Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes, 66657-66661 [E6-19164]

Download as PDF rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations in a subcritical configuration providing reasonable assurance that excessive fuel cladding temperatures and subsequent fuel damage would not occur. The third scenario involves those dry storage casks that would remain filled with borated water. The possibility exists for a licensee to cause a boron dilution event in the dry storage cask when spraying the fuel stored in the SFP racks. The location of the dry storage cask might be close enough to the SFP storage racks that it could inadvertently be sprayed at the same time as the SFP racks, overfilling the dry storage cask, and eventually diluting the boron. Under these conditions, the boron concentration would slowly decrease and this scenario becomes very similar to a slow boron dilution event as discussed previously. The criticality monitors required for dry cask loading would still be available and would provide indication of an accidental criticality. With indication of an accidental criticality, it is reasonable to assume that the licensee would take action to stop the boron dilution from continuing and restore the dry storage cask to a subcritical configuration. Actions the licensee could take to return the dry storage cask to a subcritical configuration could include: 1. Stop spraying unborated water into the dry storage cask and allow the water in the cask to heat up with a subsequent reduction in the moderation provided by the water that would eventually re-establish a subcritical configuration at a higher water temperature. In this condition, the temperature of the water may be high enough that the water would eventually boil off (be higher than 212 degrees F at atmospheric conditions). If this were to occur, the cask would eventually become dry and the fuel would be in a subcritical configuration and cooled consistent with the design of the cask. As the water boiled off, it would continue to provide cooling to the fuel such that the fuel would not experience significantly elevated temperatures and there would be no fuel damage; or 2. Spray water into the cask from a borated water source to increase the boron concentration, re-establishing a subcritical configuration and keeping the fuel cooled. In each case, the fuel would not be subject to excessive temperatures and therefore, there would be no fuel damage that could impact public health and safety. Under this third scenario there is also the possibility that the licensee might intentionally spray water into the dry storage cask in an attempt to keep the fuel in the cask cool. Given that the cask will already be filled with water and the importance of cooling the fuel in the SFP storage racks (where there is no water following a rapid drain down event), the NRC considers the possibility of the intentional diversion of cooling water from the fuel stored in the SFP racks to the fuel stored in the dry storage cask to be very remote. Therefore, the NRC does not consider this as a factor that would have an adverse affect on its determination with regard to the acceptability of the proposed change to 10 CFR 50.68. However, even if the licensee intentionally diverted water from cooling the fuel in the SFP racks to the fuel VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:50 Nov 15, 2006 Jkt 211001 in the dry storage cask, there would be a slow boron dilution event, a slow approach to criticality, and indication of an accidental criticality from the required criticality monitors. As such, this case would be very similar to the unintentional dilution case described above. In the fourth scenario, the NRC assumed that the licensee was able to repair the damage to the SFP and reflood the pool. In this scenario as the licensee reflooded the SFP the dry storage cask would either reflood as the SFP was filled (for those casks with drain ports at the bottom); if the cask had dried out it would reflood once the water level in the SFP reached the top of the cask and water began spilling into the cask; or if the cask remained flooded following the rapid drain down event, there would be a slow dilution of the boron in the water in the cask as the SFP level continued to rise. In each of these cases, as the cask was filled with water or as the boron dilution of the water in the cask occurred, the possibility increases that an accidental criticality might occur. However, because of the relatively slow reactivity addition that would occur during each of these cases, the approach to criticality would be reasonably slow. As noted previously, the licensee is required to have criticality monitors in place during dry storage cask loading (or unloading) activities. These criticality monitors would provide indication that an accidental criticality had occurred. Once identified, it is reasonable that the licensee would take action to reestablish a subcritical configuration. However, as discussed above for the third scenario, even if there were an accidental criticality, the likelihood of fuel damage is very remote. The possibility of an accidental criticality in the fourth scenario is even less likely given the following factors: 1. Dry storage casks are typically loaded with fuel that has significant burnup that reduces the reactivity of the assembly. As such, it is reasonable to conclude that even in an unborated condition, the fuel stored in the cask would remain subcritical. 2. As the licensee refilled the SFP, it is reasonable to assume that it would be injecting borated water to re-establish the boron concentration level required by plant technical specifications as soon as practical. Based on the above, even if there were an event that caused a rapid drain down of a SFP while a dry storage cask was in the SFP, the likelihood of a boron dilution event causing fuel damage is very remote. Therefore, the NRC concludes there is no safety benefit from requiring the licensee to conduct a site specific analysis in support of dry storage cask loading, fuel storage, or unloading activities. V. Conclusion As discussed above the NRC assessed the safety benefit of requiring licensees to conduct an additional criticality analysis to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 while loading a transportation package or dry storage cask in the SFP. The NRC determined that the controls required by 10 CFR Part 71 or 72 for the associated package or cask provide reasonable assurance that a slow PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 66657 boron dilution event would not result in elevated fuel temperature and subsequent fuel damage. Therefore, for a slow boron dilution event, there is no benefit to the additional criticality analysis. The NRC further determined that the probability of having a rapid drain down event result in elevated fuel temperatures and subsequent fuel damage was highly unlikely. Based on its analysis, the NRC concludes there is no safety benefit from requiring a licensee to conduct a site specific analysis in support of storage cask loading, fuel storage, or unloading activities and that the proposed rule change is therefore acceptable. [FR Doc. E6–19372 Filed 11–15–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590–01–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2006–23734; Directorate Identifier 2005–NM–174–AD; Amendment 39–14827; AD 2006–23–15] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of Transportation (DOT). ACTION: Final rule. AGENCY: SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires installing a control wheel damper assembly at the first officer’s drum bracket assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section 41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, this AD also requires doing an additional adjustment test of the relocated control wheel position sensor, and an operational test of the flight data recorder and the digital flight data acquisition unit. This AD also requires installing vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the outboard main flap on certain airplanes. This AD results from several reports that flightcrews experienced unintended roll oscillations during final approach, just before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintended roll oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss of directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers. DATES: This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006. E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM 16NOR1 66658 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of December 21, 2006. ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https:// dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC. Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207, for service information identified in this AD. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Neff, Aerospace Engineer, Flight Test Branch, ANM–160S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6521; fax (425) 917–6590. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Examining the Docket You may examine the airworthiness directive (AD) docket on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section. rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1 Discussion The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on January 31, 2006 (71 FR 5021). That NPRM proposed to require installing a control wheel damper assembly at the first officer’s drum bracket assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section 41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For certain airplanes, that NPRM also proposed to require doing an additional adjustment test of the relocated control wheel position sensor, and an operational test of the flight data recorder and the digital flight data acquisition unit. That NPRM also proposed to require installing vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the outboard main flap on certain airplanes. Comments We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:50 Nov 15, 2006 Jkt 211001 development of this AD. We have considered the comments received. Support for the NPRM American Airlines supports the NPRM. Requests To Change Compliance Time Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) supports the intent of the NPRM, but feels that the 24-month compliance time should be reduced. ALPA states that, given the serious consequences of unintended roll oscillations near the ground, a shorter compliance time should be imposed. Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of US Airways and United Airlines, requests that we lengthen the compliance time from 24 months to the later of 36 months or the next heavy maintenance check. ATA states that the NPRM would impose more work and elapsed hours than stated in the preamble of the NPRM and would require operational tests after certain modifications, and that the accomplishment would be constrained by long production lead times for vortex generators. Further, ATA states that the manufacturer’s service instructions recommend compliance within 36 months. US Airways comments that a longer compliance time is appropriate because of the long lead time for getting the vortex generator installation kits (40 weeks, as stated in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0058, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2002). We disagree. In developing the compliance time for this AD action, we considered not only the safety implications of the identified unsafe condition, but also the average utilization rate of the affected fleet, the practical aspects of an orderly modification of the fleet, the availability of required parts, and the time necessary for the rulemaking process. After the release of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0058, Revision 1 (which was referenced in the NPRM as an appropriate source of service information for accomplishing certain required actions), we came to an agreement with Boeing that a compliance time of 24 months was appropriate. When we notified Boeing of this NPRM, Boeing increased the procurement of the vortex generator installation kits to ensure an adequate supply to support the proposed compliance time. Therefore, we have determined that the compliance time, as proposed, represents the maximum interval of time allowable for the affected airplanes to continue to safely operate before the installations are done. In addition, since maintenance PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 schedules vary among operators, we could not assure that the airplanes would be modified during that maximum interval if we changed the compliance time to incorporate the heavy maintenance visit. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request To Include Part Number (P/N) Change for Vortex Generators America West states that the NPRM does not include a change in P/N after installation of vortex generators in accordance with paragraph (f)(2) of the NPRM. America West points out that this could result in the installation of pre-modification outboard main flaps on post-modification airplanes. America West recommends that Boeing revise Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757– 57A0058, Revision 1, to include a change in P/N; and that the NPRM be revised to prohibit installation of premodification flaps on an airplane after it has been brought into compliance with the AD. We disagree. Determining whether or not an airplane is in compliance with the vortex generator installation can be confirmed easily by visual inspection, on or off the wing. Therefore, we determined that renumbering the flap assembly is an unnecessary burden to the manufacturer and to the operators of the affected airplanes, as the part marking, drawings, and other documentation would have to be revised as well. Boeing agrees that the renumbering is unnecessary. In addition, section 39.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.7) prohibits operation of an aircraft that is not in compliance with an AD. Therefore, it is not necessary to include the specified prohibition in the AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Request To Clarify Differences Paragraph Boeing and UPS both request that we clarify the third paragraph in the section of the NPRM titled ‘‘Differences Between the Proposed AD and the Service Bulletins.’’ That paragraph states: ‘‘Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0147 specify that operators may contact the manufacturer if a justinstalled (new) wheel damper does not function properly, this proposed AD would require operators to correct that condition according to a method approved by the FAA.’’ Boeing also states that clarification is needed because customers have asked if Boeing is about to revise the existing service bulletins referenced in the NPRM to incorporate possible E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM 16NOR1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations alternative modifications. Other customers have asked Boeing if the FAA will be adding another requirement to the AD that is not currently in the NPRM regarding the replacement of a damper assembly. UPS asks that, if possible, we provide additional information on the approved method that we are considering to correct any problems with the newly installed damper. UPS suggests that, if we are considering a requirement to install a new damper and/or flight tests to certify the installation, we include these specifics and have a new comment period after the specific actions have been defined. We agree that the paragraph Boeing quoted needs clarification. However, since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the final rule, we have instead changed the following to provide clarification: • We have changed the ‘‘Interim Action’’ section of the AD to specify that no additional fixes have been identified; however, as investigation into the unsafe condition continues, additional fixes may be deemed necessary in the future. • We have revised paragraph (f)(1) of the AD to specify that, if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does not function properly, operators should correct the condition in accordance with the procedures specified in paragraph (i) of the AD, Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs). An AMOC for this condition could include removing the defective part and returning the airplane to the original configuration, or securing the installation in a method acceptable to us until the affected part can be replaced or repaired within the compliance time of the AD. Request To Revise Parts Installation Paragraph Boeing requests that we change paragraph (g), ‘‘Parts Installation,’’ of the NPRM to allow operators that have not yet performed the new damper installation to replace any part for the existing control wheel position installation during the initial 24-month compliance time. Boeing explains that if an operator needs to replace an existing control wheel position sensor installation before the service bulletin kit can be delivered, they would appear to be out of compliance in just repairing the airplane to the as-delivered condition. Boeing suggests revising paragraph (g) to include these words, ‘‘After the incorporation of the wheel damper assembly to comply with this AD * * *.’’ We agree that operators may continue to install the existing affected parts and assemblies until the airplane is modified to bring it into compliance with this AD. Therefore, we find that the Parts Installation paragraph is not necessary, and we have removed that paragraph and reidentified the following paragraphs accordingly. Request To Include Cost for ‘‘Lost Time’’ United Airlines states that Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 757–27A0146, dated October 14, 2004; and 757– 57A0058, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2002, state that no ‘‘lost time’’ work hours are included in the cost estimates in the NPRM. United Airlines states that, if the tasks specified in the service bulletins are accomplished during nonroutine maintenance, then lost-time hours must be included in the cost estimates, and unscheduled downtime must also be considered in those cost estimates. If lost time is included, United Airlines states that the total work hours would increase to approximately 31 total work hours and 19 elapsed-time hours. In addition, United Airlines states that unscheduled downtime for accomplishing the required tasks is estimated to cost $35,000 per day. United Airlines estimates the additional cost for accomplishing both service bulletins during an unscheduled maintenance visit to be $36,000 per day. Therefore, United Airlines requests that the cost estimates be updated to reflect the work accomplished for both service bulletins. We disagree. The cost information below describes only the direct costs of the specific actions required by the AD. The manufacturer provided us with the 66659 number of work hours necessary to do the required actions based on the best data available. This number represents the time necessary to perform only the actions actually required by the AD. We recognize that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators may incur incidental costs in addition to the direct costs. The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include incidental costs such as the time required to gain access and close up, time necessary for planning, or time necessitated by other administrative actions. Those incidental costs, which may vary significantly among operators, are almost impossible to calculate. We have not changed the AD in this regard. Conclusion We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. We have determined that these changes will neither increase the economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD. Interim Action We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently investigating an additional modification that may further reduce or eliminate the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this modification is developed, approved, and available, we may consider additional rulemaking. Should any additional modification be required as a result of further rulemaking activities, that modification would be in addition to, not a replacement for, the modifications required by this AD. Costs of Compliance There are about 1,036 airplanes of the affected design in the worldwide fleet and about 629 U.S.-registered airplanes. The following table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with this AD. Not all of the required actions must be done on all U.S.-registered airplanes. ESTIMATED COSTS Average labor rate per hour Parts 9 to 11 ... $65 $7,640 to $10,550. $8,225 to $11,265. 15 ........... 65 $10,550 ............ $11,525 ............ rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1 Action Work hours Install control wheel damper assembly, and do functional test (Model 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes). Install control wheel damper assembly, and do functional test (Model 757–300 series airplanes). VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:50 Nov 15, 2006 Jkt 211001 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Cost per airplane E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM Number of U.S.registered airplanes 578 16NOR1 51 Fleet cost $4,754,050 to $6,511,170. $587,775. 66660 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations ESTIMATED COSTS—Continued Action Work hours Install vortex generators (Model 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes). 10 ........... Authority for This Rulemaking Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s authority. We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action. Regulatory Findings We have determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on Average labor rate per hour Number of U.S.registered airplanes Parts $3,336 .............. 65 Cost per airplane $3,986 .............. the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD: (1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory action’’ under Executive Order 12866; (2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act. We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation. 527 Fleet cost $2,100,622. the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows: PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES 1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows: I Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. § 39.13 [Amended] 2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD): I 2006–23–15 Boeing: Amendment 39–14827. Docket No. FAA–2006–23734; Directorate Identifier 2005–NM–174–AD. Effective Date (a) This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006. Affected ADs (b) None. List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety. Applicability (c) This AD applies to Model 757–200, –200PF, –200CB, and –300 series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in the applicable service bulletin or bulletins in Table 1 of this AD. Adoption of the Amendment Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, I TABLE 1.—BOEING SERVICE BULLETINS Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Revision Date Model 757–27A0146 .................................... 757–27A0147 .................................... 757–57A0058 .................................... Original ........ Original ........ 1 .................. October 14, 2004 .............................. October 14, 2004 .............................. January 10, 2002 .............................. 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes. 757–300 series airplanes. 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes. Unsafe Condition (d) This AD results from several reports that flightcrews experienced unintended roll oscillations during final approach, just before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintended roll oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss of directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers. rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1 Compliance (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the actions have already been done. VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:50 Nov 15, 2006 Jkt 211001 Installations (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, do the actions in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable. (1) For all airplanes: Install a control wheel damper assembly at the first officer’s drum bracket assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section 41; and do all applicable functional and operational tests and adjustments of the new installation, and all applicable related investigative/corrective actions before further flight after the installation. Do all actions in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0146, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes); or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0147, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757–300 series airplanes). Where PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0146 specifies to contact Boeing if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does not function properly, correct that condition in accordance with the procedures in paragraph (i) of this AD. (2) For Model 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes: Install vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the outboard main flap in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0058, Revision 1, dated January 10, 2002. Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Revision of Service Bulletin (g) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757–57–0058, dated March 9, 2000, are acceptable for E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM 16NOR1 Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations compliance with the actions in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD. No Reporting Required (h) Although the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0147, both dated October 14, 2004, describe procedures for submitting a sheet recording accomplishment of the service bulletin, this AD does not require that action. Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs) (i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards Certificate Holding District Office. Material Incorporated by Reference (j) You must use the service information in Table 2 of this AD to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of these documents in 66661 accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–2207, for a copy of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Room PL–401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the Internet at https:// dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741–6030, or go to https://www.archives.gov/ federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ ibr_locations.html. TABLE 2.—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Revision level 757–27A0146 .......................................................................................................................... 757–27A0147 .......................................................................................................................... 757–57A0058 .......................................................................................................................... Original ............................. Original ............................. 1 ....................................... Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 31, 2006. Kalene C. Yanamura, Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. [FR Doc. E6–19164 Filed 11–15–06; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 4910–13–P DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA–2006–25260; Directorate Identifier 2006–CE–37–AD; Amendment 39– 14826; AD 2006–23–14] RIN 2120–AA64 Airworthiness Directives; Air Tractor, Inc. Models AT–502, AT–502A, AT– 502B, AT–602, AT–802, and AT–802A Airplanes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT. ACTION: Final rule. rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1 AGENCY: SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models AT–502, AT–502A, AT–502B, AT–602, AT–802, and AT–802A airplanes. This AD requires you to repetitively visually inspect the rudder and vertical fin hinge attaching structure (vertical fin skins, spars, hinges, and brackets) for loose fasteners, cracks, and/or corrosion. This AD also requires you to replace any damaged parts found as a result of the inspection and install an external doubler at the upper rudder hinge. This AD results from two reports of in-flight rudder separation from the vertical fin VerDate Aug<31>2005 15:50 Nov 15, 2006 Jkt 211001 at the upper attach hinge area, and other reports of airplanes with loose hinges, skin cracks, or signs of repairs to the affected area. We are issuing this AD to detect and correct loose fasteners; any cracks in the rudder or vertical fin skins, spars, hinges or brackets; and/or corrosion of the rudder and vertical fin hinge attaching structure. Hinge failure adversely affects ability to control yaw and has led to the rudder folding over in flight. This condition could allow the rudder to contact the elevator and affect ability to control pitch with consequent loss of control. This AD becomes effective on December 21, 2006. As of December 21, 2006, the Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of certain publications listed in the regulation. DATES: To get the service information identified in this AD, contact Air Tractor, Inc., P.O. Box 485, Olney, Texas 76374; telephone: (940) 564–5616; fax: (940) 564–5612. To view the AD docket, go to the Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590 or on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov. The docket number is FAA–2006– 25260; Directorate Identifier 2006–CE– 37–AD. ADDRESSES: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Andrew McAnaul, Aerospace Engineer, ASW–150 (c/o MIDO–43), 10100 Reunion Place, Suite 650, San Antonio, Texas 78216; telephone: (210) 308– 3365; fax: (210) 308–3370. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 Date October 14, 2004. October 14, 2004. January 10, 2002. Discussion On August 3, 2006, we issued a proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include an AD that would apply to certain Air Tractor Models AT–502, AT–502A, AT–502B, AT–602, AT–802, and AT–802A airplanes. This proposal was published in the Federal Register as a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on August 3, 2006 (71 FR 45451). The NPRM proposed to require you to repetitively visually inspect the rudder and vertical fin hinge attaching structure for loose fasteners, any cracks in the rudder or vertical fin skins, spars, hinges or brackets, or corrosion. The AD would also require you to replace any damaged parts found as a result of the inspection and install an external doubler at the upper rudder hinge. Installation of the external doubler at the upper rudder hinge is terminating action for the repetitive inspection requirements. Comments We provided the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal and FAA’s response to each comment: Comment Issue No. 1: Availability of Manufacturer Service Information for the Proposed AD Jack Buster with the Modification and Replacement Parts Association (MARPA) provides comments on the AD process pertaining to how the FAA addresses publishing manufacturer service information as part of a proposed AD action. Mr. Buster states that the proposed rule attempts to E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM 16NOR1

Agencies

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 221 (Thursday, November 16, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 66657-66661]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-19164]


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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2006-23734; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-174-AD; 
Amendment 39-14827; AD 2006-23-15]
RIN 2120-AA64


Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Final rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for 
certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires installing a 
control wheel damper assembly at the first officer's drum bracket 
assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section 
41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and 
doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For 
certain airplanes, this AD also requires doing an additional adjustment 
test of the re-located control wheel position sensor, and an 
operational test of the flight data recorder and the digital flight 
data acquisition unit. This AD also requires installing vortex 
generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the outboard main flap on 
certain airplanes. This AD results from several reports that 
flightcrews experienced unintended roll oscillations during final 
approach, just before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent 
unintended roll oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss 
of directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage 
and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers.

DATES: This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006.

[[Page 66658]]

    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of December 21, 
2006.

ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management Facility, U.S. 
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, 
Room PL-401, Washington, DC.
    Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, 
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this AD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Neff, Aerospace Engineer, Flight 
Test Branch, ANM-160S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-
6521; fax (425) 917-6590.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Examining the Docket

    You may examine the airworthiness directive (AD) docket on the 
Internet at https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management 
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office 
(telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif 
Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section.

Discussion

    The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 
CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to certain Boeing Model 
757 airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on 
January 31, 2006 (71 FR 5021). That NPRM proposed to require installing 
a control wheel damper assembly at the first officer's drum bracket 
assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section 
41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and 
doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For 
certain airplanes, that NPRM also proposed to require doing an 
additional adjustment test of the re-located control wheel position 
sensor, and an operational test of the flight data recorder and the 
digital flight data acquisition unit. That NPRM also proposed to 
require installing vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of 
the outboard main flap on certain airplanes.

Comments

    We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the 
development of this AD. We have considered the comments received.

Support for the NPRM

    American Airlines supports the NPRM.

Requests To Change Compliance Time

    Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) supports the intent of the NPRM, 
but feels that the 24-month compliance time should be reduced. ALPA 
states that, given the serious consequences of unintended roll 
oscillations near the ground, a shorter compliance time should be 
imposed.
    Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of US Airways and United 
Airlines, requests that we lengthen the compliance time from 24 months 
to the later of 36 months or the next heavy maintenance check. ATA 
states that the NPRM would impose more work and elapsed hours than 
stated in the preamble of the NPRM and would require operational tests 
after certain modifications, and that the accomplishment would be 
constrained by long production lead times for vortex generators. 
Further, ATA states that the manufacturer's service instructions 
recommend compliance within 36 months. US Airways comments that a 
longer compliance time is appropriate because of the long lead time for 
getting the vortex generator installation kits (40 weeks, as stated in 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision 1, dated January 
10, 2002).
    We disagree. In developing the compliance time for this AD action, 
we considered not only the safety implications of the identified unsafe 
condition, but also the average utilization rate of the affected fleet, 
the practical aspects of an orderly modification of the fleet, the 
availability of required parts, and the time necessary for the 
rulemaking process. After the release of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
757-57A0058, Revision 1 (which was referenced in the NPRM as an 
appropriate source of service information for accomplishing certain 
required actions), we came to an agreement with Boeing that a 
compliance time of 24 months was appropriate. When we notified Boeing 
of this NPRM, Boeing increased the procurement of the vortex generator 
installation kits to ensure an adequate supply to support the proposed 
compliance time. Therefore, we have determined that the compliance 
time, as proposed, represents the maximum interval of time allowable 
for the affected airplanes to continue to safely operate before the 
installations are done. In addition, since maintenance schedules vary 
among operators, we could not assure that the airplanes would be 
modified during that maximum interval if we changed the compliance time 
to incorporate the heavy maintenance visit. We have not changed the AD 
in this regard.

Request To Include Part Number (P/N) Change for Vortex Generators

    America West states that the NPRM does not include a change in P/N 
after installation of vortex generators in accordance with paragraph 
(f)(2) of the NPRM. America West points out that this could result in 
the installation of pre-modification outboard main flaps on post-
modification airplanes. America West recommends that Boeing revise 
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision 1, to include a 
change in P/N; and that the NPRM be revised to prohibit installation of 
pre-modification flaps on an airplane after it has been brought into 
compliance with the AD.
    We disagree. Determining whether or not an airplane is in 
compliance with the vortex generator installation can be confirmed 
easily by visual inspection, on or off the wing. Therefore, we 
determined that renumbering the flap assembly is an unnecessary burden 
to the manufacturer and to the operators of the affected airplanes, as 
the part marking, drawings, and other documentation would have to be 
revised as well. Boeing agrees that the renumbering is unnecessary. In 
addition, section 39.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
39.7) prohibits operation of an aircraft that is not in compliance with 
an AD. Therefore, it is not necessary to include the specified 
prohibition in the AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard.

Request To Clarify Differences Paragraph

    Boeing and UPS both request that we clarify the third paragraph in 
the section of the NPRM titled ``Differences Between the Proposed AD 
and the Service Bulletins.'' That paragraph states:

    ``Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0146 and Boeing 
Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0147 specify that operators may 
contact the manufacturer if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does 
not function properly, this proposed AD would require operators to 
correct that condition according to a method approved by the FAA.''

    Boeing also states that clarification is needed because customers 
have asked if Boeing is about to revise the existing service bulletins 
referenced in the NPRM to incorporate possible

[[Page 66659]]

alternative modifications. Other customers have asked Boeing if the FAA 
will be adding another requirement to the AD that is not currently in 
the NPRM regarding the replacement of a damper assembly.
    UPS asks that, if possible, we provide additional information on 
the approved method that we are considering to correct any problems 
with the newly installed damper. UPS suggests that, if we are 
considering a requirement to install a new damper and/or flight tests 
to certify the installation, we include these specifics and have a new 
comment period after the specific actions have been defined.
    We agree that the paragraph Boeing quoted needs clarification. 
However, since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the 
final rule, we have instead changed the following to provide 
clarification:
     We have changed the ``Interim Action'' section of the AD 
to specify that no additional fixes have been identified; however, as 
investigation into the unsafe condition continues, additional fixes may 
be deemed necessary in the future.
     We have revised paragraph (f)(1) of the AD to specify 
that, if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does not function 
properly, operators should correct the condition in accordance with the 
procedures specified in paragraph (i) of the AD, Alternative Methods of 
Compliance (AMOCs). An AMOC for this condition could include removing 
the defective part and returning the airplane to the original 
configuration, or securing the installation in a method acceptable to 
us until the affected part can be replaced or repaired within the 
compliance time of the AD.

Request To Revise Parts Installation Paragraph

    Boeing requests that we change paragraph (g), ``Parts 
Installation,'' of the NPRM to allow operators that have not yet 
performed the new damper installation to replace any part for the 
existing control wheel position installation during the initial 24-
month compliance time. Boeing explains that if an operator needs to 
replace an existing control wheel position sensor installation before 
the service bulletin kit can be delivered, they would appear to be out 
of compliance in just repairing the airplane to the as-delivered 
condition. Boeing suggests revising paragraph (g) to include these 
words, ``After the incorporation of the wheel damper assembly to comply 
with this AD * * *.''
    We agree that operators may continue to install the existing 
affected parts and assemblies until the airplane is modified to bring 
it into compliance with this AD. Therefore, we find that the Parts 
Installation paragraph is not necessary, and we have removed that 
paragraph and reidentified the following paragraphs accordingly.

Request To Include Cost for ``Lost Time''

    United Airlines states that Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 757-
27A0146, dated October 14, 2004; and 757-57A0058, Revision 1, dated 
January 10, 2002, state that no ``lost time'' work hours are included 
in the cost estimates in the NPRM. United Airlines states that, if the 
tasks specified in the service bulletins are accomplished during non-
routine maintenance, then lost-time hours must be included in the cost 
estimates, and unscheduled downtime must also be considered in those 
cost estimates. If lost time is included, United Airlines states that 
the total work hours would increase to approximately 31 total work 
hours and 19 elapsed-time hours. In addition, United Airlines states 
that unscheduled downtime for accomplishing the required tasks is 
estimated to cost $35,000 per day. United Airlines estimates the 
additional cost for accomplishing both service bulletins during an 
unscheduled maintenance visit to be $36,000 per day. Therefore, United 
Airlines requests that the cost estimates be updated to reflect the 
work accomplished for both service bulletins.
    We disagree. The cost information below describes only the direct 
costs of the specific actions required by the AD. The manufacturer 
provided us with the number of work hours necessary to do the required 
actions based on the best data available. This number represents the 
time necessary to perform only the actions actually required by the AD. 
We recognize that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators 
may incur incidental costs in addition to the direct costs. The cost 
analysis in AD rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include 
incidental costs such as the time required to gain access and close up, 
time necessary for planning, or time necessitated by other 
administrative actions. Those incidental costs, which may vary 
significantly among operators, are almost impossible to calculate. We 
have not changed the AD in this regard.

Conclusion

    We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the 
comments received, and determined that air safety and the public 
interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously. 
We have determined that these changes will neither increase the 
economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.

Interim Action

    We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently 
investigating an additional modification that may further reduce or 
eliminate the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this 
modification is developed, approved, and available, we may consider 
additional rulemaking. Should any additional modification be required 
as a result of further rulemaking activities, that modification would 
be in addition to, not a replacement for, the modifications required by 
this AD.

Costs of Compliance

    There are about 1,036 airplanes of the affected design in the 
worldwide fleet and about 629 U.S.-registered airplanes. The following 
table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with 
this AD. Not all of the required actions must be done on all U.S.-
registered airplanes.

                                                                     Estimated Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                           Average                                                    Number  of
                                                            labor                                                       U.S.-
               Action                     Work hours       rate per           Parts            Cost per  airplane     registered        Fleet cost
                                                             hour                                                     airplanes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install control wheel damper         9 to 11............        $65  $7,640 to $10,550.....  $8,225 to $11,265.....          578  $4,754,050 to
 assembly, and do functional test                                                                                                  $6,511,170.
 (Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB
 series airplanes).
Install control wheel damper         15.................         65  $10,550...............  $11,525...............           51  $587,775.
 assembly, and do functional test
 (Model 757-300 series airplanes).

[[Page 66660]]

 
Install vortex generators (Model     10.................         65  $3,336................  $3,986................          527  $2,100,622.
 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series
 airplanes).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    We have determined that this AD will not have federalism 
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a 
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between 
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power 
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866;
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
    (3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
    We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to 
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES 
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, 
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.


Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec.  39.13 by 
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):

2006-23-15 Boeing: Amendment 39-14827. Docket No. FAA-2006-23734; 
Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-174-AD.

Effective Date

    (a) This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006.

Affected ADs

    (b) None.

Applicability

    (c) This AD applies to Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300 
series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in the 
applicable service bulletin or bulletins in Table 1 of this AD.

                                                           Table 1.--Boeing Service Bulletins
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Boeing Alert Service Bulletin             Revision                  Date                                          Model
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-27A0146........................  Original...............  October 14, 2004......  757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes.
757-27A0147........................  Original...............  October 14, 2004......  757-300 series airplanes.
757-57A0058........................  1......................  January 10, 2002......  757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Unsafe Condition

    (d) This AD results from several reports that flightcrews 
experienced unintended roll oscillations during final approach, just 
before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintended roll 
oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss of 
directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage 
and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers.

Compliance

    (e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this 
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the 
actions have already been done.

Installations

    (f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, do the 
actions in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable.
    (1) For all airplanes: Install a control wheel damper assembly 
at the first officer's drum bracket assembly and aileron quadrant 
beneath the flight deck floor in section 41; and do all applicable 
functional and operational tests and adjustments of the new 
installation, and all applicable related investigative/corrective 
actions before further flight after the installation. Do all actions 
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 
Service Bulletin 757-27A0146, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757-
200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes); or Boeing Alert Service 
Bulletin 757-27A0147, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757-300 
series airplanes). Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0146 
specifies to contact Boeing if a just-installed (new) wheel damper 
does not function properly, correct that condition in accordance 
with the procedures in paragraph (i) of this AD.
    (2) For Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes: 
Install vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the 
outboard main flap in accordance with the Accomplishment 
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision 
1, dated January 10, 2002.

Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Revision of Service 
Bulletin

    (g) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in 
accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-57-
0058, dated March 9, 2000, are acceptable for

[[Page 66661]]

compliance with the actions in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.

No Reporting Required

    (h) Although the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert 
Service Bulletin 757-27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-
27A0147, both dated October 14, 2004, describe procedures for 
submitting a sheet recording accomplishment of the service bulletin, 
this AD does not require that action.

Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in 
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
    (2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.  
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the 
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards 
Certificate Holding District Office.

Material Incorporated by Reference

    (j) You must use the service information in Table 2 of this AD 
to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD 
specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved 
the incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with 
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial 
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for a copy 
of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket 
Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh 
Street, SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the 
Internet at https://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and 
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability 
of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to https://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_
federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.

                                  Table 2.--Material Incorporated by Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
       Boeing Alert Service Bulletin                   Revision level                          Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-27A0146................................  Original..........................  October 14, 2004.
757-27A0147................................  Original..........................  October 14, 2004.
757-57A0058................................  1.................................  January 10, 2002.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 31, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
 [FR Doc. E6-19164 Filed 11-15-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P