Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of Transport Category Airplanes, 630-639 [E6-22563]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 72, Number 3 (Friday, January 5, 2007)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 630-639]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-22563]



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Part II





 Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 25 and 121



 Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of 
Transport Category Airplanes; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 3 / Friday, January 5, 2007 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 25 and 121

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26722; Notice No. 06-19]
RIN 2120-AI66


Security Related Considerations in the Design and Operation of 
Transport Category Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: Under this notice, the FAA proposes to implement certain 
security related requirements governing the design of transport 
category airplanes. The requirements would provide improved airplane 
design features and greater protection of the cabin, flightdeck, and 
cargo compartments from the detonation of explosive or incendiary 
devices, penetration by projectiles, and intrusion by unauthorized 
persons. The FAA also proposes to require operators to establish a 
``least risk bomb location'' on all affected airplanes. These proposed 
changes would adopt several International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) standards. Also, this notice discusses six proposed advisory 
circulars (ACs) and proposed changes to two existing ACs.

DATES: Send your comments on or before April 5, 2007.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments identified by Docket Number FAA-2006-
26722 using any of the following methods:
     Submit your comments electronically to (1) the Department 
of Transportation (DOT) Docket Management System Web site at https://
dms.dot.gov or (2) the government-wide rulemaking Web site at https://
www.regulations.gov
     Mail your comments to Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 
Room PL-401, Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Fax your comments to the Docket Management System at 1-
202-493-2251.
     Hand deliver your comments to Room PL-401 on the plaza 
level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays.
    For more information on the rulemaking process, see the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. For 
more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of 
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For technical issues: Jeff Gardlin, 
FAA Airframe and Cabin Safety Branch, ANM-115, Transport Airplane 
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., 
Renton, Washington 98055; telephone (425) 227-2136, facsimile (425) 
227-1149, e-mail: jeff.gardlin@faa.gov. For legal issues: Komal Jain, 
Regulations Division, AGC-200, FAA Office of the Chief Counsel, 800 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington DC, 20591; telephone (202) 267-
3073, e-mail: komal.jain@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written 
comments.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to 
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section 
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the 
Internet at the Web address in the ADDRESSES section.
    Privacy Act: Using the search function of our docket Web site, 
anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, 
including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing 
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, or 
other group). You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in 
the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or 
you may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

Proprietary or Confidential Business Information

    You should not file in the docket any information that you consider 
to be proprietary or confidential business information. Instead, you 
should send or deliver that information directly to the person 
identified in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this 
document. You must mark the information that you consider proprietary 
or confidential. If you send the information on a disk or CD-ROM, mark 
the outside of the disk or CD-ROM and also identify electronically 
within the disk or CD-ROM the specific information that is proprietary 
or confidential.
    Under 14 CFR 11.35(b), when we are aware of proprietary information 
filed with a comment, we do not place it in the docket. We hold it in a 
separate file to which the public does not have access and place a note 
in the docket that we have received it. If we receive a request to 
examine or copy this information, we treat it as any other request 
under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C. 552). We process such a 
request under the DOT procedures found in 49 CFR part 7.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can access an electronic copy of this proposal at any of the 
following Web sites:
     The Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web site at https://dms.dot.gov/search.
     Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at 
https://www.faa.gov/regulations_policies; or
     The Government Printing Office's Web site at https://
www.access.gpo.gov/su_docs/aces/aces140.html.

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    You can also receive a hard copy by mailing a request to the 
Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or calling (202) 267-
9680. Please identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment 
number of this rulemaking.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding aviation safety is 
found under Title 49 of the United States Code. Subtitle I, section 106 
describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, 
Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the agency's 
authority.
    This rulemaking is promulgated under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, the FAA is charged with promoting 
safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing minimum 
standards required in the interest of safety for the design and 
performance of aircraft. This regulation is within the scope of that 
authority because it prescribes new safety standards for the design of 
transport category airplanes.

Background

    Since the mid 1970s, terrorist acts--including hijackings and 
detonation of explosive devices--have targeted airplanes.

Design Standards by ICAO

    Because of the number of airplane bombings and hijackings that 
occurred in the 1960s, 1970s, and early 1980s, the International Civil 
Aviation Organization (ICAO) \1\ considered several proposals to 
incorporate security safeguards into the design of new airplanes. ICAO 
has adopted in Annex 8 airworthiness standards for airplanes that carry 
passengers, cargo, or mail in international air navigation. In the 
1980s, the International Federation of Airline Pilots Association 
(IFALPA) submitted proposals regarding design standards for security in 
airplanes. ICAO, in turn, solicited comments on the proposals from 
organizations and member countries.
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    \1\ A specialized agency of the United Nations with 189 member 
countries (known in ICAO as contracting states). The agency is 
charged with development of international standards for safety and 
security of civil aviation.
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    On December 21, 1988, a terrorist bomb in a Boeing Model 747 
airplane exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing all 259 people 
onboard and 11 people on the ground. \2\ The terrorist bomb exploded in 
the forward cargo hold on Pan American World Airways Flight 103 from 
London to New York City. As a result, the effort initiated by IFALPA to 
establish security design standards gained impetus. Within several 
months, ICAO formed the ``Incorporation of Security into Aircraft 
Design'' (ISAD) study group with representatives of the airworthiness 
authorities of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, 
Brazil, and Russia to consider the existing proposals and to recommend 
standards for security in design to be incorporated into Annex 8. ISAD 
also included representatives from IFALPA, the International 
Coordinating Council of Aerospace Industries Associations (ICCAIA), and 
the International Air Transport Association (IATA).
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    \2\ The terrorist bomb exploded in the forward cargo hold on Pan 
American World Airways Flight 103 from London to New York City.
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    The study group developed proposals pertaining to the following 
subjects:
    (1) Survivability of systems,
    (2) Cargo compartment fire suppression,
    (3) Smoke and fumes protection (in the cabin and flightdeck),
    (4) Least risk bomb location and design,
    (5) Protection of pilot compartment from penetration by small arms 
fire or shrapnel, and
    (6) Interior design to deter hiding of dangerous articles and 
improve searching.
These proposals were submitted to all ICAO member countries for 
comment.
    On March 12, 1997, new standards were adopted as Amendment 97 to 
Annex 8. The member countries subsequently approved them. All but one 
of the standards became effective 3 years after their adoption. The 
standard requiring identification of a ``least risk bomb location'' 
became effective immediately because it was already common practice in 
the aviation industry. It had been applied as an operational standard 
rather than as a design standard.
    While Annex 8 provisions may be applied to an operator of a 
transport category airplane by a national authority in order to obtain 
landing rights at international airports, this does not generally 
occur, in part, because this would assume that operators could pass 
through the design specifications to the aircraft manufacturers. 
Typically, Annex 8 standards do not apply directly to the design of an 
airplane but are implemented by adoption into the airworthiness codes 
of ICAO's member countries. Once implemented, airplane certification by 
a member country implies compliance with Annex 8. As a signatory to the 
Convention, the United States must implement the Annex 8 rules into our 
national airworthiness codes to the extent practicable. It is possible, 
however, for a signatory to file differences with ICAO if it is unable 
to implement the ICAO standards. The FAA does not believe permanent 
differences are warranted in this situation. However, because we have 
not yet promulgated these ICAO standards into our regulations, the 
United States (like all other states of manufacture) has filed 
differences with ICAO regarding the design for security provisions of 
Annex 8. Adoption of these proposals would remove the current 
difference with the ICAO standards.

Activity by the Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee \3\ (ARAC)
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    \3\ The FAA formally established ARAC on January 22, 1991, to 
provide advice and recommendations about FAA's safety-related 
rulemaking (56 FR 2190).
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    In addition to participating in the development of international 
standards through the ICAO, the FAA considers maintaining harmonized 
standards between the United States and Europe to be a high priority. 
The FAA found that carrying out this harmonization task was best 
achieved through ARAC. The ARAC is composed of 76 member organizations 
with a wide range of interests in the aviation community and provides 
the FAA with firsthand information and insight regarding proposed new 
or revised rules.
    In October 1999, the FAA tasked the Transport Aircraft Engine 
Issues area of ARAC to propose harmonized regulations incorporating 
security measures into airplane design (64 FR 57921, October 27, 1999). 
The proposed regulations were to be based on Amendment 97 to Annex 8. 
The task was assigned to the Design for Security Harmonization Working 
Group (DSHWG), with members from the aviation industry and the 
governments of Europe, the United States, Brazil, and Canada.
    In April 2001, after several airlines reported incidents of 
flightdeck intrusion by aggressive passengers, the FAA tasked the DSHWG 
through ARAC to propose harmonized regulations to improve the intrusion 
resistance of the flightdeck (66 FR 31273, June 11, 2001).
    The DSHWG developed and proposed harmonized regulations for 
implementing security provisions into the design of transport category 
airplanes, and the ARAC approved those recommendations and forwarded 
them to the FAA. We accepted the ARAC recommendations. With one 
exception that is discussed below, the

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proposals in this document are based on those recommendations.

Other FAA Rulemaking Activity

    Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist acts, Congress passed 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (the Act) on November 19, 
2001. Section 104(a) of the Act, Improved Flightdeck Integrity 
Measures, required that aircraft engaged in passenger air 
transportation or intrastate air transportation have a door between the 
passenger and pilot compartments. The Administrator of the FAA issued a 
final rule with the following provisions:
    (A) Access to the flightdeck was prohibited,
    (B) The flightdeck door was to be strengthened,
    (C) Flightdeck doors were to remain locked during flight, and
    (D) Possession of a key to any flightdeck door by a member of the 
flightcrew not assigned to the flightdeck was prohibited.
    The FAA published Amendment No. 25-106 in the Federal Register on 
January 15, 2002 (67 FR 2118). Amendment No. 25-106 added new Sec.  
25.795, Security considerations, requiring strengthening the flightdeck 
door to resist forcible intrusion by unauthorized persons or 
penetration by small arms fire and fragmentation devices. The amendment 
addressed only the ICAO requirements regarding protection of the pilot 
compartment. At the same time, the FAA published a notice of issuance 
of Advisory Circular (AC) 25.795-1, Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance, 
and AC 25.795-2, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance.

Proposed Changes to Part 25

    This proposal has two goals: (1) To improve the safety of transport 
category airplanes, and (2) To provide an equivalent level of safety 
for different classes of transport category airplanes.
    Accordingly, the proposal considers the following factors:
     The security threat;
     Practicability of compliance;
     Benefits of compliance; and
     Any mitigating factors.
    For certain classes of airplanes, applying the proposed security 
design requirements would improve safety significantly. For others, 
applying them would not improve safety appreciably and would require 
great effort and expense.

Applicability of Proposed Rules

1. Flightdeck Security
    The January 15, 2002, final rule added the requirement for 
transport category airplanes with flightdeck doors to strengthen the 
flightdeck door installation. Under this proposal, we would extend 
those requirements to all barriers--such as bulkheads, ceilings, and 
floors--between the flightdeck and other occupied areas. Since 
strengthening these barriers would serve no purpose unless there also 
was a door separating the passenger cabin and the flightdeck, the 
proposed amendments to Sec.  25.795(a) would be applicable only to 
airplanes required to have a flightdeck door.
2. Other Security Considerations
    a. Commercial and private use operations. Significant security 
risks are associated with boarding passengers on commercial airplanes. 
Even with the best screening and other layered security measures, there 
is the possibility that a person could carry or place an explosive or 
incendiary device onboard an airplane. Likewise, there is the 
possibility that an explosive or incendiary device could be placed 
aboard a commercial airplane in cargo operations.
    Generally, airplanes in private use carry heads of state, business 
leaders, and ordinary citizens. In contrast to commercial passenger 
airplanes, access to airplanes in private use is limited to specific 
individuals, namely, the owner and guests. For this reason, these 
airplanes typically are not targets of onboard terrorists. We believe 
that applying the proposed requirements to airplanes in private use 
would not provide significant improvement in security.
    Therefore, the FAA proposes to apply the security requirements 
under this rule only to airplanes designed for commercial operations 
involving cargo or passengers. We welcome comments regarding 
applicability of the proposed rule.
    b. Airplane Size. Both small and large airplanes transport 
passengers and cargo. Our review of security-related events over the 
last 30 years indicates that smaller airplanes (whether carrying 
passengers or cargo) are less likely to be the target of terrorists. 
Operators of smaller airplanes have fewer people to screen and/or less 
cargo to inspect; thus, the probability of detecting an explosive 
device is greater should a terrorist attempt to carry or place one 
onboard.
    The FAA reviewed passenger capacity and airplane gross weight as 
distinguishing parameters in assessing applicability of these 
proposals. We concluded both parameters need to be addressed when 
defining a satisfactory and practical standard. Specifically, we 
propose that--with the exception of Sec.  25.795(a)(1), (2), and (3), 
Protection of Flightcrew Compartment, which is discussed below--the 
rule applies to airplanes with a certificated passenger seating 
capacity of more than 60 persons or a maximum certificated gross 
takeoff weight of over 100,000 pounds.\4\ This approach addresses 
airplanes of significant size that carry both passengers and cargo--
called ``combi'' airplanes--because the passenger capacity alone may 
not trigger the proposed requirements. We welcome comments regarding 
the applicability of this proposed rule to airplanes of different 
seating capacity or gross takeoff weight.
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    \4\ Based on the input of its member states, ICAO recently 
amended its standards to apply to airplanes with a maximum passenger 
capacity greater than 60 persons, or a gross takeoff weight greater 
than 100,000 pounds.
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Provisions of Proposed Rules

1. Protection of Flightcrew Compartment
    This section would apply to airplanes required by operating rules 
to have a flightdeck door.
    a. Intrusion by unauthorized persons. The proposed change to Sec.  
25.795(a)(1) and (a)(2) would extend the requirement for the design of 
the strengthened flightdeck door to the bulkhead and other accessible 
barriers (those barriers that are susceptible to forcible intrusion by 
a person as distinguished from barriers such as floors or ceilings) 
separating occupied areas from the flightdeck. The flightdeck and any 
other accessible areas would need to resist forcible intrusion by an 
unauthorized person and withstand impacts of 300 joules (221.3 foot-
pounds). The FAA believes the flightdeck door is the most critical 
feature in providing resistance to intrusion. However, there could be 
other access points through the bulkhead from occupied areas. 
Therefore, the FAA proposes that these barriers be designed to the same 
security standards as the flightdeck door.
    To demonstrate compliance, a manufacturer would generally be able 
to rely on the test conducted on the flightdeck door. Critical 
locations (i.e., those requiring tests) are expected to be the door 
latch and hinge as well as the panel itself but will depend on the 
design. If there is a more critical part of the bulkhead, the FAA would 
require testing, either in addition to testing the door or instead of 
it.
    b. Penetration by projectiles. Proposed Sec.  25.795(a)(3) would 
extend security design precautions to any barrier, not just accessible 
barriers, between the flightdeck and occupied areas to

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minimize the penetration of shrapnel from a fragmentation device or 
projectiles from small arms. Although protection of the flightdeck door 
provides a high level of safety, the flightdeck itself remains 
susceptible to damage from discharge of weapons. For example, in a 
multi-deck airplane, the ceiling and floor around the flightdeck may be 
vulnerable, and ballistic penetration of the flightdeck can injure the 
pilots. Such penetration also could disable critical flight 
instrumentation because the system controls are concentrated in a small 
area of the flightdeck.
    Under this proposal, protection would be required for all barriers 
between the flightdeck and occupied areas to the extent necessary to 
resist penetration of projectiles, because they could interfere with 
safe flight and landing. Areas of concern include grills, closeouts, 
and latches, if their failure could compromise continued safe flight 
and landing. For a multi-deck airplane, these barriers could include 
the floor and ceiling in addition to the bulkhead and door. Protection 
equivalent to level IIIA of the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) 
Standard 0101.04 is considered sufficient to protect against small arms 
or fragmentation devices.
2. Smoke and Fire Safety
    The proposed requirements described in paragraphs a. and b. below 
would apply to airplanes with a certificated passenger seating capacity 
of more than 60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff gross weight 
of over 100,000 pounds.
    a. Flightdeck. Currently, Sec.  25.831 addresses removal of smoke 
from the flightdeck. However, the rule does not directly address 
penetration of smoke into the flightdeck, other than smoke originating 
in a cargo compartment. Advisory Circular 25-9A, Smoke Detection, 
Penetration, and Evacuation Tests and Related Flight Manual Emergency 
Procedures, discusses smoke penetration testing and does consider smoke 
originating in other areas. However, these discussions are in the 
context of more general fire safety practices rather than an explicit 
requirement to prevent smoke penetration. Proposed Sec.  25.795(b)(1) 
would require the design of the flightdeck to limit penetration of 
smoke, fumes, or noxious gases generated by explosives, incendiary 
devices, or fires elsewhere on the airplane.
    The FAA expects the most practicable means of compliance will be to 
control airflow into and out of the flightdeck, which would include 
crew rest and other areas accessible only from the flightdeck. 
Maintaining a slight positive pressure differential between the 
flightdeck and surrounding areas would direct smoke, fumes, and noxious 
gases to those surrounding areas.
    b. Passenger cabin. Proposed Sec.  25.795(b)(2) would require the 
ability to remove smoke, fumes, and noxious gases--such as might be 
produced by an explosive or incendiary device--from the passenger 
cabin. The goal is to prevent smoke, fumes, and noxious gases from 
reaching incapacitating levels if an explosive or incendiary device is 
activated. Currently, there are no requirements for evacuation of cabin 
smoke, fumes, or noxious gases. The levels of smoke, fumes, or noxious 
gases that could incapacitate passengers depend on at least the 
following variables:
     The specific gases present;
     Concentrations of those gases; and
     The duration of exposure.

The FAA considered these variables and arrived at an approach that does 
not require detailed knowledge of the explosive or incendiary device.

    We determined a fire resulting from an explosive or incendiary 
device affects the levels and types of gases in the cabin more than 
does the type of device. Using data from full-scale tests conducted on 
fires in the cargo compartment, the FAA developed a ``standard'' for 
the quantity of smoke, fumes, and noxious gases produced. The quantity 
is a function of the volume of the compartment and the amount of 
material in it.
    We assume the passenger cabin begins at the flightdeck bulkhead and 
ends at the aft pressure bulkhead (or other bulkhead separating the 
passenger cabin from another definable space, such as a cargo 
compartment). The passenger cabin is bound at the top by the ceiling 
and stowage-bin contour and at the bottom by the cabin floor. We 
consider the crew rest and other locations that are accessible only 
from the flightdeck to be part of the flightdeck. However, isolated 
areas above or below the passenger cabin that are not occupied for 
takeoff and landing are included in the cabin. An example of such an 
isolated area is an overhead crew rest that is only occupied in flight.
    If the smoke, fumes, and noxious gases resulting from a fire are 
dispersed in the passenger cabin, it is possible to calculate the 
frequency of fresh air changes necessary to prevent fire by-products in 
the cabin from incapacitating the passengers. Time to incapacitation 
can be calculated by using a Fractional Effective Dose (FED) model. 
This model considers the types of gases and the duration of exposure to 
them to determine whether certain conditions will produce 
incapacitation. Using this approach, the FAA determined occupants of 
the passenger cabin must be protected against incapacitation when there 
is a combined volumetric concentration of 0.59% carbon monoxide and 
1.23% carbon dioxide.
    The combined effect of the two gases on occupants of the passenger 
cabin, as predicted by the FED, represents the short-term threat posed 
by all hazardous fire products generated when an explosive or 
incendiary device is discharged. As a result, we cannot compare the 
combined concentrations of carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide specified 
under proposed Sec.  25.795(b)(2) with the individual concentrations of 
the two gases specified in the existing ventilation requirements under 
Sec.  25.831(b).
    The FAA cannot assume the smoke, fumes, and noxious gases produced 
by an explosive device would be uniformly dispersed throughout the 
passenger cabin. It also is unreasonable to assume the smoke, fumes, 
and noxious gases would not be dispersed at all before the fire is 
extinguished. To estimate the expected variability in smoke dispersion, 
we assume the smoke, fumes, and noxious gases are initially 
concentrated in any one-quarter portion of the total cabin volume. The 
other portions of the cabin remain less hazardous than the area of 
initial concentration and can be removed from the FED calculations. 
Since the rate of air change applies to the entire passenger cabin, 
this is a conservative approach.
    If we assume airflow patterns within a passenger cabin will create 
a constant mixing as well as an evacuation of the air, removal of the 
smoke, fumes, and noxious gases will reduce their concentrations in an 
exponential decay pattern. Therefore, the initial evacuation of the 
smoke, fumes, and noxious gases will be rapid, and the FED will quickly 
reach a maximum value. That value will not increase much after 
approximately two air changes.
    As noted above, we determined the quantity of smoke, fumes, and 
noxious gases and their resulting concentrations using data from a fire 
in a cargo compartment. The relationship of cargo compartment volume to 
passenger compartment volume is not the same for all airplanes that 
would be affected by this proposal. Therefore, the FAA assessed this 
relationship before establishing these guidelines. We recognize that it 
would be equally acceptable to address the proposed

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requirements under Sec.  25.795(b)(2) by other means, including 
providing a protective device for each passenger or using a combination 
of smoke evacuation and protective devices.
3. Fire Suppression in Cargo Compartments
    Proposed Sec.  25.795(b)(3) would require fire suppression systems 
in cargo compartments to be designed to suppress a sudden and extensive 
fire, such as might result from an explosive or incendiary device. The 
principal concerns are that the fire suppression system is able to 
survive such an event and the extinguishing agent retains its ability 
to suppress such a fire. These requirements would apply to airplanes 
with a certificated passenger seating capacity of more than 60 persons 
or a maximum certificated takeoff gross weight of over 100,000 pounds.
    The ICAO standard recognizes that Halon 1301 extinguishing agents 
satisfy this requirement from the standpoint of suppression. However, 
the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency banned production of Halon 
1301 because it contributes to depletion of the ozone layer. Although 
existing stores of Halon 1301 may still be used, the product will not 
be available indefinitely. The FAA worked with the International 
Systems Fire Protection Working Group (formerly the Halon Replacement 
Working Group) to establish minimum performance standards for new fire 
suppression agents that are ``equivalent'' to the Halon 1301 
extinguishing agents.
    For the fire suppression agent to be effective, the fire 
suppression system must be able to discharge the agent immediately 
following an explosion. The FAA reviewed test data to assess the 
vulnerability of fire suppression systems to damage from explosive 
devices. These data indicate the fire suppression systems currently in 
use are not affected by the over-pressure produced by an explosive 
device. However, the fire suppression systems may be vulnerable to 
secondary loading by panels and supporting structures that are affected 
by over-pressure. The fire suppression systems also may be vulnerable 
to damage from fragments of the explosive device or from contents of 
the cargo compartment. Storage vessels for the fire suppression agent 
are usually outside the cargo compartment. Therefore, the distribution 
lines and nozzles may be vulnerable.
    There may be several ways to address this concern. Providing a 
distribution system that has redundancy and adequate separation would 
be an acceptable way to comply with the proposed requirement. That is, 
separate storage vessels for the fire suppression agent with an 
independent distribution system and adequate separation, could be an 
acceptable approach. Alternatively, shrouding or otherwise hardening 
the lines could be acceptable, if the mounting scheme could accommodate 
the secondary loading mentioned above. Based on a review of test data, 
the shielding would have to protect against fragments of 0.5-inch 
diameter traveling at a rate of 430 feet a second.
    With respect to secondary loading, the threat to the system is from 
large displacements that might occur on panels or structure to which 
the systems are attached. In reviewing test data, local structural 
displacements up to 6 inches are possible within an airplane in a 
survivable event. Therefore, system attachment arrangements also would 
have to tolerate 6-inch local displacements, and each system component 
would still need to function.
    Manufacturers need to address only those components in the cargo 
compartment or separated from it only by the cargo compartment liner. 
Manufacturers do not need to provide added protection for the fire 
suppression agent's storage vessel if it is remote from the 
compartment. We consider the storage vessel remote if it is outside the 
compartment and is protected by barriers that meet the criteria 
discussed above.
    The fire detection system in the cargo compartment will not require 
explosion protection. The FAA determined that, if the event were small, 
there would be no effect on the fire detection system. If the event is 
large enough to affect the integrity of the fire detection system, the 
passengers or crew will notice the event. If smoke, fumes, or noxious 
gases are present, the crew will know they should discharge the 
suppression agent to the affected area. In addition, the specific 
compartment where the affected fire detection system is located must be 
indicated to the crew. As a result, sufficient warning would be given 
to the flightcrew to preclude hardening of the fire detection systems.
    For affected airplanes, a significant consequence of this proposal 
would be to effectively prohibit the Class B cargo compartment 
currently permitted by Sec.  25.857. A Class B cargo compartment 
incorporates a fire detection system, but relies on a crewmember to 
manually fight the fire. Entry into the cargo compartment to fight a 
fire after an explosion would not be practicable.
4. Least Risk Bomb Location
    Proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(1) would require the manufacturer to 
establish a ``least risk bomb location'' (LRBL) as part of the design 
of airplanes with a certificated passenger seating capacity of more 
than 60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff gross weight of over 
100,000 pounds.
    The LRBL is a location in the cabin where crewmembers can put a 
suspected explosive device that will do the least amount of damage to 
the airplane in the event of an explosion. Presently, an airplane 
manufacturer considers the LRBL only after completion of the design. 
This proposal would require manufacturers to identify the LRBL during 
the airplane design process. We expect this will improve the level of 
safety, since the LRBL will be a design consideration and manufacturers 
can incorporate provisions to enhance its effectiveness. For example, 
when considering the physical location and design of the LRBL, the 
manufacturer must consider systems near the LRBL. The goal is to ensure 
the manufacturer locates critical systems out of the immediate vicinity 
of the LRBL or protects those systems from explosive devices. On 
airplanes with more than one passenger deck, more than one LRBL may be 
desirable.
    Operational procedures also can improve the effectiveness of the 
LRBL in reducing a threat. For example, reducing or eliminating 
differential cabin pressure markedly reduces the damage explosive 
devices could cause to airplane structures.
5. System Safety
    Proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(2) would require the manufacturer to 
separate redundant flight critical systems to maximize the ability to 
continue safe flight and landing of the airplane if there is an event 
that damages one of those systems. This requirement would apply to 
airplanes with a certificated passenger seating capacity of more than 
60 persons or a maximum certificated takeoff gross weight of over 
100,000 pounds.
    The goal of the proposal is to maximize the ability of flight 
critical systems to survive damage caused by an explosive device or 
other event through a design that will separate, shield, or provide 
redundancy to the critical systems. To achieve this purpose, the FAA 
used a ``damage based'' approach. The FAA had previously proposed a 
similar requirement related to structural capability of the airplane 
and concluded

[[Page 635]]

that a damage based approach is reasonable.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \5\ Notice No. 75-31 (40 FR 29410; July 11, 1975).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Under this approach, the FAA assumes an explosive device destroys 
the flight critical systems contained within a certain volume. We then 
assess the ability of the airplane to continue safe flight and landing 
based on the functionality of flight critical systems after an 
explosion and the effect of any resultant loss of functionality. Under 
this proposal, the manufacturer would use the formula derived from the 
requirements of Sec.  25.365 to generate a sphere and use the sphere to 
determine the volume of the airplane within which one must assess loss 
of system function. Any associated structural damage that might result 
from the explosion is not relevant to this assessment.
    In practice, the manufacturer may assess the effect of separating 
each flight critical system from other flight critical systems as a 
design specification, rather than using the proposed formula throughout 
the fuselage. However, the manufacturer also should consider the 
combination of systems made inoperative when determining the effect on 
continued safe flight and landing. This approach might mean considering 
whether one should separate primary or backup controls for a particular 
system from both the primary and backup controls for certain other 
critical systems.
    The manufacturer would apply the spherical volume within the 
fuselage:
     Anywhere within the passenger cabin from the bulkhead (or 
bulkheads) separating the passenger cabin from the flightdeck to the 
aft cabin bulkhead, with half of the diameter penetrating those 
bulkheads, and
     Anywhere within the volumes of the cargo compartments, 
except that only one-half of the spherical volume need extend beyond 
the liners of the cargo-compartments.
    For practical reasons, we propose an upper limit on the size of the 
sphere. While it is theoretically possible to increase the distance 
between systems as the diameter of the fuselage increases, there comes 
a point of no benefit. That is, the event necessary to render systems 
inoperative in a larger volume than proposed would have other 
catastrophic results. A standard with no limit on the volume of the 
sphere would not be cost-effective and could lead to complications in 
system design. Those complications could present a safety risk at least 
as great as the risk of an explosion. For example, separations 
resulting in acute changes in direction of control cables could 
complicate the function of the cables and cause additional failure or 
jamming modes.
    Conversely, the formula permits successively smaller considerations 
of separation as the fuselage diameter decreases. At some point, the 
volume is so small there is no practical value to the requirement. 
Because the proposed regulation would apply to airplanes with a gross 
takeoff weight greater than 100,000 pounds or a passenger capacity 
greater than 60 persons, the FAA is not proposing a lower limit on the 
size of the sphere.
    Use of the sphere is a tool to measure the effectiveness of 
separating flight critical systems. The FAA's intention is not to limit 
separation of such systems to the size of the sphere. Rather, we hope 
to maximize separation to improve survivability of the function of 
flight critical systems in the aftermath of some event. Conversely, 
airplanes in general have confined areas where it might not always be 
possible to apply the sphere.
    Therefore, the FAA is proposing an exception for areas where it is 
impracticable to apply the sphere. Generally, these areas will be at 
the extreme ends of the fuselage or where concentrations of systems are 
essentially unavoidable, such as in electronic equipment bays or 
portions of the flightdeck. In those instances, other design measures, 
such as shielding, may be appropriate for regions where the sphere or 
half sphere is to be applied.
6. Interior Security
    Proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(3) would require that the interior design 
of the airplane deter the easy concealment of weapons, explosives, or 
other objects and lessen the likelihood of overlooking such items 
during a search. This requirement would apply to airplanes with a 
certificated passenger seating capacity of more than 60 persons or a 
maximum certificated takeoff gross weight of over 100,000 pounds.
    Under ICAO and TSA requirements, it is necessary to search an 
airplane interior under certain conditions. To improve reliability of 
such searches, Amendment 97 to ICAO Annex 8 requires that--during the 
design phase--manufacturers consider the need to search the interior of 
the airplane.
    Transport category airplanes contain many areas that are not 
readily visible but are relatively accessible. For example, under-seat 
areas, areas above stowage bins, and toilet bowl drains may not be 
easily visible when conducting a search but could be accessible places 
to hide an explosive device. This proposal would require that during 
the design phase of the interior, the manufacturer consider the need to 
search airplanes regularly and, therefore, avoid designs that make it 
difficult to search an area.
    The FAA did not receive a recommendation from ARAC on this subject. 
While the working group tried to arrive at a recommendation, it did not 
achieve consensus. Certain members of the working group felt the 
proposals under consideration were ambiguous and open to different 
interpretation. In addition, no agreement was reached on the best 
approach--design changes or better techniques and training for 
searching the airplane. Therefore, the FAA independently developed the 
proposal described below.
    One approach to eliminating hidden devices is to reduce the number 
of areas where a device can be hidden. For example, the manufacturer 
could use locks (or other specialty tools) to limit access to certain 
areas or could remove certain areas from the design altogether. The 
result would be to reduce the scope of the search. Another approach is 
to design features that facilitate a simple inspection, i.e., features 
that can be searched quickly and easily. Examples include bare and open 
surfaces or use of mirrors that make compartments more visible.
    Both approaches have benefits. Making areas more difficult to 
access may be preferable in some cases; an example is making fasteners 
on compartment panels more difficult to remove than standard fasteners. 
A potential drawback, however, is an area that is less accessible may 
also become less likely to be searched. Therefore, the FAA proposes to 
focus on requiring design features that lead to quick and easy 
searches. By ensuring it is easy to search those areas where the 
opportunity to hide an explosive device is greatest, we make more time 
available to search areas that are more difficult to access and 
inspect. In this way, the overall search of the airplane will be more 
effective.
    The following is a brief description of our proposed requirement 
for each item.
    a. Area above stowage bins. The area above stowage bins is 
difficult to search. Light fixtures often inhibit both visual and 
physical inspection. Proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(3)(i) would require the 
area above overhead bins to be designed to prevent hiding objects from 
view. This objective can be accomplished either by preventing a person 
from placing an object in the area above stowage bins or by designing a 
feature that makes it obvious someone has tampered with the area. An 
example of the first approach is screening off the area above the 
stowage bins. An example of the second

[[Page 636]]

is designing the area above the stowage bin so that if anything is 
placed there, the stowage bin could not be opened properly.
    b. Toilet. A toilet can be an easy place to hide a device. Some 
toilets are designed to restrict the size of a device that can be 
flushed down it. The vacuum-waste system is one example. Proposed Sec.  
25.795(c)(3)(ii) would deter hiding a device in a toilet by restricting 
the diameter of the passage pipes prevent passage of objects greater 
than or equal to 2 inches.
    c. Life preservers. Under proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(3)(iii), life 
preservers or their storage location would be designed so any tampering 
is evident. One way to meet this requirement would be to make an 
inspection easier. For example, life preservers are typically installed 
under seats but alternatively may be installed in the passenger service 
unit on the underside of stowage bins.
    Note that manufacturers have to meet the requirements of Sec.  
25.1415, Ditching equipment, for accessibility to life preservers. The 
FAA, however, does not believe Sec.  25.1415 and proposed Sec.  
25.795(c)(3)(iii) conflict.
    d. Other areas. Designers can consider several other areas of an 
airplane to promote ease of search. There are no specific requirements 
to consider these areas under this proposal.

Proposed Advisory Circulars (ACs)

    In conjunction with issuance of this NPRM, the FAA is issuing six 
proposed ACs and proposing changes to two existing ACs. Each AC 
describes an acceptable means of complying with a specific provision of 
the proposed amendments to 14 CFR 25.795. These proposed ACs are 
available for comment at: https://www.faa.gov/aircraft/
draft%5Fdocs/display_docs/index.cfm?Doc_Type=AC.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-1X, Flightdeck Intrusion Resistance, would 
revise AC 25.795-1 to provide guidance on designing flightdeck barriers 
to resist intrusion by unauthorized persons during flight.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-2X, Flightdeck Penetration Resistance, 
would revise AC 25.795-2 to provide guidance on designing flightdeck 
barriers to prevent penetration by small arms and fragmentation 
devices.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-3X, Flightdeck Protection (Smoke and 
Fumes), would provide guidance on designing an airplane to limit entry 
of smoke, fumes, and noxious gases into the flightdeck in the event of 
detonation of an explosive or incendiary device on the airplane.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-4X, Passenger Cabin Smoke Evacuation, 
would provide guidance on designing an airplane with means to prevent 
passengers from being incapacitated by smoke, fumes, or noxious gases, 
resulting from detonation of an explosive or incendiary device during 
flight.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-5X, Compartment Fire Suppression, would 
provide guidance on designing the fire suppression system of the cargo 
compartment to withstand a sudden and extensive fire, such as could be 
caused by an explosive or incendiary device in the cargo compartment.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-6X, Least Risk Bomb Location (LRBL), would 
provide guidance on designing a location where an explosive or 
incendiary device discovered on-board an airplane may be placed to 
protect flight critical structures and systems from damage in case of 
detonation.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-7X, Survivability of Systems, would 
provide guidance on designing redundant systems necessary for continued 
safe flight and landing of the airplane so that they are physically 
separated by certain minimum distances.
    [cir] Proposed AC 25.795-8X, Design for Ease of Search, would 
provide guidance on designing specified areas in the interior of an 
airplane to make it more difficult to hide dangerous objects or make it 
easier to find such objects if they have been brought onboard.

Proposed Change to Part 121

    Under proposed Sec.  25.795(c)(1), manufacturers would be required 
to designate a ``least risk bomb location'' (LRBL) in designing new 
airplanes which have a maximum passenger capacity greater than 60 
persons or a gross weight greater than 100,000 pounds. Under proposed 
Sec.  121.295, within one year of the effective date of this amendment 
an LRBL would need to be identified on existing airplanes with a 
passenger seating capacity of more than 60 persons within one year of 
the amendment. As noted previously, it has been common practice for 
airplane manufacturers to designate such a location on existing 
airplanes, but it is not a requirement to do so. Therefore, some 
airplane types have no LRBL identified. Because designation of the LRBL 
is already common practice, we propose one year for compliance.
    Other procedures regarding use of the LRBL are currently regulated 
by the Transportation Security Administration.

Paperwork Reduction Act

    The Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3507(d)) requires 
that the FAA consider the impact of paperwork and other information 
collection burdens imposed on the public. We have determined no new 
information collection requirements are associated with this proposed 
rule.

International Compatibility

    In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, it is FAA policy to comply with ICAO 
Standards and Recommended Practices to the maximum extent practicable. 
The FAA has reviewed the corresponding ICAO Standards and Recommended 
Practices and proposes these regulations to harmonize with the 
standards.

Economic Assessment

    Changes to Federal regulations must undergo several economic 
analyses. First, Executive Order 12866 directs that each Federal agency 
shall propose or adopt a regulation only upon a reasoned determination 
that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its costs. Second, 
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 requires agencies to analyze the 
economic impact of regulatory changes on small entities. Third, the 
Trade Agreements Act (19 U.S.C. 2531-2533) prohibits agencies from 
setting standards that create unnecessary obstacles to the foreign 
commerce of the United States. In developing U.S. standards, this Trade 
Act requires agencies to consider international standards and, where 
appropriate, to be the basis of U.S. standards. Fourth, the Unfunded 
Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4) requires agencies to 
prepare a written assessment of the costs, benefits, and other effects 
of proposed or final rules that include a Federal mandate likely to 
result in the expenditure by State, local, or tribal governments, in 
the aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or more 
annually (adjusted for inflation).
    In conducting these analyses, the FAA has determined this proposal: 
(1) Has benefits that justify its costs, is not an economically 
``significant regulatory action'' as defined in section 3(f) of 
Executive Order 12866, and is ``significant'' as defined in DOT's 
Regulatory Policies and Procedures; (2) would not have a significant 
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities; (3) would be 
in agreement with the Trade Agreement Act; and (4) would not impose an 
unfunded mandate on state, local, or tribal governments, or on the 
private sector.

[[Page 637]]

Total Costs and Benefits of This Rulemaking

    The cost of a fatal aircraft accident involving terrorist bombing 
and hijacking can exceed one billion dollars. In addition to the 
quantitative measures, the psychological impact, investigative costs, 
bankruptcy proceedings, and other litigation that follows such 
accidents further emphasizes the importance of the proposed measures as 
a means of cost avoidance, and the future health of the civil aviation 
industry in the world marketplace.
    The total estimated costs of this proposal are $453.9 million 
($197.3 million present value). The total includes the costs of 
certification, manufacturing, and the incremental fuel consumption 
cost. We estimate larger transport category aircraft costs at $395.1 
million ($167.6 million present value) and smaller transport category 
aircraft costs are $58.8 million ($29.7 million present value).
    We estimate the total benefits of this proposal at $1.2 billion 
($328.8 million present value). The total benefits are comprised of 
operational benefits of $391 million ($119.4 million present value) and 
safety benefits of $763.5 million ($204.4 million present value).
    This proposal is cost beneficial, because the estimated $1.2 
billion ($328.8 million) in benefits outweigh the estimated costs of 
$453.9 million ($197.3 million present value). We estimate one event 
will be prevented by year 2049 creating safety benefits of $763.5 
million ($204.4 present value). The one event is based upon the 
historical number of aircraft bombings (18), and aircraft hijackings/
commandeerings (105).

Who is Potentially Affected by This Rulemaking

    Manufacturers of part 25 newly designed passenger aircraft.

Assumptions and Sources of Information

     Period of analysis--2006 through 2049.
     Discount rate--7%.
     Compensation Rates, Economic Values for FAA Investment and 
Regulatory Decisions, a Guide, May 2005.
     Terrorist Acts, Press Release--Transportation Security 
Administration, September 29, 2003.
     Civil Aviation Crimes, 2000 Crime Acts Report--Federal 
Aviation Administration.
     Terrorist Acts, 9-11 Commission Report, July 22, 2004.
     Costs of Terrorist Acts, ``September 11, 2001: Then and 
Now,'' John R. Jameson.
     Costs of Terrorist Acts, ``The Economic Cost of 
Terrorism,'' Brian S. Wesbury. September 2002.
     $3 million Value to Avert a Fatality, Revised Departmental 
Guidance, Treatment of Value of Life and Injuries in Preparing Economic 
Evaluations, Office of the Secretary of Transportation Memorandum,'' 
January 29, 2002.
     Airborne Flight Hours, FAA Aerospace Forecasts Fiscal 
Years 2005-2016.

Alternatives We Considered

    The FAA considered reducing the size of transport category 
airplanes that would be subject to all the requirements contained in 
this proposal but believed that smaller airplanes (whether carrying 
passengers or cargo) are less likely to be the target of terrorists. 
However, given the importance of maintaining cabin security, this 
proposal would require protection of the flightcrew compartment for all 
transport category airplanes required by operating rules to have a 
flightdeck door.

Benefits of This Rule

    We estimate the total benefits of this proposal at $1.2 billion 
($323.8 million). The total benefits are comprised of operational 
benefits of $763.5 million ($204.4 million present value) and safety 
benefits of $391 million ($119.4 million present value).
    Currently, larger transport category aircraft have many areas that 
are accessible to passengers, but can only be inspected with 
considerable effort. This proposal would require that the interior 
design of an airplane incorporate features that make it more difficult 
to hide dangerous objects in the airplane. Improving the aircraft 
design by incorporating security features would reduce the time 
required to search an aircraft. Operational cost savings would occur 
due the design requirements that would reduce the time necessary to 
conduct aircraft searches.
    Based on continued security risks and threats, the FAA believes 
that adopting the requirements contained in this proposal would provide 
an overall increase in security to commercial aviation in the United 
States. This proposal would decrease aircraft vulnerability and 
increase aircraft survivability in the event of a bombing or hijacking.
    The upper bound of a hijacking or bombing could have a similar 
impact to that of September 11th with direct financial impacts in the 
billions of dollars, and an indirect financial impact in the billions 
of dollars.

Costs of This Rule

    The total estimated costs of this proposal are $453.9 million 
($197.3 million present value). The total includes the costs of 
certification, manufacturing, and the incremental fuel consumption 
cost. We estimate larger transport category aircraft costs at $395.1 
million ($167.6 million present value) and smaller transport category 
aircraft costs are $58.8 million ($29.7 million present value).

Initial Regulatory Flexibility Determination

    The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) establishes ``as a 
principle of regulatory issuance that agencies shall endeavor, 
consistent with the objective of the rule and of applicable statutes, 
to fit regulatory and informational requirements to the scale of the 
business, organizations, and governmental jurisdictions subject to 
regulation.'' To achieve that principle, the Act requires agencies to 
solicit and consider flexible regulatory proposals and to explain the 
rationale for their actions. The Act covers a wide range of small 
entities, including small businesses, not-for-profit organizations, and 
small governmental jurisdictions.
    Agencies must perform a review to determine whether a proposed or 
final rule will have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities. If the determination is that it will, the 
agency must prepare a regulatory flexibility analysis as described in 
the Act.
    However, if an agency determines that a proposed or final rule is 
not expected to have a significant economic impact on a substantial 
number of small entities, section 605(b) of the 1980 Act provides the 
head of the agency may so certify and a regulatory flexibility analysis 
is not required. The certification must include a statement providing 
the factual basis for this determination, and the reasoning should be 
clear.
    Entities potentially affected by this proposal include part 25, 
transport category airplane manufacturers and operators of affected 
aircraft.
    In its classification, the FAA uses the size standards from the 
Small Business Administration. It specifies that companies with less 
than 1,500 employees are small entities. All U.S. transport category 
airplane manufacturers have more than 1,500 employees; thus, none are 
considered small entities.

[[Page 638]]

    A substantial number of operators who purchase larger affected 
aircraft are small entities and would incur cost due to increased fuel 
consumption. Although a substantial number of small entities would be 
affected, operational cost savings are greater than the additional cost 
of fuel consumption.
    In addition, a substantial number of operators who purchase smaller 
affected airplanes would incur additional fuel cost. The estimated 
number of affected smaller aircraft is 714, with an estimated present 
value cost of roughly $2.1 million. Thus, the total average fuel burn 
cost for a smaller transport category aircraft is $191. The FAA 
believes $191 is not a significant amount in the overall cost of 
purchasing and operating a new aircraft.
    Therefore, the FAA certifies that this proposed rule would not have 
a signifficant economic impact on a substantial number of small 
entities.

Initial International Trade Impact Assessment

    The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 prohibits Federal agencies from 
engaging in any standards or related activities that create unnecessary 
obstacles to the foreign commerce of the United States. Legitimate 
domestic objectives, such as safety, are not considered unnecessary 
obstacles. The statute also requires consideration of international 
standards and, where appropriate, they be the basis for U.S. standards.
    The FAA has assessed the potential effect of this proposed rule and 
determined that it would promote international trade by standardizing 
security related design features of part 25 aircraft and thereby 
complying with ICAO's international design standards. In accordance 
with the above statute, the FAA has assessed the potential effect of 
this proposal and determined that it would impose the same costs on 
domestic and international entities. The FAA uses international 
aircraft safety standards as the basis for this proposed rule and 
therefore is in compliance with the International Trade Agreements Act.

Initial Unfunded Mandates Assessment

    The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (the Act) is intended, 
among other things, to curb the practice of imposing unfunded Federal 
mandates on State, local, and tribal governments.
    Title II of the Act requires each Federal agency to prepare a 
written statement assessing the effects of any Federal mandate in a 
proposed or final agency rule that may result in an expenditure of $100 
million or more (adjusted annually for inflation) in any one year by 
State, local, and tribal governments, in the aggregate, or by the 
private sector; such a mandate is deemed to be a ``significant 
regulatory action.'' The FAA currently uses an inflation-adjusted value 
of $120.7 million in lieu of $100 million. This proposed rule does not 
contain such a mandate. Therefore, the requirements of Title II of the 
Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 do not apply.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rule under the principles and 
criteria of Executive Order 13132, Federalism. We determined that this 
action would not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the 
relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the 
distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of 
government and therefore would not have federalism implications.

Plain English

    Executive Order 12866 (58 FR 51735, Oct. 4, 1993) requires each 
agency to write regulations that are simple and easy to understand. We 
invite your comments on how to make these proposed regulations easier 
to understand, including answers to questions such as the following:
     Are the requirements in the proposed regulations clearly 
stated?
     Do the proposed regulations contain unnecessary technical 
language or jargon that interferes with their clarity?
     Would the regulations be easier to understand if they were 
divided into more (but shorter) sections?
     Is the description in the preamble helpful in 
understanding the proposed regulations?

Environmental Analysis

    Environmental Analysis FAA Order 1050.1E identifies FAA actions 
that are categorically excluded from preparation of an environmental 
assessment or environmental impact statement under the National 
Environmental Policy Act in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. 
The FAA has determined this proposed rulemaking action qualifies for 
the categorical exclusion identified in paragraph 3f and involves no 
extraordinary circumstances.

Regulations That Significantly Affect Energy Supply, Distribution, or 
Use

    The FAA has analyzed this proposed rulemaking under Executive Order 
13211, Actions Concerning Regulations that Significantly Affect Energy 
Supply, Distribution, or Use (May 18, 2001). We have determined that it 
is not a ``significant