National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities, 3395-3399 [E7-1157]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 16 (Thursday, January 25, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 3395-3399]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-1157]


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DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES


National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health; Report on 
Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons 
Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities

AGENCY: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), 
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).

ACTION: Notice.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) gives notice 
as required by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2005 (Pub. L. 108-375) of the release of a report on residual 
contamination of facilities under the Energy Employees Occupational 
Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 et 
seq. The report is below. The report and appendices are also available 
at: https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/ocas.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Larry Elliott, Director, Office of 
Compensation Analysis and Support, National Institute for Occupational 
Safety and Health, 4676 Columbia Parkway, MS C-46, Cincinnati, OH 
45226, Telephone 513-533-6800 (this is not a toll-free number). 
Information requests can also be submitted by e-mail to OCAS@CDC.GOV.

John Howard,
Director, National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health.

Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic 
Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities

Prepared by: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

John Howard, M.D., Director, December 2006

[[Page 3396]]

I. Summary of Results

    This update to the Report on Residual Radioactive and Beryllium 
Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer Facilities and Beryllium 
Vendor Facilities is the second revision of the original study reported 
in November 2002 and revised in June 2004. The National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) is required to submit this 
report by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 
(NDAA) (Pub. L. 108-375), which amended the Energy Employees 
Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 
U.S.C. 7384 et seq., as follows:
    1. For each facility for which such report found that insufficient 
information was available to determine whether significant residual 
contamination was present;
    2. For each facility for which such report found that significant 
residual contamination remained present as of the date of the report, 
determine the date on which such contamination ceased to be present;
    3. For each facility for which such report found that significant 
residual contamination was present but for which the Director has been 
unable to determine the extent to which such contamination is 
attributable to atomic weapons-related activities, identify the 
specific dates of coverage attributable to such activities and, in so 
identifying, presume that such contamination is attributable to such 
activities until there is evidence of decontamination of residual 
contamination identified with atomic weapons-related activities;
    4. For each facility for which such report found significant 
residual contamination, determine whether it is at least as likely as 
not that such contamination could have caused an employee who was 
employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period 
to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B 
of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 
of 2000; and
    5. If new information that pertains to the report has been made 
available to the Director since that report was submitted, identify and 
describe such information.

NIOSH found that there were 94 Atomic Weapons Employer (AWE) facilities 
and 65 Beryllium Vendors that required evaluation as described above. 
The documents reviewed did not indicate the existence of a current, 
unrecognized occupational or public health threat. NIOSH evaluated new 
information that had been identified since 2004. NIOSH also based 
findings on information posted on the Department of Energy (DOE) Office 
of Environment, Safety, and Health (ES&H) website as of July 31, 2006 
(changes made to the DOE ES&H website after July 31, 2006 are not 
reflected in this report).
    The following actions have been taken in this report:
    1. A determination on the presence of significant residual 
radioactive or beryllium contamination has been made for all of the 
facilities for which the previous report found that insufficient 
information was available to determine whether significant residual 
contamination was present.
    2. A determination on the date when significant residual 
contamination was no longer present has been made for many facilities 
for which the previous report found that significant residual 
contamination remained present as of the date of the report. However, 
many sites were determined to have significant residual contamination 
remaining as of the date of this report. This is described on a 
facility-by-facility basis.
    3. For all facilities for which the previous report was unable to 
determine that significant residual contamination was attributable to 
atomic weapons-related activities, specific dates of coverage 
attributable to such activities have been determined and, when the 
source of such contamination was not clear, the contamination was 
presumed to be associated with atomic weapons-related activities.
    4. All facilities for which significant residual contamination was 
determined to be present after the period of weapons related production 
are considered to have the potential of causing an employee who was 
employed at such facility only during the residual contamination period 
to contract a cancer or beryllium illness compensable under subtitle B 
of the Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 
of 2000.
    5. All information used in making the determinations in this report 
are referenced in the individual facility evaluations found in 
Appendices A-3 and B-3.
    Individual results for the 94 AWEs evaluated as required by the 
NDAA are as follows:
     18 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have 
little potential for significant residual contamination outside of the 
periods in which weapons-related production occurred.
     72 of the 94 atomic weapons employer facilities have the 
potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods 
in which weapons-related production occurred.
     4 of the 94 previously listed Atomic Weapons Employer 
facilities are no longer listed as Atomic Weapons Employers on the DOE 
ES&H Web site.
    Individual results for the 65 Beryllium Vendor Facilities evaluated 
are required by the NDAA are as follows:
     7 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities have little 
potential for significant residual contamination outside of the periods 
in which weapons-related production occurred.
     58 of the 65 beryllium vendor facilities evaluated have 
the potential for significant residual contamination outside of the 
periods in which weapons-related production occurred.

II. Background and Purpose

    The Energy Employees Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act 
of 2000 (EEOICPA), 42 U.S.C. 7384 et seq., established a program to 
compensate individuals who developed illnesses as a result of their 
employment in nuclear weapons production-related activities at certain 
facilities in which radioactive materials or beryllium was processed. 
DOE was directed by Executive Order 13179 to publish in the Federal 
Register a list of facilities covered by the Act. On January 17, 2001, 
DOE published a list of AWEs, DOE facilities, and beryllium vendors, in 
the Federal Register; the list was revised on December 27, 2002, 67 FR 
32690. Updates to the list (corrections, additions, and deletions) have 
been made periodically by DOE. This update to the Report on Residual 
Radioactive and Beryllium Contamination at Atomic Weapons Employer 
Facilities and Beryllium Vendor Facilities is the second revision to 
the original study reported in November of 2002 and revised in June of 
2004.
    The DOE ES&H Web site (https://www.eh.doe.gov/advocacy) provides a 
synopsis of the work performed at each facility, including a listing of 
periods during which DOE believes, based on current information, that 
weapons-related processing was conducted. In determining these periods, 
DOE has applied the definitions in EEOICPA to the known facts about the 
time and conditions of weapons-related processing at each facility. DOE 
changes the entries on its database as additional information is 
obtained. These periods are referred to in this report as ``Periods in 
which weapons-related production occurred.'' It must be noted that the 
Department of Labor (DOL) is responsible for determining actual periods 
of covered employment based

[[Page 3397]]

upon DOE's findings as well as information from claimants and other 
sources.
    This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents 
pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H, 
documents obtained through NIOSH data capture efforts, and documents 
located on the Formerly Utilized Sites Remediation Action Program 
(FUSRAP) and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. The quantity and 
quality of the information available for each site varied 
significantly. Examples of documentation reviewed include radiological 
surveys, descriptions of production operations, contractual agreements, 
and interoffice correspondence. In addition, interviews with current 
and past employees of these facilities were conducted to obtain 
information not contained in available documentation. When such 
interviews were used in the facility evaluation, they are listed in the 
individual site descriptions in Appendix B-3.
    NIOSH believes that contamination levels at designated facilities 
in excess of those indicated in 10 CFR part 835, Appendix D 
(Occupational Radiation Protection, Surface Contamination Values) 
indicate that there is ``significant contamination'' remaining in those 
facilities. Documentation for each facility was reviewed, as available, 
to determine if there was an indication that residual radioactive 
contamination was present outside of the periods in which weapons-
related production occurred. Those levels then were compared to current 
radiation protection limits as listed in 10 CFR part 835, to determine 
if there was ``significant contamination.'' If there was no 
documentation or limited documentation on radiation levels at specified 
facilities, NIOSH made a professional judgment regarding the residual 
contamination. If NIOSH determined there was ``the potential for 
significant contamination'' at a designated facility, then NIOSH 
determined, pursuant to NDAA, that such contamination ``could have 
caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a covered employee 
with cancer.''
    In the case of beryllium contamination, if there was no evidence 
that the beryllium areas had been decontaminated, it was determined 
that this material could have caused or substantially contributed to 
the beryllium illness of an employee. Because beryllium sensitization 
can occur at very low levels of exposure, the level of residual 
beryllium contamination remaining was not included in the 
determination.
    Because the investigation involved evaluating potential radioactive 
contamination and beryllium contamination, the study was divided so 
that the required expertise could be devoted to the radiological 
facilities and the beryllium facilities. Appendices A-1 and B-1 provide 
synopses of the findings for the 159 facilities that were evaluated as 
required by NDAA: Appendix A-1 applies to 94 facilities evaluated for 
residual radioactive contamination while Appendix B-1 applies to 65 
facilities evaluated for residual beryllium contamination.
    Some of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred 
have been changed on the DOE ES&H Web site since the June 2004 report. 
Appendices A-2 and B-2 provide the current descriptions and evaluations 
for all AWE and Beryllium Vendor facilities, respectively. Appendices 
A-3 and B-3 provide descriptions of each facility, the data reviewed as 
a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

Periods of Residual Contamination

    The evaluations focused on determining whether the potential for 
significant residual contamination existed outside of the periods in 
which weapons-related production occurred. In many cases, no records of 
decontamination were found or surveys performed outside of the period 
in which weapons-related production occurred indicated the existence of 
significant residual contamination. However, some of the documentation 
provided dates of decontamination, dates of demolition of the facility, 
or descriptions of the radiological controls in place during 
operations. For sites that exhibited a potential for significant 
residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods in which 
weapons-related production occurred, and for which an indication of a 
more accurate period was available, this time period was provided. For 
sites that exhibited a potential for significant residual radioactive 
contamination outside of the periods in which weapons-related 
production occurred, and for which an indication of a more accurate 
period was not available, it was assumed that significant residual 
contamination existed until the time which the facility was demolished 
or until the present, defined as July 2006, when this report was 
written.
    Some sites performed work with radioactive material and/or 
beryllium for commercial purposes, in addition to work for the Atomic 
Energy Commission (AEC)/DOE. When it was impossible to distinguish 
residual contamination resulting from AEC/DOE activities from those 
resulting from commercial purposes, it was assumed that the 
contamination was attributable to weapons-related activities.

III. Residual Radioactive Contamination Evaluation

    This study consisted primarily of an evaluation of documents 
pertaining to AWEs. These include documents compiled by DOE ES&H, 
documents obtained through data capture efforts of NIOSH, and documents 
located on the FUSRAP and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Web sites. In 
all cases, the individual site finding is based on the available 
information. The finding on any single site was based on the quantity 
and completeness of the information available regarding that site and 
professional judgment as necessary.
    In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the 
previous report, the following factors were considered:
    (1) The radionuclides involved;
    (2) The quantity of radioactive material processed;
    (3) The physical form of the radioactive material processed (i.e., 
solid, liquid, or gas);
    (4) The operations performed and their potential for radiation/
radioactivity exposure;
    (5) Documented radiological control and monitoring programs that 
were in place during operations; and
    (6) Documented decontamination of facilities
    These factors were used to estimate the potential for radiation 
exposure both during operations and after production/processing had 
ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was 
documented was classified as having little potential for residual 
radioactive contamination after the decontamination date, while a 
facility with a high potential for residual radioactive contamination 
during operations and no documented decontamination data was classified 
as having a potential for residual contamination after operations had 
ceased.
    Each site was assigned to one of two categories:
    1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for 
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
    A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available 
for the facility indicated one or more of the following 
characteristics:

[[Page 3398]]

    (a) The facility was decontaminated within the periods in which 
weapons-related production occurred,
    (b) The facility had very little potential for residual 
contamination during actual operations, or
    (c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed 
as ``present.''
    2. Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for 
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
    A site was assigned to this category if there was documentation 
indicating the following:
    (a) Radioactive material was present in quantities or forms which 
could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of a 
covered employee, and
    (b) Radioactive material was processed or present outside of the 
dates as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
    This type of documentation often included FUSRAP surveys conducted 
after Manhattan Engineering District (MED)/AEC/DOE operations were 
complete, which indicated the presence of residual radioactive 
contamination that could be attributed to those activities.
    In some cases, the facilities processed radioactive material for 
not only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE 
contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons 
production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial 
purposes. Wherever residual radioactive contamination due to DOE 
operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from 
commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the 
result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases, 
the findings were that the potential for significant residual 
contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related 
production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for 
significant residual radioactive contamination outside of the periods 
in which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date 
could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual 
contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or 
until the present, defined as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Radioactive 
Contamination

    The results of this study indicate that there are atomic weapons 
employer facilities for which the potential for significant residual 
radiological contamination exists outside of the periods in which 
weapons-related production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
    Appendix A-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant 
residual radioactive contamination at the 94 facilities required for 
evaluation by NDAA. Appendix A-2 lists all of the AWE facilities and 
the findings for potential residual radioactive contamination. Appendix 
A-3 describes each facility evaluated for residual radioactive 
contamination, the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the 
final findings.

IV. Residual Beryllium Contamination Evaluation

    The primary sources of information used to evaluate each site were 
the individual facility files compiled by DOE ES&H. In addition, 
interviews with current and past employees of these facilities were 
conducted to obtain information not contained in available 
documentation.
    The finding on any single site was based on the quantity and 
completeness of the information available regarding that site and 
professional judgment as necessary.
    In this evaluation of residual radioactive contamination, as in the 
previous report, the following factors were considered:
    (1) If beryllium was actually handled at the site.
    (2) If there was evidence of decontamination of the facility.
    These factors were used to estimate the potential for beryllium 
exposure both during operations and after production/processing had 
ceased. For example, a facility for which a decontamination survey was 
documented or for which personal interviews indicated that 
decontamination was performed, was classified as having little 
potential for residual beryllium contamination after the 
decontamination date; a facility without such evidence of 
decontamination was classified as having a potential for residual 
beryllium contamination after operations had ceased.
    Each site was assigned to one of two categories:
    1. Documentation reviewed indicates there is little potential for 
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
    A site was assigned to this category if the documentation available 
for the facility indicated one or more of the following 
characteristics:
    (a) Evidence of decontamination and/or beryllium contamination 
survey data,
    (b) The facility had very little potential for residual 
contamination during actual operations, or
    (c) The facility is still in operation and the end date is listed 
as ``present.''
    2. Documentation reviewed indicates there is a potential for 
significant residual contamination outside the period in which weapons-
related production occurred.
    A site was assigned to this category if either of the following 
conditions existed:
    (a) Documentation was available indicating that beryllium was 
processed or present outside of the dates listed on the DOE ES&H 
website that could have caused or substantially contributed to the 
beryllium illness of a covered employee.
    (b) There was no evidence of a decontamination of the facility or 
area where beryllium was processed.
    In some cases, the facilities processed beryllium material for not 
only nuclear weapons production, but also commercial, non-DOE 
contracts. Sometimes the material processed for nuclear weapons 
production was indistinguishable from material processed for commercial 
purposes. Wherever residual beryllium contamination due to DOE 
operations was not clearly distinguishable from that resulting from 
commercial operations, it was assumed that the contamination was the 
result of weapons production activities. As a result, in these cases, 
the findings were that the potential for significant residual 
contamination existed outside of the periods in which weapons-related 
production occurred. For sites that exhibited a potential for 
significant residual beryllium contamination outside of the periods in 
which weapons-related production occurred, and for which an end date 
could not be determined, it was assumed that significant residual 
contamination existed until the time the facility was demolished or 
until the present, defined as the date this report was written.

Findings of Evaluation of Facilities for Residual Beryllium 
Contamination

    The results of this study indicate that there are Beryllium Vendor 
facilities for which the potential for significant residual beryllium 
contamination exists outside of the periods in which weapons-related 
production occurred as listed on the DOE ES&H website.
    Appendix B-1 lists the findings for the potential for significant 
residual beryllium contamination at the 65 facilities required for 
evaluation by NDAA. Appendix B-2 lists all Beryllium Vendor facilities 
and the

[[Page 3399]]

findings for potential residual beryllium contamination. Appendix B-3 
describes each facility evaluated for residual beryllium contamination, 
the data reviewed as a part of this evaluation, and the final findings.

V. Conclusions

    The findings of this study are: (1) Some atomic weapons employer 
facilities and beryllium vendor facilities have the potential for 
significant residual radiological and beryllium contamination outside 
of the periods in which weapons-related production occurred. (2) For 
the purposes of this report, NIOSH believes that facilities having 
``significant contamination'' had quantities of radioactive material 
that ``could have caused or substantially contributed to the cancer of 
a covered employee with cancer.'' (3) The documents reviewed did not 
indicate the existence of a current, unrecognized occupational or 
public health threat.

 [FR Doc. E7-1157 Filed 1-24-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4163-19-P