance with the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR Parts
30, 32, 70 and 71, or equivalent
Agreement State regulations. The
1 Attachment A contains sensitive information
and will not be released to the public.
PO 00000
Frm 00128
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
licenses authorize them to possess and
transfer items containing radioactive
material quantities of concern. This
Order is being issued to all such
Licensees who may transport
radioactive material quantities of
concern under the NRC’s authority to
protect the common defense and
security, which has not been
relinquished to the Agreement States.
The Orders require compliance with
specific additional security measures to
enhance the security for transport of
certain radioactive material quantities of
concern.
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists
simultaneously attacked targets in New
York, NY, and Washington, DC,
utilizing large commercial aircraft as
weapons. In response to the attacks and
intelligence information subsequently
obtained, the Commission issued a
number of Safeguards and Threat
Advisories to Licensees in order to
strengthen Licensees’ capabilities and
readiness to respond to a potential
attack on this regulated activity. The
Commission has also communicated
with other Federal, State and local
government agencies and industry
representatives to discuss and evaluate
the current threat environment in order
to assess the adequacy of the current
security measures. In addition, the
Commission commenced a
comprehensive review of its safeguards
and security programs and
requirements.
As a result of its initial consideration
of current safeguards and security
requirements, as well as a review of
information provided by the intelligence
community, the Commission has
determined that certain security
measures are required to be
implemented by Licensees as prudent,
interim measures to address the current
threat environment in a consistent
manner. Therefore, the Commission is
imposing requirements, as set forth in
Attachment B 2 of this Order, on all
Licensees identified in Attachment A of
this Order. These additional security
measures, which supplement existing
regulatory requirements, will provide
the Commission with reasonable
assurance that the common defense and
security continue to be adequately
protected in the current threat
environment. Attachment C of this
2 Attachment B contains some requirements that
are SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION, and can not be
released to the public, and have therefore been
redacted. The remainder of the requirements
contained in Attachment B that are not
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released to
the public.
E:\FR\FM\04JNN1.SGM
04JNN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 106 (Monday, June 4, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 30864-30870]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-10691]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[EA 07-019]
In the Matter of All Licensees Authorized To Manufacture or
Initially Transfer Items Containing Radioactive Material for Sale or
Distribution and Possess High-Risk Radioactive Material of Concern;
Order Imposing Additional Security Measures (Effective Immediately)
I
The Licensees identified in Attachment 1 \1\ to this Order hold
licenses issued in accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 by the
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or Commission) or an Agreement
State authorizing them to manufacture or initially transfer items
containing radioactive material for sale or distribution. Commission
regulations at 10 CFR 20.1801 or equivalent Agreement State regulations
require Licensees to secure, from unauthorized removal or access,
licensed materials that are stored in controlled or unrestricted areas.
Commission regulations at 10 CFR 20.1802 or equivalent Agreement States
regulations require Licensees to control and maintain constant
surveillance of licensed material that is in a controlled or
unrestricted area and that is not in storage.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Attachment 1 contains sensitive information and will not be
released to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
II
On September 11, 2001, terrorists simultaneously attacked targets
in New York, N.Y., and Washington, DC, utilizing large commercial
aircraft as weapons. In response to the attacks and intelligence
information subsequently obtained, the Commission issued a number of
Safeguards and Threat Advisories to its Licensees in order to
strengthen Licensees' capabilities and readiness to respond to a
potential attack on a nuclear facility. The Commission has also
communicated with other Federal, State and local government agencies
and industry representatives to discuss and evaluate the current threat
environment in order to assess the adequacy of security measures at
licensed facilities. In addition, the Commission has been conducting a
review of its safeguards and security programs and requirements.
As a result of its consideration of current safeguards and license
requirements, as well as a review of information provided by the
intelligence community, the Commission has determined that certain
additional security measures are required to be implemented by
Licensees as prudent measures to address the current threat
environment. Therefore, the Commission is imposing the requirements set
forth in Attachment 2 \2\ on certain Manufacturing and Distribution
licensees identified in Attachment 1 of this Order who currently
possess, or have near term plans to possess, high-risk radioactive
material of concern. These requirements, which supplement existing
regulatory requirements, will provide the Commission with reasonable
assurance that the public health and safety and common defense and
security continue to be adequately protected in the current threat
environment. Attachment 3 of this Order contains the requirements for
fingerprinting and criminal history record checks for individuals when
licensee's reviewing official is determining access to Safeguards
Information or unescorted access to the radioactive materials. These
requirements will remain in effect until the Commission determines
otherwise.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Attachment 2 contains some requirements that are SAFEGUARDS
INFORMATION, and cannot be released to the public, and have
therefore been redacted. The remainder of the requirements contained
in Attachment 2 that are not SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION will be released
to the public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Commission recognizes that Licensees may have already initiated
many measures set forth in Attachment 2 to this Order in response to
previously issued advisories or on their own. It is also recognized
that some measures may not be possible or necessary at some sites, or
may need to be tailored to accommodate the Licensees' specific
circumstances to achieve the intended objectives and avoid any
unforeseen effect on the safe use and storage of the sealed sources.
Although the additional security measures implemented by the Licensees
in response to the Safeguards and Threat Advisories have been adequate
to provide reasonable assurance of adequate protection of public health
and safety, the Commission concludes that the security measures must be
embodied in an Order consistent with the established regulatory
framework. Furthermore, the Commission has determined that some of the
security measures contained in Attachment 2 of this Order contain
Safeguards Information and will not be released to the public as per
the NRC's ``Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-241 or EA-06-289
[[Page 30865]]
as applicable), regarding the protection of Safeguards Information. The
Commission hereby provides notice that it intends to treat all
violations of the requirements contained in Attachment 2 to the NRC's
``Order Imposing Requirements for the Protection of Certain Safeguards
Information'' (EA-06-241 or EA-06-289 as applicable), applicable to the
handling and unauthorized disclosure of Safeguards Information as
serious breaches of adequate protection of the public health and safety
and the common defense and security of the United States. Access to
Safeguards Information is limited to those persons who have established
a need-to-know the information, are considered to be trustworthy and
reliable, have been fingerprinted and undergone a Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) identification and criminal history records check
in accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable). A need-to-know
means a determination by a person having responsibility for protecting
Safeguards Information that a proposed recipient's access to Safeguards
Information is necessary in the performance of official, contractual,
or licensee duties of employment. Individuals who have been
fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by the
reviewing official under the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting and
Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to Safeguards
Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable) do not need to be
fingerprinted again for purposes of being considered for unescorted
access.
To provide assurance that Licensees are implementing prudent
measures to achieve a consistent level of protection to address the
current threat environment, Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees
identified in Attachment 1 to this Order shall implement the
requirements identified in Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order. In
addition, pursuant 10 CFR 2.202, I find that in light of the common
defense and security matters identified above, which warrant the
issuance of this Order, the public health, safety and interest require
that this Order be effective immediately.
III
Accordingly, pursuant to Sections 81, 147, 149, 161b, 161i, 161o,
182 and 186 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 2.202, 10 CFR Part 30, and 10 CFR
Part 32, It Is Hereby Ordered, effective immediately, that all
licensees identified in Attachment 1 to this order shall comply with
the requirements of this order as follows:
A. The Licensee shall, notwithstanding the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State regulation or license to the contrary,
comply with the requirements described in Attachments 2 and 3 to this
Order. The Licensee shall immediately start implementation of the
requirements in Attachments 2 and 3 to the Order and shall complete
implementation by November 18, 2007, or the first day that
radionuclides of concern at or above threshold limits (i.e., high-risk
radioactive material), also identified in Attachment 2, are possessed,
whichever is later.
B.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, notify the Commission, (1) if it is unable to comply with
any of the requirements described in Attachments 2 or 3, (2) if
compliance with any of the requirements is unnecessary in its specific
circumstances, or (3) if implementation of any of the requirements
would cause the Licensee to be in violation of the provisions of any
Commission or Agreement State regulation or its license. The
notification shall provide the Licensee's justification for seeking
relief from or variation of any specific requirement.
2. If the Licensee considers that implementation of any of the
requirements described in Attachments 2 or 3 to this Order would
adversely impact safe operation of the facility, the Licensee must
notify the Commission, within twenty (20) days of this Order, of the
adverse safety impact, the basis for its determination that the
requirement has an adverse safety impact, and either a proposal for
achieving the same objectives specified in Attachments 2 or 3
requirement in question, or a schedule for modifying the facility to
address the adverse safety condition. If neither approach is
appropriate, the Licensee must supplement its response to Condition B.1
of this Order to identify the condition as a requirement with which it
cannot comply, with attendant justifications as required in Condition
B.1.
C.1. In accordance with the NRC's ``Order Imposing Fingerprinting
and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for Access to
Safeguards Information'' (EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as applicable), only
the NRC-approved reviewing official shall review results from an FBI
criminal history records check. The reviewing official shall determine
whether an individual may have, or continue to have, unescorted access
to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the quantities in
Attachment 2 to this Order. Fingerprinting and the FBI identification
and criminal history records check are not required for individuals
exempted from fingerprinting requirements under 10 CFR 73.61 [72 FR
4945 (February 2, 2007)]. In addition, individuals who have a favorably
decided U.S. Government criminal history records check within the last
five (5) years, or have an active federal security clearance (provided
in each case that the appropriate documentation is made available to
the Licensee's reviewing official), have satisfied the Energy Policy
Act of 2005 fingerprinting requirement and need not be fingerprinted
again for purposes of being considered for unescorted access.
2. No person may have access to Safeguards Information or
unescorted access to radioactive materials if the NRC has determined,
in accordance with its administrative review process based on
fingerprinting and an FBI identification and criminal history records
check, either that the person may not have access to Safeguards
Information or that the person may not have unescorted access to a
utilization facility or radioactive material or other property subject
to regulation by the NRC.
D. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment 3 to this Order. Individuals who
have been fingerprinted and granted access to Safeguards Information by
the reviewing official under Order EA-06-242 or EA-06-290 as
applicable, do not need to be fingerprinted again for purposes of being
considered for unescorted access.
E. The Licensee may allow any individual who currently has
unescorted access to radioactive materials, in accordance with this
Order, to continue to have unescorted access without being
fingerprinted, pending a decision by the reviewing official (based on
fingerprinting, an FBI criminal history records check and a trustworthy
and reliability determination) that the individual may continue to have
unescorted access to radioactive materials that equal or exceed the
quantities listed in Attachment 2. The licensee shall complete
implementation of the requirements of Attachments 2 and 3 to this Order
by November 18, 2007.
F.1. The Licensee shall, within twenty (20) days of the date of
this Order, submit to the Commission a schedule for completion of each
requirement described in Attachments 2 and 3.
[[Page 30866]]
2. The Licensee shall report to the Commission when they have
achieved full compliance with the requirements described in Attachments
2 and 3.
G. Notwithstanding any provisions of the Commission's or an
Agreement State's regulations to the contrary, all measures implemented
or actions taken in response to this Order shall be maintained until
the Commission determines otherwise.
Licensee responses to Conditions B.1, B.2, F.1, and F.2 above shall
be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555. In addition, Licensee submittals that contain
specific physical protection or security information considered to be
Safeguards Information shall be put in a separate enclosure or
attachment and, marked as ``SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION--MODIFIED HANDLING''
and mailed (no electronic transmittals i.e., no e-mail or FAX) to the
NRC.
The Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and
Environmental Management Programs, may, in writing, relax or rescind
any of the above conditions upon demonstration by the Licensee of good
cause.
IV
In accordance with 10 CFR 2.202, the Licensee must, and any other
person adversely affected by this Order may, submit an answer to this
Order, and may request a hearing on this Order, within twenty (20) days
of the date of this Order. Where good cause is shown, consideration
will be given to extending the time to request a hearing. A request for
extension of time in which to submit an answer or request a hearing
must be made in writing to the Director, Office of Federal and State
Materials and Environmental Management Programs, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and include a statement of
good cause for the extension. The answer may consent to this Order.
Unless the answer consents to this Order, the answer shall, in writing
and under oath or affirmation, specifically set forth the matters of
fact and law on which the Licensee or other person adversely affected
relies and the reasons as to why the Order should not have been issued.
Any answer or request for a hearing shall be submitted to the
Secretary, Office of the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff,
Washington, DC 20555. Copies also shall be sent to the Director, Office
of Federal and State Materials and Environmental Management Programs,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, to the
Assistant General Counsel for Materials Litigation and Enforcement at
the same address, and to the Licensee if the answer or hearing request
is by a person other than the Licensee. Because of possible disruptions
in delivery of mail to United States Government offices, it is
requested that answers and requests for hearing be transmitted to the
Secretary of the Commission either by means of facsimile transmission
to 301-415-1101 or by e-mail to hearingdocket@nrc.gov and also to the
Office of the General Counsel either by means of facsimile transmission
to 301-415-3725 or by e-mail to OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov. If a person
other than the Licensee requests a hearing, that person shall set forth
with particularity the manner in which his interest is adversely
affected by this Order and shall address the criteria set forth in 10
CFR 2.309(d).
If a hearing is requested by the Licensee or a person whose
interest is adversely affected, the Commission will issue an Order
designating the time and place of any hearing. If a hearing is held,
the issue to be considered at such hearing shall be whether this Order
should be sustained.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 2.202(c)(2)(i), the Licensee may, in addition to
demanding a hearing, at the time the answer is filed or sooner, move
the presiding officer to set aside the immediate effectiveness of the
Order on the ground that the Order, including the need for immediate
effectiveness, is not based on adequate evidence but on mere suspicion,
unfounded allegations, or error.
In the absence of any request for hearing, or written approval of
an extension of time in which to request a hearing, the provisions
specified in Section III above shall be final twenty (20) days from the
date of this Order without further order or proceedings. If an
extension of time for requesting a hearing has been approved, the
provisions specified in Section III shall be final when the extension
expires if a hearing request has not been received. An answer or a
request for hearing shall not stay the immediate effectiveness of this
order.
Dated this 22nd day of May 2007.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Charles L. Miller,
Director, Office of Federal and State Materials and Environmental
Management Programs.
Attachment 1: Service List of Materials Licensees--Redacted
Attachment 2: Additional Security Measures for Manufacturing and
Distribution Materials Licensees (U)--(Revision 1)
These Additional Security Measures (ASMs) and new requirements are
established to delineate licensee responsibility in response to the
current threat environment. The following security measures apply to
Radioactive Material Manufacturing and Distribution Licensees who, at
any given time, possess greater than or equal to the quantities of
concern of radioactive material defined in Table 1 (unless the licensee
documents the basis for concluding that radioactive material possessed
cannot be easily aggregated into quantities in excess of the limits
defined in Table 1). As with the additional security measures
previously provided to other licensees who possess risk significant
radioactive sources, these increased security measures and requirements
address licensees who are authorized to possess high-activity
radioactive material which poses a high risk to human health if not
managed safely and securely.
1. Establish a security zone (or zones). A security zone is an
area, determined by the licensee, that provides for both isolation of
radioactive material and access control.
a. Only use and store the radioactive material within the
established security zone(s); and
b. The licensee shall demonstrate for each security zone, a means
to deter, detect and delay any attempt of unauthorized access to
licensed material. The security zone is not required to be the same as
the restricted area or controlled area, as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 or
equivalent agreement state regulations; and
c. Security zones can be permanent or temporary to meet transitory
or intermittent business activities (such as during periods of
maintenance, source delivery, source replacement, and temporary job
sites.). Different isolation/access control measures may be used for
periods during which the security zone is occupied versus unoccupied.
2. Control access at all times to the security zone and limit
admittance to those individuals who are approved and require access to
perform their duties.
3. Implement a system to monitor, detect, assess and respond to
[[Page 30867]]
unauthorized entries into or activities in the security zone.
a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed]
b. Provide a positive measure to detect unauthorized removal of the
radioactive material from the security zone; and
c. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed]
4. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed]
5. Licensees shall document the basis for concluding that there is
reasonable assurance that individuals granted access to safeguards
information or unescorted access to the security zone are trustworthy
and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk for malevolent
use of the regulated material. ``Access'' means that an individual
could exercise some physical control over the material or device
containing radioactive material.
a. The trustworthiness and reliability of individuals shall be
determined based on a background investigation. The background
investigation shall address at least the past 3 years and, as a
minimum, include fingerprinting and a Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) criminal history check, verification of work or education
references as appropriate to the length of employment, and confirmation
of employment eligibility.
b. Fingerprints shall be submitted and reviewed in accordance with
the procedures described in Attachment 3 to this Order.
c. A reviewing official that the licensee nominated and has been
approved by the NRC, in accordance with NRC ``Order Imposing
Fingerprinting and Criminal History Records Check Requirements for
Access to Safeguards Information,'' is the only individual that may
make trustworthiness and reliability determinations.
d. Individuals for whom the licensee has not made a determination
of trustworthiness and reliability, based on the appropriate background
investigation above, shall be escorted within the security zone to
prevent unauthorized access or actions to the licensed radioactive
material. The licensee shall also ensure these individuals are clearly
identifiable as needing an escort while in the security zone.
6. Before transfer of radioactive materials that exceed the
quantities in Table 1, Licensees shall:
a. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed]
b. [This paragraph contains SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION and will not be
publicly disclosed]
c. Assure that the material is shipped to an address authorized in
the license and that the address is valid,
d. Verify the address for deliveries to temporary job site, and
e. Document the verification or validation process.
7. For domestic highway and rail shipments of materials in
quantities greater than or equal to the quantities in Table 1, per
conveyance, the licensee shall:
a. Only use carriers who:
(1) Use established package tracking systems,
(2) Implement methods to assure trustworthiness of drivers,
(3) Maintain constant control and/or surveillance during transit,
and
(4) Have the capability for immediate communication to summon
appropriate response or assistance.
The licensee shall verify and document that the carrier employs the
measures listed above.
b. Coordinate departure and arrival times with the recipient.
c. Immediately initiate an investigation with the carrier and
intended recipient If the shipment does not arrive by close of business
on the day of the previously coordinated arrival time. Not later than
one hour after the time when, through the course of the investigation,
it is determined the shipment has become lost or stolen, the licensee
shall notify the appropriate local law enforcement agency, the NRC
Operations Center at (301) 816-5100, and the appropriate Agreement
State regulatory agency. If after 24 hours of initiating the
investigation, the radioactive material cannot be located, it shall be
presumed lost and the licensee shall immediately notify the NRC
Operations Center and, for Agreement State licensees, the appropriate
Agreement State regulatory agency.
d. In addition to a and b above, for highway and rail shipments of
material in quantities greater than or equal to 100 times the
quantities in Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee shall implement the
NRC Order for Additional Security Measures on the Transportation of
Radioactive Material Quantities of Concern.
8. For imports and exports of material in quantities greater than
the quantities in Table 1, per conveyance, the licensee shall follow
the requirements in the Final Rule 10 CFR Part 110, July 1, 2005, (70
FR 37985 and 46066) Export and Import of Radioactive Materials:
Security Policies.
9. The licensee shall protect pre-planning, coordinating, and
reporting information required by ASM 7 related to shipments of
radioactive material, and the radioisotopes identified in Table 1 as
sensitive information (proprietary business financial or confidential).
Licensees shall restrict access to this information to those licensee
and contractor personnel with a need to know. Licensees shall require
all parties receiving this information to protect it similarly.
Information may be transmitted either in writing or electronically and
shall be marked as ``Security-Related Information--Withhold Under 10
CFR 2.390.''
10. The licensee shall maintain all documentation required by these
ASMs for a period of not less than three (3) years after the document
is superceded or no longer effective.
Table 1.--Radionuclides of Concern
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Quantity of
Radionuclide Quantity of concern \1\ (TBq) concern \2\
(Ci)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Am-241.......................................... 0.6.......................................... 16
Am-241/BE....................................... 0.6.......................................... 16
Cf-252.......................................... 0.2.......................................... 5.4
Cm-244.......................................... 0.5.......................................... 14
Co-60........................................... 0.3.......................................... 8.1
Cs-137.......................................... 1............................................ 27
Gd-153.......................................... 10........................................... 270
Ir-192.......................................... 0.8.......................................... 22
Pm-147.......................................... 400.......................................... 11,000
[[Page 30868]]
Pu-238.......................................... 0.6.......................................... 16
Pu-239/Be....................................... 0.6.......................................... 16
Ra-226 \3\...................................... 0.4.......................................... 11
Se-75........................................... 2............................................ 54
Sr-90 (Y-90).................................... 10........................................... 270
Tm-170.......................................... 200.......................................... 5,400
Yb-169.......................................... 3............................................ 81
Combinations of radioactive materials listed See Footnote Below \5\ ......................
above \4\.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The aggregate activity of multiple, collocated sources of the same radionuclide should be included when the
total activity equals or exceeds the quantity of concern.
\2\ The primary values used for compliance with this Order are TBq. The curie (Ci) values are rounded to two
significant figures for informational purposes only.
\3\ The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes NRC to regulate Ra-226 and
NRC is in the process of amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra-226.
\4\ Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security
barrier (e.g., a locked door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material
or devices containing the radioactive material.
\5\ If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, i of
radionuclide, n, A(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that radionuclide
equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) -- (quantity of concern for
radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) -- (quantity of concern for radionuclide
B)] + etc. . . . . >=1.
Guidance for Aggregation of Sources
NRC supports the use of the International Atomic Energy
Association's (IAEA) source categorization methodology as defined in
IAEA Safety Standards Series No. RS-G-1.9, ``Categorization of
Radioactive Sources,'' (2005) (see https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/
publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf) and as endorsed by the agency's
Code of Conduct for the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources,
January 2004 (see https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Code-
2004_web.pdf). The Code defines a three-tiered source categorization
scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the largest source strength (equal to
or greater than 100 times the quantity of concern values listed in
Table 1.) and Category 3, the smallest (equal or exceeding one-tenth
the quantity of concern values listed in Table 1.). Additional security
measures apply to sources that are equal to or greater than the
quantity of concern values listed in Table 1, plus aggregations of
smaller sources that are equal to or greater than the quantities in
Table 1. Aggregation only applies to sources that are collocated.
Licensees who possess individual sources in total quantities that
equal or exceed the Table 1 quantities are required to implement
additional security measures. Where there are many small (less than the
quantity of concern values) collocated sources whose total aggregate
activity equals or exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are to
implement additional security measures.
Some source handling or storage activities may cover several
buildings, or several locations within specific buildings. The question
then becomes, ``When are sources considered collocated for purposes of
aggregation?'' For purposes of the additional controls, sources are
considered collocated if breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked
door at the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the
sources. Sources behind an outer barrier should be aggregated
separately from those behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked source
safe inside the locked storage room). However, if both barriers are
simultaneously open, then all sources within these two barriers are
considered to be collocated. This logic should be continued for other
barriers within or behind the inner barrier.
The following example illustrates the point: A lockable room has
sources stored in it. Inside the lockable room, there are two shielded
safes with additional sources in them. Inventories are as follows:
The room has the following sources outside the safes: Cf-252, 0.12
TBq (3.2 Ci); Co-60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu-238, 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci).
Application of the unity rule yields: (0.12--0.2) + (0.18--0.3) +
(0.3--0.6) = 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources would
require additional security measures.
Shielded safe 1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs-137 source and a
0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am-241 source. In this case, the sources would require
additional security measures, regardless of location, because they each
exceed the quantities in Table 1.
Shielded safe 2 has two Ir-192 sources, each having an
activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci). In this case, the sources would not
require additional security measures while locked in the safe. The
combined activity does not exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22
Ci).
Because certain barriers may cease to exist during source handling
operations (e.g., a storage location may be unlocked during periods of
active source usage), licensees should, to the extent practicable,
consider two modes of source usage--``operations'' (active source
usage) and ``shutdown'' (source storage mode). Whichever mode results
in the greatest inventory (considering barrier status) would require
additional security measures for each location.
Use the following method to determine which sources of radioactive
material require implementation of the Additional Security Measures
(ASMs):
Include any single source equal to or greater than the
quantity of concern in Table
Include multiple collocated sources of the same
radionuclide when the combined quantity equals or exceeds the quantity
of concern
For combinations of radionuclides, include multiple
collocated sources of different radionuclides when the aggregate
quantities satisfy the following unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide
A)--(quantity of concern of radionuclide A)] + [(amount of radionuclide
B)--(quantity of concern of radionuclide B)] + etc.....>=1
[[Page 30869]]
Attachment 3: Requirements for Fingerprinting and Criminal History
Checks of Individuals When Licensee's Reviewing Official Is Determining
Access to Safeguards Information or Unescorted Access to Radioactive
Materials
General Requirements
Licensees shall comply with the following requirements of this
attachment.
1. Each Licensee subject to the provisions of this attachment shall
fingerprint each individual who is seeking or permitted access to
safeguards information (SGI) or unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to, or greater than, the quantities listed in
Attachment 2 to this Order. The Licensee shall review and use the
information received from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and
ensure that the provisions contained in this Order and this attachment
are satisfied.
2. The Licensee shall notify each affected individual that the
fingerprints will be used to secure a review of his/her criminal
history record and inform the individual of the procedures for revising
the record or including an explanation in the record, as specified in
the ``Right to Correct and Complete Information'' section of this
attachment.
3. Fingerprints for access to SGI or unescorted access need not be
taken if an employed individual (e.g., a Licensee employee, contractor,
manufacturer, or supplier) is relieved from the fingerprinting
requirement by 10 CFR 73.59 for access to SGI or 10 CFR 73.61 for
unescorted access, has a favorably-decided U.S. Government criminal
history check within the last five (5) years, or has an active federal
security clearance. Written confirmation from the Agency/employer which
granted the federal security clearance or reviewed the criminal history
check must be provided for either of the latter two cases. The Licensee
must retain this documentation for a period of three (3) years from the
date the individual no longer requires access to SGI or unescorted
access to radioactive materials associated with the Licensee's
activities.
4. All fingerprints obtained by the Licensee pursuant to this Order
must be submitted to the Commission for transmission to the FBI.
5. The Licensee shall review the information received from the FBI
and consider it, in conjunction with the trustworthy and reliability
requirements of this Order, in making a determination whether to grant,
or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive
materials.
6. The Licensee shall use any information obtained as part of a
criminal history records check solely for the purpose of determining an
individual's suitability for access to SGI or unescorted access to
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in
Attachment 2 to this Order.
7. The Licensee shall document the basis for its determination
whether to grant, or continue to allow, access to SGI or unescorted
access to radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities
used in Attachment 2 to this Order.
Prohibitions
A Licensee shall not base a final determination to deny an
individual access to radioactive materials solely on the basis of
information received from the FBI involving: an arrest more than one
(1) year old for which there is no information of the disposition of
the case, or an arrest that resulted in dismissal of the charge or an
acquittal.
A Licensee shall not use information received from a criminal
history check obtained pursuant to this Order in a manner that would
infringe upon the rights of any individual under the First Amendment to
the Constitution of the United States, nor shall the Licensee use the
information in any way which would discriminate among individuals on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, sex, or age.
Procedures for Processing Fingerprint Checks
For the purpose of complying with this Order, Licensees shall,
using an appropriate method listed in 10 CFR 73.4, submit to the NRC's
Division of Facilities and Security, Mail Stop T-6E46, one completed,
legible standard fingerprint card (Form FD-258, ORIMDNRCOOOZ) or, where
practicable, other fingerprint records for each individual seeking
access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order, to the
Director of the Division of Facilities and Security, marked for the
attention of the Division's Criminal History Check Section. Copies of
these forms may be obtained by writing the Office of Information
Services, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, by calling (301) 415-5877, or by e-mail to forms@nrc.gov.
Practicable alternative formats are set forth in 10 CFR 73.4. The
Licensee shall establish procedures to ensure that the quality of the
fingerprints taken results in minimizing the rejection rate of
fingerprint cards due to illegible or incomplete cards.
The NRC will review submitted fingerprint cards for completeness.
Any Form FD-258 fingerprint record containing omissions or evident
errors will be returned to the Licensee for corrections. The fee for
processing fingerprint checks includes one re-submission if the initial
submission is returned by the FBI because the fingerprint impressions
cannot be classified. The one free re-submission must have the FBI
Transaction Control Number reflected on the re-submission. If
additional submissions are necessary, they will be treated as initial
submittals and will require a second payment of the processing fee.
Fees for processing fingerprint checks are due upon application.
Licensees shall submit payment with the application for processing
fingerprints by corporate check, certified check, cashier's check,
money order, or electronic payment, made payable to ``U.S. NRC.'' [For
guidance on making electronic payments, contact the Facilities Security
Branch, Division of Facilities and Security, at (301) 415-7404].
Combined payment for multiple applications is acceptable. The
application fee (currently $27) is the sum of the user fee charged by
the FBI for each fingerprint card or other fingerprint record submitted
by the NRC on behalf of a Licensee, and an NRC processing fee, which
covers administrative costs associated with NRC handling of Licensee
fingerprint submissions. The Commission will directly notify Licensees
who are subject to this regulation of any fee changes.
The Commission will forward to the submitting Licensee all data
received from the FBI as a result of the Licensee's application(s) for
criminal history checks, including the FBI fingerprint record.
Right To Correct and Complete Information
Prior to any final adverse determination, the Licensee shall make
available to the individual the contents of any criminal records
obtained from the FBI for the purpose of assuring correct and complete
information. Written confirmation by the individual of receipt of this
notification must be maintained by the Licensee for a period of one (1)
year from the date of the notification.
If, after reviewing the record, an individual believes that it is
incorrect or incomplete in any respect and wishes to change, correct,
or update the alleged
[[Page 30870]]
deficiency, or to explain any matter in the record, the individual may
initiate challenge procedures. These procedures include either direct
application by the individual challenging the record to the agency
(i.e., law enforcement agency) that contributed the questioned
information, or direct challenge as to the accuracy or completeness of
any entry on the criminal history record to the Assistant Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Division, Washington, DC
20537-9700 (as set forth in 28 CFR 16.30 through 16.34). In the latter
case, the FBI forwards the challenge to the agency that submitted the
data and requests that agency to verify or correct the challenged
entry. Upon receipt of an official communication directly from the
agency that contributed the original information, the FBI
Identification Division makes any changes necessary in accordance with
the information supplied by that agency. The Licensee must provide at
least ten (10) days for an individual to initiate an action challenging
the results of an FBI criminal history records check after the record
is made available for his/her review. The Licensee may make a final
determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive
materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2
to this Order based upon the criminal history record only upon receipt
of the FBI's ultimate confirmation or correction of the record. Upon a
final adverse determination on access to SGI or unescorted access to
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in
Attachment 2 to this Order, the Licensee shall provide the individual
its documented basis for denial. Access to SGI or unescorted access to
radioactive materials equal to or greater than the quantities used in
Attachment 2 to this Order shall not be granted to an individual during
the review process.
Protection of Information
1. Each Licensee who obtains a criminal history record on an
individual pursuant to this Order shall establish and maintain a system
of files and procedures for protecting the record and the personal
information from unauthorized disclosure.
2. The Licensee may not disclose the record or personal information
collected and maintained to persons other than the subject individual,
his/her representative, or to those who have a need to access the
information in performing assigned duties in the process of determining
access to SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials equal to or
greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this Order. No
individual authorized to have access to the information may re-
disseminate the information to any other individual who does not have a
need-to-know.
3. The personal information obtained on an individual from a
criminal history record check may be transferred to another Licensee if
the Licensee holding the criminal history record receives the
individual's written request to re-disseminate the information
contained in his/her file, and the gaining Licensee verifies
information such as the individual's name, date of birth, social
security number, sex, and other applicable physical characteristics for
identification purposes.
4. The Licensee shall make criminal history records, obtained under
this section, available for examination by an authorized representative
of the NRC to determine compliance with the regulations and laws.
5. The Licensee shall retain all fingerprint and criminal history
records received from the FBI, or a copy if the individual's file has
been transferred, for three (3) years after termination of employment
or denial to access SGI or unescorted access to radioactive materials
equal to or greater than the quantities used in Attachment 2 to this
Order. After the required three (3) year period, these documents shall
be destroyed by a method that will prevent reconstruction of the
information in whole or in part.
[FR Doc. E7-10691 Filed 6-1-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
