Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards, 17688-17745 [E7-6363]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
6 CFR Part 27
Dennis Deziel, Chemical Security
Regulatory Task Force, Department of
Homeland Security, 703–235–5263.
[DHS–2006–0073]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
RIN 1601–AA41
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards
Department Of Homeland
Security.
ACTION: Interim final rule.
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AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS or Department) issues
this interim final rule (IFR) pursuant to
Section 550 of the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007 (Section
550), which provided the Department
with authority to promulgate ‘‘interim
final regulations’’ for the security of
certain chemical facilities in the United
States.
This rule establishes risk-based
performance standards for the security
of our Nation’s chemical facilities. It
requires covered chemical facilities to
prepare Security Vulnerability
Assessments (SVAs), which identify
facility security vulnerabilities, and to
develop and implement Site Security
Plans (SSPs), which include measures
that satisfy the identified risk-based
performance standards. It also allows
certain covered chemical facilities, in
specified circumstances, to submit
Alternate Security Programs (ASPs) in
lieu of an SVA, SSP, or both.
The rule contains associated
provisions addressing inspections and
audits, recordkeeping, and the
protection of information that
constitutes Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI). Finally,
the rule provides the Department with
authority to seek compliance through
the issuance of Orders, including Orders
Assessing Civil Penalty and Orders for
the Cessation of Operations.
EFFECTIVE DATES: This regulation is
effective June 8, 2007, except for
Appendix A to part 27. A subsequent
final rule document will announce the
effective date of Appendix A to Part 27.
Comment related to the addition of
Appendix A to part 27 only will be
accepted until May 9, 2007.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments,
identified by docket number 2006–0073,
by one of the following methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Mail: IP/CSCD/Dennis Deziel, Mail
Stop 8100, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, DC 20528–8100.
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This
interim final rule is organized as
follows: Section I explains the public
participation provisions and provides a
brief discussion of the statutory and
regulatory authority and history; Section
II summarizes the changes from the
Advance Notice of Rulemaking and
discusses the revised rule text; Section
III summarizes and responds to the
comments the Department received in
response to the Advance Notice of
Rulemaking; and Section IV contains
the regulatory analyses for this interim
final rule.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Background
A. Public Participation
B. Statutory and Regulatory Authority and
History
II. Interim Final Rule
A. Summary of Changes From Advance
Notice of Rulemaking
B. Rule Provisions
III. Discussion of Comments
A. Applicability of the Rule
1. Definition of ‘‘Chemical Facility or
Facility’’
2. Multiple Owners or Operators
3. Classifying Facilities Based on Hazard
Class
4. Applicability to Specific Chemicals or
Quantities of Chemicals
5. Applicability to Types of Facilities
6. Statutory Exemptions
B. Determining Which Facilities Present a
High-Level of Security Risk
1. Use of the Top-Screen Approach
2. Assessment Methodologies
3. Risk-Based Tiers
C. Security Vulnerability Assessments and
Site Security Plans
1. General Comments
2. Submitting a Site Security Plan
3. Content of Site Security Plans
4. Approval of Site Security Plans
5. Timing
6. Alternate Security Programs
D. Risk-Based Performance Standards
1. General Approach To Performance
Standards
2. Comments about Specific Performance
Standards
3. Variations in Performance Standards for
Risk Tiers
4. Adoption of MTSA Provisions
E. Background Checks
F. Inspections and Audits
1. Inspections
2. Third-Party Auditors and Inspectors
G. Recordkeeping
H. Orders
I. Adjudications and Appeals
J. Information Protection: Chemicalterrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI)
1. General
2. Disclosure of CVI
3. Scope of CVI
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4. Relation of CVI to Other Categories of
Protected Information and FOIA
5. Sharing CVI with State and Local
Officials, the Public, and Congress
6. Litigation
7. Protection of CVI
K. Preemption
L. Implementation of the Rule
M. Other Issues
1. Whistleblower Protection
2. Inherently Safer Technology
3. Delegation of Responsibility
4. Interaction with Other Federal Rules and
Programs
5. Third-Party Actions
6. Judicial Review
7. Guidance and Technical Assistance
8. Miscellaneous Comments
N. Regulatory Evaluation
IV. Regulatory Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
1. Background
2. Propriety of the Department’s View on
Preemption
3. No Field Preemption
4. Principles of Conflict Preemption
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. NEPA
I. Introduction and Background
A. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to
participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or
arguments on Appendix A of this
interim final rule. Comments that will
provide the most assistance to DHS in
finalizing the Appendix will reference
specific chemicals and Screening
Threshold Quantities on the list, explain
the reason for any recommended
change, and include data, information,
or authority that support such
recommended change.
Instructions: All submissions received
must include the agency name and
docket number for this rulemaking. All
comments received will be posted
without change to https://
www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Comments that include trade secrets,
confidential commercial or financial
information, Sensitive Security
Information (SSI), or Protected Critical
Infrastructure Information (PCII) should
not be submitted to the public
regulatory docket. Please submit such
comments separately from other
comments on the rule. Comments
containing trade secrets, confidential
commercial or financial information,
Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or
Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) should be
appropriately marked as containing
such information and submitted by mail
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to the individual(s) listed in the FOR
FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.
Docket: For access to the docket to
read background documents or
comments received, go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Submitted
comments by mail may also be
inspected. To inspect comments, please
call Dennis Deziel, 703–235–5263, to
arrange for an appointment.
B. Statutory Regulatory Authority and
History
On October 4, 2006, the President
signed the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007
(the Act), which provides the
Department of Homeland Security with
the authority to regulate the security of
high-risk chemical facilities. See Pub. L.
109–295, sec. 550. Section 550 requires
the Secretary of Homeland Security to
promulgate interim final regulations
‘‘establishing risk-based performance
standards for security of chemical
facilities’’ by April 4, 2007. Id. Although
interim final regulations are usually
issued without prior notice and
comment (and the Act requires neither),
the Department issued an Advance
Notice of Rulemaking (Advance Notice)
seeking comment on the significant
issues and regulatory text. See generally
71 FR 78276 (Dec. 28, 2006).
As discussed more fully in the
Advance Notice, before the enactment of
Section 550, the Federal government did
not have authority to regulate the
security of most chemical facilities. The
Department has, however, worked
closely with industry leaders in pursuit
of voluntary enhancement of security at
these facilities and provided both
technical assistance and grant funding
for security. In addition, through the
Coast Guard’s Maritime Security
regulations, the Department has
addressed security at certain maritimerelated chemical facilities. See 33 CFR
Part 105. Recently, the Departments of
Homeland Security and Transportation
also proposed security regulations for
the rail transportation of hazardous
chemicals. See 71 FR 76834, 71 FR
76851 (Dec. 21, 2006). Other Federal
programs have addressed chemical
facility safety, but not security: the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
regulates chemical process safety
through its Risk Management Plan
(RMP) program; the Department of
Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) regulates
workplace safety and health at chemical
facilities; the Department of Commerce
oversees compliance with the Chemical
Weapons Convention; and the
Department of Justice’s Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
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Explosives (ATF) regulates, through
licenses and permits, the purchase,
possession, storage, and transportation
of explosives.
With the authority under Section 550,
the Department can now fill a
significant security gap in the country’s
anti-terrorism efforts. Section 550
specifies that the regulations ‘‘shall
apply to chemical facilities that, in the
discretion of the Secretary, present high
levels of security risk.’’ The statute
requires that the regulations establish
risk-based performance standards;
requires Security Vulnerability
Assessments and Site Security Plans;
allows Alternative Security Programs;
mandates audits and inspections to
determine compliance with the
regulations; provides for civil penalties
for violation of an order issued under
the statute; and allows the Secretary to
order a facility to cease operations if the
facility is not in compliance with the
requirements. The statute also gives the
Department the authority to protect
from inappropriate public disclosure
any information developed pursuant to
Section 550, ‘‘including vulnerability
assessments, site security plans, and
other security related information,
records, and documents.’’
As discussed in the Advance Notice,
by directing the Secretary to issue
‘‘interim final regulations,’’ Congress
authorized the Secretary to proceed
without the traditional notice-andcomment required by the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 71
FR 78276, 78277. The Department,
however, saw great benefit in soliciting
comments on as much of the program as
was practicable in the short timeframe
permitted under the statute.
Accordingly, the Department
voluntarily sought comment on a range
of regulatory and implementation issues
and responds to the comments below.
II. Interim Final Rule
A. Summary of Changes From Advance
Notice of Rulemaking
In this interim final rule, the
Department has not changed the
general, risk-based approach it proposed
in the December 28, 2006, Advance
Notice. See 71 FR 78276. As discussed
in detail below, the Department plans to
implement the regulation in phases,
starting to work aggressively with
chemical facilities presenting the very
highest security risks first. The
Department adopts a risk-based tiering
structure in its regulatory approach, so
that the Department’s scrutiny of
facilities under this regulation increases
as the level of risk increases. Even
though this approach remains the same,
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the Department provides further details
below on a number of unresolved issues
presented in the Advance Notice. For
example, the Department provides
further detail on the issues surrounding
background checks for those with access
to high-risk facilities, and the
Department describes its approach on
facilities possessing ammonium nitrate.
On several important issues, the
Department has reconsidered and
modified the position it proposed in the
Advance Notice. For example, in
response to comments, the Department
has restructured its provisions
concerning objections, consultations,
adjudications, and appeals. As
discussed below, the Department’s aim
is to provide flexibility and assistance
for facilities seeking to comply with the
regulatory standards. The Department
has decided, however, to incorporate a
role for a neutral adjudicator where
unresolved differences present
themselves and result in significant
fines or other penalties. In addition, the
Department has modified a number of
scheduling and timing requirements in
response to comments, and the
Department further explains its
approach on preemption of state and
local law after considering the
numerous comments on that subject.
Although the Department continues to
view as important the opportunity for
facilities to submit Alternative Security
Programs, the Department modified the
circumstances in which it will accept
Alternative Security Programs.
Finally, the Department will consider
the issues surrounding the use of fees in
this regulatory program. The
Department is contemplating the
assessment of different fees, including
filing fees, fees for inspections and
audits, and fees for the screening of
individuals against the Terrorist
Screening Database. The Department
has not provided for fees in this interim
final rule, but may, in the future,
propose and seek comment on the
issues surrounding fees for this
regulatory program.
B. Rule Provisions
This section summarizes the
regulatory text changes that the
Department has made to this interim
final rule. In addition to the summary
contained in this section, we have, in
many cases, provided a more extensive
discussion of the change, and the reason
for the change, in the response to
comments below. See § III ‘‘Discussion
of Comments.’’ Finally, to the extent
that the Department has made technical
corrections or corrected typographical
errors, we do not specifically discuss
them.
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Subpart A
Section 27.100
Purpose
The Department has added a Purpose
section to the rule. It states the
Department’s purpose and intent in
issuing this rule and enforcing this
regulatory program.
Section 27.105
Definitions
For purposes of clarity, DHS has
added several definitions, including
‘‘Chemical Security Assessment Tool,’’
‘‘Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information,’’ ‘‘Deputy Secretary,’’
‘‘Director of the Chemical Security
Division’’ and ‘‘Screening Threshold
Quantity.’’ The Department has also
revised a few definitions, including
‘‘Assistant Secretary’’ and ‘‘Under
Secretary.’’ The Department revised
‘‘Under Secretary’’ as a result of
organizational changes in the
Department following the Post-Katrina
Emergency Reform Act, which the
President signed on October 4, 2006.
See Public Law 109–295, Title VI. In
several places, the Department indicated
that the named official, or his designee,
has the specified responsibility under
the regulation. The Department also
revised the definition of ‘‘Alternate
Security Program,’’ to provide
consistency with changes the
Department has since made to § 27.235,
the Alternate Security Programs section.
The Department expanded upon the
definition of ‘‘tier,’’ adding that, for
purposes of this part, there are four riskbased tiers.
Finally, the Department made
clarifying changes to ‘‘Chemical
Facility,’’ ‘‘Covered Chemical Facility,’’
and ‘‘Owner.’’ With respect to the
definition of ‘‘Chemical Facility,’’ the
Department removed the circular nature
of the definition in the Advance Notice
(i.e., a chemical facility shall mean any
facility) (emphasis added) and now
provides that a chemical facility ‘‘shall
mean any establishment that possesses
or plans to possess * * *.’’
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Section 27.120 Designation of a
coordinating official; Consultations and
technical assistance
The language in revised § 27.120(a)
makes clear that the Assistant Secretary
will designate a Coordinating Official
responsible for ensuring the uniform,
impartial, and fair implementation of
these regulations. The language in
revised § 27.120(b) indicates that the
Coordinating Official and his staff shall
provide guidance to facilities, and while
the Coordinating Official and his staff
will be available for consultation and to
provide technical assistance, they will
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be available only to the extent that
resources permit.
In § 27.120(c), the Department has
provided specific details as to how a
facility requests the assistance of the
Coordinating Official. In the second
sentence of § 27.120(c), the Department
provides that requests for consultation
or technical guidance do not serve to
toll any of the applicable timelines set
forth in this part. Accordingly,
regardless of whether or when a facility
submits a request for consultation or
technical guidance, the Department will
require the facility to comply with the
regulatory requirements, such as
completing the Top-Screen, identifying
vulnerabilities in the Security
Vulnerability Assessment, and
developing and implementing a Site
Security Plan.
The Department has added a new
provision in § 27.120(d). This provision
provides that a covered facility may
request a consultation with the
Coordinating Official if it modifies its
facility, processes, or the types or
quantities of materials that it possesses,
and believes such changes may impact
the covered facility’s obligations under
this part. The Department added this
provision in response to commenters
concerned about a facility’s ability to
‘‘exit’’ the regulatory program. The
Department recognizes that facilities
that reduce risk to levels below those
levels that the Department deems as that
characterized for Tier 4 facilities (i.e.,
the lowest risk facilities of the ‘‘high
risk’’ facilities) or that eliminate certain
risks altogether may no longer need to
be covered by this regulation. This
provision allows the covered facility to
request the initiation of the screening
process (which determines whether or
not the facility is high-risk and therefore
whether the facility is or is not included
in this regulatory program) prior to the
facility’s next scheduled CSAT TopScreen submission pursuant to § 27.210.
Through this consultation process, the
facility may initiate discussions with
the Department and ultimately
accelerate the process for determining
whether it can ‘‘exit’’ the regulatory
program.
Subpart B
Section 27.200 Information regarding
security risk for a chemical facility
The Department has added several
new provisions to this section. The
Department has revised paragraph (b),
by incorporating language from
proposed § 27.200(a) of the Advance
Notice and by also adding new
provisions. The two sentences in
paragraph (b)(1) come from the end of
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proposed § 27.200(a). Paragraph (b)(1)
provides that the Assistant Secretary
may seek the information listed in
paragraph (a) by contacting chemical
facilities individually or by publishing a
notice in the Federal Register. It also
provides that the Assistant Secretary
may instruct facilities to complete and
submit a Top-Screen through a secure
Department Web site or through any
other means approved by the Assistant
Secretary.
Paragraph (b)(2) is a new provision. It
provides that a facility must complete
and submit a Top-Screen in accordance
with the schedule provided in § 27.210
if it possesses any of the chemicals
listed in Appendix A: ‘‘DHS Chemicals
of Interest’’ at the corresponding
quantities. For a further discussion of
Appendix A, see the discussion of
Appendix A further below in the Rule
Provisions section. The purpose of this
provision is to give facilities direction as
to whether or not they must complete
and submit a Top-Screen.
As noted in the discussion of
Appendix A, the presence or amount of
a particular chemical is not an indicator
of a facility’s coverage under this rule.
The presence or amount of a chemical
in the Appendix is merely a baseline
threshold requiring a facility to
complete and submit a Top-Screen.
(Consistent with § 27.200(b)(1), DHS
will retain the ability to notify facilities,
through direct notification or Federal
Register notice, that they need to
complete and submit a Top-Screen.) The
information that the Department will
obtain through the Top-Screen process
is only one of several factors that the
Department will consider in
determining whether a facility is ‘‘highrisk’’ and thus covered by this rule.
Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the
requirements for individuals who
submit information to the Department
through the CSAT system, which
includes the Top-Screen process.
Paragraph (b)(3) provides that, where
the Department requests that a facility
complete and submit a Top-Screen, the
facility must designate a person to be
responsible for the submission of
information through the CSAT system.
(The CSAT system is comprised of three
sequential parts: the Top-Screen, the
SVA, and the SSP). The Department
provides that any such submitter must
be an officer of the corporation or other
person designated by an officer of the
corporation, and must be domiciled in
the United States. The Department had
contemplated such requirements in
Appendix A to the Advance Notice and
now finalizes them here.
Consistent with the explanation in
Appendix A to the Advance Notice, the
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Department notes that a facility may
choose to have another individual, in
addition to the above-discussed
‘‘submitter,’’ involved in the submission
of information through the Top-Screen.
That other individual is a ‘‘provider.’’ A
provider would be a qualified
individual who is familiar with the
facility in question and who completes
the information in the CSAT system.
The provider, however, would not
formally submit information to the
Department. The individual responsible
for sending information to the
Department through the CSAT system
(whether Top-Screen, SVA, or SSP) is
always the submitter. And as indicated
in paragraph (b)(3), the submitter is also
responsible for attesting to the accuracy
of the submitted information.
Paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) address
facilities that the Department deems as
‘‘presumptively high risk.’’ Both
paragraphs were in the Advance Notice,
though they were located in proposed
§§ 27.200(b) and (c).
Section 27.205 Determination that a
chemical facility ‘‘presents a high level
of security risk.’’
The Advance Notice, at the end of
§ 27.205(a), contained a provision about
Departmental notification to facilities of
their preliminary placement in a riskbased tier. The Department has moved
that language to § 27.220 ‘‘Tiering,’’ so
that it is located with the related tiering
provisions.
In addition, the Department has
removed proposed § 27.205(c), along
with §§ 27.220(b), and 27.240(c), all of
which had contained a mechanism for
objections. In the Advance Notice, the
Department had provided facilities with
the opportunity to object to the
following three Departmental actions:
determination that a facility ‘‘presents a
high level of risk,’’ placement in a highrisk tier, and disapproval of a facility’s
Site Security Plan. The intention behind
those provisions was to provide
facilities with an informal opportunity
to consult with the Department. The
Department believes that the rule
(including existing provisions from the
Advance Notice as well as new
provisions in this interim final rule)
provides facilities with several
opportunities for consultation when
they disagree with an initial decision on
these matters. Specifically, revised
§ 27.120(b) provides that the
Coordinating Official and his staff shall
be available to consult and to provide
technical assistance to a facility owner
or operator, revised § 27.120(c) provides
the details for how a facility should
initiate consultations or assistance, and
revised § 27.120(d) provides that a
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covered facility may request a
consultation if it modifies its facility,
processes, or the types or quantities of
materials that it possesses and believes
such changes may impact the covered
facility’s obligations under this part. In
addition, §§ 27.240(b) and 27.245(b)
provide that a facility shall enter further
consultations following Departmental
written notification that a Security
Vulnerability Assessment or Site
Security Plan is unsatisfactory. Given
that the rule already provides
consultation opportunities, coupled
with the fact that the Department has
greatly modified its adjudication and
appeal provisions, the Department
believes it is unnecessary to retain these
objections provisions and has thus
removed them from the interim final
rule.
Section 27.210 Submissions Schedule
In § 27.210, the Department clarifies
the submission schedule for the TopScreen, Security Vulnerability
Assessment, and Site Security Plan. In
§ 27.210(a) of the Advance Notice, the
Department included a sentence
indicating that the presumptive time
frames were 60 days for the Security
Vulnerability Assessment and 120 days
for the Site Security Plan. In this interim
final rule, the Department has added
presumptive timeframes for the
submission of the Top-Screen and
revised the presumptive timeframes for
SVAs and SSPs. See § 27.210(a) and (b).
The presumptive timeframes for initial
submissions are 60 calendar days for the
Top-Screen, 90 calendar days for the
SVA, and 120 calendar days for the SSP.
The presumptive timeframes for
resubmission vary depending on a
facility’s tier. As a general matter, the
Department will require facilities in
Tiers 1 and 2 to update their TopScreen, SVA, and SSP every two years,
and facilities in Tiers 3 and 4 to update
their Top-Screen, SVA, and SSP every
three years.
In addition, the Department added a
new paragraph (c), which addresses the
Department’s authority to modify
schedules as necessary. The Department
removed § 27.210(c) as it appeared in
the Advance Notice, because the
provision was unnecessary in light of
the new provisions in § 27.120(b) and
(c), ‘‘Designation of a coordinating
official; consultations and technical
assistance.’’
Finally, the Department added a new
paragraph (d), which addresses material
modifications. In §§ 27.215(c)(3) and
27.225(b)(3) of the Advance Notice, the
Department provided that a covered
facility had to notify the Department of
material modifications to the SVA or
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SSP and that the Department would
notify the facility within 60 days of
whether the Department disapproved
the revised SVA or SSP. The
Department has re-located a new but
similar requirement in § 27.210(d). The
regulation now provides that if a
covered facility makes material
modifications to its operations or site,
the covered facility must complete and
submit a revised Top-Screen to the
Department within 60 days of
completion of the material modification.
In accordance with the resubmission
requirements in § 27.210(b)(2) and (3),
the Department will notify the covered
facility as to whether the covered
facility must submit a revised Security
Vulnerability Assessment, Site Security
Plan, or both. As a result of this new
paragraph (d), the Department removed
the provisions that appeared in
§§ 27.215(c)(3) and 27.225(b)(3) of the
Advance Notice.
Section 27.215 Security Vulnerability
Assessments and Section 27.225 Site
Security Plans
The Department has revised several of
the corresponding provisions in both
§ 27.215 and § 27.225. First, the
Department has revised the
corresponding provisions regarding
methodologies. Specifically, the
Department has revised the language in
§ 27.215(b) and added a new paragraph
(b) in § 27.225. In both places, the
Department explains that, except as
provided in § 27.235, a covered facility
must submit either the SVA/SSP
through the CSAT process or any other
methodology or process identified by
the Assistant Secretary.
By this change, the Department is
making more explicit its intention to use
the CSAT process at this time. The
CSAT process includes completion of
the Top-Screen process and, depending
on the results of the Top-Screen process,
may also include the development of a
Security Vulnerability Assessment and
the development of a Site Security Plan.
Thus, for facilities that are determined
to be high-risk, the CSAT process will
consist of three sequential parts (i.e., the
Top-Screen, SVA, and SSP). The
Department also notes that facilities will
have to obtain access to the CSAT
system by submitting a user registration
request. Section 27.200(b)(1) contains
the requirements for individuals (i.e.,
submitters) who will be submitting
information through the CSAT system
and attesting to the accuracy of that
information.
Second, in paragraph (c) of both
sections, the Department provides that a
covered facility must submit an SVA or
SSP to the Department in accordance
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with the schedule provided in § 27.210.
This captures the requirement that had
been located in proposed § 27.240(a)(1)
of the Advance Notice.
Third, in paragraph (d) of both
sections, the Department revised the
update/revision provisions for
submitting SVAs and SSPs. In the
Advance Notice, the Department
indicated that covered facilities must
update or revise their SVAs or SSPs
based on a schedule set by the Assistant
Secretary. Because the Department has
established a submission schedule in
§ 27.210, the Department now includes
cross-references in § 27.215(d)(1) and
§ 27.225(d)(2) to that schedule. As a
related matter, in § 27.215(d), the
Department moved the general
submissions schedule requirement to
§ 27.215(d)(1), thereby re-locating the
provision formerly in § 27.215(d)(1) to
§ 27.215(d)(2).
Fourth, the Department has removed
the language about material
modifications from proposed
§ 27.215(c)(3) and § 27.225(b)(3). As
discussed in the summary of § 27.210,
the Department added a new, but
similar, provision to § 27.210(d). The
new provision now captures the concept
contemplated in proposed § 27.215(c)(3)
and § 27.225(b)(3).
With respect to changes to § 27.225
only, the Department has added a
provision that requires facilities to
conduct annual audits of their Site
Security Plans. See § 27.225(e). This
provision had been implied in the
recordkeeping requirement in the
Advance Notice (see § 27.255(a)(6)) and
is now explicit. DHS made some
additional revisions to the
corresponding recordkeeping provision,
in which DHS more clearly specifies the
audit-related records that covered
facilities should maintain.
Finally, throughout this document,
the Department now uses the term
‘‘Security Vulnerability Assessment’’ (or
SVA) instead of the term ‘‘Vulnerability
Assessment’’ or (VA), which the
Department had used in the Advance
Notice. The Department intends no
change in meaning with this revision.
Section 27.220 Tiering
The Department has added several
paragraphs to this section. Section
27.220(a) addresses the Department’s
preliminary determination as to a
facility’s risk-based tier. Paragraph (a) is
based on language that had been in the
Advance Notice at the end of
§ 27.205(a). The Department has
elaborated on the Preliminary Tiering
provision. Notably, the Department has
indicated that it shall notify a facility of
the Department’s preliminary tiering
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decision. This contrasts with the
Advance Notice, which had merely
indicated that the Department may
notify a facility of the Department’s
preliminary tiering decision.
Section 27.220(b) is not a new
subsection; rather, it contains the
language that was previously located in
§ 27.220(a). Note that the Department
has removed paragraph (b) as proposed
in the Advance Notice. Paragraph (b)
had contained an objections provision.
For a discussion of the Department’s
decision to remove the objections
provisions from this rule (in
§§ 27.205(c), 27.220(b), and 27.240(c)),
see the summary under § 27.205(c).
Section 27.220(c) is a new subsection.
The Department is reiterating, in part,
what it provides in the definitions
section. The Department will place
facilities in one of four risk-based tiers.
Tiers will range from Tier 1, which
contains the highest-risk covered
facilities, to Tier 4, which contains the
lowest-risk covered facilities. Finally,
the Department separated the sentence
located at the end of proposed
§ 27.220(a) into its own section,
§ 27.220(d).
Section 27.230 Risk-Based
Performance Standards
This section contains the risk-based
performance standards that covered
facilities must satisfy. The Department
has added a sentence to § 27.230(a),
noting that the ‘‘acceptable layering of
measures used to meet the standards
will vary by risk-based tier.’’ While all
facilities must satisfy the performance
standards, the measures sufficient to
meet those standards will be more
robust for those facilities that present
higher levels of risk. In other words, the
manner in which the standards are
applied will require a higher level of
security (and so provide for greater
reduction in risk) for those facilities that
present higher levels of risk. The
Department will provide details about
the application of these standards in
guidance.
In addition, for each of the
performance standards, the Department
has added a short descriptor at the
beginning of the subparagraph (e.g.,
paragraph (a)(1) begins with ‘‘Restricted
Area Perimeter,’’ paragraph (a)(2) begins
with ‘‘Securing Site Assets,’’ and so
forth).
The Department has also revised some
of the language related to specific
performance standards. Section
27.230(a)(4) now provides that facilities
must select, develop, and implement
measures designed to ‘‘[d]eter, detect,
and delay an attack, creating sufficient
time between detection of an attack and
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the point at which the attack becomes
successful.’’ This revised language more
adequately captures the concept that the
Department had intended in the
language in paragraph (a)(4) of the
Advance Notice and is more complete.
Section 27.230(a)(5) now requires
facilities to secure and monitor the
storage of hazardous materials, in
addition to the shipping and receipt of
hazardous materials. Section
27.230(a)(8) now contains a broader
description of critical process systems.
In the Advance Notice, the Department
had used the acronym ‘‘SCADA’’
(Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) to refer to instrumented
control systems in general. In this
interim final rule, the Department has
provided more descriptive terminology
to refer to critical process systems. For
a further discussion of SCADA, see the
Department responses to ‘‘Comments on
Specific Performance Standards.’’
Section 27.230(a)(12) contains an
expanded standard for background
checks. For a further discussion of
background checks, see the Department
response to comments about
‘‘Background Checks.’’ Section
27.230(a)(15) now provides that
facilities should report significant
security incidents to local law
enforcement in addition to the
Department. Finally, the Department
has removed the paragraph that was
paragraph 27.230(a)(19) in the Advance
Notice, because that standard was
already addressed in paragraph (a)(14).
Section 27.235 Alternative security
program
The Department has revised this
section to provide more detail about the
process for Alternate Security Programs
(ASPs). The basic requirement remains
the same, in that certain covered
facilities may submit ASPs, and the
Assistant Secretary may approve those
ASPs. See § 27.235(a). To accept an
ASP, the Assistant Secretary must find
that the program ‘‘provides an
equivalent level of security to the level
of security established by this part.’’
This language, which clarifies the
standard for accepting ASPs, comes
from the preamble of the Advance
Notice and is consistent with the terms
of Section 550. See 71 FR 78276, 78285.
In § 27.235(a)(1)–(2), the Department
specifies, by tier, which facilities may
submit ASPs in lieu of Security
Vulnerability Assessments (SVAs) and
which facilities may submit ASPs in
lieu of Site Security Plans (SSPs). A Tier
4 facility may submit an ASP in lieu of
a Security Vulnerability Assessment,
Site Security Plan, or both. Tier 1, Tier
2, and Tier 3 facilities may submit an
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ASP in lieu of a Site Security Plan. Tier
1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 facilities may not
submit an ASP in lieu of a Security
Vulnerability Assessment. Accordingly,
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 facilities will
have to submit their SVA through the
CSAT system.
With respect to Tier 4 facilities, the
Department clarifies the following
point: Given that the Department
notifies a facility of its final placement
in a risk-based tier following the
Department’s review of a covered
facility’s SVA (see § 27.220(b)), a facility
will not know its final tier placement at
the time it might decide to submit an
ASP in lieu of a SVA. Because of that,
the Department understands that
facilities will rely on the Department’s
preliminary tiering determination made
pursuant to § 27.220(a).
There are various reasons underlying
the Department’s decision not to accept
ASPs as SVAs for Tier 1, Tier 2, and
Tier 3 facilities. The Department needs
a consistent baseline against which to
compare risks and vulnerabilities across
chemical facilities. (For a further
discussion of this issue, see the
Department’s response to comments in
§ III(B)(1)). As well, the Chemical
Security Assessment Tool (CSAT)
system uses an integrated approach to
chemical facility security, and by
considering SVAs that use the
methodology in the CSAT system, the
Department can take full advantage of
that integrated approach. Furthermore,
by using this electronic, integrated
CSAT approach, the Department can
more efficiently review and assess a
greater number SVAs, and that is of
importance considering the
Department’s phased implementation
scheme to address the highest risk
facilities first.
The Department acknowledges that
many facilities have expended
substantial resources and incurred
significant expense to identify
vulnerabilities and to develop security
plans. The Department commends
facilities for such efforts. The work
performed on these efforts is valuable,
and DHS is committed to capitalizing on
these investments. The information
developed in these efforts will be
relevant to facilities as they complete
the CSAT SVA. Facilities will be able to
use the information from existing
vulnerability assessments, and in many
cases, the practical impact of requiring
Tiers 1, 2, and 3 facilities use the CSAT
SVA system will be one of formatting,
i.e., facilities will have to enter their
information from their existing
vulnerability assessments into the
format established by the CSAT system.
While some additional analytical effort
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will be required, even where the facility
has produced a strong SVA, the effort
will be considerably less than that at
facilities that are starting without a preexisting SVA.
In addition, § 27.235(b) provides that
the notice requirements for submitting
ASPs correspond with the notice
requirements (including the approval
and disapproval process) for SVAs and
SSPs. In other words, if a facility is
submitting an ASP in lieu of an SVA,
the process in § 27.240 applies, and if a
facility is submitting an ASP in lieu of
an SSP, the process in § 27.245 applies.
Section 27.240 Review and Approval
of Security Vulnerability Assessment
and Section 27.245 Review and
Approval of Site Security Plans
In this interim final rule, the
Department has separated the review
and approval of SVAs and SSPs into
two separate sections. In the Advance
Notice, both sets of requirements were
located in § 27.240. In this interim final
rule, the provisions related to Security
Vulnerability Assessments are located
in § 27.240, and the provisions related
to Site Security Plans are located in
§ 27.245.
In addition, the Department made
some changes to the corresponding
provisions in the two separate sections.
In both sections, the Department has
removed the language (from proposed
§ 27.240(a)(1)) about time periods for
submitting SVAs and SSPs. The
Department has already addressed this
issue in §§ 27.215(c)–(d) and
§§ 27.225(c)–(d) (by providing that a
facility must provide, update, and revise
its SVA and SSP consistent with the
schedule in § 27.210), so it was
unnecessary to also include this
language here. Also, in both sections,
the Department has added new language
about the disapproval of SVAs or SSPs.
The Department added a new sentence,
which provides that ‘‘[i]f the
resubmitted [SVA or SSP] does not
satisfy the requirements of [§ 27.215 or
§ 27.225], the Department will provide
the facility with written notification
(including a clear explanation of
deficiencies in the [SVA or SSP]) of the
Department’s disapproval of the [SVA or
SSP].’’ See § 27.240(b) and § 27.245(b).
Finally, the Department has added a
provision in § 27.245(a)(1)(iii),
indicating that the Department issues a
Letter of Approval if it approves a
facility’s Site Security Plan in
accordance with § 27.250. While this
provision appears elsewhere in the rule
(see § 27.245(b)), the Department
thought it was appropriate to include it
here as well.
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The Department has removed
27.240(c) as proposed in the Advance
Notice. Paragraph (c) had contained an
objections provision. For a discussion of
the Department’s decision to remove the
objections provisions from this rule (in
§§ 27.205(c), 27.220(b), and 27.240(c)),
see the summary under § 27.205(c).
Section 27.250 Inspections and Audits
The Department has added additional
provisions to the inspection and audit
section. In § 27.250(c), the Department
discusses the time and manner
requirements for inspections. While the
Department will generally provide
facilities with 24-hour advance notice of
inspections, the Department recognizes
two exceptions where an unannounced
inspection might occur. The Department
included the first exception in the
Advance Notice, and the Department
has added the second exception in this
interim final rule. For a further
discussion, see the Discussion of
Comments in § III(F) on ‘‘Inspections
and Audits.’’
In § 27.250(d), the Department
addresses various details related to the
inspectors who will conduct inspections
and audits. This is a new paragraph that
was not in the Advance Notice.
Although Congress has not provided the
Department with administrative
subpoena authority, this paragraph
explains that inspectors will have
credentials and may administer oaths
and receive affirmations upon consent.
It also provides details about the means
by which inspectors may gather
information and the access that
inspectors will have to records. The
Department has also added a paragraph
(e), which addresses confidentiality.
Finally, the guidance paragraph, which
had been located in paragraph (d) has
been moved to paragraph (f).
Section 27.255 Recordkeeping
Requirements
The Department revised various
provisions related to recordkeeping.
With respect to § 27.255(a)(1), the
Department added a few additional
record requirements regarding training.
In addition to keeping records of the
date and location of each training
session, time of day and duration of
each session, the name and
qualifications of the instructor, and a
clear, legible list of the attendees
including attendees’ signatures, the
facility must also keep at least one other
unique identifier for each attendee
receiving training and the results of any
evaluation or training. The Department
also added a requirement to § 27.255(b),
requiring facilities to keep submitted
Top-Screens in addition to submitted
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SVAs and SSPs. In addition, as
discussed above in the summary for
§ 27.225(e), the Department revised the
recordkeeping provision related to
internal audits. See § 27.255(a)(6).
The Department also added a new
paragraph (c), allowing the Department
to request that covered facilities make
available records kept pursuant to other
Federal programs or regulations. The
Department would make such requests
for records to the extent that any such
records were necessary for security
purposes. As a result of adding new
paragraph (c), the Department had to redesignate proposed paragraph (c) as
paragraph (d).
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Subpart C
The Department has substantially
revised Subpart C, which contains the
provisions for Orders, Adjudications,
and Appeals.
Section 27.300 Orders
The Department has restructured the
Orders provisions. Whereas the
Advance Notice contained four separate
sections (see §§ 27.300, 27.305, 27.310,
and 27.315), the Department has now
consolidated all of the Order provisions
into one section, § 27.300. The main
substance of the Orders provisions,
however, remains the same. Pursuant to
§ 27.300(a), the Assistant Secretary can
issue an Order for any instance of
noncompliance. For example, the
Assistant Secretary may issue an Order
for a facility’s refusal to complete a TopScreen, failure to allow an inspection, or
failure to update a Site Security Plan.
Beyond a basic Order, the Assistant
Secretary may issue an Order Assessing
Civil Penalty, an Order to Cease
Operations, or both, where it determines
that a facility is in violation of any
Order issued pursuant to paragraph (a).
See § 27.300(b). Orders Assessing Civil
Penalty are for a continual
noncompliance, a repeated pattern of
noncompliance or egregious instances of
noncompliance. Orders to Cease
Operations are the most serious Orders
that the Assistant Secretary might
choose to issue under this regulatory
scheme. The Assistant Secretary will
use such a measure cautiously and
judiciously and will balance the
immediate security needs with the
possible impact (e.g., economic impact
or national security effect) of such an
Order on the chemical industry and the
Nation as a whole. As the Department
wrote in the Advance Notice, ‘‘This
authority would be utilized when no
other options will achieve the required
result.’’ See 71 FR 78276, 78287.
Paragraphs (c) through (f) of § 27.300
address the process and procedures for
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Orders. Section 27.300(c) lists the
information, at a minimum, that the
Assistant Secretary must include in an
Order and also notes that the Assistant
Secretary may establish further
procedures for the issuance of Orders.
Section 27.300(d) notes that a facility
must comply with the terms of the
Order by the date specified in the Order.
Section 27.300(e) indicates that a
facility has the right to seek an
adjudication to review the decision of
the Assistant Secretary to issue an
Order, and § 27.300(f) addresses final
agency action.
With respect to the staying of Orders,
the Department addresses this issue in
the new adjudications sections.
Specifically, § 27.310(b)(4) provides that
an Order is stayed from the timely filing
of a Notice of Application for Review
until the Presiding Officer issues an
Initial Decision, unless the Secretary
lifts the stay due to exigent
circumstances pursuant to § 27.310(d).
The new adjudications section is
discussed in more depth below.
Section 27.305 through 27.340
Adjudications
Most significantly with respect to
adjudications, the Department has
provided facilities with the opportunity
to seek review of specified decisions
before a neutral adjudications officer. A
facility or other person may seek review
of the following Department (i.e.,
Assistant Secretary) determinations: (1)
A finding, pursuant to
§ 27.230(a)(12)(iv) that an individual is
a potential security threat; (2) The
disapproval of a Site Security Plan
pursuant to § 27.245(b); or (3) The
issuance of an Order pursuant to
§ 27.300(a) or (b). See § 27.310(a).
The procedures for Applications are
found in § 27.310(b). To institute
Adjudication Proceedings, the facility or
other person (‘‘Applicant’’) must file a
Notice of Application for Review within
seven calendar days of notification of
the Assistant Secretary’s determination.
See § 27.310(b)(1)–(2). Then, in an
Application for Review, the Applicant
must explain his or her position (i.e.,
explain why the Assistant Secretary’s
determination should be set aside). The
Applicant has 14 calendar days from the
date of notification of the Assistant
Secretary’s determination to file and
serve an Application for Review. See
§ 27.310(b)(5). The Assistant Secretary,
through the Office of the General
Counsel, shall file and serve a Response
within 14 calendar days of the filing and
service of the Application for Review.
See § 27.310(c). Finally, the Secretary
may make certain procedural
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modifications in exigent circumstances.
See § 27.310(d).
A Presiding Officer is the neutral
adjudications officer who handles these
proceedings. The Secretary shall
appoint a Presiding Officer, consistent
with the requirements in § 27.315. A
Presiding Officer shall immediately
consider whether a summary
adjudication of an Application for
Review is appropriate, and if the
Presiding Officer finds that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that
one party or the other is entitled to
decision as a matter of law, then the
record shall be closed and the Presiding
Officer shall issue an Initial Decision on
the Application for Review. See
§ 27.330(b). Such summary decisions
are governed by the procedures in
§ 27.330.
Where there is no summary decision,
the Presiding Officer may conduct a
hearing using the procedures specified
in § 27.335. The Presiding Officer shall
close and certify the record upon the
completion of one of the following: a
summary judgment proceeding, a
hearing, the submission of post-hearing
briefs, or the conclusion of oral
arguments. See § 27.340(a). Based on the
certified record, the Presiding Officer
shall issue an Initial Decision, and the
decision shall be subject to appeal
pursuant to § 27.345.
In addition to the sections mentioned
above, there are a few other sections that
address provisions related to
adjudications. Section 27.320 specifies
the prohibition on ex parte
communications during Proceedings.
And § 27.325 provides that the Assistant
Secretary bears the initial burden of
proving the facts necessary to support
the challenged administrative action at
every proceeding instituted under this
subpart.
Finally, as related to the Appeals
section below, a Presiding Officer’s
Initial Decision is stayed from the
timely filing of a Notice of Appeal until
the Under Secretary issues a Final
Decision, unless the Under Secretary
lifts the stay due to exigent
circumstances. See § 27.345(b)(4).
Section 27.345 Appeals
The interim final rule contains a
revised appeals section. There are
several differences. First, a facility or
other person may appeal the Initial
Decision of the Presiding Officer made
pursuant to § 27.340(b). This differs
from the Advance Notice, in which a
facility could appeal a Departmental
final determination regarding
disapproval of a Site Security Plan and
the Departmental issuance of an Order.
See § 27.320 in the Advance Notice.
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Second, the Advance Notice provided
that the Under Secretary would make
decisions for most categories of appeals,
and the Deputy Secretary would make
decisions for one category of appeal.
This interim final rule provides that all
appeals go to the Under Secretary or his
designee acting as a neutral appeals
officer. Third, as is discussed in more
depth below, the procedures for an
appeal have changed.
The Assistant Secretary, a facility, or
other person (‘‘Appellant’’) may
institute an Appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal within seven calendar days of
notification of the Presiding Officer’s
Initial Decision. See § 27.345(b)(1)–(3).
The Appellant shall then file and serve
a Brief within 28 calendar days of the
notification of the Presiding Officer’s
Initial Decision. See § 27.345(b)(5). The
Appellee shall file and serve its
Opposition Brief within 28 days of the
filing of Appellant’s Brief. See
§ 27.345(b)(6). The Under Secretary
shall issue a Final Decision and serve it
on the parties. A Final Decision by the
Under Secretary constitutes final agency
action. See § 27.345(f).
In addition to the provisions
mentioned above, the Department notes
the following: Pursuant to § 27.345(b),
the Under Secretary may provide for an
expedited appeal; pursuant to
§ 27.345(c), ex parte communications
are prohibited; and pursuant to
§ 27.345(c), a facility or other person
may elect to have the Under Secretary
participate in any mediation or other
resolution process by expressly waiving,
in writing, any argument that such
participation has compromised the
Appeals process. In addition, pursuant
to § 27.345(g), the Secretary may
establish procedures for the conduct of
appeals.
Subpart D
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Section 27.400 Chemical-Terrorism
Vulnerability Information
The Department has made numerous
clarifying changes to the chemicalterrorism vulnerability information
(CVI) section. Some of these changes
corrected typographical errors, while
several others clarified existing
provisions. With respect to a minor
change, note that, in § 27.400 of the
Advance Notice, the Department
referred to CVI as ‘‘Chemical-terrorism
Security and Vulnerability Information’’
and in this interim final rule, the
Department now refers to CVI as
‘‘Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information.’’ The Department intends
no change in meaning with this
revision.
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The Department has highlighted
below the more substantive changes to
§ 27.400. With respect to paragraph (c),
the Department has removed paragraph
(c)(2), because that concept is already
covered in paragraph (e)(1)(v). In
paragraph (d)(1), the Department
provides that covered persons must
protect all CVI in their possession or
control, including electronic data. In
paragraph (e)(1), the Department added
language providing that a person who
might have a ‘‘need to know’’ includes
‘‘state or local officials, law enforcement
officials, and first responders.’’ In
paragraph (e)(1)(ii), the Department
clarified that a person in training will
only have access to CVI that he needs
as part of his training, and in paragraph
(e)(1)(iv), the Department clarified that a
the person in a fiduciary relationship
with a covered person who is
representing or providing advice to that
covered person will also have a need to
know CVI. In paragraph (e)(2)(iii), the
Department provides that it may require
non-Federal persons seeking access to
CVI to complete a non-disclosure
agreement before such access is granted.
In paragraph (f)(3), the Department
shortened the distribution limitation
statement and added a new sentence at
the end, which provides: ‘‘[i]n any
administrative or judicial proceedings,
this information shall be treated as
classified information in accordance
with 6 CFR §§ 27.400(h) and (i).’’ And
in paragraphs (h)(1), (i)(1), and (i)(2), the
Department made it clear that these
sections apply to the disclosure of CVI
in the context of administrative or
judicial enforcement proceedings of
section 550 only, not any other kind of
enforcement proceeding. Similarly, in
paragraph (i)(7)(iii), the Department
made it clear that this section applies
only to judicial enforcement
proceedings and not any other judicial
proceeding.
Section 27.405 Review and Preemption
of State Laws and Regulations
The Department has made several
changes to § 27.405, including various
regulatory text changes. Among those
changes, the Department has added
paragraph (a)(1). The Department
wishes to avoid any unintended
consequences in the program’s
interaction with other Federal
requirements. For this reason,
§ 27.405(a)(1) provides that ‘‘[n]othing
in this regulation is intended to displace
other federal requirements administered
by the Environmental Protection
Agency, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S.
Department of Labor, U.S. Department
of Transportation, or other federal
agencies.’’ For a further discussion of
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these changes and preemption in
general, see the section below entitled
‘‘Executive Order: 13132: Federalism.’’
Proposed Appendix A: DHS Chemicals
of Interest
In the Advance Notice, the
Department sought comment on
appropriate sources of information or
methodologies for evaluating and
categorizing chemical facilities.’’ See 71
FR 78276, 78282. The Department
responds to those comments below in
the ‘‘Discussion of Comments.’’ In this
interim final rule, the Department has
decided to evaluate chemical facility
risks by, in part, classifying facilities by
particular chemicals. In proposed
Appendix A, the Department has
included a list of ‘‘DHS Chemicals of
Interest’’ along with Screening
Threshold Quantities, or STQs, for each
chemical. The Department has
established STQs to trigger preliminary
screening requirements. The STQ is not
the threshold quantity for establishing
whether a given facility is a high-risk
facility, but only sets a threshold to
require a facility to complete and submit
a CSAT Top-Screen. As noted in the
‘‘Public Participation’’ section above,
the Department is accepting public
comment on proposed Appendix A for
30 days. Following the close of the
comment period, the Department will
review the comments and publish a
final Appendix A. The requirements
related to Appendix A, which are found
in §§ 27.200(b)(2) and 27.210, will
become operative on the date that the
Department publishes a final Appendix
A.
Pursuant to § 27.200(b)(2), if a facility
possesses any chemicals identified in
Appendix A at the corresponding
quantities, the facility must complete
and submit a Top-Screen. Consistent
with the submission requirements in
§ 27.210(a)(1), the facility must
complete the Top-Screen within 60
calendar days of the effective date of a
final Appendix A or within 60 calendar
days of coming into possession of any
such chemical at the corresponding
quantity. (As indicated in the regulatory
text, this submission requirement is not
operative until the Department
publishes a final Appendix A.) Note that
this provision does not affect the
Department’s ability to contact facilities
independently of this list. Pursuant to
§ 27.200(b)(1), DHS may notify facilities,
on an individual basis or through an
additional Federal Register notice, that
they need to complete and submit the
Top-Screen. The Department notes that,
where a facility has a question as to
whether it should complete a TopScreen, the facility can contact the
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Department and seek a consultation
pursuant to § 27.120.
The Department reiterates that the
presence or amount of a particular
chemical listed in Appendix A is not
the sole factor in determining whether
a facility presents a high-level of
security risk and is not an indicator of
a facility’s coverage under this rule. The
DHS Chemicals of Interest list merely
directs certain facilities to complete and
submit the Top-Screen. This list serves
as a tool to aid the Department in
gathering information needed to
administer the program under Section
550. In order for the Department to
assess compliance by particular
chemical facilities with the regulation
(see Section 550(e)), the Department
must first obtain information to
determine whether the particular
chemical facilities qualify for coverage
under Section 550. The list set out in
Appendix A serves as a procedural tool
designed to aid the Department in
determining which facilities must
comply with the substantive standards.
Only after the Department gathers
additional information through the TopScreen process will the Department
make a determination as to whether a
facility presents a high risk and
therefore must comply with the
regulatory requirements to ensure
adequate security. Under Section 550,
the Department has the authority to use
its best judgment and all available
information in determining whether a
facility presents a high level of security
risk.
In developing the ‘‘DHS Chemicals of
Interest’’ list, the Department has looked
to existing sources of information and
has then drawn on many of those
sources of information, including some
of the sources that commenters
suggested. Those sources include the
following: (1) The chemicals contained
on the EPA’s RMP list. Pursuant to the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.),
which provides that the EPA shall
promulgate a list of substances that ‘‘in
the case of accidental release, are known
to cause or may reasonably be
anticipated to cause death, injury, or
serious adverse effects to human health
or the environment (see 42 U.S.C.
7412(r)(3)), the EPA promulgated two
lists. Table 1 is titled ‘‘List of Regulated
Toxic Substances and Threshold
Quantities for Accidental Release
Prevention,’’ and Table 3 is titled ‘‘List
of Regulated Flammable Substances and
Threshold Quantities for Accidental
Release Prevention’’ (see 40 CFR
68.130); (2) The chemicals from the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
Section 6701, et seq. of Title 22 of the
United States Code implements the
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Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction. The CWC covers
three lists, or ‘‘schedules’’ of chemicals.
Schedule 1 chemicals are provided in
Supplement No. 1 to 15 CFR part 712,
Schedule 2 chemicals are provided in
Supplement No. 2 to 15 CFR part 713,
and Schedule 3 chemicals are provided
in Supplement No. 3 to 15 CFR part 714;
and (3) Hazardous materials, including
gases poisonous by inhalation (PIH) and
explosive materials, which the
Department of Transportation regulates.
See 49 CFR 173.115(c), 49 CFR
173.50(b), and 49 CFR 172.101. The
Department has also considered other
categories of chemicals, such as
chemicals that can be used as precursors
for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs)
and certain water-reactive materials that
produce toxic gases.
The Department makes a few points
with respect to the list in Appendix A.
First, DHS is not using any existing list
(e.g., the EPA RMP list) as its sole
source, and DHS is not classifying all
facilities on a list in one particular way
(i.e., classifying all RMP facilities as
high-risk). By using multiple sources at
this initial phase, DHS believes it is
obtaining a more complete picture of the
universe of facilities that may qualify as
high-risk. Second, in identifying the
types and STQs of chemicals for
Appendix A, the Department has sought
to be sufficiently inclusive of chemicals
and quantities that might present a high
level of risk under the statute without
being overly inclusive and therefore
capturing facilities which are unlikely
to present a high level of risk.
In addition to drawing on information
from existing sources, the Department
has identified chemicals by considering
three security issues. These three
security issues, which are explained
below, address multiple risk areas.
1. Release—DHS believes that certain
quantities of toxic, flammable, or
explosive chemicals or materials, if
released from a facility, have the
potential for significant adverse
consequences for human life or health.
2. Theft or Diversion—DHS believes
that certain chemicals or materials, if
stolen or diverted, have the potential to
be used as weapons or easily converted
into weapons using simple chemistry,
equipment or techniques in order to
create significant adverse consequences
for human life or health.
3. Sabotage or Contamination—DHS
believes that certain chemicals or
materials, if mixed with readilyavailable materials, have the potential to
create significant adverse consequences
for human life or health.
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In proposed Appendix A, the
Department lists the DHS Chemicals of
Interest and identifies a Standard
Threshold Quantity (STQ) for each
chemical. To clearly identify each
chemical, the Department includes the
Chemical Abstract Service (CAS)
number for each chemical. These
chemicals listed in proposed Appendix
A fall into the three categories identified
above: chemicals with a release hazard,
chemicals with a theft or diversion
hazard, and chemicals with a sabotage
or contamination hazard.
The Department acknowledges that
there are two additional security issues
that it is considering at this time,
although it is not including any such
chemicals that would trigger a TopScreen submission. They include the
following two issues:
1. Critical Relationship to Government
Mission—DHS believes that the loss of
certain chemicals, materials, or facilities
could create significant adverse
consequences for national security or
the ability of the government to deliver
essential services.
2. Critical Relationship to National
Economy—DHS believes that the loss of
certain chemicals, materials or facilities
could create significant adverse
consequences for the national or
regional economy.
The Department is continuing to
assess currently-available information
about these chemicals critical to
government mission and the national
economy. The Department will use the
information it collects through the TopScreen process, as well as currentlyavailable information, as a means of
identifying facilities responsible for
economically critical and missioncritical chemicals.
III. Discussion of Comments
In the Advance Notice, DHS sought
comment on proposed text for the
interim final rule as well as on various
implementation and policy issues
concerning the chemical security
program. DHS received a total of 106
public comments totaling more than
1,300 pages, including comments from
thirty-two trade associations, thirty
companies, thirteen private citizens, ten
state agencies and associations, seven
advocacy and safety groups, eight U.S.
Representatives, five U.S. Senators, four
unions, one Local Emergency Planning
Committee, one professional
association, one international standards
committee, and the U.S. Small Business
Administration.
Commenters generally applauded this
effort from the Department and
commended the general approach that
the Department is taking. However,
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commenters also raised some specific
concerns. In the sections below, DHS
provides a topical summary of the
comments and responses to those
comments.
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A. Applicability of the Rule
1. Definition of ‘‘Chemical Facility or
Facility’’
The Advance Notice defined
‘‘Chemical Facility or facility’’ to mean
‘‘any facility that possesses or plans to
possess, at any relevant point in time, a
quantity of a chemical substance
determined by the Secretary to be
potentially dangerous or that meets
other risk-related criterion identified by
the Department. * * *’’ See proposed
§ 27.100.
Comment: While a few industry and
State agency commenters supported this
definition, commenters generally
thought that the proposed definition
was broad. In particular, several
industry commenters, an industry
association, a labor union, and a State
agency thought the proposed definition
was overly broad and consequently did
not inform facilities about whether they
would be regulated. They noted that the
definition did not name the regulated
chemical substances or the threshold
quantities. One commenter argued that
DHS’s failure to release to the public its
proposed list of ‘‘potentially dangerous
chemicals’’ and threshold amounts for
those chemicals denies the public the
opportunity to comment on key
provisions of the rule that depend on
whether the facility possess specified
quantities of chemicals determined by
DHS to be potentially dangerous. The
commenter explained that it is difficult
to comment on that aspect of the rule
without knowing what the chemicals
and thresholds are. An industry group
cautioned that threshold quantities
should be set high enough that retail
establishments are not covered merely
because they stock commercially
acceptable quantities of commonly used
chemicals. A few industry commenters
and a member of Congress added that
the definition of chemical facility
should include the concepts of national
security and economic criticality.
Several industry commenters
supported the use of EPA’s Risk
Management Plan (RMP) program to
help identify the initial group of
regulated facilities. Commenters
supported use of the RMP list of toxic
substances as a basis for selecting
chemical facilities. Likewise, one
association felt that DHS should link its
definition of chemical facility to those
facilities covered by EPA’s RMP,
because it is a clear and defined list.
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The industry commenters noted,
however, that not all RMP facilities
should be considered high-risk. One
commenter pointed out that RMP does
not take into account facilities that may
cause substantial impacts from multiple
tanks. A few commenters also
recommended that DHS should consider
facilities in EPA’s Toxic Release
Inventory program or facilities that
handle DOT hazardous materials.
One commenter emphasized that the
rule could focus on toxic gases at RMP
threshold quantities, but warned that
the RMP program has a different
purpose. The commenter indicated that
worst-case scenarios under RMP may be
based on unrealistic assumptions.
Another commenter indicated that DHS
should consider certain substances from
the Chemical Weapons Convention list
when assessing overall risk. Finally,
some industry commenters objected to
the phrase ‘‘possesses or plans to
possess,’’ because the term implies legal
title or ownership rather than simple
presence at the facility.
Response: Aside from the minor
modification noted above, DHS is
retaining the definition of chemical
facility that it proposed in the Advance
Notice. And while DHS is not defining
‘‘chemical facility’’ by listing specific
chemicals, DHS is making available,
with the issuance of this rule, a list of
those chemicals and Screening
Threshold Quantities (STQs) that it
proposes to use to determine whether to
further assess whether a chemical
facility presents a high risk.
Specifically, if a facility possesses any
of the chemicals, at the corresponding
quantities, in Appendix A (when
finalized), the facility must complete
and submit a Top-Screen within 60
calendar days. See § 27.200(b)(2) and
§ 27.210(a). The Department will
continue to contact facilities
individually and through additional
Federal Register notices, as necessary.
See § 27.200(b)(1). To the extent the
Department notifies facilities through an
additional Federal Register notice, the
Department will engage in outreach
activities with the chemical sector.
Finally, in response to specific
comments above, the Department makes
two additional points. The Department
has retained the phrase ‘‘possesses or
plans to possess.’’ DHS believes that
phrase adequately captures the
Department’s intent. The plain meaning
of those terms is not limited to
ownership. Also, with respect to the
commenter who cautioned that any
types of threshold quantities should be
high enough so that DHS does not cover
all retail establishments that stock
commercially acceptable quantities of
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commonly used chemicals, DHS notes
that it is aware of that issue. While DHS
believes these STQs are set at levels that
normally will not cover such retail
establishments, DHS believes that, if a
retail establishment does exceed any of
these STQs, the retail establishment will
have to complete the Top-Screen.
2. Multiple Owners and Operators
The second half of the definition of
‘‘Chemical Facility or facility’’ provides
that the terms ‘‘shall also refer to the
owner or operator of the chemical
facility. Where multiple owners and/or
operators function within a common
infrastructure or within a single fenced
area, the Assistant Secretary may
determine that such owners and
operators constitute multiple chemical
facilities depending on the
circumstances.’’ See § 27.105.
Comment: Comments were varied on
the issue of multiple owners and
operators. One industry commenter
suggested that DHS should combine
adjacent facilities under common
ownership into a single facility, and
other industry commenters thought that
DHS should define certain adjacent
facilities as less than the entire property.
One industry commenter thought that
DHS should allow facilities with
multiple owners or operators to agree
among themselves how to meet the
requirements of this rule. A trade
association noted that some large
chemical facilities have third-party
warehouses and leasing agreements and
that the owners of the chemical facility
should be responsible for security.
Response: DHS believes that it will
generally be fairly straightforward for
facilities to define their boundaries and
identify the party (at their facility) that
is responsible for compliance with the
regulation. However, DHS
acknowledges that, in some
circumstances, the issue might be more
complex. The Department will address
these situations on a case-by-case basis.
Both owners and operators of facilities,
however, bear responsibility under the
regulations for implementing measures
that meet the regulatory standards.
3. Classifying Facilities Based on Hazard
Class
Comment: In the preamble to the
Advance Notice, DHS requested
comment on whether it should use an
approach based on hazard class, rather
than use an approach where
classifications are based on particular
chemicals. Responses were mixed.
Several commenters favored the
hazard class approach, noting that
facilities are familiar with the DOT
hazard classes, that the hazard classes
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may be harmonized with international
requirements, and that the number of
chemicals (in a non-hazard class
approach) might otherwise be very
large. Some of the commenters who
favored the hazard class approach also
noted some caveats to its use. Industry
commenters and a State agency warned
that the hazard class approach could
result in the inclusion of chemicals that
do not pose a security risk. Conversely,
others noted that the hazard classes may
not include chemicals of concern from
a terrorism perspective. Commenters
noted that other agencies may regulate
the hazard classes under other
programs. Also, one State agency
association pointed out that a
combination of chemicals might be
more dangerous than any one chemical.
One firm suggested that the DHS
approach should include both the
hazard class approach and the
classification of chemicals approach.
A few industry commenters indicated
that basing the applicability of the rule
on hazard classes would be
inappropriate and that they favored a
list of security-sensitive chemicals with
threshold quantities. One trade
association supported the use of lists of
particular chemicals, explaining that
they thought it would lead to more
accurate assessments of likelihood and
consequence and therefore risk. They
also argued that DHS publish the list in
the final rule.
Response: As explained above, DHS is
publishing a list of ‘‘Chemicals of
Interest’’ in Appendix A to this interim
final rule. The list contains specific
chemicals and STQs. That list is a
baseline screening threshold against
which facilities will know whether they
need to complete and submit a TopScreen. While DHS’s primary approach
will be through the classification of
chemicals, DHS will not preclude the
use of the hazard classes for certain
purposes in the performance standard
guidelines.
4. Applicability to Specific Chemicals or
Quantities of Chemicals
Comment: Several commenters
discussed specific chemicals and
whether or not the regulation should
cover facilities that possess those
chemicals. Several commenters thought
that DHS should not cover anhydrous
ammonia or ammonium nitrate, both of
which are discussed in more depth
below. A local government agency urged
DHS to cover facilities that store
propane, while other commenters
indicated that DHS should not cover
flammable fuels such as propane. A few
commenters noted that some facilities
may have only small amounts of
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chemicals or may handle them only
intermittently. A trade association
suggested that DHS should allow such
facilities to adjust their level of security
to the level of risk. Another commenter
urged DHS to consider the nature of
batch production facilities, which make
a continually changing mix of products
using a continually changing, and often
unpredictable, mix of ingredients.
With respect to anhydrous ammonia,
commenters noted that the chemical is
in the EPA RMP list but indicated that
it should not be a chemical that DHS
regulates. They explained that ammonia
refrigeration is used for dairy and food
processing facilities and that those
facilities do not pose a significant risk
to human health, national security, or
the economy, because an attack on such
a facility would not result in a
catastrophic release of ammonia. In
addition, the commenters stated that the
food industry (which uses anhydrous
ammonia for refrigeration) should not
have to spend its resources enhancing
security for refrigeration systems.
With respect to ammonium nitrate
(AN), some industry commenters noted
that AN is an important part of the
economy in both the explosives and the
fertilizer industries. They noted that the
threat posed by AN is not that of a direct
attack but of theft or diversion for later
criminal misuse. While they said that
DHS should focus not only on the
possibility of a direct attack at facilities
with ‘‘weaponizable’’ chemicals, but on
facilities with risks of theft or diversion,
they suggested that DHS place those
facilities (i.e., those with risk of theft or
diversion) in lower-risk tiers.
One commenter recommended
requirements for chain-of-custody
control and suggested that the ATF
could assist in enforcement at AN sites
with commercial explosives; other
commenters favored regulation by DHS,
not ATF. Another commenter believed
that DHS should work with the U.S.
Department of Agriculture and producer
groups in deciding whether to regulate
an agriculture operator or supplier. An
industry commenter noted that the mere
presence of AN at a site should not
trigger application of DHS’s screening
process. Two members of Congress
argued that the rule should apply to AN
manufacturing facilities, but they agreed
with DHS and other commenters that
DHS should subject AN facilities to
regulatory requirements based on the
nature of the facility and risk
assessment results. The commenters
thought that by including AN facilities
in the regulatory program, DHS would
make it more difficult for terrorists to
acquire this product.
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Response: The Department’s
regulatory scheme will cover chemical
facilities that present a high risk because
they possess or plan to possess
chemicals that terrorists may use or
target in the furtherance of acts of
terrorism. Facilities that possess
chemicals that are hazardous and can be
used as weapons, such as anhydrous
ammonia or ammonium nitrate, will be
regulated if they present a high risk.
However, a facility that possesses a
chemical substance that does not cause
it to present a high risk (taking into
account all relevant factors), or
possesses an otherwise hazardous
chemical in an amount that is below
what would cause the facility to present
a high risk (again, taking into
consideration all relevant factors), will
not be regulated.
Accordingly, with this interim final
rule, DHS plans to regulate high-risk
facilities with ammonium nitrate and
anhydrous ammonia using the same
risk-based approach under which it
plans to regulate all other high-risk
facilities. If DHS later decides that any
individual chemicals warrant
specialized attention in regulatory
provisions, DHS will address such
chemicals through future rulemakings.
5. Applicability to Types of Facilities
Comment: A few commenters
suggested that the rule should not apply
to railroad facilities, because such
facilities are covered by current and
proposed requirements from the
Department of Transportation’s (DOT)
Federal Railroad Administration and
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety
Administration and DHS’s
Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). Those commenters asserted that
railroads should be treated separately
from fixed facilities and that the
proposed requirements are
inappropriate for railroad facilities. One
commenter requested exemptions for
motor vehicles and rail cars that are ‘‘in
transit.’’ Another commenter asked DHS
to take a system-wide approach and
recognize the interdependence of
chemical facility and rail security.
Response: Regulating chemicals in the
railroad system is a complex issue, and
DHS continues to evaluate it. TSA is the
lead component within DHS for the
security of transportation facilities and
has initiated some recent efforts to
address rail security, including
Voluntary Agreements with the rail
industry and a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on Rail Transportation
Security. See 71 FR 76852 (December
21, 2006). With respect to chemical
security, certain aspects of Section 550
and TSA’s authorities are concurrent
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and overlapping. DHS is working, and
will continue to work, with its
components, including TSA, to
determine whether DHS will include
railroad facilities in its chemical
security program. DHS presently does
not plan to screen railroad facilities for
inclusion in the Section 550 regulatory
program, and therefore DHS will not
request that railroads complete the TopScreen risk assessment methodology.
DHS may in the future, however, reevaluate the coverage of railroads, and
would issue a rulemaking to consider
the matter.
Comment: Commenters asked about
the applicability of the rule to natural
gas pipelines and facilities, with some
noting that DHS should not regulate
pipelines because DOT/PHMSA and
DHS/TSA already regulate safety and
security of pipelines. Other commenters
asked about DHS’s plans to address
other large facilities, such as mines. One
engineer pointed out that mining
facilities can be very large and can cover
thousands or tens of thousands acres but
that the security-sensitive portions of
those mines may be very small (e.g., a
single tank).
Response: Whether a facility is
covered under this regulation is driven
by a number of factors, including the
specific types and quantities of
chemicals at a given facility. Whether
the Department will apply the
requirements of this regulation to a
facility depends, in part, on the
chemicals present at that facility. In the
case of natural gas pipelines, DHS has
no intention at this time of requiring
long-haul pipelines to complete the
Top-Screen (or prepare Security
Vulnerability Assessments and develop
Site Security Plans). But chemical
facilities otherwise covered by this
regulation and with pipelines within
their boundaries must treat those
pipelines like any other asset, i.e.,
include measures in their Site Security
Plan addressing the security of those
pipelines.
Related to this, DHS makes a
clarifying point about facility assets in
general. DHS expects that facilities will
address all facility assets in their
Security Vulnerability Assessments and
Site Security Plans, as any given facility
asset has the potential to have an effect
on the consequence and/or
vulnerabilities of the facility. Facility
assets include any items or structures
(such as buildings, vehicles,
laboratories, or test facilities) located on
an area owned, operated, or used by the
facility. Such assets may exist inside or
outside of perimeter structures.
Similarly, the extent of coverage of
mines in this regulation will depend in
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part on the type and amount of
chemicals present at any given mine
facility. The Department expects that
mines will comply with the
requirements of § 27.200(b) and
complete and submit the Top-Screen as
required in that section. With respect to
large mines that may only possess a
concentrated amount of a given
chemical in one discrete location, if the
given chemical (and quantity) is one
that the Department believes presents a
security risk, the Department will
expect that the facility will go through
the screening process. While the facility
may have to develop a Site Security
Plan, the SSP would be tailored to the
specific circumstances at the mine. The
SSP for a large mine with a concentrated
amount of one chemical in one location
would surely look dramatically different
than that of mine company with
different circumstances (e.g., a large
mine with larger quantities of different
types of chemicals spread throughout
the mine or a smaller mine with
moderate quantities of very hazardous
chemicals in several different locations).
6. Statutory Exemptions
Comment: Some commenters asked
why § 27.105(b) excluded certain
facilities from the rule, and another
commenter suggested that the exempted
facilities should be reviewed to
determine if they would be considered
high-risk but for the exemption.
Other commenters suggested
additional exemptions. One commenter
suggested that the rule should not apply
to most facilities that manufacture, sell,
or reclaim lead-acid batteries, and
another commenter believed DHS
should exclude pesticide facilities. Yet
another commenter thought that most
facilities storing petroleum products,
some of which are exempted under
proposed § 27.105(b), are not high-risk
facilities.
Response: In the authorizing
legislation for this regulation, Congress
exempted various facilities from this
rule. See Section 550(a). DHS has
included those exemptions in
§ 27.110(b) of the rule. The statute
provides for the following exemptions:
facilities regulated pursuant to the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, Public Law 107–295, as amended;
public water systems (as defined by
Section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water
Act); water treatment works facilities (as
defined by Section 212 of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act); any
facilities owned or operated by the
Departments of Defense and Energy; and
any facilities subject to regulation by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The
Department has considered the
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exemptions requested by commenters,
and, at this time, the Department does
not intend to provide any additional
regulatory text exemptions.
Comment: Some industry commenters
supported the exemptions in § 27.110,
such as the exemption for facilities
regulated under the Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). In
addition, one association wanted to
exclude from the Top-Screen
requirements any facilities covered
under MTSA. Other commenters asked
for clarifying information about the
exemptions.
Response: In the Advance Notice, the
Department discussed the applicability
of this rule to maritime facilities. See 71
FR 78276, 78290. In this interim final
rule, the Department clarifies that it will
apply the statutory exemption only to
facilities regulated under 33 CFR part
105, Maritime Facility Security
regulations. Part 105 of Title 33 of the
Code of Federal Regulations is the only
regulation that imposes the security
plan requirements of 46 U.S.C. 70103 on
maritime facilities.
Comment: A State agency believed
that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) exemption should apply only to
facilities holding an NRC power reactor
license and disagreed with the
exemptions for public water systems
and treatment works.
Response: The Department agrees
with the commenter and will apply the
statutory exemption to facilities where
NRC already imposes significant
security requirements and regulates the
safety and security of most of the
facility, not just a few radioactive
sources. For example, a power reactor
holding a license under 10 CFR part 50,
a special nuclear material fuel cycle
holding a license under 10 CFR part 70,
and facilities licensed under 10 CFR
parts 30 and 40 that have received
security orders requiring increased
protection, will all be exempt from 6
CFR part 27. A facility that only
possesses small radioactive sources for
chemical process control equipment,
gauges, and dials, will not be exempt.
B. Determining Which Facilities Present
a High-Level of Security Risk
1. Use of the Top-Screen Approach
Comment: In general, many industry
associations and chemical companies
supported the use of a tiered approach
that narrows DHS’s focus to high-risk
facilities. Several commenters pointed
out as a problem the fact that they had
been unable to review the details of the
approach and associated criteria; several
commenters suggested that
knowledgeable parties should have an
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opportunity to review the details. Many
of the commenters wanted to make sure
that the final group of high-risk facilities
was determined based on risk (not just
on potential consequence or limited
pieces of threat data) and that the
number of facilities in this group was
small.
Associations differed in their views
on how inclusive the Top-Screen
process should be—one association
wanted DHS to screen out certain lowrisk facilities in the first few questions
while other associations and a chemical
company wanted DHS to make sure that
as many facilities as possible submitted
Top-Screen data, including some
facilities that might not traditionally be
considered chemical facilities. Several
associations urged DHS not to
presumptively classify facilities as highrisk without perfect information; they
felt that doing so would go beyond the
authority that Congress granted DHS
and would not match the intended focus
on high-risk facilities. A local agency
took the opposite view on that question.
Several commenters provided input
on the data that facilities will need to
enter into the Top-Screen. One
association suggested that DHS allow
facilities to enter chemical volumes in
ranges and asked that DHS provide
guidance on handling mixtures and
blends. That association also questioned
how facilities should address chemicals
that are stored offsite. Another
association encouraged DHS to include
reactive chemicals and propane in the
Top-Screen. One advocacy group
encouraged DHS to incorporate
chemical transportation in the rule and
the Top-Screen.
Commenters also provided input on
how DHS should process the
information that it receives through the
Top-Screen. One industry association
suggested that facilities should be
allowed to explain ‘‘yes’’ responses
before DHS drives the facility to a full
Security Vulnerability Assessment. The
association suggested that facilities
should not be the ones to estimate
consequences, particularly injuries, and
that DHS should refine the definition of
injuries. The association stated that DHS
should have different requirements for
facilities that only periodically have
certain materials onsite. One association
cautioned about using RMP data and
advocated for DHS to use conversion
factors to make estimates of casualties.
Several commenters were concerned
about the questions in the Top-Screen
that related to economic impacts.
Several associations indicated that DHS
should use a sufficiently high threshold
for economic impacts that captures the
full extent of economic impacts. They
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noted that a facility should consider all
impacts, not just the impacts to one
facility. One association commented
that most facilities will not be able to
provide answers to the questions in the
Top-Screen that ask about a facility’s
market share for given chemicals. That
association suggested that DHS rephrase those questions to support yes/
no answers or to allow facilities to use
broad ranges.
Several associations commented that
the submitting company, not DHS,
should determine the most appropriate
person to submit data. A number of
parties commented on DHS’s
subsequent use of the data that is
collected through the Top-Screen. One
association commented that any
information must have demonstrated
utility before it is shared with anyone.
As for timing, commenters, including
State agencies, requested that DHS
provide facilities with the specific
timing requirements for completing the
Top-Screen. One industry association
recommended that DHS use phased-in
timing for having facilities complete the
Top-Screen. A number of commenters
from State agencies and industry
associations suggested the need for DHS
to provide active, written notification
that a facility is not high risk—and for
telling facilities that they need to
comply with the regulation. One
association suggested that DHS provide
this notification immediately upon the
facility’s submission of data.
Finally, a number of company and
industry association commenters
wanted to make sure that facilities have
the opportunity to conduct independent
evaluations (or meet with DHS) to verify
or deny DHS’s initial classification of a
facility’s risk.
Response: In this regulatory program,
DHS will employ a modified version of
the Risk Analysis and Management for
Critical Asset Protection (RAMCAP) risk
assessment methodology known as the
Chemical Security Assessment Tool, or
CSAT. The RAMCAP Sector Specific
Guidance was developed under contract
to DHS by the ASME Innovative
Technologies Institute (ASME–ITI) and
leveraged the knowledge and insight of
leading experts from across the industry
and Federal Government. The DHS Risk
Assessment Methodology is composed
of two separate parts. The first part is a
screening tool known as the Top-Screen,
which is used to perform a preliminary
‘‘consequence’’ analysis. The second
part provides the tools to conduct a
thorough facility Security Vulnerability
Assessment.
DHS is using a standard vulnerability
tool, the CSAT system, because it is not
practical for DHS to accept a broad
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spectrum of methodologies. Even where
certain ‘‘equivalencies’’ exist between
methodologies, the equivalencies can
only be extracted and employed in a
comparative risk analysis at very great
cost and over a very long period of time.
In order to effectively manage risk at the
national level, the Department must be
able to develop and understand the
relative risk of different facilities. A
comparative risk capability is essential
to regulation and can be achieved only
through the collection of comparative
data. Thus, a standard vulnerability tool
is necessary.
The Department has vetted the CSAT
system with the engineering profession,
the National Laboratories, and
academia. The Top-Screen component,
as well as the individual algorithms
employed in the Top-Screen, have been
subject to extensive peer review and
have been found acceptable. While the
Top-Screen is consequence-specific,
DHS uses the Top-Screen only to
determine a preliminary tier ranking.
DHS bases a facility’s final tier ranking
upon the complete Security
Vulnerability Assessment, as well as the
application of threat information—and
thus it is risk-based.
Insofar as the range of facilities
possessing dangerous or potentially
dangerous chemicals is large, there is no
good alternative to a fairly broad range
of facilities being included in the
screening process. DHS anticipates that
the vast majority of screened facilities
will be found not to have a level of
potential consequences that would
result in a ‘‘high risk’’ designation.
However, the facilities that do achieve
that level of consequence are expected
to come from a fairly broad swath of the
Nation’s economy. DHS has no
intention of classifying facilities as
presumptively high risk until and
unless DHS is unable to acquire
sufficient data.
The Top-Screen will enable DHS to
determine a preliminary tier based on
consequence. That ranking will
determine the need for (and timeline
for) a Security Vulnerability
Assessment, and where the Top-Screen
indicates the need for a follow-on
Security Vulnerability Assessment, DHS
will expect that the owner-operator will
comply. The Department will require
facilities to submit the Top-Screen
within the timeframes now specified in
§ 27.210. The Department notes that the
Top-Screen is designed to preclude a
large number of ‘‘false negatives.’’
DHS is establishing the entire CSAT
system as an on-line suite of tools,
which will allow notification of results
to the owner or operator. As provided in
§ 27.205, the Department ‘‘shall notify
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the facility in writing [of a
determination that the facility presents
a high level of security risk].’’ While the
online feature of the CSAT system will
allow rapid results, it will not allow the
Department to respond instantaneously,
as some commenters requested. Finally,
the Top-Screen tool does require the
owner-operator to provide certain data
similar to an RMP analysis; however,
casualty estimates and consequence
ranking are performed by DHS using
well-vetted formulae.
Regarding economic criticality, DHS
recognizes the complexity of estimating
potential economic or mission impact
stemming from the loss of certain
manufacturing (or other) capacity.
Accordingly, DHS will focus early
efforts on developing a sufficiently clear
picture of the chemical industry as a
system in order to allow a reasonable
analysis of economic and mission
criticality, which will be enhanced as
the Department moves forward.
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2. Assessment Methodologies
Comment: Many commenters
provided input on methodologies that
DHS should use for determining which
facilities present a high level of risk, and
several commenters had suggestions as
to how DHS should determine which
facilities are high-risk. One association
asserted that DHS needed to clearly
define the ‘‘risk of interest’’ before DHS
could determine which methodology to
use. One (non-chemical) company
suggested that DHS use other Federal
programs such as the EPA’s Toxics
Release Inventory or the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA) Tier II annual reports to
determine high risk facilities.
Commenters addressed the suitability of
both asset- and scenario-based
approaches, with the majority favoring
an asset-based approach. Commenters
suggested that DHS consider specific
methodologies developed by
associations, national laboratories, or
State and Federal agencies. One
association suggested that DHS use
other methodologies while RAMCAP
continues to develop and mature. State
agency commenters warned that the
question of which facilities pose a high
risk is a community-specific issue.
Many comments were very specific as
to how DHS should proceed, and what
tools DHS should employ. For example,
an engineering firm focused on the need
for process-based assessments. A
chemical company noted the need for
any approved methodology to also
consider the criticality of surrounding
and supporting infrastructure in a
reasonable manner—that is, one that is
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within the expertise of the facility
personnel.
Many commenters also focused on
various aspects related to RAMCAP.
One commenter asserted that RAMCAP
might not adequately identify high-risk
facilities. Another commenter asked
who owns RAMCAP. Several
commenters noted that the RAMCAP
approach was not designed to address
control system cyber security. Another
commenter felt that DHS provided
inadequate detail on the RAMCAP
methodology and noted that DHS
should define the method before DHS
solicits comment. Several commenters
also pointed out that RAMCAP’s lack of
details on vulnerability team
composition and experience could be a
limitation. Some of RAMCAP’s
developers took issue with deviations
from the original RAMCAP design.
Another commenter pointed out the
need for DHS to include proper
references to the RAMCAP and its
genesis.
Also related to RAMCAP, some
commenters expressed concern with the
details in Appendix B, ‘‘Background:
Risk Analysis and Management Critical
Asset Protection (RAMCAP)
Vulnerability Assessment
Methodology.’’ In particular, some
expressed concern about expectations
that the noted threat scenarios would be
analyzed as design basis threats. The
commenters noted that many of the
scenarios require military support to
defeat, and that appears to be beyond
the capability of a chemical facility to
address. Associations noted that
scenarios can be useful in a comparative
top-screen, but that they should not
guide all facility-specific assessments.
One company opined that the threats
needed to be more realistic before they
were used in any assessments.
Finally, one chemical company
commented that DHS needs to list in the
rule the specific threats that facilities
need to address in their SSP. Also, the
company indicated that DHS, not
individual companies, should
determine deaths and injuries.
Response: In the Advance Notice,
DHS sought to provide an overview of
RAMCAP and the DHS Methodology
Assessment in the preamble (see, e.g.,
pp. 78277–78288) and in Appendix B.
As there seemed to be confusion about
the nature and purpose of RAMCAP and
the DHS Assessment Methodology (or
CSAT) and its purpose, DHS provides
further explanation here.
The CSAT vulnerability assessment
tool, part of the CSAT system owned by
DHS, is an asset-based vulnerability
assessment tool very similar to the
Chemical Sector RAMCAP module. The
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CSAT system employs a set of defined
attack vectors, used to both ‘‘produce’’
consequences (for the measurement of
criticality) and to measure vulnerability.
These are not ‘‘Design Basis’’ threats
and in no way reflect the type of actual
threats against which owner-operators
will be expected to ‘‘defend.’’ They are
measurement devices, supporting the
DHS need to conduct comparative risk
analysis. The CSAT tool does include
basic assessments of certain types of
cyber systems, and certain features
thereof. However, the CSAT tool is not
intended to be a full-scope, detailed
analysis of all possible areas of
vulnerability. It is a measurement tool
that will allow general categorization of
a facility as vulnerable or not, critical or
not, and thus, at risk or not. DHS will
undertake detailed evaluations of
specific security issues as part of the
ongoing relationship between the
facility owner-operator and DHS. The
assessment tool that DHS uses to
conduct comparative risk assessments
must be uniform and consistent in order
for DHS to use it, and so a ‘‘menu’’ of
different methodologies is simply not
practical.
Finally, DHS notes that there were
several comments from companies,
encouraging the Department to adopt or
require their own methodology or
technique. DHS is unaware of the extent
of peer review or scientific evaluation of
these other methodologies or
techniques. In addition, DHS does not
believe it is appropriate to identify a
single commercial product or endorse
particular commercial products for
purposes of complying with this rule.
3. Risk-Based Tiers
In the Advance Notice, the
Department asked for comment on the
notion of risk-based tiering of high-risk
facilities. Specifically, the Department
asked how many risk-based tiers should
the Department create, what the criteria
should be for differentiating among
tiers, what the types of risk should be
most critical in the tiering, how should
performance standards differ among
risk-based tiers, what additional levels
of regulatory scrutiny should DHS apply
to each tier. 71 FR 78276, 78283.
Comment: Most commenters
supported the establishment of risk tiers
and agreed that three or four tiers would
be sufficient. Several comments,
including industry commenters, State
agencies, and a member of Congress
believed that DHS should base tiering
on the attractiveness of the facility as a
target or the consequences of a terrorist
attack, such as adverse impacts on
public health and welfare, the potential
for mass casualties, and disruption of
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essential services. The commenter
indicated that the creation of tiers
would allow facilities to maintain
security measures commensurate with
risk.
A few commenters suggested that
DHS did not provide enough
information in the Advance Notice on
the number of tiers or on how a tier
classification would affect a facility’s
security requirements. Two industry
commenters were concerned that DHS
might apply the rule requirements to
facilities other than those that pose the
highest security risk. Two other
commenters believed that the tiering
approach is not appropriate for cyber
security of control systems. One
commenter argued that tiers should
include consideration of the
transportation of chemicals outside the
facility property. Another commenter
recommended that DHS should modify
the tiers after it receives data from
regulated facilities. Another commenter
thought that DHS should define
‘‘present high levels of security risk’’
and ‘‘high risk’’ at the end of the
RAMCAP process and not at the
discretion of the Secretary.
Commenters suggested that tiers
should be objective and transparent and
should provide flexibility. One industry
commenter pointed out that tiering
allows DHS to focus on the most
important facilities first and believed
that DHS should establish a de minimis
tier that sets thresholds below which a
facility does not have to complete the
Top-Screen tool. Two commenters
noted that tiering provides an incentive
for facilities to eliminate risk.
Some industry commenters and State
and local agencies suggested that
facilities in higher risk tiers should have
more contact with DHS, and that lowerrisk facilities should have fewer security
layers implemented over a longer period
of time, greater discretion, or fewer
inspections. One commenter, however,
believed there should be no difference
in regulatory scrutiny or performance
standards between tiers.
Response: The Department agrees
with many of the commenters that the
risk-based tiering structure will allow
DHS to focus its efforts on the highest
risk facilities first. To that end, the
Department intends to retain the model
proposed in the Advance Notice. See,
e.g., 71 FR 78276, 78283. In sum, the
Department’s framework for risk-based
tiering will consist of four risk-based
tiers of high-risk facilities, ranging from
high (Tier 1) to low (Tier 4). The
Department will use a variety of factors
in determining which tier facilities will
be placed, including information about
the public health and safety risk,
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economic impact, and mission critical
aspects of the given chemicals and
Threshold Quantities (TQ) of the
chemicals. The Department considers
the methods for determining these tiers
to be sensitive anti-terrorism
information that may be protected from
further disclosure. The types and
intensity of security measures
(necessary to satisfy the risk-based
performance standards in the facility’s
Site Security Plan) will depend on the
facility’s tier. The Department will
mandate the most rigorous levels of
protection and regulatory scrutiny for
facilities that present the greatest degree
of risk. Finally, pursuant to Section
550(a), it is in the discretion of the
Secretary to apply regulatory
requirements to those facilities that
present high levels of security risk;
accordingly, the Department believes it
is most appropriate for the Secretary to
determine which facilities present highrisk (and not, for example, rely solely on
output from the CSAT process).
The Department incorporates the
concept of ‘‘target attractiveness’’ into
its risk equation. Insofar as it is a fairly
subjective element, and that it requires
considerable analysis to develop, DHS
will not incorporate it into the initial
tier assignment process. However,
insofar as ‘‘target attractiveness’’ is
included in the more detailed Security
Vulnerability Assessment component of
the regulatory process, and insofar as
the final determination of tier placement
will be based upon the complete
analysis of risk, ‘‘target attractiveness’’
will, in fact, be an important element in
tier assignment and subsequent risk
management efforts.
C. Security Vulnerability Assessments
and Site Security Plans
1. General Comments
Comment: One association requested
that DHS encourage, but not require,
facilities that are not high-risk to
conduct vulnerability assessments as a
best practice.
Response: The Department has always
encouraged the chemical sector to
analyze security vulnerabilities and will
continue to do so through voluntary
sector efforts even if the site has not
been designated as high risk under this
rule.
Comment: One commenter requested
that DHS define ‘‘material
modifications,’’ as used in
§§ 27.215(c)(3) and 27.225(b)(3), or at
least provide examples of circumstances
or events that rise to the level of
‘‘material modifications.’’
Response: Material modifications can
include a whole host of changes, and for
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that reason, the Department cannot
provide an exhaustive list of material
modifications. In general, though, DHS
expects that material modifications
would likely include changes at a
facility to chemical holdings (including
the presence of a new chemical,
increased amount of an existing
chemical, or the modified use of a given
chemical) or to site physical
configuration, which may (1)
substantially increase the level of
consequence should a terrorist attack or
incident occur; (2) substantially increase
a facility’s vulnerabilities from those
identified in the facility’s Security
Vulnerability Assessment; (3)
substantially effect the information
already provided in the facility’s TopScreen submission; or (4) substantially
effect the measures contained in the
facility’s Site Security Plan.
2. Submitting a Site Security Plan
Comment: Several industry
commenters recommended changes to
the proposed process for notifying
facilities to submit SSPs and the timing
for submitting the SSPs. A number of
commenters believed that the most
appropriate person to submit an SSP is
a corporate representative with firsthand knowledge of security matters at
the facility, rather than an officer of the
corporation, as proposed. The
comments recommended allowing a
corporate security contact, a security
manager, or a consultant with delegated
authority to submit information on
behalf of the corporation. The
commenters indicated that, in most
instances, members of senior
management teams do not have day-today detailed knowledge on security
issues and, thus, cannot meet the
proposed qualifications. One of the
commenters added that the proposed
regulations appear to limit an
organization’s flexibility to assign
internal responsibilities for various
aspects of the regulations. Another
commenter suggested that, in addition
to notifying a covered facility, the
Department should notify the facility’s
corporate ownership (and/or parent
corporation) allowing a multi-facility
corporation to prepare and submit a
response in an efficient and timely
manner.
Response: The goal of this rule is to
increase flexibility while embracing
security for covered facilities, not to
unnecessarily decrease flexibility. The
rule obligates the chemical facility to
submit the Site Security Plan; however,
as used herein, the term chemical
facility or facility shall also refer to the
owner or operator of the chemical
facility. While the owner or operator of
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a chemical facility may designate
someone to submit the Site Security
Plan, the owner or operator is
responsible for satisfying all the
requirements under this part. Note that
the Department has added requirements
for submitters in the rule (see
§ 27.200(b)(3)) and that the Department
discusses those new requirements in the
Rule Provisions discussion of § 27.200.
See § II(B). Finally, it is presumed that
the covered facility is the most
appropriate party to notify its parent
corporation or other related corporate
entities as necessary.
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3. Content of Site Security Plans
Comment: One commenter stated that,
until some of the initial regulatory
elements regarding definition of risk
and the establishment of tiers is in
place, it would be premature for DHS to
publish details on Site Security Plans.
Another commenter stated that, based
on the consequence assessment, every
site should be required to have specific
security elements in place that
prudently deter, detect, delay, and
respond based on their assigned tier
level. The commenter also stated that,
without some degree of access control
and physical security specificity based
on tier levels, there will be considerable
confusion as to the exact considerations
needed to meet Department
requirements. Another commenter
encouraged DHS to abide by the
congressional mandate of Public Law
104–113, as described in OMB Circular
A119, and ensure that voluntary
consensus codes and standards are used
when they are applicable under the rule.
Response: The Department has
developed a means of assessing risk and
a tiering process as described in
§§ 27.205 and 27.220. These methods
anticipate, on a risk basis, a certain level
of vulnerability for a given tier level. A
facility’s SSP will describe the
appropriate levels of security measures
that a facility must implement to
address the vulnerabilities identified in
their SVA and the risk-based
performance standards for their tier. The
Department has included risk-based
performance standards in this interim
final rule and will publish further
guidance on the risk-based performance
standards. The risk-based standards
address, among other things,
vulnerabilities under the security
concepts of detection, deterrence, delay,
and response. Finally, the Department
notes that covered facilities may use and
cite voluntary consensus codes and
standards in their SVAs and SSPs to the
extent they are appropriate.
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4. Approval of Site Security Plans
Comment: In general, commenters
supported the proposed submission and
approval processes for SSPs. While one
commenter endorsed proposed
§ 27.240(a)(3) stating that the
Department will not disapprove an SSP
based on the presence or absence of a
particular security measure, another
commenter believed that the
Department should have the authority to
disapprove an SSP if a facility has
refused to include a widely-practiced
and cost-efficient procedure that can
severely reduce the risk posed by a
chemical facility. Two commenters
requested that the Department inform
local law enforcement and first
responders when the Department is
reviewing an SSP in their community
and then inform them whether that plan
was accepted or rejected. The
commenters stated that the health and
safety of responders may well depend
upon whether the chemical facility has
an adequate SSP.
Response: The Department may not
disapprove a Site Security Plan
submitted under this Part based on the
presence or absence of a particular
security measure, as provided in Section
550 of the Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007. The
Department may disapprove a Site
Security Plan that fails to satisfy the
risk-based performance standards
established in § 27.230.
The Department intends to work
closely with local law enforcement and
first responders to provide adequate
homeland security information to them
under this rule.
Comment: One commenter
recommended that the Department first
complete the SSP review and approval
process for Tier 1 facilities, then, after
soliciting feedback from the Tier 1
facilities on the process, then proceed in
a step-wise fashion to subsequent tiers.
Response: The Department will
implement the rule in a phased
approach but will not necessarily
complete all Tier 1 sites prior to
undertaking plan review and approvals
with lower-tier chemical facilities as the
need arises. This is necessary to make
sufficient progress with higher-tier
chemical facilities and not only the
highest tier.
5. Timing
Comment: One concern raised by an
industry association related to DHS’s
resources for reviewing Security
Vulnerability Assessments and
providing responses in 20 days. Changes
to control systems were suggested for
reviews and updates within 7 days or
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sooner. One commenter agreed with
updating SSPs annually, but not
Security Vulnerability Assessments.
Several commenters suggested the
following for updates: every 2–5 years
for Tier 1 facilities, 3–5 years for Tier 2,
and 3–7 years for Tier 3 and beyond.
Numerous reviewers recommended
that the reviews be limited to
approximately every three years. Two
companies and one industry association
wanted reviews to follow major changes
and not follow a set schedule. Many
reviewers wanted periodic replaced
with a suggested frequency.
Several commenters stated that the
requirement to submit SVAs within 60
calendar days, and SSPs within 120
calendar days, starting on the date that
the facility is notified that it is
considered high-risk, is too short, and
therefore inadequate. One commenter
noted that managing change in a safe
fashion requires significant thought and
careful planning to ensure that the
change itself does not create another
hazard to the community, the
environment, or employees. The
commenter also noted that developing
and implementing an SSP that properly
mitigates risk requires the security
manager to make appropriate revisions
to existing facility procedures and to
train employees and other affected
parties on these new procedures.
Another commenter expressed concern
that there is no specific date or time by
which DHS must notify high-risk
chemical facilities of their status.
Likewise, there is no firm time by which
the Secretary will send out a notice
approving or disapproving an SSP.
With regard to the time needed to
review an SSP, one commenter stated
that DHS should issue a decision
approving or disapproving them within
30 days of receipt of a completed plan.
This timeframe would bring at least
most priority facilities into compliance
within seven months of the effective
date. The commenter also stated that,
given the urgency, any ‘‘objections’’ or
‘‘appeals’’ should be processed after the
seven-month schedule is completed.
Because of concern that DHS staffing
levels might delay the processing of
SSPs, another commenter requested a
provision be included in the interim
final rule indicating that facilities are
deemed in compliance after 30 days of
submission of SVAs and SSPs until
such time that the Department reviews
and responds to the submission.
A few commenters recommended that
the deadline for Tier 1 facilities to
submit SSPs be extended from 120 days
to 180 days. The commenters believe
that this extension would assure
facilities adequate time to assemble the
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best teams, prepare thorough SVAs, deal
with budget planning for potentially
large capital expenditures, and ensure
the on-site work is properly conducted.
Another commenter agreed that the
proposed submission schedule for
submitting SSPs was unrealistic in light
of the tasks involved. The commenter
also thought that, if DHS found fault
with a provision of the SVA, it would
be unreasonable to begin development
of an SSP based upon a potentially
flawed assessment. Consequently, the
commenter argued that the submission
time of 120 days should be started only
after the Department’s approval of the
SVA is formally received. Yet another
commenter believed that submission of
SSPs should be timed according to the
tier assigned to the facility and that the
time clock should begin when the
facility receives word back from the
Department on its preliminary tier
assignment.
Response: The Department has
established a schedule for activities
under this part that considers the need
to generally address the risks associated
with higher tier facilities before that of
lower tiers, but staggers the submittals
and review and inspection activities.
The Department has developed the
Chemical Security Assessment Tool
(CSAT) to assist chemical facilities with
all of the program requirements
(registration, screening, SVA, and SSP).
In addition, because information from
the CSAT applications will be in
electronic form, DHS will be able to
expedite its review of the information
that chemical facilities submit. These
deadlines are both prudent and
achievable. DHS expects that it will
complete its review of the Top-Screen,
SVA, and SSP within 60 days of the
facility’s submission of the Top-Screen,
SVA, or SSP.
6. Alternate Security Programs
Comment: The use of alternate
security programs was supported by
several chemical companies and
associations as well as companies and
associations in related industries. A
chemical company agreed with the
concept of initially allowing multiple
methodologies and then switching to a
common methodology for at least the
Tier 1 facilities; they encouraged DHS to
still allow alternate approaches for other
tiers. This viewpoint was echoed by at
least one association. Several companies
wanted to ensure that existing plans
could be used and one association noted
that more methodologies than just those
approved by the Center for Chemical
Process Safety (CCPS) would be
appropriate. Commenters also noted
that CCPS should not be the sole arbiter
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unless DHS periodically reviews its
resources and expertise.
A number of industry associations
offered their own approaches and a food
industry association commented on the
need to keep their current programs in
place and to not unduly focus on
ammonia refrigeration risks. MTSA-,
Sandia-, and NFPA-approved programs
were among those mentioned by the
commenters, as were those allowed
under other regulations. Some
commenters found the specific process
for approval of alternative programs to
be lacking in detail. One association
requested that submitters just send in a
form saying they have an alternate
security plan, and not require any other
document be submitted for approval.
An advocacy group commented that
alternate approaches needed to be
equivalent to the DHS approach, not just
sufficiently similar, and that DHS
should approve equivalent State and
local programs. Another advocacy group
suggested that DHS should only
determine equivalency based on reviews
of individual SSPs, not in any blanket
or broad way. A third advocacy group
supported a single, consistent approach
set out by DHS with private sector
programs being modified to conform to
the DHS approach. One commenter
noted that the specification of RAMCAP
may have created an unfair playing field
for other firms wanting to visit the
source company for RAMCAP.
Response: The Assistant Secretary
will review and may approve an ASP
upon a determination that it meets the
requirements of this regulation and
provides an equivalent level of security
to the level of security established by
this part. In its ASP submission, a
facility will have to provide sufficient
information about the proposed ASP to
ensure that the Department can
adequately perform a review and make
an equivalency determination.
As described below, certain facilities
may submit an ASP in lieu of an SVA,
an ASP in lieu of a SSP, or both.
Accordingly, the ASP option will only
be available following the facility’s
submission, and Department’s review,
of the Top-Screen. An ASP for an SVA
will need to satisfy the requirements
provided in § 27.215, and an ASP for an
SSP will need to satisfy the
requirements provided in § 27.225. The
ASP for the SSP will need to describe
specific security measures, or metrics
for measures, that will allow the ASP to
be considered equivalent to an
individually-developed SSP, and
facilities implementing an ASP will be
subject to DHS inspection against the
terms of the ASP.
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At this time, the Department will only
permit Tier 4 facilities (found to be Tier
4 facilities following the Department’s
preliminary tiering decision pursuant to
§ 27.220(a)) to submit an ASP in lieu of
an SVA. Tier 4 facilities may submit for
review and approval the Sandia RAM
for chemical facilities, the CCPS
Methodology for fixed chemical
facilities, or any methodology certified
by CCPS as equivalent to CCPS and has
equivalent steps, assumptions, and
outputs and sufficiently addresses the
risk-based performance standards and
CSAT SVA potential terrorist attack
scenarios. The Department is requiring
Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 chemical
facilities to use the CSAT SVA
methodology for preliminary and final
tiering. As discussed above in the
summary of changes to Rule Provisions,
this will provide a common platform for
the analysis of vulnerabilities and will
ensure that the Department has a
consistent measure of risk across the
industry. With respect to SSPs, the
Department will permit facilities of all
tiers to submit ASPs to satisfy the
requirements of this rule.
The Department modified § 27.235 to
reflect these requirements. The
Department also amended the regulation
to link the review and approval
procedures for ASPs to the review and
approval procedures for SVAs and SSPs.
D. Risk-Based Performance Standards
In the Advance Notice, DHS sought
comment on the use of risk-based
performance standards to address
facility-identified vulnerabilities. The
Advance Notice proposed that DHS
require covered facilities to select,
develop, and implement security
measures to satisfy the risk-based
performance standards in § 27.230. The
measures sufficient to meet these
standards would vary depending on the
covered facility’s risk-based tier.
Facilities would address the
performance standards in the facility’s
Site Security Plan, and DHS would
verify and validate the facility’s
implementation of the Site Security
Plan during an on-site inspection.
1. General Approach to Performance
Standards
Comment: The majority of the
commenters supported the proposed
regulatory approach due to the
flexibility that the risk-based
performance standards provide to the
regulated community in choosing
security measures for their respective
facilities. The proposed approach
acknowledges the fact that each of the
facilities faces different security
challenges. A few commenters noted
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that the goal of the performance
standards should be to reduce
vulnerabilities identified in the SVA,
not necessarily reduce all potential
consequences or mandate the use of
specific countermeasures.
By contrast, some other commenters
opposed the Department’s proposed
regulatory approach, noting various
reasons: that the Advance Notice was
too prescriptive in certain areas; that
performance standards are open to
interpretation and thus can become
discretionary, interpretive, and
sometimes arbitrary; that chemical
companies may be allowed under the
rule to make risk reduction
determinations based on their available
risk reduction budget, rather than on the
actual elimination or reduction of the
most serious risks; that the rule allows
enormous flexibility and variability in
the documents that facilities can submit
to the Department, which could make
program review difficult and hinder any
comparative analysis of risk reduction
efforts among similar sites.
Response: The Department’s statutory
authority mandates the issuance of
performance standards. Section 550
requires the Department to issue interim
final regulations ‘‘establishing riskbased performance standards for
security chemical facilities.’’ See
§ 550(a). Also, as noted in the Advance
Notice, Executive Order 12866 also
directs federal agencies to use
performance standards. See 71 FR
78276, 78283. Performance standards
avoid prescriptive requirements, and
although they provide flexibility, they
still establish and maintain a nonarbitrary threshold standard that
facilities will have to reach in order to
gain DHS approval under the regulation.
The ultimate purpose of the
performance standards is to reduce
vulnerabilities, and that is regardless of
risk reduction budgets.
With respect to documentation,
except as provided in § 27.235 for
Alternative Security Programs, DHS is
requiring facilities to electronically
submit all documentation required for
analysis and approval. Facilities will
complete the Top-Screen, Security
Vulnerability Assessment, and Site
Security Plans through the online, Webbased CSAT system. This electronic
submission will minimize the
variability concerns and allow DHS to
manage and protect information.
Comment: Regarding the application
of the performance standards, some
commenters thought that facilities
should not have to address all
performance standards (listed in
§ 27.230) in their Site Security Plan and
should only have to address those
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performance standards that directly
apply to its facility and its risk-based
tier. One commenter thought that, in
certain circumstances, a covered facility
should be able provide adequate
chemical security without
implementing every one of the riskbased performance standards. The
commenter stated that the regulations
should allow for situations where the
facility can demonstrate that, under its
particular circumstances, one or more of
the risk-based performance standards is
unnecessary or redundant.
Response: Congress intended for the
performance standards to provide
facilities with a degree of flexibility in
the selection of security measures, and
the Department has tried to provide that
flexibility throughout the rule. DHS
expects that a facility will need to
address only those performance
standards that apply directly to their
facility. In addition, DHS notes that
there may be circumstances in which a
facility needs not implement one or
more of the risk-based performance
standards and will still be able to
provide adequate chemical security; the
Department will work with these
facilities on a case-by-case basis in these
specific situations.
Comment: Several commenters stated
that the proposed standards do not
include clear security goals, outcomes,
or results to measure increased security.
They also asserted that DHS should
develop a measurement of vulnerability
or risk reduction. One commenter
suggested that chemical facilities should
identify operational and protection
goals and that the protection system
should be evaluated with respect to
meeting these goals. Another
commenter suggested that DHS express
the performance standards in terms of
overall vulnerability scores as measures
via a common Security Vulnerability
Assessment methodology. This
alternative would allow facilities to
devote their security expenses to those
measures that would produce the
greatest vulnerability reductions and
would result, nationally, in the greatest
amount of overall vulnerability
reduction per dollar spent.
Response: DHS intends for the riskbased performance standards to provide
facility owners with the flexibility to
choose security measures in their Site
Security Plan that will reduce the
facility’s level of risk. The Security
Vulnerability Assessment process, and
DHS’s resulting placement of the facility
within the tier structure, will provide
facility owner-operators with an
indication of their level of risk.
Comment: Many commenters
supported DHS’s intention to issue
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guidance to assist the regulated
community in the interpretation and
application of the proposed
performance standards. They
encouraged the Department to work
with the regulated community on the
development of such guidance.
However, some of these same
commenters also emphasized that, to
effectuate Congress’ intention that the
chemical security requirements be riskbased performance standards rather
than prescriptive requirements, DHS
must explicitly make the guidance nonbinding. Consistent with the comments
about CVI, one commenter discussed
the importance of limiting public access
to the completed guidance since it could
serve as a roadmap for terrorists.
Response: DHS intends to release
non-binding guidance on the
application of the performance
standards in § 27.230 to the risk-based
tiers of covered facilities. This guidance
will contain sensitive information
concerning anti-terrorism measures, and
DHS will make that guidance available
to those individuals and entities with an
appropriate need for the document. DHS
will provide the guidance to the House
of Representatives Committee on
Homeland Security and the Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs.
2. Comments About Specific
Performance Standards
Comment: Several commenters
requested clarification about the
performance standards in proposed
§ 27.230(a). A few asked whether
paragraph (a)(5) is intended to cover all
Department of Transportation hazardous
materials and whether it is intended to
cover transportation and storage of
hazardous materials. One suggested that
paragraph (a)(5) should include a
provision for securing and monitoring
the storage of hazardous materials, in
addition to securing and monitoring the
shipping and receipt of hazardous
materials. Commenters also requested
that DHS have facilities report
significant security incidents to local
law enforcement in addition to the
Department. Another commenter
indicated that the Department should
require the following additional
elements in the performance standards:
written job descriptions for security
personnel, adequate response teams and
resources, safe shutdown procedures,
evacuation procedures, and
decontamination facilities. In addition,
another commenter asked that DHS
define ‘‘dangerous substances and
devices’’ as used in § 27.230(a)(3)(i),
‘‘potentially dangerous chemicals’’ as
used in § 27.230(a)(6), and ‘‘significant
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security incidents’’ and ‘‘suspicious
activities’’ as used in §§ 27.230(a)(15)
and 27.230(a)(16). Another commenter
asked to whom facilities should report
‘‘significant security incidents.’’
Response: These comments relate to
the measures that facilities must select,
develop, and implement in their Site
Security Plans. The Department will
provide information in guidance to
facilities on these measures. That might
include information on the meaning of
these terms, details on the parties to
whom facilities should report security
incidents and suspicious activities, and
explanations about the role of local law
enforcement (e.g., the Department’s
recognition that some investigations of
potentially illegal conduct may be the
role of local law enforcement).
In addition, DHS also notes that it has
made a few changes to the regulatory
context based on these comments. As
discussed in the summary of regulatory
text changes, the Department has
revised paragraphs (a)(5), (8), (12), and
(15).
Comment: Several comments
discussed the need for approaches that
address cyber security risks, with
several asserting that it is not sufficient
for DHS to consider security only from
a physical perspective. Commenters
opined that there were very few specific
references to cyber security in the
Advance Notice, even though it is
important. Some commenters suggested
that DHS should address cyber security
in more detail in its own performance
standard (i.e., a performance standard
that only addresses cyber security),
while others suggested that DHS should
integrate cyber considerations into other
performance standards. Other
commenters asked DHS to identify the
scope of ‘‘cyber’’ security and ‘‘other
sensitive computerized systems’’ in
paragraph (a)(8).
Commenters also raised other issues
related to cyber security. One
commenter mentioned that cyber or
joint physical/cyber intrusions could
create dangerous chemicals that did not
previously exist. Consequently,
commenters thought that DHS should
address these contingencies in the
screening process and/or issue an
expansive list of chemicals. Other
commenters noted that the RAMCAP
approach was not designed to address
control system cyber security. A few
other commenters believed that the
tiering approach is not appropriate for
cyber security of control systems.
Additionally, commenters mentioned
that it is important to consider that
facilities with interconnecting electronic
systems could face additional threats as
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one site’s vulnerability poses a risk to
other connected sites.
Response: The Department recognizes
that cyber security is an issue and has
included cyber security as one of the
performance standards that facilities
must address in their Site Security
Plans. Paragraph (c)(8) requires facilities
to select, develop, and implement
measures that ‘‘deter cyber sabotage.’’ In
addition, the Department notes that it
has implemented an assessment of cyber
vulnerabilities for industrial control
systems within the CSAT Security
Vulnerability Assessment. The
Department has accomplished this
through the assistance of DHS’s
National Cyber Security Division
(NCSD). DHS appreciates the
complexity and uniqueness of
addressing cyber security with chemical
facilities and anticipates that the CSAT
will mature over time, especially with
the constructive feedback from
interested and knowledgeable parties.
Comment: The Department received
numerous comments on its use of the
acronym ‘‘SCADA’’ in § 27.230(a)(8).
Commenters asserted that SCADA refers
to a central control system that monitors
and controls a complete site or a system
spread out over a long distance. They
noted that using the term SCADA to
represent cyber systems at chemical
facilities is too narrow and suggested
that the Department should replace the
term SCADA with ‘‘Industrial Control
Systems.’’
Response: While the Department had
used the acronym ‘‘SCADA’’
(Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) in the Advance Notice as
shorthand for instrumented control
systems in general, the Department
agrees with the comments and has
incorporated broader, more descriptive
terminology into this performance
standard. The Department has revised
§ 27.230(a)(8), so that it reads as follows:
‘‘Each covered facility must select,
develop, and implement measures
designed to: * * * [d]eter cyber
sabotage, including by preventing
unauthorized onsite or remote access to
critical process controls, such as
Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (SCADA) systems,
Distributed Control Systems (DCS),
Process Control Systems (PCS),
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), critical
business systems, and other sensitive
computerized systems.’’
3. Variations in Performance Standards
for Risk Tiers
Comment: Several commenters
supported the use of risk-based tiers,
with several recommending that DHS
consult with industry in the
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development of specific performance
standards for each tier. Various
commenters favored the Department’s
proposal to place high-risk facilities in
risk-based tiers and to prioritize the
implementation phase-in and the level
of regulatory scrutiny (i.e., frequency of
regulatory reviews, inspections and
SVA/SSP updates) based on the
facility’s risk and associated tier.
Commenters noted that DHS should
require facilities in higher risk tiers to
develop more robust measures to meet
the performance standards.
In contrast, a few other commenters
had differing opinions. A small number
of comments cautioned that
performance standards should be
consistent across all tiers, regardless of
the level of risk. These commenters
noted that DHS should adjust the
specific measures, not the performance
standards, to match the level of risk. In
addition, one commenter stated that
DHS should not establish risk-based
tiers and should instead identify the
criteria for those facilities that will be
regulated and those that will not. If DHS
were to establish tiers, that commenter
thought DHS should limit the tiers to
high or low risk.
Response: As discussed above in
Section III(B)(3), DHS is creating four
risk-based tiers, with the highest risk
facilities in the top tier (i.e., Tier 1). The
types and intensity of security measures
(sufficient to satisfy the risk-based
performance standards in the facility’s
Site Security Plan) will depend on the
facility’s tier. For facilities that present
the greatest degree of risk, more rigorous
security measures will be needed to
satisfy the performance standards. The
Department will use a higher level of
regulatory scrutiny for facilities that
present the highest risk.
DHS consulted with the chemical
industry in developing the tier system
and performance standards. In adopting
the four tier system and applicable riskbased performance standards, DHS
intends to employ a scalable
performance standard across the tiers,
i.e., within the same performance
standard, a more robust set of security
measures will be needed for a Tier 1
facility than for a Tier 2 facility, for a
Tier 2 facility than for a Tier 3 facility,
and so on. DHS will ensure that riskbased performance standards are
applied consistently across each tier,
but guidelines for each tier will vary.
Comment: A few commenters also
supported the idea that a facility, which
the Department has previously
determined is ‘‘high risk,’’ can request
that the Department move it to a lower
tier if it has materially altered its
operations in a way that significantly
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lowers its potential vulnerabilities and
consequences.
Response: Pursuant to § 27.205(b), ‘‘if
a covered facility previously determined
to present a high level of security risk
has materially altered its operations, it
may seek a redetermination by filing a
Request for Redetermination with the
Assistant Secretary, and may request a
meeting regarding the request.’’ DHS has
retained that provision in this interim
final rule. This provision allows DHS to
re-evaluate risk based upon changes at
the facility in process, chemistry, or
other factors. DHS, through the
Assistant Secretary, intends to evaluate
such proposed measures on a case-bycase basis.
In evaluating the redetermination,
DHS will consider whether the planned
action actually reduces risk (as opposed
to simply ‘‘moving’’ the risk into the
community around the facility) and
does so without compromising security.
Where these parameters are met, DHS
will approve the plan and re-evaluate
the tier placement for the facility in
question. Pursuant to § 27.205(b), the
Assistant Secretary will notify the
facility of the Department’s decision on
the Request for Redetermination within
45 calendar days of receipt of such a
Request or within 45 calendar days of a
meeting regarding the Request.
Comment: One commenter noted that
how performance standards vary across
tiers would depend on the criteria used
to establish the tiers.
Response: DHS will assess all
facilities based upon worst plausible
case scenarios as applicable to each
facility.
4. Adoption of MTSA Provisions
The Advance Notice solicited
comment on whether DHS should adopt
various provisions from MTSA as
elements of the chemical security
program. In particular, DHS asked
whether it should adopt the following
performance standards in addition to
the standards already listed in 6 CFR
27.230: 33 CFR 105.250 (Security
systems and equipment maintenance),
33 CFR 105.255 (Security measures for
access control); 33 CFR 105.260
(Security measures for restricted areas);
33 CFR 105.275 (Security measures for
monitoring); 33 CFR 105.280 (Security
incident procedures). See 71 FR 78276,
78284.
Comment: Of the several comments
received on the request, the majority
opposed adopting the standards,
characterizing them as highly detailed
and prescriptive and, as such,
incompatible with the risk-based
performance standards proposed for
chemical facilities. A chemical industry
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association presented an analysis of the
four MTSA standards and concluded
that they were largely duplicative of, or
potentially inconsistent with, existing
categories of performance standards
presented in the Advance Notice. The
commenter stated that the MTSA
standards were not performance
standards, but mandatory particular
security measures, in direct conflict
with Section 550. Through a similar
section-by-section analysis of the MTSA
provisions, a chemical manufacturer
found several provisions to be
compatible with performance standards,
but others too prescriptive or
incompatible with activities in chemical
facilities.
Another association representing
chemical distributors stated that only a
tiny fraction of its members relied on
waterways to distribute chemicals and,
accordingly, recommended against
adoption of the standards.
Response: The Department agrees
with the commenters who
recommended against adopting the
MTSA provisions referred to in the
preamble of the Advance Notice. As the
commenters noted, these provisions
either duplicate current standards,
conflict with current standards, or
mandate particular security measures in
conflict with the statute.
Comment: One association noted that,
because many of its members had
facilities on waterways, member
companies often developed MTSA-type
approaches to Security Vulnerability
Assessments and Site Security Plans to
establish some uniformity across
facilities. Another commenter suggested
that when an owner of multiple
facilities has some covered by MTSA
and others by the chemical security
rules, MTSA could be an ASP if applied
to non-MTSA facilities.
Response: Where the application of
MTSA practices is sufficient, it may be
considered a valid ASP. DHS will
review and consider adoption of MTSA
plans to non-MTSA facilities on a caseby-case basis. The Department does not
intend to require duplication of effort
where responsible facilities have
implemented adequate security
measures.
E. Background Checks
Under the Advance Notice, covered
facilities would be required to perform
appropriate background checks on and
ensure appropriate credentials for
facility personnel and, as appropriate,
for unescorted visitors with access to
restricted areas or critical assets.
Comment: Numerous commenters
stated that chemical facilities already
screen their employees for their own
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interests and in response to government
programs. The commenters urged that
the level of screening for existing
employees and contractors should be
commensurate with the access
provided. While some commenters
wanted existing employees who had
undergone employee screening before
hire to be ‘‘grandfathered’’ from any
new requirements, other commenters
thought that existing employees should
be subject to screening when they are
assigned to secure areas or have the
potential to be reassigned. An
association recommended checking
current employees with less than five
years seniority within six months of the
effective date of the program and more
senior employees within one year.
Several commenters argued that,
extending the proposed requirements to
contractors, subcontractors, truck
drivers, and delivery and repair
personnel, and others who are
frequently on site, would create serious
difficulties because of the large numbers
of individuals in these categories, the
need to have them available on short
notice, redundancy of existing
credentials, cost of new credentialing,
and delay while screening is completed.
Chemical companies explained that
they rely heavily on contractors and
expect the contracting company to be
responsible for assuring that their
employees meet security requirements.
Commenters suggested that officers
hired by the facility supervise
contractors and sub-contractors without
background checks.
The commenters also addressed the
types of background checks that DHS is
considering, including the personal
information required, and whether
name checks against the Terrorist
Screening Database and fingerprintbased checks for terrorism, criminal
history, or immigration status would be
required. A number of commenters
urged DHS to tailor the degree of
scrutiny to the degree of employee
access to sensitive locations. Private
screening firms described systems that
collect more detailed information and
enhanced verification depending on the
applicant’s access. Operators of private
screening systems state that they
typically rely on the database screens
for candidates with potential terrorist
connections. A chemical industry
association supported screening of
chemical facility employees for
terrorism, criminal records, and
immigration status.
One commenter explained that
biometric testing in a chemical
environment can fail because of
smudging and deterioration of
fingerprints over time, while another
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believed that adequate field testing had
not been completed. Another
commenter explained that biometrics
and other verification techniques will
not foil a person who has stolen an
identity to pass the screen. The
commenter recommended that
authentication techniques, in addition
to validation and verification, be
applied to applicants with access to
secure locations. In response to the
proposed use of a list of disqualifying
crimes to reject applications for
clearance, a number of commenters
urged DHS to restrict the crimes to those
that were most clearly linked to
potential for terrorism. The commenters,
both unions and chemical companies,
argued that loyal employees can lose
their jobs or fail to qualify for hire
because of misdemeanors, such as
missing a few months of child support,
or crimes that are not good predictors of
the potential for terrorism. One
commenter recommended adoption of
an appeal process that allows a
disqualified person to explain why he or
she is no longer at risk, similar to the
process under MTSA regulations.
The preamble also requested
comment on whether the access
provisions of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC)
Program, Hazardous Materials
Endorsement (HME), ATF requirements,
or other structured programs should
apply to chemical facility security
programs. A few commenters supported
the concept that the screening required
for the TWIC program should be
acceptable for the chemical security
program. Indeed, many chemical
facilities are on bodies of water and
employees were already compliant with
the TWIC program. Another commenter
took the opposite position that the
TWIC program did not provide the
customization available in existing
screening systems to grade the level of
screening based on employment and
assignment decision. Numerous
comments maintained that an employee
or contractor who was credentialed
under the TWIC, HME, ATF, or similar
programs should not need additional
security screening under the chemical
security program. Related comments
requested portability of security checks
for employees or contractors cleared by
another chemical facility. One
commenter recommended that DHS
establish a national repository of cleared
personnel to minimize redundancy and
expense.
With respect to the question of
whether the government should conduct
background checks or whether the
industry could use authorized third
parties to conduct the checks, three
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commenters stated that third parties
were already providing background
checks for thousands of employees of
chemical facilities. Other commenters,
including organizations that provided
screening services, maintained that
existing programs for screening
applicants and employees for chemical
facilities were reliable, effective, and
inexpensive. Another commenter wrote
that one program operated through
safety councils might be eligible as an
alternate security program, although a
chemical company suggested not using
safety councils, because their standards
were too lax.
A few commenters favored the
government’s undertaking background
checks because, unlike private
companies, the government has access
to terrorist databases and FBI databases,
and because the government, unlike
employers, would be immune from legal
challenges from a rejected employee.
Opposition to government responsibility
came from several commenters who
were concerned about slow completion
of background checks, and that the
backlog might be exacerbated by a new
chemical security program.
A few commenters, including three
unions, strongly urged that the system
provide an appeals process for affected
applicants whose employment
prospects in the chemical industry and
elsewhere could be seriously affected by
an erroneous determination. Private
services noted that they notified
applicants of adverse decisions and
allowed them to contest the decisions.
Response: DHS believes that
personnel surety is a key component of
a successful chemical facility security
program. This component of the
performance standards will enhance
security in what would otherwise be a
significant potential vulnerability. In the
Advance Notice, the Department
requested comment on these
components of a background check
program: (1) What individuals should
have a background check? (2) When
should the check be required? (3) What
type of background check should be
conducted? And (4) Should the federal
government conduct the check? We
address each of these four issues below.
First, DHS agrees that the level of
screening for employees and contractors
should be commensurate with the
access provided. As part of this
approach, the facility shall identify
critical assets and restricted areas and
establish which employees and
contactors may need unescorted access
to those areas or assets, and thus must
undergo a background check. A
facility’s approach to personnel surety,
including its defined restricted areas, its
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critical assets, and a list of the
employees requiring background
checks, shall be detailed in the Site
Security Plan that the facility submits to
the Department for approval. The rule
does not include a provision that would
exempt certain employees from the
personnel surety performance standard
based on length of employment at the
facility. Merely because an individual
has worked in a chemical facility for a
period of time without incident does not
automatically mean that they do not
pose a terrorism risk and should be
given free access to restricted areas and
critical assets without a background
check. Allowing such access without a
background check presents an
unacceptable security risk, and is
contrary to the performance standard on
personnel surety. This is not to say,
however, that employers may not
consider an employee’s prior history of
employment and service in making
personnel decisions. It should also be
noted that nothing in this regulation
prohibits a person that has been
convicted of a misdemeanor offense
from being employed at a high risk
chemical facility.
Second, DHS views the background
check process as one of the many pieces
of the Site Security Plan, and as such,
will require that it be completed and
submitted with the Site Security Plan.
Once the facility receives the Letter of
Authorization under § 27.245 denoting
preliminary approval of the Site
Security Plan, the facility may then
proceed with all necessary background
checks, if it has not done so already. All
employees required in the SSP to have
a background check should be included
in the initial submission and must be
duly vetted in accordance with the plan.
This should not cause any interruption
in work.
Third, the Department understands
that many covered facilities already
perform background checks on
employees and certain contractor
employees, and with some
modifications, will allow that process to
continue. In order to perform an
appropriate background check for the
purpose of protecting critical assets and
restricted areas of high risk chemical
facilities from persons who pose a
terrorist threat, the Department has
made some modifications to the
personnel surety performance standard
in the regulation. The Department will
consider appropriate open source
background checks as an acceptable
response to the background check
performance standard. Specifically, the
Department will consider as appropriate
a background check process that verifies
and validates identity; includes a
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criminal history check of publicly or
commercially available databases;
verifies and validates legal authorization
to work through the I–9 process; and
includes measures designed to identify
people with terrorist ties. This last
standard can be achieved by checking
against the consolidated Terrorist
Screening Database (TSDB). The
Department modified the performance
standard at 6 CFR § 27.230(a)(12) to
reflect these changes.
Fourth, while much of the
background check process can be
accomplished by commercial methods,
the check of the Terrorist Screening
Database is an inherently governmental
function that necessarily includes a
check of classified databases that are not
commercially available. The Department
will augment the background check in
the SSP with a TSDB check. The
Department has determined a TSDB
check is necessary for the purpose of
protecting critical assets and restricted
areas of high risk chemical facilities
from persons who pose a terrorist threat.
DHS will designate a secure portal or
other method for the submission of
application data for each employee or
contractor for whom a TSDB check is
required in the SSP. The Application
data will be the name, date of birth,
address, and citizenship, and if
applicable, the passport number, DHS
redress number,1 and information
concerning whether the person has a
DHS credential or has previously
applied for a DHS credential.
To minimize redundant background
checks of workers, DHS agrees that a
person who has successfully undergone
a security threat assessment conducted
by DHS and is in possession of a valid
DHS credential such as a TWIC, HME,
NEXUS, or FAST, will not need to
undergo additional vetting by DHS.
Even so, the facility shall submit the
name and credential information for
these persons along with the application
data for other employees. Facilities shall
not allow unescorted access to a critical
asset or restricted area to a person in
possession of a DHS credential unless
information on that person has been
submitted as discussed above.
DHS will screen each applicant and
determine whether the applicant poses
a security threat. Where appropriate,
DHS will notify the facility and
applicant via U.S. mail, with
information concerning the nature of the
1 A DHS redress number is issued by DHS to an
individual who has successfully completed a
redress inquiry, in which the inquiry resolved a
previous false-positive match to a watch list record.
Redress inquiries can be submitted directly to DHS
as part of the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry
Program (DHS–TRIP).
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finding and how the applicant may
contest the finding. Applicants will
have the opportunity to seek an
adjudication proceeding and appeal
under Subpart C.
F. Inspections and Audits
Numerous comments addressed the
proposed provisions for auditing and
inspecting chemical facilities to
determine compliance and allowing
certified third-party auditors to
supplement DHS personnel at lower tier
facilities. While DHS has responded, to
the extent that it is able, to the
comments below, DHS also notes that it
will issue guidance that identifies
appropriate processes for inspections
and provides specifics about the records
that must be made available to DHS
upon request. See §§ 27.250(d) and
27.255. That guidance will provide
further detail.
1. Inspections
Comment: Section 27.245(a) in the
Advance Notice provided that DHS may
‘‘enter, inspect, and audit the property,
equipment, operations, and records of
covered facilities.’’ One commenter
asserted that DHS should inspect and
audit using an approved or
preliminarily approved Site Security
Plan and not on other criteria outside
the scope of the Site Security Plan. In
addition, commenters indicated that
DHS need not inspect equipment and
records related to operations outside the
vulnerabilities identified in the facility’s
Security Vulnerability Assessment and
protected in the Site Security Plan; the
commenter thought that such
inspections would go beyond what is
required to ensure that high-risk
chemical facilities are secure. In
addition, one commenter requested that
DHS revise the scope of inspection to
property, equipment, operation, and
records covered in a facility’s Site
Security Plan.
Response: During inspections,
authorized DHS officials may inspect
equipment, view and/or copy records,
and audit records and/or operations.
This section imposes an affirmative
obligation on facilities to cooperate with
authorized DHS officials, including
inspectors, and allow inspections and
audits. DHS will inspect a covered
facility following DHS’s preliminary
approval of the facility’s Site Security
Plan. DHS may also inspect facilities
outside of the Site Security Plan
approval cycle if there are exigent
circumstances or special security
concerns. During the course of
inspections, an inspector may ask a
facility to demonstrate the effectiveness
of a given security measure found in the
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facility’s Site Security Plan. This will
help the inspector to determine whether
the facility has adequately implemented
the risk-based performance standards in
its Site Security Plan. With respect to
requests for records, the Department
expects that facilities will produce the
records—whether located onsite at the
facility, at corporate headquarters, or in
any other location—that are relevant to
the security of the facility. The
Department has added some additional
language in the rule about the
production of records. See
§ 27.250(d)(4).
With respect to scope of inspections,
DHS is not narrowing its scope to cover
only those items covered in the facility’s
Security Vulnerability Assessment and
Site Security Plan; DHS needs the
appropriate discretion to inspect those
items and areas that are related to the
security of the facility. However, DHS
has no intention of inspecting areas that
are unrelated to security.
Comment: One industry association
noted that § 27.245(b)(1) of the Advance
Notice suggested that security measures
(which DHS requires for final approval
of the Site Security Plan) should be in
place at the time that DHS inspects a
facility. The commenter stated that, if
facilities address vulnerabilities through
capital improvements, facilities are
unlikely to have these security measures
in place within the stated time frame. In
such cases, the commenter
recommended that DHS use a timeline
approach, detailing an implementation
schedule of prioritized security
measures, and include that timeline in
a facility’s Site Security Plan.
Response: The commenter is correct
in noting that DHS expects that facilities
will have met the requirements of
§ 27.225 (i.e., the facility will have
developed and submitted a Site Security
Plan, which the Department will have
preliminarily approved) when the
Department visits the facility for an
inspection or audit. See § 27.250(b)(l).
One of the purposes of the inspection is
for the Department to determine
whether facilities have adequately
implemented their Site Security Plans.
However, the Department realizes that
there may be circumstances where
facilities will have to implement
security measures through capital
improvements, and that can take time.
Based on the Department’s assessment
of risk at a given facility and the
realities of getting security measures
into place, the Department will work
with facilities on a case-by-case basis.
Where the Department believes that
extra time is warranted, the Department
will work with facilities to incorporate
that time into the facility’s Site Security
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Plan and into the Department’s timeline
for inspecting the facility.
Comment: Various commenters
requested clarification about the time
and manner provisions found in
§ 27.245(c) of the Advance Notice.
Several commenters noted that the
proposed regulations did not define the
terms ‘‘reasonable times’’ or ‘‘reasonable
manner’’ and asked the Department to
define those terms. In addition, some
commenters noted that the preamble
provided a timeframe for inspections
(‘‘during regular business hours of 9
a.m. to 5 p.m.’’) but that the Advance
Notice text did not specify that
timeframe. Other commenters indicated
that DHS should clearly outline the
regularity of audits and inspections that
the Department will require for each
tier.
Several other comments discussed the
notice provisions in the rule. The
Advance Notice provided that ‘‘DHS
will provide covered facility owners and
operators with 24-hour advance notice
before inspections, except where the
Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary
determines that an inspection without
such notice is warranted by exigent
circumstances and approves such
inspection.’’ See § 27.250(c). Several
industry associations believe that 24hour advance notice would not be a
sufficient amount of time for facilities to
arrange for the appropriate personnel to
be available for the inspection.
Commenters suggested that DHS
provide more notice to facilities;
requests ranged from three to seven
days. Other commenters requested that,
in addition to notifying the facility, DHS
also provide local emergency
responders and local agencies tasked
with regulating hazardous materials
facilities with a 24-hour advance notice
as a courtesy.
Others commented on the concept of
unannounced inspections. A member of
Congress objected to the restrictions on
unannounced inspections, asserting that
the provision was a near-preclusion of
random audits, because approval by
senior officials (i.e., the Under Secretary
for Preparedness or Assistant Secretary
for Infrastructure Protection) would
make unannounced audits exceedingly
rare. Moreover, focusing such
unannounced audits exclusively on
facilities (or geographic regions) where
agency officials determine that ‘‘exigent
circumstances preclude notice’’
presupposes that the agency is already
in a position to know where exigent
circumstances exist. As a result it would
be far harder for the Department to
determine actual rates of compliance
with regulatory requirements. An
industry commenter would support
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unannounced inspections for facilities
that had significant deficiencies in the
prior inspection or that have had an
unusual number of breaches.
Response: DHS has retained the
language that it used in the Advance
Notice. Authorized DHS officials will
conduct audits and inspections during
reasonable times and in a reasonable
manner. The nature of any given
inspection will depend on the specific
circumstances surrounding a particular
facility’s operations at a given point in
time and will be considered in
conjunction with available threat
information.
Commenters asked for clarification on
the times that DHS plans to conduct
inspections. While DHS expects that it
will conduct many of its inspections
during the regular business hours of 9
a.m. to 5 p.m., DHS will not limit its
inspections to regular business hours
only. DHS must have the flexibility to
respond to information, operations, and
circumstances whenever they exist or
develop, and so DHS may have to
conduct inspections in the evening, at
night, or during weekends. Security
concerns are different at different times
of the day and on different days of the
week, and so DHS must be able to assess
the different security measures that
facilities put into place, pursuant to
their Site Security Plans.
DHS has maintained the Advance
Notice provision that gives facilities 24hour advance notice before an
inspection. In some circumstances, DHS
may provide facilities with additional
time. As a general matter, DHS believes
that 24 hours is an appropriate and
reasonable notice period, striking a
balance between providing the
Department with flexibility to determine
compliance with this regulation and
providing regulated entities with
sufficient notice to prepare for an
inspection. Some commenters suggested
that DHS also provide advance notice
about inspections to local emergency
responders and local agencies. While
DHS may choose to notify local
emergency responders or other agencies
on a case-by-case basis, DHS does not
believe it is necessary to include a
mandatory requirement in the rule.
Many commenters expressed concern
that DHS is not able to conduct
unannounced inspections. These
concerns are unfounded: DHS will be
able to conduct unannounced
inspections when it complies with
internal policy. While DHS has a
general requirement for advance notice,
DHS recognizes that there may be
circumstances where advance notice is
not possible.
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To accommodate those circumstances,
DHS has identified two exceptions. See
§ 27.250(c). DHS had identified one
exception in the Advance Notice: If the
Under Secretary determines that an
inspection without notice is warranted
by exigent circumstances, the Under
Secretary or Assistant Secretary may
approve such an inspection. The exigent
circumstances may include threat
information warranting immediate
action. DHS adds a second exception in
this interim final rule: If any delay in
conducting an inspection might be
seriously detrimental to security, and
the Director of the Chemical Security
Division, Office of Infrastructure
Protection determines that an inspection
without notice is warranted, the Field
Operations supervisor may permit an
inspector to conduct such inspection.
This additional exception addresses the
concerns of commenters who claimed
the exception in the Advance Notice
was too restrictive.
Comment: Some commenters noted
that facilities may choose to validate
any government-issued credential for
the purpose of inspectors gaining entry
onto a chemical facility. One commenter
requested that, as part of the guidance,
DHS include information on the
security measures that will allow a
facility to determine that the DHS
officials or third party auditors are
legitimate.
Response: DHS will handle this issue
like other Federal agencies handle their
respective inspectors and auditors.
Individuals performing these
inspections will carry Federal
government credentials identifying
themselves as having official authority
to inspect. In addition, any chemical
facility wishing to authenticate the
identity of an individual purporting to
represent DHS may contact the
appropriate DHS Chemical Security
Division official within the Office of
Infrastructure Protection at DHS
headquarters. In addition, the
Department has provided some
additional regulation text on the issue of
inspector credentials. See § 27.250(d)(1).
Comment: Several commenters
addressed the issue of training for
inspectors. One commenter stated that it
is DHS’s role to ensure that inspectors
and auditors are qualified in both
physical security and chemical
processes. Others noted that, if
inspectors and auditors do not have a
background in chemical manufacturing,
then DHS must adequately train
inspectors. Furthermore, that
commenter encouraged DHS to utilize a
cross functional team consisting of
individuals with chemical process
knowledge and physical security
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background and include a local area
first responder on each inspection team
for each facility. The commenter noted
that many facilities maintain a close
relationship with local emergency
responders. One commenter indicated
that DHS inspectors should expect that
chemical facilities may require them to
complete a safety overview before being
granted access to a facility; this is
regardless of the training that DHS
provides to its inspectors.
Response: DHS will use properly
trained personnel to conduct
inspections. During inspections, DHS
intends to use teams consisting of
Federal inspectors, many with
backgrounds in law enforcement and
physical security, and experts in
chemical manufacturing. DHS will put
inspectors through a rigorous training
program, incorporating both classroom
training and on-site visits, so that
inspectors are informed on all aspects
related to this regulatory program as
well as on safety issues. These
individuals will receive training on
specific safety procedures, including
OSHA’s Hazardous Waste Operations
and Emergency Response Standard
(HAZWOPER), that they should use
while visiting chemical facilities. If
chemical facilities request that
inspectors receive facility-specific safety
briefings or training, the Department
will work with facilities to
accommodate those concerns, provided
that the additional safety training is
reasonable given the nature of the
expected inspection.
2. Third-Party Auditors and Inspectors
Comment: Numerous chemical
companies, industry associations, and
State and local agencies requested
clarification on the roles and
responsibilities of third-party auditors.
Several commenters pointed out that
there is currently a lack of standards for
third-party auditors, and some
commenters noted that if DHS does not
provide specific criteria for compliance,
such audits will be very subjective.
Several commenters asserted that there
is a need for DHS to develop standards
and requirements for third-party
auditors, including requirements for
certification, qualifications,
independence, objectivity, training and
re-training, confidentiality, ethical
obligations, conflicts of interests,
discipline procedures, and liability
insurance.
Several commenters discussed the
third-party auditor certification or
approval process in detail. One
commenter pointed out that DHS would
have to develop either a professional
registration or licensing for third-party
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auditors in order to establish a
minimum level of competency for thirdparty auditors. Other commenters stated
that training should include, among
other things, information on physical
security, chemical processes, and safety
operations. One commenter
recommended Sandia National
Laboratory’s Risk Assessment
Methodology for Chemical Facilities
(RAM–CF) training as an excellent
review in all aspects of chemical facility
operation and security. One pointed out
that there is currently no certification
for control system cyber security
auditors. Another commenter added
that any DHS third-party inspectors
should have a strong background and
experience with the agricultural retail/
distribution segment of the chemical
industry. The commenter encouraged
DHS to work with industry associations
and industry experts on establishing the
proper criteria to select certified thirdparty auditors that will be used to
inspect agricultural retail or distribution
facilities determined to be covered by
these regulations.
One commenter was concerned that
DHS had not effectively addressed
auditor independence and objectivity in
the Advance Notice. To remedy this
concern, the commenter suggested that
DHS define third-party auditor and
address auditor concepts such as due
diligence, due professional care, auditor
certification, auditor training, auditor
indemnification, conformity assessment,
audit/inspection methodology, etc.
Other commenters raised questions
about third-party auditors and
information protection. One commenter
stated that all third-party auditors must
be held to the same requirements and
standards as applied to DHS officers and
employees regarding the protection of
confidential information; this includes
information protected by law, such as
PCII, Sensitive Security Information
(SSI), or other applicable requirements.
DHS should develop requirements and
procedures, including the use of nondisclosure agreements, to prohibit
disclosure or use of confidential
information developed or obtained
during the auditing process. One
association, whose member companies
already use third party audits, wanted
confirmation that the use of third-party
auditors would be in compliance with
the CVI framework.
Three State agency commenters urged
the Department to clarify that the thirdparty auditor provision includes
qualified state and local assets to
conduct audit inspections and assist
with Security Vulnerability
Assessments and Site Security Plans.
One commenter would limit third-party
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auditors to appropriate state and local
government officials with familiarity of
the chemical process safety and security
systems currently in place at the
chemical facility in question to ensure
the credibility and effectiveness of the
inspection and auditing program. Some
other commenters suggested that State
and local entities could be a resource
base for audits and site visits, including
those of higher tier facilities.
Commenters asked several other
specific questions about DHS’s use of
third-party auditors. A chemical
company requested clarification on how
DHS could delegate its authorities to
third-parties. Another commenter
wanted the ability to seek legal remedies
against third-party auditors. Other
commenters raised the question of who
would pay for third-party auditors,
suggesting that DHS should.
Some commenters argued for the use
of third-party audits at any chemical
facility regardless of its tier ranking.
One commenter noted that the eventual
requirements for certification should be
stringent, creating confidence that the
auditor will be just as capable as DHS
inspectors of auditing or inspecting a
high-risk facility. The commenter
suggested that, as a result, a certified
third-party auditor should also be
allowed to conduct inspections at
‘‘high’’ or ‘‘higher’’ risk facilities. Other
commenters noted that allowing thirdparty auditors to perform work at any
chemical facility, regardless of its tier,
will increase the ability of DHS to
rapidly and effectively review security
plans at chemical facilities by making
sure sufficient numbers of inspectors are
available at any given time.
Other commenters opposed DHS’s use
of third-party auditors altogether. A
chemical industry commenter opposed
DHS’s use of consultants, contractors, or
vendors to perform audits and
inspections of facilities based on
concerns about confidentiality and
conflicts of interest. The commenter
asserted that DHS-trained personnel are
best suited to understand the
complexities of security in affected
facilities and to understand the
importance of sensitive business
information provided to DHS.
Consequently, the commenter urged
DHS not to initiate the proposed
program without the appropriate level
of staff, training, and resources
necessary to implement enforcement.
One commenter preferred that DHS
officials, not officials from other
government agencies or nongovernmental organizations, conduct
third-party inspections or audits to
assess compliance; the commenter
asserted that consistency of audits can
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only be maintained if one agency, using
the same inspection and/or audit
procedures, performs the work. Several
other commenters disagreed with the
concept of third-party auditors unless
they were under contract to DHS and
met DHS hiring standards and training
certifications. They felt that if such an
activity is important, then DHS should
carry out the activity itself.
Response: The Department recognizes
that there are many important and
complex issues surrounding the use of
third-party auditors. Those issues
include questions about whether it is
appropriate for DHS to use third-party
auditors and if so, for which tiers of
facilities; what the standards and
requirements would be for those thirdparty auditors; and who would pay for
third-party auditors. DHS continues to
take these issues under advisement.
DHS intends to issue a future
rulemaking providing the details about
its plans to use third-party auditors. In
developing its proposed rule, DHS will
consider these comments about thirdparty auditors. Until that time, DHS will
use its own inspectors for conducting
inspections and audits.
G. Recordkeeping
Comment: One commenter suggested
that the recordkeeping and reporting
requirements be strengthened for
process malfunctions or any attempted
terrorist attack; the need for emergency
response, safe shut down, evacuation
and decontamination procedures in case
of an attack or malfunction be defined;
and effective training requirements for
workers in covered facilities be
required.
Response: Recordkeeping
requirements under this new authority
focus on security and will capture many
of the issues identified by the
commenter. Recordkeeping
requirements regarding incidents under
process safety, including shut down/
start up, are outside of the scope of this
regulation.
Comment: One commenter asked for
guidance regarding what would
constitute a reportable ‘‘security
incident’’ or ‘‘suspicious incident.’’ The
commenter noted that DOT has
provided helpful guidance for reporting
and recordkeeping under HM–232.
Response: The Department will
provide facility owners with guidance
on these and other terms used in the
recordkeeping section.
Comment: Another commenter
suggested that § 27.250(a)(4) include a
reference to NFPA 731, Standard for the
Installation of Electronic Premises
Security Systems (2006 edition),
Chapter 9, Testing and Inspections. The
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commenter supported the
recommendation by pointing out that all
NFPA codes and standards are
developed through the voluntary
consensus process and are accredited by
the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI); that Congress, in
several cases has mandated the adoption
of NFPA codes and standards and that
Public Law 104–113, as described in
OMB Circular A119, mandated that
voluntary consensus codes and
standards be used when they are
applicable and to ensure that chemical
facility safety be the primary concern.
Response: Voluntary consensus
approaches to chemical facility security
will be addressed in guidance. However,
the Department cannot mandate specific
security measures under this authority.
Comment: One chemical association
found the requirements for
recordkeeping to be excessive.
Concerning training, the commenter
stated that the location of the session
and the name and qualifications of the
trainer were not important, and the
requirement for attendees’ signatures
would cause headaches if attendees
leave without signing. Also, many of
these requirements seem to prevent the
use of web-based training. With respect
to the drill and exercise provision, the
commenter believed that a
comprehensive list of participants is
more challenging than it might appear,
since drills and exercises frequently
involve persons in multiple locations.
Finally, recording the name and
qualifications of every maintenance
technician is overly burdensome and
extremely difficult to document.
According to the commenter, this
proposed requirement would lead to
inadvertent non-compliance due to its
inherent complexity. The commenter
urged that the recordkeeping
requirements, at most, track the MTSA
requirements (33 CFR § 105.225), which
are less detailed and only require
records to be maintained for two years.
Response: Memorializing minimal
information about training, drills,
exercise, and maintenance is important
for a facility to assist in the analysis and
review of its security efforts, and DHS
does not agree that these requirements
are overly burdensome or excessive
given the potential risks in this sector.
The recordkeeping requirements
address specific issues that arise in
chemical facilities, and a three year
period is consistent with the anticipated
audit and review cycle under this rule.
Comment: An industry association
argued that, in light of existing DOT
requirements, no additional training and
recordkeeping requirements are needed
for battery transportation. Further, any
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training and recordkeeping
requirements that are made applicable
to drivers hauling covered chemicals
should be the responsibility of the
transportation firms, not the facilities
they service.
Response: There are no specific
requirements for recordkeeping of
transportation activities in this rule.
H. Orders
Comment: Various commenters
mentioned the remedies in proposed
§§ 27.300, 27.305, 27.310, and 27.315.
An industry group indicated that the
rule should provide adequate protection
for recipients of penalty and cessation
orders, including the opportunity for an
adjudicatory hearing before a neutral
hearing officer. The commenter
suggested that the rule make clear that
the burden of proof lies with DHS, not
the facility; that facilities may be
represented by counsel; that the facility
is entitled to present evidence on its
behalf; that there be an orderly process
for the hearing officer to make a
decision on the basis of the record
presented, including a record of
decision and for intra-agency appeal of
the hearing officer’s decision before it
becomes final. Finally, a trade
association pointed out a typographical
error in proposed §§ 27.305(b) and
27.310(a).
Response: The Department has
substantially revised the regulatory text
in Subpart C, which includes Orders,
adjudications, and appeals. The
Department directs commenters to the
revised regulatory text in Subpart C, as
well as summary of those changes in
§ II(B) Rule Provisions. In sum, the
Department has included adjudicatory
procedures for a proceeding before a
neutral hearing officer whereby facilities
and others may be represented by
counsel and may present evidence. The
procedures provide that the burden of
proof rests with the Assistant Secretary
and that a record will be compiled for
an appeal within DHS.
Comment: Several others provided
input on cessation orders. A local
government agency indicated that an
Order to Cease Operations likely would
be litigated immediately after issuance,
and questioned how non-compliance
during the lengthy litigation period
would be remedied. Another commenter
recommended that DHS add a provision
stating that it would not enforce an
order to cease operations within 30 days
of a final action, which would allow the
facility time to seek judicial review. An
industry commenter stated that DHS’s
professional assessment that a chemical
facility was in total violation of the
security requirements should result in
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an initial audit of what is required at
that particular site to be in compliance.
If, after a reasonable time, the facility
does not come into compliance, then
DHS should consider temporary closure
until compliance is attained. An
association expressed concern that DHS
should consider whether a facility’s
products are critical to the economy,
chemical industry, or national security
before imposing fines or issuing a notice
to cease operations.
Response: As noted above, the
Department has substantially revised
the regulatory text in Subpart C, which
includes the provisions on Orders,
adjudications, and appeals. Consistent
with the statement in the Advance
Notice, the Department realizes that an
Order to Cease Operations would likely
be litigated immediately after issuance.
See 71 FR 78276, 78287.
I. Adjudications and Appeals
Comment: While commenters
generally supported the processes
proposed for objections and appeals,
some thought that DHS should
strengthen and expand the objections
and appeals provisions. Several
commenters suggested that DHS include
additional provisions to the objections
and appeals sections. One commenter
recommended that DHS revise the rule
to include a full description of the
administrative review process,
including the procedures to which all
parties and the adjudicating official
must adhere. Another commenter
recommended that the Under Secretary
and the Deputy Secretary have the
authority to delegate their
responsibilities as adjudicating officials.
One commenter stated that the burden
of proof should lie with DHS, not the
order recipient, that recipients may be
represented by counsel, that the
recipient is entitled to present evidence
on its behalf, that there be an orderly
process for the hearing officer to make
a decision on the basis of the record
presented, including a record of
decision, and for intra-agency appeal of
the hearing officer’s decision before it
becomes final.
Response: DHS has reorganized the
adjudications and appeals procedures,
as discussed in the summary of rule
provision changes to Subpart C. See
§ II(B). Given that the rule already
provides consultation opportunities,
coupled with the fact that the
Department has greatly modified its
adjudications provisions, the
Department believes it is unnecessary to
retain the objections provisions from the
Advance Notice (proposed §§ 27.205(c),
27.220(b), and 27.240(c) and has thus
removed them from the interim final
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rule. Of course, consultations are still
available pursuant to various provisions
in the rule including § 27.120(b).
In addition, DHS now expressly spells
out new procedures for adjudications
and appeals. In particular, DHS has
added adjudicatory procedures for a
proceeding before a neutral hearing
officer whereby facilities and others
may be represented by counsel and may
present evidence. The procedures
provide that the burden of proof rests
with the Assistant Secretary and that a
record will be compiled for an appeal
within DHS. The Secretary is expressly
authorized to appoint individuals to
serve as a neutral hearing officer. The
Secretary and others retain their existing
authority to delegate duties and
responsibilities.
Comment: Another commenter
suggested that DHS revise the rule to
provide some guidance and limitation
on the number of requests that a facility
will be permitted to make for additional
information and on the maximum extent
to which DHS will toll timeframes. One
commenter noted that although there is
authority for the Assistant Secretary to
ask the facility for more information,
there is no mechanism for the facility to
seek further explanation that is needed
for purposes of arguing its objection.
Response: The revisions of the
procedures substantially address these
comments. The adjudications provisions
empower a hearing officer to make
decisions on the information to be
accepted into each hearing record.
Comment: Another commenter stated
that, under the Advance Notice, a
facility had the option of using the
appeal procedure (instead of the
objection procedure) for challenging the
disapproval of its SSP. The Advance
Notice stated that orders are stayed until
the administrative appeal is completed,
but the Advance Notice did not provide
specifically for the disapproval of a SSP
to be stayed pending the administrative
appeal. The commenter suggested that
DHS should make such a stay explicit.
Another commenter argued that,
because timelines are short, facilities
will be forced to complete the SVA and
SSP regardless of the outcome of the
appeal, thus rendering the appeals
process moot. If a facility objects to a
determination, whether it is opposing
either the overall assessment of ‘‘high
risk’’ or the specific tier assignment, one
commenter recommended that DHS
should issue a decision on objection
before the facility is required to
implement any additional measures—
including both the SVA and SSP.
Response: The addition of the factual
adjudication procedure, with provisions
on the effectiveness of administrative
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actions during adjudications and
appeals, substantially address these
comments. The adjudications and
appeals sections provide that, absent
exigent circumstances, Orders are
stayed pending the completion of
proceedings.
Comment: Another commenter
indicated that §§ 27.205(c)(1),
27.220(b)(1), and 27.240(c)(1) (of the
Advance Notice) cite ‘‘within 20
calendar days’’ as the deadline for filing
objections regarding the high risk
determination, risk-based tiering, and
disapproval of site security plans. In
contrast, §§ 27.215(c), 27.305(d), and
27.320(b)–(d) (of the Advance Notice)
cite ‘‘within 30 calendar days’’ for
certain deadlines regarding notification,
appeals, and payments of civil
penalties. The commenter believed that
having two different deadlines for
various actions under the regulatory
program is burdensome to both DHS
and the regulated facilities, and
requested that all ‘‘within 20 calendar
days’’ be amended to ‘‘within 30
calendar days’’ to provide more
consistency within the Department’s
regulatory program. Another commenter
urged that an appeal must be filed
within 30 calendar days of when the
order is issued should be changed to
within 30 calendar days of when the
order is served. See § 27.320(b) of the
Advance Notice.
Response: The Department’s revisions
to the adjudications and appeals
provisions substantially address these
comments. The rule continues to permit
consultations but does not set hard and
fast time periods for such consultations.
See, e.g., § 27.120(b), § 27.240(b), and
§ 27.245(b). With respect to the time
periods for adjudications and appeals,
the revised procedures provide that
adjudications and appeals must be
commenced with stated time periods
after ‘‘notification.’’ See, e.g.,
§ 27.310(b)(2) or § 27.345(b)(2).
Comment: One commenter
recommended that the regulations
provide specifically that DHS would
make available to the public nonconfidential summaries of
determinations on appeals. The
commenter also recommended that the
regulations contain specific statements
that objections and appeals may be
submitted as CVI.
Response: The adjudication and
appeal sections contemplate that the
hearing officer or appeal officer will
make the necessary decisions
concerning the handling of CVI. There
is nothing in the procedure to prevent
a facility or other person from relying on
CVI.
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J. Information Protection: Chemicalterrorism Vulnerability Information
(CVI)
The Advance Notice identified a
category of Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI) and set
forth rules governing the maintenance,
safeguarding, and disclosure of
information and records that constitute
CVI.
1. General
Comment: Several commenters
maintained that the proposed rule
undermined enforcement,
accountability, and the credibility of the
program through excessive secrecy. One
of these commenters thought that the
proposed regulations pose a threat to
existing right-to-know laws, while
another stated that people might be well
aware of security gaps and
vulnerabilities at specific facilities, and
yet would have no official channel to
communicate concerns to DHS.
Response: As Congress recognized in
section 550(c), protecting CVI from
public disclosure is crucial to DHS’s
ability to ensure that chemical facilities
are as secure as possible against a
terrorist attack. CVI information may
reveal, among other things, current
vulnerabilities or other details of a
chemical facility’s security capabilities
that could be exploited by terrorists. In
addition, limited and controlled public
disclosure of CVI is essential to fostering
the necessary relationship and
information flow between the
government and private sector. Indeed,
because the chemical security regime
relies to an extent in the first instance
on the veracity and completeness of the
information provided by chemical
facilities, it is of the utmost importance
that those facilities are comfortable that
such information—which may include
proprietary information—will not be
unduly exposed to public view.
In crafting the Advance Notice, DHS
attempted to balance these concerns
with the desire to enhance information
sharing, as appropriate. We believe that
the rule adequately does this by
ensuring that any entities or individuals
with a ‘‘need to know,’’ including
appropriate State and local officials,
will have access to the necessary CVI,
while, at the same time, and consistent
with congressional intent, protecting
CVI from public disclosure that would
undermine the government’s ability to
ensure the security of chemical
facilities.
To the extent that this approach
conflicts with existing state ‘‘right to
know’’ or ‘‘sunshine’’ laws, we believe
that such laws are preempted by this
IFR. At this time, we do not intend to
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displace or otherwise affect any
provisions of Federal statutes, including
the Emergency Planning and
Community Right to Know Act, 42
U.S.C. 11001 et seq., or section 112(r)
and 114 of the Clean Air Act of 1990,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. 7412(r), 7414,
sections 308 and 402 of the Clean Water
Act, 33 U.S.C. 1318, 1342, and section
104(e)(7) of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42
U.S.C. 9604.
We also believe that any potential
gaps in a facility’s security will be
addressed through the government’s
close involvement with chemical
facilities as a result of this rule.
2. Disclosure of CVI
Comment: While some of the
commenters found the provisions to be
inadequately protective of chemical
industry information, others found the
disclosure rules to be too restrictive. A
few commenters urged the Department
to include language requiring
notifications to facilities in cases of CVI
disclosure to unauthorized parties. The
commenters noted that a facility has a
need to know if sensitive information
pertaining to its site has been or might
have been disclosed. A commenter,
concerned over how the CVI rules may
affect third-party audits of security
measures and documents that may be
submitted to the Department as
Alternative Security Plans, requested an
interpretation of DHS’s approach.
Taking the point further, another
commenter did not believe it was in a
company’s best interest to provide
copies of CVI to outside parties, as
currently allowed under the proposed
rule. The commenter would prefer the
proposed rule be amended to require
CVI be made readily available to
authorized Department representatives
only when they conduct on-site visits.
One commenter encouraged the
Department to adopt non-disclosure
protections for verbally transmitted or
obtained CVI. The commenter noted
that information sharing among a
covered facility and authorized
individuals may require verbal
communication as much as it will
require written communication. To
further protect against disclosure, some
commenters believed that proposed
§ 27.400(j) should be enhanced so that it
has a meaningful deterrent effect and
establishes consequences that reflect the
seriousness of the violation. The
commenter suggested that the
Department adopt administrative
penalties similar to those outlined by 6
CFR 29.9(d).
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In addition, some commenters
requested provisions to protect
whistleblowers by stating that no
criminal charges be associated with
disclosing information marked as CVI in
manner complying with whistleblower
protections.
Response: Under § 27.400(c)(3) of the
Advance Notice, ‘‘any person who
* * * receives or gains access to what
they know or should reasonably know
constitutes CVI’’ is a ‘‘covered person’’
and therefore has a duty to protect that
CVI in the manner provided in
§ 27.400(d). This includes the duty to
promptly inform the Assistant Secretary
‘‘when a covered person becomes aware
that CVI has been released to persons
without a need to know * * *.’’ See
§ 27.400(d)(7). We expect that in the
event DHS is so notified, it will notify
the affected chemical facility.
To the extent DHS determines that it
is appropriate to use third-party
auditors in the future for certain
chemical facilities, the auditors will
have a ‘‘need to know’’ under
§ 27.400(e)(1)(i) as persons who
‘‘require[ ] access to specific CVI to
carry out chemical security activities
* * * directed by the Department.’’
Moreover, under § 27.400(e)(3), DHS
retains the discretion to require that any
individuals with a need to know,
including third-party auditors, complete
appropriate background checks before
obtaining access to CVI. We believe that
these safeguards are sufficient to ensure
that CVI is adequately protected from
improper disclosure, even if it may be
handled by third-party auditors.
Section 27.400(b) of the Advance
Notice, which defines CVI, currently is
ambiguous as to whether it includes
information conveyed verbally as well
as in written form. DHS believes that
concerns over public disclosure of CVI
are the same regardless of the manner in
which the information is conveyed.
Accordingly, we have amended this
section to read as follows: ‘‘In
accordance with section 550(c) of the
Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act of 2007, the
following information, whether
transmitted verbally, electronically, or
in written form, shall constitute CVI.’’
We believe that § 27.400(j) gives the
Department broad latitude to craft a
civil remedy sufficient to deter the
unauthorized disclosure of CVI. The IFR
does not provide for any criminal
penalties for disclosure of CVI.
3. Scope of CVI
Comment: A number of commenters
expressed concern regarding the scope
of CVI. The commenters wanted the
interim final rule to declare that
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information developed under other
requirements of law or regulation
cannot be designated as CVI under this
program. Similarly, a commenter
suggested that DHS narrow the scope of
CVI by removing from the rule
§ 27.400(b)(9), which defines CVI to
include ‘‘[a]ny other information that
the Secretary, in his discretion,
determines warrants the protections set
forth in this part.’’
Response: As outlined in the Advance
Notice, the Department intends CVI to
include only that information developed
and/or submitted pursuant to Section
550(c). Accordingly, any information
resulting from other statutory regimes is
not considered CVI. The Department
believes, however, that the Secretary
must retain the discretion provided in
§ 27.400(b)(9). As the Department and
private sector gain more experience
with the chemical security regime set
forth herein, the Department may
determine that other types of
information, not covered in the current
definition of CVI, require similar
protection. Section 27.400(b)(9) is also
necessary to cover any unique or novel
information that the Department may
deem, on a case-by-case basis, requires
protection from public disclosure.
4. Relation of CVI to Other Categories of
Protected Information and FOIA
Comment: Some commenters were
confused by the different categories of
protected information. One commenter
stated that the proposed regulations are
not sufficiently clear on the relationship
of CVI to SSI and other relevant
methods of information protection. The
commenter indicated that the interim
final rule should clarify how these
information protection regimes will
relate to each other. A few commenters
believed that the creation of the new
CVI category of information protection
is redundant and unnecessary given that
current protections, such as SSI, are
adequate options for the Department to
implement the statutory restrictions.
One commenter noted that the
‘‘Safeguards’’ classification for the
Nuclear Sector seems to parallel the
proposed ‘‘CVI’’ classification for the
Chemical Sector. The commenter
questioned whether the Department is
considering inventing new security
classifications for each of the 15 Critical
Infrastructure Protection Sectors. The
commenter would prefer that the
Department develop a new Category of
Information Classification for all 17
sectors for security-specific or securityrelated information that are, at a
minimum, the same as those for the
current ‘‘Safeguards’’ classification
program.
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Two commenters recommended that
the interim final rule clarify that CVI
protections would be in addition to any
other applicable bases for nondisclosure
of information under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA), such as the
Trade Secrets Act and its protections are
for confidential business information.
Another commenter noted the provision
gives the Department discretion to
refuse release of part of a record under
FOIA that contains no CVI, when
another part of the same document
contains CVI. The commenter suggests
that this proposal is at odds with
longstanding FOIA mandates and
practice. Furthermore, the commenter
noted that, if a portion of a requested
record contains no CVI and is
reasonably segregable from other parts
of the record that do, there is no
authority or justification for
withholding that CVI-free portion unless
some other FOIA exemption or
exclusion applies.
Response: It is the Department’s view
that the language of Section 550(c) calls
for a unique information protection
regime. As stated in the preamble of the
Advance Notice, in creating CVI, the
Department looked to and drew on
various aspects of those information
protection regimes currently in
existence, including, SSI, PCII and SGI.
Moreover, as the Advance notice makes
clear, the Department intended CVI to
track the existing SSI regime in certain
respects and indeed, borrowed
somewhat from that regime’s structure
and provisions (e.g., requiring a ‘‘need
to know,’’ storage in a secure container,
etc.) None of these regimes, however, is
sufficient to accommodate the
protections Congress called for in
Section 550(c), most notably, that any
information developed pursuant to
Section 550(c) be treated as classified
information in the course of
enforcement proceedings. For this and
other reasons, the Department
developed CVI, which is separate and
distinct from SSI, PCII, SGI or any other
pre-existing information protection
regime.
Section 550(c) pertains only to
chemical facilities and thus this rule
does not speak to the handling of other
critical infrastructure sectors. That said,
the Department does not take the
creation of a new information protection
regime lightly, especially in light of the
President’s Memorandum for Heads of
Executive Departments and Agencies of
December 16, 2005, entitled ‘‘Guidelines
and Requirements in Support of the
Information Sharing Environment.’’
Absent express direction from Congress,
as in Section 550(c), the Department is
reluctant to create additional regimes.
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In drafting the rule, the Department
did not intend for its restrictions on
public disclosure to displace separate
and additional statutory restrictions on
the public disclosure of confidential
business information.
The terms and structure of Section
550 clearly preclude public disclosure
of CVI. For this reason, it is the
Department’s view that CVI, like SSI
and PCII, is exempt from FOIA
disclosure under Exemption 3 of FOIA.
See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3). Exemption 3
provides, in part, that information is
exempt from disclosure by operation of
another statute, provided that such
statute either: ‘‘(A) requires that the
matters be withheld from the public in
such a manner as to leave no discretion
on the issue; or (B) * * * provided that
such statute refers to particular types of
matters to be withheld.’’ Id. Section
550(c) provides in relevant part that
‘‘information developed under this
section, including vulnerability
assessments, site security plans, and
other security related information,
records, and documents, shall be given
protections from public disclosure
consistent with similar information
developed by chemical facilities subject
to regulation under section 70103 of
title 46 [the Maritime Transportation
Security Act (MTSA)] * * *.’’ MTSA
states that ‘‘information developed
under this chapter is not required to be
disclosed to the public.’’ 46 U.S.C.
70103. Under this language, it is
conceivable that the government has
discretion to release information to the
public. See Church of Scientology of
Calif. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 633 F.2d
1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1980). As stated in
the Advance Notice, however,
‘‘information developed’’ under MTSA
is treated as SSI and, unlike MTSA, the
statute governing SSI (49 U.S.C. 114(s))
states that the government ‘‘shall
prescribe regulations prohibiting the
disclosure of information * * *.’’
(Emphasis added.) This language has
been interpreted as constituting the
‘‘absolute’’ prohibition required to
invoke the exception of Subsection (A).
See Chowdhury v. Northwest Airlines
Corp., 226 F.R.D. 608, 611 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
To the extent that there is some
ambiguity as to which statute should
govern for purposes of an Exemption 3
analysis, it is our view that the SSI
statute most accurately reflects
Congress’s intent in section 550(c) and
that, therefore, CVI should be exempt
from FOIA disclosure under subsection
(A) of Exemption 3. Nevertheless, we
need not resolve the issue at this time
because it is also our view that the
language of section 550(c), which
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provides meaningful limits on the
universe of information subject to
withholding, is sufficient to justify
withholding CVI from FOIA disclosure
under subsection (B) of Exemption 3. Cf.
Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132,
1138 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding provision
of Trade Secrets Act failed to qualify for
subsection (B) exemption because of
‘‘exceedingly broad,’’ ‘‘oceanic,’’ and
‘‘encyclopedic’’ quality of the Act). The
Department believes that it adequately
expresses this conclusion in
§ 27.400(g)(1), which states that:
‘‘Except as otherwise provided in this
section, and notwithstanding the
Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
552), the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a),
and other laws, records containing CVI
are not available for public inspection or
copying, nor does DHS release such
records without a need to know.’’
(Emphasis added.) Moreover, even if
FOIA did apply to CVI, we believe that
it would be exempt from disclosure,
inter alia, as ‘‘homeland security
information’’ under FOIA Exemption 2.
See 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(2).
The commenters’ concern that, if a
document is portion marked to signify
both CVI and non-CVI, the Department
intends to withhold the entire document
under FOIA, is not supported by the
Advance Notice. Section 27.400(g)(2)
states to the contrary that: ‘‘If a record
is marked to signify both CVI and
information that is not CVI, DHS, on a
proper Freedom of Information Act
request, may disclose the record with
the CVI redacted, provided the record is
not otherwise exempt under the
Freedom of Information Act or Privacy
Act.’’ The use of ‘‘may’’ in this context
was intended as permissive, assuming
such disclosure is otherwise
appropriate.
5. Sharing CVI With State and Local
Officials, the Public, and Congress
Comment: Several comments sought
greater access to CVI. Commenters
stated that the Department should share
CVI with State and local officials.
Others noted that the definitions of
‘‘covered persons’’ and ‘‘need-to-know’’
were overly narrow and heightened
their concern that the Department
would not provide information to State
and local officials. One commenter
noted that, to the extent information is
shared directly with State or local
officials, DHS should enter into
agreements with them to ensure that
CVI is sufficiently protected. Other
commenters agreed that the Department
should impose strict controls for the use
of any facility-specific information by
States and local governments. A
commenter stated that information that
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is provided to California local agencies
may be subject to the California Public
Records Act, which if true, means that
CVI in California may not be protected.
A commenter recommended that the
Department develop a method to share
certain information with the public,
such as whether a facility is in
compliance with the security program,
because the people who live in close
proximity to a chemical facility deserve
to know. The commenter recommended
the disclosure of the Letters of Approval
issued upon completion of a site
inspection and audit. The Letters of
Approval could be stripped of any
sensitive information, but still provide
some assurance that facilities are
complying with security requirements.
Finally, other commenters stated that
the interim final rule should make clear
that DHS is not authorized to withhold
information from either House of
Congress, or, to the extent of matter
within its jurisdiction, any committee or
subcommittee of Congress.
Response: Congress clearly intended
that CVI would be shared with State and
local officials, including law
enforcement officials and first
responders, in appropriate cases.
Section 550(c) states that ‘‘this
subsection does not prohibit the sharing
of such information, as the Secretary
deems appropriate, with State and local
government officials possessing the
necessary security clearances, including
law enforcement officials and first
responders, for the purpose of carrying
out this section, provided that such
information may not be disclosed
pursuant to any State or local law.’’ And
the Department made clear in the
preamble to the Advance Notice that
‘‘[t]he Secretary shall administer this
Section consistent with section 550,
including appropriate sharing with State
and local officials, law enforcement
officials, and first responders.’’ See 71
FR 78276, 78289. Furthermore, the
importance of sharing CVI with
appropriate State and local officials is
reflected in the structure of the rule. For
example, it is expected that chemical
facilities will coordinate extensively
with state and local officials—including
the sharing of relevant CVI—in the
course of completing the SSPs required
under § 27.225. It is the Department’s
view, therefore, that the language in the
rule is sufficiently broad to accomplish
this task. For example, we believe that
State and local officials, including law
enforcement officials and emergency
responders, fall within § 27.400(e)(1)(i)’s
definition of those with a need to know
because they will require access to CVI
to ‘‘carry out chemical facility security
activities approved, accepted, funded,
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recommended, or directed by the
Department.’’ Yet because many
commenters have requested clarification
on this point, the Department amends
the § 27.400(e)(1) to read as follows: ‘‘A
person, including a State or local
official, has a need to know CVI in each
of the following circumstances. * * * ’’
As stated above, to the extent any
state law requires the public disclosure
of information that is deemed CVI, it is
the Department’s view that such laws
are preempted by this rule.
At this time the Department does not
intend to provide a means of notifying
the public about local chemical
facilities. We will continue to consider
this issue as the program progresses,
however, and issue a subsequent notice
if necessary.
This rule does not attempt to displace
or create any new law concerning the
Department’s ability to withhold
information from Congress.
6. Litigation
Comment: With respect to availability
of CVI during litigation, some
commenters supported the preamble
statement that, in enforcement cases, the
defendant and its counsel would have
access to relevant CVI to enable them to
prepare a full defense. Another
commenter supported the Department’s
proposal to prohibit the disclosure of
CVI in civil litigation unrelated to
Section 550 enforcement. Yet another
commenter stated that, according to the
proposed rule, information on routine
chemicals used and produced in
processes would be treated as CVI, and
thus disclosed in litigation only in
extraordinary circumstances. The
commenter noted that, because personal
injury and workers’ compensation
claims are the consequences of handling
many toxic substances, this provision
would appear to bring these actions to
an absolute halt, since these cases
cannot be prosecuted without precise
knowledge of the toxic substances at
issue. Finally, a commenter cautioned
the Department to limit those provisions
governing disclosure in civil or criminal
litigation to the authority delegated to
the Department. The commenter saw
nothing in the statute delegating the
authority to issue binding regulations to
govern a judicial proceeding. The
commenter did think it helpful for the
Department to publish regulations that
express its own policies and
interpretations, thereby affording others
guidance as to what the Department’s
preferred practices will be when
litigation arises.
Response: As stated above, Section
550(c) requires CVI to be treated as
classified information in the context of
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any enforcement proceedings. This
novel mandate reflects the seriousness
with which Congress viewed the
protection of CVI from unnecessary
disclosure in administrative or judicial
enforcement proceedings and, by
extension, any civil litigation unrelated
to Section 550. The Department
approach balances this concern with the
need for individuals to have access to
certain CVI, as appropriate, to defend
themselves in enforcement proceedings.
That said, it is not clear that the type
of information involved in a worker’s
compensation or tort claim would
necessarily constitute CVI. The mere
reference to a type of chemical may not
readily fit into one of the categories of
information under §§ 27.400(b)(1)–(9).
However, even if it did, under
§ 27.400(i)(6), the Secretary retains the
discretion to release CVI in such
proceedings.
As explained in the preamble to the
Advance Notice, Section 550(c) states
generally that CVI shall be treated as
‘‘classified material’’ in the context of
any enforcement proceedings. Congress
did not specify, though, whether the
Department should look to the rules
governing classified material in civil
litigation or criminal litigation. The
Department chose to mirror in large part
the handling of classified material in
civil litigation under 18 U.S.C. 2339B. It
remains the Department’s view that this
is a reasoned approach to effectuating
Congress’s intent.
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7. Protection of CVI
Comment: Other comments sought
technical changes to make the rule more
secure or user-friendly including:
Prohibiting the transmission of CVI
using electronic systems unless DHS is
able to provide Military Grade/Quality
Encryption Devices/Systems to the
private sector or provide access to
government locations where this
equipment is available for private sector
use; extending the safeguards that the
CVI provisions require in proposed
§ 27.400(d)(1) concerning ‘‘secure
container[s], such as a safe,’’ to
establishing secure databases; modifying
requirements for marking every page of
a CVI document with the words
‘‘CHEMICAL-TERRORISM
VULNERABILITY INFORMATION’’ and
a lengthy warning statement; allowing
facilities to mark only those pages of a
document containing the CVI and the
warning statement only be provided
once per record, with per page reference
to it as needed; indicating DHS’s
intention to destroy, return, or permit
reclassification of Top-Screen data
pursuant to proposed § 27.400(k).
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Response: The Department believes
that the protective measures required by
§§ 27.400(d) and (f) are sufficient to
adequately protect CVI.
K. Preemption
Comment: Section 27.405(a) of the
Advance Notice proposed to preempt
State and local laws, rules, and court
decisions that conflict with, hinder,
pose an obstacle to, or frustrate the
regulation. Several chemical companies
and associations endorsed the proposed
preemption of State and local
regulations because they believe that
national risk-based, performance
standards could be undercut by
specification standards imposed by the
States. These commenters expressed the
concern that companies with multi-state
operations could be subject to a
confusing array of State programs. One
commenter argued that varying State
regulations also provide varying levels
of protection, which the commenter did
not think was Congress’s intent. Other
commenters noted that Maritime
Transportation Security Act (MTSA),
which applies to facilities located on
waterways, including chemical
facilities, contains an express
preemption provision.
An equal number of comments from
advocacy groups, State agencies, and
Members of Congress opposed the
Department’s position on preemption.
These commenters cited the lack of
express language in Section 550 and the
legislative history to support their
position that Congress did not intend to
grant DHS express or implied authority
to preempt State laws and regulations.
A few commenters referred to a body of
case law indicating a ‘‘presumption
against preemption.’’ Other
commenters, including Members of
Congress, suggested Congress intended
to resolve the issue of preemption in
future chemical facility security
legislation. Commenters also urged DHS
to delete § 27.405 and allow the courts
to determine the preemptive effect of
the Department’s chemical facility
regulations.
A few commenters were concerned
that the language in § 27.405 was so
broad that it might be construed to
preempt State health, safety, and
environmental regulations. Similarly,
one State requested that DHS modify the
final provision to avoid any inadvertent
preemption of Federal, State, or local
health, safety, and environmental
regulations.
A few comments were directed at the
appeals procedures for preemption
decisions. One commenter disagreed
with the lack of benchmarks that DHS
would use to determine if preemption
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was called for and another added that
the interim final rule should specify a
reasonable time period for a decision to
be rendered and for the decision to
constitute a final administrative
decision so that judicial relief could be
sought. One association stated that the
preemption decision process and
appeals procedures did not include
State government, thereby excluding the
parties whose laws, rules, and public
interests are most affected. The
commenter proposed including a
mandatory consultation process
between the State and the facility before
the DHS appeal, a joint hearing
opportunity with the facility and State
before DHS, a written decision, and
State access to a judicial appeal for an
adverse decision.
Response: Please see the section
below entitled ‘‘Executive Order: 13132:
Federalism’’ for a response to these
comments and a discussion of
preemption.
L. Implementation of the Rule
Comment: The preamble stated that
DHS is considering a phased
implementation of the program. Several
industry commenters and a State agency
supported phased implementation
because they agreed that DHS should
take action on the most critical facilities
first. One commenter warned that
problems and issues should be
addressed prior to implementation, and
another commenter requested that DHS
define what tiers apply to which phases.
Two members of Congress asked DHS to
clarify implementation for high-risk
facilities beyond Phase I.
Response: The Department will
immediately and quickly address the
highest risk facilities. At the same time,
the Department will reach out to a
broader class of facilities, (numbering in
the many thousands), to gather
information necessary for the
Department to make risk-based tiering
decisions.
M. Other Issues
1. Whistleblower Protection
Comment: Many commenters thought
that this regulation should provide
‘‘whistleblower protection.’’ They
explained that the regulation should
protect employees that provide
information on a facility’s security and
safety from employer retaliation.
Commenters suggested that workers are
on the front lines, and therefore in the
best position to participate in the
development of Security Vulnerability
Assessments and Site Security Plans.
Commenters suggested that DHS create
a system which would allow
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individuals to report vulnerabilities,
shortcomings, and failures without the
fear of retaliation from the company.
Commenters requested that DHS change
regulatory text to provide whistleblower
protection to employees, with some
suggesting that DHS should include the
protections found in H.R. 5695 and S.
2145.
Response: Section 550 did not give
DHS authority to provide whistleblower
protection, and so DHS has not
incorporated specific whistleblower
protections into this regulation. The
Department does, however, value frank
information concerning security
vulnerabilities. Employees with daily
involvement at high-risk facilities can
certainly be a valuable source of
information. In the interest of providing
some mechanism for employees to alert
the Department about information at
their employer’s chemical facility, the
Department intends to establish a
telephone line through which
individuals can submit security
concerns to the Department. The
Department will provide callers with
the option of remaining anonymous.
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2. Inherently Safer Technology
Comment: The Department received
numerous comments on the issue of
inherently safer technologies (IST)
options. Several commenters, including
advocacy groups, unions, academics,
State agencies, and other officials,
strongly encouraged DHS to consider
safer technologies as well as physical
countermeasures. A few commenters,
including members of Congress,
suggested that the Department should
address the use of ISTs, even though
Section 550 was silent on the issue.
Many of these commenters urged DHS
to include provisions in the rule that
would encourage chemical facilities to
consider implementing safer processes
and using safer chemicals as a method
to improve site security through the
reduction of risk. They suggested that
DHS require chemical companies to
analyze and report on safer technologies
in their Site Security Plans. These
commenters asserted that substituting
safer chemicals, processes, practices, or
technologies not only contributes to
severity (i.e., can minimize the
consequences associated with an
accident at or attack on a chemical
facility), but has the potential to greatly
minimize the physical security costs a
chemical facility would otherwise have
to assume. Other commenters pointed
out that ISTs are the best tools available
to completely mitigate facility
vulnerabilities and safeguard
communities.
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In contrast, other commenters rejected
the use of any IST requirements. Some
argued that inherently safer
technologies are an environmental
construct and should not be implicitly
or explicitly required for security. One
association expressed concern that
requirements for safer technologies
could shift rather than reduce risk and/
or limit the production of certain
chemicals. In addition, some
commenters urged DHS to avoid
including any ‘‘pseudo-IST mandates’’
in the rule; the commenter thought that
DHS had inadvertently done so.
Response: Section 550 prohibits the
Department from disapproving a site
security plan ‘‘based on the presence or
absence of a particular security
measure,’’ including inherently safer
technologies. See Section 550(a). Even
so, covered chemical facilities are
certainly free to consider IST options,
and their use may reduce risk and
regulatory burdens.
3. Delegation of Responsibility
Comment: Another commenter
strongly recommended that DHS
consider delegating oversight
responsibility to State governments,
along with appropriate levels of Federal
funding to support homeland security
efforts. Interested states could petition
DHS, and DHS would grant delegated
authority on a discretionary basis. The
commenter suggested that DHS could
retain oversight authority, but would
delegate programmatic responsibility
and commit resources to authorized
States. The commenter likened the
arrangement to the one that the EPA
uses to handle air and water regulations
and the one that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission runs with its ‘‘Agreement
State’’ program. Another State agency
commenter noted that California has
promulgated a successful chemical
safety program built on partnering State
and local regulatory interests with
chemical industry hazard mitigation
activities.
Response: The Department has
contemplated the issue of delegating
authority to State governments, and has
decided not to do so. If the Department
reconsiders the issue in the future, it
will provide notice of any such
decision.
4. Interaction With Other Federal Rules
and Programs
Comment: Many commenters pointed
out potential overlap between this rule
and other Federal agency rules. As one
commenter stated, many Federal
agencies have some involvement in
chemical facility security, including
DHS (including the U.S. Coast Guard
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and TSA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, &
Explosives (ATF), the Departments of
State, Commerce, and Transportation
(including its modal administrations),
EPA, and OSHA. Other commenters
encouraged DHS to build upon the
existing EPCRA and the Risk
Management Program (RMP) regulatory
programs, because of their proven
records of success and the important
health, safety, and environmental
purposes that they serve.
One commenter noted that DOT has
security plan requirements in 49 CFR
Part 172, Subpart I and that several of
the DHS performance standards overlap
with the DOT security plan
requirements. One commenter asserted
that the proposal in the Advance Notice
attempted to cover up knowledge of
toxic dangers by potentially ‘‘gutting the
worker and public right-to-know
provisions’’ of existing Federal and
State laws, including the Occupational
Safety and Health Act and the
Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA). In
addition, some of these commenters
were concerned that preemption and
CVI classification will restrict
information flow and access currently
available through these Federal
regulatory programs.
Several commenters expressed
concern that, although DHS intends that
this rule not affect other laws regulating
manufacture, sale, use, and disposal of
chemicals, it is unclear how the DHS
security planning and enforcement can
avoid impacting the environmental,
occupational, trade, and other rules
already regulating the same facilities.
Potential conflicts also affect first
responders. Since past conflicts over
authority have tended to diminish
program effectiveness, the commenter
wonders how such conflicts can be
avoided. Solutions offered by
commenters include a more explicit
statement on conflict resolution in the
final rules, an inter-agency coordination
process to resolve conflicts, or
memoranda of agreement with agencies
having concurrent authority.
Response: The Department is aware
that potential overlap exists between
this rule and existing Federal rules and
programs. In the Advance Notice, the
Department acknowledged that overlap
and included an extensive discussion of
existing and proposed Federal programs
that are related to chemical security. See
§ I of the Advance Notice, ‘‘Brief History
of Federal Pre-Existing Chemical
Security Tools and Programs.’’
Section 550 provides that ‘‘[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to
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supersede, amend, alter, or affect any
Federal law that regulates the
manufacture, distribution in commerce,
use, sale, other treatment, or disposal of
chemical substances or mixtures.’’ In
the Advance Notice, after
acknowledging that the ATF regulates
the purchase, possession, storage, and
transportation of explosives, the
Department indicated that it did not
intend for these regulations to interfere
with ATF’s current authorities. See 71
FR 78276, 78290. Likewise, the
Department does not intend for these
regulations to impede the authorities of
other Federal agencies. With respect to
this regulatory program, DHS will work
closely with the Department of Energy,
EPA, OSHA, ATF and other federal
agencies. Where there is concurrent
jurisdiction, the Department will work
closely with other Federal agencies to
ensure that regulated facilities can
comply with applicable regulations
while minimizing any duplication. As
the program develops, the Department
will consider the necessity of various
formalized arrangements, such as an
inter-agency coordination process, to
resolve jurisdictional questions or
conflicts.
5. Third-Party Actions
Comment: Several commenters
supported the Advance Notice
discussion of the statutory prohibition
against third party actions to enforce
any provision of the chemical security
rules. See § 27.410 and Section 550(d).
A State commenter wrote that the
prohibition might be construed to
prevent State actions against the
Department to enforce the regulations, a
position that the commenter believed to
be contrary to congressional intent. The
commenter agreed that the statutory
language would bar a State from taking
enforcement action against an owner or
operator for violation of these
regulations, but it saw no support in the
statute to bar State action against the
Department (or other non-owners or
non-operators). According to the
commenter, this interpretation exceeds
the scope of Section 550 and is therefore
an unnecessary limitation on private
rights of action. Commenters asserted
that a plain reading of Section 550
indicates that Congress limited judicial
review in only two ways: (1) By
prohibiting Section 550 from being
asserted as a jurisdictional basis for a
cause of action; and (2) by providing
that only the Secretary of Homeland
Security has the right to bring
enforcement actions against ‘‘owners
and operators.’’ The commenters said
they do not believe that Congress
intended to prohibit other statutory
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causes of actions (such as review
pursuant to the Administrative
Procedure Act).
Members of Congress also challenged
the broad scope of DHS’s position on
third-party suits, because it would block
basic challenges to DHS under the
Administrative Procedure Act. The
commenters believed that § 27.410(a)
was an unnecessary limitation on
private rights of action. One Member of
Congress explained that Congress
intended to limit the provision to
citizen suits against chemical facilities
for failure to comply with the
Department’s chemical security rules.
One commenter strongly supported
the Department’s discussion of the
prohibition of private rights of action to
enforce the provisions of Section 550.
The commenter believed that the
availability of enforcement actions
should be limited to avoid unnecessary
and potentially frivolous lawsuits that
attempt to enforce chemical facility
security requirements that are outside
the reach of the government’s authority.
Some commenters supported the DHS
provision because they believed that
third party actions should be limited
and that the Department should have
the sole discretion of when and how to
enforce these regulations. One
commenter stated that neither DHS nor
regulated chemical facilities should be
distracted from their purpose of
minimizing the possibility of a
catastrophic terrorist incident by
concerns about how their actions
implementing Section 550 might be
used in private tort litigation. One
industry organization supported
§ 27.410(b), which allows a chemical
facility to petition DHS to provide ‘‘the
Department’s view in any litigation
involving any issues or matters
regarding this Part.’’ The commenter
noted that DHS is in a unique position,
in light of its Section 550 authorities
and expertise, to provide its views
regarding a chemical facility’s security
efforts.
A labor union expressed concern that
§ 27.410(a) grants immunity to chemical
facilities from actions by third parties to
enforce any provisions of the rule. The
labor union thought that it may act as
an open invitation to chemical facilities
to disregard provisions in the rules or in
security plans that are meant to protect
maritime activities from unduly
burdensome or improper application of
security procedures. The labor union
explained that ‘‘[w]here damages are
incurred by maritime-related businesses
or mariners as a result of improper
action of chemical facilities under color
of enforcing their security plans, the
injured parties should not be denied the
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normal recourse of the U.S. legal
system.’’
Response: In § 27.410 of the Advance
Notice, the Department set out two
principles: (1) the chemical security
regulations did not on their own terms
create any additional rights of action for
any person other than the Secretary; and
(2) relevant parties may seek a statement
from the Department of its views in any
litigation involving the chemical
security regulatory program. The
Department has decided to adopt these
provisions as proposed in the Advance
Notice.
In the preamble to the Advance
Notice, the Department also stated its
view that Section 550(d) prohibits any
party other than the Secretary from
enforcing the provisions of Section 550.
The Department also stated its view that
Section 550(d) prohibits actions brought
to compel the Department to take a
specific action to enforce Section 550.
Although the Department does not find
it necessary to codify these views in the
Code of Federal Regulations, they
remain the views of the Department
after considering the comments
received. In Section 550(d), Congress
provided in clear terms its intent to
prevent parties other than the Secretary
from making enforcement decisions
under Section 550. This intent would be
thwarted if parties could seek indirectly
to have particular enforcement measures
taken by bringing suit against the
Department. Such suits would also pose
difficulties involving the information
protections of Section 550 and its
implementing regulations. In short, the
terms and structure of Section 550
provide the Secretary with critical
discretion in implementing the
chemical security program. It would be
inappropriate to curtail that discretion
through lawsuits. See generally Norton
v. Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance,
542 U.S. 55 (2004).
6. Judicial Review
Comment: Several commenters,
including Members of Congress, urged
DHS to incorporate the right to judicial
review in the interim final rule and
clarify the judicial remedies available.
One commenter mentioned that the
right to judicial review was expressly
stated in prior legislative proposals.
Another commenter believed that the
District Courts have jurisdiction to
consider whether a facility presents a
‘‘high level of security risk.’’ Other
commenters discussed judicial review
in the context of preemption, urging the
Department to provide facilities with
the opportunity for judicial review of
Departmental decisions pursuant to
§ 27.405. Finally, one commenter
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recommended that the rule provide that
if the adjudicating official fails to reach
a decision within the timeframes
provided by the proposed rule, then the
administrative review process is
deemed completed and all
administrative remedies exhausted, so
as to afford the facility the ability to
challenge the Department’s decision in
a District Court.
Response: The Department does not
have authority to create jurisdiction in
the district courts for review of
Department decisions. Jurisdiction is
created by provisions of law other than
these regulations. Nor does the
Department have authority to create
specific judicial remedies through
rulemaking. Decision-making authority
with respect to preemption is discussed
below in the portion of this preamble
related to Federalism. As discussed
there, courts have the ability in
appropriate contexts to review the
Department’s opinions as they relate to
preemption. This interim final rule does
not augment the administrative law
default principles that govern
appropriate action if the Department
does not make decisions in the
timeframes specified in this interim
final rule.
7. Guidance and Technical Assistance
Comment: Some industry commenters
noted that guidance, information, and
education were essential for the success
of the program. A chemical company
commented that facilities should have
the opportunity to review and comment
on any guidance provided to them by
DHS. Several industry associations
made the same comment and stated the
need for guidance to provide direction
and advice but not to become either
enforceable or limiting in the security
measures that a facility may employ.
One commenter suggested that there
be sufficient time to respond to the
guidance prior to developing a security
plan. Commenters suggested that DHS
draft guidance on aspects of the
regulation and that such guidance be as
detailed and specific as possible.
One commenter believed that, while
agency guidance is procedurally easier
to issue because agencies typically issue
it without notice and comment, due
process, or other protections afforded by
rulemaking under the Administrative
Procedure Act, this ‘‘pseudorulemaking’’ can be referenced in
enforcement actions, imposing cost
burdens, or creating other compliance
liabilities. Another commenter
appreciated the fact that the guidance
would specify the security measures
that facilities could take to meet the
proposed standards while not
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mandating any particular measures that
facilities should use. Commenters
recommended that DHS follow the OMB
Bulletin entitled ‘‘Agency Good
Guidance Practices,’’ which establishes
policies and procedures for the
development, issuance, and use of
significant guidance documents by
Executive Branch departments and
agencies.
Response: DHS believes that guidance
will play an important role in this
regulatory program. The Department’s
guidance will provide examples of
specific measures that facilities may use
to address the performance standards in
the rule. Because this rule is based on
performance standards and not on
prescriptive measures, guidance is
particularly important. The guidance
will aid in informing the regulated
community of ways to satisfy the
performance standards without
imposing additional requirements not
found in these regulations.
The Department will designate the
guidance document as CVI. The
guidance document will contain
specific anti-terrorism measures
designed to mitigate or prevent terrorist
attacks, as well as other sensitive
information. This type of information is
not appropriate for public disclosure
under Section 550 and the regulations
issued hereunder.
With respect to comments regarding
OMB’s Bulletin on Agency Good
Guidance Practices, the Department
notes that it will apply the Bulletin as
appropriate.
Comment: The availability of
technical assistance to facilities not
placed in the top tier was requested by
an industry association.
Response: Technical assistance will
be available for all covered facilities as
resources permit. Section 27.120
establishes requirements for a
Coordinating Official who will provide
guidance to facilities in all tiers, as
necessary and to the extent that
resources permit.
8. Miscellaneous Comments
Comment: One commenter
recommended that DHS engage and
work with Congress to enact a more
comprehensive and meaningful
chemical security law as soon as
possible, and under no circumstances
beyond the three year expiration of
interim authority.
Response: The Department has
aggressively sought this authority, and
on October 4, 2006, Congress provided
that authority. The Department will
continue to work with Congress on
chemical security matters.
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Comment: One commenter supported
the position that continued funding of
this program would, in effect,
reauthorize the program beyond the
three years noted in the statute and that
DHS may amend the interim final rule
if necessary. Another commenter did
not support this position and stated that
the statute was clear that the regulatory
authority expires after three years. That
commenter also urged the Department
to engage in notice and comment
rulemaking for any future modifications
to the interim final rule.
Response: The Department will, to the
extent required by law, engage in notice
and comment rulemaking in the event
that changes are made to this interim
final rule.
Comment: Commenters suggested a
process by which facilities can exit the
program if they make sufficient changes
to their operations. In addition, a
chemical company and an industry
association questioned how the results
from vulnerability assessments could be
used to allow a facility to exit the
program.
Response: To address the issue of
exiting the program, the Department
added § 27.120(d). It provides that
covered facilities may request a
consultation with the Department if
their facility, processes, or types or
quantities of chemicals change in such
a way that they believe their obligations
under this part may be impacted. For a
discussion of this provision, see § II(B)
above.
Comment: Various commenters raised
issues related to data security,
specifically in the context of the
Department’s web-based CSAT
applications. One commenter thought
that DHS should be able to provide
Military Grade/Quality Encryption
Devices/Systems for the private sector to
use to submit information. Until that
time, the commenter requested that DHS
receive information only in paper form
or discs produced on stand-alone
computers.
Response: DHS recognizes the data
security issues that commenters have
raised. DHS realizes that there is a risk,
both on the sending of information and
the receiving of information, when
transmitting data over the Internet. DHS
has weighed the risk to the data
collection approach against the risk of
collecting the data through paper
submissions and concluded that the
web-based approach was the best.
DHS is concerned about data security
and has taken a number of steps to
protect both the data that will be
collected through the CSAT program
and the process of collection. The
security of the data has been the system
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designers’ number one priority. The site
that the Department will use to collect
submissions is equipped with hardware
encryption that requires Transport Layer
Security (TLS), as mandated by the
latest Federal Information Processing
Standard (FIPS). The encryption devices
have full Common Criteria Evaluation
and Validation Scheme (CCEVS)
certifications. CCEVS is the
implementation of the partnership
between the National Security Agency
and the National Institute of Standards
(NIST) to certify security hardware and
software.
Upon completing any part of the
CSAT (whether the Top-Screen,
Security Vulnerability Assessment, or
Site Security Plan), the facility will click
a ‘‘submit’’ button, which calls a routine
to encrypt the data on the server using
a one way key. Properly-executed public
key encrypted data is very secure, and
the implementation that DHS has used
complies with the NIST 800–57
requirements for security. The key to
decrypt the data does not exist outside
of facilities that are isolated from the
public internet. The key is connected
only through a dedicated, restricted,
government network that cannot
connect to the public internet. Once a
facility submits a Top-Screen (or SVA or
SSP), the data is no longer available
unencrypted.
Comment: A few commenters
indicated that the Advance Notice
lacked meaningful worker involvement.
According to some of the commenters,
the rule does not ensure meaningful
front line worker and union
participation during risk assessments,
during the development of the Site
Security Plans, in the inspection
process, or as part of ongoing
consideration of safety and security
concerns. One commenter felt that this
omission occurred despite the fact that
it is the front line employee whose life
is on the line first if there is a
catastrophic release.
Response: There is nothing in the rule
that prohibits chemical facilities from
involving employees in their security
efforts. Many facilities may find it
beneficial to include employees in their
respective efforts to comply with this
regulation (e.g., identifying security
vulnerabilities, developing Site Security
Plans). However, the Department is not
mandating participation by any
particular type of employee, and the
Department does not think it is wise to
specify any employees that must be
involved. The Department will leave
those decisions to facilities, as they will
best understand the types and functions
of employees at their facility and the
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extent to which any given type of
employee may be able to contribute.
Comment: A commenter noted that a
strong enforcement program is essential.
Response: The Department agrees
with the commenter and will vigorously
enforce these regulations.
Comment: A few commenters sought
immediate phased-in implementation of
a national re-routing and a ban on toxic
by inhalation (TIH) storage wherever
feasible. Although the commenters
stated that re-routing is the first and
fastest step in eliminating catastrophic
vulnerabilities in the chemical sector,
the commenters thought it should
ideally be done in tandem with the use
of safe technology, which could in turn
eliminate ultra-hazardous substances in
our rail system.
Response: These comments are
beyond the scope of this rulemaking,
which addresses chemical facility antiterrorism standards. However, DHS
points out that there are current DHS
and other Federal initiatives to address
materials that are toxic by inhalation.
On December 21, 2006, TSA issued a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Rail
Transportation Security. See 71 FR
76852. The rule applies, in part, to tank
cars containing materials that are
poisonous by inhalation (PIH) as
defined in 49 CFR § 171.8. (Note that the
PIH is synonymous with TIH). See
proposed 49 CFR § 1580.100(b). Also, on
December 21, 2006, one of the
Department of Transportation’s modal
administrations, the Pipelines and
Hazardous Materials Administration
(PHMSA), issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking titled ‘‘Hazardous
Materials: Enhancing Rail
Transportation Safety and Security for
Hazardous Material Shipments.’’ See 71
FR 76834. PHMSA’s proposed
regulation would include requirements
for rail carriers to use data to analyze
safety and security risks along rail
transportation routes where certain
hazardous materials (including PIH
materials) are used.
Comment: Some commenters raised
questions regarding specific funding for
programs such as the BZPP Webcam
Pilot Program.
Response: Those comments are
beyond of the scope of this rulemaking,
which addresses chemical facility antiterrorism standards.
N. Regulatory Evaluation
Comment: Commenters believe that
DHS has underestimated this cost to the
chemical sector and that DHS should
consider other costs beyond capital
costs, such as additional physical
security.
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Response: In the Advance Notice,
DHS did not attempt to estimate the full
cost of complying with the regulation.
Instead, DHS placed in the docket a
stand-alone document titled ‘‘Capital
Cost Information for Public Comment,’’
which provides specific cost estimates
for a potential suite of capital security
investments, such as fences and
perimeter lighting. DHS fully
understands that, in addition to capital
costs, facilities may also incur noncapital costs, including the costs of
additional personnel (e.g., security
guards) and the costs of preparing
assessments and plans. The costs that
DHS has estimated for compliance with
the interim final rule do indeed include
both the capital costs and non-capital
costs.
DHS also notes that while a few
commenters thought the costs DHS
presented were too low, commenters
did not generally provide specific
information regarding which costs may
have been too low or additional
information that would have assisted
the Department in reconsidering the
costs presented with the Advance
Notice. Consequently, while DHS did
re-evaluate the costs presented with the
Advance Notice in response to these
comments, DHS believes that the costs
presented in the Advance Notice are
reasonable approximations, and they
remain unchanged in the interim final
rule.
Some commenters indicated that cost
recovery for implementation can be
difficult under certain government
contracts. Such comments are outside of
the scope of this rulemaking.
Comment: Commenters also
expressed concern that the high costs
will give an unfair advantage to larger
companies, because these associated
costs will be harder for smaller
companies (like local farmers) to absorb.
Response: The Department notes, in
general, that it may be more difficult for
smaller companies to absorb increased
costs than larger companies. However,
the security measures required by this
interim final rule are not ‘‘command
and control’’ type measures. Instead,
they are risk-based performance
measures that will allow a high degree
of flexibility for small entities that own
high-risk chemical facilities. These riskbased performance measures will allow
high-risk chemical facilities to tailor a
specific regulatory compliance regime
that could minimize the compliance
costs to their respective facilities. DHS
also notes that certain chemical
facilities have already voluntarily spent
a significant amount of financial
resources to increase their security. This
interim final rule, by establishing a
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baseline level of security across tiers,
will serve to minimize any competitive
advantage that may be currently enjoyed
by those companies that are underinvesting in security.
Comment: One commenter noted that
in order to quantify the benefits of the
rule, DHS must make assumptions about
the threats to the public, which injects
uncertainty into the calculation of
actual benefits.
Response: The Department agrees that
it is difficult to quantify the ‘‘actual
benefits’’ of this interim final rule. DHS
has included a qualitative discussion of
the benefits of this rule in the regulatory
analysis of Executive Order 12886,
which is located in Section IV of the
preamble to this rule.
Comment: Commenters noted that the
idea of a model facility is indeed a good
proposal but worried that there is
insufficient time to implement the
changes this proposal would entail.
Response: DHS agrees that the idea of
model facilities is a good proposal. The
cost estimate of the interim final rule is
based on the concept of the ‘‘model
facility’’ as it was used by the Coast
Guard to estimate the cost of their
Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002 Facility Security final rule. See 68
FR 60515 (Oct. 22, 2003).
Comment: The Small Business
Administration (SBA), Office of
Advocacy, commented that DHS should
prepare an Initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis (IRFA) under the Regulatory
Flexibility Act (RFA), 5 U.S.C. 603, after
issuing the interim final rule or if DHS
makes subsequent changes to the rule
once it is promulgated. SBA explained
that the RFA process is an extremely
valuable tool for agencies to use when
assessing the impact of a rule on small
businesses and other small entities.
Response: The RFA mandates that an
agency conduct an analysis when an
agency is required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C.
603(a). In this case, the Department is
not required to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking: By directing the
Secretary to issue ‘‘interim final
regulations’’, Congress authorized the
Secretary to proceed without the
traditional notice-and-comment
required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 71 FR 78276, 78277,
and 78292 (Dec. 28, 2006).
DHS did, however, consider the
impacts of this rule on small entities.
The Regulatory Assessment, which is
available in the public docket, contains
our analysis of the impacts of this rule
on small entities. After consideration of
the percentage of small entities that may
have to comply with the risk-based
performance standards required by this
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rule and the compliance costs explained
in the Regulatory Assessment, we have
determined that this rule may have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities. See
‘‘Regulatory Flexibility Act’’ section
below.
IV. Regulatory Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory
Planning and Review
This rule is considered to be an
economically significant regulatory
action under Executive Order 12866,
because it will result in the expenditure
of over $100 million in any one year.
Accordingly, this rule has been
reviewed by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB). A Regulatory
Assessment which more thoroughly
explains the assumptions used to
generate the cost of this interim final
rule is available in the docket as
indicated under ADDRESSES. A summary
of the Regulatory Assessment follows:
Cost Assessment Summary
Section 550 requires the Secretary of
Homeland Security to promulgate
‘‘interim final regulations establishing
risk-based performance standards for
security of chemical facilities * * *.’’
He must do so ‘‘[n]o later than six
months’’ from the date of enactment of
this new authority, i.e. by April 4, 2007.
Consequently, the methodology chosen
to analyze the cost of the interim final
rule was chosen with the six month
congressional deadline in mind. In
order to quickly analyze the cost of the
interim final rule, DHS relied on readily
available information and drew upon
the knowledge of professionals
employed by DHS who have extensive
knowledge of the chemical industry. In
addition, on December 28, 2006, DHS
published an Advance Notice, which
outlined our costing methodology and
also placed in the docket our estimates
of capital costs for potential security
investments in order to seek meaningful
public comment.
We have reviewed the methodology
used by the U.S. Coast Guard to analyze
the cost of the MTSA Facility Security
final rule at 68 FR 60515 (Oct. 22, 2003),
and, due to the similarities between the
MTSA Facility final rule and this
interim final rule, we believe that this
methodology has merit and should be
used in this rulemaking. The MTSA
Facility Security final rule estimated the
cost of performance standards on
several thousand unique facilities.
Similarly, the interim final rule will
estimate the costs of risk-based
performance standards to several
thousand unique facilities. The Coast
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Guard found it impractical to attempt to
estimate compliance costs for each
individual facility and instead
developed costs based on 16 ‘‘model
facilities.’’ Each of the several thousand
facilities was placed into one of the 16
different subgroups for which
compliance costs were then estimated.
Once the compliance costs for the 16
‘‘model facilities’’ were calculated,
estimating the cost of the regulation was
relatively straightforward.
As this regulation is not a ‘‘command
and control’’ regulation, owners and/or
operators will have considerable
flexibility in how they choose to comply
with its requirements. As owners and/
or operators will have discretion on how
to best meet the risk-based performance
objectives, the cost assessment makes
broad assumptions regarding the
percentage of facilities that will choose
to implement or continue certain
security measures and the costs of those
security measures. For example, many
facility owners and/or operators will
choose such measures as building
fences, enhancing perimeter lighting,
and hiring additional security guards in
order to comply with the risk-based
performance standards. In order to
estimate the cost of the interim final
regulation, we made assumptions
regarding the specific percentage of
facilities that will choose to implement
certain security measures, such as
fences and perimeter lighting.
We expect that chemical facility
owners and/or operators will take full
advantage of the flexibility that these
risk-based performance standards will
provide and will conduct facilityspecific and company-specific analyses
to determine the most cost-effective
method to comply with the
requirements of this interim final
regulation. As a result of these internal
analyses, facilities are likely to identify
various means of meeting the risk-based
performance standards applicable to
their facility and tier. It is possible that
some percentage of facilities will find
the most-cost effective method to
comply with the requirements will be to
implement business and related
production, processing or equipment
changes such as to no longer make
certain chemicals or to change their
process to use a less concentrated or less
hazardous form of a listed chemical.
Such process changes, however, are
very facility-, business- and processspecific. Those that involve changes in
chemistry or processes may take several
years of design, testing and repermitting before they can become
operational. Others may be easily and
immediately implemented. However,
because process changes are so facility-
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and business-specific, DHS has no way
of estimating how many facilities may
ultimately implement such measures for
the purpose of estimating compliance
costs. Consequently, DHS is basing its
estimate of compliance costs on
commonly used security measures that
are broadly applicable to a wide range
of high risk chemical facilities, such as
the purchase of fences, the purchase of
perimeter lighting, and the employment
of security guards.
For the purposes of good practices or
regulations promulgated by other
Federal or State agencies, many
chemical facility owners and/or
operators have already spent a
substantial amount of money and
resources to upgrade and improve
security. The costs shown below do not
include the costs of security measures
already implemented to enhance
security. The costs shown here are
intended to represent the marginal cost
incurred by owner and/or operators as
a result of the interim final rule.
DHS’s preliminary estimate of the
number of high risk chemical facilities
that will be covered by the risk-based
performance measures required by the
interim final rule ranges from 1,500 to
6,500 chemical facilities. It is important
to stress that this estimate is simply
DHS’s best guess based on currently
available information. Within this range
of 1,500 to 6,500 potentially covered
chemical facilities, DHS is estimating
5,000 facilities as its best guess of
covered facilities for the purpose of
generating the cost estimate required by
Executive Order 12866.
Using the point estimate of 5,000
facilities, the estimated present value
cost of this interim final rule is $3.6
billion dollars over the period 2006–
2009 2 (7 percent discount rate). For the
purposes of illustration, we also have
calculated the cost of the interim final
rule over the ten year period 2006–2015.
Over the period 2006–2015, DHS
estimates the present value cost of this
interim final rule would be $8.5 billion
assuming 5,000 covered facilities.
Benefits Assessment
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
This interim final rule allows DHS to
implement Section 550 of the Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007.
The first sentence of Section 550
mandates the Secretary to issue interim
2 Section 550(b) of the Act states: ‘‘Interim
regulations issued under this section shall apply
until the effective date of interim or final
regulations promulgated under other laws that
establish requirements and standards referred to in
subsection (a) and expressly supersede this section:
Provided, That the authority provided by this
section shall terminate three years after the date of
enactment of this Act.’’
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final regulations establishing risk-based
performance standards requiring the
performance of vulnerability
assessments and the development and
implementation of site security plans.
Section 550 establishes the parameters
of the Federal government’s first
regulatory program to secure chemical
facilities against possible terrorist
attack.
The threat of a terrorist attack against
high-risk chemical facilities is real.
However, due to the economics of
externalities, the free market may not
provide adequate incentives for
chemical facilities to make a socially
optimal investment in the full range of
measures that would reduce the
probability of a successful terrorist
attack. Externalities are a cost or benefit
from an economic transaction
experienced by parties ‘‘external’’ to the
transaction. In the case of chemical
facilities, since the consequences of an
attack or other security incident may be
significantly larger than what would be
suffered by the owner of the facility
itself, the private market may not
generally provide the incentive for
profit-maximizing firms to unilaterally
spend the socially optimal amount of
resources to prevent or mitigate a
terrorist attack. Since companies
nevertheless will likely suffer serious
consequences in the case of a terrorist
attack, many certainly have invested
significant resources in implementing
security measures, and this analysis
recognizes those resource expenditures.
In a competitive marketplace, however,
a firm will not normally choose to make
some additional investment in security
over their privately optimal amount,
since they would consequently be
choosing to increase its cost of
production and would be at a
disadvantage when competing with
companies that have chosen not to make
a similar investment in security. As this
interim final rule will require high-risk
chemical facilities to be held to the
same risk-based performance standards
according to their risk-based tier, the
competitive advantage that may be
currently enjoyed by those companies
that are under-investing in security
measures would be expected to
disappear.
Need for Increased Security at High-Risk
Chemical Facilities
There is much publicly-available
information that indicates an attack on
a chemical facility is a credible threat
with dire consequences:
• According to the Government
Accountability Office, experts agree that
the Nation’s chemical facilities present
an attractive target for terrorists who are
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17723
intent on causing massive damage.
Many facilities house toxic chemicals
that could become airborne and drift to
surrounding communities if released or
could be stolen and used to create a
weapon capable of causing harm.
Terrorist attacks involving the theft or
release of certain chemicals could have
a significant impact on the health and
safety of millions of Americans. The
disaster at Bhopal, India in 1984, when
methyl isocyanate gas—a highly toxic
chemical—leaked from a tank,
reportedly killing about 3,800 people
and injuring anywhere from 150,000 to
600,000 others, illustrates the potential
threat to public health from a chemical
release.3
• The Department of Justice has
concluded that the risk of terrorists
attempting in the foreseeable future to
cause an industrial chemical release is
both real and credible. Terrorists or
other criminals are likely to view the
potential of a chemical release from an
industrial facility as a relatively
attractive means to cause mass
casualties to the populace and/or large
scale damage to property. DOJ notes that
there have been successful efforts by
foreign militaries and certain terrorist
groups indigenous to other countries to
cause releases from industrial facilities
using bombs. Those efforts have in
effect converted the facilities into
makeshift WMD. Some of these releases
have inflicted damage on the
surrounding communities. Moreover,
the evacuations that were triggered by
the attempted and successful releases of
industrial chemicals produced panic
and disruption among the targeted
population. These are precisely the
goals of a terrorist.4
• In April 27, 2005, testimony before
the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs
regarding the vulnerability of America
to a chemical attack, a Brookings
Institution Visiting Fellow testified. The
testimony stated that ‘‘of all the various
remaining civilian vulnerabilities in
America today, one stands alone as
uniquely deadly, pervasive, and
susceptible to a terrorist attack: toxicinhalation-hazard (TIH) industrial
chemicals, such as chlorine, ammonia,
phosgene, methyl bromide,
hydrochloric and various other acids.’’
In addition, the testimony indicated,
3 GAO, Homeland Security: Federal and Industry
Efforts Are Addressing Security Issues at Chemical
Facilities, but Additional Action is Needed, GAO–
05–631T (Washington, DC: April 2005).
4 Department of Justice Assessment of the
Increased Risk of Terrorist or Other Criminal
Activity Associated With Posting Off-Site
Consequence Analysis Information on the Internet,
April 18, 2000.
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‘‘the casualty potential of a terrorist
attack against a large TIH chemical
container near a population center is
comparable to that of a fully successful
terrorist employment of an improvised
nuclear device or effective biological
weapon. The key difference is that TIH
chemical containers are substantially
easier to attack than improvised nuclear
devices or effective biological weapons
are to acquire or fabricate.’’ 5
• In April 27, 2005, testimony before
the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs
regarding the vulnerability of America
to a chemical attack, a Senior Fellow for
National Security Studies at the Council
on Foreign Relations testified. The
testimony stated ‘‘Of the carefully
selected potential targets that al Qaeda
or its imitators might seek to attack, the
chemical industry should be at the top
of the list. There are hundreds of
chemical facilities within the United
States that represent the military
equivalent of a poorly guarded arsenal
of weapons of mass destruction.’’ 6
• A recent Congressional Research
Service Report discussed trends in
chemical terrorism and discussed
evidence that U.S. chemical facilities
may be used by terrorists to gain access
to chemicals. One of the 1993 World
Trade Center bombers, Nidal Ayyad,
became a naturalized U.S. citizen and
worked as a chemical engineer in the
chemical industry, from which he used
company stationery to order chemical
ingredients to make the bomb.’’ 7
• Information contained in the
Congressional Record states that U.S.
chemical trade publications were found
in one of the caves where Osama bin
Laden had hidden.8
Qualitative Benefits of the Risk-Based
Performance Standards
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As explained previously, Section 550
requires the Secretary of Homeland
Security to promulgate ‘‘interim final
regulations establishing risk-based
performance standards for security of
chemical facilities * * *.’’ Section
27.230 establishes these standards.
Below is a discussion of the qualitative
5 Statement of Richard A. Falkenrath, Visiting
Fellow, The Brookings Institution, before the
United States Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs (April 27, 2005).
6 Statement of Stephen E. Flynn, PhD, Jeane J.
Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National Security
Studies, Council on Foreign Relations, before the
United States Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs (April 27, 2005).
7 CRS Report for Congress, Chemical Facility
Security, Updated August 2, 2006.
8 Bond, Christopher. Statement on S.2579.
Congressional Record, Daily Edition, June 5, 2002,
p. S5044.
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benefits of these risk-based performance
standards:
• By securing and monitoring the
perimeter of the facility, site personnel
are better able to detect, delay, and
respond to individuals or groups who
seek unauthorized access to the site or
its restricted areas. A well-secured
perimeter deters intruders from seeking
to gain access. By limiting acce3ss
through control points, the facility can
more easily and effectively control who
enters and leaves the site. Additionally,
securing and monitoring restricted areas
or potentially critical targets within the
facility reduces the likelihood of theft of
chemicals because adversaries risk
observation arriving and leaving the
premises. Control of gates by guards or
observation of the perimeter allows
facility personnel to know who is
entering and leaving the site and in
what vehicles. Access control points
permit the facility to check persons and
vehicles seeking entrance to the site and
confirm their legitimate business.
• Controlling access to the site
including the screening and/or
inspection of individuals and vehicles
as they enter and exit the facility serves
to deter and detect unauthorized
introduction or removal of substances
and devices that may cause a dangerous
chemical reaction, explosion, or other
release to harm facility personnel or the
surrounding community. A regular
system of identification checks will help
guards and other facility personnel
recognize those personnel authorized to
be on the site and identify those
individuals who should not be granted
access.
• Deterring vehicles from entering the
facility or restricted access areas will
reduce the likelihood that an adversary
will detonate a vehicle-borne
improvised explosive device inside the
facility. Appropriate methods of
deterring vehicles form unauthorized
entry provide additional time for local
law enforcement response or otherwise
delay or prevent the vehicle from
entering the site to cause harm.
• Securing and monitoring the
shipping and receiving of hazardous
chemicals will improve inventory
control, product stewardship and
security against theft, diversion and
tampering. In addition, improved
inventory control and control of
transportation containers on site
decreases the likelihood that a foreign
substance could be introduced into
feedstock, incidental chemicals, or
products leaving the site that could later
react with the chemical to cause a
significant on- or off-site reaction to
damage process equipment or cause a
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release of a hazardous material to harm
onsite personnel or the community.
• Deterring the theft or possible
diversion of potentially hazardous
chemicals will prevent loss of chemicals
from the site. Such measures provide
security benefits as well as improving
inventory controls especially for
chemicals that can be used directly as
a chemical weapon or can be used to
produce such a weapon.
• Deterring insider sabotage prevents
the facility’s own property and activities
from being used by a potential terrorist
against the facility. Examining the
background of employees or contractors
who may be planning acts of sabotage
assists in preventing an in situ release
of hazardous chemicals, damage to
process units manufacturing chemicals
or tampering with chemicals that could
cause an offsite impact. Ascertaining
that visitors and contractors have
legitimate business onsite and are
escorted when necessary increases the
control of the site in general and
reduces the likelihood of sabotage or
theft.
• The deterrence of cyber sabotage
will benefit the facility by preventing
unauthorized onsite or remote access to
critical process controls, site security,
business systems, or SCADA systems (if
significant consequences can be
generated by the manipulation of the
process controls/systems). Appropriate
controls will allow the detection of
unauthorized access and unauthorized
modification of information (hacking).
• Developing and exercising an
emergency plan to respond to security
incidents internally and with local law
enforcement and first responders (i.e.,
emergency medical technicians (EMTs),
fire, police) benefits the facility by
preparing it to take quick and decisive
action in the event of an attack or other
breach of security. Establishing
relationships with local law
enforcement improves responder
understanding of the layout and of
hazards associated with the facility and
strengthens relationships with the
community.
• Maintaining effective monitoring,
communications and warning systems
allows the facility to notify internal
personnel and local responders in a
timely manner about security incidents.
Regular tests, repairs and improvements
to the warning and communications
system increase the reliability of such
systems and will improve response
time.
• When the facility provides proper
security training, exercises and drills,
facility personnel are better able to
respond to suspicious behavior,
attempts to enter or attack a facility, or
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other malevolent acts by insiders or
intruders. Well trained personnel who
practice how to react can more
effectively detect and delay intruders
and provide increased measures of
deterrence against unauthorized acts.
Establishing relationships with local
law enforcement improves responder
understanding of the layout and hazard
associated with the facility and
strengthens relationships with the
community.
• The ability to escalate the levels of
security measures for periods of
elevated threat will provide the facility
with the capacity to increase security
measures to better protect against
known increased threats or generalized
increased threat levels declared by the
federal government. By maintaining the
ability to increase security measures, the
facility does not have to expend time
and resources on more robust security
measures unless and until warranted.
• A facility addressing specific
threats, vulnerabilities or risks
identified by the Assistant Secretary
will decrease the likelihood of a
successful attack on its facility,
personnel, products or community. Any
additional performance standards
specified by the Secretary will increase
the facilities ability to deter, detect,
delay and respond to specific and
general threats against its security.
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
The Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA)
mandates that an agency conduct an
RFA analysis when an agency is
required to publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. 603(a). An
RFA analysis, however, is not required
when an agency is not required to
publish a notice of proposed
rulemaking, as is the case here. By
directing the Secretary to issue ‘‘interim
final regulations’’ Congress authorized
the Secretary to proceed without the
traditional notice-and-comment
required by the Administrative
Procedure Act. See 71 FR 78276, 78277,
and 78292.
Even though a Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis is not required for this rule,
DHS did consider the impacts of this
rule on small entities. The Regulatory
Assessment, which is available in the
public docket, contains this analysis of
the impacts of this rule on small
entities. A portion of the analysis is
summarized below.
At this time, DHS’s preliminary
estimate of the number of high risk
chemical facilities that will be covered
by the risk-based performance measures
required by the rule ranges from 1,500
to 6,500. This estimate is based on
currently available information. After
chemical facilities with certain risk
profiles complete the Top-Screen, DHS
will have a better understanding of how
many and which specific chemical
17725
facilities will be deemed to be ‘‘highrisk’’ for the purposes of the rule. Also,
in meeting the risk-based performance
standards required by this rule, facilities
will have a large degree of flexibility in
choosing specific security
enhancements. We expect that chemical
facility owners and/or operators will use
this flexibility to minimize the cost of
this rule to their operations. These
uncertainties make it very difficult to
estimate the extent of the economic
impact of this rule on small entities.
Even so, strictly for the purposes of
analyzing the impact of this rule on
small entities, DHS has selected from
the EPA RMP database a sample of 350
facilities that may be required to comply
with the risk-based performance
standards required by the rule. We
researched these 350 facilities using
Reference USA and LexisNexis and
found detailed information (i.e., annual
revenue, number of employees, and
parent company information) for 326
(93%) of them. Of the 326 facilities for
which we were able to find detailed
information, our analysis of the data
indicates that 118 (36%) fit the Small
Business Administration’s definition of
a small entity. If we assume that the 24
companies for which we could find no
information are also small entities, the
percentage of these facilities which are
owned by small entities could be 41
percent. Table 1 below provides revenue
ranges of the118 small entities.
TABLE 1.—PERCENTAGE OF SMALL ENTITIES BY REVENUE
Number of
small entities
Revenue
Percent of
small entities
$0–$999,999 ............................................................................................................................................................
$1,000,000–$4,999,999 ...........................................................................................................................................
$5,000,000–$9,999,999 ...........................................................................................................................................
$10,000,000–$19,999,999 .......................................................................................................................................
$20,000,000–$49,999,999 .......................................................................................................................................
$50,000,000–$99,999,999 .......................................................................................................................................
$100,000,000–$999,999,999 ...................................................................................................................................
> $1Billion ................................................................................................................................................................
11
14
12
15
23
9
31
3
9.3
11.9
10.2
12.7
19.5
7.6
26.3
2.5
Total ..................................................................................................................................................................
118
100.0
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After consideration of the percentage of
small entities that may have to comply
with the risk-based performance
standards required by this rule and the
compliance costs explained in the
Regulatory Assessment, we have
determined that this rule may have a
significant economic impact on a
substantial number of small entities.
C. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
1. Background
Executive Order 13132 requires DHS
to develop a process to ensure
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‘‘meaningful and timely input by State
and local officials in the development of
regulatory policies that have federalism
implications.’’ Between the publication
of the Advance Notice and this Interim
Final Rule, the Department has
complied with this instruction in two
ways. The Department specifically
sought public comment on issues
involving preemption. Additionally,
after issuing its proposal, the
Department specifically invited a
number of groups representing the
interests of States and their legislators to
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meet with the Department to discuss the
proposed regulations. These groups
were: the National League of Cities, the
National Association of Counties, the
National Conference of State Legislators,
the County Executives of America, the
International City/County Management
Association, the American Legislative
Exchange Council, the National
Emergency Management Association/
CSG Council of State Governments, the
International Association of Emergency
Managers, the National Governors
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Association, and the United States
Conference of Mayors.
The Department received numerous
comments in response to its invitations.
States, the private sector, academia,
various interest groups, and individual
members of Congress submitted
comments. The commenters were
divided in their views of the proposed
approach on preemption. A number of
commenters favored the Department’s
proposal, while others opposed it. Some
commenters misunderstood the
Department’s position on preemption or
the current state of the case law on
preemption. As discussed below, the
Department is clarifying its approach on
preemption in certain respects.
Specifically, we confirm: the propriety
of discussing the Department’s view on
preemption, though Congress was silent
on the question; that the type of
preemption called for by Section 550 is
not field preemption, but conflict
preemption; and that the Department
will further assist in the process of
determining whether a non-Federal
regulation is preempted by providing
opinions regarding the impact of that
regulation on the Federal scheme.
2. Propriety of Department’s Views on
Preemption
As an initial matter, some
commenters, including Members of
Congress, suggested that, since Congress
was silent on preemption, the
Department’s rulemaking should be
silent as well. The comments on this
subject touch on two important
subtopics: who (i.e., which government
structure) should determine the
preemptive effect of Section 550 and the
regulatory program promulgated under
its authority; and what law, if any, the
regulatory program under Section 550
might preempt.
In Section 550, Congress did not
expressly speak to the issue of
preemption. Preemption questions
following statutory silence on
preemption are not novel. Courts and
agencies have previously faced and
dealt with who decides preemption
issues in the face of congressional
silence. It is helpful to recall that, as a
general matter, Congress often provides
the Executive Branch with authority to
administer a regulatory program while
leaving gaps or ambiguities in the
authorizing law. When this happens, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that
agencies have the responsibility, within
the general delegation, to formulate
policy and make rules to fill those gaps
and interpret the ambiguities. See
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (‘‘The power of an
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administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created * * * program
necessarily requires the formulation of
policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly by
Congress.’’) (ellipses in original; citation
omitted). Agencies, not only the courts,
exercise their expertise to fill in the gaps
and interpret the ambiguities. See id. at
843 & n.11 (‘‘If, however, the court
determines that Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question
at issue, the court does not simply
impose its own construction on the
statute * * * Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the
specific issue, the question for the court
is whether the agency’s answer is based
on a permissible construction of the
statute. The court need not conclude
that the agency construction was the
only one it permissibly could have
adopted to uphold the construction, or
even the reading the court would have
reached if the question initially had
arisen in a judicial proceeding.’’). And
even if a court interprets an ambiguous
statute before an agency promulgates
rules to fill the gaps or interpret the
ambiguities, the court’s interpretation
does not necessarily restrict the agency’s
ability to adopt a different interpretation
in the future. See National Cable &
Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 982 (2005).
This does not mean to slight the
courts’ role in the interpretive process.
As the Supreme Court has stated, ‘‘The
judiciary is the final authority on issues
of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are
contrary to clear congressional intent.’’
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9.
With respect to the issue of
preemption in particular, the Supreme
Court has applied these same principles
regarding Congress, the courts and the
agencies. See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Sav.
and Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141, 151–54 (1982). ‘‘Federal regulations
have no less pre-emptive effect than
federal statutes * * * A pre-emptive
regulation’s force does not depend on
express congressional authorization to
displace state law.’’ Id. at 153–54. The
Supreme Court, and lower courts, have
given deference to agencies that define,
through regulation, the scope of
preemption. See, e.g., id.; Wachovia
Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305 (2d
Cir. 2005).
So although some commenters
claimed that the Department lacks the
authority to address the issue of
preemption in its regulations or laterissued opinions, this assertion is simply
not consistent with current law. Federal
agencies have historically published
their views on the preemptive effect of
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federal law in a number of contexts. See,
e.g., In re Wireless Consumers Alliance,
Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17,021 (Aug. 14, 2000)
(administrative agency opinion on
preemptive effect of federal law); 1999
WL 303948 (April 20, 1999) (U.S.
Department of Labor Release discussing
views on preemption of state laws). We
anticipate that the courts will ultimately
resolve any preemption question, with
an appropriate level of deference to the
position of the agency.
Some comments urged the
Department to avoid preemption after
looking to a canon of interpretation
involving a presumption against
preemption. This presumption,
however, typically exists ‘‘in areas of
regulation that are traditionally
allocated to states and are of particular
local concern.’’ Wachovia Bank, N.A.,
414 F.3d at 314; see also United States
v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89 (2000). As noted
in the Advance Notice, measures to
prevent terrorist attacks against the
Nation’s critical infrastructure do not
involve an area traditionally regulated
by the States. Very few state and local
jurisdictions currently regulate security
at chemical facilities.
The Department recognizes that
courts sometimes look to legislative
intent with respect to the issue of
preemption—decisions in this area are
replete with such references. See, e.g.,
Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470,
485 (1996). In the context of Section
550, however, it is very difficult to
discern that intent. The legislative
history on the point is mixed, with
various Members of Congress making
floor statements that are not consistent
with each other. See, e.g., Cong. Rec.
H7967 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2006)
(statement of Rep. King) (‘‘the intention
is not to preempt the ability of the
States’’) and Cong. Rec. S10619 (daily
ed. Sept. 29, 2006) (statement of Sen.
Voinovich) (‘‘I feel strongly that this
provision sets that uniform set of rules
and in so doing, impliedly preempts
further regulation by State rules or
laws.’’) In addition, it is particularly
difficult to gauge congressional intent
on one relatively short, page-and-a half
authorizing provision in a lengthy
appropriations act that runs over 100
pages. To be sure, individual members
of Congress—including some members
substantially involved in homeland
security issues—have expressed strong
views on preemption. But can it really
be said that legislative intent may be
discerned on the silent aspect of one
authorizing section of a lengthy
appropriations act? Cf. Chrysler Corp. v.
Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 311–12 (1979);
Castaneda-Gonzalez v. INS, 564 F.2d
417, 424 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
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As an additional consideration, the
Department notes that if it were to
disclaim any preemptive effect of the
regulatory program under Section 550, it
would create an inconsistency with the
Department’s own regime for regulating
chemical facilities under the MTSA. In
its regulations under MTSA, the
Department has stated its view that the
principles of conflict preemption apply.
See 68 FR 60468 (Oct. 22, 2003).
Congress has charged the Department
with implementing the security
programs under both MTSA and Section
550, and the Department seeks to
implement these programs in a
consistent and logical manner.
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3. No Field Preemption
Some commenters feared—and others
hoped—that the Department’s approach
to preemption would wholly displace
state and local laws. This is incorrect.
The Department does not in this interim
final rule claim that the ‘‘field
preemption’’ doctrine applies in this
regulatory context. The Department
does not view its regulatory scheme as
one which so fully occupies the field as
to pre-empt any state law touching the
same subject.
This is clear from the statutory text.
For example, the authority granted in
Section 550 calls for the federal
regulations to apply to facilities that
present ‘‘high levels of security risk’’ as
determined by the Secretary. The
Department does not, therefore, have
authority under Section 550 to regulate
facilities that may, in the Secretary’s
view, present other than high levels of
security risk. Some facilities may not be
deemed by the Department as
presenting a high risk. These facilities
may be regulated by States provided
such regulation is not otherwise in
conflict with the federal program. In
addition, as mentioned in the
comments, Section 550 specifically
allows the Secretary to approve
alternative security programs that may
have been submitted in response to
State or local authorities.
4. Principles of Conflict Preemption
Even for high risk facilities, the
approach outlined in the Advance
Notice, and further developed here, is
one of conflict preemption. Conflict
preemption is established in the
Constitution and has been developed in
case law (see, e.g., Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873
(2000); Fidelity Fed. Sav. and Loan
Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152
(1982); Surrick v. Killion, 449 F.3d 520,
530–31 (3d Cir. 2006)), and the wellknown standards of conflict
preemption—which are captured in the
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regulatory text at § 27.405—apply to
Section 550 and this regulation.
After considering comments,
however, the Department has modified
certain of its prior statements on
preemption as potentially too broad. In
the Advance Notice, the Department
noted that Section 550 compels the
Department to preserve chemical
facilities’ flexibility to choose security
measures to reach the appropriate
security outcome. The Department went
on to say that a State measure frustrating
this balance ‘‘will be preempted.’’ The
Department has decided, however, that
clarification is in order, as this
regulation is not intended to be the
equivalent of ‘‘field preemption’’ for
facilities determined to be high risk.
Instead, it is only meant to indicate that
the regulation is not to be conflicted by,
interfered with, hindered by or
frustrated by State measures, under
long-standing legal principles.
Only a few jurisdictions have
developed security regulations (rather
than health, safety, and environmental
regulations) governing chemical sites.
While we have not canvassed all
existing state laws and regulations,
currently we have no reason to conclude
that any such non-Federal measure is
being applied in a way that would
impede the performance standards or
other provisions of Section 550 and this
Interim Final Rule. However, concrete
conclusions about the effect of state
laws and the application of preemption
principles will require an understanding
of future, factual contexts in which
those laws are applied. The Department
will consider any problems that arise in
this regard in a more particularized
manner.
Consistent with the approach outlined
in the Advance Notice, the Department
will entertain requests for its views on
particular state or local laws, which will
be issued by way of an opinion. In
addition to the approach described in
the Advanced Notice, the Department
will seek the input and views of a State
before finalizing the Department’s view
of preemption with respect to such
State’s laws. See § 27.405(d)(3). It will
be helpful for the Department to seek
the views of the relevant States if an
opinion on preemption is requested
under these regulations. Additionally,
the Department would, time permitting,
seek public notice and comment before
formulating its views on a particular
preemption question, consistent, of
course, with the congressional mandate
to protect from public disclosure
information submitted under Section
550. The Department, however, declines
to add additional procedural formalities
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17727
to the regulation as it relates to
preemption.
Certain commenters asked that the
Advance Notice be more clear in
delineating what state laws are not to be
preempted. The Department does not
intend to preempt existing health, safety
and environmental regulations. In the
future, however, if state or local
governments enact security laws or
promulgate security regulations under
the rubric of health, safety, or
environmental protections, those laws
and regulations will be measured
against the standard described in
§ 27.405. Of course, non-Federal
regulations that fall below federal
performance standards will not
diminish the federal requirements that
covered facilities must meet.
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
Title II of the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act of 1995 (UMRA), enacted as
Pub. L. 104–4 on March 22, 1995,
requires each Federal agency, to the
extent permitted by law, to prepare a
written assessment of the effects of any
Federal mandate in a proposed or final
agency rule that may result in the
expenditure by State, local, and tribal
governments, in the aggregate, or by the
private sector, of $100 million or more
(adjusted annually for inflation) in any
one year. Section 204(a) of UMRA, 2
U.S.C. 1534(a), requires the Federal
agency to develop an effective process
to permit timely input by elected
officers (or their designees) of State,
local, and tribal governments on a
proposed ‘‘significant intergovernmental
mandate.’’ A ‘‘significant
intergovernmental mandate’’ under the
UMRA is any provision in a Federal
agency regulation that will impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and
tribal governments, in the aggregate, of
$100 million (adjusted annually for
inflation) in any one year. Section 203
of UMRA, 2 U.S.C. 1533, which
supplements section 204(a), provides
that before establishing any regulatory
requirements that might significantly or
uniquely affect small governments, the
agency shall have developed a plan that,
among other things, provides for notice
to potentially affected small
governments, if any, and for a
meaningful and timely opportunity to
provide input in the development of
regulatory proposals. The Department
sought input from state and local
governments during the comment
period and hosted a meeting with state
and local representatives on February 6,
2007. A list of participants and short
description of the meeting is in the
docket.
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This interim final rule would result in
expenditure by the private sector of
$100 million (adjusted annually for
inflation) or more in any one year. At
this time, however, we do not have
enough information regarding the
specific facilities that will be required to
comply with the rule’s risk-based
performance standards in order to know
if this interim final rule will impose an
enforceable duty upon State, local, and
tribal governments of $100 million
(adjusted annually for inflation) or more
in any one year. DHS has conducted a
‘‘Regulatory Assessment,’’ which
explains the economic effects of the
rule. The ‘‘Regulatory Assessment’’ is
summarized in the section entitled
‘‘Executive Order 12866,’’ and a copy
may be found in the public docket for
this IFR.
As explained in the ‘‘Regulatory
Assessment,’’ DHS’s preliminary
estimate of the total number of high-risk
chemical facilities that will be covered
by the risk-based performance measures
required by this rule ranges from 1,500
to 6,500 chemical facilities. This
estimate is based on currently available
information. After chemical facilities
fitting certain risk profiles complete the
Top-Screen risk assessment
methodology (which will be accessible
through a secure Department website),
DHS will better understand how many
and which specific chemical facilities
will be deemed to be ‘‘high-risk’’ for the
purposes of this rule. For the purposes
of this discussion, we believe this rule
may require certain municipalities that
own and/or operate power generating
facilities to purchase security
enhancements, but at this time we do
not know the extent of the financial
impact.
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
This interim final rule contains
collection of information requirements
under the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501–3520). ‘‘Collection
of information,’’ as defined in 5 CFR
1320.3(c), includes reporting, record
keeping, monitoring, posting, labeling,
and other similar actions.
Under Section 550 of the DHS
Appropriations Act, the Department
will use the Chemical Security
Assessment Tool (CSAT) system to
collect and analyze key data from
chemical facilities to: (1) Identify
facilities that present a high level of
risk, (2) Support the facility-specific
judgment for preliminary and final tier
high risk determinations, (3) Specify the
facility-specific security concerns that
facilities must address in their SVAs
and SSPs, and (4) Collect the facilityspecific security measures, activities,
and systems for judging compliance
against the risk based performance
standards. DHS will submit the
collections for SVAs and the SSPs
during the summer months.
This rule introduces a new collection,
1670–NEW, with two new forms: User
Registration (DHS 9002 (1/07)) and Top
Screen (DHS 9007 (2/07)). As such, DHS
has submitted the following information
requirements to OMB for its review:
Title: Chemical Security Assessment
Tool (CSAT): User Registration.
OMB Control Number: 1670_NEW
Summary of Collection of
Information: Section 550 provided the
Department with the authority to
regulate high risk chemical facilities.
Further, it requires that the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security
identify high risk facilities and provide
for the protection of the information
regarding and provided by those
facilities. DHS has identified the CSAT
system as the Information Technology
(IT) system it will use to obtain and
quantify this key risk data from
facilities. The Department will begin
collecting information upon the
effective date of this interim final rule.
Use of: The Department will use the
registration information as a basis for
providing chemical facilities access to
the CSAT system.
Need for Information: The
Department needs the information from
the User Registration form to identify
and vet requests to access the CSAT
system.
Description of the Respondents: DHS
anticipates that there will be 40,000
respondents in the first year. The
respondents will be the owners and
operators of the chemical facilities that
will need to submit information through
the CSAT system.
Frequency of Response: On Occasion.
Annual Burden Estimate: Each facility
is estimated to have a burden of 44.5
minutes to complete DHS Form 9002
(1/07). The annual hour burden is
estimated to be 22,250.
Title: Chemical Security Assessment
Tool (CSAT): Top Screen.
Summary of Collection of
Information: Section 550 provided the
Department with the authority to
regulate high risk chemical facilities.
Further, it requires that the Secretary of
the Department of Homeland Security
identify high risk facilities and provide
for the protection of the information
regarding and provided by those
facilities. DHS has identified the CSAT
system as the Information Technology
(IT) system it will use to obtain and
quantify this key risk data from
facilities. The Department will begin
collecting information upon the
effective date of this interim final rule.
Use of: The CSAT is the Department’s
system for collecting and analyzing key
data from chemical facilities to: (1)
Identify facilities that present a high
level of risk, (2) Support the facilityspecific judgment for preliminary and
final tier determinations, and (3) Specify
the facility-specific security concerns
that facilities must address in their
SVAs and SSPs.
Respondents (including number of):
DHS anticipates there will be 40,000
respondents in the first year. The
respondents will be chemical facilities
that possess, or plan to possess, a
quantity of a chemical substance
determined by the Secretary to be
potentially dangerous or that meets
other risk-related criteria identified by
the Department.
Frequency: Most facilities will
complete the Top-Screen once. The
Department will require facilities that
are determined to be high risk to
periodically resubmit the Top-Screen.
Burden of Response: Depending upon
the size of the facility, the burden rates
will vary. The estimated burden hours
for the different facility types are
detailed in the table below. The
combined hour burden for all facilities
completing the Top-Screen is estimated
to be 1,230,550. The combined annual
cost burden for the User Registration
and the Top-Screen is $110,003,900.
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TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF BURDEN HOURS FOR CONDUCTING USER REGISTRATION (DHS FORM 9002 (1/07)) AND TOP
SCREEN (DHS FORM 9007 (2/07))
Number of
facilities
Type of facility
Open Large ..................................................................................................................................
Merchant Wholesalers .................................................................................................................
Facilities with only 1–2 chemicals ...............................................................................................
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9,327
432
7,968
09APR2
Hour burden
per facility
39.5
30
25.5
Total hour
burden
368,400
13,000
203,200
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TABLE 2.—SUMMARY OF BURDEN HOURS FOR CONDUCTING USER REGISTRATION (DHS FORM 9002 (1/07)) AND TOP
SCREEN (DHS FORM 9007 (2/07))—Continued
Number of
facilities
Type of facility
Hour burden
per facility
Total hour
burden
Other ............................................................................................................................................
22,273
30
668,200
Total ......................................................................................................................................
........................
........................
1,252,800
As required by the Paperwork
Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507
(d)), we have submitted a copy of the
interim final rule to OMB for its review
of the collections of information. Due to
the circumstances surrounding this final
rule, we ask for emergency processing.
DHS is soliciting comments to:
(1) Evaluate whether the proposed
information requirement is necessary for
the proper performance of the functions
of the agency, including whether the
information will have practical utility;
(2) Evaluate the accuracy of the
agency’s estimate of the burden;
(3) Enhance the quality, utility, and
clarity of the information to be
collected; and
(4) Minimize the burden of the
collection of information on those who
are to respond, including using
appropriate automated, electronic,
mechanical, or other technological
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology.
Individuals and organizations may
submit comments on the information
collection requirements by July 9, 2007.
Direct the comments to the address
listed in the ADDRESSES section of this
document. Also, fax a copy of the
comments to the Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs, Office of
Management and Budget at 202–395–
6974, Attention: Nathan Lesser, DHS
Desk Officer; and send via electronic
mail to oira_submission@omb.eop.gov.
A comment to OMB is most effective
if OMB receives it within 30 days of
publication. DHS will publish the OMB
control number for this information
collection in the Federal Register after
OMB approves it.
Under the protections provided by the
PRA, as amended, an agency may not
conduct or sponsor, and a person is not
required to respond to, a collection of
information unless it displays a
currently valid OMB control number.
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F. National Environmental Policy Act
In the Advance Notice, the
Department reviewed the rulemaking
process with regard to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). See
71 FR 78276, 78294 (Dec. 28, 2006).
Specifically, the Department considered
the short timeframe to issue these
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interim final regulations and the
statutory mandate, which directed that
each chemical facility develop and
implement site security plans, with the
proviso that the facility could select
layered security measures to
appropriately address the vulnerability
assessment and the risk-based
performance standards for security of
the facility. Additionally, Congress
mandated that the Secretary could not
disapprove a site security plan based on
the presence or absence of a particular
security measure, but only on the failure
to satisfy a risk-based performance
standard.
Chemical facilities are of a wide
variety of designs and sizes, and are
located in a wide range of geographic
settings, communities, and natural
environments. The Department is not
funding or directing specific measures
under these regulations, but issuing
performance standards. Consequently,
the Department currently has no way to
determine the action the chemical
facility will take to meet the standards,
and what effect any action might have
on the environment. Even if the
Department could predict the actions
the facilities would take in response to
the standards, it is likely facilities
would take widely varying actions to
comply, based upon type of facility,
geographic location, existing
infrastructure, etc.
We received no comments objecting
to this conclusion during the comment
period, and further, no comments on
this matter were raised during the
Environmental Organizations Forum the
Department hosted on January 17, 2007.
Accordingly, the information needed to
conduct an Environmental Impact
Statement is not available at this time
and, in any event, the Department could
not reasonably conduct an
Environmental Impact Statement within
the six months time allotted for issuance
of the interim final regulations.
The Interim Final Rule
For the reasons set forth in the
preamble, the Department of Homeland
Security adds Part 27 to Title 6, Code of
Federal Regulations, to read as follows:
I
Title 6—Department of Homeland
Security
Chapter 1—Department of Homeland
Security, Office of the Secretary
PART 27—CHEMICAL FACILITY ANTITERRORISM STANDARDS
Subpart A—General
Sec.
27.100 Purpose.
27.105 Definitions.
27.110 Applicability.
27.115 Implementation.
27.120 Designation of a coordinating
official; Consultations and technical
assistance.
27.125 Severability.
Subpart B—Chemical Facility Security
Program
27.200 Information regarding security risk
for a chemical facility.
27.205 Determination that a chemical
facility ‘‘presents a high level of security
risk.’’
27.210 Submissions schedule.
27.215 Security vulnerability assessments.
27.220 Tiering.
27.225 Site security plans.
27.230 Risk-based performance standards.
27.235 Alternative security program.
27.240 Review and approval of security
vulnerability assessments.
27.245 Review and approval of site security
plans.
27.250 Inspections and audits.
27.255 Recordkeeping requirements.
List of Subjects in 6 CFR Part 27
Subpart C—Orders and Adjudications
27.300 Orders.
27.305 Neutral adjudications.
27.310 Commencement of adjudication
proceedings.
27.315 Presiding officers for proceedings.
27.320 Prohibition on ex parte
communications during proceedings.
27.325 Burden of proof.
27.330 Summary decision procedures.
27.335 Hearing procedures.
27.340 Completion of adjudication
proceedings.
27.345 Appeals.
Chemical security, Facilities,
Reporting and recordkeeping, Security
measures.
Subpart D—Other
27.400 Chemical-terrorism vulnerability
information.
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27.405 Review and preemption of State
laws and regulations.
27.410 Third party actions.
Appendix A to Part 27—DHS Chemicals of
Interest
Authority: Pub. L. 109–295, sec. 550.
Subpart A—General
§ 27.100
Purpose.
The purpose of this Part is to enhance
the security of our Nation by furthering
the mission of the Department as
provided in 6 U.S.C. § 111(b)(1) and by
lowering the risk posed by certain
chemical facilities.
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§ 27.105
Definitions.
As used in this part:
Alternative Security Program or ASP
shall mean a third-party or industry
organization program, a local authority,
state or Federal government program or
any element or aspect thereof, that the
Assistant Secretary has determined
meets the requirements of this Part and
provides for an equivalent level of
security to that established by this Part.
Assistant Secretary shall mean the
Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure
Protection, Department of Homeland
Security or his designee.
Chemical Facility or facility shall
mean any establishment that possesses
or plans to possess, at any relevant point
in time, a quantity of a chemical
substance determined by the Secretary
to be potentially dangerous or that
meets other risk-related criteria
identified by the Department. As used
herein, the term chemical facility or
facility shall also refer to the owner or
operator of the chemical facility. Where
multiple owners and/or operators
function within a common
infrastructure or within a single fenced
area, the Assistant Secretary may
determine that such owners and/or
operators constitute a single chemical
facility or multiple chemical facilities
depending on the circumstances.
Chemical Security Assessment Tool or
CSAT shall mean a suite of four
applications, including User
Registration, Top-Screen, Security
Vulnerability Assessment, and Site
Security Plan, through which the
Department will collect and analyze key
data from chemical facilities.
Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information or CVI shall mean the
information listed in § 27.400(b).
Coordinating Official shall mean the
person (or his designee(s)) selected by
the Assistant Secretary to ensure that
the regulations are implemented in a
uniform, impartial, and fair manner.
Covered Facility or Covered Chemical
Facility shall mean a chemical facility
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determined by the Assistant Secretary to
present high levels of security risk, or a
facility that the Assistant Secretary has
determined is presumptively high risk
under § 27.200.
Department shall mean the
Department of Homeland Security.
Deputy Secretary shall mean the
Deputy Secretary of the Department of
Homeland Security or his designee.
Director of the Chemical Security
Division or Director shall mean the
Director of the Chemical Security
Division, Office of Infrastructure
Protection, Department of Homeland
Security or any successors to that
position within the Department or his
designee.
General Counsel shall mean the
General Counsel of the Department of
Homeland Security or his designee.
Operator shall mean a person who has
responsibility for the daily operations of
a facility or facilities subject to this Part.
Owner shall mean the person or entity
that owns any facility subject to this
Part.
Present high levels of security risk and
high risk shall refer to a chemical
facility that, in the discretion of the
Secretary of Homeland Security,
presents a high risk of significant
adverse consequences for human life or
health, national security and/or critical
economic assets if subjected to terrorist
attack, compromise, infiltration, or
exploitation.
Risk profiles shall mean criteria
identified by the Assistant Secretary for
determining which chemical facilities
will complete the Top-Screen or provide
other risk assessment information.
Screening Threshold Quantity or STQ
shall mean the quantity of a chemical of
interest, upon which the facility’s
obligation to complete and submit the
CSAT Top-Screen is based.
Secretary or Secretary of Homeland
Security shall mean the Secretary of the
Department of Homeland Security or
any person, officer or entity within the
Department to whom the Secretary’s
authority under Section 550 is
delegated.
Terrorist attack or terrorist incident
shall mean any incident or attempt that
constitutes terrorism or terrorist activity
under 6 U.S.C. 101(15) or 18 U.S.C.
2331(5) or 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii),
including any incident or attempt that
involves or would involve sabotage of
chemical facilities or theft,
misappropriation or misuse of a
dangerous quantity of chemicals.
Tier shall mean the risk level
associated with a covered chemical
facility and which is assigned to a
facility by the Department. For purposes
of this part, there are four risk-based
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tiers, ranging from highest risk at Tier 1
to lowest risk at Tier 4.
Top-Screen shall mean an initial
screening process designed by the
Assistant Secretary through which
chemical facilities provide information
to the Department for use pursuant to
§ 27.200 of these regulations.
Under Secretary shall mean the Under
Secretary for National Protection and
Programs, Department of Homeland
Security or any successors to that
position within the Department or his
designee.
§ 27.110
Applicability.
(a) This Part applies to chemical
facilities and to covered facilities as set
out herein.
(b) This Part does not apply to
facilities regulated pursuant to the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of
2002, Pub. L. 107–295, as amended;
Public Water Systems, as defined by
Section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, Pub. L. 93–523, as amended;
Treatment Works as defined in Section
212 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act, Pub. L. 92–500, as
amended; any facility owned or
operated by the Department of Defense
or the Department of Energy, or any
facility subject to regulation by the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
§ 27.115
Implementation.
The Assistant Secretary may
implement the Section 550 program in
a phased manner, selecting certain
chemical facilities for expedited initial
processes under these regulations and
identifying other chemical facilities or
types or classes of chemical facilities for
other phases of program
implementation. The Assistant
Secretary has flexibility to designate
particular chemical facilities for specific
phases of program implementation
based on potential risk or any other
factor consistent with this Part.
§ 27.120 Designation of a coordinating
official; Consultations and technical
assistance.
(a) The Assistant Secretary will
designate a Coordinating Official who
will be responsible for ensuring that
these regulations are implemented in a
uniform, impartial, and fair manner.
(b) The Coordinating Official and his
staff shall provide guidance to covered
facilities regarding compliance with this
Part and shall, as necessary and to the
extent that resources permit, be
available to consult and to provide
technical assistance to an owner or
operator who seeks such consultation or
assistance.
(c) In order to initiate consultations or
seek technical assistance, a covered
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facility shall submit a written request
for consultation or technical assistance
to the Coordinating Official or contact
the Department in any other manner
specified in any subsequent guidance.
Requests for consultation or technical
guidance do not serve to toll any of the
applicable timelines set forth in this
Part.
(d) If a covered facility modifies its
facility, processes, or the types or
quantities of materials that it possesses,
and believes that such changes may
impact the covered facility’s obligations
under this Part, the covered facility may
request a consultation with the
Coordinating Official as specified in
paragraph (c).
§ 27.125
Severability.
If a court finds any portion of this Part
to have been promulgated without
proper authority, the remainder of this
Part will remain in full effect.
Subpart B—Chemical Facility Security
Program
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§ 27.200 Information regarding security
risk for a chemical facility.
(a) Information to determine security
risk. In order to determine the security
risk posed by chemical facilities, the
Secretary may, at any time, request
information from chemical facilities that
may reflect potential consequences of or
vulnerabilities to a terrorist attack or
incident, including questions
specifically related to the nature of the
business and activities conducted at the
facility; information concerning the
names, nature, conditions of storage,
quantities, volumes, properties,
customers, major uses, and other
pertinent information about specific
chemicals or chemicals meeting a
specific criterion; information
concerning facilities’ security, safety,
and emergency response practices,
operations, and procedures; information
regarding incidents, history, funding,
and other matters bearing on the
effectiveness of the security, safety and
emergency response programs, and
other information as necessary.
(b) Obtaining information from
facilities. (1) The Assistant Secretary
may seek the information provided in
paragraph (a) of this section by
contacting chemical facilities
individually or by publishing a notice in
the Federal Register seeking
information from chemical facilities that
meet certain criteria, which the
Department will use to determine risk
profiles. Through any such individual
or Federal Register notification, the
Assistant Secretary may instruct such
facilities to complete and submit a Top-
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Screen process, which may be
completed through a secure Department
Web site or through other means
approved by the Assistant Secretary.
(2) A facility must complete and
submit a Top-Screen in accordance with
the schedule provided in § 27.210 if it
possesses any of the chemicals listed in
Appendix A to this part at the
corresponding Screening Threshold
Quantities.
(3) Where the Department requests
that a facility complete and submit a
Top-Screen, the facility must designate
a person who is responsible for the
submission of information through the
CSAT system and who attests to the
accuracy of the information contained
in any CSAT submissions. Such
submitter must be an officer of the
corporation or other person designated
by an officer of the corporation and
must be domiciled in the United States.
(c) Presumptively High Risk Facilities.
(1) If a chemical facility subject to
paragraph (a) or (b) of this section fails
to provide information requested or
complete the Top-Screen within the
timeframe provided in § 27.210, the
Assistant Secretary may, after
attempting to consult with the facility,
reach a preliminary determination,
based on the information then available,
that the facility presumptively presents
a high level of security risk. The
Assistant Secretary shall then issue a
notice to the entity of this determination
and, if necessary, order the facility to
provide information or complete the
Top-Screen pursuant to these rules. If
the facility then fails to do so, it may be
subject to civil penalties pursuant to
§ 27.300, audit and inspection under
§ 27.250 or, if appropriate, an order to
cease operations under § 27.300.
(2) If the facility deemed
‘‘presumptively high risk’’ pursuant to
paragraph (c)(1) of this section
completes the Top-Screen, and the
Department determines that it does not
present a high level of security risk
under § 27.205, its status as
‘‘presumptively high risk’’ will
terminate, and the Department will
issue a notice to the facility to that
effect.
§ 27.205 Determination that a chemical
facility ‘‘presents a high level of security
risk.’’
(a) Initial Determination. The
Assistant Secretary may determine at
any time that a chemical facility
presents a high level of security risk
based on any information available
(including any information submitted to
the Department under § 27.200) that, in
the Secretary’s discretion, indicates the
potential that a terrorist attack involving
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the facility could result in significant
adverse consequences for human life or
health, national security or critical
economic assets. Upon determining that
a facility presents a high level of
security risk, the Department shall
notify the facility in writing of such
initial determination and may also
notify the facility of the Department’s
preliminary determination of the
facility’s placement in a risk-based tier
pursuant to § 27.220(a).
(b) Redetermination. If a covered
facility previously determined to
present a high level of security risk has
materially altered its operations, it may
seek a redetermination by filing a
Request for Redetermination with the
Assistant Secretary, and may request a
meeting regarding the Request. Within
45 calendar days of receipt of such a
Request, or within 45 calendar days of
a meeting under this paragraph, the
Assistant Secretary shall notify the
covered facility in writing of the
Department’s decision on the Request
for Redetermination.
§ 27.210
Submissions schedule.
(a) Initial Submission. The timeframes
in paragraphs (a)(2) and (a)(3) of this
section also apply to covered facilities
that submit an Alternative Security
Program pursuant to § 27.235.
(1) Top-Screen. Facilities shall
complete and submit a Top-Screen
within the following time frames:
(i) This paragraph is operative on the
date that the Department publishes a
final Appendix A. Unless otherwise
notified, within 60 calendar days of the
effective date of Appendix A for
facilities that possess any of the
chemicals listed in Appendix A at the
corresponding STQs, or within 60
calendar days for facilities that come
into possession of any of the chemicals
listed in Appendix A at the
corresponding STQs; or
(ii) Within the time frame provided in
any written notification from the
Department or specified in any
subsequent Federal Register notice.
(2) Security Vulnerability Assessment.
Unless otherwise notified, a covered
facility must complete and submit a
Security Vulnerability Assessment
within 90 calendar days of written
notification from the Department or
within the time frame specified in any
subsequent Federal Register notice.
(3) Site Security Plan. Unless
otherwise notified, a covered facility
must complete and submit a Site
Security Plan within 120 calendar days
of written notification from the
Department or within the time frame
specified in any subsequent Federal
Register notice.
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(b) Resubmission Schedule for
Covered Facilities. The timeframes in
this subsection also apply to covered
facilities who submit an Alternative
Security Program pursuant to § 27.235.
(1) Top-Screen. Unless otherwise
notified, Tier 1 and Tier 2 covered
facilities must complete and submit a
new Top-Screen no less than two years,
and no more than two years and 60
calendar days, from the date of the
Department’s approval of the facility’s
Site Security Plan; and Tier 3 and Tier
4 covered facilities must complete and
submit a Top-Screen no less than 3
years, and no more than 3 years and 60
calendar days, from the date of the
Department’s approval of the facility’s
Site Security Plan.
(2) Security Vulnerability Assessment.
Unless otherwise notified and following
a Top-Screen resubmission pursuant to
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, a
covered facility must complete and
submit a new Security Vulnerability
Assessment within 90 calendar days of
written notification from the
Department or within the time frame
specified in any subsequent Federal
Register notice.
(3) Site Security Plan. Unless
otherwise notified and following a
Security Vulnerability Assessment
resubmission pursuant to paragraph
(b)(2) of this section , a covered facility
must complete and submit a new Site
Security Plan within 120 calendar days
of written notification from the
Department or within the time frame
specified in any subsequent Federal
Register notice.
(c) The Assistant Secretary retains the
authority to modify the schedule in this
Part as needed. The Assistant Secretary
may shorten or extend these time
periods based on the operations at the
facility, the nature of the covered
facility’s vulnerabilities, the level and
immediacy of security risk, or for other
reasons. If the Department alters the
time periods for a specific facility, the
Department will do so in written notice
to the facility.
(d) If a covered facility makes material
modifications to its operations or site,
the covered facility must complete and
submit a revised Top-Screen to the
Department within 60 days of the
material modification. In accordance
with the resubmission requirements in
§ 27.210(b)(2) and (3), the Department
will notify the covered facility as to
whether the covered facility must
submit a revised Security Vulnerability
Assessment, Site Security Plan, or both.
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§ 27.215 Security vulnerability
assessments.
security-related reasons, if requested by
the Assistant Secretary.
(a) Initial Assessment. If the Assistant
Secretary determines that a chemical
facility is high-risk, the facility must
complete a Security Vulnerability
Assessment. A Security Vulnerability
Assessment shall include:
(1) Asset Characterization, which
includes the identification and
characterization of potential critical
assets; identification of hazards and
consequences of concern for the facility,
its surroundings, its identified critical
asset(s), and its supporting
infrastructure; and identification of
existing layers of protection;
(2) Threat Assessment, which
includes a description of possible
internal threats, external threats, and
internally-assisted threats;
(3) Security Vulnerability Analysis,
which includes the identification of
potential security vulnerabilities and
the identification of existing
countermeasures and their level of
effectiveness in both reducing identified
vulnerabilities and in meeting the
applicable Risk-Based Performance
Standards;
(4) Risk Assessment, including a
determination of the relative degree of
risk to the facility in terms of the
expected effect on each critical asset
and the likelihood of a success of an
attack; and
(5) Countermeasures Analysis,
including strategies that reduce the
probability of a successful attack or
reduce the probable degree of success,
strategies that enhance the degree of risk
reduction, the reliability and
maintainability of the options, the
capabilities and effectiveness of
mitigation options, and the feasibility of
the options.
(b) Except as provided in § 27.235, a
covered facility must complete the
Security Vulnerability Assessment
through the CSAT process, or through
any other methodology or process
identified or issued by the Assistant
Secretary.
(c) Covered facilities must submit a
Security Vulnerability Assessment to
the Department in accordance with the
schedule provided in § 27.210.
(d) Updates and Revisions. (1) A
covered facility must update and revise
its Security Vulnerability Assessment in
accordance with the schedule provided
in § 27.210.
(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (d)(1)
of this section, a covered facility must
update, revise or otherwise alter its
Security Vulnerability Assessment to
account for new or differing modes of
potential terrorist attack or for other
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§ 27.220
Tiering.
(a) Preliminary Determination of RiskBased Tiering. Based on the information
the Department receives in accordance
with §§ 27.200 and 27.205 (including
information submitted through the TopScreen process) and following its initial
determination in § 27.205(a) that a
facility presents a high level of security
risk, the Department shall notify a
facility of the Department’s preliminary
determination of the facility’s placement
in a risk-based tier.
(b) Confirmation or Alteration of RiskBased Tiering. Following review of a
covered facility’s Security Vulnerability
Assessment, the Assistant Secretary
shall notify the covered facility of its
final placement within a risk-based tier,
or for covered facilities previously
notified of a preliminary tiering,
confirm or alter such tiering.
(c) The Department shall place
covered facilities in one of four riskbased tiers, ranging from highest risk
facilities in Tier 1 to lowest risk
facilities in Tier 4.
(d) The Assistant Secretary may
provide the facility with guidance
regarding the risk-based performance
standards and any other necessary
guidance materials applicable to its
assigned tier.
§ 27.225
Site security plans.
(a) The Site Security Plan must meet
the following standards:
(1) Address each vulnerability
identified in the facility’s Security
Vulnerability Assessment, and identify
and describe the security measures to
address each such vulnerability;
(2) Identify and describe how security
measures selected by the facility will
address the applicable risk-based
performance standards and potential
modes of terrorist attack including, as
applicable, vehicle-borne explosive
devices, water-borne explosive devices,
ground assault, or other modes or
potential modes identified by the
Department;
(3) Identify and describe how security
measures selected and utilized by the
facility will meet or exceed each
applicable performance standard for the
appropriate risk-based tier for the
facility; and
(4) Specify other information the
Assistant Secretary deems necessary
regarding chemical facility security.
(b) Except as provided in § 27.235, a
covered facility must complete the Site
Security Plan through the CSAT
process, or through any other
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methodology or process identified or
issued by the Assistant Secretary.
(c) Covered facilities must submit a
Site Security Plan to the Department in
accordance with the schedule provided
in § 27.210.
(d) Updates and Revisions. (1) When
a covered facility updates, revises or
otherwise alters its Security
Vulnerability Assessment pursuant to
§ 27.215(d), the covered facility shall
make corresponding changes to its Site
Security Plan.
(2) A covered facility must also
update and revise its Site Security Plan
in accordance with the schedule in
§ 27.210.
(e) A covered facility must conduct an
annual audit of its compliance with its
Site Security Plan.
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§ 27.230 Risk-based performance
standards.
(a) Covered facilities must satisfy the
performance standards identified in this
section. The Assistant Secretary will
issue guidance on the application of
these standards to risk-based tiers of
covered facilities, and the acceptable
layering of measures used to meet these
standards will vary by risk-based tier.
Each covered facility must select,
develop in their Site Security Plan, and
implement appropriately risk-based
measures designed to satisfy the
following performance standards:
(1) Restrict Area Perimeter. Secure
and monitor the perimeter of the
facility;
(2) Secure Site Assets. Secure and
monitor restricted areas or potentially
critical targets within the facility;
(3) Screen and Control Access.
Control access to the facility and to
restricted areas within the facility by
screening and/or inspecting individuals
and vehicles as they enter, including,
(i) Measures to deter the unauthorized
introduction of dangerous substances
and devices that may facilitate an attack
or actions having serious negative
consequences for the population
surrounding the facility; and
(ii) Measures implementing a
regularly updated identification system
that checks the identification of facility
personnel and other persons seeking
access to the facility and that
discourages abuse through established
disciplinary measures;
(4) Deter, Detect, and Delay. Deter,
detect, and delay an attack, creating
sufficient time between detection of an
attack and the point at which the attack
becomes successful, including measures
to:
(i) Deter vehicles from penetrating the
facility perimeter, gaining unauthorized
access to restricted areas or otherwise
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presenting a hazard to potentially
critical targets;
(ii) Deter attacks through visible,
professional, well maintained security
measures and systems, including
security personnel, detection systems,
barriers and barricades, and hardened or
reduced value targets;
(iii) Detect attacks at early stages,
through countersurveillance, frustration
of opportunity to observe potential
targets, surveillance and sensing
systems, and barriers and barricades;
and
(iv) Delay an attack for a sufficient
period of time so to allow appropriate
response through on-site security
response, barriers and barricades,
hardened targets, and well-coordinated
response planning;
(5) Shipping, Receipt, and Storage.
Secure and monitor the shipping,
receipt, and storage of hazardous
materials for the facility;
(6) Theft and Diversion. Deter theft or
diversion of potentially dangerous
chemicals;
(7) Sabotage. Deter insider sabotage;
(8) Cyber. Deter cyber sabotage,
including by preventing unauthorized
onsite or remote access to critical
process controls, such as Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems, Distributed Control Systems
(DCS), Process Control Systems (PCS),
Industrial Control Systems (ICS), critical
business system, and other sensitive
computerized systems;
(9) Response. Develop and exercise an
emergency plan to respond to security
incidents internally and with assistance
of local law enforcement and first
responders;
(10) Monitoring. Maintain effective
monitoring, communications and
warning systems, including,
(i) Measures designed to ensure that
security systems and equipment are in
good working order and inspected,
tested, calibrated, and otherwise
maintained;
(ii) Measures designed to regularly
test security systems, note deficiencies,
correct for detected deficiencies, and
record results so that they are available
for inspection by the Department; and
(iii) Measures to allow the facility to
promptly identify and respond to
security system and equipment failures
or malfunctions;
(11) Training. Ensure proper security
training, exercises, and drills of facility
personnel;
(12) Personnel Surety. Perform
appropriate background checks on and
ensure appropriate credentials for
facility personnel, and as appropriate,
for unescorted visitors with access to
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restricted areas or critical assets,
including,
(i) Measures designed to verify and
validate identity;
(ii) Measures designed to check
criminal history;
(iii) Measures designed to verify and
validate legal authorization to work; and
(iv) Measures designed to identify
people with terrorist ties;
(13) Elevated Threats. Escalate the
level of protective measures for periods
of elevated threat;
(14) Specific Threats, Vulnerabilities,
or Risks. Address specific threats,
vulnerabilities or risks identified by the
Assistant Secretary for the particular
facility at issue;
(15) Reporting of Significant Security
Incidents. Report significant security
incidents to the Department and to local
law enforcement officials;
(16) Significant Security Incidents
and Suspicious Activities. Identify,
investigate, report, and maintain records
of significant security incidents and
suspicious activities in or near the site;
(17) Officials and Organization.
Establish official(s) and an organization
responsible for security and for
compliance with these standards;
(18) Records. Maintain appropriate
records; and
(19) Address any additional
performance standards the Assistant
Secretary may specify.
(b) [Reserved]
§ 27.235
Alternative security program.
(a) Covered facilities may submit an
Alternate Security Program (ASP)
pursuant to the requirements of this
section. The Assistant Secretary may
approve an Alternate Security Program,
in whole, in part, or subject to revisions
or supplements, upon a determination
that the Alternate Security Program
meets the requirements of this Part and
provides for an equivalent level of
security to that established by this Part.
(1) A Tier 4 facility may submit an
ASP in lieu of a Security Vulnerability
Assessment, Site Security Plan, or both.
(2) Tier 1, Tier 2, or Tier 3 facilities
may submit an ASP in lieu of a Site
Security Plan. Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier
3 facilities may not submit an ASP in
lieu of a Security Vulnerability
Assessment.
(b) The Department will provide
notice to a covered facility about the
approval or disapproval, in whole or in
part, of an ASP, using the procedure
specified in § 27.240 if the ASP is
intended to take the place of a Security
Vulnerability Assessment or using the
procedure specified in § 27.245 if the
ASP is intended to take the place of a
Site Security Plan.
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§ 27.240 Review and approval of security
vulnerability assessments.
(a) Review and Approval. The
Department will review and approve in
writing all Security Vulnerability
Assessments that satisfy the
requirements of § 27.215, including
Alternative Security Programs
submitted pursuant to § 27.235.
(b) If a Security Vulnerability
Assessment does not satisfy the
requirements of § 27.215, the
Department will provide the facility
with a written notification that includes
a clear explanation of deficiencies in the
Security Vulnerability Assessment. The
facility shall then enter further
consultations with the Department and
resubmit a sufficient Security
Vulnerability Assessment by the time
specified in the written notification
provided by the Department under this
section. If the resubmitted Security
Vulnerability Assessment does not
satisfy the requirements of § 27.215, the
Department will provide the facility
with written notification (including a
clear explanation of deficiencies in the
SVA) of the Department’s disapproval of
the SVA.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
§ 27.245 Review and approval of site
security plans.
(a) Review and Approval. (1) The
Department will review and approve or
disapprove all Site Security Plans that
satisfy the requirements of § 27.225,
including Alternative Security Programs
submitted pursuant to § 27.235.
(i) The Department will review Site
Security Plans through a two-step
process. Upon receipt of Site Security
Plan from the covered facility, the
Department will review the
documentation and make a preliminary
determination as to whether it satisfies
the requirements of § 27.225. If the
Department finds that the requirements
are satisfied, the Department will issue
a Letter of Authorization to the covered
facility.
(ii) Following issuance of the Letter of
Authorization, the Department will
inspect the covered facility in
accordance with § 27.250 for purposes
of determining compliance with the
requirements of this Part.
(iii) If the Department approves the
Site Security Plan in accordance with
§ 27.250, the Department will issue a
Letter of Approval to the facility, and
the facility shall implement the
approved Site Security Plan.
(2) The Department will not
disapprove a Site Security Plan
submitted under this Part based on the
presence or absence of a particular
security measure. The Department may
disapprove a Site Security Plan that fails
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to satisfy the risk-based performance
standards established in § 27.230.
(b) When the Department disapproves
a preliminary Site Security Plan issued
prior to inspection or a Site Security
Plan following inspection, the
Department will provide the facility
with a written notification that includes
a clear explanation of deficiencies in the
Site Security Plan. The facility shall
then enter further consultations with the
Department and resubmit a sufficient
Site Security Plan by the time specified
in the written notification provided by
the Department under this section. If the
resubmitted Site Security Plan does not
satisfy the requirements of § 27.225, the
Department will provide the facility
with written notification (including a
clear explanation of deficiencies in the
SSP) of the Department’s disapproval of
the SSP.
§ 27.250
Inspections and audits.
(a) Authority. In order to assess
compliance with the requirements of
this Part, authorized Department
officials may enter, inspect, and audit
the property, equipment, operations,
and records of covered facilities.
(b) Following preliminary approval of
a Site Security Plan in accordance with
§ 27.245, the Department will inspect
the covered facility for purposes of
determining compliance with the
requirements of this Part.
(1) If after the inspection, the
Department determines that the
requirements of § 27.225 have been met,
the Department will issue a Letter of
Approval to the covered facility.
(2) If after the inspection, the
Department determines that the
requirements of § 27.225 have not been
met, the Department will proceed as
directed by § 27.245(b) in ‘‘Review and
Approval of Site Security Plans.’’
(c) Time and Manner. Authorized
Department officials will conduct audits
and inspections at reasonable times and
in a reasonable manner. The Department
will provide covered facility owners
and/or operators with 24-hour advance
notice before inspections, except
(1) If the Under Secretary or Assistant
Secretary determines that an inspection
without such notice is warranted by
exigent circumstances and approves
such inspection; or
(2) If any delay in conducting an
inspection might be seriously
detrimental to security, and the Director
of the Chemical Security Division
determines that an inspection without
notice is warranted, and approves an
inspector to conduct such inspection.
(d) Inspectors. Inspections and audits
are conducted by personnel duly
authorized and designated for that
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purpose as ‘‘inspectors’’ by the
Secretary or the Secretary’s designee.
(1) An inspector will, on request,
present his or her credentials for
examination, but the credentials may
not be reproduced by the facility.
(2) An inspector may administer oaths
and receive affirmations, with the
consent of any witness, in any matter.
(3) An inspector may gather
information by reasonable means
including, but not limited to,
interviews, statements, photocopying,
photography, and video- and audiorecording. All documents, objects and
electronically stored information
collected by each inspector during the
performance of that inspector’s duties
shall be maintained for a reasonable
period of time in the files of the
Department of Homeland Security
maintained for that facility or matter.
(4) An inspector may request
forthwith access to all records required
to be kept pursuant to § 27.255. An
inspector shall be provided with the
immediate use of any photocopier or
other equipment necessary to copy any
such record. If copies can not be
provided immediately upon request, the
inspector shall be permitted
immediately to take the original records
for duplication and prompt return.
(e) Confidentiality. In addition to the
protections provided under CVI in
§ 27.400, information received in an
audit or inspection under this section,
including the identity of the persons
involved in the inspection or who
provide information during the
inspection, shall remain confidential
under the investigatory file exception,
or other appropriate exception, to the
public disclosure requirements of 5
U.S.C. 552.
(f) Guidance. The Assistant Secretary
shall issue guidance identifying
appropriate processes for such
inspections, and specifying the type and
nature of documentation that must be
made available for review during
inspections and audits.
§ 27.255
Recordkeeping requirements.
(a) Except as provided in § 27.255(b),
the covered facility must keep records of
the activities as set out below for at least
three years and make them available to
the Department upon request. A covered
facility must keep the following records:
(1) Training. For training, the date and
location of each session, time of day and
duration of session, a description of the
training, the name and qualifications of
the instructor, a clear, legible list of
attendees to include the attendee
signature, at least one other unique
identifier of each attendee receiving the
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training, and the results of any
evaluation or testing.
(2) Drills and exercises. For each drill
or exercise, the date held, a description
of the drill or exercise, a list of
participants, a list of equipment (other
than personal equipment) tested or
employed in the exercise, the name(s)
and qualifications of the exercise
director, and any best practices or
lessons learned which may improve the
Site Security Plan;
(3) Incidents and breaches of security.
Date and time of occurrence, location
within the facility, a description of the
incident or breach, the identity of the
individual to whom it was reported, and
a description of the response;
(4) Maintenance, calibration, and
testing of security equipment. The date
and time, name and qualifications of the
technician(s) doing the work, and the
specific security equipment involved for
each occurrence of maintenance,
calibration, and testing;
(5) Security threats. Date and time of
occurrence, how the threat was
communicated, who received or
identified the threat, a description of the
threat, to whom it was reported, and a
description of the response;
(6) Audits. For each audit of a covered
facility’s Site Security Plan (including
each audit required under § 27.225(e))
or Security Vulnerability Assessment, a
record of the audit, including the date
of the audit, results of the audit, name(s)
of the person(s) who conducted the
audit, and a letter certified by the
covered facility stating the date the
audit was conducted.
(7) Letters of Authorization and
Approval. All Letters of Authorization
and Approval from the Department, and
documentation identifying the results of
audits and inspections conducted
pursuant to § 27.250.
(b) A covered facility must retain
records of submitted Top-Screens,
Security Vulnerability Assessments, Site
Security Plans, and all related
correspondence with the Department for
at least six years and make them
available to the Department upon
request.
(c) To the extent necessary for
security purposes, the Department may
request that a covered facility make
available records kept pursuant to other
Federal programs or regulations.
(d) Records required by this section
may be kept in electronic format. If kept
in an electronic format, they must be
protected against unauthorized access,
deletion, destruction, amendment, and
disclosure.
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Subpart C—Orders and Adjudications
§ 27.300
Orders.
(a) Orders Generally. When the
Assistant Secretary determines that a
facility is in violation of any of the
requirements of this Part, the Assistant
Secretary may take appropriate action
including the issuance of an appropriate
Order.
(b) Orders Assessing Civil Penalty and
Orders to Cease Operations. (1) Where
the Assistant Secretary determines that
a facility is in violation of an Order
issued pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
section, the Assistant may enter an
Order Assessing Civil Penalty, Order to
Cease Operations, or both.
(2) Following the issuance of an Order
by the Assistant Secretary pursuant to
paragraph (b)(1) of this section, the
facility may enter further consultations
with Department.
(3) Where the Assistant Secretary
determines that a facility is in violation
of an Order issued pursuant to
paragraph (a) of this section and issues
an Order Assessing Civil Penalty
pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of this
section, a chemical facility is liable to
the United States for a civil penalty of
not more than $25,000 for each day
during which the violation continues.
(c) Procedures for Orders. (1) At a
minimum, an Order shall be signed by
the Assistant Secretary, shall be dated,
and shall include:
(i) The name and address of the
facility in question;
(ii) A listing of the provision(s) that
the facility is alleged to have violated;
(iii) A statement of facts upon which
the alleged instances of noncompliance
are based;
(iv) A clear explanation of
deficiencies in the facility’s chemical
security program, including, if
applicable, any deficiencies in the
facility’s Security Vulnerability
Assessment, Site Security Plan, or both;
and
(v) A statement, indicating what
action(s) the chemical must take to
remedy the instance(s) of
noncompliance; and
(vi) The date by which the facility
must comply with the terms of the
Order.
(2) The Assistant Secretary may
establish procedures for the issuance of
Orders.
(d) A facility must comply with the
terms of the Order by the date specified
in the Order unless the facility has filed
a timely Notice for Application for
Review under § 27.310.
(e) Where a facility or other person
contests the determination of the
Assistant Secretary to issue an Order, a
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chemical facility may seek an
adjudication pursuant to § 27.310.
(f) An Order issued under this section
becomes final agency action when the
time to file a Notice of Application of
Review under § 27.310 has passed
without such a filing or upon the
conclusion of adjudication or appeal
proceedings under this subpart.
§ 27.305
Neutral adjudications.
(a) Any facility or other person who
has received a Finding pursuant to
§ 27.230(a)(12)(iv), a Determination
pursuant to § 27.245(b), or an Order
pursuant to § 27.300 is entitled to an
adjudication, by a neutral adjudications
officer, of any issue of material fact
relevant to any administrative action
which deprives that person of a
cognizable interest in liberty or
property.
(b) A neutral adjudications officer
appointed pursuant to § 27.315 shall
issue an Initial Decision on any material
factual issue related to a Finding
pursuant to § 27.230(a)(12)(iv), a
Determination pursuant to § 27.245, or
an Order pursuant to § 27.300 before
any such administrative action is
reviewed on appeal pursuant to
§ 27.345.
§ 27.310 Commencement of adjudication
proceedings.
(a) Proceedings Instituted by Facilities
or other Persons. A facility or other
person may institute proceedings to
review a determination by the Assistant
Secretary:
(1) Finding, pursuant to the
§ 27.230(a)(12)(iv), that an individual is
a potential security threat;
(2) Disapproving a Site Security Plan
pursuant to § 27.245(b); or
(3) Issuing an Order pursuant to
§ 27.300(a) or (b).
(b) Procedure for Applications by
Facilities or other Persons. A facility or
other person may institute Proceedings
by filing a Notice of Application for
Review specifying that the facility or
other person requests a Proceeding to
review a determination specified in
paragraph (a) of this section.
(1) An Applicant institutes a
Proceeding by filing a Notice of
Application for Review with the office
of the Department hereinafter
designated by the Secretary.
(2) An Applicant must file a Notice of
Application for Review within seven
calendar days of notification to the
facility or other person of the Assistant
Secretary’s Finding, Determination, or
Order.
(3) The Applicant shall file and
simultaneously serve each Notice of
Application for Review and all
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subsequent filings on the Assistant
Secretary and the General Counsel.
(4) An Order is stayed from the timely
filing of a Notice of Application for
Review until the Presiding Officer
issues an Initial Decision, unless the
Secretary has lifted the stay due to
exigent circumstances pursuant to
paragraph (d) of this section.
(5) The Applicant shall file and serve
an Application for Review within
fourteen calendar days of the
notification to the facility or other
person of the Assistant Secretary’s
Finding, Determination, or Order.
(6) Each Application for Review shall
be accompanied by all legal
memoranda, other documents,
declarations, affidavits, and other
evidence supporting the position
asserted by the Applicant.
(c) Response. The Assistant Secretary,
through the Office of General Counsel,
shall file and serve a Response,
accompanied by all legal memoranda,
other documents, declarations,
affidavits and other evidence supporting
the position asserted by the Assistant
Secretary within fourteen calendar days
of the filing and service of the
Application for Review and all
supporting papers.
(d) Procedural Modifications. The
Secretary may, in exigent circumstances
(as determined in his sole discretion):
(1) Lift any stay applicable to any
Order under § 27.300;
(2) Modify the time for a response;
(3) Rule on the sufficiency of
Applications for Review; or
(4) Otherwise modify these
procedures with respect to particular
matters.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
§ 27.315 Presiding officers for
proceedings.
(a) Immediately upon the filing of any
Application for Review, the Secretary
shall appoint an attorney, who is
employed by the Department and who
has not performed any investigative or
prosecutorial function with respect to
the matter, to act as a neutral
adjudications officer or Presiding
Officer for the compilation of a factual
record and the recommendation of an
Initial Decision for each Proceeding.
(b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of
this section, the Secretary may appoint
one or more attorneys who are
employed by the Department and who
do not perform any investigative or
prosecutorial function with respect to
this subpart, to serve generally in the
capacity as Presiding Officer(s) for such
matters pursuant to such procedures as
the Secretary may hereafter establish.
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§ 27.320 Prohibition on ex parte
communications during proceedings.
(a) At no time after the designation of
a Presiding Officer for a Proceeding and
prior to the issuance of a Final Decision
pursuant to § 27.345 with respect to a
facility or other person, shall the
appointed Presiding Officer, or any
person who will advise that official in
the decision on the matter, discuss ex
parte the merits of the proceeding with
any interested person outside the
Department, with any Department
official who performs a prosecutorial or
investigative function in such
proceeding or a factually related
proceeding, or with any representative
of such person.
(b) If, after appointment of a Presiding
Officer and prior to the issuance of a
Final Decision pursuant to § 27.345 with
respect to a facility or other person, the
appointed Presiding Officer, or any
person who will advise that official in
the decision on the matter, receives
from or on behalf of any party, by means
of an ex parte communication,
information which is relevant to the
decision of the matter and to which
other parties have not had an
opportunity to respond, a summary of
such information shall be served on all
other parties, who shall have an
opportunity to reply to the ex parte
communication within a time set by the
Presiding Officer.
(c) The consideration of classified
information or CVI pursuant to an in
camera procedure does not constitute a
prohibited ex parte communication for
purposes of this subpart.
§ 27.325
Burden of proof.
The Assistant Secretary bears the
initial burden of proving the facts
necessary to support the challenged
administrative action at every
proceeding instituted under this
subpart.
§ 27.330
Summary decision procedures.
(a) The Presiding Officer appointed
for each Proceeding shall immediately
consider whether the summary
adjudication of the Application for
Review is appropriate based on the
Application for Review, the Response,
and all the supporting filings of the
parties pursuant to §§ 27.310(b)(5) and
27.310(c).
(1) The Presiding Officer shall
promptly issue any necessary
scheduling order for any additional
briefing of the issue of summary
adjudication on the Application for
Review and Response.
(2) The Presiding Officer may conduct
scheduling conferences and other
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proceedings that the Presiding Officer
determines to be appropriate.
(b) If the Presiding Officer determines
that there is no genuine issue of material
fact and that one party or the other is
entitled to decision as a matter of law,
then the record shall be closed and the
Presiding Officer shall issue an Initial
Decision on the Application for Review
pursuant to § 27.340.
(c) If a Presiding Officer determines
that any factual issues require the crossexamination of one or more witnesses or
other proceedings at a hearing, the
Presiding Officer, in consultation with
the parties, shall promptly schedule a
hearing to be conducted pursuant to
§ 27.335.
§ 27.335
Hearing procedures.
(a) Any hearing shall be held as
expeditiously as possible at the location
most conducive to a prompt
presentation of any necessary testimony
or other proceedings.
(1) Videoconferencing and
teleconferencing may be used where
appropriate at the discretion of the
Presiding Officer.
(2) Each party offering the affirmative
testimony of a witness shall present that
testimony by declaration, affidavit, or
other sworn statement submitted in
advance as ordered by the Presiding
Officer.
(3) Any witness presented for further
examination shall be asked to testify
under an oath or affirmation.
(4) The hearing shall be recorded
verbatim.
(b)(1) A facility or other person may
appear and be heard on his own behalf
or through any counsel of his choice
who is qualified to possess CVI.
(2) A facility of other person
individually, or through counsel, may
offer relevant and material information
including written direct testimony
which he believes should be considered
in opposition to the administrative
action or which may bear on the
sanction being sought.
(3) The facility or other person
individually, or through counsel, may
conduct such cross-examination as may
be specifically allowed by the Presiding
Officer for a full determination of the
facts.
§ 27.340 Completion of adjudication
proceedings.
(a) The Presiding Officer shall close
and certify the record of the
adjudication promptly upon the
completion of:
(1) Summary judgment proceedings,
(2) A hearing, if necessary,
(3) The submission of post hearing
briefs, if any are ordered by the
Presiding Officer, and
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(4) The conclusion of oral arguments,
if any are permitted by the Presiding
Officer.
(b) The Presiding Officer shall issue
an Initial Decision based on the certified
record, and the decision shall be subject
to appeal pursuant to § 27.345.
(c) An Initial Decision shall become a
final agency action on the expiration of
the time for an Appeal pursuant to
§ 27.345.
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§ 27.345
Appeals.
(a) Right to Appeal. A facility or any
person who has received an Initial
Decision under § 27.340(b) has the right
to appeal to the Under Secretary acting
as a neutral appeals officer.
(b) Procedure for Appeals. (1) The
Assistant Secretary, a facility or other
person, or a representative on behalf of
a facility or person, may institute an
Appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal with
the office of the Department hereinafter
designated by the Secretary.
(2) The Assistant Secretary, a facility,
or other person must file a Notice of
Appeal within seven calendar days of
the service of the Presiding Officer’s
Initial Decision.
(3) The Appellant shall file with the
designated office and simultaneously
serve each Notice of Appeal and all
subsequent filings on the General
Counsel.
(4) An Initial Decision is stayed from
the timely filing of a Notice of Appeal
until the Under Secretary issues a Final
Decision, unless the Secretary lifts the
stay due to exigent circumstances
pursuant to § 27.310(d).
(5) The Appellant shall file and serve
a Brief within 28 calendar days of the
notification of the service of the
Presiding Officer’s Initial Decision.
(6) The Appellee shall file and serve
its Opposition Brief within 28 calendar
days of the service of the Appellant’s
Brief.
(c) The Under Secretary may provide
for an expedited appeal for appropriate
matters.
(d) Ex Parte Communications. (1) At
no time after the filing of a Notice of
Appeal pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of
this section and prior to the issuance of
a Final Decision on an Appeal pursuant
to paragraph (f) of this section with
respect to a facility or other person shall
the Under Secretary, his designee, or
any person who will advise that official
in the decision on the matter, discuss ex
parte the merits of the proceeding with
any interested person outside the
Department, with any Department
official who performs a prosecutorial or
investigative function in such
proceeding or a factually related
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proceeding, or with any representative
of such person.
(2) If, after the filing of a Notice of
Appeal pursuant to paragraph (b)(1) of
this section and prior to the issuance of
a Final Decision on an Appeal pursuant
to paragraph (f) of this section with
respect to a facility or other person, the
Under Secretary, his designee, or any
person who will advise that official in
the decision on the matter, receives
from or on behalf of any party, by means
of an ex parte communication,
information which is relevant to the
decision of the matter and to which
other parties have not had an
opportunity to respond, a summary of
such information shall be served on all
other parties, who shall have an
opportunity to reply to the ex parte
communication within a time set by the
Under Secretary or his designee.
(3) The consideration of classified
information or CVI pursuant to an in
camera procedure does not constitute a
prohibited ex parte communication for
purposes of this subpart.
(e) A facility or other person may elect
to have the Under Secretary participate
in any mediation or other resolution
process by expressly waiving, in
writing, any argument that such
participation has compromised the
Appeal process.
(f) The Under Secretary shall issue a
Final Decision and serve it upon the
parties. A Final Decision made by the
Under Secretary constitutes final agency
action.
(g) The Secretary may establish
procedures for the conduct of Appeals
pursuant to this section.
Subpart D—Other
§ 27.400 Chemical-terrorism vulnerability
information.
(a) Applicability. This section governs
the maintenance, safeguarding, and
disclosure of information and records
that constitute Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI), as
defined in § 27.400(b). The Secretary
shall administer this section consistent
with Section 550(c) of the Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007,
including appropriate sharing with
Federal, State and local officials.
(b) Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information. In accordance with Section
550(c) of the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007,
the following information, whether
transmitted verbally, electronically, or
in written form, shall constitute CVI:
(1) Security Vulnerability
Assessments under § 27.215;
(2) Site Security Plans under § 27.225;
(3) Documents relating to the
Department’s review and approval of
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Security Vulnerability Assessments and
Site Security Plans, including Letters of
Authorization, Letters of Approval and
responses thereto; written notices; and
other documents developed pursuant to
§§ 27.240 or 27.245;
(4) Alternate Security Programs under
§ 27.235;
(5) Documents relating to inspection
or audits under § 27.250;
(6) Any records required to be created
or retained under § 27.255;
(7) Sensitive portions of orders,
notices or letters under § 27.300;
(8) Information developed pursuant to
§§ 27.200 and 27.205; and
(9) Other information developed for
chemical facility security purposes that
the Secretary, in his discretion,
determines is similar to the information
protected in § 27.400(b)(1) through (8)
and thus warrants protection as CVI.
(c) Covered Persons. Persons subject
to the requirements of this section are:
(1) Each person who has a need to
know CVI, as specified in § 27.400(e);
(2) Each person who otherwise
receives or gains access to what they
know or should reasonably know
constitutes CVI.
(d) Duty to protect information. A
covered person must—
(1) Take reasonable steps to safeguard
CVI in that person’s possession or
control, including electronic data, from
unauthorized disclosure. When a person
is not in physical possession of CVI, the
person must store it in a secure
container, such as a safe, that limits
access only to covered persons with a
need to know;
(2) Disclose, or otherwise provide
access to, CVI only to persons who have
a need to know;
(3) Refer requests for CVI by persons
without a need to know to the Assistant
Secretary;
(4) Mark CVI as specified in
§ 27.400(f);
(5) Dispose of CVI as specified in
§ 27.400(k);
(6) If a covered person receives a
record or verbal transmission containing
CVI that is not marked as specified in
§ 27.400(f), the covered person must—
(i) Mark the record as specified in
§ 27.400(f) of this section; and
(ii) Inform the sender of the record
that the record must be marked as
specified in § 27.400(f); or
(iii) If received verbally, make
reasonable efforts to memorialize such
information and mark the memorialized
record as specified in § 27.400(f) of this
section, and inform the speaker of any
determination that such information
warrants CVI protection.
(7) When a covered person becomes
aware that CVI has been released to
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09APR2
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
persons without a need to know
(including a covered person under
§ 27.400(c)(2)), the covered person must
promptly inform the Assistant
Secretary.
(8) In the case of information that is
CVI and also has been designated as
critical infrastructure information under
Section 214 of the Homeland Security
Act, any covered person in possession
of such information must comply with
the disclosure restrictions and other
requirements applicable to such
information under Section 214 and any
implementing regulations.
(e) Need to know. (1) A person,
including a State or local official, has a
need to know CVI in each of the
following circumstances:
(i) When the person requires access to
specific CVI to carry out chemical
facility security activities approved,
accepted, funded, recommended, or
directed by the Department.
(ii) When the person needs the
information to receive training to carry
out chemical facility security activities
approved, accepted, funded,
recommended, or directed by the
Department.
(iii) When the information is
necessary for the person to supervise or
otherwise manage individuals carrying
out chemical facility security activities
approved, accepted, funded,
recommended, or directed by the
Department.
(iv) When the person needs the
information to provide technical or legal
advice to a covered person, who has a
need to know the information, regarding
chemical facility security requirements
of Federal law.
(v) When the Department determines
that access is required under
§§ 27.400(h) or 27.400(i) in the course of
a judicial or administrative proceeding.
(2) Federal employees, contractors,
and grantees. (i) A Federal employee
has a need to know CVI if access to the
information is necessary for
performance of the employee’s official
duties.
(ii) A person acting in the
performance of a contract with or grant
from the Department has a need to know
CVI if access to the information is
necessary to performance of the contract
or grant. Contractors or grantees may not
further disclose CVI without the consent
of the Assistant Secretary.
(iii) The Department may require that
non-Federal persons seeking access to
CVI complete a non-disclosure
agreement before such access is granted.
(3) Background check. The
Department may make an individual’s
access to the CVI contingent upon
satisfactory completion of a security
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background check or other procedures
and requirements for safeguarding CVI
that are satisfactory to the Department.
(4) Need to know further limited by
the Department. For some specific CVI,
the Department may make a finding that
only specific persons or classes of
persons have a need to know.
(5) Nothing in § 27.400(e) shall
prevent the Department from
determining, in its discretion, that a
person not otherwise listed in
§ 27.400(e) has a need to know CVI in
a particular circumstance.
(f) Marking of paper records. (1) In the
case of paper records containing CVI, a
covered person must mark the record by
placing the protective marking
conspicuously on the top, and the
distribution limitation statement on the
bottom, of—
(i) The outside of any front and back
cover, including a binder cover or
folder, if the document has a front and
back cover;
(ii) Any title page; and
(iii) Each page of the document.
(2) Protective marking. The protective
marking is: CHEMICAL-TERRORISM
VULNERABILITY INFORMATION.
(3) Distribution limitation statement.
The distribution limitation statement is:
WARNING: This record contains
Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information controlled by 6 CFR 27.400.
Do not disclose to persons without a
‘‘need to know’’ in accordance with 6
CFR 27.400(e). Unauthorized release
may result in civil penalties or other
action. In any administrative or judicial
proceeding, this information shall be
treated as classified information in
accordance with 6 CFR 27.400(h) and
(i).
(4) Other types of records. In the case
of non-paper records that contain CVI,
including motion picture films,
videotape recordings, audio recording,
and electronic and magnetic records, a
covered person must clearly and
conspicuously mark the records with
the protective marking and the
distribution limitation statement such
that the viewer or listener is reasonably
likely to see or hear them when
obtaining access to the contents of the
record.
(g) Disclosure by the Department—In
general. (1) Except as otherwise
provided in this section, and
notwithstanding the Freedom of
Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552), the
Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. 552a), and other
laws, records containing CVI are not
available for public inspection or
copying, nor does the Department
release such records to persons without
a need to know.
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(2) Disclosure of Segregatable
Information under the Freedom of
Information Act and the Privacy Act. If
a record is marked to signify both CVI
and information that is not CVI, the
Department, on a proper Freedom of
Information Act or Privacy Act request,
may disclose the record with the CVI
redacted, provided the record is not
otherwise exempt from disclosure under
the Freedom of Information Act or
Privacy Act.
(h) Disclosure in administrative
enforcement proceedings. (1) The
Department may provide CVI to a
person governed by Section 550, and his
counsel, in the context of an
administrative enforcement proceeding
of Section 550 when, in the sole
discretion of the Department, as
appropriate, access to the CVI is
necessary for the person to prepare a
response to allegations contained in a
legal enforcement action document
issued by the Department.
(2) Security background check. Prior
to providing CVI to a person under
§ 27.400(h)(1), the Department may
require the individual or, in the case of
an entity, the individuals representing
the entity, and their counsel, to undergo
and satisfy, in the judgment of the
Department, a security background
check.
(i) Disclosure in judicial proceedings.
(1) In any judicial enforcement
proceeding of Section 550, the
Secretary, in his sole discretion, may,
subject to § 27.400(i)(1)(i), authorize
access to CVI for persons necessary for
the conduct of such proceedings,
including such persons’ counsel,
provided that no other persons not so
authorized shall have access to or be
present for the disclosure of such
information.
(i) Security background check. Prior
to providing CVI to a person under
§ 27.400(i)(1), the Department may
require the individual to undergo and
satisfy, in the judgment of the
Department, a security background
check.
(ii) [Reserved]
(2) In any judicial enforcement
proceeding of Section 550 where a
person seeks to disclose CVI to a person
not authorized to receive it under
paragraph (i)(1) of this section, or where
a person not authorized to receive CVI
under paragraph (i)(1) of this section
seeks to compel its disclosure through
discovery, the United States may make
an ex parte application in writing to the
court seeking authorization to—
(i) Redact specified items of CVI from
documents to be introduced into
evidence or made available to the
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defendant through discovery under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
(ii) Substitute a summary of the
information for such CVI; or
(iii) Substitute a statement admitting
relevant facts that the CVI would tend
to prove.
(3) The court shall grant a request
under paragraph (i)(2) of this section if,
after in camera review, the court finds
that the redacted item, stipulation, or
summary is sufficient to allow the
defendant to prepare a defense.
(4) If the court enters an order
granting a request under paragraph (i)(2)
of this section, the entire text of the
documents to which the request relates
shall be sealed and preserved in the
records of the court to be made available
to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal.
(5) If the court enters an order
denying a request of the United States
under paragraph (i)(2) of this section,
the United States may take an
immediate, interlocutory appeal of the
court’s order in accordance with 18
U.S.C. 2339B(f)(4), (5). For purposes of
such an appeal, the entire text of the
documents to which the request relates,
together with any transcripts of
arguments made ex parte to the court in
connection therewith, shall be
maintained under seal and delivered to
the appellate court.
(6) Except as provided otherwise at
the sole discretion of the Secretary,
access to CVI shall not be available in
any civil or criminal litigation unrelated
to the enforcement of Section 550.
(7) Taking of trial testimony—
(i) Objection—During the examination
of a witness in any judicial proceeding,
the United States may object to any
question or line of inquiry that may
require the witness to disclose CVI not
previously found to be admissible.
(ii) Action by court—In determining
whether a response is admissible, the
court shall take precautions to guard
against the compromise of any CVI,
including—
(A) Permitting the United States to
provide the court, ex parte, with a
proffer of the witness’s response to the
question or line of inquiry; and
(B) Requiring the defendant to
provide the court with a proffer of the
nature of the information that the
defendant seeks to elicit.
17739
(iii) Obligation of defendant—In any
judicial enforcement proceeding, it shall
be the defendant’s obligation to
establish the relevance and materiality
of any CVI sought to be introduced.
(8) Construction. Nothing in this
subsection shall prevent the United
States from seeking protective orders or
asserting privileges ordinarily available
to the United States to protect against
the disclosure of classified information,
including the invocation of the military
and State secrets privilege.
(j) Consequences of Violation.
Violation of this section is grounds for
a civil penalty and other enforcement or
corrective action by the Department,
and appropriate personnel actions for
Federal employees. Corrective action
may include issuance of an order
requiring retrieval of CVI to remedy
unauthorized disclosure or an order to
cease future unauthorized disclosure.
(k) Destruction of CVI. (1) The
Department of Homeland Security.
Subject to the requirements of the
Federal Records Act (5 U.S.C. 105),
including the duty to preserve records
containing documentation of a Federal
agency’s policies, decisions, and
essential transactions, the Department
destroys CVI when no longer needed to
carry out the agency’s function.
(2) Other covered persons—(i) In
general. A covered person must destroy
CVI completely to preclude recognition
or reconstruction of the information
when the covered person no longer
needs the CVI to carry out security
measures under paragraph (e) of this
section.
(ii) Exception. Section 27.400(k)(2)
does not require a State or local
government agency to destroy
information that the agency is required
to preserve under State or local law.
administered by the Environmental
Protection Agency, U.S. Department of
Justice, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S.
Department of Transportation, or other
federal agencies.
(2) [Reserved]
(b) State law, regulation or
administrative action defined. For
purposes of this section, the phrase
‘‘State law, regulation or administrative
action’’ means any enacted law,
promulgated regulation, ordinance,
administrative action, order or decision,
or common law standard of a State or
any of its political subdivisions.
(c) Submission for review. Any
chemical facility covered by these
regulations and any State may petition
the Department by submitting a copy of
a State law, regulation, or administrative
action, or decision or order of a court for
review under this section.
(d) Review and opinion—(1) Review.
The Department may review State laws,
administrative actions, or opinions or
orders of a court under State law and
regulations submitted under this
section, and may offer an opinion
whether the application or enforcement
of the State law or regulation would
conflict with, hinder, pose an obstacle
to or frustrate the purposes of this Part.
(2) Opinion. The Department may
issue a written opinion on any question
regarding preemption. If the question
was submitted under subsection (c) of
this part, the Assistant Secretary will
notify the affected chemical facility and
the Attorney General of the subject State
of any opinion under this section.
(3) Consultation with States. In
conducting a review under this section,
the Department will seek the views of
the State or local jurisdiction whose
laws may be affected by the
Department’s review.
§ 27.405 Review and preemption of State
laws and regulations.
§ 27.410
(a) As per current law, no law,
regulation, or administrative action of a
State or political subdivision thereof, or
any decision or order rendered by a
court under state law, shall have any
effect if such law, regulation, or
decision conflicts with, hinders, poses
an obstacle to or frustrates the purposes
of this regulation or of any approval,
disapproval or order issued there under.
(1) Nothing in this part is intended to
displace other federal requirements
(a) Nothing in this Part shall confer
upon any person except the Secretary a
right of action, in law or equity, for any
remedy including, but not limited to,
injunctions or damages to enforce any
provision of this Part.
(b) An owner or operator of a
chemical facility may petition the
Assistant Secretary to provide the
Department’s view in any litigation
involving any issues or matters
regarding this Part.
Third party actions.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
Chemical of interest
1,1,3,3,3-pentafluoro-2-(trifluoromethyl)-1-propene .....................................................................
1,1-Dimethylhydrazine .................................................................................................................
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382–21–8
57–14–7
E:\FR\FM\09APR2.SGM
09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
Any Amount.
11,250.
17740
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST—Continued
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
Chemical of interest
1,2-bis(2-chloroethylthio)ethane ..................................................................................................
1,3-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-propane ............................................................................................
1,3-Butadiene ...............................................................................................................................
1,3-Pentadiene .............................................................................................................................
1,4-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-butane ..............................................................................................
1,5-bis(2-chloroethylthio)-n-pentane ............................................................................................
1-Butene ......................................................................................................................................
1-Chloropropylene .......................................................................................................................
1H-Tetrazole ................................................................................................................................
1-Pentane ....................................................................................................................................
2,2-Dimethylpropane ....................................................................................................................
2-Butene ......................................................................................................................................
2-Butene-cis .................................................................................................................................
2-Butene-trans .............................................................................................................................
2-chloroethylchloromethylsulfide ..................................................................................................
2-Chloropropylene .......................................................................................................................
2-Chlorovinyldichloroarsine ..........................................................................................................
2-Methyl-1-butene ........................................................................................................................
2-Methylpropene ..........................................................................................................................
2-Pentene, (Z)- ............................................................................................................................
2-Pentene,(E)- .............................................................................................................................
3,3-dimethyl-2-butanol .................................................................................................................
3-Methyl-1-butene ........................................................................................................................
3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ) ......................................................................................................
5-Nitrobenzotriazol .......................................................................................................................
Acetaldehyde ...............................................................................................................................
Acetone ........................................................................................................................................
Acetone cyanohydrin, stabilized ..................................................................................................
Acetyl bromide .............................................................................................................................
Acetyl chloride .............................................................................................................................
Acetyl iodide ................................................................................................................................
Acetylene .....................................................................................................................................
Acrolein ........................................................................................................................................
Acrylonitrile ..................................................................................................................................
Acrylyl chloride .............................................................................................................................
Allyl alcohol ..................................................................................................................................
Allylamine .....................................................................................................................................
Allyltrichlorosilane, stabilized .......................................................................................................
Aluminum bromide, anhydrous ....................................................................................................
Aluminum chloride, anhydrous ....................................................................................................
Aluminum phosphide ...................................................................................................................
Ammonia (anhydrous) .................................................................................................................
Ammonia (conc. 20% or greater) ................................................................................................
Ammonium nitrate (nitrogen concentration of 28%–34%) ..........................................................
Ammonium perchlorate ................................................................................................................
Ammonium picrate .......................................................................................................................
Amyltrichlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
Antimony pentafluoride ................................................................................................................
Arsenous trichloride .....................................................................................................................
Arsine ...........................................................................................................................................
Barium azide ................................................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethyl)ethylamine ........................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethyl)methylamine .....................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide ...............................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethylthio)methane ......................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethylthioethyl)ether ....................................................................................................
bis(2-chloroethylthiomethyl)ether .................................................................................................
bis(2-chlorovinyl)chloroarsine ......................................................................................................
Boron tribromide ..........................................................................................................................
Boron trichloride ...........................................................................................................................
Boron triflouride ...........................................................................................................................
Boron triflouride compound with methyl ether (1:1) ....................................................................
Bromine ........................................................................................................................................
Bromine chloride ..........................................................................................................................
Bromine pentafluoride ..................................................................................................................
Bromine trifluoride ........................................................................................................................
Bromotrifluorethylene ...................................................................................................................
Butane ..........................................................................................................................................
Butene ..........................................................................................................................................
Butyltrichlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
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3563–36–8
63905–10–2
106–99–0
504–60–9
142868–93–7
142868–94–8
106–98–9
590–21–6
16681–77–9
109–67–1
463–82–1
107–01–7
590–18–1
624–64–6
2625–76–5
557–98–2
541–25–3
563–46–2
115–11–7
627–20–3
646–04–8
464–07–3
563–45–1
62869–69–6
2338–12–7
75–07–0
67–64–1
75–86–5
506–96–7
75–36–5
507–02–8
74–86–2
107–02–8
107–13–1
814–68–6
107–18–6
107–11–9
107–37–9
7727–15–3
7446–70–0
20859–73–8
7664–41–7
7664–41–7
6484–52–2
7790–98–9
131–74–8
107–72–2
7783–70–2
7784–34–1
7784–42–1
18810–58–7
538–07–8
51–75–2
505–60–2
63869–13–6
63918–89–8
63918–90–1
40334–69–8
10294–33–4
10294–34–5
7637–07–2
353–42–4
7726–95–6
13863–41–7
7789–30–2
7787–71–5
598–73–2
106–97–8
25167–67–3
7521–80–4
E:\FR\FM\09APR2.SGM
09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
2,000.
7,500.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
3,750.
15,000.
3,750.
11,250.
7,500.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
15,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
11,250.
7,500.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
17741
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST—Continued
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
Chemical of interest
Calcium dithionite ........................................................................................................................
Calcium hydrosulfite ....................................................................................................................
Calcium phosphide ......................................................................................................................
Carbon disulfide ...........................................................................................................................
Carbon monoxide ........................................................................................................................
Carbon oxysulfide ........................................................................................................................
Carbonyl fluoride ..........................................................................................................................
Carbonyl sulfide ...........................................................................................................................
Chlorine ........................................................................................................................................
Chlorine dioxide ...........................................................................................................................
Chlorine monoxide .......................................................................................................................
Chlorine pentafluoride ..................................................................................................................
Chlorine trifluoride ........................................................................................................................
Chloroacetyl chloride ...................................................................................................................
Chloroform ...................................................................................................................................
Chloromethyl ether ......................................................................................................................
Chloromethyl methyl ether ...........................................................................................................
Chloropicrin ..................................................................................................................................
Chlorosulfonic acid ......................................................................................................................
Chromium oxychloride .................................................................................................................
Crotonaldehyde ............................................................................................................................
Crotonaldehyde, (E)- ...................................................................................................................
Cyanogen .....................................................................................................................................
Cyanogen chloride .......................................................................................................................
Cyclohexylamine ..........................................................................................................................
Cyclohexyltrichlorosilane .............................................................................................................
Cyclopropane ...............................................................................................................................
Cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine ..............................................................................................
Diazodinitrophenol .......................................................................................................................
Diborane ......................................................................................................................................
Dichlorosilane ..............................................................................................................................
Diethyl ethylphosphonate ............................................................................................................
Diethyl N,N-dimethylphosphoramidate ........................................................................................
Diethyl phosphate ........................................................................................................................
Diethyldichlorosilane ....................................................................................................................
Diethyleneglycol dinitrate .............................................................................................................
Difluoroethane ..............................................................................................................................
Dimethyl ethylphosphonate .........................................................................................................
Dimethyl methylphosphonate ......................................................................................................
Dimethyl phosphate .....................................................................................................................
Dimethylamine .............................................................................................................................
Dimethyldichlorosilane .................................................................................................................
Dimethylphosphoramidodichloridate ............................................................................................
Dinitrogen tetroxide ......................................................................................................................
Dinitroglycoluril .............................................................................................................................
Dinitrophenol ................................................................................................................................
Dinitroresorcinol ...........................................................................................................................
Dinitrosobenzene .........................................................................................................................
Diphenyl-2-hydroxyacetic acid (aka benzilic acid) .......................................................................
Diphenyldichlorosilane .................................................................................................................
Dipicryl sulfide ..............................................................................................................................
Dodecyltrichlorosilane ..................................................................................................................
Epichlorohydrin ............................................................................................................................
Ethane ..........................................................................................................................................
Ethyl acetylene ............................................................................................................................
Ethyl chloride ...............................................................................................................................
Ethyl ether ....................................................................................................................................
Ethyl mercaptan ...........................................................................................................................
Ethyl nitrite ...................................................................................................................................
Ethyl phosphonyl dichloride .........................................................................................................
Ethyl phosphonyl difluoride ..........................................................................................................
Ethylamine ...................................................................................................................................
Ethyldiethanolamine .....................................................................................................................
Ethylene .......................................................................................................................................
Ethylene oxide .............................................................................................................................
Ethylenediamine ..........................................................................................................................
Ethyleneimine ..............................................................................................................................
Ethyltrichlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
Fluorine ........................................................................................................................................
Fluorosulfonic acid .......................................................................................................................
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15512–36–4
15512–36–4
1305–99–3
75–15–0
630–08–0
463–58–1
353–50–4
463–58–1
7782–50–5
10049–04–4
7791–21–1
13637–63–3
7790–91–2
79–04–9
67–66–3
542–88–1
107–30–2
76–06–2
7790–94–5
7803–51–2
4170–30–3
123–73–9
460–19–5
506–77–4
108–91–8
98–12–4
75–19–4
2691–41–0
87–31–0
19287–45–7
4109–96–0
78–38–6
2404–03–7
762–04–9
1719–53–5
693–21–0
75–37–6
6163–75–3
756–79–6
868–85–9
124–40–3
75–78–5
677–43–0
10544–72–6
55510–04–8
25550–58–7
35860–51–6
25550–55–4
76–93–7
80–10–4
2217–06–3
4484–72–4
106–89–8
74–84–0
107–00–6
75–00–3
60–29–7
75–08–1
109–95–5
1066–50–8
753–98–0
75–04–7
139–87–7
74–85–1
75–21–8
107–15–3
151–56–4
115–21–9
7782–41–4
7789–21–1
E:\FR\FM\09APR2.SGM
09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
15,000.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
1,875.
2,000.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
15,000.
750.
3,750.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
15,000.
15,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
11,250.
2,000.
7,500.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
15,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
15,000.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
17742
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST—Continued
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
Chemical of interest
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
Formaldehyde (solution) ..............................................................................................................
Furan ............................................................................................................................................
Germane ......................................................................................................................................
Germanium tetrafluoride ..............................................................................................................
Guanyl nitrosaminoguanylidene hydrazine ..................................................................................
Guanyl nitrosaminoguanyltetrazene ............................................................................................
Hexaethyl tetraphosphate and compressed gas mixtures ..........................................................
Hexafluoroacetone .......................................................................................................................
Hexanitrodiphenylamine ..............................................................................................................
Hexanitrostilbene .........................................................................................................................
Hexolite ........................................................................................................................................
Hexotonal .....................................................................................................................................
Hexyltrichlorosilane ......................................................................................................................
Hydrazine .....................................................................................................................................
Hydrochloric acid (conc. 37% or greater) ....................................................................................
Hydrocyanic acid .........................................................................................................................
Hydrogen .....................................................................................................................................
Hydrogen bromide, anhydrous ....................................................................................................
Hydrogen chloride (anhydrous) ...................................................................................................
Hydrogen cyanide ........................................................................................................................
Hydrogen fluoride/Hydrofluoric acid (conc. 50% or greater) .......................................................
Hydrogen iodide, anhydrous ........................................................................................................
Hydrogen peroxide (concentration of at least 30%) ....................................................................
Hydrogen selenide .......................................................................................................................
Hydrogen sulfide ..........................................................................................................................
Iodine pentafluoride .....................................................................................................................
Iron, pentacarbonyl- .....................................................................................................................
Isobutane .....................................................................................................................................
Isobutyronitrile ..............................................................................................................................
Isopentane ...................................................................................................................................
Isoprene .......................................................................................................................................
Isopropyl chloride .........................................................................................................................
Isopropyl chloroformate ...............................................................................................................
Isopropylamine .............................................................................................................................
Lead azide ...................................................................................................................................
Lead styphnate ............................................................................................................................
Lithium amide ..............................................................................................................................
Lithium nitride ..............................................................................................................................
Magnesium aluminum phosphide ................................................................................................
Magnesium diamide .....................................................................................................................
Magnesium phosphide .................................................................................................................
Mannitol hexanitrate, wetted ........................................................................................................
Mercury fulminate ........................................................................................................................
Methacrylonitrile ...........................................................................................................................
Methane .......................................................................................................................................
Methyl bromide ............................................................................................................................
Methyl chloride .............................................................................................................................
Methyl chloroformate ...................................................................................................................
Methyl ether .................................................................................................................................
Methyl formate .............................................................................................................................
Methyl hydrazine ..........................................................................................................................
Methyl isocyanate ........................................................................................................................
Methyl mercaptan ........................................................................................................................
Methyl phosphonyl dichloride ......................................................................................................
Methyl phosphonyl difluoride .......................................................................................................
Methyl thiocyanate .......................................................................................................................
Methylamine .................................................................................................................................
Methylchlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
Methyldichlorosilane ....................................................................................................................
Methyldiethanolamine ..................................................................................................................
Methylphenyldichlorosilane ..........................................................................................................
Methyltrichlorosilane ....................................................................................................................
N,N-diisopropyl-2-aminoethyl chloride hydrochloride ..................................................................
N,N-diisopropyl-b-aminoethanol ...................................................................................................
N,N-diisopropyl-b-aminoethyl chloride .........................................................................................
Nickel Carbonyl ............................................................................................................................
Nitric acid .....................................................................................................................................
Nitric oxide ...................................................................................................................................
Nitro urea .....................................................................................................................................
Nitrocellulose ...............................................................................................................................
50–00–0
110–00–9
7782–65–2
7783–58–6
..........................
109–27–3
757–58–4
684–16–2
35860–31–2
20062–22–0
121–82–4
107–15–3
928–89–2 6
302–01–2
7647–01–0
74–90–8
1333–74–0
10035–10–6
7647–01–0
74–90–8
7664–39–3
10034–85–2
7722–84–1
7783–07–5
7783–06–4
7783–66–6
13463–40–6
75–28–5
78–82–0
78–78–4
78–79–5
75–29–6
108–23–6
75–31–0
13424–46–9
15245–44–0
7782–89–0
26134–62–3
..........................
7803–54–5
12057–74–8
15825–70–4
628–86–4
126–98–7
74–82–8
74–83–9
74–87–3
79–22–1
115–10–6
107–31–3
60–34–4
624–83–9
74–93–1
676–97–1
676–99–3
556–64–9
74–89–5
993–00–0
75–54–7
105–59–9
149–74–6
75–79–6
4261–68–1
96–80–0
96–79–7
13463–39–3
7697–37–2
10102–43–9
556–89–8
9004–70–0
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09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
11,250.
3,750.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
11,250.
11,250.
1,875.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
750.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
1,875.
7,500.
15,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
11,250.
7,500.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
7,500.
3,750.
7,500.
7,500.
11,250.
11,250.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
15,000.
7,500.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
750.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
17743
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST—Continued
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
Chemical of interest
Nitrogen trioxide ...........................................................................................................................
Nitroglycerine ...............................................................................................................................
Nitroguanidine ..............................................................................................................................
Nitromethane ...............................................................................................................................
Nitrostarch ....................................................................................................................................
Nitrosyl chloride ...........................................................................................................................
Nitrotriazolone ..............................................................................................................................
Nonyltrichlorosilane ......................................................................................................................
o,o-diethyl S-[2-(diethylamino)ethyl] phosphorothiolate ..............................................................
Octadecyltrichlorosilane ...............................................................................................................
Octolite .........................................................................................................................................
Octonal .........................................................................................................................................
Octyltrichlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
o-ethyl-N,N-dimethylphosphoramido-cyanidate ...........................................................................
o-ethyl-o-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methylphosphonite .................................................................
o-ethyl-S-2-diisopropylaminoethyl methyl phosphonothiolate .....................................................
o-isopropyl methylphosphonochloridate ......................................................................................
o-isopropyl methylphosphonofluoridate .......................................................................................
Oleum (Fuming Sulfuric acid) ......................................................................................................
o-pinacolyl methylphosphonochloridate .......................................................................................
o-pinacolyl methylphosphonofluoridate .......................................................................................
Oxygen difluoride .........................................................................................................................
Pentaerythrite tetranitrate or PETN .............................................................................................
Pentane ........................................................................................................................................
Pentolite .......................................................................................................................................
Peracetic acid ..............................................................................................................................
Perchloromethylmercaptan ..........................................................................................................
Perchloryl fluoride ........................................................................................................................
Phenyltrichlorosilane ....................................................................................................................
Phosgene .....................................................................................................................................
Phosphine ....................................................................................................................................
Phosphorus ..................................................................................................................................
Phosphorus oxychloride ..............................................................................................................
Phosphorus oxychloride ..............................................................................................................
Phosphorus pentachloride ...........................................................................................................
Phosphorus pentachloride ...........................................................................................................
Phosphorus pentasulfide .............................................................................................................
Phosphorus trichloride .................................................................................................................
Phosphorus trichloride .................................................................................................................
Piperidine .....................................................................................................................................
Potassium chlorate ......................................................................................................................
Potassium cyanide .......................................................................................................................
Potassium nitrate .........................................................................................................................
Potassium perchlorate .................................................................................................................
Potassium phosphide ..................................................................................................................
Propadiene ...................................................................................................................................
Propane .......................................................................................................................................
Propionitrile ..................................................................................................................................
Propyl chlorofromate ....................................................................................................................
Propylene .....................................................................................................................................
Propylene oxide ...........................................................................................................................
Propyleneimine ............................................................................................................................
Propyltrichlorosilane .....................................................................................................................
Propyne ........................................................................................................................................
Quinuclidine-3-ol ..........................................................................................................................
RDX and HMX mixtures ..............................................................................................................
Selenium hexafluoride .................................................................................................................
Silane ...........................................................................................................................................
Silicon tetrachloride .....................................................................................................................
Silicon tetrafluoride ......................................................................................................................
Sodium chlorate ...........................................................................................................................
Sodium cyanide ...........................................................................................................................
Sodium dinitro-o-cresolate ...........................................................................................................
Sodium dithionite .........................................................................................................................
Sodium hydrosulfite .....................................................................................................................
Sodium nitrate ..............................................................................................................................
Sodium phosphide .......................................................................................................................
Sodium picramate ........................................................................................................................
Stibine ..........................................................................................................................................
Strontium phosphide ....................................................................................................................
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10544–73–7
55–63–0
556–88–7
75–52–5
9056–38–6
2696–92–6
932–64–9
5283–67–0
78–53–5
112–04–9
68610–51–5
124–13–0
5283–66–9
77–81–6
57856–11–8
50782–69–9
1445–76–7
107–44–8
8014–95–7
7040–57–5
96–64–0
7783–41–7
78–11–5
109–66–0
8066–33–9
79–21–0
594–42–3
7616–94–6
98–13–5
75–44–5
7803–51–2
7723–14–0
10025–87–3
10025–87–3
10026–13–8
10026–13–8
1314–80–3
7719–12–2
7719–12–2
110–89–4
3811–04–9
151–50–8
7757–79–1
7778–74–7
20770–41–6
463–49–0
74–98–6
107–12–0
109–61–5
115–07–1
75–56–9
75–55–8
141–57–1
74–99–7
1619–34–7
121–82–4
7783–79–1
7803–62–5
10026–04–7
7783–61–1
7775–09–9
143–33–9
25641–53–6
7775–14–6
7775–14–6
7631–99–4
7558–80–7
831–52–7
7803–52–3
13450–99–2
E:\FR\FM\09APR2.SGM
09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
7,500.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
11,250.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
11,250.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
7,500.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
17744
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
APPENDIX A TO PART 27.—DHS CHEMICALS OF INTEREST—Continued
Chemical Abstract Service
(CAS) number
Chemical of interest
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with RULES_2
Sulfur dichloride ...........................................................................................................................
Sulfur dioxide (anhydrous) ...........................................................................................................
Sulfur monochloride .....................................................................................................................
Sulfur tetraflouride .......................................................................................................................
Sulfur trioxide ...............................................................................................................................
Sulfuryl chloride ...........................................................................................................................
Sulfuryl fluoride ............................................................................................................................
Tellurium hexafluoride .................................................................................................................
Tetrafluoroethylene ......................................................................................................................
Tetramethyllead ...........................................................................................................................
Tetramethylsilane .........................................................................................................................
Tetranitroaniline ...........................................................................................................................
Tetranitromethane ........................................................................................................................
Tetrazol-1-acetic acid ..................................................................................................................
Thiodiglycol ..................................................................................................................................
Thionyl chloride ............................................................................................................................
Thionyl chloride ............................................................................................................................
Titanium tetrachloride ..................................................................................................................
Toluene 2,4-diisocyanate .............................................................................................................
Toluene 2,6-diisocyanate .............................................................................................................
Toluene diisocyanate (unspecified isomer) .................................................................................
Trichlorosilane ..............................................................................................................................
Triethanolamine ...........................................................................................................................
Triethanolamine hydrochloride ....................................................................................................
Triethyl phosphite ........................................................................................................................
Trifluoroacetyl chloride .................................................................................................................
Trifluorochloroethylene ................................................................................................................
Trimethyl phosphite .....................................................................................................................
Trimethylamine ............................................................................................................................
Trimethylchlorosilane ...................................................................................................................
Trinitroaniline ...............................................................................................................................
Trinitroanisole ..............................................................................................................................
Trinitrobenzene ............................................................................................................................
Trinitrobenzenesulfonic acid ........................................................................................................
Trinitrobenzoic acid ......................................................................................................................
Trinitrochlorobenzene ..................................................................................................................
Trinitrofluorenone .........................................................................................................................
Trinitro-meta-cresol ......................................................................................................................
Trinitronaphthalene ......................................................................................................................
Trinitrophenetole ..........................................................................................................................
Trinitrophenol ...............................................................................................................................
Trinitroresorcinol ..........................................................................................................................
Trinitrotoluene ..............................................................................................................................
Tris(2-chloroethyl)amine ..............................................................................................................
Tris(2-chlorovinyl)arsine ...............................................................................................................
Tritonal .........................................................................................................................................
Tungsten hexafluoride .................................................................................................................
Uranium hexafluoride ...................................................................................................................
Urea .............................................................................................................................................
Urea nitrate ..................................................................................................................................
Vinyl acetate monomer ................................................................................................................
Vinyl actylene ...............................................................................................................................
Vinyl chloride ...............................................................................................................................
Vinyl ethyl ether ...........................................................................................................................
Vinyl fluoride ................................................................................................................................
Vinyl methyl ether ........................................................................................................................
Vinylidene chloride .......................................................................................................................
Vinylidene fluoride .......................................................................................................................
Vinyltrichlorosilane .......................................................................................................................
Zinc dithionite ...............................................................................................................................
Zinc hydrosulfite ...........................................................................................................................
Zirconium picramate ....................................................................................................................
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10545–99–0
7446–09–5
10025–67–9
7783–60–0
7446–11–9
7791–25–5
2699–79–8
7783–80–4
116–14–3
75–74–1
75–76–3
53014–37–2
509–14–8
21732–17–2
111–48–8
7719–09–7
7719–09–7
7550–45–0
584–84–9
91–08–7
26471–62–5
10025–78–2
102–71–6
637–39–8
122–52–1
354–32–5
79–38–9
121–45–9
75–50–3
75–77–4
26952–42–1
606–35–9
99–35–4
2508–19–2
129–66–8
88–88–0
129–79–3
602–99–3
558101–17–8
4732–14–3
88–89–1
82–71–3
118–96–7
555–77–1
40334–70–1
54413–15–9
7783–82–6
7783–81–5
57–13–6
124–47–0
108–05–4
689–97–4
75–01–4
109–92–2
75–02–5
107–25–5
75–35–4
75–38–7
75–94–5
7779–86–4
7779–86–4
63868–82–6
E:\FR\FM\09APR2.SGM
09APR2
Screening threshold quantity
(STQ)
(lbs)
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Any Amount.
Any Amount.
2,000.
Any Amount.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
11,250.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
7,500.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
2,000.
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules and Regulations
Dated: April 2, 2007.
Michael Chertoff,
Secretary of Homeland Security, Department
of Homeland Security.
[FR Doc. E7–6363 Filed 4–6–07; 8:45 am]
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17745
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 67 (Monday, April 9, 2007)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 17688-17745]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-6363]
[[Page 17687]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
Part III
Department of Homeland Security
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
6 CFR Part 27
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards; Final Rule
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 67 / Monday, April 9, 2007 / Rules
and Regulations
[[Page 17688]]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
6 CFR Part 27
[DHS-2006-0073]
RIN 1601-AA41
Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards
AGENCY: Department Of Homeland Security.
ACTION: Interim final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS or Department) issues
this interim final rule (IFR) pursuant to Section 550 of the Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (Section 550), which provided the
Department with authority to promulgate ``interim final regulations''
for the security of certain chemical facilities in the United States.
This rule establishes risk-based performance standards for the
security of our Nation's chemical facilities. It requires covered
chemical facilities to prepare Security Vulnerability Assessments
(SVAs), which identify facility security vulnerabilities, and to
develop and implement Site Security Plans (SSPs), which include
measures that satisfy the identified risk-based performance standards.
It also allows certain covered chemical facilities, in specified
circumstances, to submit Alternate Security Programs (ASPs) in lieu of
an SVA, SSP, or both.
The rule contains associated provisions addressing inspections and
audits, recordkeeping, and the protection of information that
constitutes Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI).
Finally, the rule provides the Department with authority to seek
compliance through the issuance of Orders, including Orders Assessing
Civil Penalty and Orders for the Cessation of Operations.
EFFECTIVE DATES: This regulation is effective June 8, 2007, except for
Appendix A to part 27. A subsequent final rule document will announce
the effective date of Appendix A to Part 27.
Comment related to the addition of Appendix A to part 27 only will
be accepted until May 9, 2007.
ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number 2006-
0073, by one of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Mail: IP/CSCD/Dennis Deziel, Mail Stop 8100, Department of
Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528-8100.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dennis Deziel, Chemical Security
Regulatory Task Force, Department of Homeland Security, 703-235-5263.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This interim final rule is organized as
follows: Section I explains the public participation provisions and
provides a brief discussion of the statutory and regulatory authority
and history; Section II summarizes the changes from the Advance Notice
of Rulemaking and discusses the revised rule text; Section III
summarizes and responds to the comments the Department received in
response to the Advance Notice of Rulemaking; and Section IV contains
the regulatory analyses for this interim final rule.
Table of Contents
I. Introduction and Background
A. Public Participation
B. Statutory and Regulatory Authority and History
II. Interim Final Rule
A. Summary of Changes From Advance Notice of Rulemaking
B. Rule Provisions
III. Discussion of Comments
A. Applicability of the Rule
1. Definition of ``Chemical Facility or Facility''
2. Multiple Owners or Operators
3. Classifying Facilities Based on Hazard Class
4. Applicability to Specific Chemicals or Quantities of
Chemicals
5. Applicability to Types of Facilities
6. Statutory Exemptions
B. Determining Which Facilities Present a High-Level of Security
Risk
1. Use of the Top-Screen Approach
2. Assessment Methodologies
3. Risk-Based Tiers
C. Security Vulnerability Assessments and Site Security Plans
1. General Comments
2. Submitting a Site Security Plan
3. Content of Site Security Plans
4. Approval of Site Security Plans
5. Timing
6. Alternate Security Programs
D. Risk-Based Performance Standards
1. General Approach To Performance Standards
2. Comments about Specific Performance Standards
3. Variations in Performance Standards for Risk Tiers
4. Adoption of MTSA Provisions
E. Background Checks
F. Inspections and Audits
1. Inspections
2. Third-Party Auditors and Inspectors
G. Recordkeeping
H. Orders
I. Adjudications and Appeals
J. Information Protection: Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability
Information (CVI)
1. General
2. Disclosure of CVI
3. Scope of CVI
4. Relation of CVI to Other Categories of Protected Information
and FOIA
5. Sharing CVI with State and Local Officials, the Public, and
Congress
6. Litigation
7. Protection of CVI
K. Preemption
L. Implementation of the Rule
M. Other Issues
1. Whistleblower Protection
2. Inherently Safer Technology
3. Delegation of Responsibility
4. Interaction with Other Federal Rules and Programs
5. Third-Party Actions
6. Judicial Review
7. Guidance and Technical Assistance
8. Miscellaneous Comments
N. Regulatory Evaluation
IV. Regulatory Analyses
A. Executive Order 12866: Regulatory Planning and Review
B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
C. Executive Order 13132: Federalism
1. Background
2. Propriety of the Department's View on Preemption
3. No Field Preemption
4. Principles of Conflict Preemption
D. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
E. Paperwork Reduction Act
F. NEPA
I. Introduction and Background
A. Public Participation
Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by
submitting written data, views, or arguments on Appendix A of this
interim final rule. Comments that will provide the most assistance to
DHS in finalizing the Appendix will reference specific chemicals and
Screening Threshold Quantities on the list, explain the reason for any
recommended change, and include data, information, or authority that
support such recommended change.
Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name
and docket number for this rulemaking. All comments received will be
posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, including any
personal information provided.
Comments that include trade secrets, confidential commercial or
financial information, Sensitive Security Information (SSI), or
Protected Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII) should not be
submitted to the public regulatory docket. Please submit such comments
separately from other comments on the rule. Comments containing trade
secrets, confidential commercial or financial information, Sensitive
Security Information (SSI), or Protected Critical Infrastructure
Information (PCII) should be appropriately marked as containing such
information and submitted by mail
[[Page 17689]]
to the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
section.
Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov. Submitted comments
by mail may also be inspected. To inspect comments, please call Dennis
Deziel, 703-235-5263, to arrange for an appointment.
B. Statutory Regulatory Authority and History
On October 4, 2006, the President signed the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act of 2007 (the Act), which provides the
Department of Homeland Security with the authority to regulate the
security of high-risk chemical facilities. See Pub. L. 109-295, sec.
550. Section 550 requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
promulgate interim final regulations ``establishing risk-based
performance standards for security of chemical facilities'' by April 4,
2007. Id. Although interim final regulations are usually issued without
prior notice and comment (and the Act requires neither), the Department
issued an Advance Notice of Rulemaking (Advance Notice) seeking comment
on the significant issues and regulatory text. See generally 71 FR
78276 (Dec. 28, 2006).
As discussed more fully in the Advance Notice, before the enactment
of Section 550, the Federal government did not have authority to
regulate the security of most chemical facilities. The Department has,
however, worked closely with industry leaders in pursuit of voluntary
enhancement of security at these facilities and provided both technical
assistance and grant funding for security. In addition, through the
Coast Guard's Maritime Security regulations, the Department has
addressed security at certain maritime-related chemical facilities. See
33 CFR Part 105. Recently, the Departments of Homeland Security and
Transportation also proposed security regulations for the rail
transportation of hazardous chemicals. See 71 FR 76834, 71 FR 76851
(Dec. 21, 2006). Other Federal programs have addressed chemical
facility safety, but not security: the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) regulates chemical process safety through its Risk Management
Plan (RMP) program; the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) regulates workplace safety and health at
chemical facilities; the Department of Commerce oversees compliance
with the Chemical Weapons Convention; and the Department of Justice's
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) regulates,
through licenses and permits, the purchase, possession, storage, and
transportation of explosives.
With the authority under Section 550, the Department can now fill a
significant security gap in the country's anti-terrorism efforts.
Section 550 specifies that the regulations ``shall apply to chemical
facilities that, in the discretion of the Secretary, present high
levels of security risk.'' The statute requires that the regulations
establish risk-based performance standards; requires Security
Vulnerability Assessments and Site Security Plans; allows Alternative
Security Programs; mandates audits and inspections to determine
compliance with the regulations; provides for civil penalties for
violation of an order issued under the statute; and allows the
Secretary to order a facility to cease operations if the facility is
not in compliance with the requirements. The statute also gives the
Department the authority to protect from inappropriate public
disclosure any information developed pursuant to Section 550,
``including vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other
security related information, records, and documents.''
As discussed in the Advance Notice, by directing the Secretary to
issue ``interim final regulations,'' Congress authorized the Secretary
to proceed without the traditional notice-and-comment required by the
Administrative Procedure Act. See 71 FR 78276, 78277. The Department,
however, saw great benefit in soliciting comments on as much of the
program as was practicable in the short timeframe permitted under the
statute. Accordingly, the Department voluntarily sought comment on a
range of regulatory and implementation issues and responds to the
comments below.
II. Interim Final Rule
A. Summary of Changes From Advance Notice of Rulemaking
In this interim final rule, the Department has not changed the
general, risk-based approach it proposed in the December 28, 2006,
Advance Notice. See 71 FR 78276. As discussed in detail below, the
Department plans to implement the regulation in phases, starting to
work aggressively with chemical facilities presenting the very highest
security risks first. The Department adopts a risk-based tiering
structure in its regulatory approach, so that the Department's scrutiny
of facilities under this regulation increases as the level of risk
increases. Even though this approach remains the same, the Department
provides further details below on a number of unresolved issues
presented in the Advance Notice. For example, the Department provides
further detail on the issues surrounding background checks for those
with access to high-risk facilities, and the Department describes its
approach on facilities possessing ammonium nitrate.
On several important issues, the Department has reconsidered and
modified the position it proposed in the Advance Notice. For example,
in response to comments, the Department has restructured its provisions
concerning objections, consultations, adjudications, and appeals. As
discussed below, the Department's aim is to provide flexibility and
assistance for facilities seeking to comply with the regulatory
standards. The Department has decided, however, to incorporate a role
for a neutral adjudicator where unresolved differences present
themselves and result in significant fines or other penalties. In
addition, the Department has modified a number of scheduling and timing
requirements in response to comments, and the Department further
explains its approach on preemption of state and local law after
considering the numerous comments on that subject. Although the
Department continues to view as important the opportunity for
facilities to submit Alternative Security Programs, the Department
modified the circumstances in which it will accept Alternative Security
Programs.
Finally, the Department will consider the issues surrounding the
use of fees in this regulatory program. The Department is contemplating
the assessment of different fees, including filing fees, fees for
inspections and audits, and fees for the screening of individuals
against the Terrorist Screening Database. The Department has not
provided for fees in this interim final rule, but may, in the future,
propose and seek comment on the issues surrounding fees for this
regulatory program.
B. Rule Provisions
This section summarizes the regulatory text changes that the
Department has made to this interim final rule. In addition to the
summary contained in this section, we have, in many cases, provided a
more extensive discussion of the change, and the reason for the change,
in the response to comments below. See Sec. III ``Discussion of
Comments.'' Finally, to the extent that the Department has made
technical corrections or corrected typographical errors, we do not
specifically discuss them.
[[Page 17690]]
Subpart A
Section 27.100 Purpose
The Department has added a Purpose section to the rule. It states
the Department's purpose and intent in issuing this rule and enforcing
this regulatory program.
Section 27.105 Definitions
For purposes of clarity, DHS has added several definitions,
including ``Chemical Security Assessment Tool,'' ``Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information,'' ``Deputy Secretary,'' ``Director of the
Chemical Security Division'' and ``Screening Threshold Quantity.'' The
Department has also revised a few definitions, including ``Assistant
Secretary'' and ``Under Secretary.'' The Department revised ``Under
Secretary'' as a result of organizational changes in the Department
following the Post-Katrina Emergency Reform Act, which the President
signed on October 4, 2006. See Public Law 109-295, Title VI. In several
places, the Department indicated that the named official, or his
designee, has the specified responsibility under the regulation. The
Department also revised the definition of ``Alternate Security
Program,'' to provide consistency with changes the Department has since
made to Sec. 27.235, the Alternate Security Programs section. The
Department expanded upon the definition of ``tier,'' adding that, for
purposes of this part, there are four risk-based tiers.
Finally, the Department made clarifying changes to ``Chemical
Facility,'' ``Covered Chemical Facility,'' and ``Owner.'' With respect
to the definition of ``Chemical Facility,'' the Department removed the
circular nature of the definition in the Advance Notice (i.e., a
chemical facility shall mean any facility) (emphasis added) and now
provides that a chemical facility ``shall mean any establishment that
possesses or plans to possess * * *.''
Section 27.120 Designation of a coordinating official; Consultations
and technical assistance
The language in revised Sec. 27.120(a) makes clear that the
Assistant Secretary will designate a Coordinating Official responsible
for ensuring the uniform, impartial, and fair implementation of these
regulations. The language in revised Sec. 27.120(b) indicates that the
Coordinating Official and his staff shall provide guidance to
facilities, and while the Coordinating Official and his staff will be
available for consultation and to provide technical assistance, they
will be available only to the extent that resources permit.
In Sec. 27.120(c), the Department has provided specific details as
to how a facility requests the assistance of the Coordinating Official.
In the second sentence of Sec. 27.120(c), the Department provides that
requests for consultation or technical guidance do not serve to toll
any of the applicable timelines set forth in this part. Accordingly,
regardless of whether or when a facility submits a request for
consultation or technical guidance, the Department will require the
facility to comply with the regulatory requirements, such as completing
the Top-Screen, identifying vulnerabilities in the Security
Vulnerability Assessment, and developing and implementing a Site
Security Plan.
The Department has added a new provision in Sec. 27.120(d). This
provision provides that a covered facility may request a consultation
with the Coordinating Official if it modifies its facility, processes,
or the types or quantities of materials that it possesses, and believes
such changes may impact the covered facility's obligations under this
part. The Department added this provision in response to commenters
concerned about a facility's ability to ``exit'' the regulatory
program. The Department recognizes that facilities that reduce risk to
levels below those levels that the Department deems as that
characterized for Tier 4 facilities (i.e., the lowest risk facilities
of the ``high risk'' facilities) or that eliminate certain risks
altogether may no longer need to be covered by this regulation. This
provision allows the covered facility to request the initiation of the
screening process (which determines whether or not the facility is
high-risk and therefore whether the facility is or is not included in
this regulatory program) prior to the facility's next scheduled CSAT
Top-Screen submission pursuant to Sec. 27.210. Through this
consultation process, the facility may initiate discussions with the
Department and ultimately accelerate the process for determining
whether it can ``exit'' the regulatory program.
Subpart B
Section 27.200 Information regarding security risk for a chemical
facility
The Department has added several new provisions to this section.
The Department has revised paragraph (b), by incorporating language
from proposed Sec. 27.200(a) of the Advance Notice and by also adding
new provisions. The two sentences in paragraph (b)(1) come from the end
of proposed Sec. 27.200(a). Paragraph (b)(1) provides that the
Assistant Secretary may seek the information listed in paragraph (a) by
contacting chemical facilities individually or by publishing a notice
in the Federal Register. It also provides that the Assistant Secretary
may instruct facilities to complete and submit a Top-Screen through a
secure Department Web site or through any other means approved by the
Assistant Secretary.
Paragraph (b)(2) is a new provision. It provides that a facility
must complete and submit a Top-Screen in accordance with the schedule
provided in Sec. 27.210 if it possesses any of the chemicals listed in
Appendix A: ``DHS Chemicals of Interest'' at the corresponding
quantities. For a further discussion of Appendix A, see the discussion
of Appendix A further below in the Rule Provisions section. The purpose
of this provision is to give facilities direction as to whether or not
they must complete and submit a Top-Screen.
As noted in the discussion of Appendix A, the presence or amount of
a particular chemical is not an indicator of a facility's coverage
under this rule. The presence or amount of a chemical in the Appendix
is merely a baseline threshold requiring a facility to complete and
submit a Top-Screen. (Consistent with Sec. 27.200(b)(1), DHS will
retain the ability to notify facilities, through direct notification or
Federal Register notice, that they need to complete and submit a Top-
Screen.) The information that the Department will obtain through the
Top-Screen process is only one of several factors that the Department
will consider in determining whether a facility is ``high-risk'' and
thus covered by this rule.
Paragraph (b)(3) addresses the requirements for individuals who
submit information to the Department through the CSAT system, which
includes the Top-Screen process. Paragraph (b)(3) provides that, where
the Department requests that a facility complete and submit a Top-
Screen, the facility must designate a person to be responsible for the
submission of information through the CSAT system. (The CSAT system is
comprised of three sequential parts: the Top-Screen, the SVA, and the
SSP). The Department provides that any such submitter must be an
officer of the corporation or other person designated by an officer of
the corporation, and must be domiciled in the United States. The
Department had contemplated such requirements in Appendix A to the
Advance Notice and now finalizes them here.
Consistent with the explanation in Appendix A to the Advance
Notice, the
[[Page 17691]]
Department notes that a facility may choose to have another individual,
in addition to the above-discussed ``submitter,'' involved in the
submission of information through the Top-Screen. That other individual
is a ``provider.'' A provider would be a qualified individual who is
familiar with the facility in question and who completes the
information in the CSAT system. The provider, however, would not
formally submit information to the Department. The individual
responsible for sending information to the Department through the CSAT
system (whether Top-Screen, SVA, or SSP) is always the submitter. And
as indicated in paragraph (b)(3), the submitter is also responsible for
attesting to the accuracy of the submitted information.
Paragraphs (c)(1) and (2) address facilities that the Department
deems as ``presumptively high risk.'' Both paragraphs were in the
Advance Notice, though they were located in proposed Sec. Sec.
27.200(b) and (c).
Section 27.205 Determination that a chemical facility ``presents a high
level of security risk.''
The Advance Notice, at the end of Sec. 27.205(a), contained a
provision about Departmental notification to facilities of their
preliminary placement in a risk-based tier. The Department has moved
that language to Sec. 27.220 ``Tiering,'' so that it is located with
the related tiering provisions.
In addition, the Department has removed proposed Sec. 27.205(c),
along with Sec. Sec. 27.220(b), and 27.240(c), all of which had
contained a mechanism for objections. In the Advance Notice, the
Department had provided facilities with the opportunity to object to
the following three Departmental actions: determination that a facility
``presents a high level of risk,'' placement in a high-risk tier, and
disapproval of a facility's Site Security Plan. The intention behind
those provisions was to provide facilities with an informal opportunity
to consult with the Department. The Department believes that the rule
(including existing provisions from the Advance Notice as well as new
provisions in this interim final rule) provides facilities with several
opportunities for consultation when they disagree with an initial
decision on these matters. Specifically, revised Sec. 27.120(b)
provides that the Coordinating Official and his staff shall be
available to consult and to provide technical assistance to a facility
owner or operator, revised Sec. 27.120(c) provides the details for how
a facility should initiate consultations or assistance, and revised
Sec. 27.120(d) provides that a covered facility may request a
consultation if it modifies its facility, processes, or the types or
quantities of materials that it possesses and believes such changes may
impact the covered facility's obligations under this part. In addition,
Sec. Sec. 27.240(b) and 27.245(b) provide that a facility shall enter
further consultations following Departmental written notification that
a Security Vulnerability Assessment or Site Security Plan is
unsatisfactory. Given that the rule already provides consultation
opportunities, coupled with the fact that the Department has greatly
modified its adjudication and appeal provisions, the Department
believes it is unnecessary to retain these objections provisions and
has thus removed them from the interim final rule.
Section 27.210 Submissions Schedule
In Sec. 27.210, the Department clarifies the submission schedule
for the Top-Screen, Security Vulnerability Assessment, and Site
Security Plan. In Sec. 27.210(a) of the Advance Notice, the Department
included a sentence indicating that the presumptive time frames were 60
days for the Security Vulnerability Assessment and 120 days for the
Site Security Plan. In this interim final rule, the Department has
added presumptive timeframes for the submission of the Top-Screen and
revised the presumptive timeframes for SVAs and SSPs. See Sec.
27.210(a) and (b). The presumptive timeframes for initial submissions
are 60 calendar days for the Top-Screen, 90 calendar days for the SVA,
and 120 calendar days for the SSP. The presumptive timeframes for
resubmission vary depending on a facility's tier. As a general matter,
the Department will require facilities in Tiers 1 and 2 to update their
Top-Screen, SVA, and SSP every two years, and facilities in Tiers 3 and
4 to update their Top-Screen, SVA, and SSP every three years.
In addition, the Department added a new paragraph (c), which
addresses the Department's authority to modify schedules as necessary.
The Department removed Sec. 27.210(c) as it appeared in the Advance
Notice, because the provision was unnecessary in light of the new
provisions in Sec. 27.120(b) and (c), ``Designation of a coordinating
official; consultations and technical assistance.''
Finally, the Department added a new paragraph (d), which addresses
material modifications. In Sec. Sec. 27.215(c)(3) and 27.225(b)(3) of
the Advance Notice, the Department provided that a covered facility had
to notify the Department of material modifications to the SVA or SSP
and that the Department would notify the facility within 60 days of
whether the Department disapproved the revised SVA or SSP. The
Department has re-located a new but similar requirement in Sec.
27.210(d). The regulation now provides that if a covered facility makes
material modifications to its operations or site, the covered facility
must complete and submit a revised Top-Screen to the Department within
60 days of completion of the material modification. In accordance with
the resubmission requirements in Sec. 27.210(b)(2) and (3), the
Department will notify the covered facility as to whether the covered
facility must submit a revised Security Vulnerability Assessment, Site
Security Plan, or both. As a result of this new paragraph (d), the
Department removed the provisions that appeared in Sec. Sec.
27.215(c)(3) and 27.225(b)(3) of the Advance Notice.
Section 27.215 Security Vulnerability Assessments and Section 27.225
Site Security Plans
The Department has revised several of the corresponding provisions
in both Sec. 27.215 and Sec. 27.225. First, the Department has
revised the corresponding provisions regarding methodologies.
Specifically, the Department has revised the language in Sec.
27.215(b) and added a new paragraph (b) in Sec. 27.225. In both
places, the Department explains that, except as provided in Sec.
27.235, a covered facility must submit either the SVA/SSP through the
CSAT process or any other methodology or process identified by the
Assistant Secretary.
By this change, the Department is making more explicit its
intention to use the CSAT process at this time. The CSAT process
includes completion of the Top-Screen process and, depending on the
results of the Top-Screen process, may also include the development of
a Security Vulnerability Assessment and the development of a Site
Security Plan. Thus, for facilities that are determined to be high-
risk, the CSAT process will consist of three sequential parts (i.e.,
the Top-Screen, SVA, and SSP). The Department also notes that
facilities will have to obtain access to the CSAT system by submitting
a user registration request. Section 27.200(b)(1) contains the
requirements for individuals (i.e., submitters) who will be submitting
information through the CSAT system and attesting to the accuracy of
that information.
Second, in paragraph (c) of both sections, the Department provides
that a covered facility must submit an SVA or SSP to the Department in
accordance
[[Page 17692]]
with the schedule provided in Sec. 27.210. This captures the
requirement that had been located in proposed Sec. 27.240(a)(1) of the
Advance Notice.
Third, in paragraph (d) of both sections, the Department revised
the update/revision provisions for submitting SVAs and SSPs. In the
Advance Notice, the Department indicated that covered facilities must
update or revise their SVAs or SSPs based on a schedule set by the
Assistant Secretary. Because the Department has established a
submission schedule in Sec. 27.210, the Department now includes cross-
references in Sec. 27.215(d)(1) and Sec. 27.225(d)(2) to that
schedule. As a related matter, in Sec. 27.215(d), the Department moved
the general submissions schedule requirement to Sec. 27.215(d)(1),
thereby re-locating the provision formerly in Sec. 27.215(d)(1) to
Sec. 27.215(d)(2).
Fourth, the Department has removed the language about material
modifications from proposed Sec. 27.215(c)(3) and Sec. 27.225(b)(3).
As discussed in the summary of Sec. 27.210, the Department added a
new, but similar, provision to Sec. 27.210(d). The new provision now
captures the concept contemplated in proposed Sec. 27.215(c)(3) and
Sec. 27.225(b)(3).
With respect to changes to Sec. 27.225 only, the Department has
added a provision that requires facilities to conduct annual audits of
their Site Security Plans. See Sec. 27.225(e). This provision had been
implied in the recordkeeping requirement in the Advance Notice (see
Sec. 27.255(a)(6)) and is now explicit. DHS made some additional
revisions to the corresponding recordkeeping provision, in which DHS
more clearly specifies the audit-related records that covered
facilities should maintain.
Finally, throughout this document, the Department now uses the term
``Security Vulnerability Assessment'' (or SVA) instead of the term
``Vulnerability Assessment'' or (VA), which the Department had used in
the Advance Notice. The Department intends no change in meaning with
this revision.
Section 27.220 Tiering
The Department has added several paragraphs to this section.
Section 27.220(a) addresses the Department's preliminary determination
as to a facility's risk-based tier. Paragraph (a) is based on language
that had been in the Advance Notice at the end of Sec. 27.205(a). The
Department has elaborated on the Preliminary Tiering provision.
Notably, the Department has indicated that it shall notify a facility
of the Department's preliminary tiering decision. This contrasts with
the Advance Notice, which had merely indicated that the Department may
notify a facility of the Department's preliminary tiering decision.
Section 27.220(b) is not a new subsection; rather, it contains the
language that was previously located in Sec. 27.220(a). Note that the
Department has removed paragraph (b) as proposed in the Advance Notice.
Paragraph (b) had contained an objections provision. For a discussion
of the Department's decision to remove the objections provisions from
this rule (in Sec. Sec. 27.205(c), 27.220(b), and 27.240(c)), see the
summary under Sec. 27.205(c).
Section 27.220(c) is a new subsection. The Department is
reiterating, in part, what it provides in the definitions section. The
Department will place facilities in one of four risk-based tiers. Tiers
will range from Tier 1, which contains the highest-risk covered
facilities, to Tier 4, which contains the lowest-risk covered
facilities. Finally, the Department separated the sentence located at
the end of proposed Sec. 27.220(a) into its own section, Sec.
27.220(d).
Section 27.230 Risk-Based Performance Standards
This section contains the risk-based performance standards that
covered facilities must satisfy. The Department has added a sentence to
Sec. 27.230(a), noting that the ``acceptable layering of measures used
to meet the standards will vary by risk-based tier.'' While all
facilities must satisfy the performance standards, the measures
sufficient to meet those standards will be more robust for those
facilities that present higher levels of risk. In other words, the
manner in which the standards are applied will require a higher level
of security (and so provide for greater reduction in risk) for those
facilities that present higher levels of risk. The Department will
provide details about the application of these standards in guidance.
In addition, for each of the performance standards, the Department
has added a short descriptor at the beginning of the subparagraph
(e.g., paragraph (a)(1) begins with ``Restricted Area Perimeter,''
paragraph (a)(2) begins with ``Securing Site Assets,'' and so forth).
The Department has also revised some of the language related to
specific performance standards. Section 27.230(a)(4) now provides that
facilities must select, develop, and implement measures designed to
``[d]eter, detect, and delay an attack, creating sufficient time
between detection of an attack and the point at which the attack
becomes successful.'' This revised language more adequately captures
the concept that the Department had intended in the language in
paragraph (a)(4) of the Advance Notice and is more complete. Section
27.230(a)(5) now requires facilities to secure and monitor the storage
of hazardous materials, in addition to the shipping and receipt of
hazardous materials. Section 27.230(a)(8) now contains a broader
description of critical process systems. In the Advance Notice, the
Department had used the acronym ``SCADA'' (Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) to refer to instrumented control systems in general. In
this interim final rule, the Department has provided more descriptive
terminology to refer to critical process systems. For a further
discussion of SCADA, see the Department responses to ``Comments on
Specific Performance Standards.'' Section 27.230(a)(12) contains an
expanded standard for background checks. For a further discussion of
background checks, see the Department response to comments about
``Background Checks.'' Section 27.230(a)(15) now provides that
facilities should report significant security incidents to local law
enforcement in addition to the Department. Finally, the Department has
removed the paragraph that was paragraph 27.230(a)(19) in the Advance
Notice, because that standard was already addressed in paragraph
(a)(14).
Section 27.235 Alternative security program
The Department has revised this section to provide more detail
about the process for Alternate Security Programs (ASPs). The basic
requirement remains the same, in that certain covered facilities may
submit ASPs, and the Assistant Secretary may approve those ASPs. See
Sec. 27.235(a). To accept an ASP, the Assistant Secretary must find
that the program ``provides an equivalent level of security to the
level of security established by this part.'' This language, which
clarifies the standard for accepting ASPs, comes from the preamble of
the Advance Notice and is consistent with the terms of Section 550. See
71 FR 78276, 78285.
In Sec. 27.235(a)(1)-(2), the Department specifies, by tier, which
facilities may submit ASPs in lieu of Security Vulnerability
Assessments (SVAs) and which facilities may submit ASPs in lieu of Site
Security Plans (SSPs). A Tier 4 facility may submit an ASP in lieu of a
Security Vulnerability Assessment, Site Security Plan, or both. Tier 1,
Tier 2, and Tier 3 facilities may submit an
[[Page 17693]]
ASP in lieu of a Site Security Plan. Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3
facilities may not submit an ASP in lieu of a Security Vulnerability
Assessment. Accordingly, Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 facilities will
have to submit their SVA through the CSAT system.
With respect to Tier 4 facilities, the Department clarifies the
following point: Given that the Department notifies a facility of its
final placement in a risk-based tier following the Department's review
of a covered facility's SVA (see Sec. 27.220(b)), a facility will not
know its final tier placement at the time it might decide to submit an
ASP in lieu of a SVA. Because of that, the Department understands that
facilities will rely on the Department's preliminary tiering
determination made pursuant to Sec. 27.220(a).
There are various reasons underlying the Department's decision not
to accept ASPs as SVAs for Tier 1, Tier 2, and Tier 3 facilities. The
Department needs a consistent baseline against which to compare risks
and vulnerabilities across chemical facilities. (For a further
discussion of this issue, see the Department's response to comments in
Sec. III(B)(1)). As well, the Chemical Security Assessment Tool (CSAT)
system uses an integrated approach to chemical facility security, and
by considering SVAs that use the methodology in the CSAT system, the
Department can take full advantage of that integrated approach.
Furthermore, by using this electronic, integrated CSAT approach, the
Department can more efficiently review and assess a greater number
SVAs, and that is of importance considering the Department's phased
implementation scheme to address the highest risk facilities first.
The Department acknowledges that many facilities have expended
substantial resources and incurred significant expense to identify
vulnerabilities and to develop security plans. The Department commends
facilities for such efforts. The work performed on these efforts is
valuable, and DHS is committed to capitalizing on these investments.
The information developed in these efforts will be relevant to
facilities as they complete the CSAT SVA. Facilities will be able to
use the information from existing vulnerability assessments, and in
many cases, the practical impact of requiring Tiers 1, 2, and 3
facilities use the CSAT SVA system will be one of formatting, i.e.,
facilities will have to enter their information from their existing
vulnerability assessments into the format established by the CSAT
system. While some additional analytical effort will be required, even
where the facility has produced a strong SVA, the effort will be
considerably less than that at facilities that are starting without a
pre-existing SVA.
In addition, Sec. 27.235(b) provides that the notice requirements
for submitting ASPs correspond with the notice requirements (including
the approval and disapproval process) for SVAs and SSPs. In other
words, if a facility is submitting an ASP in lieu of an SVA, the
process in Sec. 27.240 applies, and if a facility is submitting an ASP
in lieu of an SSP, the process in Sec. 27.245 applies.
Section 27.240 Review and Approval of Security Vulnerability Assessment
and Section 27.245 Review and Approval of Site Security Plans
In this interim final rule, the Department has separated the review
and approval of SVAs and SSPs into two separate sections. In the
Advance Notice, both sets of requirements were located in Sec. 27.240.
In this interim final rule, the provisions related to Security
Vulnerability Assessments are located in Sec. 27.240, and the
provisions related to Site Security Plans are located in Sec. 27.245.
In addition, the Department made some changes to the corresponding
provisions in the two separate sections. In both sections, the
Department has removed the language (from proposed Sec. 27.240(a)(1))
about time periods for submitting SVAs and SSPs. The Department has
already addressed this issue in Sec. Sec. 27.215(c)-(d) and Sec. Sec.
27.225(c)-(d) (by providing that a facility must provide, update, and
revise its SVA and SSP consistent with the schedule in Sec. 27.210),
so it was unnecessary to also include this language here. Also, in both
sections, the Department has added new language about the disapproval
of SVAs or SSPs. The Department added a new sentence, which provides
that ``[i]f the resubmitted [SVA or SSP] does not satisfy the
requirements of [Sec. 27.215 or Sec. 27.225], the Department will
provide the facility with written notification (including a clear
explanation of deficiencies in the [SVA or SSP]) of the Department's
disapproval of the [SVA or SSP].'' See Sec. 27.240(b) and Sec.
27.245(b).
Finally, the Department has added a provision in Sec.
27.245(a)(1)(iii), indicating that the Department issues a Letter of
Approval if it approves a facility's Site Security Plan in accordance
with Sec. 27.250. While this provision appears elsewhere in the rule
(see Sec. 27.245(b)), the Department thought it was appropriate to
include it here as well.
The Department has removed 27.240(c) as proposed in the Advance
Notice. Paragraph (c) had contained an objections provision. For a
discussion of the Department's decision to remove the objections
provisions from this rule (in Sec. Sec. 27.205(c), 27.220(b), and
27.240(c)), see the summary under Sec. 27.205(c).
Section 27.250 Inspections and Audits
The Department has added additional provisions to the inspection
and audit section. In Sec. 27.250(c), the Department discusses the
time and manner requirements for inspections. While the Department will
generally provide facilities with 24-hour advance notice of
inspections, the Department recognizes two exceptions where an
unannounced inspection might occur. The Department included the first
exception in the Advance Notice, and the Department has added the
second exception in this interim final rule. For a further discussion,
see the Discussion of Comments in Sec. III(F) on ``Inspections and
Audits.''
In Sec. 27.250(d), the Department addresses various details
related to the inspectors who will conduct inspections and audits. This
is a new paragraph that was not in the Advance Notice. Although
Congress has not provided the Department with administrative subpoena
authority, this paragraph explains that inspectors will have
credentials and may administer oaths and receive affirmations upon
consent. It also provides details about the means by which inspectors
may gather information and the access that inspectors will have to
records. The Department has also added a paragraph (e), which addresses
confidentiality. Finally, the guidance paragraph, which had been
located in paragraph (d) has been moved to paragraph (f).
Section 27.255 Recordkeeping Requirements
The Department revised various provisions related to recordkeeping.
With respect to Sec. 27.255(a)(1), the Department added a few
additional record requirements regarding training. In addition to
keeping records of the date and location of each training session, time
of day and duration of each session, the name and qualifications of the
instructor, and a clear, legible list of the attendees including
attendees' signatures, the facility must also keep at least one other
unique identifier for each attendee receiving training and the results
of any evaluation or training. The Department also added a requirement
to Sec. 27.255(b), requiring facilities to keep submitted Top-Screens
in addition to submitted
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SVAs and SSPs. In addition, as discussed above in the summary for Sec.
27.225(e), the Department revised the recordkeeping provision related
to internal audits. See Sec. 27.255(a)(6).
The Department also added a new paragraph (c), allowing the
Department to request that covered facilities make available records
kept pursuant to other Federal programs or regulations. The Department
would make such requests for records to the extent that any such
records were necessary for security purposes. As a result of adding new
paragraph (c), the Department had to re-designate proposed paragraph
(c) as paragraph (d).
Subpart C
The Department has substantially revised Subpart C, which contains
the provisions for Orders, Adjudications, and Appeals.
Section 27.300 Orders
The Department has restructured the Orders provisions. Whereas the
Advance Notice contained four separate sections (see Sec. Sec. 27.300,
27.305, 27.310, and 27.315), the Department has now consolidated all of
the Order provisions into one section, Sec. 27.300. The main substance
of the Orders provisions, however, remains the same. Pursuant to Sec.
27.300(a), the Assistant Secretary can issue an Order for any instance
of noncompliance. For example, the Assistant Secretary may issue an
Order for a facility's refusal to complete a Top-Screen, failure to
allow an inspection, or failure to update a Site Security Plan.
Beyond a basic Order, the Assistant Secretary may issue an Order
Assessing Civil Penalty, an Order to Cease Operations, or both, where
it determines that a facility is in violation of any Order issued
pursuant to paragraph (a). See Sec. 27.300(b). Orders Assessing Civil
Penalty are for a continual noncompliance, a repeated pattern of
noncompliance or egregious instances of noncompliance. Orders to Cease
Operations are the most serious Orders that the Assistant Secretary
might choose to issue under this regulatory scheme. The Assistant
Secretary will use such a measure cautiously and judiciously and will
balance the immediate security needs with the possible impact (e.g.,
economic impact or national security effect) of such an Order on the
chemical industry and the Nation as a whole. As the Department wrote in
the Advance Notice, ``This authority would be utilized when no other
options will achieve the required result.'' See 71 FR 78276, 78287.
Paragraphs (c) through (f) of Sec. 27.300 address the process and
procedures for Orders. Section 27.300(c) lists the information, at a
minimum, that the Assistant Secretary must include in an Order and also
notes that the Assistant Secretary may establish further procedures for
the issuance of Orders. Section 27.300(d) notes that a facility must
comply with the terms of the Order by the date specified in the Order.
Section 27.300(e) indicates that a facility has the right to seek an
adjudication to review the decision of the Assistant Secretary to issue
an Order, and Sec. 27.300(f) addresses final agency action.
With respect to the staying of Orders, the Department addresses
this issue in the new adjudications sections. Specifically, Sec.
27.310(b)(4) provides that an Order is stayed from the timely filing of
a Notice of Application for Review until the Presiding Officer issues
an Initial Decision, unless the Secretary lifts the stay due to exigent
circumstances pursuant to Sec. 27.310(d). The new adjudications
section is discussed in more depth below.
Section 27.305 through 27.340 Adjudications
Most significantly with respect to adjudications, the Department
has provided facilities with the opportunity to seek review of
specified decisions before a neutral adjudications officer. A facility
or other person may seek review of the following Department (i.e.,
Assistant Secretary) determinations: (1) A finding, pursuant to Sec.
27.230(a)(12)(iv) that an individual is a potential security threat;
(2) The disapproval of a Site Security Plan pursuant to Sec.
27.245(b); or (3) The issuance of an Order pursuant to Sec. 27.300(a)
or (b). See Sec. 27.310(a).
The procedures for Applications are found in Sec. 27.310(b). To
institute Adjudication Proceedings, the facility or other person
(``Applicant'') must file a Notice of Application for Review within
seven calendar days of notification of the Assistant Secretary's
determination. See Sec. 27.310(b)(1)-(2). Then, in an Application for
Review, the Applicant must explain his or her position (i.e., explain
why the Assistant Secretary's determination should be set aside). The
Applicant has 14 calendar days from the date of notification of the
Assistant Secretary's determination to file and serve an Application
for Review. See Sec. 27.310(b)(5). The Assistant Secretary, through
the Office of the General Counsel, shall file and serve a Response
within 14 calendar days of the filing and service of the Application
for Review. See Sec. 27.310(c). Finally, the Secretary may make
certain procedural modifications in exigent circumstances. See Sec.
27.310(d).
A Presiding Officer is the neutral adjudications officer who
handles these proceedings. The Secretary shall appoint a Presiding
Officer, consistent with the requirements in Sec. 27.315. A Presiding
Officer shall immediately consider whether a summary adjudication of an
Application for Review is appropriate, and if the Presiding Officer
finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that one
party or the other is entitled to decision as a matter of law, then the
record shall be closed and the Presiding Officer shall issue an Initial
Decision on the Application for Review. See Sec. 27.330(b). Such
summary decisions are governed by the procedures in Sec. 27.330.
Where there is no summary decision, the Presiding Officer may
conduct a hearing using the procedures specified in Sec. 27.335. The
Presiding Officer shall close and certify the record upon the
completion of one of the following: a summary judgment proceeding, a
hearing, the submission of post-hearing briefs, or the conclusion of
oral arguments. See Sec. 27.340(a). Based on the certified record, the
Presiding Officer shall issue an Initial Decision, and the decision
shall be subject to appeal pursuant to Sec. 27.345.
In addition to the sections mentioned above, there are a few other
sections that address provisions related to adjudications. Section
27.320 specifies the prohibition on ex parte communications during
Proceedings. And Sec. 27.325 provides that the Assistant Secretary
bears the initial burden of proving the facts necessary to support the
challenged administrative action at every proceeding instituted under
this subpart.
Finally, as related to the Appeals section below, a Presiding
Officer's Initial Decision is stayed from the timely filing of a Notice
of Appeal until the Under Secretary issues a Final Decision, unless the
Under Secretary lifts the stay due to exigent circumstances. See Sec.
27.345(b)(4).
Section 27.345 Appeals
The interim final rule contains a revised appeals section. There
are several differences. First, a facility or other person may appeal
the Initial Decision of the Presiding Officer made pursuant to Sec.
27.340(b). This differs from the Advance Notice, in which a facility
could appeal a Departmental final determination regarding disapproval
of a Site Security Plan and the Departmental issuance of an Order. See
Sec. 27.320 in the Advance Notice.
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Second, the Advance Notice provided that the Under Secretary would make
decisions for most categories of appeals, and the Deputy Secretary
would make decisions for one category of appeal. This interim final
rule provides that all appeals go to the Under Secretary or his
designee acting as a neutral appeals officer. Third, as is discussed in
more depth below, the procedures for an appeal have changed.
The Assistant Secretary, a facility, or other person
(``Appellant'') may institute an Appeal by filing a Notice of Appeal
within seven calendar days of notification of the Presiding Officer's
Initial Decision. See Sec. 27.345(b)(1)-(3). The Appellant shall then
file and serve a Brief within 28 calendar days of the notification of
the Presiding Officer's Initial Decision. See Sec. 27.345(b)(5). The
Appellee shall file and serve its Opposition Brief within 28 days of
the filing of Appellant's Brief. See Sec. 27.345(b)(6). The Under
Secretary shall issue a Final Decision and serve it on the parties. A
Final Decision by the Under Secretary constitutes final agency action.
See Sec. 27.345(f).
In addition to the provisions mentioned above, the Department notes
the following: Pursuant to Sec. 27.345(b), the Under Secretary may
provide for an expedited appeal; pursuant to Sec. 27.345(c), ex parte
communications are prohibited; and pursuant to Sec. 27.345(c), a
facility or other person may elect to have the Under Secretary
participate in any mediation or other resolution process by expressly
waiving, in writing, any argument that such participation has
compromised the Appeals process. In addition, pursuant to Sec.
27.345(g), the Secretary may establish procedures for the conduct of
appeals.
Subpart D
Section 27.400 Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information
The Department has made numerous clarifying changes to the
chemical-terrorism vulnerability information (CVI) section. Some of
these changes corrected typographical errors, while several others
clarified existing provisions. With respect to a minor change, note
that, in Sec. 27.400 of the Advance Notice, the Department referred to
CVI as ``Chemical-terrorism Security and Vulnerability Information''
and in this interim final rule, the Department now refers to CVI as
``Chemical-terrorism Vulnerability Information.'' The Department
intends no change in meaning with this revision.
The Department has highlighted below the more substantive changes
to Sec. 27.400. With respect to paragraph (c), the Department has
removed paragraph (c)(2), because that concept is already covered in
paragraph (e)(1)(v). In paragraph (d)(1), the Department provides that
covered persons must protect all CVI in their possession or control,
including electronic data. In paragraph (e)(1), the Department added
language providing that a person who might have a ``need to know''
includes ``state or local officials, law enforcement officials, and
first responders.'' In paragraph (e)(1)(ii), the Department clarified
that a person in training will only have access to CVI that he needs as
part of his training, and in paragraph (e)(1)(iv), the Department
clarified that a the person in a fiduciary relationship with a covered
person who is representing or providing advice to that covered person
will also have a need to know CVI. In paragraph (e)(2)(iii), the
Department provides that it may require non-Federal persons seeking
access to CVI to complete a non-disclosure agreement before such access
is granted. In paragraph (f)(3), the Department shortened the
distribution limitation statement and added a new sentence at the end,
which provides: ``[i]n any administrative or judicial proceedings, this
information shall be treated as classified information in accordance
with 6 CFR Sec. Sec. 27.400(h) and (i).'' And in paragraphs (h)(1),
(i)(1), and (i)(2), the Department made it clear that these sections
apply to the disclosure of CVI in the context of administrative or
judicial enforcement proceedings of section 550 only, not any other
kind of enforcement proceeding. Similarly, in paragraph (i)(7)(iii),
the Department made it clear that this section applies only to judicial
enforcement proceedings and not any other judicial proceeding.
Section 27.405 Review and Preemption of State Laws and Regulations
The Department has made several changes to Sec. 27.405, including
various regulatory text changes. Among those changes, the Department
has added paragraph (a)(1). The Department wishes to avoid any
unintended consequences in the program's interaction with other Federal
requirements. For this reason, Sec. 27.405(a)(1) provides that
``[n]othing in this regulation is intended to displace other federal
requirements administered by the Environmental Protection Agency, U.S.
Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of
Transportation, or other federal agencies.'' For a further discussion
of these changes and preemption in general, see the section below
entitled ``Executive Order: 13132: Federalism.''
Proposed Appendix A: DHS Chemicals of Interest
In the Advance Notice, the Department sought comment on appropriate
sources of information or methodologies for evaluating and categorizing
chemical facilities.'' See 71 FR 78276, 78282. The Department responds
to those comments below in the ``Discussion of Comments.'' In this
interim final rule, the Department has decided to evaluate chemical
facility risks by, in part, classifying facilities by particular
chemicals. In proposed Appendix A, the Department has included a list
of ``DHS Chemicals of Interest'' along with Screening Threshold
Quantities, or STQs, for each chemical. The Department has established
STQs to trigger preliminary screening requirements. The STQ is not the
threshold quantity for establishing whether a given facility is a high-
risk facility, but only sets a threshold to require a facility to
complete and submit a CSAT Top-Screen. As noted in the ``Public
Participation'' section above, the Department is accepting public
comment on proposed Appendix A for 30 days. Following the close of the
comment period, the Department will review the comments and publish a
final Appendix A. The requirements related to Appendix A, which are
found in Sec. Sec. 27.200(b)(2) and 27.210, will become operative on
the date that the Department publishes a final Appendix A.
Pursuant to Sec. 27.200(b)(2), if a facility possesses any
chemicals identified in Appendix A at the corresponding quantities, the
facility must complete and submit a Top-Screen. Consistent with the
submission requirements in Sec. 27.210(a)(1), the facility must
complete the Top-Screen within 60 calendar days of the effective date
of a final Appendix A or within 60 calendar days of coming into
possession of any such chemical at the corresponding quantity. (As
indicated in the regulatory text, this submission requirement is not
operative until the Department publishes a final Appendix A.) Note that
this provision does not affect the Department's ability to contact
facilities independently of this list. Pursuant to Sec. 27.200(b)(1),
DHS may notify facilities, on an individual basis or through an
additional Federal Register notice, that they need to complete and
submit the Top-Screen. The Department notes that, where a facility has
a question as to whether it should complete a Top-Screen, the facility
can contact the
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Department and seek a consultation pursuant to Sec. 27.120.
The Department reiterates that the presence or amount of a
particular chemical listed in Appendix A is not the sole factor in
determining whether a facility presents a high-level of security risk
and is not an indicator of a facility's coverage under this rule. The
DHS Chemicals of Interest list merely directs certain facilities to
complete and submit the Top-Screen. This list serves as a tool to aid
the Department in gathering information needed to administer the
program under Section 550. In order for the Department to assess
compliance by particular chemical facilities with the regulation (see
Section 550(e)), the Department must first obtain information to
determine whether the particular chemical facilities qualify for
coverage under Section 550. The list set out in Appendix A serves as a
procedural tool designed to aid the Department in determining which
facilities must comply with the substantive standards. Only after the
Department gathers additional information through the Top-Screen
process will the Department make a determination as to whether a
facility presents a high risk and therefore must comply with the
regulatory requirements to ensure adequate security. Under Section 550,
the Department has the authority to use its best judgment and all
available information in determining whether a facility presents a high
level of security risk.
In developing the ``DHS Chemicals of Interest'' list, the
Department has looked to existing sources of information and has then
drawn on many of those sources of information, including some of the
sources that commenters suggested. Those sources include the following:
(1) The chemicals contained on the EPA's RMP list. Pursuant to the
Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401, et seq.), which provides that the EPA
shall promulgate a list of substances that ``in the case of accidental
release, are known to cause or may reasonably be anticipated to cause
death, injury, or serious adverse effects to human health or the
environment (see 42 U.S.C. 7412(r)(3)), the EPA promulgated two lists.
Table 1 is titled ``List of Regulated Toxic Substances and Threshold
Quantities for Accidental Release Prevention,'' and Table 3 is titled
``List of Regulated Flammable Substances and Threshold Quantities for
Accidental Release Prevention'' (see 40 CFR 68.130); (2) The chemicals
from the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Section 6701, et seq. of
Title 22 of the United States Code implements the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of
Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The CWC covers three lists,
or ``schedules'' of chemicals. Schedule 1 chemicals are provided in
Supplement No. 1 to 15 CFR part 712, Schedule 2 chemicals are provided
in Supplement No. 2 to 15 CFR part 713, and Schedule 3 chemicals are
provided in Supplement No. 3 to 15 CFR part 714; and (3) Hazardous
materials, including gases poisonous by inhalation (PIH) and explosive
materials, which the Department of Transportation regulates. See 49 CFR
173.115(c), 49 CFR 173.50(b), and 49 CFR 172.101. The Department has
also considered other categories of chemicals, such as chemicals that
can be used as precursors for Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and
certain water-reactive materials that produce toxic gases.
The Department makes a few points with respect to the list in
Appendix A. First, DHS is not using any existing list (e.g., the EPA
RMP list) as its sole source, and DHS is not classifying all facilities
on a list in one particular way (i.e., classifying all RMP facilities
as high-risk). By using multiple sources at this initial phase, DHS
believes it is obtaining a more complete picture of the universe of
facilities that may qualify as high-risk. Second, in identifying the
types and STQs of chemicals for Appendix A, the Department has sought
to be sufficiently inclusive of chemicals and quantities that might
present a high level of risk under the statute without being overly
inclusive and therefore capturing facilities which are unlikely to
present a high level of risk.
In addition to drawing on information from existing sources, the
Department has identified chemicals by considering three security
issues. These three security issues, which are explained below, address
multiple risk areas.
1. Release--DHS believes that certain quantities of toxic,
flammable, or explosive chemicals or materials, if released from a
facility, have the potential for significant adverse consequences for
human life or health.
2. Theft or Diversion--DHS believes that certain chemicals or
materials, if stolen or diverted, have the potential to be used as
weapons or easily converted into weapons using simple chemistry,
equipment or techniques in order to c