Safety Advisory 2006-05, 69606-69607 [E6-20359]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 231 (Friday, December 1, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 69606-69607]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-20359]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration


Safety Advisory 2006-05

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of Safety Advisory; Passenger Train Safety--Passengers 
Boarding or Alighting from Trains.

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SUMMARY: FRA is issuing Safety Advisory 2006-05 recommending that each 
railroad operating passenger trains assess the rules, instructions, and 
procedures used to ensure that a train will not depart a station until 
all passengers successfully board or alight from the train, and ensure 
compliance with such rules, instructions, and procedures.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda Moscoso, Operations Research 
Analyst, Grade Crossing Division (RRS-23), FRA Office of Safety 
Analysis, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone: 
(202) 493-6282 or Anna Winkle, Trial Attorney, FRA Office of Chief 
Counsel, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590, telephone: 
(202) 493-6166.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Although the safety of passengers traveling 
by rail compares extremely favorably to other modes of transportation, 
the recent fatality of a passenger who apparently became caught in the 
doors of a train from which he was alighting and was dragged as the 
train departed the station emphasizes the need for close adherence to 
certain railroad safety procedures and rules. The November 21,

[[Page 69607]]

2006, incident, which occurred in Bradley Beach, New Jersey on the New 
Jersey Transit (NJT) railroad, is currently under investigation by the 
FRA, and state and local agencies. The cause and contributing factors, 
if any, have not been established; nothing in this Safety Advisory 
should be construed as placing blame or responsibility for the incident 
on the acts or omissions of any person. FRA notes that managers and 
employees of NJT have cooperated in FRA's investigation of the incident 
and that NJT has responded positively to FRA's suggested course of 
action following the incident, including issuing written instructions 
regarding checking of seals on door bypass switches and the location of 
train crewmembers when trains are leaving stations.
    The electrically-operated doors on the passenger car involved in 
this incident are equipped with flexible edges that are designed to 
sense an obstruction when closing. If an obstruction is detected, the 
door reopens. If a door does not close properly, the engineer will not 
be able to draw power to move the train. This safety feature can be 
overridden by operating a bypass switch which is located in the 
locomotive or control car. This switch is normally sealed until used. 
However, FRA is aware of instances on various railroads when this type 
of seal has been improperly applied and has therefore been loose enough 
that the switch could be operated without breaking the seal. This could 
result in the unintentional use or intentional misuse of the bypass 
switch, creating a potentially dangerous operating condition where a 
passenger train would be able to depart with a passenger caught in a 
door.
    FRA also notes that there is a difference among railroads as to 
when this type of bypass switch may be used. Some railroads require 
that permission be obtained from the train dispatcher prior to using 
the switch; others allow crewmembers to operate the switch and then 
inform a designated railroad employee at some point during the tour of 
duty. Railroads are encouraged to review their procedures to ensure 
that they provide an adequate level of safety for a railroad's 
particular operating characteristics.
    Additionally, in the event that an obstruction sensor fails or is 
bypassed, it is important that railroads ensure that each crewmember 
knows and carries out his or her role in recognizing potential door 
obstructions and in providing an equivalent level of safety for 
passengers.
    An additional opportunity to assure safety of boarding and 
alighting passengers is provided by an employee assigned to observe the 
station platform while the train departs. Many commuter railroads, 
including NJT, have a rule or instruction requiring employees to 
perform this task. It is imperative that employees comply with such a 
rule or instruction and that railroads take appropriate steps to ensure 
compliance.
    As a result of this incident, NJT has issued a Supplemental 
Bulletin Order that includes a review of the rule addressing the 
location of train crews when making a station stop, as well as the rule 
concerning sealing of protective devices. NJT also issued a notice to 
their mechanical staff, placing special emphasis on ensuring that the 
seals on all appliances are properly applied.
    Recommended Action: In recognition of the need to assure railroad 
passenger safety, FRA recommends that railroads operating passenger 
equipment:
    (1) Assess the current railroad rules, instructions, and procedures 
intended to reduce the likelihood that death or injury will result when 
passengers attempt to board or alight from trains at station stops. FRA 
recommends that this assessment include, but not necessarily be limited 
to assessing the adequacy of current railroad rules, instructions, and 
procedures:
    (a) Designed to ensure passenger safety when boarding or alighting 
from trains;
    (b) governing the override of safety systems, such as the bypass of 
an electrically-powered door safety device, including each crewmember's 
role in assessing whether to override the safety device as well as any 
additional steps necessary to ensure continued passenger safety 
following activation of the safety override device; and
    (c) governing crewmember observation of boarding and alighting 
passengers to ensure it is safe to depart a station.
    (2) Assess the extent to which compliance with the rules, 
instructions, and procedures in recommendations (1)(a), (1)(b), and 
(1)(c) are measured and recorded in the railroad's test and observation 
program required by 49 CFR Sec.  217.9;
    (3) Ensure compliance with the rules, instructions, and procedures 
in recommendations (1)(a), (1)(b), and (1)(c); and
    (4) Inspect all sealed door-bypass switches on a daily basis.
    Railroads operating passenger equipment are encouraged to 
voluntarily take action in accordance with these recommendations. If 
circumstances so warrant, FRA reserves the right to take other 
corrective action, including: modifying this Safety Advisory 2006-05; 
issuing additional safety advisories; taking regulatory action; or 
taking other appropriate action necessary to ensure the highest level 
of safety on the nation's passenger railroads.

    Issued in Washington, DC on November 22, 2006.
Jo Strang,
Associate Administrator for Safety.
 [FR Doc. E6-20359 Filed 11-30-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-06-P