Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F Airplanes, 74459-74461 [E6-20951]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
Citation
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113 and
44701; 14 CFR 21.16 and 21.101; and 14 CFR
11.38 and 11.19.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
The Special Conditions
The FAA has determined that this
project will be accomplished without
lowering the current level of safety of
the Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., models PC–12,
PC–12/45 and PC–12/47 occupant
restraint system. Accordingly, pursuant
to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special
conditions are issued as part of the type
certification basis for these models, as
modified by AmSafe, Incorporated.
Inflatable Three-Point Restraint Safety
Belt with an Integrated Airbag Device
for the Pilot, Co-pilot, and Passenger
Seats of the Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., Models
PC–12, PC–12/45 and PC–12/47.
1. It must be shown that the inflatable
restraint will deploy and provide
protection under emergency landing
conditions. Compliance will be
demonstrated using the dynamic test
condition specified in 14 CFR, part 23,
§ 23.562(b)(2). It is not necessary to
account for floor warpage, as required
by § 23.562(b)(3), or vertical dynamic
loads, as required by § 23.562(b)(1). The
means of protection must take into
consideration a range of stature from a
5th percentile female to a 95th
percentile male. The inflatable restraint
must provide a consistent approach to
energy absorption throughout that
range.
2. The inflatable restraint must
provide adequate protection for each
occupant. In addition, unoccupied seats
that have an active restraint must not
constitute a hazard to any occupant.
3. The design must prevent the
inflatable restraint from being
incorrectly buckled and/or incorrectly
installed such that the airbag would not
properly deploy. Alternatively, it must
be shown that such deployment is not
hazardous to the occupant and will
provide the required protection.
4. It must be shown that the inflatable
restraint system is not susceptible to
inadvertent deployment as a result of
wear and tear or the inertial loads
resulting from in-flight or ground
maneuvers (including gusts and hard
landings) that are likely to be
experienced in service.
5. It must be extremely improbable for
an inadvertent deployment of the
restraint system to occur, or an
inadvertent deployment must not
impede the pilot’s ability to maintain
control of the airplane or cause an
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17:58 Dec 11, 2006
Jkt 211001
unsafe condition (or hazard to the
airplane). In addition, a deployed
inflatable restraint must be at least as
strong as a Technical Standard Order
(C114) certificated belt and shoulder
harness.
6. It must be shown that deployment
of the inflatable restraint system is not
hazardous to the occupant or will not
result in injuries that could impede
rapid egress. This assessment should
include occupants whose restraint is
loosely fastened.
7. It must be shown that an
inadvertent deployment that could
cause injury to a standing or sitting
person is improbable. In addition, the
restraint must also provide suitable
visual warnings that would alert rescue
personnel to the presence of an
inflatable restraint system.
8. It must be shown that the inflatable
restraint will not impede rapid egress of
the occupants 10 seconds after its
deployment.
9. To comply with HIRF and lightning
requirements, the inflatable restraint
system is considered a critical system
since its deployment could have a
hazardous effect on the airplane.
10. It must be shown that the
inflatable restraints will not release
hazardous quantities of gas or
particulate matter into the cabin.
11. The inflatable restraint system
installation must be protected from the
effects of fire such that no hazard to
occupants will result.
12. There must be a means to verify
the integrity of the inflatable restraint
activation system before each flight or it
must be demonstrated to reliably
operate between inspection intervals.
13. A life limit must be established for
appropriate system components.
14. Qualification testing of the
internal firing mechanism must be
performed at vibration levels
appropriate for a general aviation
airplane.
Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on
November 29, 2006.
John Colomy,
Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–21018 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
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74459
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–26527; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–220–AD; Amendment
39–14850; AD 2006–25–09]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell
Douglas Model MD–11F Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; request for
comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11F
airplanes. This AD requires a general
visual inspection for installation of
conduit and chafing damage on the
auxiliary power unit (APU) power
feeder wires and the upper surface of
the auxiliary fuel tank and repair if
necessary. This AD results from fuel
system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct unprotected APU
power feeder wires that come into close
proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, which
could result in a potential ignition
source, and in combination with
flammable fuel vapors, could cause a
fuel tank explosion and consequent loss
of the airplane.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
December 27, 2006.
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of a certain publication listed in the AD
as of December 27, 2006.
We must receive comments on this
AD by February 12, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
AD.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to
https://dms.dot.gov and follow the
instructions for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
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74460
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach,
California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A
(D800–0024), for the service information
identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM–140L, FAA,
Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard,
Lakewood, California 90712–4137;
telephone (562) 627–5262; fax (562)
627–5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
Discussion
The FAA has examined the
underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large
transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the
service history of airplanes subject to
those regulations, and existing
maintenance practices for fuel tank
systems. As a result of those findings,
we issued a regulation titled ‘‘Transport
Airplane Fuel Tank System Design
Review, Flammability Reduction and
Maintenance and Inspection
Requirements’’ (66 FR 23086, May 7,
2001). In addition to new airworthiness
standards for transport airplanes and
new maintenance requirements, this
rule included Special Federal Aviation
Regulation No. 88 (‘‘SFAR 88,’’
Amendment 21–78, and subsequent
Amendments 21–82 and 21–83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88
requires certain type design (i.e., type
certificate (TC) and supplemental type
certificate (STC)) holders to substantiate
that their fuel tank systems can prevent
ignition sources in the fuel tanks. This
requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered
transport airplanes and for subsequent
modifications to those airplanes. It
requires them to perform design reviews
and to develop design changes and
maintenance procedures if their designs
do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble
to the rule, we intended to adopt
airworthiness directives to mandate any
changes found necessary to address
unsafe conditions identified as a result
of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we
have established four criteria intended
to define the unsafe conditions
associated with fuel tank systems that
require corrective actions. The
percentage of operating time during
which fuel tanks are exposed to
flammable conditions is one of these
criteria. The other three criteria address
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:58 Dec 11, 2006
Jkt 211001
the failure types under evaluation:
Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s),
and in-service failure experience. For all
four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken
that may mitigate the need for further
action.
We have determined that the actions
identified in this AD are necessary to
reduce the potential of ignition sources
inside fuel tanks, which, in combination
with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent
loss of the airplane.
Boeing also conducted an
investigation and analysis on
McDonnell Douglas Model MD–11
airplanes that revealed that eleven
airplanes had two locations of
unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU)
power feeder wires that come into close
proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank.
Unprotected APU power feeder wires
that come into close proximity to the
upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy
back’’ fuel tank, could result in a
potential ignition source and, in
combination with flammable fuel
vapors, could cause a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin (ASB) MD11–24A222,
dated August 16, 2006. The ASB
describes procedures for performing a
general visual inspection for installation
of conduit and chafing damage on the
APU feeder wires and upper surface of
the auxiliary fuel tank. If protective
conduit is installed, the ASB specifies
that no further action is necessary. If no
protective conduit is installed and no
chafing is found, the ASB describes
procedures for installing sleeving and
high temperature tape and replacing
clamps below the cabin floor beams. If
no protective conduit is installed and
chafing is found, the ASB describes
procedures to repair any damaged APU
power feeder wires and any damaged
upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank
structure, as well as installing sleeving
and high temperature tape and replacing
clamps below the cabin floor beams.
Accomplishing the actions specified in
the service information is intended to
adequately address the unsafe
condition.
FAA’s Determination and Requirements
of This AD
The unsafe condition described
previously is likely to exist or develop
on other airplanes of the same type
design that may be registered in the U.S.
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Frm 00006
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
at some time in the future. Therefore,
we are issuing this AD to detect and
correct unprotected APU power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to
the upper surface of the auxiliary ‘‘piggy
back’’ fuel tank, which, if not corrected,
could result in a potential ignition
source, and in combination with fuel
vapors, could cause a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane. This AD requires
accomplishing the actions specified in
the service information described
previously.
Costs of Compliance
None of the airplanes affected by this
action are on the U.S. Register. All
airplanes affected by this AD are
currently operated by non-U.S.
operators under foreign registry;
therefore, they are not directly affected
by this AD action. However, we
consider this AD necessary to ensure
that the unsafe condition is addressed if
any affected airplane is imported and
placed on the U.S. Register in the future.
If an affected airplane is imported and
placed on the U.S. Register in the future,
the required actions would take about
1 work hour per airplane, at an average
labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based
on these figures, the estimated cost of
the AD would be $80 per airplane.
FAA’s Determination of the Effective
Date
No airplane affected by this AD is
currently on the U.S. Register.
Therefore, providing notice and
opportunity for public comment is
unnecessary before this AD is issued,
and this AD may be made effective in
less than 30 days after it is published in
the Federal Register.
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves
requirements that affect flight safety and
was not preceded by notice and an
opportunity for public comment;
however, we invite you to submit any
relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this AD. Send your
comments to an address listed under the
ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No.
FAA–2006–26527; Directorate Identifier
2006–NM–220–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of the AD that might suggest a
need to modify it.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information you provide. We will also
post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact with FAA
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 238 / Tuesday, December 12, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
personnel concerning this AD. Using the
search function of that Web site, anyone
can find and read the comments in any
of our dockets, including the name of
the individual who sent the comment
(or signed the comment on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the DOT’s complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit
https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in subtitle VII,
part A, subpart III, section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with RULES
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will
not have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that the regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
VerDate Aug<31>2005
17:58 Dec 11, 2006
Jkt 211001
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
See the ADDRESSES section for a location
to examine the regulatory evaluation.
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
I
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority for This Rulemaking
74461
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
I
2006–25–09 McDonnell Douglas:
Amendment 39–14850. Docket No.
FAA–2006–26527; Directorate Identifier
2006–NM–220–AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective December
27, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to certain McDonnell
Douglas Model MD–11F airplanes, identified
in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11–
24A222, dated August 16, 2006; certificated
in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system
reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We
are issuing this AD to detect and correct
unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU)
power feeder wires that come into close
proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ‘‘piggy back’’ fuel tank, which
could result in a potential ignition source,
and in combination with flammable fuel
vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and
consequent loss of the airplane.
General Visual Inspection
(f) Within 24 months after the effective
date of this AD, perform a general visual
inspection for installation of conduit and
chafing damage on APU power feeder wires
and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank,
in accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD11–24A222, dated August 16,
2006. Before further flight, accomplish any
applicable repair or replacement in
accordance with the alert service bulletin.
(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(h) You must use Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD11–24A222, dated August 16,
2006, to perform the actions that are required
by this AD, unless the AD specifies
otherwise. The Director of the Federal
Register approved the incorporation by
reference of this document in accordance
with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long
Beach Division, 3855 Lakewood Boulevard,
Long Beach, California 90846, Attention:
Data and Service Management, Dept. C1–L5A
(D800–0024), for a copy of this service
information. You may review copies at the
Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Room PL–401, Nassif Building,
Washington, DC; on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at the NARA, call (202) 741–6030,
or go to https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
November 30, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–20951 Filed 12–11–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 238 (Tuesday, December 12, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 74459-74461]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-20951]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD;
Amendment 39-14850; AD 2006-25-09]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F
Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule; request for comments.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F airplanes. This AD requires a
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing
damage on the auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires and the
upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank and repair if necessary. This
AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the manufacturer. We
are issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential
ignition source, and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could
cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
DATES: This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of December 27,
2006.
We must receive comments on this AD by February 12, 2007.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this AD.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
[[Page 74460]]
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data and
Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for the service
information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Samuel Lee, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140L, FAA, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification
Office, 3960 Paramount Boulevard, Lakewood, California 90712-4137;
telephone (562) 627-5262; fax (562) 627-5210.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Discussion
The FAA has examined the underlying safety issues involved in fuel
tank explosions on several large transport airplanes, including the
adequacy of existing regulations, the service history of airplanes
subject to those regulations, and existing maintenance practices for
fuel tank systems. As a result of those findings, we issued a
regulation titled ``Transport Airplane Fuel Tank System Design Review,
Flammability Reduction and Maintenance and Inspection Requirements''
(66 FR 23086, May 7, 2001). In addition to new airworthiness standards
for transport airplanes and new maintenance requirements, this rule
included Special Federal Aviation Regulation No. 88 (``SFAR 88,''
Amendment 21-78, and subsequent Amendments 21-82 and 21-83).
Among other actions, SFAR 88 requires certain type design (i.e.,
type certificate (TC) and supplemental type certificate (STC)) holders
to substantiate that their fuel tank systems can prevent ignition
sources in the fuel tanks. This requirement applies to type design
holders for large turbine-powered transport airplanes and for
subsequent modifications to those airplanes. It requires them to
perform design reviews and to develop design changes and maintenance
procedures if their designs do not meet the new fuel tank safety
standards. As explained in the preamble to the rule, we intended to
adopt airworthiness directives to mandate any changes found necessary
to address unsafe conditions identified as a result of these reviews.
In evaluating these design reviews, we have established four
criteria intended to define the unsafe conditions associated with fuel
tank systems that require corrective actions. The percentage of
operating time during which fuel tanks are exposed to flammable
conditions is one of these criteria. The other three criteria address
the failure types under evaluation: Single failures, single failures in
combination with a latent condition(s), and in-service failure
experience. For all four criteria, the evaluations included
consideration of previous actions taken that may mitigate the need for
further action.
We have determined that the actions identified in this AD are
necessary to reduce the potential of ignition sources inside fuel
tanks, which, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could result
in fuel tank explosions and consequent loss of the airplane.
Boeing also conducted an investigation and analysis on McDonnell
Douglas Model MD-11 airplanes that revealed that eleven airplanes had
two locations of unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank. Unprotected APU power feeder wires
that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary
``piggy back'' fuel tank, could result in a potential ignition source
and, in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel tank
explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin (ASB) MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006. The ASB describes procedures for performing a
general visual inspection for installation of conduit and chafing
damage on the APU feeder wires and upper surface of the auxiliary fuel
tank. If protective conduit is installed, the ASB specifies that no
further action is necessary. If no protective conduit is installed and
no chafing is found, the ASB describes procedures for installing
sleeving and high temperature tape and replacing clamps below the cabin
floor beams. If no protective conduit is installed and chafing is
found, the ASB describes procedures to repair any damaged APU power
feeder wires and any damaged upper surface of the auxiliary fuel tank
structure, as well as installing sleeving and high temperature tape and
replacing clamps below the cabin floor beams. Accomplishing the actions
specified in the service information is intended to adequately address
the unsafe condition.
FAA's Determination and Requirements of This AD
The unsafe condition described previously is likely to exist or
develop on other airplanes of the same type design that may be
registered in the U.S. at some time in the future. Therefore, we are
issuing this AD to detect and correct unprotected APU power feeder
wires that come into close proximity to the upper surface of the
auxiliary ``piggy back'' fuel tank, which, if not corrected, could
result in a potential ignition source, and in combination with fuel
vapors, could cause a fuel tank explosion and consequent loss of the
airplane. This AD requires accomplishing the actions specified in the
service information described previously.
Costs of Compliance
None of the airplanes affected by this action are on the U.S.
Register. All airplanes affected by this AD are currently operated by
non-U.S. operators under foreign registry; therefore, they are not
directly affected by this AD action. However, we consider this AD
necessary to ensure that the unsafe condition is addressed if any
affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register in the
future.
If an affected airplane is imported and placed on the U.S. Register
in the future, the required actions would take about 1 work hour per
airplane, at an average labor rate of $80 per work hour. Based on these
figures, the estimated cost of the AD would be $80 per airplane.
FAA's Determination of the Effective Date
No airplane affected by this AD is currently on the U.S. Register.
Therefore, providing notice and opportunity for public comment is
unnecessary before this AD is issued, and this AD may be made effective
in less than 30 days after it is published in the Federal Register.
Comments Invited
This AD is a final rule that involves requirements that affect
flight safety and was not preceded by notice and an opportunity for
public comment; however, we invite you to submit any relevant written
data, views, or arguments regarding this AD. Send your comments to an
address listed under the ADDRESSES section. Include ``Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD'' at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite comments on the overall
regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of the AD that
might suggest a need to modify it.
We will post all comments we receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
[[Page 74461]]
personnel concerning this AD. Using the search function of that Web
site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our dockets,
including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or signed
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you may visit
https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. Comments will be
available in the AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System
receives them.
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
2006-25-09 McDonnell Douglas: Amendment 39-14850. Docket No. FAA-
2006-26527; Directorate Identifier 2006-NM-220-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective December 27, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to certain McDonnell Douglas Model MD-11F
airplanes, identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006; certificated in any category.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from fuel system reviews conducted by the
manufacturer. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct
unprotected auxiliary power unit (APU) power feeder wires that come
into close proximity to the upper surface of the auxiliary ``piggy
back'' fuel tank, which could result in a potential ignition source,
and in combination with flammable fuel vapors, could cause a fuel
tank explosion and consequent loss of the airplane.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
General Visual Inspection
(f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD,
perform a general visual inspection for installation of conduit and
chafing damage on APU power feeder wires and upper surface of the
auxiliary fuel tank, in accordance with Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin MD11-24A222, dated August 16, 2006. Before further flight,
accomplish any applicable repair or replacement in accordance with
the alert service bulletin.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(g)(1) The Manager, Los Angeles Aircraft Certification Office
(ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(h) You must use Boeing Alert Service Bulletin MD11-24A222,
dated August 16, 2006, to perform the actions that are required by
this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of this
document in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Long Beach Division, 3855
Lakewood Boulevard, Long Beach, California 90846, Attention: Data
and Service Management, Dept. C1-L5A (D800-0024), for a copy of this
service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management
Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet
at https://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this
material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to https://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 30, 2006.
Kevin M. Mullin,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-20951 Filed 12-11-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
