Safety Advisory 2007-01, 2333-2334 [E7-594]
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Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 11 / Thursday, January 18, 2007 / Notices
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 10,
2007.
Carla Mauney,
FAA Information Collection Clearance
Officer, Strategy and Investment Analysis
Division, AIO–20.
[FR Doc. 07–152 Filed 1–17–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–M
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2007–01
Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory;
Safety in Yards; Behavior of Employees
On or About Tracks; and Point
Protection.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety
Advisory 2007–01, which addresses the
safety of shoving or pushing movements
in yards, including those involving
remote control locomotives. This
advisory also addresses the behavior of
employees on or about tracks.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office of
Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont
Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202–493–6049 or 202–493–
6052); Edward Pritchard, Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and
Compliance, Office of Safety, FRA, 1120
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC
20590, telephone (202–493–6300).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although
the overall safety of railroad operations
has improved in recent years, a recent
fatal accident involving a carman struck
by a remote control yard movement
while he was backing a pickup truck
onto an in-yard private railroad grade
crossing (yard crossing) highlights the
need to review current railroad
procedures and practices.
pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
Results of Preliminary Investigation
The following discussion of the
circumstances surrounding a fatal
accident that occurred on December 14,
2006, is based on FRA’s preliminary
investigation. The accident is still under
investigation by FRA and local
authorities. The causes and contributing
factors, if any, have not yet been
established; therefore, nothing in this
Safety Advisory should be construed as
placing blame or responsibility for the
accident on the acts or omissions of any
person or entity.
The fatal accident occurred in
Manlius, New York, a suburb of
Syracuse, in CSX Transportation, Inc.’s
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:52 Jan 17, 2007
Jkt 211001
(CSX) DeWitt Yard at about 5:25 p.m. on
December 14, 2006. The victim was a
54-year-old carman with about 30 years
of railroad service. While backing a
pickup truck onto a yard crossing, he
was struck by a yard movement of
railroad cars shoved by a remote control
locomotive. The remote control operator
(RCO) aligned a track switch, initiated
the yard movement by remote control,
and was driven to the East End
Yardmasters Tower by another CSX
employee while the yard movement was
underway.
The RCO stated that as he was riding
to the East End Yardmasters Tower, he
made a visual determination that the
track (including the track at the two
yard crossings over which the
movement traversed) was clear of
equipment or other obstructions. The
yard movement was not conducted in
an activated remote control zone.
During the approximately 1⁄4-mile
shoving movement, the leading end of
the movement was not under
continuous observation by the RCO. The
route traversed included both the yard
crossing on which the accident occurred
and a second, paved yard crossing.
The leading end of the yard
movement, which is the end that struck
the carman’s pickup truck, consisted of
six empty flat cars. Due to its low
profile, the approach of an empty flat
car is less perceptible than the approach
of other rolling stock, e.g., box car, tank
car, locomotive. This was exacerbated
by darkness, as the sun had set
approximately 1 hour before the
accident.
Upon impact, the carman’s truck was
shoved for about 444 feet whereupon it
flipped onto its roof and was
additionally shoved approximately 490
feet. Immediately after the accident, the
truck was observed with its backup
lights illuminated and its backup alarm
sounding, indicating that the carman
had backed onto the crossing ahead of
the yard movement.
The RCO stated that he stopped the
yard movement when he noticed a
strange white light at the leading end of
the yard movement and heard a radio
transmission to stop the yard
movement. The preliminary
investigation disclosed that upon
impact, the carman in the pickup truck
transmitted his urgent plea on the
mechanical department radio channel to
stop the movement. That transmission
was heard by the yardmaster because he
could monitor the mechanical
department channel in the yard office.
Within seconds, the yardmaster
observed the carman’s truck being
shoved and radioed the RCO to stop.
Because the carman and the RCO were
PO 00000
Frm 00082
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
2333
utilizing different radio channels, the
carman was unable to contact the RCO
directly. The yard movement finally
came to rest about 1,490 feet from where
the movement was initiated and 934 feet
from where it struck the carman’s truck.
The autopsy determined that the cause
of death was due to injuries sustained
when the truck overturned while being
shoved by the yard movement. Postaccident testing of the carman’s urine
specimen revealed the presence of
marijuana metabolite (THCA) at low
levels. Neither the parent drug (THC)
nor the marijuana metabolite was
detected in the blood at the established
cutoff point. Since the marijuana
metabolite was not active and the parent
drug was not reported in the blood,
these findings do not provide scientific
evidence that would support any
conclusion regarding possible
impairment of the carman’s faculties.
This is particularly the case since death
occurred shortly after the impact, and
marijuana constituents remain stable in
these fluids for long periods after
metabolism ceases.
Safety Issues
CSX’s General and Operating
Equipment Rule R15 (published in CSX
System Bulletin 001 of October 1, 2006,
under Instructions Governing Remote
Control Locomotive Operation) states, in
relevant part, that
[P]oint protection must be provided when
cars, platform or engines are being moved
and conditions require. A crewmember must
take a position on the lead equipment to see
that the track ahead is clear, or be ahead of
the movement. When an RCO operator is
providing point protection, that operator
should be the primary operator when
practicable.
CSX rules do not define the term ‘‘point
protection.’’ Although the RCO was
ahead of the movement as permitted by
CSX rule, he did not observe the
collision and initiated a brake
application only after hearing a radio
transmission from the yardmaster.
The preliminary investigation
indicates that the RCO controlled the
yard movement while riding in a
moving motor vehicle. CSX General and
Operating Equipment Rule R8 states, in
relevant part, that ‘‘[an] RCL [remote
control locomotive] crew member will
not operate an RCL * * * while riding
in a moving motor vehicle or other
machinery that is not connected to their
consist.’’ This rule goes further than
FRA’s published guidelines for the
operation of remote control locomotives,
which states, in relevant part: ‘‘[W]hen
operating an RCL, the RCO should not
operate any other type of machinery [66
FR 10340, 10344 (Feb. 14, 2001) (Notice
E:\FR\FM\18JAN1.SGM
18JAN1
2334
Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 11 / Thursday, January 18, 2007 / Notices
of Safety Advisory 2001–01)].’’ Both
CSX Rule R8 and FRA guidelines were
intended to address the lack of
situational awareness that a person may
experience when ‘‘multitasking’’—in
this case, focusing on a moving train
while at the same time operating or
riding in a moving vehicle.
Although Federal regulations do not
currently prohibit shoving movements
conducted in the manner described by
the preliminary findings of this
accident, FRA is contemplating the
regulation of shoving movements as
addressed in a recently published FRA
notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
‘‘Railroad Operating Rules: Program of
Operational Tests and Inspections;
Railroad Operating Practices: Handling
Equipment, Switches and Derails [71 FR
60372, 60410 (October 12, 2006)].’’ In
the NPRM, FRA stated that it proposes:
pwalker on PROD1PC71 with NOTICES
A requirement that the employee providing
point protection visually determine, for the
duration of the shoving or pushing
movement, that the track is clear within the
range of vision for the complete distance to
be shoved or pushed. Shoving accidents
often occur because a train crew makes a
shoving movement without determining that
the track is clear in the direction of
movement. This proposed paragraph would
address this problem by requiring an
operating rule that keeps a qualified
employee observing the track to make sure it
is clear and remains clear [71 FR 60393].
In this instance, the RCO apparently
made an initial determination that the
track was clear, but was not in a
position to determine that the track
would remain clear of conflicting
mechanical department vehicles. (See
71 FR at 60409 defining ‘‘track is
clear.’’) Although FRA has proposed
requirements for shoving movements, it
has not made any decisions as to the
contents of a final rule in that
proceeding, and thus the proposal is not
now, and may not in the future become,
a regulatory requirement. Railroads,
however, are encouraged to consider
FRA’s proposed rule and this incident
as they review their operating rules.
The investigation of this accident also
raised questions regarding the visibility
of the rail car leading the shoving
movement. As stated earlier, the lead
car was a low-profile, empty flat car
followed by five more empty flat cars.
The first freight car of significant height
was the seventh car from the lead, a box
car. It is possible that the carman did
not see the low-profile cars in the
darkness. Although FRA does have
regulations pertaining to reflectorization
of freight cars, there are no Federal rules
regarding illumination within rail yards,
at yard crossings, or on the leading
point of a movement.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:52 Jan 17, 2007
Jkt 211001
The following CSX rules may apply to
this accident:
CSX Safe Way, Effective January 1, 2006 at
GS–10. On or About Tracks; When working
on or about tracks: * * * Be alert for and
keep clear of the movement of cars,
locomotives, or equipment at any time, in
either direction, on any track. * * * Stop
and look in both directions before making
any of the following movements: Fouling or
crossing a track.
SJP C–177 (Rev 3/99) Safe Procedure for
Backing Vehicle Driver Only:
Step 4. Always look behind you before
backing. If you are not sure get out and look
again.
Step 5. Avoid backing when possible, pull
thru if you can, or make a circle wide
enough.
Operating rule 103: When cars are shoved
and conditions require, a trainman must take
a conspicuous position on the leading car. At
night, the trainman must display a white
light.
Recommended Action
In light of the above discussion and in
an effort to maintain safety in the
Nation’s rail yards, FRA recommends
that railroads:
(1) Assess their current rules
addressing safety at yard crossings,
including rules governing shoving and
pushing movements and backing motor
vehicles;
(2) Review, or amend as necessary,
their point protection rules to clarify
that the person protecting the point
visually determine, for the duration of
the shoving or pushing movement, that
the track is clear either within the
person’s range of vision or for the
complete distance the equipment is to
be shoved or pushed, or that other
safeguards are observed to prevent
critical incidents involving shoving
movements. FRA notes that continuous
observation cannot be accomplished if
the person is also attempting to
accomplish other tasks that cause the
person to divert attention from
providing point protection;
(3) Review their point protection rules
and their importance with all relevant
employees;
(4) Review their current rules
pertaining to employee behavior on or
about tracks with particular emphasis in
yards with all relevant employees;
(5) Address the ability of employees
to call for assistance in emergency
situations through the use of common
emergency radio frequencies, or by
other means; and
(6) Assess the conspicuity of flat cars
and other equipment with low profiles
and consider measures available to
increase their visibility when they are
the lead car in a shoving movement,
especially at yard crossings.
PO 00000
Frm 00083
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
Failure of industry members to take
action consistent with the preceding
recommendations or to take other
actions to ensure yard safety may result
in FRA pursuing other corrective
measures under its rail safety authority.
FRA may modify this Safety Advisory
2007–01, issue additional safety
advisories, or take other appropriate
action necessary to ensure the highest
level of safety on the Nation’s railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 11,
2007.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7–594 Filed 1–17–07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–06–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Maritime Administration
[Docket No. MARAD–2007–26848]
Information Collection Available for
Public Comments and
Recommendations
Notice and request for
comments.
ACTION:
SUMMARY: In accordance with the
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, this
notice announces the Maritime
Administration’s (MARAD’s) intention
to request approval for three years of a
new information collection.
DATES: Comments should be submitted
on or before March 19, 2007.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Richard Walker, Maritime
Administration, MAR–810, 400 Seventh
St., SW.,Washington, DC 20590.
Telephone: 202–366–8888, Fax: 202–
366–6988; or E-Mail:
Richard.walker@dot.gov. Copies of this
collection also can be obtained from that
office.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Title of Collection: Marine Port and
Terminal Infrastructure Data.
Type of Request: New Collection.
OMB Control Number: 2133-New.
Form Numbers: Marine Terminal
Operator Survey (Unnumbered), Marine
Port Survey (Unnumbered), and Marine
Terminal Company Survey
(Unnumbered).
Expiration Date of Approval: Three
years from date of approval by the
Office of Management and Budget.
Summary of Collection Information:
The Port and Terminal Infrastructure
Data Collection Survey will provide
MARAD with key U.S. marine terminal
data to enable the agency to provide
timely information to determine the
present level of system performance and
future requirements.
E:\FR\FM\18JAN1.SGM
18JAN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 11 (Thursday, January 18, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2333-2334]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-594]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Railroad Administration
Safety Advisory 2007-01
AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Safety in Yards; Behavior of
Employees On or About Tracks; and Point Protection.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2007-01, which addresses the
safety of shoving or pushing movements in yards, including those
involving remote control locomotives. This advisory also addresses the
behavior of employees on or about tracks.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Alan H. Nagler, Trial Attorney, Office
of Chief Counsel, FRA, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590,
telephone (202-493-6049 or 202-493-6052); Edward Pritchard, Director,
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Office of Safety, FRA, 1120
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone (202-493-6300).
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although the overall safety of railroad
operations has improved in recent years, a recent fatal accident
involving a carman struck by a remote control yard movement while he
was backing a pickup truck onto an in-yard private railroad grade
crossing (yard crossing) highlights the need to review current railroad
procedures and practices.
Results of Preliminary Investigation
The following discussion of the circumstances surrounding a fatal
accident that occurred on December 14, 2006, is based on FRA's
preliminary investigation. The accident is still under investigation by
FRA and local authorities. The causes and contributing factors, if any,
have not yet been established; therefore, nothing in this Safety
Advisory should be construed as placing blame or responsibility for the
accident on the acts or omissions of any person or entity.
The fatal accident occurred in Manlius, New York, a suburb of
Syracuse, in CSX Transportation, Inc.'s (CSX) DeWitt Yard at about 5:25
p.m. on December 14, 2006. The victim was a 54-year-old carman with
about 30 years of railroad service. While backing a pickup truck onto a
yard crossing, he was struck by a yard movement of railroad cars shoved
by a remote control locomotive. The remote control operator (RCO)
aligned a track switch, initiated the yard movement by remote control,
and was driven to the East End Yardmasters Tower by another CSX
employee while the yard movement was underway.
The RCO stated that as he was riding to the East End Yardmasters
Tower, he made a visual determination that the track (including the
track at the two yard crossings over which the movement traversed) was
clear of equipment or other obstructions. The yard movement was not
conducted in an activated remote control zone. During the approximately
\1/4\-mile shoving movement, the leading end of the movement was not
under continuous observation by the RCO. The route traversed included
both the yard crossing on which the accident occurred and a second,
paved yard crossing.
The leading end of the yard movement, which is the end that struck
the carman's pickup truck, consisted of six empty flat cars. Due to its
low profile, the approach of an empty flat car is less perceptible than
the approach of other rolling stock, e.g., box car, tank car,
locomotive. This was exacerbated by darkness, as the sun had set
approximately 1 hour before the accident.
Upon impact, the carman's truck was shoved for about 444 feet
whereupon it flipped onto its roof and was additionally shoved
approximately 490 feet. Immediately after the accident, the truck was
observed with its backup lights illuminated and its backup alarm
sounding, indicating that the carman had backed onto the crossing ahead
of the yard movement.
The RCO stated that he stopped the yard movement when he noticed a
strange white light at the leading end of the yard movement and heard a
radio transmission to stop the yard movement. The preliminary
investigation disclosed that upon impact, the carman in the pickup
truck transmitted his urgent plea on the mechanical department radio
channel to stop the movement. That transmission was heard by the
yardmaster because he could monitor the mechanical department channel
in the yard office. Within seconds, the yardmaster observed the
carman's truck being shoved and radioed the RCO to stop. Because the
carman and the RCO were utilizing different radio channels, the carman
was unable to contact the RCO directly. The yard movement finally came
to rest about 1,490 feet from where the movement was initiated and 934
feet from where it struck the carman's truck. The autopsy determined
that the cause of death was due to injuries sustained when the truck
overturned while being shoved by the yard movement. Post-accident
testing of the carman's urine specimen revealed the presence of
marijuana metabolite (THCA) at low levels. Neither the parent drug
(THC) nor the marijuana metabolite was detected in the blood at the
established cutoff point. Since the marijuana metabolite was not active
and the parent drug was not reported in the blood, these findings do
not provide scientific evidence that would support any conclusion
regarding possible impairment of the carman's faculties. This is
particularly the case since death occurred shortly after the impact,
and marijuana constituents remain stable in these fluids for long
periods after metabolism ceases.
Safety Issues
CSX's General and Operating Equipment Rule R15 (published in CSX
System Bulletin 001 of October 1, 2006, under Instructions Governing
Remote Control Locomotive Operation) states, in relevant part, that
[P]oint protection must be provided when cars, platform or
engines are being moved and conditions require. A crewmember must
take a position on the lead equipment to see that the track ahead is
clear, or be ahead of the movement. When an RCO operator is
providing point protection, that operator should be the primary
operator when practicable.
CSX rules do not define the term ``point protection.'' Although the RCO
was ahead of the movement as permitted by CSX rule, he did not observe
the collision and initiated a brake application only after hearing a
radio transmission from the yardmaster.
The preliminary investigation indicates that the RCO controlled the
yard movement while riding in a moving motor vehicle. CSX General and
Operating Equipment Rule R8 states, in relevant part, that ``[an] RCL
[remote control locomotive] crew member will not operate an RCL * * *
while riding in a moving motor vehicle or other machinery that is not
connected to their consist.'' This rule goes further than FRA's
published guidelines for the operation of remote control locomotives,
which states, in relevant part: ``[W]hen operating an RCL, the RCO
should not operate any other type of machinery [66 FR 10340, 10344
(Feb. 14, 2001) (Notice
[[Page 2334]]
of Safety Advisory 2001-01)].'' Both CSX Rule R8 and FRA guidelines
were intended to address the lack of situational awareness that a
person may experience when ``multitasking''--in this case, focusing on
a moving train while at the same time operating or riding in a moving
vehicle.
Although Federal regulations do not currently prohibit shoving
movements conducted in the manner described by the preliminary findings
of this accident, FRA is contemplating the regulation of shoving
movements as addressed in a recently published FRA notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM), ``Railroad Operating Rules: Program of Operational
Tests and Inspections; Railroad Operating Practices: Handling
Equipment, Switches and Derails [71 FR 60372, 60410 (October 12,
2006)].'' In the NPRM, FRA stated that it proposes:
A requirement that the employee providing point protection
visually determine, for the duration of the shoving or pushing
movement, that the track is clear within the range of vision for the
complete distance to be shoved or pushed. Shoving accidents often
occur because a train crew makes a shoving movement without
determining that the track is clear in the direction of movement.
This proposed paragraph would address this problem by requiring an
operating rule that keeps a qualified employee observing the track
to make sure it is clear and remains clear [71 FR 60393].
In this instance, the RCO apparently made an initial determination that
the track was clear, but was not in a position to determine that the
track would remain clear of conflicting mechanical department vehicles.
(See 71 FR at 60409 defining ``track is clear.'') Although FRA has
proposed requirements for shoving movements, it has not made any
decisions as to the contents of a final rule in that proceeding, and
thus the proposal is not now, and may not in the future become, a
regulatory requirement. Railroads, however, are encouraged to consider
FRA's proposed rule and this incident as they review their operating
rules.
The investigation of this accident also raised questions regarding
the visibility of the rail car leading the shoving movement. As stated
earlier, the lead car was a low-profile, empty flat car followed by
five more empty flat cars. The first freight car of significant height
was the seventh car from the lead, a box car. It is possible that the
carman did not see the low-profile cars in the darkness. Although FRA
does have regulations pertaining to reflectorization of freight cars,
there are no Federal rules regarding illumination within rail yards, at
yard crossings, or on the leading point of a movement.
The following CSX rules may apply to this accident:
CSX Safe Way, Effective January 1, 2006 at GS-10. On or About
Tracks; When working on or about tracks: * * * Be alert for and keep
clear of the movement of cars, locomotives, or equipment at any
time, in either direction, on any track. * * * Stop and look in both
directions before making any of the following movements: Fouling or
crossing a track.
SJP C-177 (Rev 3/99) Safe Procedure for Backing Vehicle Driver
Only:
Step 4. Always look behind you before backing. If you are not
sure get out and look again.
Step 5. Avoid backing when possible, pull thru if you can, or
make a circle wide enough.
Operating rule 103: When cars are shoved and conditions require,
a trainman must take a conspicuous position on the leading car. At
night, the trainman must display a white light.
Recommended Action
In light of the above discussion and in an effort to maintain
safety in the Nation's rail yards, FRA recommends that railroads:
(1) Assess their current rules addressing safety at yard crossings,
including rules governing shoving and pushing movements and backing
motor vehicles;
(2) Review, or amend as necessary, their point protection rules to
clarify that the person protecting the point visually determine, for
the duration of the shoving or pushing movement, that the track is
clear either within the person's range of vision or for the complete
distance the equipment is to be shoved or pushed, or that other
safeguards are observed to prevent critical incidents involving shoving
movements. FRA notes that continuous observation cannot be accomplished
if the person is also attempting to accomplish other tasks that cause
the person to divert attention from providing point protection;
(3) Review their point protection rules and their importance with
all relevant employees;
(4) Review their current rules pertaining to employee behavior on
or about tracks with particular emphasis in yards with all relevant
employees;
(5) Address the ability of employees to call for assistance in
emergency situations through the use of common emergency radio
frequencies, or by other means; and
(6) Assess the conspicuity of flat cars and other equipment with
low profiles and consider measures available to increase their
visibility when they are the lead car in a shoving movement, especially
at yard crossings.
Failure of industry members to take action consistent with the
preceding recommendations or to take other actions to ensure yard
safety may result in FRA pursuing other corrective measures under its
rail safety authority. FRA may modify this Safety Advisory 2007-01,
issue additional safety advisories, or take other appropriate action
necessary to ensure the highest level of safety on the Nation's
railroads.
Issued in Washington, DC, on January 11, 2007.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. E7-594 Filed 1-17-07; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P