Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway; Emergency Order To Prevent Operation of Trains on Railroad Bridge No. 29.11 of the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway, 76424-76425 [06-9788]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 244 (Wednesday, December 20, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 76424-76425]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-9788]



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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

[FRA Emergency Order No. 25, Notice No. 1]


Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway; Emergency Order To Prevent 
Operation of Trains on Railroad Bridge No. 29.11 of the Toledo, Peoria 
and Western Railway

    The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) of the United States 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has determined that public safety 
compels issuance of this Emergency Order requiring the Toledo, Peoria 
and Western Railway (TPW, a subsidiary of RailAmerica, Inc., to 
discontinue operation of trains or any railroad on-track equipment by 
anyone on a railroad bridge it owns spanning Prairie Creek (hereinafter 
designated as ``Bridge 29.11'') near the City of LaHogue, Illinois. The 
bridge shall remain out of service until it has been properly repaired 
and its capacity determined by a registered professional engineer 
licensed to practice in the State of Illinois who is technically 
proficient in the field of timber railroad bridge engineering.

Authority

    Authority to enforce Federal railroad safety laws has been 
delegated by the Secretary of Transportation to the Federal Railroad 
Administrator. 49 CFR 1.49. Railroads are subject to FRA's safety 
jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws, 49 U.S.C. 20101, 
20103. FRA is authorized to issue emergency orders where an unsafe 
condition or practice ``causes an emergency situation involving a 
hazard of death or personal injury.'' 49 U.S.C. 20104. These orders may 
impose such ``restrictions and prohibitions * * * that may be necessary 
to abate the situation.'' (Ibid.)

Background

    TPW, a common carrier, is a part of the general railroad system of 
transportation. The track segment in which the Bridge 29.11 is located 
extends approximately 180 miles from Peoria, Illinois to Logansport, 
Indiana.
    TPW Bridge 29.11 crosses Prairie Creek at Mile Post 29.11, one-half 
mile east of LaHogue, Illinois. The bridge is approximately 100 feet 
north of County Road 1800N and one-half mile east of County Road 200E. 
Approximate geographic coordinates are 40[deg]45'50.5'' North latitude 
and 88[deg]04'46.4'' West longitude. There is no commercial water 
traffic on Prairie Creek.
    TPW hauls mixed freight, including hazardous material, across the 
bridge. Current traffic levels are two trains per day, one each way, 
six days a week. Car weights are limited by TPW to 286,000 pounds.

Configuration of the Bridge

    The bridge carries a single tangent main track. Its total length is 
58 feet. It incorporates three Spans, numbered east to west as spans 1, 
2 and 3. For reference in this and other documents relating to this 
Emergency Order, the bridge components are numbered from east to west 
and north to south, with the east end bent or abutment numbered as 0, 
and the north stringer in each span numbered as 1.

Superstructure

    Spans 1 and 3 are timber pile trestle-type of approximately 13 feet 
in length. Span 2, approximately 30 feet in length, is of the deck 
plate girder design, with two built-up girders placed under this track.
    Spans 1 and 3 each have eight timber stringers, 8 inches wide by 16 
inches deep by 14 feet long. Four stringers are bolted together into 
each of two chords which are essentially centered under each rail. Span 
2 is a 30 foot steel deck plate girder-type span two girders supporting 
the track.

Substructure

    End bents 0 and 3 consist of five driven timber piles with a timber 
cap. Intermediate bents 1 and 2, which also support the steel girders 
of span 2, each have two rows of six driven timber piles. Each row of 
piles in bents 1 and 2 has a timber cap and one row of timber cross 
blocking above the caps. Above the cross blocking under the deck plate 
girder span are two transverse timbers laid side by side. Above the 
cross blocking under the timber spans there are three transverse 
timbers stacked on top of each other.

Track

    Track ties rest directly on top of the stringers, and support in 
turn tie plates and the two continuously welded running rails, 112 
pounds per yard. There are no rail joints on the bridge. A metal strap 
is attached to the top of the outside edge of the ties to maintain 
spacing.

FRA Activity Related to the Bridge

    On August 8, 2006, two FRA Bridge Safety Specialists, on FRA Chief 
Inspector and a TPW Track Foreman observed the bridge. The serious 
bridge conditions and a track defect (warp) on the bridge were noted 
and discussed with the TPW Track Foreman. FRA determined that the warp 
condition on the bridge was caused by deteriorated and crushing 
stringers. On August 11, 2006, an FRA Bridge Safety Specialist 
discussed the condition of this bridge with TPW's Roadmaster. A 
conference call was held on August 31, 2006, with FRA, TPW, and 
RailAmerica officials specifically to discuss bridge conditions on the 
TPW and TPW's bridge management program. During this call, the 
condition of this bridge was discussed. TPW and RailAmerica officials 
agreed to immediately repair this and other bridges. On October 31, 
2006, an FRA Bridge Safety Survey Report of the TPW was sent to TPW and 
RailAmerica officials. The condition of this bridge was shown on page 4 
of that report.
    An FRA Bridge Safety Specialist conducted an observation of the 
bridge on December 13, 2006, after notifying TPW several days in 
advance of his plans. TPW elected not to accompany the FRA specialist 
during that observation, which was conducted from below the bridge. The 
FRA observation of the bridge on December 13, 2006, revealed no 
evidence of repairs to the bridge or the track since the initial bridge 
observation on August 8, 2006. The condition of the bridge on December 
13, 2006, enumerated below, is the basis for FRA to issue this 
Emergency Order.

Condition of the Bridge

    The FRA observation of Bridge 29.11 on December 13, 2006, revealed 
the following conditions:
Span 1:
    Stringer 1--West end is hollow, decayed and crushing with 
horizontal cracking.
    Stringer 2--West end is hollow and decayed.
    Stringer 3--West end is decayed.
    Stringer 4--Horizontal shear crack entire length. West end is 
hollow, decayed and crushing.
    Stringer 5--Horizontal shear crack entire length. West and is 
hollow, decayed and crushing.
    Stringer 6--West end is hollow and decayed.
    Stringer 7--West end is hollow and decayed.
    Stringer 8--Stringer has failed.

Span 3:
    Stringer 1--West end is crushing severely with multiple horizontal 
cracks. East end hollow.
    Stringer 2--East end hollow
    Stringer 3--West end of the stringer appears to be crushing. East 
end hollow.
    Stringer 4--Horizontal shear crack

[[Page 76425]]

entire length. West end is crushing. East end hollow.
    Stringer 5--West end hollow with numerous horizontal cracks. East 
end hollow.
    Stringer 6--East end hollow.
    Stringer 7--East end hollow.
    Stringer 8--West end hollow, decayed and crushing with horizontal 
cracks.

    In span 1, a vertical gap of approximately .75 inches exists 
between the south rail and the tie plates, and a vertical gap of 1.25 
inches exists between the track ties and stringer 8 at the southwest 
corner of the span.
    Span 1 was observed while a westbound mixed freight train crossed 
the bridge at approximately 10 miles per hour. Vertical deflection of 
stringer 8 was measured at mid-span by attaching a tape measure to the 
stringer and referencing the movement against a fixed object near the 
ground. Several loaded cars each caused a deflection of approximately 
1.25 inches. A deflection measurement was not taken while the 
locomotive was on the span. Significant vertical deflection was also 
observed but not measured in span 3.
    Many of the cross blocks in bents 1 and 2 have various degrees of 
decay and voids. The timber under the west end of the stringers in span 
1 has split lengthwise with approximately one-quarter of the timber 
broken off.

Evaluation of Bride Conditions

    Using the live load deflection measurements in span 1 and by 
observing deterioration, crushing, and distress of the stringers in 
spans 1 and 3, FRA has determined that TPW's Bridge 29.11 is in 
imminent danger of catastrophic failure under a train at any time.
    Failure of the bridge under load could have very serious 
consequences. The bridge failure could cause the train to fall into the 
creek below, seriously injuring any railroad employees on the train and 
any other persons in the vicinity of Prairie Creek. A derailment could 
block the creek resulting in widespread flooding in the immediate area. 
Locomotive diesel fuel or hazardous materials in the train could cause 
severe environmental damage to Prairie Creek and the Iroquois River 
into which it eventually flows.

Finding and Order

    FRA has concluded that any future railroad use of Bridge 29.11 on 
the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway poses an imminent and 
unacceptable threat to public and employee safety. The past failure of 
the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway to voluntarily remove the bridge 
from service and perform proper repairs persuades FRA that the agency 
cannot rely upon the cooperation of the railroad to protect public 
safety in relation to the Bridge 29.11. I find that these unsafe 
conditions create an emergency situation involving a hazard of death or 
injury to persons.
    Accordingly, pursuant to the authority of 49 U.S.C. 20104 delegated 
to me by the Secretary of Transportation (49 CFR 1.49), it is ordered 
that the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway Company shall discontinue, 
and shall not permit, the operation of trains or any railroad on-track 
equipment over its Bridge 29.11 while this emergency Order remains in 
effect.

Relief

    The Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway may obtain relief from this 
Emergency Order by providing the Federal Railroad Administrator with a 
report of inspection and evaluation of repairs, indicating to FRA's 
satisfaction that Bridge 29.11 has been acceptably repaired. The report 
shall be prepared and sealed by a registered professional engineer who 
is licensed to practice in the State of Illinois and is technically 
proficient in the field of timber railroad bridge engineering. The 
report shall state that the capacity of the entire bridge to carry 
safely railroad cars and locomotives has been restored. The 
configuration and weights of the loads for which the determination has 
been made shall be stated in the report, together with all calculations 
upon which that determination is based. The engineer's evaluation shall 
include a calculation of the capacity of every load-bearing member of 
each span in Bridge 29.11. The original of the engineer's report, 
bearing the embossed imprint of the seal of the engineer, shall be 
provided to the Regional Administrator of FRA's Region 4 before the 
report will be considered by FRA. Upon FRA's approval of the engineer's 
assessment of the bridge restoration, and following an inspection by 
FRA in which the agency finds the bridge properly repaired to safe 
condition, the Administrator will rescind this Emergency Order.

Penalties

    Any violation of this order shall subject the person committing the 
violation to a civil penalty of up to $27,000, 49 U.S.C. 21301, 28 
U.S.C. 2461, and see 69 FR 30591. FRA may, through the Attorney 
General, also seek injunctive relief to enforce this order. 49 U.S.C. 
20112.

Effective Date and Notice to Affected Persons

    The Emergency Order shall take effect at 12:01 a.m. (CST) on 
December 15, 2006, and apply to all operations of trains or railroad 
on-track equipment on Bridge 29.11 on or after that time. Notice of 
this Emergency Order will be provided by publishing it in the Federal 
Register. Copies of this Emergency Order will be sent by mail or 
facsimile prior to publication to Mr. Buford Hunter, General Manager, 
Toledo, Peoria and Western Railway, 1990 East Washington Street, East 
Peoria, Illinois, 61611; Mr. Joe Spirk, Chief Engineer-Central Business 
Unit of Rail America; and Mr. Scott Linn, Senior Vice President-Asset 
Management of RailAmerica, 5300 Broken Arrow Sound, NW., Boca Raton, 
Florida 33487; the Association of American Railroads; and the American 
Short Line and Regional Railroad Association.

Review

    Opportunity for formal review of this Emergency Order will be 
provided in accordance with 49 U.S.C. 20104(b) and section 554 of Title 
5 of the United States Code. Administrative procedures governing such 
review are found at 49 CFR part 211. See 49 CFR 211.47, 211.71, 211.73, 
211.75, and 211.77.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on December 14, 2006.
Joseph H. Boardman,
Administrator.
[FR Doc. 06-9788 Filed 12-15-06; 2:56 pm]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-M