Notice of Availability of Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, 2022-2033 [E7-503]

Download as PDF 2022 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES considered the impact of the residual radioactivity at the Facility and concluded that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment. Environmental Impacts of the Alternatives to the Proposed Action: Due to the largely administrative nature of the proposed action, its environmental impacts are small. Therefore, the only alternative the staff considered is the no-action alternative, under which the staff would leave things as they are by simply denying the amendment request. This no-action alternative is not feasible because it conflicts with 10 CFR 30.36(d), requiring that decommissioning of byproduct material facilities be completed and approved by the NRC after licensed activities cease. The NRC’s analysis of the Licensee’s final status survey data confirmed that the Facility meets the requirements of 10 CFR 20.1402 for unrestricted release. Additionally, denying the amendment request would result in no change in current environmental impacts. The environmental impacts of the proposed action and the no-action alternative are therefore similar, and the no-action alternative is accordingly not further considered. Conclusion: The NRC staff has concluded that the proposed action is consistent with the NRC’s unrestricted release criteria specified in 10 CFR 20.1402. Because the proposed action will not significantly impact the quality of the human environment, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed action is the preferred alternative. Agencies and Persons Contacted: NRC provided a draft of this EA to the State of Hawaii for review on October 23, 2006. On November 6, 2006, the State of Hawaii responded by letter. The State had no additional comments. The NRC staff has determined that the proposed action is of a procedural nature, and will not affect listed species or critical habitat. Therefore, no further consultation is required under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. The NRC staff has also determined that the proposed action is not the type of activity that has the potential to cause effects on historic properties. Therefore, no further consultation is required under Section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act. III. Finding of No Significant Impact The NRC staff has prepared this EA in support of the proposed action. On the basis of this EA, the NRC finds that there are no significant environmental impacts from the proposed action, and that preparation of an environmental VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 impact statement is not warranted. Accordingly, the NRC has determined that a Finding of No Significant Impact is appropriate. IV. Further Information Documents related to this action, including the application for amendment and supporting documentation, are available electronically at the NRC’s Electronic Reading Room at https://www.nrc.gov/ reading-rm/adams.html. From this site, you can access the NRC’s Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS), which provides text and image files of NRC’s public documents. The documents related to this action are listed below, along with their ADAMS accession numbers. 1. NRC, ‘‘Generic Environmental Impact Statement in Support of Rulemaking on Radiological Criteria for License Termination of NRC-Licensed Nuclear Facilities,’’ NUREG–1496, July 1997 (ML042310492, ML042320379, and ML042330385). 2. NRC, ‘‘Consolidated NMSS Decommissioning Guidance,’’ NUREG– 1757, Volume 1, Revision 1, September 2003 (ML053260027). 3. Title 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 20, Subpart E, ‘‘Radiological Criteria for License Termination.’’ 4. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 51, ‘‘Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions.’’ 5. Miyake, Nancy, University of Hawaii, Queen’s Tower Decommissioning Report, January 19, 2006 (ML0604106581). 6. Whitten, Jack E., Acknowledgment of Receipt of Final Status Survey, June 21, 2006 (ML061740111). 7. Whitten, Jack E., Request for Comments on Draft Environmental Assessment for Decommissioning of the University of Hawaii, School of Medicine, Queen’s Medical Center, University Towers, October 23, 2006 (ML0629803480). 8. Takata, Russell S., Concerning the Request for Comments on Draft Environmental Assessment, November 6, 2006 (ML063340094). If you do not have access to ADAMS or if there are problems in accessing the documents located in ADAMS, contact the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) Reference staff at 1–800–397–4209, 301– 415–4737, or by e-mail to pdr@nrc.gov. These documents may also be viewed electronically on public computers located at the NRC’s PDR, O 1 F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, MD 20852. The PDR PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 reproduction contractor will copy documents for a fee. Dated at Arlington, Texas, this 8th day of January, 2007. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. D. Blair Spitzberg, Chief, Fuel Cycle & Decommissioning Branch, Division of Nuclear Materials Safety, Region IV. [FR Doc. E7–507 Filed 1–16–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Notice of Availability of Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Notice of Availability. AGENCY: SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared and is making available a model safety evaluation (SE) and a model nosignificant-hazards-consideration (NSHC) determination relating to the modification of technical specification (TS) requirements regarding the habitability of the control room envelope (CRE) for referencing in license amendment requests (LARs). The NRC staff is also making available an associated model LAR for use by licensees to prepare such LARs. The TS modification is based on NRC staff approved changes to the improved standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430–1434) that were proposed by the pressurized and boiling water reactor owners groups’ Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) on behalf of the commercial nuclear electrical power generation industry, in STS change traveler TSTF–448, Revision 3 (Rev 3). Previously, on October 17, 2006, drafts of the model SE, model NSHC determination, and model LAR were published in the Federal Register for public comment (71 FR 61075). Based on its evaluation of the public comments received in response to that notice, the NRC staff made appropriate changes to the models, and is including the final versions of the models in this notice. This notice also contains a description of each public comment and its disposition by the NRC staff. Based on its evaluation of the public comments, the NRC staff has decided to announce the availability of the model SE and E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices model NSHC determination to licensees for referencing in LARs to adopt TSTF– 448, Rev 3, using the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). An LAR that references the model SE and model NSHC determination will permit the NRC to efficiently process a license amendment that proposes to adopt the changes in TSTF–448, Rev 3. Licensees of nuclear power reactors proposing to adopt these changes should follow the guidance in the model LAR and confirm the applicability of the model SE and model NSHC determination to their reactors. DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces that the attached model SE and model NSHC determination (which differ only slightly from the versions previously published) may be referenced in plant specific applications to adopt the improved CRE habitability TS requirements. The staff has also posted the model LAR (which also differs only slightly from the versions previously published) on the NRC web site to assist licensees in using the CLIIP to apply for the proposed TS change. The NRC staff can most efficiently consider applications based upon the model application if the application is submitted within a year of this Federal Register Notice. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: C. Craig Harbuck, Mail Stop: O–12H2, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555– 0001, telephone 301–415–3140. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION Background Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06, ‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification Changes for Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March 20, 2000. The consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing proposed changes to the improved standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430–1434) in a manner that supports subsequent license amendment requests (LARs) from licensees. The CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed change to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or announce the VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 availability of the change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible for reviewing the staff’s evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each LAR made in response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures. The present notice makes available for adoption by licensees a change to establish more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative TS requirements related to ensuring CRE habitability. This change was proposed for incorporation into the STS by the owners groups participants in the Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF–448, Revision 3 (Rev 3). TSTF–448, Rev 3, can be viewed on the NRC’s Web page at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/ operating/licensing/techspecs.html. Applicability This proposal to modify the TS to establish more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements related to maintaining CRE habitability, as proposed in TSTF– 448, Rev 3, is applicable to all licensees. To efficiently process incoming license amendment requests (LARs), the staff requests that each licensee applying for the TS changes proposed in TSTF–448, Rev 3, use the CLIIP. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the TS changes without the requested TS bases and TS bases control program. Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may require additional review by the NRC staff, and may increase the time and resources needed for the review. Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion of additional changes to the license, will result in staff rejection of the application. Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/or additional changes should submit an LAR that does not request to adopt TSTF–448, Rev 3, using the CLIIP. Evaluation of Public Comments on the Model Safety Evaluation, Model No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Model License Amendment Request The NRC staff evaluated the public comments received on the model safety evaluation (SE), model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination, and model license amendment request (LAR) published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075–61084). Comments PO 00000 Frm 00047 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2023 were received from Progress Energy (PE) (Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML063260063), Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) (ADAMS Accession No. ML063340340), and the pressurized and boiling water reactor owners groups’ Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) (ADAMS Accession No. ML063260064). The NRC staff also had one comment. The NRC staff’s disposition of each comment follows. 1. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 2.3, Paragraph 8 (71 FR 61078). Comment: ‘‘Other Technical Specifications currently exist that are directly related to control room habitability (e.g., NUREG–1430, TS 3.3.16, ‘‘Control Room Isolation—High Radiation,’’ NUREG–1431, TS 3.3.7, ‘‘CREFS Actuation Instrumentation,’’ and NUREG–1432, TS 3.3.8, ‘‘Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)’’). It is recommended that the paragraph be revised as follows: Prior to incorporation of TSTF–448, Revision 3, the STS requirements addressing CRE boundary operability resided only in the following CRE ventilation system specifications: Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated the recommended change into the model SE. 2. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 2.4, Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61078). Comment: [The SE] characterizes the six year surveillance frequency for demonstrating unfiltered leakage into the control room envelope (CRE) is within limits as a relatively long test interval (frequency). When compared with the 15 year test frequency justified for the integrated leak rate test of containment, the six year frequency seems exceedingly short. This is particularly true given the safety (risk) significance of containment relative to the CRE boundary. Therefore, the bases for the six year frequency should be included in the model safety evaluation. Additionally, the model safety evaluation should allow sites the option to justify a site specific test frequency based on unique site characteristics using a risk-informed approach. (e.g., Regulatory Guide 1.177—An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications) Disposition: The NRC staff determined that explicitly suggesting in the model LAR that an applicant propose longer test intervals based on risk considerations is inappropriate because such a request would exceed the scope of changes covered by TSTF– 448, Rev 3, would require staff E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 2024 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES evaluation beyond that described in the model SE, and could not be considered under the CLIIP. The proposed TS Bases for the in-leakage surveillance gives the basis for the six-year frequency by referencing the TS CRE Habitability Program, which requires this surveillance to be performed ‘‘in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197.’’ However, the phrase ‘‘relatively long’’ in the model SE is potentially misleading and has been removed. 3. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 3.4 Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61081). Comment: [The] model safety evaluation states: The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions * * * The control room envelope boundary and programs to maintain it are providing the necessary radiological protection for occupancy of the control room. The program is independent of any ability to ‘‘access’’ the control room. Therefore, it is recommended that the sentence be revised as follows: The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions * * * Disposition: Occupancy of the CRE must account for any radiation sources encountered outside the CRE while accessing (going to and from) the CRE. The proposed CRE Habitability Program TS states, ‘‘The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions * * * .’’ The recommendation is not accepted. 4. (PE) (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: Model LAR Section 3.2 (71 FR 61084). Comment: Section 3.2 of the model LAR requires that the applicant make three commitments. Commitments 2 and 3 state: • 2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures to implement the new surveillance and programmatic TS requirements related to CRE habitability. • 3. [LICENSEE] commits to Regulatory Positions C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003, with the following exceptions: [Add descriptions of proposed exceptions.] In the case of commitment 2, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, ‘‘Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,’’ already requires that, VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 ‘‘Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures, or drawings.’’ In the case of commitment 3, the commitment is specifically addressed by the wording that will be included in Technical Specifications per Technical Specification Task Force 448 (TSTF– 448) Section 5.5.18c (5 .5.15c for boiling water reactors) which states: Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003, and (ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0. [The following are exceptions to Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0: 1.; and] Therefore, upon approval of the licensee’s amendment request, proposed commitments 2 and 3 will be addressed through legally binding regulatory obligations (i.e., 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and Technical Specifications) making regulatory commitments duplicative and an unnecessary burden on the licensee. It is recommended that commitments 2 and 3 be deleted from the subject model LAR. Disposition: The NRC staff accepts the recommendation and has removed commitments 2 and 3 from Section 3.2 and Attachment 4 of the model LAR. 5. (TSTF) Reference: In the Notice under ‘‘Applicability,’’ the last sentence (71 FR 61076). Comment: Should a licensee submit an application that requests adoption of TSTF–448 but includes significant variations or additional changes, it would facilitate the NRC’s review for the licensee to acknowledge that the change is based on TSTF–448 so that the NRC may use the model safety evaluation to the extent possible. We recommend revising the [last] sentence as follows: ‘‘Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/or additional changes should submit a license amendment request (LAR) that does not request to adopt TSTF–448, Rev 3, under the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process.’’ Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated the recommended change into the present notice. 6. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 2.2 (71 FRN 61083). Comment: PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 We recommend that the NRC modify Section 2.2 of the Model Application, ‘‘Optional Changes and Variations,’’ to request that licensees describe which optional portions of the model Safety Evaluation are applicable. Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated the recommended change as a note at the end of the first paragraph of Section 2.2 of the model LAR. 7. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 2.3, first paragraph (71 FR 61077). Comment: Section 2.3, ‘‘Regulations Applicable to Control Room Habitability,’’ lists General Design Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. Many licensees are not committed to the General Design Criteria and the wording of this section may result in many plants proposing an unnecessary variation in response to the required verification that the published safety evaluation is applicable in Section 2.2 of the model application. We recommend adding the following sentence to the first paragraph prior to the last sentence, ‘‘Any licensee commitments to these criteria are described in the plant’s licensing basis documents.’’ Disposition: The following optional sentence is added to the first paragraph for use by applicants whose facilities are not licensed under the General Design Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. ‘‘[Facilities not licensed under the General Design Criteria from 10 CFR Part 50 are licensed under similar plantspecific design criteria, as described in the facility’s licensing basis documents.]’’ 8. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 3.3, Evaluation 5 (71 FR 61080). Comment: Remove Mode 4 from the sentence about the applicable operational modes for new Action B of TS 3.7.[4] because the BWR/4 and BWR/ 6 Applicability does not include Mode 4 for this action requirement. Disposition: The NRC staff replaced the subject sentence with ‘‘This new condition in Action F is needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 1, 2, and 3.’’ 9. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 3.3, Evaluation 6 (71 FR 61081). Comment: In Evaluation 6, the next to the last sentence is overly specific concerning the wording of the licensee’s Generic Letter 2003–01 response about the adequacy of existing surveillance requirements to verify CRE boundary operability, and may lead to many plants proposing an unnecessary variation in response to the required verification that the published safety evaluation is applicable in Section 2.2 of the model LAR. The acceptability of E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices the deletion of SR 3.7.[10].[4] is not dependent on the licensee’s Generic Letter response, but on the findings in the Generic Letter. We propose revising the sentences to be consistent with the statements in Section 1.0 of the model Safety Evaluation, such as ‘‘In Generic Letter 2003–01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted to findings that the differential pressure surveillance is not a reliable method for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. Based on the adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, the licensee’s proposal to delete SR 3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable.’’ Response: If the language of the model SE is not consistent with the wording of the licensee’s Generic Letter 2003–01 response, the licensee should explain the inconsistency in its LAR to facilitate evaluation of the inconsistency by the staff in the SE for the license amendment. To account for the possibility of an inconsistency, the model SE is revised by surrounding the sentence in brackets. 10. (TSTF) Reference: Model NSHC determination (71 FR 61082). Comment: In the evaluation of Criterion 2, add the word ‘‘Accident’’ before the word ‘‘Previously’’ in the title, and change ‘‘an accident’’ to ‘‘any accident’’ in the last sentence to match the wording of Criterion 2 in 10 CFR 50.92(c)(2). Disposition: The model NSHC determination was revised as suggested. 11. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR title, second sentence (71 FR 61083). Comment: Revise the sentence by inserting the phrase ‘‘Plant Technical Specifications’’ after the phrase ‘‘to Revise’’ and changing ‘‘Tstf-448’’ to ‘‘TSTF–448.’’ Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested. 12. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 2.2, third paragraph (71 FR 61083). Comment: Change the date ‘‘June 2003’’ to ‘‘June 2001.’’ Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested. 13. (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: Model LAR, lists of Attachments in cover letter, and Attachment 3 cover page title (71 FR 61083 and 4). Comment: Place brackets around references to the revised TS pages in the LAR cover letter and the Attachment 3 cover page title, and replace ‘‘Proposed’’ with ‘‘Revised’’ in the Attachment 3 cover page title. Providing smooth revised TS pages should be optional in the LAR. Also, make the Attachment 4 cover page title consistent with the title as stated in the LAR cover letter by removing ‘‘list of.’’ Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested. Finally, because the revised model LAR contains no list of regulatory commitments, the NRC VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 staff added brackets around appropriate text in the model LAR to indicate that including regulatory commitments is optional. 14. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR cover letter, next to last paragraph (71 FR 61083). Comment: Revise the oath or affirmation statement to match the phrasing contained in Regulatory Issue Summary (RIS) 2001–18, ‘‘Requirements for Oath or Affirmation.’’ Disposition: The model LAR was revised to match RIS 2001–18. 15. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 3.2 (71 FR 61084). Comment: Commitment 1 states, ‘‘[LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of NEI 99–03, Revision 0, ‘‘Control Room Habitability Assessment Guidance’’ dated June 2001, which provides guidance and details on the assessment and management of control room envelope (CRE) habitability.’’ This commitment should be deleted. A licensee general commitment to NEI 99–03, Revision 0, is not relied upon in TSTF–448 or the model Safety Evaluation as a basis for finding the proposed changes acceptable. The analysis in the model Safety Evaluation does not support a conclusion that the NRC Staff has a ‘‘significant interest’’ in the matter to warrant a commitment. There are only two references to NEI 99–03 in TSTF–448 and in the model Safety Evaluation: a. The model SE, Section 3.4, ‘‘TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability Program,’’ refers to NEI 99–03, Revision 0, as one of two documents (with Regulatory Guide 1.196) containing guidance related to configuration control and maintenance of the control room envelope boundary. TSTF–448, Revision 3, proposed Specification 5.5.[18], ‘‘Control Room Envelope Habitability Program,’’ paragraph b, requires that the licensee’s Control Room Envelope Habitability Program include requirements for maintaining the control room envelope boundary in its design condition including configuration control and preventive maintenance. NEI 99–03, Revision 0, discusses configuration control and maintenance in Section 9.4, ‘‘Configuration Control,’’ which contains only generic guidance applicable to any configuration control program and which encompasses less than 2 pages of a 177 page document. A generic commitment to all of NEI 99– 03, Revision 0, for this purpose is unnecessary and unjustified. The appropriate control is already provided by the Technical Specifications and NEI 99–03, [Revision 0, Section 9.4] is only one method of meeting the Technical Specification requirement. PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2025 b. The proposed Bases for SR 3.7.[10].[4] (the inleakage test) state, ‘‘Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 5) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99–03, Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 6).’’ This very specific reference in the Technical Specification Bases to portions (8 pages of the 177 page document) of NEI 99–03, [Revision 0] do not justify a generic commitment to the entire document. Disposition: The NRC staff revised the model application to remove the commitment as suggested. 16. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR cover letter (71 FR 61083). Comment: After the sentence ‘‘Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.’’ insert ‘‘Attachment 5 provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show proposed change and is for information only.’’ For completeness, this adds information related to Attachment 5 in the cover letter. Disposition: The model LAR was revised by adding the sentence ‘‘Attachment 5 provides existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes.’’ The NRC staff expects that a licensee adopting a TSTF change to the STS will also adopt associated changes to the STS Bases or provide in its LAR a justification for any deviation. 17. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR, Attachment 1, Section 1.0, paragraph 1 (71 FR 61083). Comment: Place the title of TS Section 5.5 in brackets to account for the possibility that some facilities may have a different title. Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested. 18. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR cover letter (71 FR 61083) and Attachment 5 cover page (71 FR 61084). Comment: Include the phrase ‘‘(For Information Only)’’ to the title of Attachment 5. Disposition: As noted in the disposition of Comment 16, the NRC staff expects that a licensee adopting a TSTF change to the STS will also adopt associated changes to the STS Bases or provide in its LAR a justification for any deviation. Consequently, the suggested phrase is not appropriate and is not adopted. 19. (NRC staff) Reference: Model SE Section 3.1, last paragraph (71 FR 61079); model LAR, Section 2.2, third paragraph (71 FR 61083); model LAR Section 3.2 and Attachment 4, first commitment (71 FR 61083). Comment: Remove option to follow guidance in March 2003 version of NEI 99–03 contingent upon showing that differences with the June 2001 version E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 2026 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices do not conflict with staff positions in Regulatory Guide 1.196, because the NRC has not endorsed the March 2003 version. Disposition: The model SE and model LAR have been revised to remove the option of referencing the March 2003 version of NEI 99–03, as described in the disposition of Comment 15. The NRC staff recommends that implementation of any guidance in NEI 99–03, Revision 0, dated June 2001, that a licensee elects to follow, be consistent with the NRC staff positions in Regulatory Guide 1.196. Adoption of TSTF–448, Rev 3 Licensees wishing to adopt TSTF– 448, Rev 3, must submit an LAR in accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each LAR, the NRC staff will publish a notice of consideration of issuance of amendment to a facility operating license, a proposed NSHC determination, and a notice of opportunity for a hearing. The NRC staff will also publish a notice of issuance of an amendment to a facility operating license to announce the modification of TS requirements related to CRE habitability, for each plant that receives the requested change. Model Safety Evaluation U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation Consolidated Line Item Improvement; Adoption of Changes to Standard Technical Specifications Under Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) Change Number TSTF–448, Revision 3 Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES 1.0 Introduction By application dated [ ] [as supplemented by letters dated [ and ]], [Name of Licensee] (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the [Name of Facility]. [The supplements dated [ and ], provided additional information that clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and did not change the staff’s original proposed no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on [Date (PM/LA will fill in FR information)] (XX FR XXXX).] On August 8, 2006, the commercial nuclear electrical power generation industry owners group Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) submitted a proposed change, TSTF– 448, Revision 3, to the improved standard technical specifications (STS) VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 (NUREGs 1430–1434) on behalf of the industry (TSTF–448, Revisions 0, 1, and 2 were prior draft iterations). TSTF–448, Revision 3, is a proposal to establish more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative STS requirements related to ensuring the habitability of the control room envelope (CRE). In United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter 2003– 01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted to findings at facilities that existing TS surveillance requirements for the [Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS )] may not be adequate. Specifically, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer gas tests to measure control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered inleakage at facilities indicated that the differential pressure surveillance is not a reliable method for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. Licensees were requested to address existing TS as follows: Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS),’’] and adding a new administrative controls program, [Specification 5.5.18, ‘‘CRE Habitability Program.’’] The purpose of the changes is to ensure that CRE boundary operability is maintained and verified through effective surveillance and programmatic requirements, and that appropriate remedial actions are taken in the event of an inoperable CRE boundary. 2.0 Regulatory Evaluation 2.1 Control Room and Control Room Envelope NRC Regulatory Guide 1.196, ‘‘Control Room Habitability at Lightwater Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003, (Reference 4) uses the term ‘‘control room envelope (CRE)’’ in addition to the term ‘‘control room’’ and defines each term as follows: Provide confirmation that your technical specifications verify the integrity [i.e., operability] of the CRE [boundary], and the assumed [unfiltered] inleakage rates of potentially contaminated air. If you currently have a differential pressure surveillance requirement to demonstrate CRE [boundary] integrity, provide the basis for your conclusion that it remains adequate to demonstrate CRE integrity in light of the ASTM E741 testing results. If you conclude that your differential pressure surveillance requirement is no longer adequate, provide a schedule for: (1) Revising the surveillance requirement in your technical specification to reference an acceptable surveillance methodology (e.g., ASTM E741), and (2) making any necessary modifications to your CRE [boundary] so that compliance with your new surveillance requirement can be demonstrated. If your facility does not currently have a technical specification surveillance requirement for your CRE integrity, explain how and at what frequency you confirm your CRE integrity and why this is adequate to demonstrate CRE integrity. To promote standardization and to minimize the resources that would be needed to create and process plantspecific amendment applications in response to the concerns described in the generic letter, the industry and the NRC proposed revisions to CRE habitability system requirements contained in the STS, using the STS change traveler process. This effort culminated in Revision 3 to traveler TSTF–448, ‘‘Control Room Habitability,’’ which the NRC staff approved on [month dd, 2006]. Consistent with the traveler as incorporated into NUREG–143[0], the licensee proposed revising action and surveillance requirements in [Specification 3.7.10, ‘‘Control Room Control Room: The plant area, defined in the facility licensing basis, in which actions can be taken to operate the plant safely under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition during accident situations. It encompasses the instrumentation and controls necessary for a safe shutdown of the plant and typically includes the critical document reference file, computer room (if used as an integral part of the emergency response plan), shift supervisor’s office, operator wash room and kitchen, and other critical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy may be necessary in the event of an accident. Control Room Envelope: The plant area, defined in the facility licensing basis, that in the event of an emergency, can be isolated from the plant areas and the environment external to the CRE. This area is served by an emergency ventilation system, with the intent of maintaining the habitability of the control room. This area encompasses the control room, and may encompass other noncritical areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is not necessary in the event of an accident. NRC Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity At Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003 (Reference 5), also contains these definitions, but uses the term CRE to mean both. This is because the protected environment provided for operators varies with the nuclear power facility. At some facilities this environment is limited to the control room; at others, it is the CRE. In this safety evaluation, consistent with the proposed changes to the STS, the CRE will be used to designate both. For consistency, facilities should use the term CRE with an appropriate facilityspecific definition derived from the above CRE definition. PO 00000 Frm 00050 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 2.2 [Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)] The [CREEVS] provides a protected environment from which operators can control the unit, during airborne challenges from radioactivity, hazardous chemicals, and fire byproducts, such as fire suppression agents and smoke, during both normal and accident conditions. The [CREEVS] is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the control room envelope for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a Design Basis Accident (DBA) without exceeding a [5 rem whole body dose or its equivalent to any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)]. The [CREEVS] consists of two redundant trains [subsystems], each capable of maintaining the habitability of the CRE. The [CREEVS] is considered operable when the individual components necessary to limit operator exposure are operable in both trains [subsystems]. A [CREEVS] train [subsystem] is considered operable when the associated: • Fan is operable; • High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are capable of performing their filtration functions; • Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are operable, and air circulation can be maintained; and • CRE boundary is operable (the single boundary supports both trains [subsystems]). The CRE boundary is considered operable when the measured unfiltered air inleakage is less than or equal to the inleakage value assumed by the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident consequences to CRE occupants. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES 2.3 Regulations Applicable To Control Room Habitability In Appendix A, ‘‘General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ to 10 CFR Part 50, ‘‘Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,’’ General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 19 apply to CRE habitability. A summary of these GDCs follows. [Facilities not licensed under the GDC from 10 CFR Part 50 are licensed under similar plant-specific design criteria, as described in the facility’s licensing basis documents.] GDC 1, ‘‘Quality Standards and Records,’’ requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed, VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with the importance of the safety functions performed. GDC 2, ‘‘Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,’’ requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes and other natural hazards. GDC 3, ‘‘Fire Protection,’’ requires SSCs important to safety be designed and located to minimize the effects of fires and explosions. GDC 4, ‘‘Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases,’’ requires SSCs important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, including loss-ofcoolant accidents (LOCAs). GDC 5, ‘‘Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,’’ requires that SSCs important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the event of an accident in one unit, the orderly shutdown and cooldown of the remaining units. GDC 19, ‘‘Control Room,’’ requires that a control room be provided from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear reactor safely under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition under accident conditions, including a LOCA. Adequate radiation protection is to be provided to permit access and occupancy of the control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of specified values. Prior to incorporation of TSTF–448, Revision 3, the STS requirements addressing CRE boundary operability resided only in the following CRE ventilation system specifications: • NUREG–1430, TS 3.7.10, ‘‘Control Room Emergency Ventilation System (CREVS);’’ • NUREG–1431, TS 3.7.10, ‘‘Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREFS);’’ • NUREG–1432, TS 3.7.11, ‘‘Control Room Emergency Air Cleanup System (CREACS);’’ • NUREG–1433, TS 3.7.4, ‘‘[Main Control Room Environmental Control (MCREC)] System;’’ and • NUREG–1434, TS 3.7.3, ‘‘[Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA)] System.’’ In these specifications, the surveillance requirement associated with demonstrating the operability of the CRE boundary requires verifying PO 00000 Frm 00051 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2027 that one [CREEVS] train [subsystem] can maintain a positive pressure of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent [turbine building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. Facilities that pressurize the CRE during the emergency mode of operation of the [CREEVS] have similar surveillance requirements. Other facilities that do not pressurize the CRE have only a system flow rate criterion for the emergency mode of operation. Regardless, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer gas tests to measure CRE unfiltered inleakage at facilities indicated that the differential pressure surveillance (or the alternative surveillance at non-pressurization facilities) is not a reliable method for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. That is, licensees were able to obtain differential pressure and flow measurements satisfying the SR limits even though unfiltered inleakage was determined to exceed the value assumed in the safety analyses. In addition to an inadequate surveillance requirement, the action requirements of these specifications were ambiguous regarding CRE boundary operability in the event CRE unfiltered inleakage is found to exceed the analysis assumption. The ambiguity stemmed from the view that the CRE boundary may be considered operable but degraded in this condition, and that it would be deemed inoperable only if calculated radiological exposure limits for CRE occupants exceeded a licensing basis limit; e.g., as stated in GDC–19, even while crediting compensatory measures. NRC Administrative Letter 98–10, ‘‘Dispositioning of Technical Specifications That Are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety,’’ (AL 98–10) states that ‘‘ the discovery of an improper or inadequate TS value or required action is considered a degraded or nonconforming condition,’’ which is defined in [NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 9900; see latest guidance in RIS 2005–20 (Reference 3)]. ‘‘Imposing administrative controls in response to an improper or inadequate TS is considered an acceptable short-term corrective action. The [NRC] staff expects that, following the imposition of administrative controls, an amendment to the [inadequate] TS, with appropriate justification and schedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion.’’ Licensees that have found unfiltered inleakage in excess of the limit assumed in the safety analyses and have yet to either reduce the inleakage below the limit or establish a higher bounding limit through re-analysis, have E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 2028 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES implemented compensatory actions to ensure the safety of CRE occupants, pending final resolution of the condition, consistent with RIS 2005–20. However, based on GL 2003–01 and AL 98–10, the staff expects each licensee to propose TS changes that include a surveillance to periodically measure CRE unfiltered inleakage in order to satisfy 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3), which requires a facility’s TS to include surveillance requirements, which it defines as ‘‘requirements relating to test, calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be within safety limits, and that limiting conditions for operation will be met.’’ (Emphasis added.) The NRC staff also expects facilities to propose unambiguous remedial actions, consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), for the condition of not meeting the limiting condition for operation (LCO) due to an inoperable CRE boundary. The action requirements should specify a reasonable completion time to restore conformance to the LCO before requiring a facility to be shut down. This completion time should be based on the benefits of implementing mitigating actions to ensure CRE occupant safety and sufficient time to resolve most problems anticipated with the CRE boundary, while minimizing the chance that operators in the CRE will need to use mitigating actions during accident conditions. 2.4 Adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, by [facility name] Adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, will assure that the facility’s TS LCO for the [CREEVS] is met by demonstrating unfiltered leakage into the CRE is within limits; i.e., the operability of the CRE boundary. In support of this surveillance, which specifies a test interval (frequency) of 6 years, TSTF– 448 also adds TS administrative controls to assure the habitability of the CRE between performances of the ASTM E741 test. In addition, adoption of TSTF–448 will establish clearly stated and reasonable required actions in the event CRE unfiltered inleakage is found to exceed the analysis assumption. The changes made by TSTF–448 to the STS requirements for the [CREEVS] and the CRE boundary conform to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 10 CFR 50.36(c)(3). Their adoption will better assure that [facility name]’s CRE will remain habitable during normal operation and design basis accident conditions. These changes are, therefore, acceptable from a regulatory standpoint. VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 3.0 Technical Evaluation The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes against the corresponding changes made to the STS by TSTF–448, Revision 3, which the NRC staff has found to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, as described above in Section 2.0. [The emergency operational mode of the [CREEVS] at [facility name] [pressurizes] [isolates but does not pressurize] the CRE to minimize unfiltered air inleakage.] The proposed changes are consistent with this design. 3.1 Proposed Changes The proposed amendment would strengthen CRE habitability TS requirements by changing TS [3.7.10, CREEVS] and adding a new TS administrative controls program on CRE habitability. Accompanying the proposed TS changes are appropriate conforming technical changes to the TS Bases. The proposed revision to the Bases also includes editorial and administrative changes to reflect applicable changes to the corresponding STS Bases, which were made to improve clarity, conform with the latest information and references, correct factual errors, and achieve more consistency among the STS NUREGs. [Except for plant specific differences, all of] these changes are consistent with STS as revised by TSTF–448, Revision 3. The NRC staff compared the proposed TS changes to the STS and the STS markups and evaluations in TSTF–448. [The staff verified that differences from the STS were adequately justified on the basis of plant-specific design or retention of current licensing basis.] The NRC staff also reviewed the proposed changes to the TS Bases for consistency with the STS Bases and the plantspecific design and licensing bases, although approval of the Bases is not a condition for accepting the proposed amendment. However, TS 5.5.[11], ‘‘TS Bases Control Program,’’ provides assurance that the licensee has established and will maintain the adequacy of the Bases. The proposed Bases for TS 3.7.[10] refer to specific guidance in NEI 99–03, ‘‘Control Room Habitability Assessment Guidance,’’ Revision 0, dated June 2001 (Reference 6), which the NRC staff has formally endorsed, with exceptions, through Regulatory Guide 1.196, ‘‘Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ dated May 2003 (Reference 4). 3.2 Editorial Changes The licensee proposed editorial changes to TS [3.7.10, ‘‘CREEVS,’’] to PO 00000 Frm 00052 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 establish standard terminology, such as ‘‘control room envelope (CRE)’’ in place of ‘‘control room,’’ except for the plantspecific name for the [CREEVS], and ‘‘radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards (or challenges)’’ in place of various phrases to describe the hazards that CRE occupants are protected from by the [CREEVS]. [The licensee also proposed to correct a typographical error by replacing ‘‘irradiate’’ with ‘‘irradiated’’ in TS 3.7.10 Condition E.] These changes improve the usability and quality of the presentation of the TS, have no impact on safety, and therefore, are acceptable. 3.3 TS [3.7.10, CREEVS] < Evaluation 1—for facilities that have adopted the [CREEVS] TS LCO Note and Action B of TSTF–287, Rev. 5 > The licensee proposed to revise the action requirements of TS [3.7.10, ‘‘CREEVS,’’] to acknowledge that an inoperable CRE boundary, depending upon the location of the associated degradation, could cause just one, instead of both [CREEVS] [trains] to be inoperable. This is accomplished by revising Condition A to exclude Condition B, and revising Condition B to address one or more [CREEVS] [trains], as follows: • Condition A One [CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons other than Condition B. • Condition B One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4]. This change clarifies how to apply the action requirements in the event just one [CREEVS] [train] is unable to ensure CRE occupant safety within licensing basis limits because of an inoperable CRE boundary. It enhances the usability of Conditions A and B with a presentation that is more consistent with the intent of the existing requirements. This change is an administrative change because it neither reduces nor increases the existing action requirements, and, therefore, is acceptable. The licensee proposed to replace existing Required Action B.1, ‘‘Restore control room boundary to OPERABLE status,’’ which has a 24-hour Completion Time, with Required Action B.1, to immediately initiate action to implement mitigating actions; Required Action B.2, to verify, within 24 hours, that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices and smoke; and Required Action B.3, to restore CRE boundary to operable status within 90 days. The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions as directed by Required Action B.1. The 90-day Completion Time of new Required Action B.3 is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. The 90day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most anticipated problems with the CRE boundary. Therefore, proposed Action B is acceptable. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES < End of Evaluation 1 > < Evaluation 2—for facilities that have not yet adopted the [CREEVS] TS LCO Note and Action B of TSTF–287, Rev. 5 > The licensee proposed to establish new action requirements in TS [3.7.10, ‘‘CREEVS,’’] for an inoperable CRE boundary. Currently, if one [CREEVS] [train] is determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, existing Action A would apply and require restoring the [train] (and the CRE boundary) to operable status in 7 days. If two [trains] are determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary, existing Action [E] specifies no time to restore the [trains] (and the CRE boundary) to operable status, but requires immediate entry into the shutdown actions of LCO 3.0.3. These existing Actions are more restrictive than would be appropriate in situations for which CRE occupant implementation of compensatory measures or mitigating actions would temporarily afford adequate CRE occupant protection from postulated airborne hazards. To account for such situations, the licensee proposed to revise the action requirements to add a new Condition B, ‘‘One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4].’’ New Action B would allow 90 days to restore the CRE boundary (and consequently, the affected [CREEVS] [trains]) to operable status, provided that mitigating actions are immediately implemented and within 24 hours are verified to ensure, VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke. The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90-day Completion Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event of a DBA. The 90day Completion Time of new Required Action B.3 is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and test most anticipated problems with the CRE boundary. Therefore, proposed Action B is acceptable. To distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for one [CREEVS] [train] inoperable, Condition A is revised to state, ‘‘One [CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.’’ To distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for two [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable, Condition [E] (renumbered as Condition [F]) is revised to state, ‘‘Two [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable during MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4] for reasons other than Condition B.’’ The changes to existing Conditions A and [E] are less restrictive because these Conditions will no longer apply in the event one or two [CREEVS] [trains] are inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during unit operation in Mode 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4]. This is acceptable because the new Action B establishes adequate remedial measures in this condition. With the addition of a new Condition B, existing Conditions B, C, D, and E are redesignated C, D, E, and F, respectively. The licensee also proposed to modify the [CREEVS] LCO by adding a note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under administrative controls. As stated in the LCO Bases, this Note ‘‘only applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist of stationing a dedicated individual at the PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2029 opening who is in continuous communication with operators in the CRE. This individual will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need for CRE isolation is indicated.’’ The allowance of this note is acceptable because the administrative controls will ensure that the opening will be quickly sealed to maintain the validity of the licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences. < End of Evaluation 2 > < Evaluation 3—for B&W CREVS TS > The existing TS 3.7.10 condition for two control room emergency ventilation system (CREVS) trains inoperable during refueling, Condition E, is revised to also apply during plant operation in Modes 5 and 6. It will state, ‘‘Two CREVS trains inoperable [in MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.’’ This change clarifies the applicability of this condition for dual unit facilities when the unit is in Mode 5 or 6, and the other unit is moving [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. Similarly, Condition D, for failing to meet Action A during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, is revised to also apply in Modes 5 and 6. These changes are administrative because they only clarify the intended applicability of the existing conditions, and are, therefore, acceptable. Required Actions D.2 and E.1, to immediately suspend movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, ensures that a fuel handling accident cannot occur while the unit is in these conditions. With only one CREVS train inoperable, Required Action D.1 specifies an alternative to immediately suspending fuel movement; it requires immediately placing the operable CREVS train in its emergency operating alignment, or mode, to minimize the chance the train will fail to properly switch to this mode if called upon in response to a fuel handling accident, or other airborne hazards challenge. < End of Evaluation 3 > < Evaluation 4—for B&W, CE, and W [CREEVS] TS > The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action E of TS 3.7.1[0] that states, ‘‘One or more [CREEVS] trains inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary [in Mode 5 or 6, or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.’’ The specified Required Action proposed for this condition is the same as for the existing condition of Action E [(revised as discussed previously) <for B&W plants if E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 2030 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices Evaluation 3 is used>], which states ‘‘[Two [CREEVS] trains inoperable [in MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.’’ Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other condition in Action E using the logical connector ‘‘OR’’ in accordance with the STS writer’s guide (TSTF–GG–05–01, ‘‘Writer’s Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications,’’ June 2005). The practical result of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two separately numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is to make the TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an additional numbered row in the Actions table. The new condition in Action E is needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. As such, this change will ensure that the Actions table continues to specify a condition for an inoperable CRE boundary during Modes 5 and 6 and during refueling. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES < End of Evaluation 4 > < Evaluation 5—for BWR4 and BWR6 [CREEVS] TS > The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action F of TS 3.7.[4] that states, ‘‘One or more [CREEVS] subsystems inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies in the [[primary or] secondary] containment or during operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).’’ The specified Required Actions proposed for this condition are the same as for the other existing condition for Action F, which states, ‘‘Two [CREEVS] subsystems inoperable during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment or during OPDRVs.’’ Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other condition in Action F using the logical connector ‘‘OR’’ in accordance with the STS writer’s guide (TSTF–GG–05–01, ‘‘Writer’s Guide for Plant-Specific Improved Technical Specifications,’’ June 2005). The practical result of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two separately numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is to make the TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an additional numbered row in the Actions table. This new condition in Action F is needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 1, 2, and 3. As such, this change will ensure that the Actions table continues to specify a condition VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 for an inoperable CRE boundary during refueling and OPDRVs. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable. < End of Evaluation 5 > < Evaluation 6—for facilities that have a CRE pressurization surveillance requirement > In the [emergency radiation state] of operation, the [CREEVS] isolates unfiltered ventilation air supply intakes, filters the emergency ventilation air supply to the CRE, and pressurizes the CRE to minimize unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary. The licensee proposed to delete the CRE pressurization surveillance requirement (SR). This SR requires verifying that one [CREEVS] [train][subsystem], operating in the [emergency radiation state], can maintain a pressure of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent [turbine building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. The deletion of this SR is proposed because measurements of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE at numerous reactor facilities demonstrated that a basic assumption of this SR, an essentially leak-tight CRE boundary, was incorrect for most facilities. Hence, meeting this SR by achieving the required CRE pressure is not necessarily a conclusive indication of CRE boundary leak tightness, i.e., CRE boundary operability. [In its response to GL 2003– 01, [dated month, dd, yyyy], the licensee reported that it had determined that the [facility name] CRE pressurization surveillance, SR 3.7.[10].[4], was inadequate to demonstrate the operability of the CRE boundary, and proposed to replace it with an inleakage measurement SR and a CRE Habitability Program in TS Section 5.5, in accordance with the approved version of TSTF–448.] Based on the adoption of TSTF–448, Revision 3, the licensee’s proposal to delete SR 3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable. <End of Evaluation 6 > The proposed CRE inleakage measurement SR states, ‘‘Perform required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.’’ The CRE Habitability Program TS, proposed TS 5.5.[18], requires that the program include ‘‘Requirements for determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 5). This guidance references ASTM E741 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 (Reference 2) as an acceptable method for ascertaining the unfiltered leakage into the CRE. The licensee has [, however, not] proposed to follow this method. [The NRC staff reviewed the licensee’s proposed alternative method for measuring CRE inleakage to ensure it meets the criteria for such methods given in RG 1.197.] [Insert plant-specific technical evaluation by the staff of the alternative method.] [The NRC staff finds that the proposed alternative method satisfies the criteria of RG 1.197.] Therefore, the proposed CRE inleakage measurement SR is acceptable. 3.4 TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability Program The proposed administrative controls program TS is consistent with the model program TS in TSTF–448, Revision 3. In combination with SR 3.7.[10].[4], this program is intended to ensure the operability of the CRE boundary, which as part of an operable [CREEVS] will ensure that CRE habitability is maintained such that CRE occupants can control the reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving radiation exposures in excess of [5 rem whole body or its equivalent to any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)] for the duration of the accident. A CRE Habitability Program TS acceptable to the NRC staff requires the program to contain the following elements: Definitions of CRE and CRE boundary. This element is intended to ensure that these definitions accurately describe the plant areas that are within the CRE, and also the interfaces that form the CRE boundary, and are consistent with the general definitions discussed in Section 2.1 of this safety evaluation. Establishing what is meant by the CRE and the CRE boundary will preclude ambiguity in the implementation of the program. Configuration control and preventive maintenance of the CRE boundary. This element is intended to ensure the CRE boundary is maintained in its design condition. Guidance for implementing this element is contained in Regulatory Guide 1.196 (Reference 4), which endorsed, with exceptions, NEI 99–03 (Reference 6). Maintaining the CRE boundary in its design condition provides assurance that its leak- E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices tightness will not significantly degrade between CRE inleakage determinations. Assessment of CRE habitability at the frequencies stated in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 5), and measurement of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at the frequencies stated in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197. [The licensee proposed the following exception[s] to Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, to be listed in the TS with this program element.] [Insert plant-specific evaluation of licensee’s proposed exceptions.] This element is intended to ensure that the plant assesses CRE habitability consistent with Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 [and NRC approved exceptions]. Assessing CRE habitability at the NRC accepted frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of the CRE boundary will not go undetected between CRE inleakage determinations. Determination of CRE inleakage using test methods acceptable to the NRC staff assures that test results are reliable for ascertaining CRE boundary operability. Determination of CRE inleakage at the NRC accepted frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of the CRE boundary will not occur between CRE inleakage determinations. Measurement of CRE pressure with respect to all areas adjacent to the CRE boundary at designated locations for use in assessing the CRE boundary at a frequency of [18] months on a staggered test basis (with respect to the [CREEVS] trains). This element is intended to ensure that CRE differential pressure is regularly measured to identify changes in pressure warranting evaluation of the condition of the CRE boundary. Obtaining and trending pressure data provides additional assurance that significant degradation of the CRE boundary will not go undetected between CRE inleakage determinations. Quantitative limits on unfiltered inleakage. This element is intended to establish the CRE inleakage limit as the CRE unfiltered infiltration rate assumed in the CRE occupant radiological consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Having an unambiguous criterion for the CRE boundary to be considered operable in order to meet LCO 3.7.[10], will ensure that associated action requirements will be consistently applied in the event of CRE degradation resulting in inleakage exceeding the limit. Consistent with TSTF–448, Revision 3, the program states that the provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the program frequencies for performing the activities VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 required by program paragraph number c, parts (i) and (ii) (assessment of CRE habitability and measurement of CRE inleakage), and paragraph number d (measurement of CRE differential pressure). This statement is needed to avoid confusion. SR 3.0.2 is applicable to the surveillance that references the testing in the CRE Habitability Program. However, SR 3.0.2 is not applicable to Administrative Controls unless specifically invoked. Providing this statement in the program eliminates any confusion regarding whether SR 3.0.2 is applicable, and is acceptable. Consistent with TSTF–448, Revision 3, proposed TS 5.5. [18] states that (1) a CRE Habitability Program shall be established and implemented, (2) the program shall include all of the NRCstaff required elements, as described above, and (3) the provisions of SR 3.0.2 shall apply to program frequencies. Therefore, TS 5.5.[18], which is consistent with the model program TS approved by the NRC staff in TSTF–448, Revision 3, is acceptable. 4.0 State Consultation In accordance with the Commission’s regulations, the [ ] State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments—with subsequent disposition by the staff]. 5.0 Environmental Consideration The amendments change a requirement with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area as defined in 10 CFR Part 20 and change surveillance requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed finding that the amendments involve no-significant-hazards considerations, and there has been no public comment on the finding [xx FR xxxxx]. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendments. 6.0 Conclusion The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the considerations discussed PO 00000 Frm 00055 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2031 above, that (1) there is reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission’s regulations, and (3) the issuance of the amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public. 7.0 References 1. NRC Generic Letter 2003–01, ‘‘Control Room Habitability,’’ dated June 12, 2003, (GL 2003–01). 2. ASTM E 741–00, ‘‘Standard Test Method for Determining Air Change in a Single Zone by Means of a Tracer Gas Dilution,’’ 2000, (ASTM E741). 3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005–20: Revision to Guidance Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91–18, ’’Information to Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,’’ dated September 26, 2005 (RIS 2005–20). 4. Regulatory Guide 1.196, ‘‘Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, dated May 2003. 5. Regulatory Guide 1.197, ‘‘Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,’’ Revision 0, May 2003. 6. NEI 99–03,’’Control Room Habitability Assessment Guidance,’’ Revision 0, dated June 2001. Principal contributors: C. Harbuck. Model No-Significant-HazardsConsideration Determination Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430 through 1434) and plant specific technical specifications (TS), to strengthen TS requirements regarding control room envelope (CRE) habitability by changing the action and surveillance requirements associated with the limiting condition for operation operability requirements for the CRE emergency ventilation system, and by adding a new TS administrative controls program on CRE habitability. Accompanying the proposed TS change are appropriate conforming technical changes to the TS Bases. The proposed revision to the Bases also includes editorial and administrative changes to reflect applicable changes to the corresponding STS Bases, which were made to improve clarity, conform with the latest information and references, correct factual errors, and achieve more consistency among the STS NUREGs. The proposed revision to the TS and associated Bases is consistent with STS as revised by TSTF–448, Revision 3. E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 2032 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices accident from any accident previously evaluated. Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue of no significant hazards consideration is presented below: Criterion 3—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Reduction in the Margin of Safety Criterion 1—The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant Increase in the Probability or Consequences of an Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or configuration of the facility. The proposed change does not alter or prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed change revises the TS for the CRE emergency ventilation system, which is a mitigation system designed to minimize unfiltered air leakage into the CRE and to filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants in the event of accidents previously analyzed. An important part of the CRE emergency ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify the operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to assess and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency ventilation system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological consequences to CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that the CRE emergency ventilation system will perform as assumed in the consequence analyses of design basis accidents. Thus, the consequences of any accident previously evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES Criterion 2—The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a New or Different Kind of Accident from any Accident Previously Evaluated The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No new or different accidents result from performing the new surveillance or following the new program. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal plant operation. The proposed change does not alter any safety analysis assumptions and is consistent with current plant operating practice. Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The proposed change does not adversely affect systems that respond to safely shut down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not involve a nosignificant-hazards consideration. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 9th day of January, 2007. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Timothy J. Kobetz, Branch Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. The following model License Amendment Request (LAR) was prepared by the NRC staff to facilitate use of the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process (CLIIP). The model provides the expected level of detail and content for an application to revise plant technical specifications according to TSTF– 448, ‘‘Control Room Habitability,’’ Revision 3, using the CLIIP. Each licensee remains responsible for ensuring that its actual application fulfills its administrative requirements as well as Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations. U.S. Nuclear Regular Commission, Document Control Desk, Washington, DC 20555. Subject: Plant Name Docket No. 50– Application To Revise Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability in Accordance With TSTF–448, Revision 3, Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process Gentlemen: In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications (TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.]. The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements related to control room envelope habitability in accordance with TSTF–448, Revision 3. Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed changes, the requested confirmation of applicability, and plantspecific verifications. Attachment 2 provides PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 the existing TS pages marked up to show the proposed changes. [Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS pages.] [Attachment [4] provides a summary of the regulatory commitments made in this submittal.] Attachment [5] provides existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the proposed changes. [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by [DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X DAYS]. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with attachments, is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official. I declare [or certify, verify, state] under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. (Note that request may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation statement). If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]. Sincerely, [Name, Title] Attachments: 1. Description and Assessment 2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up) [3. Revised Technical Specification Pages] [[4]. Regulatory Commitments] [5]. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes (Mark-Up) cc: NRC Project Manager ——NRC Regional Office ——NRC Resident Inspector ——State Contact Attachment 1—DESCRIPTION AND ASSESSMENT 1.0 Description The proposed amendment would modify technical specification (TS) requirements related to control room envelope habitability in TS 3.7.[10], [‘‘Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)’’] and TS Section 5.5, [‘‘Administrative Controls—Programs.’’] The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change TSTF–448 Revision 3. The availability of this TS improvement was published in the Federal Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP). 2.0 Assessment 2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation [LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staff’s evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support TSTF–448. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications presented in the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment for the incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] TS. E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1 Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 10 / Wednesday, January 17, 2007 / Notices 2.2 Optional Changes and Variations [LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the TS changes described in the TSTF–448, Revision 3, or the applicable parts of the NRC staff’s model safety evaluation dated [DATE]. Note: The Applicant should state which parts of Section 3.0 of the model SE are applicable to its facility, since these sections contain variations based on the plant-specific design and existing TS requirements. 2.3 License Condition Regarding Initial Performance of New Surveillance and Assessment Requirements [LICENSEE] proposes the following as a license condition to support implementation of the proposed TS changes: Upon implementation of Amendment No. xxx adopting TSTF–448, Revision 3, the determination of control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered air inleakage as required by SR 3.7.[10].[4], in accordance with TS 5.5.[18].c.(i), the assessment of CRE habitability as required by Specification 5.5.[18].c.(ii), and the measurement of CRE pressure as required by Specification 5.5.[18].d, shall be considered met. Following implementation: (a) The first performance of SR 3.7.[10.5], in accordance with Specification 5.5.[18].c.(i), shall be within the specified Frequency of 6 years, plus the 15-month allowance of SR 3.0.2, as measured from [date], the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in the [date] letter response to Generic Letter 2003–01, or within the next 15 months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 6 years. (b) The first performance of the periodic assessment of CRE habitability, Specification 5.5.[18].c.(ii), shall be within 3 years, plus the 9-month allowance of SR 3.0.2, as measured from [date], the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in the [date] letter response to Generic Letter 2003–01, or within the next 9 months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas test is greater than 3 years. (c) The first performance of the periodic measurement of CRE pressure, Specification 5.5.[18].d, shall be within [18] months, plus the [138] days allowed by SR 3.0.2, as measured from [date], the date of the most recent successful pressure measurement test, or within [138] days if not performed previously. mstockstill on PROD1PC61 with NOTICES 3.0 Regulatory Analysis 3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHCD presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT] and is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91(a). [3.2 Commitments] [Note: The Applicant should state regulatory commitments proposed in support VerDate Aug<31>2005 13:58 Jan 16, 2007 Jkt 211001 of this LAR, if any, in this section, and restate them in optional Attachment 4.] 4.0 Environmental Evaluation [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in the model safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff’s findings presented in that evaluation are applicable to [PLANT] and the evaluation is hereby incorporated by reference for this application. Attachment 2—Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up) [Attachment 3—Revised Technical Specification Pages] [Attachment 4—Regulatory Commitments] The following table identifies those actions committed to by [LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are provided for information purposes and are not considered to be regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these commitments to [CONTACT NAME].] REGULATORY COMMITMENTS DUE DATE/ EVENT Attachment 5—Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages (MarkUp) [FR Doc. E7–503 Filed 1–16–07; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE Generalized System of Preferences (GSP): Notice Regarding the 2006 Annual Review for Products and Country Practices Office of the United States Trade Representative. ACTION: Notice. AGENCY: SUMMARY: The Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) received petitions in connection with the 2006 GSP Annual Review to modify the list of products that are eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP program and to modify the GSP status of certain GSP beneficiary developing countries because of country practices. This notice announces the product and country practice petitions that are accepted for further review in the 2006 GSP Annual Review, and sets forth the schedule for comment and public hearing on these petitions, for requesting participation in the hearing, and for submitting pre-hearing and posthearing briefs. The list of accepted petitions is available at: https:// www.ustr.gov/Trade_Development/ PO 00000 Frm 00057 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 2033 Preference_Programs/GSP/ Section_Index.html. This notice also announces closure of the review for case 003-CP–06 (formerly case 011–CP–05), Protection of Worker Rights in Uganda. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Contact the GSP Subcommittee of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 1724 F Street, NW., Room F–220, Washington, DC 20508. The telephone number is (202) 395–6971. DATES: The GSP regulations (15 CFR Part 2007) provide the schedule of dates for conducting an annual review unless otherwise specified in a Federal Register notice. The current schedule follows. Notification of any other changes will be given in the Federal Register. February 2, 2007 Due date for submission of pre-hearing briefs and requests to appear at the GSP Subcommittee Public Hearing that include the name, address, telephone, fax, e-mail address and organization of witnesses. February 16, 2007 GSP Subcommittee Public Hearing, Rooms 1 and 2, 1724 F St NW., Washington, DC 20508, beginning at 9:30 am. February 22, 2007 U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC)’s scheduled hearings on whether any industry in the United States is likely to be adversely affected by the waivers proposed by petition.) March 9, 2007 Due date for submission of post-hearing briefs. April 2007 USITC scheduled to publish report on products of cases 2006–01 to 2006–08. Comments on USITC reports on these products due 10 days after USITC date of publication. June 30, 2007 Modifications to the list of articles eligible for duty-free treatment under the GSP resulting from the 2006 Annual Review will be announced on or about June 30, 2007, in the Federal Register, and any changes will take effect on the effective date announced. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The GSP provides for the duty-free importation of designated articles when imported from designated beneficiary developing countries. The GSP is authorized by title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C. 2461, et seq.), as amended (the ‘‘1974 Act’’), and is implemented in accordance with Executive Order 11888 of November 24, 1975, as modified by subsequent Executive Orders and Presidential Proclamations. A. Petitions Requesting Modifications of Product Eligibility In a Federal Register notice dated June 29, 2006, USTR announced that the E:\FR\FM\17JAN1.SGM 17JAN1

Agencies

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 10 (Wednesday, January 17, 2007)]
[Notices]
[Pages 2022-2033]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E7-503]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Availability of Technical Specification Improvement To 
Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability Using 
the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Notice of Availability.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared and is making available a 
model safety evaluation (SE) and a model no-significant-hazards-
consideration (NSHC) determination relating to the modification of 
technical specification (TS) requirements regarding the habitability of 
the control room envelope (CRE) for referencing in license amendment 
requests (LARs). The NRC staff is also making available an associated 
model LAR for use by licensees to prepare such LARs. The TS 
modification is based on NRC staff approved changes to the improved 
standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) that were 
proposed by the pressurized and boiling water reactor owners groups' 
Technical Specifications Task Force (TSTF) on behalf of the commercial 
nuclear electrical power generation industry, in STS change traveler 
TSTF-448, Revision 3 (Rev 3). Previously, on October 17, 2006, drafts 
of the model SE, model NSHC determination, and model LAR were published 
in the Federal Register for public comment (71 FR 61075). Based on its 
evaluation of the public comments received in response to that notice, 
the NRC staff made appropriate changes to the models, and is including 
the final versions of the models in this notice. This notice also 
contains a description of each public comment and its disposition by 
the NRC staff. Based on its evaluation of the public comments, the NRC 
staff has decided to announce the availability of the model SE and

[[Page 2023]]

model NSHC determination to licensees for referencing in LARs to adopt 
TSTF-448, Rev 3, using the consolidated line item improvement process 
(CLIIP). An LAR that references the model SE and model NSHC 
determination will permit the NRC to efficiently process a license 
amendment that proposes to adopt the changes in TSTF-448, Rev 3. 
Licensees of nuclear power reactors proposing to adopt these changes 
should follow the guidance in the model LAR and confirm the 
applicability of the model SE and model NSHC determination to their 
reactors.

DATES: The NRC staff hereby announces that the attached model SE and 
model NSHC determination (which differ only slightly from the versions 
previously published) may be referenced in plant specific applications 
to adopt the improved CRE habitability TS requirements. The staff has 
also posted the model LAR (which also differs only slightly from the 
versions previously published) on the NRC web site to assist licensees 
in using the CLIIP to apply for the proposed TS change. The NRC staff 
can most efficiently consider applications based upon the model 
application if the application is submitted within a year of this 
Federal Register Notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: C. Craig Harbuck, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional 
Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-3140.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing 
proposed changes to the improved standard technical specifications 
(STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) in a manner that supports subsequent license 
amendment requests (LARs) from licensees. The CLIIP includes an 
opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed change to the STS 
after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a finding that the 
change will likely be offered for adoption by licensees. The CLIIP 
directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a proposed 
change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or announce the 
availability of the change for adoption by licensees. Licensees opting 
to apply for this TS change are responsible for reviewing the staff's 
evaluation, referencing the applicable technical justifications, and 
providing any necessary plant-specific information. Each LAR made in 
response to the notice of availability will be processed and noticed in 
accordance with applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    The present notice makes available for adoption by licensees a 
change to establish more effective and appropriate action, 
surveillance, and administrative TS requirements related to ensuring 
CRE habitability. This change was proposed for incorporation into the 
STS by the owners groups participants in the Technical Specification 
Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-448, Revision 3 (Rev 3). TSTF-
448, Rev 3, can be viewed on the NRC's Web page at https://www.nrc.gov/
reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs.html.

Applicability

    This proposal to modify the TS to establish more effective and 
appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements 
related to maintaining CRE habitability, as proposed in TSTF-448, Rev 
3, is applicable to all licensees.
    To efficiently process incoming license amendment requests (LARs), 
the staff requests that each licensee applying for the TS changes 
proposed in TSTF-448, Rev 3, use the CLIIP. The CLIIP does not prevent 
licensees from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the TS 
changes without the requested TS bases and TS bases control program. 
Variations from the approach recommended in this notice may require 
additional review by the NRC staff, and may increase the time and 
resources needed for the review. Significant variations from the 
approach, or inclusion of additional changes to the license, will 
result in staff rejection of the application. Instead, licensees 
desiring significant variations and/or additional changes should submit 
an LAR that does not request to adopt TSTF-448, Rev 3, using the CLIIP.

Evaluation of Public Comments on the Model Safety Evaluation, Model No 
Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Model License 
Amendment Request

    The NRC staff evaluated the public comments received on the model 
safety evaluation (SE), model no significant hazards consideration 
(NSHC) determination, and model license amendment request (LAR) 
published in the Federal Register on October 17, 2006 (71 FR 61075-
61084). Comments were received from Progress Energy (PE) (Agency-wide 
Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. 
ML063260063), Strategic Teaming and Resource Sharing (STARS) (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML063340340), and the pressurized and boiling water 
reactor owners groups' Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML063260064). The NRC staff also had one comment. The NRC 
staff's disposition of each comment follows.
    1. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 2.3, Paragraph 8 (71 FR 61078). 
Comment: ``Other Technical Specifications currently exist that are 
directly related to control room habitability (e.g., NUREG-1430, TS 
3.3.16, ``Control Room Isolation--High Radiation,'' NUREG-1431, TS 
3.3.7, ``CREFS Actuation Instrumentation,'' and NUREG-1432, TS 3.3.8, 
``Control Room Isolation Signal (CRIS)''). It is recommended that the 
paragraph be revised as follows: Prior to incorporation of TSTF-448, 
Revision 3, the STS requirements addressing CRE boundary operability 
resided only in the following CRE ventilation system specifications:
    Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated 
the recommended change into the model SE.
    2. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 2.4, Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61078). 
Comment: [The SE] characterizes the six year surveillance frequency for 
demonstrating unfiltered leakage into the control room envelope (CRE) 
is within limits as a relatively long test interval (frequency). When 
compared with the 15 year test frequency justified for the integrated 
leak rate test of containment, the six year frequency seems exceedingly 
short. This is particularly true given the safety (risk) significance 
of containment relative to the CRE boundary. Therefore, the bases for 
the six year frequency should be included in the model safety 
evaluation. Additionally, the model safety evaluation should allow 
sites the option to justify a site specific test frequency based on 
unique site characteristics using a risk-informed approach. (e.g., 
Regulatory Guide 1.177--An Approach for Plant-Specific, Risk-Informed 
Decisionmaking: Technical Specifications)
    Disposition: The NRC staff determined that explicitly suggesting in 
the model LAR that an applicant propose longer test intervals based on 
risk considerations is inappropriate because such a request would 
exceed the scope of changes covered by TSTF-448, Rev 3, would require 
staff

[[Page 2024]]

evaluation beyond that described in the model SE, and could not be 
considered under the CLIIP. The proposed TS Bases for the in-leakage 
surveillance gives the basis for the six-year frequency by referencing 
the TS CRE Habitability Program, which requires this surveillance to be 
performed ``in accordance with the testing methods and at the 
Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 
1.197.'' However, the phrase ``relatively long'' in the model SE is 
potentially misleading and has been removed.
    3. (PE) Reference: Model SE Section 3.4 Paragraph 1 (71 FR 61081). 
Comment: [The] model safety evaluation states: The program shall ensure 
that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit access and 
occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) conditions * * *
    The control room envelope boundary and programs to maintain it are 
providing the necessary radiological protection for occupancy of the 
control room. The program is independent of any ability to ``access'' 
the control room. Therefore, it is recommended that the sentence be 
revised as follows: The program shall ensure that adequate radiation 
protection is provided to permit occupancy of the CRE under design 
basis accident (DBA) conditions * * *
    Disposition: Occupancy of the CRE must account for any radiation 
sources encountered outside the CRE while accessing (going to and from) 
the CRE. The proposed CRE Habitability Program TS states, ``The program 
shall ensure that adequate radiation protection is provided to permit 
access and occupancy of the CRE under design basis accident (DBA) 
conditions * * * .'' The recommendation is not accepted.
    4. (PE) (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: Model LAR Section 3.2 (71 FR 
61084). Comment: Section 3.2 of the model LAR requires that the 
applicant make three commitments. Commitments 2 and 3 state:

     2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures to implement the 
new surveillance and programmatic TS requirements related to CRE 
habitability.
     3. [LICENSEE] commits to Regulatory Positions C.1 and 
C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 
Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003, with 
the following exceptions: [Add descriptions of proposed exceptions.]

    In the case of commitment 2, 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, 
``Instructions, Procedures, and Drawings,'' already requires that, 
``Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented 
instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the 
circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these 
instructions, procedures, or drawings.''
    In the case of commitment 3, the commitment is specifically 
addressed by the wording that will be included in Technical 
Specifications per Technical Specification Task Force 448 (TSTF-448) 
Section 5.5.18c (5 .5.15c for boiling water reactors) which states:

    Requirements for (i) determining the unfiltered air inleakage 
past the CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing 
methods and at the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of 
Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 
Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003, and 
(ii) assessing CRE habitability at the Frequencies specified in 
Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0.
    [The following are exceptions to Sections C.1 and C.2 of 
Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0: 1.; and]

    Therefore, upon approval of the licensee's amendment request, 
proposed commitments 2 and 3 will be addressed through legally binding 
regulatory obligations (i.e., 10 CFR 50, Appendix B and Technical 
Specifications) making regulatory commitments duplicative and an 
unnecessary burden on the licensee. It is recommended that commitments 
2 and 3 be deleted from the subject model LAR.
    Disposition: The NRC staff accepts the recommendation and has 
removed commitments 2 and 3 from Section 3.2 and Attachment 4 of the 
model LAR.
    5. (TSTF) Reference: In the Notice under ``Applicability,'' the 
last sentence (71 FR 61076). Comment: Should a licensee submit an 
application that requests adoption of TSTF-448 but includes significant 
variations or additional changes, it would facilitate the NRC's review 
for the licensee to acknowledge that the change is based on TSTF-448 so 
that the NRC may use the model safety evaluation to the extent 
possible. We recommend revising the [last] sentence as follows: 
``Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/or additional 
changes should submit a license amendment request (LAR) that does not 
request to adopt TSTF-448, Rev 3, under the Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process.''
    Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated 
the recommended change into the present notice.
    6. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 2.2 (71 FRN 61083). 
Comment: We recommend that the NRC modify Section 2.2 of the Model 
Application, ``Optional Changes and Variations,'' to request that 
licensees describe which optional portions of the model Safety 
Evaluation are applicable.
    Disposition: The NRC staff accepted the comment and incorporated 
the recommended change as a note at the end of the first paragraph of 
Section 2.2 of the model LAR.
    7. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 2.3, first paragraph (71 FR 
61077). Comment: Section 2.3, ``Regulations Applicable to Control Room 
Habitability,'' lists General Design Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix 
A. Many licensees are not committed to the General Design Criteria and 
the wording of this section may result in many plants proposing an 
unnecessary variation in response to the required verification that the 
published safety evaluation is applicable in Section 2.2 of the model 
application. We recommend adding the following sentence to the first 
paragraph prior to the last sentence, ``Any licensee commitments to 
these criteria are described in the plant's licensing basis 
documents.''
    Disposition: The following optional sentence is added to the first 
paragraph for use by applicants whose facilities are not licensed under 
the General Design Criteria from 10 CFR 50, Appendix A. ``[Facilities 
not licensed under the General Design Criteria from 10 CFR Part 50 are 
licensed under similar plant-specific design criteria, as described in 
the facility's licensing basis documents.]''
    8. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 3.3, Evaluation 5 (71 FR 
61080). Comment: Remove Mode 4 from the sentence about the applicable 
operational modes for new Action B of TS 3.7.[4] because the BWR/4 and 
BWR/6 Applicability does not include Mode 4 for this action 
requirement.
    Disposition: The NRC staff replaced the subject sentence with 
``This new condition in Action F is needed because proposed Action B 
will only apply in Modes 1, 2, and 3.''
    9. (TSTF) Reference: Model SE Section 3.3, Evaluation 6 (71 FR 
61081). Comment: In Evaluation 6, the next to the last sentence is 
overly specific concerning the wording of the licensee's Generic Letter 
2003-01 response about the adequacy of existing surveillance 
requirements to verify CRE boundary operability, and may lead to many 
plants proposing an unnecessary variation in response to the required 
verification that the published safety evaluation is applicable in 
Section 2.2 of the model LAR. The acceptability of

[[Page 2025]]

the deletion of SR 3.7.[10].[4] is not dependent on the licensee's 
Generic Letter response, but on the findings in the Generic Letter. We 
propose revising the sentences to be consistent with the statements in 
Section 1.0 of the model Safety Evaluation, such as ``In Generic Letter 
2003-01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted to findings that the 
differential pressure surveillance is not a reliable method for 
demonstrating CRE boundary operability. Based on the adoption of TSTF-
448, Revision 3, the licensee's proposal to delete SR 3.7.[10].[4] is 
acceptable.''
    Response: If the language of the model SE is not consistent with 
the wording of the licensee's Generic Letter 2003-01 response, the 
licensee should explain the inconsistency in its LAR to facilitate 
evaluation of the inconsistency by the staff in the SE for the license 
amendment. To account for the possibility of an inconsistency, the 
model SE is revised by surrounding the sentence in brackets.
    10. (TSTF) Reference: Model NSHC determination (71 FR 61082). 
Comment: In the evaluation of Criterion 2, add the word ``Accident'' 
before the word ``Previously'' in the title, and change ``an accident'' 
to ``any accident'' in the last sentence to match the wording of 
Criterion 2 in 10 CFR 50.92(c)(2).
    Disposition: The model NSHC determination was revised as suggested.
    11. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR title, second sentence (71 FR 
61083). Comment: Revise the sentence by inserting the phrase ``Plant 
Technical Specifications'' after the phrase ``to Revise'' and changing 
``Tstf-448'' to ``TSTF-448.''
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested.
    12. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 2.2, third paragraph (71 
FR 61083). Comment: Change the date ``June 2003'' to ``June 2001.''
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested.
    13. (TSTF) (STARS) Reference: Model LAR, lists of Attachments in 
cover letter, and Attachment 3 cover page title (71 FR 61083 and 4). 
Comment: Place brackets around references to the revised TS pages in 
the LAR cover letter and the Attachment 3 cover page title, and replace 
``Proposed'' with ``Revised'' in the Attachment 3 cover page title. 
Providing smooth revised TS pages should be optional in the LAR. Also, 
make the Attachment 4 cover page title consistent with the title as 
stated in the LAR cover letter by removing ``list of.''
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested. Finally, 
because the revised model LAR contains no list of regulatory 
commitments, the NRC staff added brackets around appropriate text in 
the model LAR to indicate that including regulatory commitments is 
optional.
    14. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR cover letter, next to last 
paragraph (71 FR 61083). Comment: Revise the oath or affirmation 
statement to match the phrasing contained in Regulatory Issue Summary 
(RIS) 2001-18, ``Requirements for Oath or Affirmation.''
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised to match RIS 2001-18.
    15. (TSTF) Reference: Model LAR, Section 3.2 (71 FR 61084). 
Comment: Commitment 1 states, ``[LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of 
NEI 99-03, Revision 0, ``Control Room Habitability Assessment 
Guidance'' dated June 2001, which provides guidance and details on the 
assessment and management of control room envelope (CRE) 
habitability.''
    This commitment should be deleted. A licensee general commitment to 
NEI 99-03, Revision 0, is not relied upon in TSTF-448 or the model 
Safety Evaluation as a basis for finding the proposed changes 
acceptable. The analysis in the model Safety Evaluation does not 
support a conclusion that the NRC Staff has a ``significant interest'' 
in the matter to warrant a commitment.
    There are only two references to NEI 99-03 in TSTF-448 and in the 
model Safety Evaluation:
    a. The model SE, Section 3.4, ``TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability 
Program,'' refers to NEI 99-03, Revision 0, as one of two documents 
(with Regulatory Guide 1.196) containing guidance related to 
configuration control and maintenance of the control room envelope 
boundary. TSTF-448, Revision 3, proposed Specification 5.5.[18], 
``Control Room Envelope Habitability Program,'' paragraph b, requires 
that the licensee's Control Room Envelope Habitability Program include 
requirements for maintaining the control room envelope boundary in its 
design condition including configuration control and preventive 
maintenance. NEI 99-03, Revision 0, discusses configuration control and 
maintenance in Section 9.4, ``Configuration Control,'' which contains 
only generic guidance applicable to any configuration control program 
and which encompasses less than 2 pages of a 177 page document. A 
generic commitment to all of NEI 99-03, Revision 0, for this purpose is 
unnecessary and unjustified. The appropriate control is already 
provided by the Technical Specifications and NEI 99-03, [Revision 0, 
Section 9.4] is only one method of meeting the Technical Specification 
requirement.
    b. The proposed Bases for SR 3.7.[10].[4] (the inleakage test) 
state, ``Compensatory measures are discussed in Regulatory Guide 1.196, 
Section C.2.7.3, (Ref. 5) which endorses, with exceptions, NEI 99-03, 
Section 8.4 and Appendix F (Ref. 6).'' This very specific reference in 
the Technical Specification Bases to portions (8 pages of the 177 page 
document) of NEI 99-03, [Revision 0] do not justify a generic 
commitment to the entire document.
    Disposition: The NRC staff revised the model application to remove 
the commitment as suggested.
    16. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR cover letter (71 FR 61083). 
Comment: After the sentence ``Attachment 4 provides a summary of the 
regulatory commitments made in this submittal.'' insert ``Attachment 5 
provides the existing TS Bases pages marked up to show proposed change 
and is for information only.'' For completeness, this adds information 
related to Attachment 5 in the cover letter.
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised by adding the sentence 
``Attachment 5 provides existing TS Bases pages marked up to show the 
proposed changes.'' The NRC staff expects that a licensee adopting a 
TSTF change to the STS will also adopt associated changes to the STS 
Bases or provide in its LAR a justification for any deviation.
    17. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR, Attachment 1, Section 1.0, 
paragraph 1 (71 FR 61083). Comment: Place the title of TS Section 5.5 
in brackets to account for the possibility that some facilities may 
have a different title.
    Disposition: The model LAR was revised as suggested.
    18. (STARS) Reference: Model LAR cover letter (71 FR 61083) and 
Attachment 5 cover page (71 FR 61084). Comment: Include the phrase 
``(For Information Only)'' to the title of Attachment 5.
    Disposition: As noted in the disposition of Comment 16, the NRC 
staff expects that a licensee adopting a TSTF change to the STS will 
also adopt associated changes to the STS Bases or provide in its LAR a 
justification for any deviation. Consequently, the suggested phrase is 
not appropriate and is not adopted.
    19. (NRC staff) Reference: Model SE Section 3.1, last paragraph (71 
FR 61079); model LAR, Section 2.2, third paragraph (71 FR 61083); model 
LAR Section 3.2 and Attachment 4, first commitment (71 FR 61083). 
Comment: Remove option to follow guidance in March 2003 version of NEI 
99-03 contingent upon showing that differences with the June 2001 
version

[[Page 2026]]

do not conflict with staff positions in Regulatory Guide 1.196, because 
the NRC has not endorsed the March 2003 version.
    Disposition: The model SE and model LAR have been revised to remove 
the option of referencing the March 2003 version of NEI 99-03, as 
described in the disposition of Comment 15. The NRC staff recommends 
that implementation of any guidance in NEI 99-03, Revision 0, dated 
June 2001, that a licensee elects to follow, be consistent with the NRC 
staff positions in Regulatory Guide 1.196.

Adoption of TSTF-448, Rev 3

    Licensees wishing to adopt TSTF-448, Rev 3, must submit an LAR in 
accordance with applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For 
each LAR, the NRC staff will publish a notice of consideration of 
issuance of amendment to a facility operating license, a proposed NSHC 
determination, and a notice of opportunity for a hearing. The NRC staff 
will also publish a notice of issuance of an amendment to a facility 
operating license to announce the modification of TS requirements 
related to CRE habitability, for each plant that receives the requested 
change.

Model Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation

Consolidated Line Item Improvement; Adoption of Changes to Standard 
Technical Specifications Under Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) Change Number TSTF-448, Revision 3 Regarding Control Room 
Envelope Habitability

1.0 Introduction

    By application dated [ ] [as supplemented by letters dated [ and 
]], [Name of Licensee] (the licensee) requested changes to the 
Technical Specifications (TS) for the [Name of Facility]. [The 
supplements dated [ and ], provided additional information that 
clarified the application, did not expand the scope of the application 
as originally noticed, and did not change the staff's original proposed 
no significant hazards consideration determination as published in the 
Federal Register on [Date (PM/LA will fill in FR information)] (XX FR 
XXXX).]
    On August 8, 2006, the commercial nuclear electrical power 
generation industry owners group Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) submitted a proposed change, TSTF-448, Revision 3, to the 
improved standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) on 
behalf of the industry (TSTF-448, Revisions 0, 1, and 2 were prior 
draft iterations). TSTF-448, Revision 3, is a proposal to establish 
more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative 
STS requirements related to ensuring the habitability of the control 
room envelope (CRE).
    In United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter 
2003-01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted to findings at facilities 
that existing TS surveillance requirements for the [Control Room 
Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS )] may not be adequate. 
Specifically, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer gas tests 
to measure control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered inleakage at 
facilities indicated that the differential pressure surveillance is not 
a reliable method for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. Licensees 
were requested to address existing TS as follows:

    Provide confirmation that your technical specifications verify 
the integrity [i.e., operability] of the CRE [boundary], and the 
assumed [unfiltered] inleakage rates of potentially contaminated 
air. If you currently have a differential pressure surveillance 
requirement to demonstrate CRE [boundary] integrity, provide the 
basis for your conclusion that it remains adequate to demonstrate 
CRE integrity in light of the ASTM E741 testing results. If you 
conclude that your differential pressure surveillance requirement is 
no longer adequate, provide a schedule for: (1) Revising the 
surveillance requirement in your technical specification to 
reference an acceptable surveillance methodology (e.g., ASTM E741), 
and (2) making any necessary modifications to your CRE [boundary] so 
that compliance with your new surveillance requirement can be 
demonstrated.
    If your facility does not currently have a technical 
specification surveillance requirement for your CRE integrity, 
explain how and at what frequency you confirm your CRE integrity and 
why this is adequate to demonstrate CRE integrity.

    To promote standardization and to minimize the resources that would 
be needed to create and process plant-specific amendment applications 
in response to the concerns described in the generic letter, the 
industry and the NRC proposed revisions to CRE habitability system 
requirements contained in the STS, using the STS change traveler 
process. This effort culminated in Revision 3 to traveler TSTF-448, 
``Control Room Habitability,'' which the NRC staff approved on [month 
dd, 2006].
    Consistent with the traveler as incorporated into NUREG-143[0], the 
licensee proposed revising action and surveillance requirements in 
[Specification 3.7.10, ``Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation 
System (CREEVS),''] and adding a new administrative controls program, 
[Specification 5.5.18, ``CRE Habitability Program.''] The purpose of 
the changes is to ensure that CRE boundary operability is maintained 
and verified through effective surveillance and programmatic 
requirements, and that appropriate remedial actions are taken in the 
event of an inoperable CRE boundary.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

2.1 Control Room and Control Room Envelope

    NRC Regulatory Guide 1.196, ``Control Room Habitability at Light-
water Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003, (Reference 4) 
uses the term ``control room envelope (CRE)'' in addition to the term 
``control room'' and defines each term as follows:

    Control Room: The plant area, defined in the facility licensing 
basis, in which actions can be taken to operate the plant safely 
under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe 
condition during accident situations. It encompasses the 
instrumentation and controls necessary for a safe shutdown of the 
plant and typically includes the critical document reference file, 
computer room (if used as an integral part of the emergency response 
plan), shift supervisor's office, operator wash room and kitchen, 
and other critical areas to which frequent personnel access or 
continuous occupancy may be necessary in the event of an accident.
    Control Room Envelope: The plant area, defined in the facility 
licensing basis, that in the event of an emergency, can be isolated 
from the plant areas and the environment external to the CRE. This 
area is served by an emergency ventilation system, with the intent 
of maintaining the habitability of the control room. This area 
encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical 
areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is 
not necessary in the event of an accident.

    NRC Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 
Integrity At Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003 (Reference 
5), also contains these definitions, but uses the term CRE to mean 
both. This is because the protected environment provided for operators 
varies with the nuclear power facility. At some facilities this 
environment is limited to the control room; at others, it is the CRE. 
In this safety evaluation, consistent with the proposed changes to the 
STS, the CRE will be used to designate both. For consistency, 
facilities should use the term CRE with an appropriate facility-
specific definition derived from the above CRE definition.

[[Page 2027]]

2.2 [Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)]

    The [CREEVS] provides a protected environment from which operators 
can control the unit, during airborne challenges from radioactivity, 
hazardous chemicals, and fire byproducts, such as fire suppression 
agents and smoke, during both normal and accident conditions.
    The [CREEVS] is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the 
control room envelope for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a 
Design Basis Accident (DBA) without exceeding a [5 rem whole body dose 
or its equivalent to any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE)].
    The [CREEVS] consists of two redundant trains [subsystems], each 
capable of maintaining the habitability of the CRE. The [CREEVS] is 
considered operable when the individual components necessary to limit 
operator exposure are operable in both trains [subsystems]. A [CREEVS] 
train [subsystem] is considered operable when the associated:
     Fan is operable;
     High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and 
charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are 
capable of performing their filtration functions;
     Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are 
operable, and air circulation can be maintained; and
     CRE boundary is operable (the single boundary supports 
both trains [subsystems]).
    The CRE boundary is considered operable when the measured 
unfiltered air inleakage is less than or equal to the inleakage value 
assumed by the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident 
consequences to CRE occupants.

2.3 Regulations Applicable To Control Room Habitability

    In Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and 
Utilization Facilities,'' General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 19 apply to CRE habitability. A summary of these GDCs follows. 
[Facilities not licensed under the GDC from 10 CFR Part 50 are licensed 
under similar plant-specific design criteria, as described in the 
facility's licensing basis documents.]
    GDC 1, ``Quality Standards and Records,'' requires that structures, 
systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed, 
fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with 
the importance of the safety functions performed.
    GDC 2, ``Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,'' 
requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to 
safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes and other 
natural hazards.
    GDC 3, ``Fire Protection,'' requires SSCs important to safety be 
designed and located to minimize the effects of fires and explosions.
    GDC 4, ``Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases,'' requires 
SSCs important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of 
and to be compatible with the environmental conditions associated with 
normal operation, maintenance, testing, and postulated accidents, 
including loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs).
    GDC 5, ``Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,'' requires 
that SSCs important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units 
unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair 
their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the 
event of an accident in one unit, the orderly shutdown and cooldown of 
the remaining units.
    GDC 19, ``Control Room,'' requires that a control room be provided 
from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear reactor safely 
under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition 
under accident conditions, including a LOCA. Adequate radiation 
protection is to be provided to permit access and occupancy of the 
control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving 
radiation exposures in excess of specified values.
    Prior to incorporation of TSTF-448, Revision 3, the STS 
requirements addressing CRE boundary operability resided only in the 
following CRE ventilation system specifications:
     NUREG-1430, TS 3.7.10, ``Control Room Emergency 
Ventilation System (CREVS);''
     NUREG-1431, TS 3.7.10, ``Control Room Emergency Filtration 
System (CREFS);''
     NUREG-1432, TS 3.7.11, ``Control Room Emergency Air 
Cleanup System (CREACS);''
     NUREG-1433, TS 3.7.4, ``[Main Control Room Environmental 
Control (MCREC)] System;'' and
     NUREG-1434, TS 3.7.3, ``[Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA)] 
System.''
    In these specifications, the surveillance requirement associated 
with demonstrating the operability of the CRE boundary requires 
verifying that one [CREEVS] train [subsystem] can maintain a positive 
pressure of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent 
[turbine building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a 
makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. Facilities that pressurize the CRE 
during the emergency mode of operation of the [CREEVS] have similar 
surveillance requirements. Other facilities that do not pressurize the 
CRE have only a system flow rate criterion for the emergency mode of 
operation. Regardless, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer 
gas tests to measure CRE unfiltered inleakage at facilities indicated 
that the differential pressure surveillance (or the alternative 
surveillance at non-pressurization facilities) is not a reliable method 
for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. That is, licensees were 
able to obtain differential pressure and flow measurements satisfying 
the SR limits even though unfiltered inleakage was determined to exceed 
the value assumed in the safety analyses.
    In addition to an inadequate surveillance requirement, the action 
requirements of these specifications were ambiguous regarding CRE 
boundary operability in the event CRE unfiltered inleakage is found to 
exceed the analysis assumption. The ambiguity stemmed from the view 
that the CRE boundary may be considered operable but degraded in this 
condition, and that it would be deemed inoperable only if calculated 
radiological exposure limits for CRE occupants exceeded a licensing 
basis limit; e.g., as stated in GDC-19, even while crediting 
compensatory measures.
    NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, ``Dispositioning of Technical 
Specifications That Are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety,'' (AL 98-
10) states that `` the discovery of an improper or inadequate TS value 
or required action is considered a degraded or nonconforming 
condition,'' which is defined in [NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 9900; 
see latest guidance in RIS 2005-20 (Reference 3)]. ``Imposing 
administrative controls in response to an improper or inadequate TS is 
considered an acceptable short-term corrective action. The [NRC] staff 
expects that, following the imposition of administrative controls, an 
amendment to the [inadequate] TS, with appropriate justification and 
schedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion.''
    Licensees that have found unfiltered inleakage in excess of the 
limit assumed in the safety analyses and have yet to either reduce the 
inleakage below the limit or establish a higher bounding limit through 
re-analysis, have

[[Page 2028]]

implemented compensatory actions to ensure the safety of CRE occupants, 
pending final resolution of the condition, consistent with RIS 2005-20. 
However, based on GL 2003-01 and AL 98-10, the staff expects each 
licensee to propose TS changes that include a surveillance to 
periodically measure CRE unfiltered inleakage in order to satisfy 10 
CFR 50.36(c)(3), which requires a facility's TS to include surveillance 
requirements, which it defines as ``requirements relating to test, 
calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of 
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be 
within safety limits, and that limiting conditions for operation will 
be met.'' (Emphasis added.)
    The NRC staff also expects facilities to propose unambiguous 
remedial actions, consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), for the condition 
of not meeting the limiting condition for operation (LCO) due to an 
inoperable CRE boundary. The action requirements should specify a 
reasonable completion time to restore conformance to the LCO before 
requiring a facility to be shut down. This completion time should be 
based on the benefits of implementing mitigating actions to ensure CRE 
occupant safety and sufficient time to resolve most problems 
anticipated with the CRE boundary, while minimizing the chance that 
operators in the CRE will need to use mitigating actions during 
accident conditions.

2.4 Adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, by [facility name]

    Adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, will assure that the facility's 
TS LCO for the [CREEVS] is met by demonstrating unfiltered leakage into 
the CRE is within limits; i.e., the operability of the CRE boundary. In 
support of this surveillance, which specifies a test interval 
(frequency) of 6 years, TSTF-448 also adds TS administrative controls 
to assure the habitability of the CRE between performances of the ASTM 
E741 test. In addition, adoption of TSTF-448 will establish clearly 
stated and reasonable required actions in the event CRE unfiltered 
inleakage is found to exceed the analysis assumption.
    The changes made by TSTF-448 to the STS requirements for the 
[CREEVS] and the CRE boundary conform to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(3). Their adoption will better assure that [facility name]'s 
CRE will remain habitable during normal operation and design basis 
accident conditions. These changes are, therefore, acceptable from a 
regulatory standpoint.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes against the 
corresponding changes made to the STS by TSTF-448, Revision 3, which 
the NRC staff has found to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, 
as described above in Section 2.0. [The emergency operational mode of 
the [CREEVS] at [facility name] [pressurizes] [isolates but does not 
pressurize] the CRE to minimize unfiltered air inleakage.] The proposed 
changes are consistent with this design.

3.1 Proposed Changes

    The proposed amendment would strengthen CRE habitability TS 
requirements by changing TS [3.7.10, CREEVS] and adding a new TS 
administrative controls program on CRE habitability. Accompanying the 
proposed TS changes are appropriate conforming technical changes to the 
TS Bases. The proposed revision to the Bases also includes editorial 
and administrative changes to reflect applicable changes to the 
corresponding STS Bases, which were made to improve clarity, conform 
with the latest information and references, correct factual errors, and 
achieve more consistency among the STS NUREGs. [Except for plant 
specific differences, all of] these changes are consistent with STS as 
revised by TSTF-448, Revision 3.
    The NRC staff compared the proposed TS changes to the STS and the 
STS markups and evaluations in TSTF-448. [The staff verified that 
differences from the STS were adequately justified on the basis of 
plant-specific design or retention of current licensing basis.] The NRC 
staff also reviewed the proposed changes to the TS Bases for 
consistency with the STS Bases and the plant-specific design and 
licensing bases, although approval of the Bases is not a condition for 
accepting the proposed amendment. However, TS 5.5.[11], ``TS Bases 
Control Program,'' provides assurance that the licensee has established 
and will maintain the adequacy of the Bases. The proposed Bases for TS 
3.7.[10] refer to specific guidance in NEI 99-03, ``Control Room 
Habitability Assessment Guidance,'' Revision 0, dated June 2001 
(Reference 6), which the NRC staff has formally endorsed, with 
exceptions, through Regulatory Guide 1.196, ``Control Room Habitability 
at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dated May 2003 (Reference 4).

3.2 Editorial Changes

    The licensee proposed editorial changes to TS [3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] 
to establish standard terminology, such as ``control room envelope 
(CRE)'' in place of ``control room,'' except for the plant-specific 
name for the [CREEVS], and ``radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards 
(or challenges)'' in place of various phrases to describe the hazards 
that CRE occupants are protected from by the [CREEVS]. [The licensee 
also proposed to correct a typographical error by replacing 
``irradiate'' with ``irradiated'' in TS 3.7.10 Condition E.] These 
changes improve the usability and quality of the presentation of the 
TS, have no impact on safety, and therefore, are acceptable.

3.3 TS [3.7.10, CREEVS]

< Evaluation 1--for facilities that have adopted the [CREEVS] TS LCO 
Note and Action B of TSTF-287, Rev. 5 >
    The licensee proposed to revise the action requirements of TS 
[3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] to acknowledge that an inoperable CRE boundary, 
depending upon the location of the associated degradation, could cause 
just one, instead of both [CREEVS] [trains] to be inoperable. This is 
accomplished by revising Condition A to exclude Condition B, and 
revising Condition B to address one or more [CREEVS] [trains], as 
follows:
     Condition A One [CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons 
other than Condition B.
     Condition B One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due 
to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4].
    This change clarifies how to apply the action requirements in the 
event just one [CREEVS] [train] is unable to ensure CRE occupant safety 
within licensing basis limits because of an inoperable CRE boundary. It 
enhances the usability of Conditions A and B with a presentation that 
is more consistent with the intent of the existing requirements. This 
change is an administrative change because it neither reduces nor 
increases the existing action requirements, and, therefore, is 
acceptable.
    The licensee proposed to replace existing Required Action B.1, 
``Restore control room boundary to OPERABLE status,'' which has a 24-
hour Completion Time, with Required Action B.1, to immediately initiate 
action to implement mitigating actions; Required Action B.2, to verify, 
within 24 hours, that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant radiological 
exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis 
analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from 
hazardous chemicals

[[Page 2029]]

and smoke; and Required Action B.3, to restore CRE boundary to operable 
status within 90 days.
    The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is 
reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this 
time period, and the use of mitigating actions as directed by Required 
Action B.1. The 90-day Completion Time of new Required Action B.3 is 
reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will 
ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while 
limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement 
protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control 
the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event 
of a DBA. The 90-day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, 
plan and possibly repair, and test most anticipated problems with the 
CRE boundary. Therefore, proposed Action B is acceptable.
< End of Evaluation 1 >
< Evaluation 2--for facilities that have not yet adopted the [CREEVS] 
TS LCO Note and Action B of TSTF-287, Rev. 5 >
    The licensee proposed to establish new action requirements in TS 
[3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] for an inoperable CRE boundary. Currently, if one 
[CREEVS] [train] is determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable 
CRE boundary, existing Action A would apply and require restoring the 
[train] (and the CRE boundary) to operable status in 7 days. If two 
[trains] are determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable CRE 
boundary, existing Action [E] specifies no time to restore the [trains] 
(and the CRE boundary) to operable status, but requires immediate entry 
into the shutdown actions of LCO 3.0.3. These existing Actions are more 
restrictive than would be appropriate in situations for which CRE 
occupant implementation of compensatory measures or mitigating actions 
would temporarily afford adequate CRE occupant protection from 
postulated airborne hazards. To account for such situations, the 
licensee proposed to revise the action requirements to add a new 
Condition B, ``One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to 
inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4].'' New Action B 
would allow 90 days to restore the CRE boundary (and consequently, the 
affected [CREEVS] [trains]) to operable status, provided that 
mitigating actions are immediately implemented and within 24 hours are 
verified to ensure, that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant 
radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the 
licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants 
are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.
    The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is 
reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this 
time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90-day Completion 
Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating 
actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits 
while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to 
implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability 
to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in 
the event of a DBA. The 90-day Completion Time of new Required Action 
B.3 is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and 
test most anticipated problems with the CRE boundary. Therefore, 
proposed Action B is acceptable.
    To distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for one 
[CREEVS] [train] inoperable, Condition A is revised to state, ``One 
[CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.'' To 
distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for two 
[CREEVS] [trains] inoperable, Condition [E] (renumbered as Condition 
[F]) is revised to state, ``Two [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable during 
MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4] for reasons other than Condition B.'' The 
changes to existing Conditions A and [E] are less restrictive because 
these Conditions will no longer apply in the event one or two [CREEVS] 
[trains] are inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during unit 
operation in Mode 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4]. This is acceptable because the 
new Action B establishes adequate remedial measures in this condition. 
With the addition of a new Condition B, existing Conditions B, C, D, 
and E are re-designated C, D, E, and F, respectively.
    The licensee also proposed to modify the [CREEVS] LCO by adding a 
note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under 
administrative controls. As stated in the LCO Bases, this Note ``only 
applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to 
the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access 
panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of 
the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. 
For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist 
of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in 
continuous communication with operators in the CRE. This individual 
will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE 
boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need 
for CRE isolation is indicated.'' The allowance of this note is 
acceptable because the administrative controls will ensure that the 
opening will be quickly sealed to maintain the validity of the 
licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences.
< End of Evaluation 2 >
< Evaluation 3--for B&W CREVS TS >
    The existing TS 3.7.10 condition for two control room emergency 
ventilation system (CREVS) trains inoperable during refueling, 
Condition E, is revised to also apply during plant operation in Modes 5 
and 6. It will state, ``Two CREVS trains inoperable [in MODE 5 or 6, 
or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.'' This 
change clarifies the applicability of this condition for dual unit 
facilities when the unit is in Mode 5 or 6, and the other unit is 
moving [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. Similarly, Condition D, 
for failing to meet Action A during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies, is revised to also apply in Modes 5 and 6. These 
changes are administrative because they only clarify the intended 
applicability of the existing conditions, and are, therefore, 
acceptable. Required Actions D.2 and E.1, to immediately suspend 
movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, ensures that a fuel 
handling accident cannot occur while the unit is in these conditions. 
With only one CREVS train inoperable, Required Action D.1 specifies an 
alternative to immediately suspending fuel movement; it requires 
immediately placing the operable CREVS train in its emergency operating 
alignment, or mode, to minimize the chance the train will fail to 
properly switch to this mode if called upon in response to a fuel 
handling accident, or other airborne hazards challenge.
< End of Evaluation 3 >
< Evaluation 4--for B&W, CE, and W [CREEVS] TS >
    The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action E of TS 
3.7.1[0] that states, ``One or more [CREEVS] trains inoperable due to 
an inoperable CRE boundary [in Mode 5 or 6, or] during movement of 
[recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.'' The specified Required Action 
proposed for this condition is the same as for the existing condition 
of Action E [(revised as discussed previously) ], which states ``[Two [CREEVS] trains inoperable 
[in MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 
assemblies.'' Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other 
condition in Action E using the logical connector ``OR'' in accordance 
with the STS writer's guide (TSTF-GG-05-01, ``Writer's Guide for Plant-
Specific Improved Technical Specifications,'' June 2005). The practical 
result of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two 
separately numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is 
to make the TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an 
additional numbered row in the Actions table. The new condition in 
Action E is needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 
1, 2, 3, and 4. As such, this change will ensure that the Actions table 
continues to specify a condition for an inoperable CRE boundary during 
Modes 5 and 6 and during refueling. Therefore, this change is 
administrative and acceptable.
< End of Evaluation 4 >
< Evaluation 5--for BWR4 and BWR6 [CREEVS] TS >
    The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action F of TS 
3.7.[4] that states, ``One or more [CREEVS] subsystems inoperable due 
to an inoperable CRE boundary during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies in the [[primary or] secondary] containment or during 
operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).'' 
The specified Required Actions proposed for this condition are the same 
as for the other existing condition for Action F, which states, ``Two 
[CREEVS] subsystems inoperable during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment or during OPDRVs.'' 
Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other condition in 
Action F using the logical connector ``OR'' in accordance with the STS 
writer's guide (TSTF-GG-05-01, ``Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific 
Improved Technical Specifications,'' June 2005). The practical result 
of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two separately 
numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is to make the 
TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an additional 
numbered row in the Actions table. This new condition in Action F is 
needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 1, 2, and 3. 
As such, this change will ensure that the Actions table continues to 
specify a condition for an inoperable CRE boundary during refueling and 
OPDRVs. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable.
< End of Evaluation 5 >
< Evaluation 6--for facilities that have a CRE pressurization 
surveillance requirement >
    In the [emergency radiation state] of operation, the [CREEVS] 
isolates unfiltered ventilation air supply intakes, filters the 
emergency ventilation air supply to the CRE, and pressurizes the CRE to 
minimize unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary. The licensee 
proposed to delete the CRE pressurization surveillance requirement 
(SR). This SR requires verifying that one [CREEVS] [train][subsystem], 
operating in the [emergency radiation state], can maintain a pressure 
of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent [turbine 
building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a makeup flow 
rate of [3000] cfm. The deletion of this SR is proposed because 
measurements of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE at numerous reactor 
facilities demonstrated that a basic assumption of this SR, an 
essentially leak-tight CRE boundary, was incorrect for most facilities. 
Hence, meeting this SR by achieving the required CRE pressure is not 
necessarily a conclusive indication of CRE boundary leak tightness, 
i.e., CRE boundary operability. [In its response to GL 2003-01, [dated 
month, dd, yyyy], the licensee reported that it had determined that the 
[facility name] CRE pressurization surveillance, SR 3.7.[10].[4], was 
inadequate to demonstrate the operability of the CRE boundary, and 
proposed to replace it with an inleakage measurement SR and a CRE 
Habitability Program in TS Section 5.5, in accordance with the approved 
version of TSTF-448.] Based on the adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, 
the licensee's proposal to delete SR 3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable.

    The proposed CRE inleakage measurement SR states, ``Perform 
required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the 
Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.'' The CRE Habitability 
Program TS, proposed TS 5.5.[18], requires that the program include 
``Requirements for determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the 
CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at 
the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 
1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 5). This guidance references ASTM E741 
(Reference 2) as an acceptable method for ascertaining the unfiltered 
leakage into the CRE. The licensee has [, however, not] proposed to 
follow this method. [The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's proposed 
alternative method for measuring CRE inleakage to ensure it meets the 
criteria for such methods given in RG 1.197.] [Insert plant-specific 
technical evaluation by the staff of the alternative method.] [The NRC 
staff finds that the proposed alternative method satisfies the criteria 
of RG 1.197.] Therefore, the proposed CRE inleakage measurement SR is 
acceptable.

3.4 TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability Program

    The proposed administrative controls program TS is consistent with 
the model program TS in TSTF-448, Revision 3. In combination with SR 
3.7.[10].[4], this program is intended to ensure the operability of the 
CRE boundary, which as part of an operable [CREEVS] will ensure that 
CRE habitability is maintained such that CRE occupants can control the 
reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe 
condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, 
or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation 
protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under 
design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving 
radiation exposures in excess of [5 rem whole body or its equivalent to 
any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)] 
for the duration of the accident.
    A CRE Habitability Program TS acceptable to the NRC staff requires 
the program to contain the following elements:
    Definitions of CRE and CRE boundary. This element is intended to 
ensure that these definitions accurately describe the plant areas that 
are within the CRE, and also the interfaces that form the CRE boundary, 
and are consistent with the general definitions discussed in Section 
2.1 of this safety evaluation. Establishing what is meant by the CRE 
and the CRE boundary will preclude ambiguity in the implementation of 
the program.
    Configuration control and preventive maintenance of the CRE 
boundary. This element is intended to ensure the CRE boundary is 
maintained in its design condition. Guidance for implementing this 
element is contained in Regulatory Guide 1.196 (Reference 4), which 
endorsed, with exceptions, NEI 99-03 (Reference 6). Maintaining the CRE 
boundary in its design condition provides assurance that its leak-

[[Page 2031]]

tightness will not significantly degrade between CRE inleakage 
determinations.
    Assessment of CRE habitability at the frequencies stated in 
Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 
5), and measurement of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE in 
accordance with the testing methods and at the frequencies stated in 
Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197. [The licensee proposed 
the following exception[s] to Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 
1.197, to be listed in the TS with this program element.] [Insert 
plant-specific evaluation of licensee's proposed exceptions.] This 
element is intended to ensure that the plant assesses CRE habitability 
consistent with Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 [and NRC 
approved exceptions]. Assessing CRE habitability at the NRC accepted 
frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of the CRE 
boundary will not go undetected between CRE inleakage determinations. 
Determination of CRE inleakage using test methods acceptable to the NRC 
staff assures that test results are reliable for ascertaining CRE 
boundary operability. Determination of CRE inleakage at the NRC 
accepted frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of 
the CRE boundary will not occur between CRE inleakage determinations.
    Measurement of CRE pressure with respect to all areas adjacent to 
the CRE boundary at designated locations for use in assessing the CRE 
boundary at a frequency of [18] months on a staggered test basis (with 
respect to the [CREEVS] trains). This element is intended to ensure 
that CRE differential pressure is regularly measured to identify 
changes in pressure warranting evaluation of the condition of the CRE 
boundary. Obtaining and trending pressure data provides additional 
assurance that significant degradation of the CRE boundary will not go 
undetected between CRE inleakage determinations.
    Quantitative limits on unfiltered inleakage. This element is 
intended to establish the CRE inleakage limit as the CRE unfiltered 
infiltration rate assumed in the CRE occupant radiological consequence 
analyses of design basis accidents. Having an unambiguous criterion for 
the CRE boundary to be considered operable in order to meet LCO 
3.7.[10], will ensure that associated action requirements will be 
consistently applied in the event of CRE degradation resulting in 
inleakage exceeding the limit.
    Consistent with TSTF-448, Revision 3, the program states that the 
provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the program frequencies for 
performing the activities required by program paragraph number c, parts 
(i) and (ii) (assessment of CRE habitability and measurement of CRE 
inleakage), and paragraph number d (measurement of CRE differential 
pressure). This statement is needed to avoid confusion. SR 3.0.2 is 
applicable to the surveillance that references the testing in the CRE 
Habitability Program. However, SR 3.0.2 is not applicable to 
Administrative Controls unless specifically invoked. Providing this 
statement in the program eliminates any confusion regarding whether SR 
3.0.2 is applicable, and is acceptable.
    Consistent with TSTF-448, Revision 3, proposed TS 5.5. [18] states 
that (1) a CRE Habitability Program shall be established and 
implemented, (2) the program shall include all of the NRC-staff 
required elements, as described above, and (3) the provisions of SR 
3.0.2 shall apply to program frequencies. Therefore, TS 5.5.[18], which 
is consistent with the model program TS approved by the NRC staff in 
TSTF-448, Revision 3, is acceptable.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) t

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