Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive Materials, 24279-24281 [E7-8374]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 84 / Wednesday, May 2, 2007 / Notices
effort to reduce paperwork and
respondent burden, conducts a preclearance consultation program to
provide the general public and federal
agencies with an opportunity to
comment on proposed and/or
continuing collections of information in
accordance with the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA95) (44
U.S.C. 3506(c)(2)(A)). This program
helps to ensure that requested data can
be provided in the desired format,
reporting burden (time and financial
resources) is minimized, collection
instruments are clearly understood, and
the impact of collection requirement on
respondents can be properly assessed.
Currently, the Corporation is
soliciting comments concerning its
proposed renewal of its Learn and Serve
America Program and Performance
Measurement Reports. These reports are
used by current grantees, subgrantees
and sub-subgrantees to report on Learn
and Serve-funded service-learning
programs. Data collected through the
reports are utilized by the Corporation
for Congressional reporting and program
management. Completion of the
Program and Performance Measurement
Reports is a requirement of the Learn
and Serve grant provisions.
Copies of the information collection
requests can be obtained by contacting
the office listed in the addresses section
of this notice.
DATES: Written comments must be
submitted to the individual and office
listed in the ADDRESSES section by July
2, 2007.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by the title of the information
collection activity, by any of the
following methods:
(1) By mail sent to: Corporation for
National and Community Service,
Research and Policy Development;
Attention Kimberly Spring, Policy
Analyst, 10th Floor; 1201 New York
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20525.
(2) By hand delivery or by courier to
the Corporation’s mailroom at Room
8100 at the mail address given in
paragraph (1) above, between 9 a.m. and
4 p.m. Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays.
(3) By fax to: (202) 606–3464,
Attention Kimberly Spring, Policy
Analyst.
(4) Electronically through the
Corporation’s e-mail address system:
kspring@cns.gov.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Kimberly Spring, (202) 606–6629, or by
e-mail at kspring@cns.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The
Corporation is particularly interested in
comments that:
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<bullet≤ Evaluate whether the
proposed collection of information is
necessary for the proper performance of
the functions of the Corporation,
including whether the information will
have practical utility;
<bullet≤ Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden of the
proposed collection of information,
including the validity of the
methodology and assumptions used;
<bullet≤ Enhance the quality, utility,
and clarity of the information to be
collected; and
<bullet≤ Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are expected to respond, including the
use of appropriate automated,
electronic, mechanical, or other
technological collection techniques or
other forms of information technology
(e.g., permitting electronic submissions
of responses).
Background
The Learn and Serve America
Program was established by the National
and Community Service Act of 1990, as
amended, (42 U.S.C. 12501, et seq.)
(Pub. L. 103–82) to support efforts in
schools, higher education institutions,
and community-based organizations to
involve young people in meaningful
service to their communities while
improving academic, civic, social, and
career-related skills. The Learn and
Serve program is administered by the
Corporation for National and
Community Service and is funded
through grants to states, national
organizations, and institutions of higher
education, and through them to
individual schools and school districts,
community-based organizations, and
colleges or universities. Approximately
100 grantees and 2,000 subgrantees and
sub-subgrantees receive Learn and Serve
funds each year.
The Learn and Serve America
Program and Performance Measurement
Reports provide an annual program
reporting process for Learn and Serve:
Collecting program characteristics,
output measurements, and institutionallevel service-learning policies and
practices. The system is Web-based and
allows for the electronic submission of
reporting information and grantee and
public-use access of data collected
through the system.
Current Action
The Corporation seeks to renew the
current reporting instruments, which
are designed to collect information on
(a) the characteristics of grantee and
subgrantee organizations; (b) the scope
and structure of service-learning
activities in the funded organizations;
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24279
(c) number of participants in servicelearning and the hours of service
provided; and (d) institutional supports
for service-learning. The Corporation
maintains three versions of the reporting
instrument to correspond to the three
major funding streams under Learn and
Serve America: K–12 School-Based,
Higher Education, and CommunityBased. The Corporation also seeks to
continue using the reporting
instruments until the renewal of the
instruments is approved by OMB. The
current application is due to expire on
September 30, 2007.
Type of Review: Renewal.
Agency: Corporation for National and
Community Service.
Title: Learn and Serve America
Program and Performance Measurement
Reports.
OMB Number: 3045–0095.
Agency Number: None.
Affected Public: Learn and Serve
America Grantees and Subgrantees.
Total Respondents: 2,100.
Frequency: Annually.
Average Time Per Response: 1⁄4 hour
for grantees and one hour for
subgrantees.
Estimated Total Burden Hours: 2,025
hours.
Total Burden Cost (capital/startup):
None.
Total Burden Cost (operating/
maintenance): None.
Comments submitted in response to
this notice will be summarized and/or
included in the request for Office of
Management and Budget approval of the
information collection request; they will
also become a matter of public record.
Dated: April 24, 2007.
Robert Grimm, Jr.,
Director, Office of Research and Policy
Development.
[FR Doc. E7–8350 Filed 5–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6050–$$–P
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES
SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 2007–1]
Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive
Assay of Radioactive Materials
Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice, recommendation.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of
Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(5)
which addresses the measuring of
radioactive material holdup at defense
nuclear facilities in the Department of
Energy complex.
E:\FEDREG\02MYN1.LOC
02MYN1
24280
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 84 / Wednesday, May 2, 2007 / Notices
Comments, data, views, or
arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before
June 1, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data,
views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue., NW, Suite 700, Washington,
DC 20004–2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau
at the address above or telephone (202)
694–7000.
DATES:
Dated: April 27, 2006.
A.J. Eggenberger,
Chairman.
Recommendation 2007–1 to the Secretary of
Energy
mmaher on DSK3CLS3C1PROD with $$_JOB
Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay
of Radioactive Materials
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286(a)(5); Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, As Amended
Dated: April 25, 2007.
Overview
There are many situations in which the
quantity and composition of radioactive
material must be determined. In some
instances, access to the material is impossible
or undesirable, and consequently, weighing,
laboratory analysis, and calorimetry are not
viable options. In these cases, in situ
nondestructive assay (NDA), based on the
measurement of signature emissions from a
specific isotope of interest, is used to provide
an estimate of the type and quantity of
radioactive material present. However, large
uncertainties and inaccuracies have occurred
in estimating the type and quantity of
radioactive material using in situ NDA. These
uncertainties and inaccuracies include
incorrect assumptions about shielding and
the spatial distribution of radioactive
material, as well as poor measurement
techniques. Measurement errors, in turn, lead
to potential criticality accident conditions,
unexpected radiation exposure to workers,
and underestimation of radioactive material
available for release in accident scenarios.
In most nuclear safety areas, the
Department of Energy (DOE) has captured
required elements for robust site programs
through its Directives system. These elements
include requirements necessary for proper
functioning of the program, training and
qualification standards for personnel,
assessment criteria to ensure proper
implementation of requirements, and
feedback mechanisms for lessons learned and
continuous improvement. However, DOE has
not established programmatic requirements
for NDA, even though this method is heavily
relied upon for nuclear safety throughout the
complex and is key to many DOE activities.
The capability to perform accurate
measurements and use the results to
determine compliance with nuclear safety
limits is absolutely essential.
Research and development efforts for NDA
have historically focused on the areas of
material control and accountability and
VerDate Mar 15 2010
03:08 Aug 19, 2011
Jkt 223001
nuclear material safeguards; advances in
these areas have peripherally benefitted in
situ NDA measurement capabilities. Current
research and development efforts appear to
hold little promise for addressing needed
improvements for in situ NDA measurement.
For example, development of
instrumentation and measurement
techniques is needed to reduce overall
measurement uncertainties.
Examples
Three notable instances of recent errors
associated with in situ NDA measurement of
radioactive material holdup are discussed
below. These errors resulted from the use of
inaccurate correction factors regarding
material geometry assumptions or failure to
perform measurements at locations where the
material was accumulating. In each of these
cases, the amount of radioactive material was
initially underestimated, resulting in a
smaller-than-expected safety margin and
violations of criticality safety limits.
Material holdup in 6-inch diameter vacuum
system pipe at the Hanford Site’s
Plutonium Finishing Plant was assumed to
be in the form of a 0.25 inch layer at the
bottom of the pipe. Using a correction
factor for this geometry, the initial estimate
of material was about 1 kg. When workers
then proceeded to remove the piping, it
was found to be filled with a solid plug of
material, and the actual amount of material
present was nearly twice as high as the
initial estimate.
Measurement of an exhaust filter at the Y–
12 National Security Complex assumed
that fissionable material was loaded only
on the face of the filter. An estimate of a
few hundred grams of material was
obtained using correction factors for this
geometry. Subsequent investigation
showed that material was loaded
throughout the filter, and not just on the
face. The actual amount of fissionable
material present was several times the
initial estimate.
A second exhaust filter at the Y–12 National
Security Complex was measured
periodically using NDA, but the
measurement point was not where the
fissionable material was accumulating.
Once this error was discovered, follow-up
measurements showed significant material
accumulation.
In each of these instances, site-specific
corrective actions were taken based on the
specific problem encountered. Lessons
learned from these events do not appear to
have been shared within the DOE complex.
Complex-wide corrective actions have not
been identified to minimize the occurrence of
similar events at other sites. The Board is
concerned that undiscovered problems
currently exist at other facilities within the
DOE complex. It is incumbent upon DOE and
its contractors to review current in situ NDA
measurements to determine whether the
assumptions used to derive results are
sufficiently conservative to ensure
compliance with nuclear safety limits.
Issues
Three main issues dominate the current
technical and regulatory landscape regarding
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Sfmt 4703
in situ NDA measurements: (1) Lack of
standardized requirements for performing
measurements, (2) lack of design
requirements for new facilities that would
facilitate accurate holdup measurement, and
(3) lack of research and development
activities for new instrumentation and/or
measurement techniques. Each of these
issues is discussed below.
Lack of Standardization—DOE has not
established requirements or guidance for
performing in situ measurements in its
Directives system. While the Board
recognizes that measurement techniques can
be highly location specific, a requirement to
follow methods outlined in national
consensus standards when performing in situ
NDA measurements would reduce the errors
and uncertainty of results. Commercial
guidance for NDA is available in a series of
standards published by the American Society
for Testing and Materials (ASTM). This series
addresses good practices for performing NDA
measurements, methods for performing
specific types of NDA measurements (for
example, ASTM C–1133–03, NDA of LowDensity Scrap and Waste by Segmented
Passive Gamma Ray Scanning), and training
and qualification of NDA personnel. While
this guidance has been used informally at
some sites, DOE has not required its use for
NDA measurements.
Lack of Design Requirements for New
Facilities—Many of the problems that require
in situ NDA to determine radioactive material
holdup arose because facilities were designed
and built before the need for NDA technology
was evident. As a result, no consistent
attempt was made to design facility systems
to minimize holdup or facilitate its
measurement. This historical trend should
not be repeated in new facilities. The
necessity of monitoring radioactive material
holdup must be considered in the design of
new facilities. For example, locations for
monitoring can be selected during the design
phase on the basis of the most likely
locations for holdup to occur. Calibrations
can then be performed at these locations
before the facility begins operations to
provide a baseline for future NDA
measurements. Facilities can also be
designed to minimize holdup in areas where
it may be of concern.
Lack of Research and Development
Activities—Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL) conducted NDA research for more
than 20 years. LANL developed most of the
NDA techniques in current use, and conducts
associated training programs. However, it is
not clear that any significant research and
development for in situ NDA measurements
is currently being conducted within DOE to
address serious concerns with material
holdup. Research and development activities
are focused in other areas, such as nuclear
material safeguards and homeland security,
but these efforts have different objectives and
may not yield results that are beneficial for
measurements using in situ NDA.
Recommendation
The Board, therefore, recommends that
DOE:
1. Evaluate the extent of condition
regarding inaccurate in situ NDA programs
E:\FEDREG\02MYN1.LOC
02MYN1
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 84 / Wednesday, May 2, 2007 / Notices
within DOE. This effort should involve at
least two actions:
A. Identifying all cases within the defense
nuclear complex in which in situ NDA
results are used to ensure compliance with
nuclear safety limits.
B. Reviewing the cases identified in step
1.A to validate that the protocols,
methodologies, calculations, and
assumptions used to obtain NDA results are
sufficiently conservative. This review should
take into consideration lessons learned from
recent events.
2. Establish requirements and guidance in
a DOE directive or directives. The
requirements and guidance should focus on
in situ NDA programs that are used to
demonstrate compliance with nuclear safety
limits. Particular issues to be addressed
should include:
A. Training and qualification standards for
personnel involved in performing NDA
measurements, interpreting and reviewing
results, and managing site programs.
B. Application of standard protocols and
methodologies, such as those given in the
national consensus series issued by ASTM,
for performing NDA measurements.
C. Standardization of correction factors for
common situations (geometry and selfattenuation factors) and consistent
application of uncertainty values.
D. Reinforcement of the use of formal
lessons-learned mechanisms in the
application of NDA programs so that
information can be shared easily among
affected DOE sites.
E. Incorporation of features in the design
of new facilities to minimize radioactive
material holdup and facilitate accurate NDA
holdup measurements.
F. Periodic assessments of the need for new
NDA technology and the status of ongoing
NDA-related research and development
programs.
G. Periodic assessments to ensure that
NDA programs are using the best available
technology.
H. Incorporation of appropriate quality
assurance elements into in situ NDA
measurements when used for compliance
with nuclear safety limits as required by 10
Code of Federal Regulations Part 830.
A.J. Eggenberger,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. E7–8374 Filed 5–1–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3670–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Notice of Proposed Information
Collection Requests
Department of Education.
Notice of proposed information
collection requests.
AGENCY:
mmaher on DSK3CLS3C1PROD with $$_JOB
ACTION:
SUMMARY: The IC Clearance Official,
Regulatory Information Management
Services, Office of Management, invites
comments on the proposed information
collection requests as required by the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.
VerDate Mar 15 2010
03:08 Aug 19, 2011
Jkt 223001
An emergency review has been
requested in accordance with the Act
(44 U.S.C. Chapter 3507(j)), since public
harm is reasonably likely to result if
normal clearance procedures are
followed. Approval by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has
been requested by December 7, 2007.
DATES:
Written comments
regarding the emergency review should
be addressed to the Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs,
Attention: Rachael Potter, Desk Officer,
Department of Education, Office of
Management and Budget; 725 17th
Street, NW., Room 10222, New
Executive Office Building, Washington,
DC 20503 or faxed to (202) 395–6974.
ADDRESSES:
Section
3506 of the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35) requires
that the Director of OMB provide
interested Federal agencies and the
public an early opportunity to comment
on information collection requests. The
Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) may amend or waive the
requirement for public consultation to
the extent that public participation in
the approval process would defeat the
purpose of the information collection,
violate State or Federal law, or
substantially interfere with any agency’s
ability to perform its statutory
obligations. The IC Clearance Official,
Regulatory Information Management
Services, Office of Management,
publishes this notice containing
proposed information collection
requests at the beginning of the
Departmental review of the information
collection. Each proposed information
collection, grouped by office, contains
the following: (1) Type of review
requested, e.g., new, revision, extension,
existing or reinstatement; (2) Title; (3)
Summary of the collection; (4)
Description of the need for, and
proposed use of, the information; (5)
Respondents and frequency of
collection; and (6) Reporting and/or
Recordkeeping burden. ED invites
public comment. The Department of
Education is especially interested in
public comment addressing the
following issues: (1) Is this collection
necessary to the proper functions of the
Department; (2) will this information be
processed and used in a timely manner;
(3) is the estimate of burden accurate;
(4) how might the Department enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information to be collected; and (5) how
might the Department minimize the
burden of this collection on
respondents, including through the use
of information technology.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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24281
Dated: April 26, 2007.
Angela C. Arrington,
IC Clearance Official, Regulatory Information
Management Services, Office of Management.
Office of Postsecondary Education
Type of Review: New.
Title: U.S.-Russian Program:
Improving Research and Educational
Activities in Higher Education.
Abstract: This is a new Special Focus
Competition, administered by the Fund
for the Improvement for Postsecondary
Education (FIPSE). FIPSE’s U.S.-Russia
Program will award grants to U.S.
institutions participating in bilateral
institutional cooperation to support
innovative projects that will improve
research and education activities in
higher education in the U.S. and Russia.
The rationale for the U.S.-Russia
Program is based upon the need for
increased interconnectedness between
the U.S. and Russia in order to operate
effectively in a global economy.
Institutions will be funded by their
respective government agencies in areas
that advance the study of English and
Russian and demonstrate innovative
and/or best practices in a variety of
academic disciplines, such as
mathematics, science, and economics.
Additional Information: This
important unique program is facing a
tight deadline in order for both nations
to have adequate time to apply, and
hence we are asking for this emergency
clearance to provide possible applicants
a decent amount of time to complete the
necessary application.
Frequency: Annually.
Affected Public: Not-for-profit
institutions.
Reporting and Recordkeeping Hour
Burden:
Responses: 12.
Burden Hours: 360.
Requests for copies of the proposed
information collection request may be
accessed from https://edicsweb.ed.gov,
by selecting the ‘‘Browse Pending
Collections’’ link and by clicking on
link number 3323. When you access the
information collection, click on
‘‘Download Attachments’’ to view.
Written requests for information should
be addressed to U.S. Department of
Education, 400 Maryland Avenue, SW.,
Potomac Center, 9th Floor, Washington,
DC 20202–4700. Requests may also be
electronically mailed to the Internet
address ICDocketMgr@.edgov or faxed to
202–245–6623. Please specify the
complete title of the information
collection when making your request.
Comments regarding burden and/or
the collection activity requirements
should be electronically mailed to
ICDocketMgr@ed.gov. Individuals who
E:\FEDREG\02MYN1.LOC
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 84 (Wednesday, May 2, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 24279-24281]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-8374]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
[Recommendation 2007-1]
Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive
Materials
AGENCY: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
ACTION: Notice, recommendation.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board has made a
recommendation to the Secretary of Energy pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
2286a(a)(5) which addresses the measuring of radioactive material
holdup at defense nuclear facilities in the Department of Energy
complex.
[[Page 24280]]
DATES: Comments, data, views, or arguments concerning the
recommendation are due on or before June 1, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Send comments, data, views, or arguments concerning this
recommendation to: Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, 625 Indiana
Avenue., NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC 20004-2001.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brian Grosner or Andrew L. Thibadeau
at the address above or telephone (202) 694-7000.
Dated: April 27, 2006.
A.J. Eggenberger,
Chairman.
Recommendation 2007-1 to the Secretary of Energy
Safety-Related In Situ Nondestructive Assay of Radioactive
Materials
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 2286(a)(5); Atomic Energy Act of 1954, As Amended
Dated: April 25, 2007.
Overview
There are many situations in which the quantity and composition
of radioactive material must be determined. In some instances,
access to the material is impossible or undesirable, and
consequently, weighing, laboratory analysis, and calorimetry are not
viable options. In these cases, in situ nondestructive assay (NDA),
based on the measurement of signature emissions from a specific
isotope of interest, is used to provide an estimate of the type and
quantity of radioactive material present. However, large
uncertainties and inaccuracies have occurred in estimating the type
and quantity of radioactive material using in situ NDA. These
uncertainties and inaccuracies include incorrect assumptions about
shielding and the spatial distribution of radioactive material, as
well as poor measurement techniques. Measurement errors, in turn,
lead to potential criticality accident conditions, unexpected
radiation exposure to workers, and underestimation of radioactive
material available for release in accident scenarios.
In most nuclear safety areas, the Department of Energy (DOE) has
captured required elements for robust site programs through its
Directives system. These elements include requirements necessary for
proper functioning of the program, training and qualification
standards for personnel, assessment criteria to ensure proper
implementation of requirements, and feedback mechanisms for lessons
learned and continuous improvement. However, DOE has not established
programmatic requirements for NDA, even though this method is
heavily relied upon for nuclear safety throughout the complex and is
key to many DOE activities. The capability to perform accurate
measurements and use the results to determine compliance with
nuclear safety limits is absolutely essential.
Research and development efforts for NDA have historically
focused on the areas of material control and accountability and
nuclear material safeguards; advances in these areas have
peripherally benefitted in situ NDA measurement capabilities.
Current research and development efforts appear to hold little
promise for addressing needed improvements for in situ NDA
measurement. For example, development of instrumentation and
measurement techniques is needed to reduce overall measurement
uncertainties.
Examples
Three notable instances of recent errors associated with in situ
NDA measurement of radioactive material holdup are discussed below.
These errors resulted from the use of inaccurate correction factors
regarding material geometry assumptions or failure to perform
measurements at locations where the material was accumulating. In
each of these cases, the amount of radioactive material was
initially underestimated, resulting in a smaller-than-expected
safety margin and violations of criticality safety limits.
Material holdup in 6-inch diameter vacuum system pipe at the Hanford
Site's Plutonium Finishing Plant was assumed to be in the form of a
0.25 inch layer at the bottom of the pipe. Using a correction factor
for this geometry, the initial estimate of material was about 1 kg.
When workers then proceeded to remove the piping, it was found to be
filled with a solid plug of material, and the actual amount of
material present was nearly twice as high as the initial estimate.
Measurement of an exhaust filter at the Y-12 National Security
Complex assumed that fissionable material was loaded only on the
face of the filter. An estimate of a few hundred grams of material
was obtained using correction factors for this geometry. Subsequent
investigation showed that material was loaded throughout the filter,
and not just on the face. The actual amount of fissionable material
present was several times the initial estimate.
A second exhaust filter at the Y-12 National Security Complex was
measured periodically using NDA, but the measurement point was not
where the fissionable material was accumulating. Once this error was
discovered, follow-up measurements showed significant material
accumulation.
In each of these instances, site-specific corrective actions
were taken based on the specific problem encountered. Lessons
learned from these events do not appear to have been shared within
the DOE complex. Complex-wide corrective actions have not been
identified to minimize the occurrence of similar events at other
sites. The Board is concerned that undiscovered problems currently
exist at other facilities within the DOE complex. It is incumbent
upon DOE and its contractors to review current in situ NDA
measurements to determine whether the assumptions used to derive
results are sufficiently conservative to ensure compliance with
nuclear safety limits.
Issues
Three main issues dominate the current technical and regulatory
landscape regarding in situ NDA measurements: (1) Lack of
standardized requirements for performing measurements, (2) lack of
design requirements for new facilities that would facilitate
accurate holdup measurement, and (3) lack of research and
development activities for new instrumentation and/or measurement
techniques. Each of these issues is discussed below.
Lack of Standardization--DOE has not established requirements or
guidance for performing in situ measurements in its Directives
system. While the Board recognizes that measurement techniques can
be highly location specific, a requirement to follow methods
outlined in national consensus standards when performing in situ NDA
measurements would reduce the errors and uncertainty of results.
Commercial guidance for NDA is available in a series of standards
published by the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM).
This series addresses good practices for performing NDA
measurements, methods for performing specific types of NDA
measurements (for example, ASTM C-1133-03, NDA of Low-Density Scrap
and Waste by Segmented Passive Gamma Ray Scanning), and training and
qualification of NDA personnel. While this guidance has been used
informally at some sites, DOE has not required its use for NDA
measurements.
Lack of Design Requirements for New Facilities--Many of the
problems that require in situ NDA to determine radioactive material
holdup arose because facilities were designed and built before the
need for NDA technology was evident. As a result, no consistent
attempt was made to design facility systems to minimize holdup or
facilitate its measurement. This historical trend should not be
repeated in new facilities. The necessity of monitoring radioactive
material holdup must be considered in the design of new facilities.
For example, locations for monitoring can be selected during the
design phase on the basis of the most likely locations for holdup to
occur. Calibrations can then be performed at these locations before
the facility begins operations to provide a baseline for future NDA
measurements. Facilities can also be designed to minimize holdup in
areas where it may be of concern.
Lack of Research and Development Activities--Los Alamos National
Laboratory (LANL) conducted NDA research for more than 20 years.
LANL developed most of the NDA techniques in current use, and
conducts associated training programs. However, it is not clear that
any significant research and development for in situ NDA
measurements is currently being conducted within DOE to address
serious concerns with material holdup. Research and development
activities are focused in other areas, such as nuclear material
safeguards and homeland security, but these efforts have different
objectives and may not yield results that are beneficial for
measurements using in situ NDA.
Recommendation
The Board, therefore, recommends that DOE:
1. Evaluate the extent of condition regarding inaccurate in situ
NDA programs
[[Page 24281]]
within DOE. This effort should involve at least two actions:
A. Identifying all cases within the defense nuclear complex in
which in situ NDA results are used to ensure compliance with nuclear
safety limits.
B. Reviewing the cases identified in step 1.A to validate that
the protocols, methodologies, calculations, and assumptions used to
obtain NDA results are sufficiently conservative. This review should
take into consideration lessons learned from recent events.
2. Establish requirements and guidance in a DOE directive or
directives. The requirements and guidance should focus on in situ
NDA programs that are used to demonstrate compliance with nuclear
safety limits. Particular issues to be addressed should include:
A. Training and qualification standards for personnel involved
in performing NDA measurements, interpreting and reviewing results,
and managing site programs.
B. Application of standard protocols and methodologies, such as
those given in the national consensus series issued by ASTM, for
performing NDA measurements.
C. Standardization of correction factors for common situations
(geometry and self-attenuation factors) and consistent application
of uncertainty values.
D. Reinforcement of the use of formal lessons-learned mechanisms
in the application of NDA programs so that information can be shared
easily among affected DOE sites.
E. Incorporation of features in the design of new facilities to
minimize radioactive material holdup and facilitate accurate NDA
holdup measurements.
F. Periodic assessments of the need for new NDA technology and
the status of ongoing NDA-related research and development programs.
G. Periodic assessments to ensure that NDA programs are using
the best available technology.
H. Incorporation of appropriate quality assurance elements into
in situ NDA measurements when used for compliance with nuclear
safety limits as required by 10 Code of Federal Regulations Part
830.
A.J. Eggenberger,
Chairman.
[FR Doc. E7-8374 Filed 5-1-07; 8:45 am]
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