Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F Airplanes, 74459-74461 [E6-20951]

Download as PDF Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations Citation The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows: Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and 44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR 11.38 and 11.19. jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES The Special Conditions The FAA has determined that this project will be accomplished without lowering the current level of safety of the Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., models PC–12, PC–12/45 and PC–12/47 occupant restraint system. Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for these models, as modified by AmSafe, Incorporated. Inflatable Three-Point Restraint Safety Belt with an Integrated Airbag Device for the Pilot, Co-pilot, and Passenger Seats of the Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., Models PC–12, PC–12/45 and PC–12/47. 1. It must be shown that the inflatable restraint will deploy and provide protection under emergency landing conditions. Compliance will be demonstrated using the dynamic test condition specified in 14 CFR, part 23, § 23.562(b)(2). It is not necessary to account for floor warpage, as required by § 23.562(b)(3), or vertical dynamic loads, as required by § 23.562(b)(1). The means of protection must take into consideration a range of stature from a 5th percentile female to a 95th percentile male. The inflatable restraint must provide a consistent approach to energy absorption throughout that range. 2. The inflatable restraint must provide adequate protection for each occupant. In addition, unoccupied seats that have an active restraint must not constitute a hazard to any occupant. 3. The design must prevent the inflatable restraint from being incorrectly buckled and/or incorrectly installed such that the airbag would not properly deploy. Alternatively, it must be shown that such deployment is not hazardous to the occupant and will provide the required protection. 4. It must be shown that the inflatable restraint system is not susceptible to inadvertent deployment as a result of wear and tear or the inertial loads resulting from in-flight or ground maneuvers (including gusts and hard landings) that are likely to be experienced in service. 5. It must be extremely improbable for an inadvertent deployment of the restraint system to occur, or an inadvertent deployment must not impede the pilot’s ability to maintain control of the airplane or cause an VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:58 Dec 11, 2006 Jkt 211001 unsafe condition (or hazard to the airplane). In addition, a deployed inflatable restraint must be at least as strong as a Technical Standard Order (C114) certificated belt and shoulder harness. 6. It must be shown that deployment of the inflatable restraint system is not hazardous to the occupant or will not result in injuries that could impede rapid egress. This assessment should include occupants whose restraint is loosely fastened. 7. It must be shown that an inadvertent deployment that could cause injury to a standing or sitting person is improbable. In addition, the restraint must also provide suitable visual warnings that would alert rescue personnel to the presence of an inflatable restraint system. 8. It must be shown that the inflatable restraint will not impede rapid egress of the occupants 10 seconds after its deployment. 9. To comply with HIRF and lightning requirements, the inflatable restraint system is considered a critical system since its deployment could have a hazardous effect on the airplane. 10. It must be shown that the inflatable restraints will not release hazardous quantities of gas or particulate matter into the cabin. 11. The inflatable restraint system installation must be protected from the effects of fire such that no hazard to occupants will result. 12. There must be a means to verify the integrity of the inflatable restraint activation system before each flight or it must be demonstrated to reliably operate between inspection intervals. 13. A life limit must be established for appropriate system components. 14. Qualification testing of the internal firing mechanism must be performed at vibration levels appropriate for a general aviation airplane. Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on November 29, 2006. John Colomy, Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6–21018 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P PO 00000 Frm 00005 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 74459 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2006–26527; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–220–AD; Amendment 39–14850; AD 2006–25–09] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11F Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule; request for comments. AGENCY: SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11F airplanes. This AD requires a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing damage on the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires and the upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank and repair if necessary. This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, which could result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 27, 2006. We must receive comments on this AD by February 12, 2007. ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on this AD. • DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically. • Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your comments electronically. • Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590. • Fax: (202) 493–2251. • Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. E:\FR\FM\12DER1.SGM 12DER1 74460 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024), for the service information identified in this AD. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712–4137; telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562) 627–5210. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES Discussion The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’ Amendment 21–78, and subsequent Amendments 21–82 and 21–83). Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews. In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:58 Dec 11, 2006 Jkt 211001 the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for further action. We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane. Boeing also conducted an investigation and analysis on McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11 airplanes that revealed that eleven airplanes had two locations of unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank. Unprotected APU power feeder wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, could result in a potential ignition source and, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. Relevant Service Information We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MD11–24A222, dated August 16, 2006. The ASB describes procedures for performing a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing damage on the APU feeder wires and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank. If protective conduit is installed, the ASB specifies that no further action is necessary. If no protective conduit is installed and no chafing is found, the ASB describes procedures for installing sleeving and high temperature tape and replacing clamps below the cabin floor beams. If no protective conduit is installed and chafing is found, the ASB describes procedures to repair any damaged APU power feeder wires and any damaged upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank structure, as well as installing sleeving and high temperature tape and replacing clamps below the cabin floor beams. Accomplishing the actions specified in the service information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition. FAA’s Determination and Requirements of This AD The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or develop on other airplanes of the same type design that may be registered in the U.S. PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 at some time in the future. Therefore, we are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, which, if not corrected, could result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the service information described previously. Costs of Compliance None of the airplanes affected by this action are on the U.S. Register. All airplanes affected by this AD are currently operated by non-U.S. operators under foreign registry; therefore, they are not directly affected by this AD action. However, we consider this AD necessary to ensure that the unsafe condition is addressed if any affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future. If an affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the future, the required actions would take about 1 work hour per airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these figures, the estimated cost of the AD would be $80 per airplane. FAA’s Determination of the Effective Date No airplane affected by this AD is currently on the U.S. Register. Therefore, providing notice and opportunity for public comment is unnecessary before this AD is issued, and this AD may be made effective in less than 30 days after it is published in the Federal Register. Comments Invited This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for public comment; however, we invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2006–26527; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–220–AD’’ at the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD that might suggest a need to modify it. We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https:// dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA E:\FR\FM\12DER1.SGM 12DER1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit https://dms.dot.gov. Examining the Docket You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them. Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES Regulatory Findings We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation: 1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866; VerDate Aug<31>2005 17:58 Dec 11, 2006 Jkt 211001 2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation. the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: I PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: I Authority for This Rulemaking 74461 Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): I 2006–25–09 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39–14850. Docket No. FAA–2006–26527; Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–220–AD. Effective Date (a) This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006. Affected ADs (b) None. Applicability (c) This AD applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11F airplanes, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11– 24A222, dated August 16, 2006; certificated in any category. Unsafe Condition (d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, which could result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane. General Visual Inspection (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, perform a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing damage on APU power feeder wires and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11–24A222, dated August 16, 2006. Before further flight, accomplish any applicable repair or replacement in accordance with the alert service bulletin. (g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office. Material Incorporated by Reference (h) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11–24A222, dated August 16, 2006, to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this document in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A (D800–0024), for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Room PL–401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet at https:// dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go to https://www.archives.gov/ federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html. Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006. Kevin M. Mullin, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6–20951 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P Compliance (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\12DER1.SGM 12DER1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 12, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 74459-74461]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-20951]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD; 
Amendment 39-14850; AD 2006-25-09]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F 
Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a 
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing 
damage on the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires and the 
upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank and repair if necessary. This 
AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We 
are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder 
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the 
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential 
ignition source, and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could 
cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 27, 
2006.
    We must receive comments on this AD by February 12, 2007.

ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on 
this AD.
     DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590.
     Fax: (202) 493-2251.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

[[Page 74460]]

    Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and 
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service 
information identified in this AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer, 
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification 
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137; 
telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562) 627-5210.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Discussion

    The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel 
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the 
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes 
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for 
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a 
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review, 
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements'' 
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards 
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule 
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,'' 
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
    Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e., 
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders 
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition 
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design 
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for 
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to 
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance 
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety 
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to 
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary 
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
    In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four 
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel 
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of 
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable 
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address 
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in 
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure 
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included 
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for 
further action.
    We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are 
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel 
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result 
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
    Boeing also conducted an investigation and analysis on McDonnell 
Douglas Model MD-11 airplanes that revealed that eleven airplanes had 
two locations of unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder 
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the 
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank. Unprotected APU power feeder wires 
that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary 
``piggy back'' fuel tank, could result in a potential ignition source 
and, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank 
explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Relevant Service Information

    We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MD11-24A222, 
dated August 16, 2006. The ASB describes procedures for performing a 
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing 
damage on the APU feeder wires and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel 
tank. If protective conduit is installed, the ASB specifies that no 
further action is necessary. If no protective conduit is installed and 
no chafing is found, the ASB describes procedures for installing 
sleeving and high temperature tape and replacing clamps below the cabin 
floor beams. If no protective conduit is installed and chafing is 
found, the ASB describes procedures to repair any damaged APU power 
feeder wires and any damaged upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank 
structure, as well as installing sleeving and high temperature tape and 
replacing clamps below the cabin floor beams. Accomplishing the actions 
specified in the service information is intended to adequately address 
the unsafe condition.

FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD

    The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or 
develop on other airplanes of the same type design that may be 
registered in the U.S. at some time in the future. Therefore, we are 
issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder 
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the 
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which, if not corrected, could 
result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with fuel 
vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the 
airplane. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the 
service information described previously.

Costs of Compliance

    None of the airplanes affected by this action are on the U.S. 
Register. All airplanes affected by this AD are currently operated by 
non-U.S. operators under foreign registry; therefore, they are not 
directly affected by this AD action. However, we consider this AD 
necessary to ensure that the unsafe condition is addressed if any 
affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the 
future.
    If an affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register 
in the future, the required actions would take about 1 work hour per 
airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these 
figures, the estimated cost of the AD would be $80 per airplane.

FAA's Determination of the Effective Date

    No airplane affected by this AD is currently on the U.S. Register. 
Therefore, providing notice and opportunity for public comment is 
unnecessary before this AD is issued, and this AD may be made effective 
in less than 30 days after it is published in the Federal Register.

Comments Invited

    This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect 
flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for 
public comment; however, we invite you to submit any relevant written 
data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an 
address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD'' at the beginning of 
your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall 
regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD that 
might suggest a need to modify it.
    We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will 
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA

[[Page 74461]]

personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of that Web 
site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets, 
including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed 
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit 
https://dms.dot.gov.

Examining the Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT 
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be 
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System 
receives them.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
    1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order 
12866;
    2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies 
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES 
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec.  39.13 by 
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2006-25-09 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-14850. Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F 
airplanes, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222, 
dated August 16, 2006; certificated in any category.

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the 
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct 
unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires that come 
into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ``piggy 
back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential ignition source, 
and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel 
tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

General Visual Inspection

    (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, 
perform a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and 
chafing damage on APU power feeder wires and upper surface of the 
auxiliary fuel tank, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletin MD11-24A222, dated August 16, 2006. Before further flight, 
accomplish any applicable repair or replacement in accordance with 
the alert service bulletin.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office 
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 
requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.  
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the 
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 
Certificate Holding District Office.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (h) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222, 
dated August 16, 2006, to perform the actions that are required by 
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the 
Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this 
document in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855 
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data 
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for a copy of this 
service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management 
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, 
SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet 
at https://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this 
material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to https://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-20951 Filed 12-11-06; 8:45 am]
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