Stephen J. Heldman, Denial Of Application, 4032-4035 [E7-1326]
Download as PDF
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
4032
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 18 / Monday, January 29, 2007 / Notices
suspended but asserted that the state
superior court had ruled that his alleged
offenses were misdemeanors and not
felonies and that he was currently in
negotiations with the Board for the
reinstatement of his license.
Respondent’s Response at 1.
Respondent further contended that
notwithstanding the suspension of his
medical license, ‘‘Georgia law allows
unlicensed individuals to work as
subordinates and laborers in the
manufacturing, distributing, and
dispensing of controlled substances.’’
Id. at 3. Respondent further asserted that
he was ‘‘still eligible to apply for
employment in the state as a physician’s
assistant, pharmacy technician, drug
manufacturing employee or drug
representative, among other occupations
involving the handling of controlled
substances.’’ Id. Respondent maintained
that ‘‘[t]he fact that [21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)]
requires both action on the
Respondent’s license and an inability to
engage in the manufacture, distribution,
and dispensing of drugs would seem to
indicate that suspension of one’s license
does not necessarily render the
individual unable to handle controlled
substances.’’ Id. Respondent thus
contended that there was an issue of fact
presented and an evidentiary hearing
was required. Id.
On April 17, 2006, the ALJ issued her
opinion and recommended decision.
The ALJ rejected Respondent’s
argument explaining that ‘‘[i]mplicit in’’
DEA’s long-standing interpretation of
the Controlled Substances Act ‘‘is the
assumption that the authority at issue is
that inuring to the registrant as a
practitioner, not whatever authority the
state grants to individuals who do not
hold a license to practice medicine.’’
ALJ Dec. at 3. The ALJ further explained
that ‘‘[t]o hold otherwise would permit
unlicensed physicians to maintain DEA
registrations, contrary to the plain
purpose of the CSA.’’ Id.
The ALJ also found that it was
undisputed that Respondent’s state
license was suspended and that he was
without authority to handle controlled
substances as a practitioner. Id. Because
there was no factual issue in dispute,
the ALJ granted the Government’s
motion for summary disposition and
recommended that Respondent’s DEA
registration be revoked. Id. at 4.
Having considered the record as a
whole, I hereby issue this decision and
final order. I adopt the ALJ’s opinion
and recommended decision.
Respondent’s contention that he is
entitled to maintain his DEA registration
notwithstanding that he lacks authority
under Georgia law to practice medicine
is easily dismissed. Even assuming that
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:04 Jan 26, 2007
Jkt 211001
Georgia law allows Respondent to
engage in some activities involving
controlled substances, the CSA makes
plain that one must be currently
authorized by the State to engage in the
specific activities for which he holds a
DEA registration.1
The CSA’s definition of the ‘‘[t]he
term ‘practitioner’ means a physician
* * * licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted, by * * * the jurisdiction in
which he practices * * * to distribute,
dispense, [or] administer * * * a
controlled substance in the course of
professional practice.’’ 21 U.S.C.
802(21) (emphasis added). Relatedly,
the CSA directs that ‘‘[t]he Attorney
General shall register practitioners
* * * if the applicant is authorized to
dispense * * * controlled substances
under the laws of the State in which he
practices.’’ Id. section 823(f). See also id.
section 802(10) (‘‘the term ‘dispense’
means to deliver a controlled substance
to an ultimate user * * * pursuant to
the lawful order of a practitioner’’)
(emphasis added).
As the CSA’s definition of the term
‘‘practitioner’’ makes plain, a physician
must be currently authorized to
dispense a controlled substance ‘‘in the
course of professional practice.’’ Id.
section 802(21). A physician whose
state license has been suspended or
revoked does not have authority under
state law to engage in the ‘‘professional
practice’’ of medicine and cannot
lawfully issue an order to dispense a
controlled substance. Accordingly,
section 304 of the CSA authorizes the
revocation of a registration ‘‘upon a
finding that the registrant * * * has had
his State license or registration
suspended or revoked * * * and is no
longer authorized by State law to engage
in the * * * dispensing of controlled
substances.’’ Id. § section824(a)(3).2
1 Contrary to the understanding of Respondent’s
counsel, the word ‘‘handle’’ as used in DEA cases
interpreting the CSA is a term of art. It refers to a
registrant’s authority to perform the specific
activities for which registration is required.
2Even if it is true, Respondent’s ‘‘contention that
he is still authorized by state law to engage in the
manufacturing [and] distribution * * * of
controlled substances,’’ Respondent Resp. at 3, is
irrelevant. Respondent was registered under the
CSA as a practitioner and not as a manufacturer or
distributor. The Act specifically defines ‘‘the term
‘distribute’’’ to exclude ‘‘dispensing.’’ 21 U.S.C.
§ 802(11). The only activity which is relevant in
assessing whether Respondent can maintain his
practitioner’s registration is dispensing. See id.
§ 823(f); see also 21 CFR 1301.13(e) (table)
(distributing and dispensing are independent
activities and require separate registrations).
Finally, even if ‘‘Georgia law allows unlicensed
individuals to work as subordinates * * * in the
* * * dispensing of controlled substances,’’ Resp.
Resp. at 3, Respondent does not maintain that he
can lawfully issue a prescription for a controlled
substance under state law, which is what matters
for purposes of the CSA.
PO 00000
Frm 00058
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
DEA has consistently held that the CSA
requires the revocation of a registration
issued to a practitioner whose state
license has been suspended or revoked.
See Sheran Arden Yeates, 71 FR 39130,
39131 (2006); Dominick A. Ricci, 58 FR
51104, 51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, 53
FR 11919, 11920 (1988).
I therefore conclude that
Respondent’s argument is without
merit. Because Respondent has
produced no evidence that the Georgia’s
Board’s summary suspension order has
been set aside or stayed, I conclude that
Respondent lacks authority under
Georgia law to handle controlled
substances as a practitioner and is not
entitled to maintain his DEA
registration.
Order
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f) & 824(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that DEA
Certificate of Registration, BD4754683,
issued to Gerald E. Dariah, M.D., be, and
it hereby is, revoked. I further order that
any pending applications for renewal or
modification of such registration be, and
they hereby are, denied. This order is
effective February 28, 2007.
Dated: January 19, 2007.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7–1320 Filed 1–26–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Stephen J. Heldman, Denial Of
Application
On November 18, 2005, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Stephen J. Heldman of
Cincinnati, Ohio (Respondent). The
Show Cause Order proposed to deny
Respondent’s pending application for a
DEA Certificate of Registration as a
distributor of the List I chemicals
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine on the
ground that his registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
See 21 U.S.C. 823(h) & 824(a).
The Show Cause Order specifically
alleged that Respondent was proposing
to distribute products containing
pseudoephedrine and ephedrine, which
are precursor chemicals used to
manufacture methamphetamine, to nontraditional retailers of these products
such as convenience stores and gas
stations. See Show Cause Order at 1–2.
E:\FR\FM\29JAN1.SGM
29JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 18 / Monday, January 29, 2007 / Notices
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
The Show Cause Order alleged that
these retailers are sources for the
diversion of these products into the
illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine. See id.
The Show Cause Order next alleged
that during a pre-registration
investigation, Respondent indicated that
he had no prior experience in handling
List I chemical products, that he was
unaware of the problem of diversion of
these products into the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine, and
that he was proposing to store listed
chemical products in a commercial selfstorage locker which had inadequate
security. See id. The Show Cause Order
also alleged that while Respondent told
investigators that he intended to
distribute only traditional products
containing pseudoephedrine, the
primary business of one of his two
proposed suppliers is the distribution of
combination ephedrine products which
are sold by gray market retailers. See id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that during customer verifications, DEA
investigators determined that several of
Respondent’s proposed customers
obtained List I chemical products from
other suppliers and had no intention of
purchasing these products from him.
See id. at 3. Finally, the Show Cause
Order alleged that during an August
2005 investigation of another DEA
registrant, DEA investigators determined
that Respondent had obtained List I
chemicals without being registered to do
so. See id.
On November 25, 2005, the
Government initially attempted to serve
the Show Cause Order by Certified Mail,
Return Receipt Requested, by sending it
to the address Respondent gave on the
application for his proposed registered
location. The mailing, however, was
returned unclaimed. Thereafter, on
January 17, 2006, the Government
served the Show Cause Order by First
Class Mail. Since that date, neither
Respondent, nor anyone purporting to
represent him, has responded. Because
(1) more than thirty days have passed
since the service of the Show Cause
Order, and (2) no request for a hearing
has been received, I conclude that
Respondent has waived his right to a
hearing. See 21 CFR 1309.53(c). I
therefore enter this final order without
a hearing based on relevant material
found in the investigative file and make
the following findings.
Findings
Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are
List I chemicals that, while having
therapeutic uses, are easily extracted
from lawful products and used in the
illicit manufacture of
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:04 Jan 26, 2007
Jkt 211001
methamphetamine, a schedule II
controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C.
802(34); 21 CFR 1308.12(d). As noted in
numerous DEA orders,
‘‘methamphetamine is an extremely
potent central nervous system
stimulant.’’ Sujak Distributors, 71 FR
50102, 50103 (2006); A–1 Distribution
Wholesale, 70 FR 28573 (2005).
Methamphetamine is highly addictive;
its abuse has destroyed lives and
families and ravaged communities.
Moreover, because of the toxic nature of
the chemicals used to make the drug, its
manufacture creates serious
environmental harms. David M. Starr,
71 FR 39367 (2006).
On October 27, 2003, Respondent, a
sole proprietor, applied for a registration
as a distributor of List I chemicals at the
address of his residence in Cincinnati,
Ohio. According to the investigative file,
on January 15, 2004, a DEA Diversion
Investigator (DI) contacted Respondent
requesting additional information. The
DI also contacted Respondent on
additional occasions to request
information. On October 11, 2004,
Respondent sent a letter to the DI
providing the requested information. In
this letter, Respondent informed the DIs
that the List I chemical products would
actually be kept in a storage unit at a
commercial storage facility.
On December 16, 2004, the DIs
conducted an on-site inspection of the
facility. Respondent’s proposed use of
the facility raised substantial concerns.
According to the investigative file, the
entrance gate to the facility remained
open long enough to allow unauthorized
persons to obtain access to the facility.
Moreover, while Respondent’s storage
unit had an alarm system, the alarm
sounded only at the facility’s office and
not at the local police station.
Furthermore, during the visit, the
facility’s office was unoccupied. Finally,
the DIs noted that it was unclear who
would be responsible for handling the
products that were delivered to the
storage facility.
During the course of the investigation,
the DIs determined that Respondent
engages in the business of distributing
assorted products to convenience stores,
gas stations, truck stops and liquor
stores. Respondent told the DIs that he
had no experience in the distribution of
List I chemical products and that he had
no knowledge of the diversion of these
products into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine.
Respondent provided the DIs with a
list of proposed customers for List I
products. A substantial number of the
proposed customers were Ameristop
Food Marts, a chain of company-owned
and franchise-owned convenience stores
PO 00000
Frm 00059
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
4033
in Ohio and adjacent states. One of the
DIs contacted the buyer for Ameristop
Corporation, who informed him that all
company-owned stores and most of the
franchise-owned stores were supplied
by Liberty Distribution, a subsidiary of
Ameristop Corp. The buyer
acknowledged that Respondent had
supplied some items to ten Ameristop
stores but stated that Ameristop would
discourage its stores from buying List I
chemical products from Respondent or
any other independent vendor.
Subsequently, on August 23, 2005,
DEA DIs executed an Administrative
Inspection Warrant at R J General
Corporation, a Cincinnati-based firm
which was soon to become—as in that
day—an ex-DEA registered distributor of
List I chemical products. During the
inspection, the DIs interviewed Mr. John
Meinerding, who admitted that R J
General had sold List I chemical
products to Respondent on various
dates between January 7, 2004, and
December 8, 2004. Of note, on October
11, 2004, Respondent had faxed a letter
to DEA in which he stated that his firm
was a ‘‘wholesale distributor.’’
Moreover, in response to a question
regarding whether he would engage in
retail sales of List I chemical products,
Respondent answered: ‘‘No.’’
Discussion
Under 21 U.S.C. 823(h), an applicant
to distribute List I chemicals is entitled
to be registered unless the registration
would be ‘‘inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ In making this determination,
Congress directed that I consider the
following factors:
(1) maintenance by the applicant of
effective controls against diversion of listed
chemicals into other than legitimate
channels;
(2) compliance by the applicant with
applicable Federal, State, and local law;
(3) any prior conviction record of the
applicant under Federal or State laws relating
to controlled substances or to chemicals
controlled under Federal or State law;
(4) any past experience of the applicant in
the manufacture and distribution of
chemicals; and
(5) such other factors as are relevant to and
consistent with the public health and safety.
Id.
‘‘These factors are considered in the
disjunctive.’’ Joy’s Ideas, 70 FR 33195,
33197 (2005). I may rely on any one or
a combination of factors, and may give
each factor the weight I deem
appropriate in determining whether an
application for registration should be
denied. See, e.g., Starr, 71 FR at 39367;
Energy Outlet, 64 FR 14269 (1999).
Moreover, I am ‘‘not required to make
findings as to all of the factors.’’ Hoxie
E:\FR\FM\29JAN1.SGM
29JAN1
4034
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 18 / Monday, January 29, 2007 / Notices
v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir.
2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165,
173–74 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In this case I
conclude that Factors One, Two, Four,
and Five establish that granting
Respondent’s application would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Factor One—Maintenance of Effective
Controls Against Diversion
The investigative file establishes that
Respondent does not have effective
controls against diversion. In this case,
it is unclear who would have access to
List I chemical products upon their
delivery to the storage facility and
whether they would be handled in a
manner which would prevent theft. See
21 CFR 1309.71(b). Furthermore,
Respondent’s proposed use of a
commercial storage facility raises
substantial questions about the
adequacy of his security controls.
Among other things, it appears that
unauthorized persons can easily gain
access to the facility. Moreover,
Respondent has no control over the
selection of the facility’s other tenants
or the persons they bring onto the
property. See Sujak Distributors, 71 FR
50102, 50104 (2006). As I have
previously explained, the use of
commercial storage facilities presents an
unacceptable risk that a criminal may
gain access to the property and steal List
I chemical products.
Finally, while the facility has an
alarm system, the alarm sounds only at
the facility’s office. This raises the
further question of whether the facility
provides effective monitoring twentyfour hours a day. I thus conclude that
Respondent does not maintain effective
controls against diversion and that this
factor alone is dispositive in concluding
that granting him a registration would
be inconsistent with the public interest.
Factor Two—The Applicant’s
Compliance With Applicable Laws
The investigative file contains
disturbing evidence that Respondent
repeatedly purchased List I chemicals
products from R J General Corp.,
between January 7, 2004, and December
8, 2004. Moreover, in a letter which
Respondent faxed to the DIs, he
expressly stated that he did not engage
in the retail sale of List I chemical
products.
Federal regulations clearly state that
‘‘[n]o person required to be registered
shall engage in any activity for which
registration is required until the
application for registration is approved
and a Certificate of Registration is
issued by the Administrator to such
person.’’ 21 CFR 1309.31(a). Respondent
did not have a registration, and the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:04 Jan 26, 2007
Jkt 211001
regulations no longer exempt an
applicant from the requirement of
obtaining a registration prior to
distributing List I chemical products. Id.
1309.25.
Based on the evidence in the file, I
conclude that Respondent violated
federal law by distributing List I
chemicals without the required
registration. See 21 U.S.C. 822(a)(1). As
I have previously noted, ‘‘[r]egistration
in one of the essential features of the
Controlled Substances Act.’’ Sato
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 71 FR 52165,
52166 (2006). Respondent’s engaging in
the distribution of List I chemicals
without first obtaining a registration is
a serious violation of the Act. I therefore
conclude that this factor also provides
sufficient reason by itself to deny
Respondent’s application.1
Factor Three—The Applicant’s
Experience in Distributing List I
Chemicals
Beyond the misconduct discussed
above, Respondent stated in his letter to
the DIs that he had no experience in the
sale of List I chemical products. Were
there no evidence of Respondent having
engaged in illicit activity, I would
nonetheless conclude that his lack of
experience bars his registration.
Because the regulatory scheme
imposed by federal law is complex and
the risk of diversion is substantial, this
is not a line of business that is suitable
for a new entrant to learn through onthe-job training. Accordingly, numerous
DEA final orders have made clear that
an applicant’s lack of experience in
distributing List I chemicals is a factor
which weighs heavily against granting
an application for a registration. TriCounty Bait Distributors, 71 FR 52160,
52163 (2006); Jay Enterprises, 70 FR
24620, 24621 (2005); ANM Wholesale,
69 FR 11652, 11653 (2004). I therefore
conclude that this factor further
supports the denial of Respondent’s
application.
Factor Four—Other Factors That Are
Relevant to and Consistent With Public
Health and Safety
Numerous DEA orders recognize that
convenience stores and gas-stations
constitute the non-traditional retail
market for legitimate consumers of
products containing pseudoephedrine
and ephedrine. See, e.g., Tri-County Bait
Distributors, 71 FR at 52161; D & S
Sales, 71 FR 37607, 37609 (2006);
Branex, Inc., 69 FR 8682, 8690–92
1 Because of the seriousness of this misconduct,
I conclude that even though there is no evidence
that Respondent has ever been convicted of an
offense related to listed chemicals, this factor is
entitled to no weight.
PO 00000
Frm 00060
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
(2004). DEA orders also establish that
the sale of certain List I chemical
products by non-traditional retailers is
an area of particular concern in
preventing diversion of these products
into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine. See, e.g., Joey
Enterprises, 70 FR 76866, 76867 (2005).
As Joey Enterprises explains, ‘‘[w]hile
there are no specific prohibitions under
the Controlled Substances Act regarding
the sale of listed chemical products to
[gas stations and convenience stores],
DEA has nevertheless found that [these
entities] constitute sources for the
diversion of listed chemical products.’’
Id. See also TNT Distributors, 70 FR
12729, 12730 (2005) (special agent
testified that ‘‘80 to 90 percent of
ephedrine and pseudoephedrine being
used [in Tennessee] to manufacture
methamphetamine was being obtained
from convenience stores’’); OTC
Distribution Co., 68 FR 70538, 70541
(2003) (noting ‘‘over 20 different
seizures of [gray market distributor’s]
pseudoephedrine product at clandestine
sites,’’ and that in eight month period
distributor’s product ‘‘was seized at
clandestine laboratories in eight states,
with over 2 million dosage units seized
in Oklahoma alone.’’); MDI
Pharmaceuticals, 68 FR 4233, 4236
(2003) (finding that ‘‘pseudoephedrine
products distributed by [gray market
distributor] have been uncovered at
numerous clandestine
methamphetamine settings throughout
the United States and/or discovered in
the possession of individuals apparently
involved in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine’’).
Significantly, all of Respondent’s
proposed customers participate in the
non-traditional market for ephedrine
and pseudoephedrine products.
Moreover, many of Respondent’s
proposed customers have other
suppliers. Finally, Respondent’s lack of
knowledge regarding the diversion of
List I chemicals into the illicit
manufacture of methamphetamine is
also disconcerting.
DEA orders recognize that there is a
substantial risk of diversion of List I
chemicals into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine when these products
are sold by non-traditional retailers. See,
e.g., Joy’s Ideas, 70 FR at 33199 (finding
that the risk of diversion was ‘‘real,
substantial and compelling’’); Jay
Enterprises, 70 FR at 24621 (noting
‘‘heightened risk of diversion’’ should
application be granted). Under DEA
precedents, an applicant’s proposal to
sell into the non-traditional market
weighs heavily against the granting of a
registration under factor five. So too
here.
E:\FR\FM\29JAN1.SGM
29JAN1
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 18 / Monday, January 29, 2007 / Notices
Because of the methamphetamine
epidemic’s devastating impact on
communities and families throughout
the country, DEA has repeatedly denied
an application when an applicant
proposed to sell into the non-traditional
market and analysis of one of the other
statutory factors supports the
conclusion that granting the application
would create an unacceptable risk of
diversion. Thus, in Xtreme Enterprises,
67 FR 76195, 76197 (2002), my
predecessor denied an application
observing that the respondent’s ‘‘lack of
a criminal record, compliance with the
law and willingness to upgrade her
security system are far outweighed by
her lack of experience with selling List
I chemicals and the fact that she intends
to sell ephedrine almost exclusively in
the gray market.’’ More recently, I
denied an application observing that the
respondent’s ‘‘lack of a criminal record
and any intent to comply with the law
and regulations are far outweighed by
his lack of experience and the
company’s intent to sell ephedrine and
pseudoephedrine exclusively to the gray
market.’’ Jay Enterprises, 70 FR at
24621. Accord Prachi Enterprises, 69 FR
69407, 69409 (2004).
The investigative file in this case
supports even more adverse findings
than those which DEA has repeatedly
held are sufficient to conclude that
granting an application would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
Here, Respondent clearly lacks effective
controls against diversion, has no
experience in the elicit wholesale
distribution of List I chemical products,
and yet intends to distribute these
products to non-traditional retailers, a
market in which the risk of diversion is
substantial. Furthermore, the file
establishes that Respondent violated
federal law by distributing List I
chemicals without a registration. Given
these findings, it is indisputable that
granting Respondent’s application
would be ‘‘inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 823(h).
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with NOTICES
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me
by 21 U.S.C. 823(h), and 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the
application of Respondent Stephen J.
Heldman, for a DEA Certificate of
Registration as a distributor of List I
chemicals be, and it hereby is, denied.
This order is effective February 28,
2007.
Dated: January 20, 2007.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7–1326 Filed 1–26–07; 8:45 am]
16:04 Jan 26, 2007
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 04–36]
Rose Mary Jacinta Lewis, M.D.;
Affirmance of Immediate Suspension
On March 22, 2004, I, the Deputy
Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause and Notice of Immediate
Suspension of the practitioner’s
Certificate of Registration, AL8962993,
held by Rose Mary Jacinta Lewis, M.D.
(Respondent), of Richmond, CA. The
Notice of Immediate Suspension was
based on my preliminary finding that
substantial amounts of Schedule III
controlled substances that had been
ordered using Respondent’s DEA
registration could not be accounted for.
Show Cause Order at 7. Based on the
significant risk that these drugs had
been diverted as well as evidence
showing that Respondent had allowed
unregistered entities and individuals to
use her registration to obtain controlled
substances, I concluded that
Respondent’s continued registration
‘‘would constitute an imminent danger
to the public health and safety.’’ Id.
More specifically, the Show Cause
Order alleged that in September 2003, R
& S Sales, a registered distributor, had
reported to DEA ‘‘that excessive
amounts of controlled substances were
being ordered under’’ Respondent’s
name and registration number. Id. at 2.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that shortly thereafter, DEA
investigators went to Respondent’s
registered location and determined that
Respondent was no longer practicing
medicine at the location and had retired
from practice and vacated the premises
six months earlier. See id. During the
attempted visit, DEA investigators found
several United Parcel Service (UPS)
delivery notices including one from R &
S. See id. According to the Show Cause
Order, DEA investigators subsequently
determined that on September 10, 2003,
an order for 300 bottles, each containing
500 count hydrocodone/apap 1 (7.5/75),
a Schedule III controlled substance, had
been placed with R & S under
Respondent’s registration and that UPS
had been unable to deliver the order to
Respondent’s former office. See id. The
Show Cause Order further alleged that
the order was subsequently delivered to
an entity known as International
Surplus Medical Products, Inc. (ISMP),
at its Richmond, California office. See
1 Apap
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
VerDate Aug<31>2005
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Jkt 211001
PO 00000
is an abbreviation for acetaminophen.
Frm 00061
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
4035
id. The address was not, however, a
registered location. See id.
The Show Cause Order next alleged
that on November 24, 2003, Respondent
left a voicemail message with a DEA
investigator in which she stated that she
was ISMP’s medical director and was
using her medical license to order
supplies. See id. According to the Show
Cause Order, a DEA investigator then
called Respondent and advised her that
R & S could not ship supplies to ISMP’s
office because it was not a registered
location. Id. at 3. The Show Cause Order
alleged that during the conversation,
Respondent stated that she was working
for a non-profit project that provided
medical supplies for AIDS patients in
Nigeria, that the project ordered only
AIDS-related drugs such as AZT, and
that it was not ordering controlled
substances. See id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that following the conversation,
Respondent submitted a written request
to change the address of her registered
location to ISMP’s Richmond office. Id.
The Show Cause Order alleged that in
her letter requesting the change,
Respondent stated that she worked with
ISMP, a non-profit entity that ‘‘sends
AIDS drugs to Nigeria.’’ Id. On
December 1, 2003, DEA personnel
changed the address of Respondent’s
registered location to ISMP’s office. Id.
The Show Cause Order next alleged
that during the week of December 3,
2003, R & S notified DEA that on
November 26, 2003, an order for 504
bottles, each containing 500 tablets of
hydrocodone/apap, had been placed
using Respondent’s registration. See id.
The Show Cause Order alleged that R &
S was told to ship the order to
Respondent’s former office, and that on
December 1, 2003, 19 packages were
received at that address and an
additional package was sent to ISMP’s
office. Id.
The Show Cause Order alleged that on
December 10, 2003, DEA investigators
attempted to serve an Administrative
Inspection Warrant at ISMP’s office but
no one was present. See id. The Show
Cause Order next alleged that on
January 15, 2004, DEA investigators
interviewed Respondent at her home.
Id. During the interview Respondent
allegedly told investigators that she had
retired from medical practice and was
working as ISMP’s medical director. Id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that Respondent told the investigators
that she had provided her DEA number
to Mr. Chuka Ogele, ISMP’s Chief
Executive Officer, so that he could order
medical supplies and controlled
substances which were to be exported to
Nigeria, and that she denied personally
E:\FR\FM\29JAN1.SGM
29JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 18 (Monday, January 29, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 4032-4035]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-1326]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Stephen J. Heldman, Denial Of Application
On November 18, 2005, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Stephen J. Heldman of Cincinnati, Ohio (Respondent). The
Show Cause Order proposed to deny Respondent's pending application for
a DEA Certificate of Registration as a distributor of the List I
chemicals ephedrine and pseudoephedrine on the ground that his
registration would be inconsistent with the public interest. See 21
U.S.C. 823(h) & 824(a).
The Show Cause Order specifically alleged that Respondent was
proposing to distribute products containing pseudoephedrine and
ephedrine, which are precursor chemicals used to manufacture
methamphetamine, to non-traditional retailers of these products such as
convenience stores and gas stations. See Show Cause Order at 1-2.
[[Page 4033]]
The Show Cause Order alleged that these retailers are sources for the
diversion of these products into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine. See id.
The Show Cause Order next alleged that during a pre-registration
investigation, Respondent indicated that he had no prior experience in
handling List I chemical products, that he was unaware of the problem
of diversion of these products into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine, and that he was proposing to store listed chemical
products in a commercial self-storage locker which had inadequate
security. See id. The Show Cause Order also alleged that while
Respondent told investigators that he intended to distribute only
traditional products containing pseudoephedrine, the primary business
of one of his two proposed suppliers is the distribution of combination
ephedrine products which are sold by gray market retailers. See id.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that during customer
verifications, DEA investigators determined that several of
Respondent's proposed customers obtained List I chemical products from
other suppliers and had no intention of purchasing these products from
him. See id. at 3. Finally, the Show Cause Order alleged that during an
August 2005 investigation of another DEA registrant, DEA investigators
determined that Respondent had obtained List I chemicals without being
registered to do so. See id.
On November 25, 2005, the Government initially attempted to serve
the Show Cause Order by Certified Mail, Return Receipt Requested, by
sending it to the address Respondent gave on the application for his
proposed registered location. The mailing, however, was returned
unclaimed. Thereafter, on January 17, 2006, the Government served the
Show Cause Order by First Class Mail. Since that date, neither
Respondent, nor anyone purporting to represent him, has responded.
Because (1) more than thirty days have passed since the service of the
Show Cause Order, and (2) no request for a hearing has been received, I
conclude that Respondent has waived his right to a hearing. See 21 CFR
1309.53(c). I therefore enter this final order without a hearing based
on relevant material found in the investigative file and make the
following findings.
Findings
Pseudoephedrine and ephedrine are List I chemicals that, while
having therapeutic uses, are easily extracted from lawful products and
used in the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine, a schedule II
controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. 802(34); 21 CFR 1308.12(d). As
noted in numerous DEA orders, ``methamphetamine is an extremely potent
central nervous system stimulant.'' Sujak Distributors, 71 FR 50102,
50103 (2006); A-1 Distribution Wholesale, 70 FR 28573 (2005).
Methamphetamine is highly addictive; its abuse has destroyed lives and
families and ravaged communities. Moreover, because of the toxic nature
of the chemicals used to make the drug, its manufacture creates serious
environmental harms. David M. Starr, 71 FR 39367 (2006).
On October 27, 2003, Respondent, a sole proprietor, applied for a
registration as a distributor of List I chemicals at the address of his
residence in Cincinnati, Ohio. According to the investigative file, on
January 15, 2004, a DEA Diversion Investigator (DI) contacted
Respondent requesting additional information. The DI also contacted
Respondent on additional occasions to request information. On October
11, 2004, Respondent sent a letter to the DI providing the requested
information. In this letter, Respondent informed the DIs that the List
I chemical products would actually be kept in a storage unit at a
commercial storage facility.
On December 16, 2004, the DIs conducted an on-site inspection of
the facility. Respondent's proposed use of the facility raised
substantial concerns. According to the investigative file, the entrance
gate to the facility remained open long enough to allow unauthorized
persons to obtain access to the facility. Moreover, while Respondent's
storage unit had an alarm system, the alarm sounded only at the
facility's office and not at the local police station. Furthermore,
during the visit, the facility's office was unoccupied. Finally, the
DIs noted that it was unclear who would be responsible for handling the
products that were delivered to the storage facility.
During the course of the investigation, the DIs determined that
Respondent engages in the business of distributing assorted products to
convenience stores, gas stations, truck stops and liquor stores.
Respondent told the DIs that he had no experience in the distribution
of List I chemical products and that he had no knowledge of the
diversion of these products into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine.
Respondent provided the DIs with a list of proposed customers for
List I products. A substantial number of the proposed customers were
Ameristop Food Marts, a chain of company-owned and franchise-owned
convenience stores in Ohio and adjacent states. One of the DIs
contacted the buyer for Ameristop Corporation, who informed him that
all company-owned stores and most of the franchise-owned stores were
supplied by Liberty Distribution, a subsidiary of Ameristop Corp. The
buyer acknowledged that Respondent had supplied some items to ten
Ameristop stores but stated that Ameristop would discourage its stores
from buying List I chemical products from Respondent or any other
independent vendor.
Subsequently, on August 23, 2005, DEA DIs executed an
Administrative Inspection Warrant at R J General Corporation, a
Cincinnati-based firm which was soon to become--as in that day--an ex-
DEA registered distributor of List I chemical products. During the
inspection, the DIs interviewed Mr. John Meinerding, who admitted that
R J General had sold List I chemical products to Respondent on various
dates between January 7, 2004, and December 8, 2004. Of note, on
October 11, 2004, Respondent had faxed a letter to DEA in which he
stated that his firm was a ``wholesale distributor.'' Moreover, in
response to a question regarding whether he would engage in retail
sales of List I chemical products, Respondent answered: ``No.''
Discussion
Under 21 U.S.C. 823(h), an applicant to distribute List I chemicals
is entitled to be registered unless the registration would be
``inconsistent with the public interest.'' In making this
determination, Congress directed that I consider the following factors:
(1) maintenance by the applicant of effective controls against
diversion of listed chemicals into other than legitimate channels;
(2) compliance by the applicant with applicable Federal, State,
and local law;
(3) any prior conviction record of the applicant under Federal
or State laws relating to controlled substances or to chemicals
controlled under Federal or State law;
(4) any past experience of the applicant in the manufacture and
distribution of chemicals; and
(5) such other factors as are relevant to and consistent with
the public health and safety.
Id.
``These factors are considered in the disjunctive.'' Joy's Ideas,
70 FR 33195, 33197 (2005). I may rely on any one or a combination of
factors, and may give each factor the weight I deem appropriate in
determining whether an application for registration should be denied.
See, e.g., Starr, 71 FR at 39367; Energy Outlet, 64 FR 14269 (1999).
Moreover, I am ``not required to make findings as to all of the
factors.'' Hoxie
[[Page 4034]]
v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 2005); Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165,
173-74 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In this case I conclude that Factors One, Two,
Four, and Five establish that granting Respondent's application would
be inconsistent with the public interest.
Factor One--Maintenance of Effective Controls Against Diversion
The investigative file establishes that Respondent does not have
effective controls against diversion. In this case, it is unclear who
would have access to List I chemical products upon their delivery to
the storage facility and whether they would be handled in a manner
which would prevent theft. See 21 CFR 1309.71(b). Furthermore,
Respondent's proposed use of a commercial storage facility raises
substantial questions about the adequacy of his security controls.
Among other things, it appears that unauthorized persons can easily
gain access to the facility. Moreover, Respondent has no control over
the selection of the facility's other tenants or the persons they bring
onto the property. See Sujak Distributors, 71 FR 50102, 50104 (2006).
As I have previously explained, the use of commercial storage
facilities presents an unacceptable risk that a criminal may gain
access to the property and steal List I chemical products.
Finally, while the facility has an alarm system, the alarm sounds
only at the facility's office. This raises the further question of
whether the facility provides effective monitoring twenty-four hours a
day. I thus conclude that Respondent does not maintain effective
controls against diversion and that this factor alone is dispositive in
concluding that granting him a registration would be inconsistent with
the public interest.
Factor Two--The Applicant's Compliance With Applicable Laws
The investigative file contains disturbing evidence that Respondent
repeatedly purchased List I chemicals products from R J General Corp.,
between January 7, 2004, and December 8, 2004. Moreover, in a letter
which Respondent faxed to the DIs, he expressly stated that he did not
engage in the retail sale of List I chemical products.
Federal regulations clearly state that ``[n]o person required to be
registered shall engage in any activity for which registration is
required until the application for registration is approved and a
Certificate of Registration is issued by the Administrator to such
person.'' 21 CFR 1309.31(a). Respondent did not have a registration,
and the regulations no longer exempt an applicant from the requirement
of obtaining a registration prior to distributing List I chemical
products. Id. 1309.25.
Based on the evidence in the file, I conclude that Respondent
violated federal law by distributing List I chemicals without the
required registration. See 21 U.S.C. 822(a)(1). As I have previously
noted, ``[r]egistration in one of the essential features of the
Controlled Substances Act.'' Sato Pharmaceutical, Inc., 71 FR 52165,
52166 (2006). Respondent's engaging in the distribution of List I
chemicals without first obtaining a registration is a serious violation
of the Act. I therefore conclude that this factor also provides
sufficient reason by itself to deny Respondent's application.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Because of the seriousness of this misconduct, I conclude
that even though there is no evidence that Respondent has ever been
convicted of an offense related to listed chemicals, this factor is
entitled to no weight.1
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factor Three--The Applicant's Experience in Distributing List I
Chemicals
Beyond the misconduct discussed above, Respondent stated in his
letter to the DIs that he had no experience in the sale of List I
chemical products. Were there no evidence of Respondent having engaged
in illicit activity, I would nonetheless conclude that his lack of
experience bars his registration.
Because the regulatory scheme imposed by federal law is complex and
the risk of diversion is substantial, this is not a line of business
that is suitable for a new entrant to learn through on-the-job
training. Accordingly, numerous DEA final orders have made clear that
an applicant's lack of experience in distributing List I chemicals is a
factor which weighs heavily against granting an application for a
registration. Tri-County Bait Distributors, 71 FR 52160, 52163 (2006);
Jay Enterprises, 70 FR 24620, 24621 (2005); ANM Wholesale, 69 FR 11652,
11653 (2004). I therefore conclude that this factor further supports
the denial of Respondent's application.
Factor Four--Other Factors That Are Relevant to and Consistent With
Public Health and Safety
Numerous DEA orders recognize that convenience stores and gas-
stations constitute the non-traditional retail market for legitimate
consumers of products containing pseudoephedrine and ephedrine. See,
e.g., Tri-County Bait Distributors, 71 FR at 52161; D & S Sales, 71 FR
37607, 37609 (2006); Branex, Inc., 69 FR 8682, 8690-92 (2004). DEA
orders also establish that the sale of certain List I chemical products
by non-traditional retailers is an area of particular concern in
preventing diversion of these products into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine. See, e.g., Joey Enterprises, 70 FR 76866, 76867
(2005). As Joey Enterprises explains, ``[w]hile there are no specific
prohibitions under the Controlled Substances Act regarding the sale of
listed chemical products to [gas stations and convenience stores], DEA
has nevertheless found that [these entities] constitute sources for the
diversion of listed chemical products.'' Id. See also TNT Distributors,
70 FR 12729, 12730 (2005) (special agent testified that ``80 to 90
percent of ephedrine and pseudoephedrine being used [in Tennessee] to
manufacture methamphetamine was being obtained from convenience
stores''); OTC Distribution Co., 68 FR 70538, 70541 (2003) (noting
``over 20 different seizures of [gray market distributor's]
pseudoephedrine product at clandestine sites,'' and that in eight month
period distributor's product ``was seized at clandestine laboratories
in eight states, with over 2 million dosage units seized in Oklahoma
alone.''); MDI Pharmaceuticals, 68 FR 4233, 4236 (2003) (finding that
``pseudoephedrine products distributed by [gray market distributor]
have been uncovered at numerous clandestine methamphetamine settings
throughout the United States and/or discovered in the possession of
individuals apparently involved in the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine'').
Significantly, all of Respondent's proposed customers participate
in the non-traditional market for ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
products. Moreover, many of Respondent's proposed customers have other
suppliers. Finally, Respondent's lack of knowledge regarding the
diversion of List I chemicals into the illicit manufacture of
methamphetamine is also disconcerting.
DEA orders recognize that there is a substantial risk of diversion
of List I chemicals into the illicit manufacture of methamphetamine
when these products are sold by non-traditional retailers. See, e.g.,
Joy's Ideas, 70 FR at 33199 (finding that the risk of diversion was
``real, substantial and compelling''); Jay Enterprises, 70 FR at 24621
(noting ``heightened risk of diversion'' should application be
granted). Under DEA precedents, an applicant's proposal to sell into
the non-traditional market weighs heavily against the granting of a
registration under factor five. So too here.
[[Page 4035]]
Because of the methamphetamine epidemic's devastating impact on
communities and families throughout the country, DEA has repeatedly
denied an application when an applicant proposed to sell into the non-
traditional market and analysis of one of the other statutory factors
supports the conclusion that granting the application would create an
unacceptable risk of diversion. Thus, in Xtreme Enterprises, 67 FR
76195, 76197 (2002), my predecessor denied an application observing
that the respondent's ``lack of a criminal record, compliance with the
law and willingness to upgrade her security system are far outweighed
by her lack of experience with selling List I chemicals and the fact
that she intends to sell ephedrine almost exclusively in the gray
market.'' More recently, I denied an application observing that the
respondent's ``lack of a criminal record and any intent to comply with
the law and regulations are far outweighed by his lack of experience
and the company's intent to sell ephedrine and pseudoephedrine
exclusively to the gray market.'' Jay Enterprises, 70 FR at 24621.
Accord Prachi Enterprises, 69 FR 69407, 69409 (2004).
The investigative file in this case supports even more adverse
findings than those which DEA has repeatedly held are sufficient to
conclude that granting an application would be inconsistent with the
public interest. Here, Respondent clearly lacks effective controls
against diversion, has no experience in the elicit wholesale
distribution of List I chemical products, and yet intends to distribute
these products to non-traditional retailers, a market in which the risk
of diversion is substantial. Furthermore, the file establishes that
Respondent violated federal law by distributing List I chemicals
without a registration. Given these findings, it is indisputable that
granting Respondent's application would be ``inconsistent with the
public interest.'' 21 U.S.C. 823(h).
Order
Pursuant to the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(h), and 28
CFR 0.100(b) & 0.104, I order that the application of Respondent
Stephen J. Heldman, for a DEA Certificate of Registration as a
distributor of List I chemicals be, and it hereby is, denied. This
order is effective February 28, 2007.
Dated: January 20, 2007.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7-1326 Filed 1-26-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-09-P