Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals Incidental to Conducting Precision Strike Weapons Testing and Training by Eglin Air Force Base in the Gulf of Mexico, 67810-67824 [06-9380]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
• National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 226 (Friday, November 24, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 67810-67824]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-9380]



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DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

50 CFR Part 216

[Docket No. 060629183-6289-02; I.D. 022106A]
RIN 0648-AT39


Taking and Importing Marine Mammals; Taking Marine Mammals 
Incidental to Conducting Precision Strike Weapons Testing and Training 
by Eglin Air Force Base in the Gulf of Mexico

AGENCY: National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), Commerce.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: NMFS, upon application from Eglin Air Force Base (Eglin AFB), 
is issuing regulations to govern the unintentional takings of marine 
mammals incidental to conducting Precision Strike Weapons (PSW) testing 
and training in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM). Issuance of regulations and 
Letters of Authorization (LOAs) under these regulations governing the 
unintentional incidental takes of marine mammals in connection with 
particular activities is required by the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
(MMPA) when the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary), after notice and 
opportunity for comment, finds, as here, that such takes will have a 
negligible impact on the species and stocks of marine mammals and will 
not have an unmitigable adverse impact on the availability of them for 
subsistence uses. These regulations do not authorize Eglin AFB's PSW 
activities as such authorization is not within the jurisdiction of the 
Secretary. Rather, NMFS' regulations together with a Letter of 
Authorization (LOA) authorize the unintentional incidental take of 
marine mammals in connection with this activity and prescribe methods 
of taking and other means of effecting the least practicable adverse 
impact on marine mammal species and their habitat, and on the 
availability of the species for subsistence uses.

DATES: Effective from December 26, 2006 through December 27, 2011.

ADDRESSES: A copy of the application containing a list of references 
used in this document may be obtained by writing to Mr. P. Michael 
Payne, Chief, Permits, Conservation and Education Division, Office of 
Protected Resources, National Marine Fisheries Service, 1315 East-West 
Highway, Silver Spring, MD 20910-3225, by telephoning the contact 
listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT, or at: https://
www.nmfs.noaa.gov/pr/permits/incidental.htm
    Documents cited in this rule may also be viewed, by appointment, 
during regular business hours at the above address or at the Department 
of the Air Force, AAC/EMSN, Natural Resources Branch, 501 DeLeon St., 
Suite 101, Eglin AFB, FL 32542-5133.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kenneth R. Hollingshead, NMFS, 301-
713-2289, ext 128.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background

    Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the Marine Mammal Protection Act (16 U.S.C. 
1361 et seq.) (MMPA) directs the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) to 
allow, upon request, the incidental, but not intentional taking of 
marine mammals by U.S. citizens who engage in a specified activity 
(other than commercial fishing) within a specified geographical region 
if certain findings are made and regulations are issued.
    An authorization may be granted for periods of 5 years or less if 
the Secretary finds that the taking will have a negligible impact on 
the species or stock(s) and will not have an unmitigable adverse impact 
on the availability of the species or stock(s) for subsistence uses, 
and if regulations are prescribed setting forth the permissible methods 
of taking and the requirements pertaining to the mitigation, monitoring 
and reporting of such taking.
    NMFS has defined ``negligible impact'' in 50 CFR 216.103 as ``an 
impact resulting from the specified activity that cannot be reasonably 
expected to, and is not reasonably likely to, adversely affect the 
species or stock through effects on annual rates of recruitment or 
survival.'' With respect to military readiness activities, the MMPA 
defines ``harassment'' as:
    (i) any act that injures or has the significant potential to 
injure a marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild [Level A 
harassment]; or (ii) any act that disturbs or is likely to disturb a 
marine mammal or marine mammal stock in the wild by causing 
disruption of natural behavioral patterns, including, but not 
limited to, migration, surfacing, nursing, breeding, feeding, or 
sheltering, to a point where such behavioral patterns are abandoned 
or significantly altered [Level B harassment].

Summary of Request

    On February 4, 2004, Eglin AFB submitted a request for a 1-year 
Incidental Harassment Authorization(IHA) under MMPA section 
101(a)(5)(D) and for an LOA (to take effect after the expiration of the 
IHA), for the incidental, but not intentional taking (in the form of 
noise-related harassment), of marine mammals incidental to PSW testing 
within the Eglin Gulf Test and Training Range (EGTTR) for the next five 
years, as authorized by section 101(a)(5) of the MMPA. The EGTTR is 
described as the airspace over the GOM that is controlled by Eglin AFB, 
and is also referred to as the ``Eglin Water Range.''
    PSW missions involve air-to-surface impacts of two weapons, the 
Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-off Missile (JASSM) AGM-158 A and B and the 
small-diameter bomb (SDB) (GBU-39/B), that result in underwater 
detonations of up to approximately 300 lbs (136 kg) and 96 lbs (43.5 
kg, double SDB) of net explosive weight (NEW), respectively.
    The JASSM is a precision cruise missile designed for launch from 
outside area defenses to kill hard, medium-hard, soft, and area-type 
targets. The JASSM has a range of more than 200 nautical miles (nm) 
(370 kilometers (km)) and carries a 1,000-lb (453.6 kg) warhead. The 
JASSM has approximately 300 lbs (136 kg) of TNT equivalent NEW. The 
explosive used is AFX-757, a type of plastic bonded explosive (PBX) 
formulation with higher blast characteristics and less sensitivity to 
many physical effects that could trigger unwanted explosions. The JASSM 
would be launched from an aircraft at altitudes greater than 25,000 ft 
(7620 m). The JASSM would cruise at altitudes greater than 12,000 ft 
(3658 m) for the majority of the flight profile until it makes the 
terminal maneuver toward the target. The JASSM exercise involves a 
maximum of two live shots (single) and 4 inert shots (single) each year 
for the next 5 years. One live shot will detonate in water and one will 
detonate in air. Detonation of the JASSM would occur under one of three 
scenarios: (1) Detonation upon impact with the target (about 5 ft (1.5 
m) above the GOM surface); (2) detonation upon impact with a barge 
target at the surface of the GOM; or (3) detonation at 120 milliseconds 
after contact with the surface of the GOM.
    The SDB is a glide bomb. Because of its capabilities, the SDB 
system is an important element of the Air Force's Global Strike Task 
Force. The SDB has a range of up to 50 nm (92.6 km) and carries a 
217.4-lb (98.6 kg) warhead. The SDB has approximately 48 lbs (21.7 kg) 
of TNT equivalent NEW. The explosive used is AFX-757. Launch from an 
aircraft would occur at altitudes greater than 15,000 ft (4572 m). The 
SDB would commence a non-powered glide

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to the intended target. The SDB exercise involves a maximum of six live 
shots a year, with two of the shots occurring simultaneously, and a 
maximum of 12 inert shots with up to two occurring simultaneously. 
Detonation of the SDBs would occur under one of two scenarios: (1) 
Detonation of one or two bombs upon impact with the target (about 5 ft 
(1.5 m)above the GOM surface), or (2) a height of burst (HOB) test: 
detonation of one or two bombs 10 to 25 ft (3 to 7.6 m) above the GOM 
surface. No underwater detonations of the SDB are planned.
    The JASSM and SDBs would be launched from B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15, F-
16, F-18, or F-117 aircraft. Chase aircraft would include F-15, F-16, 
and T-38 aircraft. These aircraft would follow the test items during 
captive carry and free flight but would not follow either item below a 
predetermined altitude as directed by Flight Safety. Other assets on 
site may include an E-9 turboprop aircraft or MH-60/53 helicopters 
circling around the target location. Tanker aircraft including KC-10s 
and KC-135s would also be used. A second unmanned barge may also be on 
location to hold instrumentation. Targets include a platform of five 
containers strapped, braced, and welded together to form a single 
structure and a hopper barge, typical for transportation of grain. The 
Eglin AFB action would occur in the northern GOM in the EGTTR. Targets 
would be located in water less than 200 ft (61 m) deep and from 15 to 
24 nm (27.8 to 44.5 km) offshore, south of Santa Rosa Island and south 
of Cape San Blas Site D3-A.
    On November 24, 2003, the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2004 (NDAA; Public Law 108-136) became law. Included in the 
NDAA were amendments to Section 101(a)(5) of the MMPA that apply where 
a ``military readiness activity'' is concerned. The term ``military 
readiness activity'' is defined in Public Law 107-314 (16 U.S.C. 703 
note) to include all training and operations of the Armed Forces that 
relate to combat; and the adequate and realistic testing of military 
equipment, vehicles, weapons and sensors for proper operation and 
suitability for combat use. Therefore, pursuant to section 315(b) of 
the NDAA, NMFS has determined that the test and training exercises 
proposed by Eglin AFB are considered to be a ``military readiness 
activity.''

Comments and Responses

    On August 3, 2006 (71 FR 44001), NMFS published a proposed rule to 
authorize the taking of marine mammals incidental to Eglin AFB's PSW 
activities. During the 30-day public comment period, comments were 
received from the Marine Mammal Commission (Commission), the Humane 
Society of the United States (HSUS) and a member of the public.
    Comment 1: The member of the public is opposed ``to the killing and 
murder of marine mammals for the testing of weapons.'' This person 
recommends that these weapons be tested in other places which have 
already been reduced to rubble by U.S. weapons.
    Response: Section 101(a)(5)(A) of the MMPA authorizes the 
incidental, but not intentional, harassment, injury, or mortality of 
marine mammals provided the taking is having a negligible impact on 
affected species and stocks of marine mammals, is at the lowest level 
practicable (i.e., through mitigation), and monitoring and reporting of 
take is conducted. As provided in this document, Eglin AFB has shown 
that few or no marine mammals will be seriously injured or killed as a 
result of Eglin AFB's PSW activities. As NMFS has made a determination 
that this activity will have a negligible impact on marine mammals, 
promulgation of these regulations and issuance of the LOA is warranted. 
In addition, NMFS believes that implementation of the monitoring and 
mitigation measures required in the regulations and subsequent LOAs 
will be effective in minimizing or avoiding serious injury or 
mortality.
    Comment 2: The HSUS noted that it would be extremely helpful if the 
Federal Register notice had contained a map indicating the location of 
the Eglin EGTTR.
    Response: NMFS posted Eglin AFB's application on its web site (see 
ADDRESSES) and noted in the Federal Register how that document could be 
accessed. Figure 1-1 of Eglin's application is a map indicating the 
target areas proposed for PSW activities.
    Comment 3: The HSUS does not understand why sperm whales are not 
included for potential taking since the range map for the species in 
the stock assessment report overlaps with that of both pygmy sperm 
whales and dwarf sperm whales. The NMFS needs to reconsider impacts to 
this endangered species.
    Response: Sperm whales in the GOM are located in waters of the 
continental slope, not in shallow continental shelf waters. For Eglin 
AFB, the PSW targets would be located in water less than 200 ft (61 m) 
deep and from 15 to 24 nm (27.8 to 44.5 km) offshore. As a result, 
sperm whales will not be affected by PSW activities.
    Comment 4: The HSUS notes that the FR notice does not specify the 
stock(s) of bottlenose dolphins that may be impacted by the PSW 
activity. The HSUS notes that given the location of the activity in 
water less than 200 ft (61 m) deep and from 15 to 24 nm (27.8 to 44.5 
km) offshore, the stocks most likely affected are the Northern Gulf of 
Mexico Continental Shelf Stock and the Northern Gulf of Mexico Coastal 
Stock. Both stocks should be considered likely to be impacted.
    Response: In the proposed Federal Register notice for Eglin's PSW 
activities, NMFS recommended readers reference Waring et al. (2006) for 
information on potentially impacted marine mammal stocks. Waring et al 
(2006) notes that the GOM Continental Shelf Stock may overlap with the 
GOM coastal stocks and the GOM oceanic stock in some areas and may be 
genetically indistinguishable from those stocks. To develop an average 
abundance estimate, data were collected from 1998 to 2001, and survey 
effort was pooled across all years. The best abundance estimate of 
bottlenose dolphins for continental shelf waters was 25,320 (CV=0.26) 
(Fulling et al. 2003). This estimate is considered the best estimate 
because these surveys have the most complete coverage of the species' 
habitat (Waring et al., 2006). The minimum population (pmin) for the 
northern GOM Continental Shelf stock is 20,414 bottlenose dolphins. 
Based on assumptions made by Waring et al.(2006), NMFS estimates that 
the potential biological removal (PBR) for the northern GOM Continental 
Shelf bottlenose dolphin stock is 204. Although no mortality has been 
observed in commercial fishing, this stock may be subject to incidental 
take resulting in serious injury or mortality (Waring et al., 2006).
    The northern GOM coastal stock has been divided into 3 stocks: 
eastern, northern and western. This stock is located from the shore (or 
bays) to the 20-m (66-ft) isobath. As the northern stock is distributed 
from 84[deg] West to the Mississippi River delta, PSW activities would 
affect only the northern coastal stock. Portions of the coastal stocks 
may co-occur with the northern GOM continental shelf stock and the bay, 
sound and estuary stock, the 20-m (66-ft) isobath generally corresponds 
to survey strata. The northern stock has an estimated population 
abundance of 4,191 animals (CV=0.21) with a pmin of 3,518 
(from estimates made in 1993). The PBR is unknown. A total of 1,377 
bottlenose dolphins were found stranded in the northern GOM from 1999 
through 2003. Of these, 73 or 5

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percent showed evidence of human interactions as the cause of death 
(e.g., gear entanglement, mutilation, gunshot wounds).
    Comment 5: The HSUS is concerned that there have been a high number 
of deaths of bottlenose dolphins along the Florida Panhandle (and the 
most heavily impacted stocks have not yet been identified). The 
relatively high number of bottlenose dolphin deaths that have occurred 
since 1990 raises a concern that not only are some of the stocks 
stressed, but they may even be in decline. Adding additional impacts 
from acoustic or physical trauma is something the stocks can ill 
afford.
    Response: Waring et al. (2006) describe several potential causes 
for impacts to bottlenose dolphin stocks in the GOM. These include the 
potential for takes in commercial fishing, disease and shootings. 
However, because Eglin AFB's PSW activities will take place only a few 
times a year, with no serious injury or mortality expected, Eglin's 
activities are unlikely to add to existing mortality levels. In 
addition, NMFS believes that impacts to bottlenose dolphins, and other 
marine mammals, will be minimized or avoided through implementation of 
the required mitigation and monitoring requirements. As a result, NMFS 
does not believe that authorizing the taking of bottlenose dolphins by 
Level B harassment will have more than a negligible impact on the 
affected dolphin stocks.
    Comment 6: The HSUS notes that NMFS has also considered a proposal 
by Eglin to conduct assault exercises that may also affect this 
bottlenose dolphin stock and cumulative impacts are not addressed.
    Response: NMFS has made determinations of negligible impact and 
issued IHAs to Eglin AFB for the taking of marine mammals incidental to 
air-to-surface gunnery exercises (71 FR 27695, May 12, 2006), naval 
explosive ordnance exercises at Santa Rosa Island (70 FR 51341, August 
30, 2005; 71 FR 35870, June 22, 2006) and previously for the PSW 
activity (70 FR 48675, August 19, 2005). Cumulative impacts from Eglin 
AFB's military activities on bottlenose dolphins (and other marine 
mammals) in addition to cumulative impacts from shipping, oil and gas 
exploration and production and commercial fishing on marine mammals 
have been addressed in several PEAs developed for Eglin AFB activities 
and adopted by NMFS for those IHAs mentioned above. Findings of No 
Significant Impact (FONSIs) have been made by Eglin AFB and NMFS as a 
result of those environmental studies. In contrast to the potential 
serious injury and mortality from commercial fishing and ship strikes, 
and Level B harassment from oil and gas seismic exploration, NMFS 
believes that the cumulative impact from Eglin AFB's PSW exercises is 
expected to be negligible. For Eglin AFB, cumulative impacts on marine 
mammals from all activities indicate that no marine mammals would be 
killed during a single year of activities, that 6 dolphins may be 
injured and 480 dolphins may be harassed annually. Additionally, NMFS 
anticipates that with the required mitigation measures, these numbers 
will be lower.
    Comment 7: The Commission recommends NMFS grant the requested 
authorizations provided that Eglin AFB conduct all practicable 
monitoring and mitigation measures to afford the potentially affected 
marine mammal species adequate protection from serious and lethal 
injury.
    Response: The monitoring effort for PSW is similar to that used in 
previous ship-shock actions wherein detonations of 10,000 lbs (4536 kg) 
were used without any serious injury or mortality being detected during 
extensive follow-up monitoring. Eglin AFB has calculated the potential 
for a marine mammal to be seriously injured or killed as a result of 
PSW activities (see Tables 2,3 and 4 later in this document). As noted, 
while it is unlikely that a marine mammal will be seriously injured or 
killed, a small potential exists that a marine mammal may be missed 
during the aerial and vessel monitoring program.
    Comment 8: The HSUS notes that post-mission monitoring will be 
conducted by vessels only, which will roam the area for 2 hours. In 
order to determine impact from exercises, this post-exercise monitoring 
relies on animals floating immediately or resurfacing within a few 
days, if mortally wounded; and then being found by cooperating 
stranding networks. The HSUS notes that stranding networks do not 
regularly survey the coastline for carcasses and, when discovered, they 
are often in a state of decomposition such that the cause of death is 
not readily ascertained.
    Response: While Eglin AFB does not routinely monitor Eglin AFB 
shoreline for strandings, they have a marine animal stranding program 
that responds to strandings when alerted by personnel. In addition, 
frequent offshore activity by Eglin AFB personnel will alert the 
network to any injured or dead marine mammals observed. However, NMFS 
believes that, if a marine mammal was seriously injured or killed as a 
result of PSW activities, a mortality would occur very close to the 
detonation (see Table 1) and would be observed during the subsequent 
post-event monitoring. The HSUS is correct that often these animals are 
decomposed and the cause of death cannot be determined.
    Currents and counter-currents both factor into where a marine 
mammal might eventually resurface if mortally wounded as a result of 
PSW activities and the animal sinks prior to detection. When 
decomposition advances, an animal that initially sank would resurface. 
Depending upon the amount of time between sinking and subsequent 
surfacing, the animal may be moved by surface and/or subsurface 
currents in a direction different from where one would surmise it would 
surface based solely on surface currents. Once the animal surfaces, 
wind and surface currents (which might not be the same direction) would 
affect where a marine mammal might eventually be located when a follow-
up survey was initiated. As this could mean a very large area for 
accurate post-detonation surveying, this survey effort would require an 
aircraft. Also, a dolphin that surfaced a significant distance from the 
detonation site would be indistinguishable from a dolphin that died 
from other causes. To recover the animal for necropsy would require a 
support vessel. Considering the low probability of a marine mammal 
being seriously injured or killed as a result of Eglin AFB's PSW 
activities, the high cost of large scale aerial and vessel surveys, and 
the low likelihood that a link between the cause of the dolphin's death 
and PSW activities could be made after several days underwater, NMFS 
does not believe lengthy post-event monitoring is warranted.
    Comment 9: The HSUS states that because this area has recently been 
subject to mortality events, carcasses seen along the beaches may not 
necessarily be linked to the Air Force activity unless necropsies are 
done. This is something that will not be possible for most carcasses. 
Thus, even if the cause of death is related to Air Force activities, it 
may remain undetected. However, the FR notice states that death is 
unlikely because of the precautionary nature of the mitigation 
measures. The HSUS does not agree that the mitigation measures are 
precautionary.
    Response: While the stranding network monitoring the beaches of the 
Florida Panhandle or Eglin personnel monitoring Eglin AFB beaches may 
recover a deceased marine mammal, it is true that cause-and-effect may 
be difficult after an animal spends a significant time at sea. However,

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animals sighted during the 2-hour post-event monitoring would be 
available for possible rescue and rehabilitation or euthanasia and/or 
necropsy by a qualified individual.
    NMFS believes that the mitigation measures, which are designed to 
detect marine mammals prior to detonation and preventing subsequent 
potential injury or mortality are the best that can be successfully 
implemented in view of the need to also ensure the safety of the 
monitoring teams (see text for details). However, post-event 
activities, such as determining a cause of mortality are considered 
monitoring measures and do not affect the actual taking of marine 
mammals.
    Comment 10: The HSUS notes that the Federal Register notice states 
there will be a buffer zone of 1.0 nm (1.8 km) established outside the 
zone of influence, which is stated to be 2.0 nm (3.7 km) for the JASSM 
or 5-10 nm (9.3-18.5 km) for the SDB with a buffer zone of 2.5 - 5 nm 
(4.6-9.3 km). However, the Federal Register notice acknowledges that 
marine mammal mitigation effectiveness may be reduced for some missions 
due to mandatory safety buffers which limit the time and type of marine 
mammal mitigation. This is not acceptable. Why bother having a 
mitigation plan if part of the plan is to obviate it if it seems 
impractical?
    Response: Because visual observation is the primary mitigation 
technique for PSW tests, mitigation effectiveness is affected by the 
distance of observers from the target. Protected species observers will 
survey from inside the Zone of Influence (ZOI) until 1 to 1.5 hours 
before weapon launch, depending on the specific type of test. At this 
time, observers will be required to move outside the ZOI/safety zone. 
This is a mandatory requirement directed by Air Force safety policy, 
and applies to Air Force personnel as well as civilian contracted 
observers. Both the JASSM and SDB are precision-guided munitions. 
However, due in part to the long distance from which these weapons are 
potentially launched (40 to 200 nautical miles), slight errors in 
flight trajectory, though not expected, could jeopardize the life of 
anyone within the safety zone. In addition to Air Force safety policy, 
the MMPA as amended by the NDAA requires the Secretary of Commerce to 
consider personnel safety when making incidental take determinations 
for military readiness activities.
    Aerial observers will leave the area 1 to 1.5 hours before weapon 
launch. However, ship-based observers will continue to monitor for 
protected species from the edge of the safety zone, up to the time of 
impact. The safety zone is larger for the SDB due to differences in 
flight characteristics. Therefore, observers may be farther from the 
target during SDB tests than during JASSM tests.
    Comment 11: The HSUS notes that there are two types of monitoring: 
aerial and shipboard. Aerial monitoring will occur using observers 
experienced in marine mammal surveying and familiar with the species 
that may occur in the area. It is not stated whether these personnel 
will be NMFS staff or how they might be ``experienced'' in survey 
methodology and marine mammal species identification, especially in 
light of the fact that identifying pygmy from dwarf sperm whales is 
difficult even for NMFS science center personnel.
    Response: NMFS does not provide marine mammal scientists to Eglin 
AFB for this, or any other project. Eglin AFB uses biologically-trained 
marine mammal observers, who are either employees or contract 
personnel, that have been approved in advance by NMFS. This is standard 
practice for all authorizations under section 101(a)(5) of the MMPA. It 
should be recognized that using NMFS scientists would reduce our 
agency's ability to conduct important marine mammal research. As a 
result, private companies have been established to train and provide 
trained biologists for activities such as this one.
    Next, it is widely recognized that it is difficult to identify some 
marine mammal species, generally referred to as being cryptic species. 
Usually, unidentified species are listed as such and then, later, 
tallied based on known stock proportions for the geographic area. 
However, when marine mammal observers are monitoring a safety or buffer 
zone, it is less critical that they be able to identify an animal by 
species; rather it is more important at the time that they are able to 
actually see the marine mammal.
    Comment 12: The HSUS notes that the Federal Register notice does 
not provide information on the type of aircraft used although the 
notice discusses turboprop craft, tanker aircraft and helicopters being 
involved in the exercise, none of which is well suited for this 
purpose.
    Response: The application notes that Eglin AFB plans to use 
helicopters for monitoring marine mammal safety zones for this 
activity. Helicopters are an effective means to monitor the relatively 
small safety zones for PSW activities. Alternatively, Eglin AFB will be 
authorized to use types of aircraft that are often used by marine 
mammal observers. While other aircraft (turboprop and tankers) may be 
used during the PSW exercise, they will not be used to monitor safety 
zones.
    Comment 13: The HSUS notes that with regard to shipboard 
monitoring, the Federal Register notice states that it will be from the 
highest point possible on the mission ship. The notice discusses barges 
that will be on-site. The highest point possible, may or may not be 
effective depending upon the size of the vessel involved but that is 
not specified and should be.
    Response: As barges are the target for PSW detonations, the target 
barge and nearby instrumentation barge (if one is used) are not an 
appropriate vessel for marine mammal observations. As a result of this 
comment, NMFS has clarified in the regulations that the marine mammal 
observation platform must provide observers a platform to see a major 
portion of the safety zone. It must also be mobile in order to observe 
the largest area possible. However, as this rule will be effective for 
a 5-year period, specifying the exact type of vessel Eglin AFB will use 
for the vessel monitoring program is not practical since it could 
preclude use of larger, more effective platforms.
    Comment 14: The HSUS notes the Federal Register notice states that 
the onboard observers will be familiar with the marine life of the 
area. This is not sufficiently specific to be reassuring. The small 
size of the marine mammals and the long dive time of sperm whales and 
dwarf and pygmy sperm whales makes them particularly difficult to 
observe, as is referenced throughout stock assessments and published 
literature.
    Response: As mentioned previously, sperm whales are unlikely to be 
encountered in the shallow, shelf waters off Eglin AFB. In this 
document, NMFS clarifies that Eglin AFB must use biologists trained in 
the at-sea detection of marine mammals.
    Comment 15: The HSUS believes that the mitigation measures should 
also include acoustic monitoring techniques.
    Response: NMFS does not believe that additional mitigation is 
warranted for this activity. Passive acoustic monitoring (PAM), which 
is designed to detect vocalizing marine mammals, can be effective when 
safety zones are significantly large so that visual monitoring 
effectiveness might be compromised. In this case, Eglin AFB has 
implemented an aerial monitoring program that is believed to be more 
effective than using PAM because of increased visibility of marine 
mammals in the shallow water areas Additionally, when using PAM in 
shallow water areas with relatively small safety zones it is difficult 
to determine whether the

[[Page 67814]]

marine mammal is actually within the safety zone due to reflection and 
refraction of the acoustic signal.
    Comment 16: The HSUS believes that extended monitoring (of the 
exercise) by skilled observers is critical in highly mobile species 
which often have long dive times.
    Response: NMFS agrees that skilled marine mammal observers are 
critical for detecting marine mammals within a safety zone and delaying 
detonations (in this case the launch) until the marine mammal(s) depart 
from the safety zone. The length of time for marine mammal observations 
depends on the type and weight of the explosive which influences the 
size of the safety zone, as described later in this document. These 
observation times are sufficient to ensure that a marine mammal is 
detected prior to detonation.
    Comment 17: The Commission recommends that NMFS cooperate with 
Eglin AFB to develop a long-term strategy to monitor the abundance and 
distribution of marine mammals in the subject activity area to ensure 
that the proposed activity is not having any population-level effects 
on marine mammals over the 5 years that the regulations are in effect. 
The Commission would be pleased to assist with the development of such 
a strategy.
    Response: While NMFS and Eglin would be pleased to discuss such a 
monitoring strategy with the Commission, it is unclear whether a 
monitoring program could be designed that would be able to make a 
determination that the injury of approximately 6 dolphins and an 
additional 480 that may be harassed by all Eglin AFB activities was 
having population level impacts. As NMFS has been unable to identify 
mortality levels in the GOM from commercial fishing, shipping, and 
pollution (Waring et al., 2006), it is unlikely that Level B harassment 
by Eglin's military-readiness activities can be empirically determined 
to be more than negligible, either individually or cumulatively. 
Finally, while monitoring the impacts that an activity might have on 
marine mammal stocks is the responsibility of an LOA applicant, 
undertaking studies on the distribution and abundance of these stocks 
is the responsibility of NMFS and other agencies. To the extent that 
these studies are underfunded does not mean that that responsibility 
should be transferred to LOA holders.

Description of Marine Mammals Affected by the Activity

    There are 29 species of marine mammals documented as occurring in 
Federal waters of the GOM. Information on those species that may be 
impacted by this activity are discussed in the Eglin AFB application 
and Eglin AFB's Final PEA. A summary of that information is provided in 
this section.
    General information on these marine mammal species can be found in 
Wursig et al. (2000) and in the NMFS Stock Assessment Report (Waring, 
2006). The NMFS Stock Assessment Report is available at: https://
www.nefsc.noaa.gov/nefsc/publications/tm/tm194/.
    Marine mammal species that potentially occur within the EGTTR 
include several species of cetaceans and one sirenian, the West Indian 
manatee. During winter months, manatee distribution in the GOM is 
generally confined to southern Florida. During summer months, a few may 
migrate north as far as Louisiana. However, manatees primarily inhabit 
coastal and inshore waters and rarely venture offshore. PSW missions 
would be conducted offshore. Therefore, effects on manatees are 
considered very unlikely.
    Cetacean abundance estimates for the study area are derived from 
GulfCet II (Davis et al., 2000) aerial surveys of the continental shelf 
within the Minerals Management Service Eastern Planning Area, an area 
of 70,470 km\2\. Texas A&M University and NMFS conducted these surveys 
from 1996 to 1998. Abundance and density data from the aerial survey 
portion of the survey best reflect the occurrence of cetaceans within 
the EGTTR, given that the survey area overlaps approximately one-third 
of the EGTTR and nearly the entire continental shelf region of the 
EGTTR where military activity is highest. The GulfCet II aerial surveys 
identified different density estimates of marine mammals for the shelf 
and slope geographic locations. Only the shelf data is used because PSW 
missions will only be conducted on the shelf.
    In order to maximize species conservation and protection, the 
species density estimate data were adjusted to reflect more realistic 
encounters of these animals in their natural environment. Refer to 
``Conservative Estimates of Marine Mammal Densities'' in this document 
and Eglin AFB's application for more information on density estimates. 
The four marine mammal species observed during GulfCet II aerial 
surveys on the shelf that have the potential to be present in the PSW 
test area and thereby affected are: Atlantic bottlenose dolphins 
(Tursiops truncatus), Atlantic spotted dolphins (Stenella frontalis), 
dwarf sperm whales (Kogia simus), and pygmy sperm whales (Kogia 
breviceps). Brief descriptions of these species were provided in 
earlier Federal Register notices (69 FR 21816, April 22, 2004; 70 FR 
48675, August 19, 2005) and are not repeated here.

Impacts to Marine Mammals

    Potential impacts to marine mammals from the detonation of the PSWs 
and SDBs include both mortality and serious injury, as well as Level B 
harassment in the form of a temporary shift in hearing sensitivity 
(called temporary threshold shift (TTS) and behavioral responses due to 
TTS. Although unlikely due to the extensive mitigation measures 
proposed herein, marine mammals have the potential to be killed or 
injured as a result of a blast due to the response of air cavities in 
the body, such as the lungs and bubbles in the intestines. Any effects 
would likely be most severe in near-surface waters where the reflected 
shock wave creates a region of negative pressure called ``cavitation.'' 
This is a region of near total physical trauma within which no animals 
would be expected to survive. A second criterion used by NMFS for 
categorizing taking by mortality is the onset of extensive lung 
hemorrhage. Extensive lung hemorrhage is considered to be debilitating 
and thereby potentially fatal. Suffocation caused by lung hemorrhage 
would likely be the major cause of any marine mammal death from 
underwater shock waves.
    For the acoustic analysis in this document, the exploding charge is 
characterized as a point source. The impact thresholds used for marine 
mammals relate to potential effects on hearing from underwater noise 
from detonations. For the explosives in question, actual detonation 
heights would range from 0 to 25 ft (7.6 m) above the water surface. 
Detonation depths would range from 0 to 80 ft (73.2 m) below the 
surface. To bracket the range of possibilities, detonation scenarios 
just above and below the surface were used by Eglin AFB to analyze 
bombs set to detonate on contact with the target barge. Potentially, 
the barge may interact with the propagation of noise into the water. 
However, barge effects on the propagation of noise into the water 
column cannot be determined without in-water noise monitoring at the 
time of detonation.
    Potential exposure of a sensitive species to detonation noise could 
theoretically occur at the surface or at any number of depths with 
differing consequences. As a conservative measure, a mid-depth scenario 
was selected by Eglin AFB to ensure the greatest direct path for the 
harassment ranges, and to give the greatest impact range for the injury 
thresholds.

[[Page 67815]]

Explosive Criteria and Thresholds for Impact of Noise on Marine Mammals

    Criteria and thresholds that are the basis of the analysis of PSW 
noise impacts to cetaceans were initially used in U.S. Navy's 
environmental impact statements (EISs) for ship shock trials of the 
SEAWOLF submarine and the USS WINSTON S. CHURCHILL vessel (DON, 1998; 
DON, 2001) and accepted by NMFS as representing the best science 
available (see 66 FR 22450, May 4, 2001). With a single exception 
mentioned in this document, NMFS believes that the criteria developed 
for the shock trials represent the best science available. The 
following sections summarize the information contained in those 
actions.
Criteria and Thresholds: Lethality
    The criterion for mortality for marine mammals used in the 
CHURCHILL Final EIS is 'onset of severe lung injury.' This is 
conservative in that it corresponds to a 1 percent chance of mortal 
injury, and yet any animal experiencing onset severe lung injury is 
counted as a lethal take. The threshold is stated in terms of the 
Goertner (1982) modified positive impulse with value ``indexed to 31 
psi-ms.'' Since the Goertner approach depends on propagation, source/
animal depths, and animal mass in a complex way, the actual impulse 
value corresponding to the 31-psi-ms index is a complicated 
calculation. The acoustic threshold is derived from:
    I1% = 42.9 (M/34)1/3 psi-ms,
    where M is animal mass in kg. Again, to be conservative, CHURCHILL 
used the mass of a calf dolphin (at 12.2 kg), so that the threshold 
index is 30.5 psi-ms.
Criteria and Thresholds: Injury (Level A Harassment)
    Non-lethal injurious impacts are defined in this document as 
eardrum rupture (i.e., tympanic-membrane (TM) rupture) and the onset of 
slight lung injury. These are considered indicative of the onset of 
injury. The threshold for TM rupture corresponds to a 50 percent rate 
of rupture (i.e., 50 percent of animals exposed to the level are 
expected to suffer TM rupture); this is stated in terms of an EFD value 
of 1.17 in-lb/in\2\, which is about 205 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s. (Note: 
EFD is the time integral of the squared pressure divided by the 
impedance in values of dB re 1 microPa\2\-s.) This recognizes that TM 
rupture is not necessarily a life-threatening injury, but is a useful 
index of possible injury that is well-correlated with measures of 
permanent hearing impairment (e.g., Ketten (1998) indicates a 30 
percent incidence of permanent threshold shift (PTS) at the same 
threshold).
Criteria and Thresholds: Non-injurious Impacts (Level B Harassment)
    Marine mammals may also be harassed due to noise from PSW missions 
involving high explosive detonations in the EGTTR. The CHURCHILL 
criterion for non-injurious harassment from detonations, as established 
through NMFS' incidental take rulemaking (see 66 FR 22450, May 4, 
2001), is temporary (auditory) threshold shift (TTS), which is a 
slight, recoverable loss of hearing sensitivity (DoN, 2001). The 
criterion for TTS used in this document is 182 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s 
maximum EFD level in any 1/3-octave band at frequencies above 100 Hz 
for all toothed whales (e.g., sperm whales, beaked whales, dolphins). 
(Note: 1/3-octave band is the EFD in a 1/3-octave frequency band; the 
1/3 octave selected is the hearing range at which the affected species' 
hearing is believed to be most sensitive.) A 1/3-octave band above 10 
Hz is used for impact assessments on all baleen whales, but those 
species do not inhabit the affected environment of this project.
    The CHURCHILL rulemaking also established a second criterion for 
estimating TTS threshold: 12 psi. The appropriate application of this 
second TTS criterion is currently under debate, as this 12-psi 
criterion was originally established for estimating the impact of a 
10,000-lb (4536-kg) explosive to be employed for the Navy's shock 
trial. It was introduced to provide a more conservative safety zone for 
TTS when the explosive or the animal approaches the sea surface (for 
which cases the explosive energy is reduced but the peak pressure is 
not).
    For large explosives (2000 to 10,000 lbs (907-4536 kg)) and the 
explosives and/or the mammals not too close to the surface, the TTS 
impact zones for these two TTS criteria are approximately the same. 
However, for small detonations, some acousticians contend the ranges 
for the two TTS thresholds may be quite different, with ranges for the 
peak pressure threshold several times greater than those for energy. In 
its application, Eglin AFB endorsed an approach, currently being 
developed by the Navy, for appropriately ``scaling'' the peak pressure 
threshold, in order to more accurately estimate TTS for small shots 
while preserving the safety feature provided by the peak pressure 
threshold. As such, in its application, Eglin AFB requested the energy-
based criterion for TTS, 182 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s (maximum EFD level in 
any 1/3-octave band), be used alone to conservatively estimate the zone 
in which non-injurious (Level B) harassment of marine mammals may 
occur. NMFS acousticians have reviewed the scientific basis for this 
proposal and agree, in part, with the statements made by Eglin AFB that 
the pressure criterion of 12 psi is not fully supportable for small 
charges or when either the charge or the recipient are at the surface. 
The model used in CHURCHILL assumed the detonation occurred in deep 
water with the charge placed below 318 ft (100 m) in depth, and that 
the bottom depth is at least 20 times the detonation depth. In 
contrast, in PSW missions, both the detonation and the recipient will 
be near the surface in relatively shallow water. Therefore, although 
this issue remains under review by NMFS and the Navy for future Navy 
actions involving small net weight explosives, as an interim criterion 
for this rule and LOAs, NMFS is adopting the experimental findings of 
Finneran et al. (2002) that TTS can be induced at a pressure level of 
23 psi (at least in belugas). As explained here, this is considered 
conservative since a 23-psi pressure level was below the level that 
induced TTS in bottlenose dolphins.
    Finneran et al. (2000; as described in Finneran et al. (2002)) 
conducted a study designed to measure masked TTS (MTTS) in bottlenose 
dolphins and belugas exposed to single underwater impulses. This study 
used an ``explosion simulator'' (ES) to generate impulsive sounds with 
pressure waveforms resembling those produced by distant underwater 
explosions. No substantial (i.e., 6 dB or larger) threshold shifts were 
observed in any of the subjects (two bottlenose dolphins and 1 beluga) 
at the highest received level produced by the ES: approximately 70 kPa 
(10 psi) peak pressure, 221 dB re re 1 micro Pa peak-to-peak (pk-pk) 
pressure, and 179 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s total EFD. In Finneran et al. 
(2002), a watergun was substituted for the ES because it is capable of 
producing impulses with higher peak pressures and total energy fluxes 
than the pressure waveforms produced using the ES. It was also 
preferable to other seismic sources because its impulses contain more 
energy at higher frequencies, where odontocete hearing thresholds are 
relatively low (i.e., more sensitive). Hearing thresholds were measured 
at 0.4, 4 and 30 kHz. MTTSs of 7 and 6 dB were observed in the beluga 
at 0.4 and 30 kHz, respectively, approximately 2 minutes following 
exposure to single impulses with peak

[[Page 67816]]

pressures of 160 kPa (23 psi), pk-pk pressures of 226 dB re 1 microPa, 
and total EFD of 186 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s. Thresholds returned to 
within 2 dB of the pre-exposure value approximately 4 minutes post 
exposure. No MTTS was observed in the single bottlenose dolphin tested 
at the highest exposure conditions: peak pressure of 207 kPa (30 psi), 
228 dB re 1 microPa pk-pk pressure, and 188 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s total 
energy flux. Therefore, until more scientific information is obtained, 
NMFS has determined that the pressure criterion for small explosions 
can be amended from 12 psi to 23 psi. At this time, NMFS believes that 
setting the pressure metric of the dual explosive criteria at 23 psi is 
conservative, while setting the pressure metric at a higher level has 
not been scientifically validated at this time. Table 1 illustrates 
estimated zones of impact for potential mortality (31 psi-ms), Level A 
harassment (injury; 205 dB EFDL) and Level B harassment (TTS; 182 dB 
EFDL/23 psi).

                     Table 1. Zones of Impact for Underwater Explosions (Mid-depth Animal).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                  Ranges for 182
                                                     Depth or      Ranges for 31    Ranges for    dB EFDL in 1/3-
            Ordnance             NEW (TNT in lb)     Height of      psi -ms (m)    EFDL >205 dB    Octave Band/
                                                   Explosion (m)                        (m)          23 psi(m)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summer                                                                            ..............  ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------                ----------------
Single SDB                       48               1.5             n/a             12              447
                                                  7.6             n/a             12              447
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Double SDB                       96               1.5             n/a             16              550
                                                  7.6             n/a             17              550
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single JASSM                     300              0.3             75              170             770
                                                  >6.1            320             550             2490
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winter                                                                            ..............  ..............
-----------------------------------------------------------------                ----------------
Single SDB                       48               1.5             n/a             12              471
                                                  7.6             n/a             12              471
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Double SDB                       96               1.5             n/a             16              594
                                                  7.6             n/a             16              594
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Single JASSM                     300              0.3             75              170             871
                                                  >6.1            320             590             3250
 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Criteria and Thresholds: Behavioral Modification (Sub-TTS)
    No strictly sub-TTS behavioral responses (i.e., Level B harassment) 
are anticipated with the JASSM and SBD test activities because there 
are no successive detonations (the 2 SBD explosions occur almost 
simultaneously) which could provide causation for a behavioral 
disruption rising to the level of a significant alteration or 
abandonment of behavioral patterns without also causing TTS. Also, 
repetitive exposures (below TTS) to the same resident animals are 
highly unlikely due to the infrequent JASSM and SBD test events, the 
potential variability in target locations, and the continuous movement 
of marine mammals in the northern GOM.

Incidental Take Estimates

    For Eglin AFB's PSW exercises, three key sources of information are 
necessary for estimating potential take levels from noise on marine 
mammals: (1) The zones of influence (ZOIs) for noise exposure; (2) The 
number of distinct firing or test events; and (3) the density of 
animals that potentially reside within a ZOI.
    Noise ZOIs were calculated for depth detonation scenarios of 1 ft 
(0.3 m) and 20 ft (6.1 m) for lethality and for harassment (both Level 
A and Level B). To estimate the number of potential ``takes'' or 
animals affected, the adjusted data on cetacean population information 
from ship and aerial surveys were applied to the various ZOIs.
    Table 1 in this document gives the estimated ZOI ranges for various 
explosive weights for summer and wintertime scenarios for JASSM and 
SDB. For example, for JASSM, the range, in winter, extends to 320 m 
(1050 ft), 590 m (1936 ft) and 3250 m (10663 ft) for potential 
mortality (31 psi-ms), injury (205 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s) and TTS (182 
dB re 1 microPa\2\-s/23 psi zones), respectively. SDB scenarios are for 
in-air detonations at heights of 1.5 m (5 ft) and 7.6 m (25 ft) during 
both seasons (whichever criterion provides the largest zone is used for 
calculating potential impacts). JASSM detonations were modeled for 
near- surface (i.e., 1-ft (0.3-m) depth) and below-surface (>20-ft 
depth (>6.1 m)). To account for ``double'' (2 nearly simultaneous) 
events, the charge weights are added (doubled) when modeling for the 
determination of energy estimates (since energy is proportional to 
weight). Pressure estimates only utilize the single charge weights for 
these estimates.
    Applying the lethality (31 psi) and harassment (205 and 182 dB 
EFDL) impact ranges shown in Table 1 to the calculated species 
densities (in Table 3-1 in Eglin AFB's application), the number of 
animals potentially occurring within the various ZOIs without 
implementation of mitigation was estimated. These results are presented 
in Tables 2 and 3 in this document. In summary, without any mitigation, 
a small possibility exists for one bottlenose and one Atlantic spotted 
dolphin to be exposed to blast levels sufficient to cause mortality. 
Additionally, less than 2 cetaceans might be exposed to noise levels 
sufficient to induce Level A harassment (injury) (205 dB re 1 
microPa\2\-s) annually, and as few as 31 or as many as 52 cetaceans 
(depending on the season and water depth) could potentially be exposed 
(annually) to noise levels sufficient to induce Level B harassment in 
the form of TTS (182 dB re 1 microPa\2\-s/23 psi). While none of

[[Page 67817]]

these impact estimates consider the proposed mitigation measures that 
will be employed by Eglin AFB to minimize potential impacts to 
protected species, NMFS proposes to authorize Eglin AFB to lethally 
take one marine mammal, 2 marine mammals by Level A harassment, and up 
to 53 marine mammals by Level B harassment (TTS) annually. The proposed 
mitigation measures described later in this document are anticipated to 
reduce potential impacts to marine mammals, in both numbers and degree 
of severity.

  Table 2. Marine Mammal Densities and Risk Estimates for Lethality (31
       psi) Noise Exposure for All In-Water and In-Air Detonations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
                                              Animals        Adjusted
                                            Exposed from  Number Exposed
            Species              Density     All In-Air    Based on 30%
                                            and In-Water    Mitigation
                                            Detonations    Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summer
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.004          0.003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       0.262          0.183
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      0.219          0.153
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      0.017          0.012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  0.502          0.351
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winter
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.004          0.003
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       0.262          0.183
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      0.219          0.153
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      0.017          0.012
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  0.502          0.351
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------


     Table 3. Marine Mammal Densities and Risk Estimates for Level A
 Harassment (205 dB EFD 1/3-Octave Band) Noise Exposure for All In-Water
                         and In-Air Detonations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
                                              Animals        Adjusted
                                            Exposed from  Number Exposed
            Species              Density     All In-Air    Based on 30%
                                            and In-Water    Mitigation
                                            Detonations    Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summer
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.014          0.010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       0.893          0.625
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      0.747          0.523
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      0.058          0.041
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  1.712          1.198
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winter
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.014          0.010
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       0.893          0.625
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      0.747          0.523
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      0.058          0.041
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  1.712          1.198
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 67818]]


 Table 4. Marine Mammal Densities and Combined Risk Estimates for the 23
 psi Peak Pressure and the 182 dB EFD 1/3-Octave Band Level B Harassment
             Metrics for All In-Water and In-Air Detonations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                             Number of
                                              Animals        Adjusted
                                            Exposed from  Number Exposed
            Species              Density     All In-Air    Based on 30%
                                            and In-Water    Mitigation
                                            Detonations    Effectiveness
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Summer
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.26           0.182
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       16.209         11.3463
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      13.547         9.4829
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      1.061          0.7427
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  31.076         21.7532
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Winter
-------------------------------           ---------------
Dwarf/pygmy sperm whale         0.013      0.44           0.308
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bottlenose dolphin              0.81       27.387         19.1709
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlantic spotted dolphin        0.677      22.89          16.023
------------------------------------------------------------------------
T. truncatus/S. frontalis       0.053      1.792          1.2544
------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL                           .........  52.509         36.7563
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mitigation and Monitoring

    Eglin AFB is required to establish and survey relevant ZOIs and 
buffer zones around a planned detonation site. The ZOI for the JASSM 
will be a radius of 2.0 nm (3.7 km) around the detonation site and the 
buffer zone will be established at a 1.0-nm (1.85-km) radius outside 
the safety zone. The ZOI for the SDB will be a radius of 5-10 nm (9.3-
18.5 km) depending upon weight of the explosive and the buffer zone 
will be established at a 2.5 - 5 nm (4.6 -18.5 km) radius outside the 
SDB ZOI. Prior to the planned detonation, trained marine mammal 
observers (MMOs) aboard aircraft will survey (visually monitor) the ZOI 
and buffer area, a very effective method for detecting cetaceans. The 
aircraft/helicopters will fly approximately 500 ft (152 m) above the 
sea surface to allow observers to scan a large distance. In addition, 
trained MMOs aboard surface support vessels will conduct ship-based 
monitoring for non-participating vessels as well as protected species. 
Using 25X power ``Big-eye'' binoculars, surface observation would be 
effective out to several kilometers.
    Weather that supports the ability to sight marine life is required 
to effectively mitigate impacts on marine life (DON, 1998). Wind, 
visibility, and surface conditions in the GOM are the most critical 
factors affecting mitigation operations. Higher winds typically 
increase wave height and create ``white cap'' conditions, both of which 
limit an MMO's ability to locate surfacing marine mammals. Therefore, 
PSW missions would be delayed if the Beaufort scale sea state is 
greater than 3.5.
    Visibility is also a critical factor for flight safety issues. A 
minimum ceiling of 305 m (1000 ft) and visibility of 5.6 km (3 nm) is 
required to support mitigation and safety-of-flight concerns (DON, 
2001).

Aerial Survey/Monitoring Team

    Eglin AFB will complete an aerial survey before each mission and 
train personnel to conduct aerial surveys for protected species. The 
aerial survey/monitoring team would consist of two MMOs. Aircraft 
provide a preferable viewing platform for detection of protected marine 
species. Each aerial MMO will be experienced in marine mammal surveying 
and familiar with species that may occur in the area. Each aircraft 
would have a data recorder who would be responsible for relaying the 
location, the species if possible, the direction of movement, and the 
number of animals sighted. Standard line transect aerial surveying 
methods, as developed by NMFS (Blaylock and Hoggard, 1994; Buckland et 
al., 1993) would be used. Aerial MMOs are expected to have above 
average to excellent sighting conditions at sunrise to 1.85 km (1 nm) 
on either side of the aircraft within the weather limitation noted 
previously. Observed marine mammals would be identified to the species 
or the lowest possible taxonomic level and the relative position 
recorded. In order to ensure adequate daylight for pre- and post-
mission monitoring, the mission activity would occur no earlier than 2 
hours after sunrise and no later than 2 hours prior to sunset.

Shipboard Monitoring Team

    Eglin AFB will conduct shipboard monitoring to reduce impacts to 
protected species. The monitoring would be staged from the highest 
point possible on a mission ship. MMOs would be familiar with the 
protected resources (marine mammals/sea turtles) of the area. The MMOs 
on the vessel must be equipped with optical equipment with sufficient 
magnification (e.g., 25X power ``Big-Eye'' binoculars, as these have 
been successfully used in monitoring activities from ships), which 
should allow the observer to sight surfacing mammals from as far as 
11.6 km (6.3 nm) and provide overlapping coverage from the aerial team. 
A team leader would be responsible for reporting sighting locations, 
which would be based on bearing and distance.
    The aerial and shipboard monitoring teams will have proper lines of 
communication to avoid communication deficiencies. The MMOs from the 
aerial team and operations vessel will have direct communication with 
the lead scientist aboard the operations vessel. The lead

[[Page 67819]]

scientist will be a qualified marine biologist familiar with marine 
mammal surveys. The lead scientist reviews the range conditions and 
recommends a Go/No-Go decision to the test director. The test director 
makes the final Go/No-Go decision.

Mitigation Procedures Plan

    All zones (injury, ZOI and buffer zones) are monitored by trained 
MMOs. Although unexpected, any mission may be delayed or aborted due to 
technical reasons. Actual delay times depend on the aircraft supporting 
the test, test assets, and range time. Should a technical delay occur, 
all mitigation procedures would continue and remain in place until 
either the test takes place or is canceled. The ZOI and buffer zone 
around JASSM missions will be monitored b