Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and Security for Hazardous Materials Shipments, 76834-76850 [E6-21518]

Agencies

• Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 245 (Thursday, December 21, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 76834-76850]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-21518]



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Part IV





Department of Transportation





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Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration



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49 CFR Parts 172 and 174



Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and Security 
for Hazardous Materials Shipments; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 245 / Thursday, December 21, 2006 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration

49 CFR Parts 172 and 174

[Docket No. RSPA-04-18730 (HM-232E)]
RIN 2137-AE02


Hazardous Materials: Enhancing Rail Transportation Safety and 
Security for Hazardous Materials Shipments

AGENCY: Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), 
Department of Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA), in consultation with the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) 
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), is proposing to 
revise the current requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regulations 
applicable to the safe and secure transportation of hazardous materials 
transported in commerce by rail. Specifically, we are proposing to 
require rail carriers to compile annual data on specified shipments of 
hazardous materials, use the data to analyze safety and security risks 
along rail transportation routes where those materials are transported, 
assess alternative routing options, and make routing decisions based on 
those assessments. We are also proposing clarifications of the current 
security plan requirements to address en route storage, delays in 
transit, delivery notification, and additional security inspection 
requirements for hazardous materials shipments. In today's edition of 
the Federal Register, TSA is publishing an NPRM proposing additional 
security requirements for rail transportation.

DATES: Submit comments by February 20, 2007. To the extent possible, we 
will consider late-filed comments as we develop a final rule.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments identified by the docket number 
RSPA-04-18730 by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Web site: https://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management System; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001. If sent by mail, comments are to be 
submitted in two copies. Persons wishing to receive confirmation of 
receipt of their comments should include a self-addressed stamped 
postcard.
     Hand Delivery: Docket Management System; Room PL-401 on 
the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays.
    Instructions: You must include the agency name and docket number 
RSPA-04-18730 for this notice at the beginning of your comment. 
Internet users may access comments received by DOT at https://
dms.dot.gov. Note that comments received may be posted without change 
to https://dms.dot.gov including any personal information provided. 
Please see the Privacy Act section of this document.
    While all comments should be sent to DOT's Docket Management System 
(DMS), comments or those portions of comments PHMSA determines to 
include trade secrets, confidential commercial information, or 
sensitive security information (SSI) will not be placed in the public 
docket and will be handled separately. If you believe your comments 
contain trade secrets, confidential commercial information, or SSI, 
those comments or the relevant portions of those comments should be 
appropriately marked so that DOT may make a determination. PHMSA 
procedures in 49 CFR part 105 establish a mechanism by which commenters 
may request confidentiality.
    In accordance with 49 CFR 105.30, you may ask PHMSA to keep 
information confidential using the following procedures: (1) Mark 
``confidential'' on each page of the original document you would like 
to keep confidential; (2) send DMS both the original document and a 
second copy of the original document with the confidential information 
deleted; and (3) explain why the information is confidential (such as a 
trade secret, confidential commercial information, or SSI). In your 
explanation, you should provide enough information to enable PHMSA to 
determine whether the information provided is protected by law and must 
be handled separately.
    In addition, for comments or portions of comments that you believe 
contain SSI as defined in 49 CFR 15.7, you should comply with Federal 
regulations governing restrictions on the disclosure of SSI. See 49 CFR 
1520.9 and 49 CFR 15.9, Restrictions on the disclosure of sensitive 
security information. For example, these sections restrict the sharing 
of SSI to those with a need to know, set out the requirement to mark 
the information as SSI, and address how the information should be 
disposed. Note also when mailing in or using a special delivery service 
to send comments containing SSI, comments should be wrapped in a manner 
to prevent the information from being read. PHMSA and TSA may perform 
concurrent reviews on requests for designations as SSI.
    After reviewing your request for confidentiality and the 
information provided, PHMSA will analyze applicable laws and 
regulations to decide whether to treat the information as confidential. 
PHMSA will notify you of the decision to grant or deny confidentiality. 
If PHMSA denies confidentiality, you will be provided an opportunity to 
respond to the denial before the information is publicly disclosed. 
PHMSA will reconsider its decision to deny confidentiality based on 
your response.
    Regarding comments not marked as confidential, prior to posting 
comments received in response to this notice in the public docket, 
PHMSA will review all comments, whether or not they are identified as 
confidential, to determine if the submission or portions of the 
submission contain information that should not be made available to the 
general public. PHMSA will notify you if the agencies make such a 
determination relative to your comment. If, prior to submitting your 
comment, you have any questions concerning the procedures for 
determining confidentiality or security sensitivity, you may call one 
of the individuals listed below under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT 
for more information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: William Schoonover, (202) 493-6229, 
Office of Safety Assurance and Compliance, Federal Railroad 
Administration; or Susan Gorsky, (202) 366-8553, Office of Hazardous 
Materials Standards, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

I. Background

    The Federal hazardous materials transportation law (Federal hazmat 
law, 49 U.S.C. 5101 et seq., as amended by Sec.  1711 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296 and Title VII of the 2005 Safe, 
Accountable, Flexible and Efficient Transportation Equity Act--A Legacy 
for Users (SAFETEA-LU))

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authorizes the Secretary of the Department of Transportation to 
``prescribe regulations for the safe transportation, including 
security, of hazardous material in intrastate, interstate, and foreign 
commerce.'' The Secretary has delegated this authority to PHMSA 
(formerly the Research and Special Programs Administration).
    The Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR: 49 CFR parts 171-180) 
promulgated by PHMSA under the mandate in section 5103(b) govern safety 
aspects, including security, of the transportation of hazardous 
material the Secretary considers appropriate. Consistent with this 
security authority, in March 2003, PHMSA adopted new transportation 
security requirements for offerors and transporters of certain classes 
and quantities of hazardous materials and new security training 
requirements for hazardous materials employees. The security 
regulations, which are explained in more detail below, require offerors 
and carriers to develop and implement security plans and to train their 
employees to recognize and respond to possible security threats.
    When PHMSA adopted its security regulations, shippers and rail 
carriers were informed these regulations were ``the first step in what 
may be a series of rulemakings to address the security of hazardous 
materials shipments.'' 68 FR 14509, 14511 (March 25, 2003). PHMSA also 
noted ``TSA is developing regulations that are likely to impose 
additional requirements beyond those established in this final rule,'' 
and stated it would ``consult and coordinate with TSA concerning 
security-related hazardous materials transportation regulations * * *'' 
68 FR 14511.
    Under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), Public 
Law 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (November 19, 2001), and delegated authority 
from the Secretary of Homeland Security (DHS), the Assistant Secretary 
of DHS for TSA has broad responsibility and authority for ``security in 
all modes of transportation * * *''\1\ ATSA authorizes TSA to take 
immediate action to protect against threats to transportation security.
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    \1\ See 49 U.S.C. 114(d). The TSA Assistant Secretary's current 
authorities under ATSA have been delegated to him by the Secretary 
of Homeland Security. Under Section 403(2) of the Homeland Security 
Act of 2002, Public Law 107-296, 116 Stat. 2315 (2002) (HSA), all 
functions of TSA, including those of the Secretary of Transporation 
and the Undersecretary of Transportation of Security related to TSA, 
transferred to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Pursuant to DHS 
Delegation Number 7060.2., the Secretary delegated to the Assistant 
Secretary (then referred to as the Administrator of TSA), subject to 
the Secretary's guidance and control, the authority vested in the 
Secretary with respect to TSA, including that in Section 403(2) of 
the HSA.
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    TSA's authority over the security of transportation stems from 
several provisions of 49 U.S.C. 114. In executing its responsibilities 
and duties, TSA is specifically empowered to develop policies, 
strategies and plans for dealing with threats to transportation.\2\ As 
part of its security mission, TSA is responsible for assessing 
intelligence and other information in order to identify individuals who 
pose a threat to transportation security and to coordinate 
countermeasures with other Federal agencies to address such threats.\3\ 
TSA also is to enforce security-related regulations and 
requirements,\4\ ensure the adequacy of security measures for the 
transportation of cargo,\5\ oversee the implementation and ensure the 
adequacy of security measures at transportation facilities,\6\ and 
carry out other appropriate duties relating to transportation 
security.\7\ TSA is charged with serving as the primary liaison for 
transportation security to the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities.\8\
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    \2\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(3).
    \3\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(1)-(5), (h)(l)-(4).
    \4\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(7).
    \5\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(10).
    \6\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(11)
    \7\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(15).
    \8\ 49 U.S.C. 114(f)(1) and (5).
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    In sum, TSA's authority with respect to transportation security is 
comprehensive and supported with specific powers related to the 
development and enforcement of regulations, security directives, 
security plans, and other requirements. Accordingly, under this 
authority, TSA may identify a security threat to any mode of 
transportation, develop a measure for dealing with that threat, and 
enforce compliance with that measure.
    As is evident from the above discussion, DHS and DOT share 
responsibility for hazardous materials transportation security. The two 
departments consult and coordinate on security-related hazardous 
materials transportation requirements to ensure they are consistent 
with the overall security policy goals and objectives established by 
DHS and the regulated industry is not confronted with inconsistent 
security guidance or requirements promulgated by multiple agencies. To 
that end, on August 7, 2006, PHMSA and TSA signed an annex to the 
September 28, 2004 DOT-DHS Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Roles 
and Responsibilities. The purpose of the annex is to delineate clear 
lines of authority and responsibility and promote communications, 
efficiency, and non-duplication of effort through cooperation and 
collaboration in the area of hazardous materials transportation 
security based on existing legal authorities and core competencies. 
Similarly, on September 28, 2006, FRA and TSA signed an annex to 
address each agency's roles and responsibilities for rail 
transportation security. The FRA-TSA annex recognizes that FRA has 
authority over every area of railroad safety (including security) and 
that FRA enforces PHMSA's hazardous materials regulations. The FRA-TSA 
annex includes procedures for coordinating (1) planning, inspection, 
training, and enforcement activities; (2) criticality and vulnerability 
assessments and security reviews; (3) communicating with affected 
stakeholders; and (4) use of personnel and resources. Copies of the two 
annexes are available for review in the public docket for this 
rulemaking.
    Consistent with the principles outlined in the PHMSA-TSA annex, 
PHMSA and FRA collaborated with TSA to develop this NPRM. In today's 
edition of the Federal Register, TSA is publishing an NPRM proposing 
additional security requirements for rail transportation. The TSA 
rulemaking would enhance security in the rail transportation mode by 
proposing requirements on freight and passenger railroads, rail transit 
systems, and on facilities with rail connections that ship, receive, or 
unload certain hazardous materials. The TSA rulemaking is intended to 
augment the proposals in this NPRM.
    Hazardous materials are essential to the economy of the United 
States and the well being of its people. Hazardous materials fuel motor 
vehicles, purify drinking water, and heat and cool homes and offices. 
Hazardous materials are used for farming and medical applications, and 
in manufacturing, mining, and other industrial processes. Railroads 
carry over 1.7 million shipments of hazardous materials annually, 
including millions of tons of explosive, poisonous, corrosive, 
flammable and radioactive materials.
    The need for hazardous materials to support essential services 
means transportation of highly hazardous materials is unavoidable. 
However, these shipments frequently move through densely populated or 
environmentally sensitive areas where the consequences of an incident 
could be loss of life, serious injury, or significant environmental 
damage.

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    The same characteristics of hazardous materials causing concern in 
the event of an accidental release also make them attractive targets 
for terrorism or sabotage. Hazardous materials in transportation are 
frequently transported in substantial quantities and are potentially 
vulnerable to sabotage or misuse. Such materials are already mobile and 
are frequently transported in proximity to large population centers. 
Further, security of hazardous materials in the transportation 
environment poses unique challenges as compared to security at fixed 
facilities. Finally, hazardous materials in transportation often bear 
clear identifiers to ensure their safe and appropriate handling during 
transportation and to facilitate identification and effective emergency 
response in the event of an accident or release.
    A primary safety and security concern related to the rail 
transportation of hazardous materials is the prevention of a 
catastrophic release or explosion in proximity to densely populated 
areas, including urban areas and events or venues with large numbers of 
people in attendance. Also of major concern is the release or explosion 
of a rail car in proximity to iconic buildings, landmarks, or 
environmentally significant areas. Such a catastrophic event could be 
the result of an accident--such as the January 6, 2005 derailment and 
release of chlorine in Graniteville, South Carolina--or a deliberate 
act of terrorism. The causes of intentional and unintentional releases 
of hazardous material are very different; however, in either case the 
potential consequences of such releases are significant. Indeed, the 
consequences of an intentional release of hazardous material by a 
criminal or terrorist action are likely to be more severe than the 
consequences of an unintentional release because an intentional action 
is designed to inflict the most damage possible.

II. Current Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety and Security 
Requirements

    Subpart I to Part 172 of the HMR requires persons who offer certain 
hazardous materials for transportation or transport certain hazardous 
materials in commerce to develop and implement security plans. Security 
awareness training is also required of all hazardous materials 
employees (hazmat employees), and in-depth security training is 
required of hazmat employees or persons required to develop and 
implement security plans.
    The HMR require persons who offer for transportation or transport 
the following hazardous materials to develop and implement security 
plans:
    (1) A highway route-controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) 
material, as defined at 49 CFR Sec.  173.403, in a motor vehicle, rail 
car, or freight container;
    (2) More than 25 kg (55 pounds) of a Division 1.1, 1.2, or 1.3 
(explosive) material in a motor vehicle, rail car, or freight 
container;
    (3) More than one L (1.06 qt) per package of a material poisonous 
by inhalation, as defined at 49 CFR Sec.  171.8, that meets the 
criteria for Hazard Zone A, as specified in 49 CFR Sec. Sec.  
173.116(a) or 173.133(a);
    (4) A shipment of a quantity of hazardous materials in a bulk 
packaging having a capacity equal to or greater than 13,248 L (3,500 
gallons) for liquids or gases or more than 13.24 cubic meters (468 
cubic feet) for solids;
    (5) A shipment in other than a bulk packaging of 2,268 kg (5,000 
pounds) gross weight or more of one class of hazardous materials for 
which placarding of a vehicle, rail car, or freight container is 
required for that class under the provisions of subpart F of this part;
    (6) A select agent or toxin regulated by the Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention under 42 CFR Part 73; or
    (7) A quantity of hazardous material that requires placarding under 
the provisions of subpart F of 49 CFR Part 172.
    Thus, in accordance with Subpart I of Part 172 of the HMR, rail 
carriers transporting any of the above materials in commerce must have 
developed and implemented security plans. The security plan must 
include an assessment of possible transportation security risks and 
appropriate measures to address the assessed risks. Specific measures 
implemented as part of the plan may vary commensurate with the level of 
threat at a particular time. At a minimum, the security plan must 
address personnel security, unauthorized access, and en route security. 
To address personnel security, the plan must include measures to 
confirm information provided by job applicants for positions involving 
access to and handling of the hazardous materials covered by the plan. 
To address unauthorized access, the plan must include measures to 
address the risk of unauthorized persons gaining access to materials or 
transport conveyances being prepared for transportation. To address en 
route security, the plan must include measures to address security 
risks during transportation, including the security of shipments stored 
temporarily en route to their destinations.
    As indicated above, the HMR set forth general requirements for a 
security plan's components rather than a prescriptive list of specific 
items that must be included. The HMR set a performance standard 
providing offerors and carriers with the flexibility necessary to 
develop security plans addressing their individual circumstances and 
operational environment. Accordingly, each security plan will differ 
because it will be based on an offeror's or a carrier's individualized 
assessment of the security risks associated with the specific hazardous 
materials it ships or transports and its unique circumstances and 
operational environment.
    Offerors and carriers in all modes were required to have security 
plans in place by September 25, 2003. New shippers and carriers must 
have security plans in place before they begin operations. To assist 
the industry in complying with the security plan requirements, PHMSA 
developed a security plan template to illustrate how risk management 
methodology could be used to identify areas in the transportation 
process where security procedures should be enhanced within the context 
of an overall risk management strategy. The security template is posted 
in the docket and on the PHMSA website at https://hazmat.dot.gov/
rmsef.htm. In addition, a number of industry groups and associations 
have developed guidance material to assist their members in developing 
appropriate security plans.
    With respect to delays in transportation, rail carriers are 
currently required to expedite the movement of hazardous materials 
shipments pursuant to Sec.  174.14 of the HMR. Each shipment of 
hazardous materials must be forwarded ``promptly and within 48 hours 
(Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays excluded)'' after acceptance of the 
shipment by the rail carrier. If only biweekly or weekly service is 
performed, the carrier must forward a shipment of hazardous materials 
in the first available train. Additionally, carriers are prohibited 
from holding, subject to forwarding orders, tank cars loaded with 
Division 2.1 (flammable gas), Division 2.3 (poisonous gas) or Class 3 
(flammable liquid) materials. The purpose of Sec.  174.14 is to help 
ensure the prompt delivery of hazardous materials shipments and to 
minimize the time materials spend in transportation, thus minimizing 
the exposure of hazmat shipments to accidents, derailments, unintended 
releases, or tampering.

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    Apart from the requirements in Sec.  174.14 to expedite the 
movement of hazardous materials, the HMR do not include specific 
routing requirements for rail hazmat shipments, e.g., to route 
shipments around or away from particular geographic areas. For example, 
in promulgating its March 2003 security regulations under Docket HM-
232, PHMSA specifically required rail carriers to address en route 
security; however, PHMSA deliberately decided to leave the specifics of 
hazardous materials rail routing decisions, and other en route security 
matters covered by transportation security plans, to the judgment of 
rail carriers. Accordingly, the HM-232 security regulations preempt, 
among other things, any state, local, or tribal laws and regulations 
prescribing or restricting the routing of rail hazardous materials 
shipments. 49 U.S.C. 5125 and 20106. This proposed rule does not change 
this general approach to route-related requirements for rail hazardous 
materials shipments. Because the nation's largest rail carriers operate 
across many states, and the operating conditions in each location can 
vary greatly, this approach gives carriers the ability to follow a 
consistent, nationally-applicable Federal standard while also tailoring 
safety and security measures to the particular circumstances of 
individual locations.
    The rail industry, through the Association of American Railroads 
(AAR), has developed a detailed protocol on recommended railroad 
operating practices for the transportation of hazardous materials. The 
AAR issued the most recent version of this document, known as Circular 
OT-55-I, on August 26, 2005. The Circular details railroad operating 
practices for: (1) Designating trains as ``key trains'' containing (i) 
five tank car loads or more of poison inhalation hazard (PIH) 
materials, (ii) 20 or more car loads or intermodal portable tank loads 
of a combination of PIH, flammable gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, 
and environmentally sensitive chemicals, or (iii) one or more car loads 
of spent nuclear fuel or high level radioactive waste; (2) designating 
operating speed and equipment restrictions for key trains; (3) 
designating ``key routes'' for key trains, and setting standards for 
track inspection and wayside defect detectors; (4) yard operating 
practices for handling placarded tank cars; (5) storage, loading, 
unloading and handling of loaded tank cars; (6) assisting communities 
with emergency response training and information; (7) shipper 
notification procedures; and (8) the handling of time-sensitive 
materials. These recommended practices were originally implemented by 
all of the Class 1 rail carriers operating in the United States; the 
most recent version of the circular also includes short-line railroads 
as signatories.
    Circular OT-55-I defines a ``key route'' as:

Any track with a combination of 10,000 car loads or intermodal 
portable tank loads of hazardous materials, or a combination of 
4,000 car loadings of PIH (Hazard zone A, B, C, or D), anhydrous 
ammonia, flammable gas, Class 1.1 or 1.2 explosives, environmentally 
sensitive chemicals, Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF), and High Level 
Radioactive Waste (HLRW) over a period of one year.

    Any route defined by a railroad as a key route should meet certain 
standards described in OT-55-I. Wayside defective wheel bearing 
detectors should be placed at a maximum of 40 miles apart, or an 
equivalent level of protection may be installed based on improvements 
in technology. Main track on key routes should be inspected by rail 
defect detection and track geometry inspection cars or by any 
equivalent level of inspection at least twice each year. Sidings on key 
routes should be inspected at least once a year; and main track and 
sidings should have periodic track inspections to identify cracks or 
breaks in joint bars. Further, any track used for meeting and passing 
key trains should be FRA Class 2 track or higher. If a meet or pass 
must occur on less than Class 2 track due to an emergency, one of the 
trains should be stopped before the other train passes. The proposals 
in this NPRM in part reflect the recommended practices mentioned above, 
which are already in wide use across the rail industry.

 III. Request for Comments on the Transportation Security of TIH 
Materials

    On August 16, 2004, PHMSA and TSA published a notice and request 
for comments on the need for enhanced security requirements for the 
rail transportation of hazardous materials posing a poison or toxic 
inhalation hazard (TIH materials). See 69 FR 50988. (Note that for 
purposes of the HMR, the terms ``poison'' and ``toxic'' are synonymous, 
as are the terms ``PIH materials'' and ``TIH materials.'') In the 
August notice, PHMSA and TSA sought comments on the feasibility of 
initiating specific security enhancements and the potential costs and 
benefits of doing so. Security measures addressed in the notice 
included improvements to security plans, modification of methods used 
to identify shipments, enhanced requirements for temporary storage, 
strengthened tank car integrity, and implementation of tracking and 
communication systems. To date, we have received over 100 comments. We 
considered the comments concerning the need for improvements to current 
security plan requirements and revisions to regulations applicable to 
in-transit storage in developing this NPRM. These comments are 
discussed in detail in the following sections.
    The comments to the August notice related to hazard communication, 
shipment identification, strengthened tank car integrity, and shipment 
tracking are not addressed in this rulemaking.
    Additionally, on August 9-10, 2005, FRA participated in a meeting 
of the AAR Hazardous Materials Bureau of Explosives (BOE) Committee. At 
this meeting, FRA requested input from the rail industry regarding 
internal methods used to track and store information about TIH, 
explosive, and highway route controlled quantity radioactive materials. 
Comments regarding the definition of a route for the purpose of rail 
route analysis were taken into consideration in the development of this 
NPRM, as reflected by the use of line segment, an industry term. Other 
comments received related to specific measures, which a carrier should 
consider in performing a route analysis. A summary of this meeting can 
be found in the docket for this rulemaking.

A. Security Plan Improvements

    In the August notice, PHMSA and TSA stated the two agencies are 
interested in determining how security plans required under the HMR 
might be improved, particularly as they relate to TIH materials. PHMSA 
and TSA asked commenters to provide information concerning the process 
by which their security plans were developed, including any problems 
encountered during the drafting or implementation phase, recommended 
``best practices,'' and any additional guidance or assistance as 
appropriate.
    Commenters found the guidance provided by DOT and various industry 
associations to be quite useful for developing the security plans under 
the HMR. Commenters generally agree additional guidance material 
specific to the transportation of TIH materials could be helpful in 
enhancing the security of TIH materials; however, commenters generally 
oppose a requirement for the creation of separate security plans 
specific to TIH or other high-hazard materials, noting such materials 
are already covered by the HMR security plan requirements and

[[Page 76838]]

DOT and DHS have not shown the existing security plan requirements are 
inadequate. Most commenters who address this issue note that the 
success of DOT's current security plan requirement is its flexibility 
and encourage DOT and DHS to focus on performance-based criteria that 
are general in nature and provide flexibility to tailor transportation 
security plans and integrate them into overall security management. 
Commenters are nearly unanimous in opposition to a requirement for DOT 
and DHS to review and approve specific security plans, unless done on-
site as part of a compliance or outreach review.
    PHMSA and TSA agree with commenters who suggest compliance with the 
current security plan regulations could be improved with the 
development of additional guidance material or more specific 
requirements applicable to certain types of hazardous materials. As 
discussed in more detail below, in this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing 
clarifications and enhancements to the current security requirements as 
they apply to certain rail operations.

B. Temporary Storage

    In the August notice, PHMSA and TSA discussed issues associated 
with the temporary storage of rail tank cars during transportation, 
including current regulatory requirements applicable to such storage. 
PHMSA and TSA requested comments concerning whether revisions to the 
temporary storage requirements applicable to rail cars transporting TIH 
materials are appropriate, including the impact such revisions could 
have on the costs to transport TIH materials and the impact on 
recipients and users (for example, towns and municipalities).
    Many commenters agree the security of TIH rail shipments stored 
temporarily during transportation should be improved but have mixed 
views on how to achieve this objective. While some commenters support 
time limits on interim storage and prohibitions on the storage of TIH 
rail cars in densely populated areas, others suggest such restrictions 
would be infeasible because of supply chain issues, adverse economic 
impacts, and railroad operational and efficiency issues. One commenter 
notes ``since the federal government does not limit the storage of TIH 
materials at customer facilities, it would be illogical for the federal 
government to limit railroad storage of TIH materials.'' Several 
commenters urge PHMSA and TSA to ``use extra caution'' before 
prohibiting the temporary storage of TIH materials, suggesting a 
location in a densely populated area should not in itself be a reason 
to prohibit temporary storage. Rather than place limits on temporary 
storage, commenters suggest the security measures implemented at 
facilities at which such storage occurs should be based on risk 
assessments. Thus, for example, a facility in a densely populated area 
would be required to implement more stringent security requirements 
than a facility in a rural area. Specific measures suggested include 
perimeter fencing with controlled and limited access, enhanced 
lighting, remote monitoring, and frequent security patrols.
    As discussed in more detail below, PHSMA, FRA, and TSA agree with 
commenters that the security of hazardous materials rail shipments 
stored temporarily during transportation should be improved, and PHMSA 
is proposing revisions in this NPRM. In addition, in its NPRM published 
in today's edition of the Federal Register, TSA is proposing additional 
security measures applicable to the storage of rail shipments of 
certain hazardous materials.

C. Shipment Tracking

    The August notice indicated DOT and DHS are considering whether 
communication or tracking requirements should be required for rail 
shipments of TIH materials, such as satellite tracking of TIH rail cars 
and real-time monitoring of tank car or track conditions. In addition, 
the notice suggested DOT and DHS are considering reporting requirements 
in the event TIH shipments are not delivered within specified time 
periods.
    The HMR currently do not include communication or tracking 
requirements for hazardous materials shipments. Offerors and 
transporters of TIH materials may elect to implement communication or 
tracking measures as part of security plans developed in accordance 
with subpart I of part 172 of the HMR, but such measures are not 
mandatory.
    Commenters who addressed this issue are not convinced that tracking 
of rail shipments of TIH materials has a security benefit, instead 
suggesting the probability of a rail car being moved off the rail 
network is extremely remote and, further, tracking rail cars to 
determine if they are off course has no value from a security 
perspective. Commenters also express concerns about the reliability of 
tracking systems and the possibility that some systems could be 
compromised. Several commenters suggest that since the railroad 
industry already has the capability to track rail cars, the existing 
system should be supplemented, not scrapped, and any mandated tracking 
requirements should provide for flexibility in choosing different 
technologies.
    PHMSA, FRA, and TSA believe that most rail carriers have the 
capability to report on the locations of certain hazardous materials 
rail cars. We believe carriers should be required to report car 
location upon request of the government in certain limited situations, 
particularly during elevated threat conditions. PHMSA, FRA, and TSA are 
continuing to consider whether and to what extent rail carriers should 
be required to gather and report car location information, including 
the type of information to be collected, its format, and the costs of 
mandating such a requirement. In its NPRM, published in today's edition 
of the Federal Register, TSA is proposing to require rail carriers to 
report location and shipping information for certain hazardous 
materials to TSA upon request.

IV. Proposals in this NPRM

    Based on comments received in response to the TIH notice and our 
experience in monitoring industry compliance with the HMR security plan 
requirements, we are proposing the following revisions to the security 
plan provisions:
     We propose to require rail carriers transporting certain 
types of hazardous materials to compile information and data on the 
commodities transported, including the transportation routes over which 
these commodities are transported.
     We propose to require rail carriers transporting certain 
types of hazardous materials to use the data they compile on 
commodities they transport to analyze the safety and security risks for 
the transportation routes used and one possible alternative route to 
the one used. Rail carriers would be required to utilize these analyses 
to transport these materials over the safest and most secure 
commercially practicable routes.
     We propose to require rail carriers to specifically 
address the security risks associated with shipments delayed in transit 
or temporarily stored in transit as part of their security plans.
     We propose to require rail carriers transporting certain 
types of hazardous materials to notify consignees if there is a 
significant unplanned delay affecting the delivery of the hazardous 
material.
     We propose to require rail carriers to work with shippers 
and consignees to minimize the time a rail car containing certain types 
of hazardous materials is

[[Page 76839]]

placed on track awaiting pick-up or delivery or transfer from one 
carrier to another.
     We propose to require rail carriers to notify storage 
facilities and consignees when rail cars containing certain types of 
hazardous materials are delivered to a storage or consignee facility.
     We propose to require rail carriers to conduct security 
visual inspections at ground level of rail cars containing hazardous 
materials to inspect for signs of tampering or the introduction of an 
improvised explosive device (IED).
    These proposed revisions are explained in more detail in the 
following sections.
    DOT's hazardous materials transportation safety program provides 
for a high degree of safety with respect to incidents involving 
unintentional releases of hazardous materials occurring during 
transportation. However, intentional misuse of hazardous materials was 
rarely considered when the regulations were developed. Since 9/11, we 
have come to realize that hazardous materials safety and security are 
inseparable. Many, if not most, of the requirements designed to enhance 
hazardous materials transportation safety, such as strong containers 
and clear hazard communication, enhance the security of hazardous 
materials shipments as well. Congress recognized this synergy and 
legislated its intent that ``hazmat safety [was] to include hazmat 
security'' when it enacted the Homeland Security Act of 2002 
authorizing the Secretary of Transportation to ``prescribe regulations 
for the safe transportation, including security, of hazardous material 
in intrastate, interstate, and foreign commerce.'' Safety and security 
must be considered together, particularly because a given security 
measure could have a potentially negative impact on overall 
transportation safety--routing and hazard communication are two obvious 
examples. Of course, the opposite can also be true--a safety policy or 
regulation could have a potentially negative impact on transportation 
security. PHMSA, FRA, and TSA are collaborating to ensure an 
appropriate balance between safety and security concerns.
    The transport of highly hazardous materials is not limited to rail. 
Currently, significant amounts of highly hazardous materials are also 
transported by highway and vessel. The focus on rail is intended to be 
one phase in a multiphase effort by DOT and DHS to assess and secure 
the transportation of hazardous materials in all transportation modes 
to create an end-to-end secure supply chain. In this regard, we note 
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration has established 
criteria in 49 CFR Part 397 for routing certain highly hazardous 
materials.

A. Applicability to Certain Types of Hazardous Materials

    PHMSA, FRA, and TSA have assessed the safety and security 
vulnerabilities associated with the transportation of different types 
and classes of hazardous materials. The list of materials to which the 
enhanced security requirements proposed in this NPRM would apply is 
based on specific transportation scenarios. These scenarios depict how 
hazardous materials could be deliberately used to cause significant 
casualties and property damage or accident scenarios resulting in 
similar catastrophic consequences. The materials specified in this NPRM 
present the greatest rail transportation safety and security risks--
because of the potential consequences associated with an unintentional 
release of these materials--and the most attractive targets for 
terrorists--because of the potential for these materials to be used as 
weapons of opportunity or weapons of mass destruction.
    In this NPRM, we are proposing enhanced rail security requirements 
for rail transportation, with a particular focus on the following types 
and quantities of hazardous materials:
    (1) More than 2,268 kg (5,000 lbs) in a single carload of a 
Division 1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 explosive;
    (2) A bulk quantity of a TIH material (poisonous by inhalation, as 
defined in 49 CFR 171.8); or
    (3) A highway-route controlled quantity of a Class 7 (radioactive) 
material.
    As indicated above, the materials to be covered by this rulemaking 
represent those posing both a significant rail transportation safety 
and security risk. The following list provides a basic summary of the 
materials and critical vulnerabilities warranting inclusion in the 
proposed rule:
     Division 1.1, 1.2, and 1.3 explosive materials. These 
explosive materials present significant safety and security risks in 
transportation. A Division 1.1 explosive is one presenting a mass 
explosive hazard. A mass explosion is one affecting almost the entire 
load simultaneously. A Division 1.2 explosive has a projection hazard, 
which means if the material were to explode, it would project fragments 
outward at some distance. A Division 1.3 explosive presents a fire 
hazard and either a minor blast hazard or a minor projection hazard or 
both. If compromised in transit by detonation or as a secondary 
explosion to an IED, these explosives could result in substantial 
damage to rail infrastructure and the surrounding area.
     TIH materials. TIH materials are gases or liquids that are 
known or presumed on the basis of tests to be toxic to humans and to 
pose a hazard to health in the event of a release during 
transportation. TIH materials pose special risks during transportation 
because their uncontrolled release can endanger significant numbers of 
people. The January 6, 2005 train derailment in Graniteville, SC with 
subsequent release of chlorine sadly underscored this risk.
     Highway Route Controlled Quantity Radioactive Materials 
(HRCQ). Shipments of HRCQ of radioactive materials are large quantities 
of radioactive materials requiring special controls during 
transportation. Because of the quantity included in a single packaging, 
HRCQ shipments pose significant safety and security risks.
    In addition, we are seeking comment on whether the requirements 
proposed in this NPRM should also apply to flammable gases, flammable 
liquids, or other materials that could be weaponized, as well as 
hazardous materials that could cause serious environmental damage if 
released into rivers or lakes. For example, although most ammonium 
nitrate and ammonium nitrate mixtures are classified as oxidizers 
during transportation based on the normal transportation environment, 
tests have shown these materials have explosive properties under 
certain conditions. Rail cars carrying large quantities of these 
materials may pose significant security risks. Commenters are asked to 
identify which additional materials (if any) should be subject to 
enhanced safety or security requirements and discuss the types of 
requirements appropriate to address the risks posed by an intentional 
or accidental release of the product.

B. Commodity Data

    In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing to require rail carriers 
transporting any of the materials specified to compile commodity data 
on a calendar year basis. Each rail carrier must identify the line 
segments over which these commodities are transported. As the carrier 
deems appropriate, line segments may be aggregated into logical 
groupings, such as between major interchange points. The rail carrier 
selected line segment(s) will be considered the route, as discussed 
below, used for rail routing analysis. Within each route, the commodity 
data must identify the route location and

[[Page 76840]]

total number of shipments transported over the line segment(s). The 
data collected must identify the specified materials by UN 
identification number. However, given that UN identification numbers 
used to identify the specified materials may also represent materials 
not meeting the criteria for commodity data collection, an allowance is 
being made to allow data collection for all Class 7 and Division 6.1 
materials transported over the route. Complete data on the shipments 
transported and the routes utilized should improve rail carriers' 
ability to develop and implement specific safety and security 
strategies.
    As proposed in this NPRM, rail carriers would be required to 
complete the commodity data collection within 90 days after the end of 
each calendar year. For example, if a rail carrier is compiling data 
for calendar year 2006, it must be available for use and inspection by 
April 1, 2007. To provide carriers with flexibility in compiling and 
assessing the data, we are not proposing a specified format; however 
the data must be available in a format that could be read and 
understood by DOT personnel and that clearly identifies the physical 
locations of the carrier's route(s) and commodities transported over 
each route. Physical location may be identified by beginning and ending 
point, locality name, station name, track milepost, or other method 
devised by the rail carrier which specifies the geographic location. 
Carriers would also be required to retain the data for two years, in 
either hard copy or electronic form, whichever is most efficient for 
the carrier.
    With respect to information confidentiality and security concerns, 
data compiled under the proposed regulations would be considered SSI 
under regulations promulgated by DOT and DHS (49 CFR Parts 15 and 1520, 
respectively). SSI is subject to special handling rules and qualifying 
information is protected from public disclosure under those regulations 
if copies of any data are kept or maintained by DOT. See 69 FR 28066 
(May 18, 2004) and 70 FR 1379 (January 7, 2005). Carriers would be 
required to ensure any information developed to comply with the 
requirements proposed in this NPRM is properly marked and handled in 
accordance with the SSI regulations. Further, information maintained by 
DOT may be shared with DHS. In such cases, SSI protections will 
continue to apply.

C. Route Analyses

    In this NPRM, PHMSA is proposing to require rail carriers to use 
the data compilation described above to include in their security plans 
an analysis of the rail transportation routes over which the specified 
materials are transported. As proposed, carriers will be required to 
analyze the specific safety and security risks for routes identified in 
the commodity data collection. Route analyses will be required to be in 
writing and to consider, at a minimum, a number of factors specific to 
each individual route. A non-inclusive list of those factors is 
included in proposed Appendix D to Subpart I of Part 172. Consistent 
with the SSI restrictions set forth in 49 CFR Parts 15 and 1520, TSA 
and FRA will provide appropriate guidance to rail carriers on how to 
properly weigh and evaluate the factors necessary for performing the 
security part of the risk analysis, and will include threat scenarios 
to aid in this route analysis.
    We invite comments to address how frequently route analyses should 
be updated and revised. This NPRM proposes to require carriers to re-
examine route analyses on an annual basis. We are seeking comments on 
whether annual analyses are necessary and whether the analyses should 
be conducted more frequently or less frequently. For example, the 
regulations could require carriers to revise and update route analyses 
only when necessary to account for changes in the way a carrier 
operates, changes to the routes utilized to transport hazardous 
materials, or in response to specific threat information.
    We anticipate carriers will first analyze the rail transportation 
route over which each specified commodity normally travels in the 
regular course of business. As discussed below, we are also proposing 
to require carriers to then identify and analyze the next most 
practicable alternative route, if available, over which they have 
authority to operate, using the same factors. We expect the alternative 
route analyzed will originate and terminate at the same points as the 
original route.
    We have given careful consideration to the question of how to 
define a ``rail transportation route'' for the purpose of the analysis 
proposed in this NPRM. We propose this very basic definition: a route 
is a series of one or more rail line segments, as selected by the rail 
carrier. Between the beginning and ending points of a rail carrier's 
possession and responsibility for a hazardous materials shipment, it 
would be up to the rail carrier to define the routes to be assessed. 
For example, a route could begin at the geographic point where a rail 
carrier takes physical possession of the hazardous material from the 
offeror or another carrier for transportation. A route could end at the 
geographic point where: (1) The rail carrier relinquishes possession of 
the hazardous material, either by delivering the commodity to its final 
destination or interchanging the shipment to another carrier; or (2) 
the carrier's operating authority ends. Hazardous materials shipments 
will likely have intermediary stops and transitions--for example, a 
shipment may be held in a railroad yard, placed in a different train, 
or stored temporarily during transportation. Our aim is to have rail 
carriers analyze the territory and track over which these certain 
hazardous materials are regularly transported in the carrier's normal 
course of business, while providing flexibility concerning how specific 
routes will be defined and assessed. The final analysis, however, 
should provide a clear picture of the routes a rail carrier uses for 
the specified hazardous materials. Patterns and regular shipments 
should become obvious, as should non-routine hazardous materials 
movements, such as the one-time move of a specific shipment of military 
explosives or high-level nuclear waste. The parameters set out for 
``key routes'' in AAR Circular OT-55-I are an excellent starting point 
for railroads to use in performing route analyses.
    In addition to the routes normally and regularly used by rail 
carriers to transport these designated hazardous materials, we are 
proposing to require carriers to analyze and assess the feasibility of 
available alternative routes over which they have authority to operate. 
For each primary route, one commercially practicable alternative route 
must be identified and analyzed using the Rail Risk Analysis Factors of 
proposed Appendix D to Part 172. We recognize in many cases, the only 
alternative route in a particular area may be on another carrier's 
right-of-way. A rail carrier would not be obligated to analyze an 
alternative route over which it has no authority to operate. We also 
recognize, in some cases, no alternative route will be available; 
therefore, no such analysis would be required. This is particularly 
true in the case of regional or short-line railroads that are often the 
only rail carriers in a given geographic area. Where an alternative 
route over which the carrier has authority to operate does exist, the 
carrier must analyze that route and document its analysis, including 
the safety and security risks presented by the alternative route, any 
remediation or mitigation measures in place or that could be 
implemented, and the economic effects of utilizing the

[[Page 76841]]

alternative route. As used in this proposal, ``commercially 
practicable'' means that the route may be utilized by the railroad 
within the limits of the railroads particular operating constraints 
and, further, that the route is economically viable given the economics 
of the commodity, route, and customer relationship. The question of 
commercial practicability must be reasonably evaluated by each rail 
carrier as a part of its analysis based on the specific circumstances 
of the route and proposed traffic. If using a possible alternative 
route would significantly increase a carrier's operating costs, as well 
as the costs to its customers, the carrier should document these facts 
in its route analysis. We expect that carriers will make these 
decisions in good faith, using the financial management principles 
generally applied to their other business decisions.
    In the rail operating environment, it is possible a carrier may 
transport the specified material over a route where the carrier has 
trackage rights, but does not own or have control over the track and 
associated infrastructure. Many of the factors in Appendix D relate to 
the physical characteristics of the track. In completing the route 
analyses required by this proposed rule, the carrier may identify 
specific measures to address risks outside its ability to accomplish. 
Because it is essential that safety and security measures be 
coordinated among all responsible entities, it is incumbent upon the 
carrier to work with the owner of the track to evaluate the 
vulnerabilities and identify measures to effect mitigation of the 
risks. If measures required by this proposed rule cannot be implemented 
because another entity refuses or fails to cooperate, the carrier must 
notify FRA. As stated in the Enforcement section of this preamble, FRA 
retains the authority to require use of an alternative route until such 
time as identified deficiencies are mitigated or corrected.
    For each primary route, one alternative route must be identified 
and analyzed, if available as discussed above. As with the primary 
route analysis, we expect the end result to be a clear picture of the 
commercially practicable alternative route(s) available to rail 
carriers for the transportation of the specified hazardous materials. 
Alternative routing is used in the normal course of business throughout 
the railroad industry in order to accommodate circumstances such as 
derailments, accidents, damaged track, natural events (mudslides, 
floods), traffic bottlenecks, and heightened security due to major 
national events. The rail carriers' analysis of the alternative route 
should, in the end, clearly indicate the reasonableness, 
appropriateness, and feasibility, including economic feasibility, of 
using the alternative. We expect a complete alternative route analysis 
will indicate such things as any actual use of alternative route; 
safety and security benefits and risks of the alternative route; and 
commercial or economic costs and benefits of the route. Clearly, if an 
alternative route, after analysis, is identified to be the safest and 
most secure commercially practicable route, the carrier would either 
designate it as the primary route or identify and implement mitigating 
measures to improve the safety and security of the analyzed primary 
route. Each carrier will be required to use the commercially 
practicable route with the overall fewest combined safety and security 
risks, based on its analysis.
    We recognize there may not be one single route that affords both 
the fewest safety and security risks. The most important part of this 
process is the route analysis itself and the identification of the 
safety and security risks on each route. The carrier may then make an 
informed decision, balancing all relevant factors and the best 
information available, regarding which route to use. For example, if a 
rail carrier determines one particular route is the safest and most 
practicable, but has a particular security risk, the carrier should 
then implement specific security measures to mitigate the security 
risk. We also recognize some security risks or threats may be long-
term, while others are short-term, such as those arising from holding a 
major national event (e.g., national political party conventions) in 
close proximity to the rail route. Mitigation measures could be put in 
place for the duration of the event; after the event is over, normal 
operations could resume. Again, we expect many of the railroads already 
have experience in addressing safety and security issues such as these, 
and likely have already catalogued possible actions to mitigate such 
risks.
    In the evaluation of alternative routes, carriers may also indicate 
certain conditions under which alternative routes will be used. In the 
case of a short-term safety or security risk, such as a temporary event 
at a venue along the route, or a derailment, carriers may specify an 
alternative route and the measures to be put in place for use of that 
alternative route.
    To assist rail carriers in performing these analyses of rail 
transportation routes and alternative routes, PHMSA is proposing to add 
a new Appendix D to Subpart 172. This appendix will lay out the minimum 
criteria a rail carrier must consider in analyzing each route and 
alternative route. The criteria listed are those we believe are most 
relevant in analyzing the rail routes for the hazardous materials 
discussed in this proposed rule. Of course, not all the criteria will 
be present on each route, and each route will have its own combination 
of factors to be considered. Again, our aim is to enable rail carriers 
to tailor these analyses to the particular risks and factors of their 
operations, and to get a clear picture of the characteristics of each 
route.
    For the initial route analysis, we anticipate rail carriers will 
review the prior two-year period when considering the criteria 
contained in Appendix D. In subsequent years, the scope of the analyses 
should focus on changes from the initial analyses. For example, using 
the criteria in Appendix D, carriers should analyze the impact of 
significant changes in traffic density, new customers offering or 
receiving the specified hazardous materials, and significant 
operational changes. The scope of the analyses in subsequent years is 
expected to be more limited than the analyses conducted in the first 
year. As proposed in this NPRM, each carrier would be required to 
perform a system-wide analysis every five years to include a 
comprehensive review of all changes occurring during the intervening 
period. The system-wide review would include an analysis of all primary 
routes and a reevaluation of the corresponding practicable alternative 
routes.
    We recognize the need for flexibility in performing risk 
assessments, yet we must balance it against the need for some degree of 
uniformity in the assessments. Uniformity is necessary when a 
performance standard is used. We have tried to balance these two 
competing interests by establishing a requirement for the assessment 
criteria to be used, while allowing rail carriers to choose the 
methodology for conducting the analysis. We believe the proposed 
criteria will improve the quality of risk assessments conducted per 
this subpart. We solicit comment on the proposal's balancing of 
flexibility and uniformity in both risk assessment and route selection.
    Regardless of methodology selected, a rail carrier should apply 
certain common principles. These include the following:
     The analysis should employ the best reasonable, obtainable 
information from the natural, physical, and social sciences to assess 
risks to health, safety, and the environment;

[[Page 76842]]

     Characterizations of risks and of changes in the nature or 
magnitude of risks should be both qualitative, and quantitative to the 
extent possible consistent with available data;
     Characterizations of risk should be broad enough to deduce 
a range of activities to reduce risks;
     Statements of assumptions, their rationale, and their 
impact on the risk analysis should be explicit;
     The analysis should consider the full population at risk, 
as well as subpopulations particularly susceptible to such risks and/or 
more highly exposed; and
     The analysis should adopt consistent approaches to 
evaluating the risks posed by hazardous agents or events.
    We believe institutionalizing a practical assessment program is 
important to supporting business activities and provides several 
benefits. First, and perhaps most importantly, assessment programs help 
ensure identification, on a continuing basis, of the movement of 
materials presenting the greatest risk to the public and the business 
community. Second, risk assessments help personnel throughout the 
organization better understand where to best apply limited resources to 
minimize risks. Further, risk assessments provide a mechanism for 
reaching a consensus on which risks are the greatest and what steps are 
appropriate for mitigating them. Finally, a formal risk assessment 
program provides an efficient means for communicating assessment 
findings and recommended actions to business unit managers as well as 
to senior corporate officials. The periodic nature of the assessments 
provides organizations a means of readily understanding reported 
information and comparing results over time.
    The route analysis described above must identify safety and 
security vulnerabilities along the route to be utilized. As proposed in 
this NPRM, each rail carrier's security plan would be required to 
include measures to minimize the safety and security vulnerabilities 
identified through the route analyses. With respect to mitigation 
measures and cost, there are many measures rail carriers can take 
without necessarily adding to the cost of compliance. For example, 
carriers can work to notify local law enforcement and emergency 
responders of the types and approximate amounts of particular 
commodities typically transported through communities. Further, 
location changes can be made as to where rail cars containing highly 
hazardous materials are stored in transit. As with the security plan 
requirements currently required, our goal with this proposal is to 
permit rail carriers the flexibility to identify potential safety and 
security vulnerabilities and measures to address them, including the 
determination of which of its routes provide the overall fewest safety 
and security risks.
    Although not a terrorist incident, the January 6, 2005, railroad 
accident and release of chlorine in Graniteville, SC, added to the 
growing concern about terrorism and prompted the development of the 
Freight Rail Security Program. This program is an innovative public-
private partnership dedicated to assessing policies and technologies 
for enhancing security throughout the freight rail industry. One 
product of this partnership is the development of the Rail Corridor 
Risk Management Tool (RCRMT). The RCRMT will leverage existing 
technologies and accepted risk management practices where feasible, and 
incorporate new technologies and elements as appropriate. A second 
project of the Freight Rail Security Program is the Rail Corridor 
Hazmat Response and Recovery Tool (RCHRRT), which will integrate 
geographical information an