Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes, 66657-66661 [E6-19164]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
in a subcritical configuration providing
reasonable assurance that excessive fuel
cladding temperatures and subsequent fuel
damage would not occur.
The third scenario involves those dry
storage casks that would remain filled with
borated water. The possibility exists for a
licensee to cause a boron dilution event in
the dry storage cask when spraying the fuel
stored in the SFP racks. The location of the
dry storage cask might be close enough to the
SFP storage racks that it could inadvertently
be sprayed at the same time as the SFP racks,
overfilling the dry storage cask, and
eventually diluting the boron. Under these
conditions, the boron concentration would
slowly decrease and this scenario becomes
very similar to a slow boron dilution event
as discussed previously. The criticality
monitors required for dry cask loading would
still be available and would provide
indication of an accidental criticality. With
indication of an accidental criticality, it is
reasonable to assume that the licensee would
take action to stop the boron dilution from
continuing and restore the dry storage cask
to a subcritical configuration.
Actions the licensee could take to return
the dry storage cask to a subcritical
configuration could include:
1. Stop spraying unborated water into the
dry storage cask and allow the water in the
cask to heat up with a subsequent reduction
in the moderation provided by the water that
would eventually re-establish a subcritical
configuration at a higher water temperature.
In this condition, the temperature of the
water may be high enough that the water
would eventually boil off (be higher than 212
degrees F at atmospheric conditions). If this
were to occur, the cask would eventually
become dry and the fuel would be in a
subcritical configuration and cooled
consistent with the design of the cask. As the
water boiled off, it would continue to provide
cooling to the fuel such that the fuel would
not experience significantly elevated
temperatures and there would be no fuel
damage; or
2. Spray water into the cask from a borated
water source to increase the boron
concentration, re-establishing a subcritical
configuration and keeping the fuel cooled.
In each case, the fuel would not be subject
to excessive temperatures and therefore,
there would be no fuel damage that could
impact public health and safety.
Under this third scenario there is also the
possibility that the licensee might
intentionally spray water into the dry storage
cask in an attempt to keep the fuel in the cask
cool. Given that the cask will already be
filled with water and the importance of
cooling the fuel in the SFP storage racks
(where there is no water following a rapid
drain down event), the NRC considers the
possibility of the intentional diversion of
cooling water from the fuel stored in the SFP
racks to the fuel stored in the dry storage cask
to be very remote. Therefore, the NRC does
not consider this as a factor that would have
an adverse affect on its determination with
regard to the acceptability of the proposed
change to 10 CFR 50.68. However, even if the
licensee intentionally diverted water from
cooling the fuel in the SFP racks to the fuel
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15:50 Nov 15, 2006
Jkt 211001
in the dry storage cask, there would be a slow
boron dilution event, a slow approach to
criticality, and indication of an accidental
criticality from the required criticality
monitors. As such, this case would be very
similar to the unintentional dilution case
described above.
In the fourth scenario, the NRC assumed
that the licensee was able to repair the
damage to the SFP and reflood the pool. In
this scenario as the licensee reflooded the
SFP the dry storage cask would either reflood
as the SFP was filled (for those casks with
drain ports at the bottom); if the cask had
dried out it would reflood once the water
level in the SFP reached the top of the cask
and water began spilling into the cask; or if
the cask remained flooded following the
rapid drain down event, there would be a
slow dilution of the boron in the water in the
cask as the SFP level continued to rise. In
each of these cases, as the cask was filled
with water or as the boron dilution of the
water in the cask occurred, the possibility
increases that an accidental criticality might
occur. However, because of the relatively
slow reactivity addition that would occur
during each of these cases, the approach to
criticality would be reasonably slow. As
noted previously, the licensee is required to
have criticality monitors in place during dry
storage cask loading (or unloading) activities.
These criticality monitors would provide
indication that an accidental criticality had
occurred. Once identified, it is reasonable
that the licensee would take action to reestablish a subcritical configuration.
However, as discussed above for the third
scenario, even if there were an accidental
criticality, the likelihood of fuel damage is
very remote.
The possibility of an accidental criticality
in the fourth scenario is even less likely
given the following factors:
1. Dry storage casks are typically loaded
with fuel that has significant burnup that
reduces the reactivity of the assembly. As
such, it is reasonable to conclude that even
in an unborated condition, the fuel stored in
the cask would remain subcritical.
2. As the licensee refilled the SFP, it is
reasonable to assume that it would be
injecting borated water to re-establish the
boron concentration level required by plant
technical specifications as soon as practical.
Based on the above, even if there were an
event that caused a rapid drain down of a
SFP while a dry storage cask was in the SFP,
the likelihood of a boron dilution event
causing fuel damage is very remote.
Therefore, the NRC concludes there is no
safety benefit from requiring the licensee to
conduct a site specific analysis in support of
dry storage cask loading, fuel storage, or
unloading activities.
V. Conclusion
As discussed above the NRC assessed the
safety benefit of requiring licensees to
conduct an additional criticality analysis to
meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.68 while
loading a transportation package or dry
storage cask in the SFP. The NRC determined
that the controls required by 10 CFR Part 71
or 72 for the associated package or cask
provide reasonable assurance that a slow
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66657
boron dilution event would not result in
elevated fuel temperature and subsequent
fuel damage. Therefore, for a slow boron
dilution event, there is no benefit to the
additional criticality analysis. The NRC
further determined that the probability of
having a rapid drain down event result in
elevated fuel temperatures and subsequent
fuel damage was highly unlikely. Based on
its analysis, the NRC concludes there is no
safety benefit from requiring a licensee to
conduct a site specific analysis in support of
storage cask loading, fuel storage, or
unloading activities and that the proposed
rule change is therefore acceptable.
[FR Doc. E6–19372 Filed 11–15–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–23734; Directorate
Identifier 2005–NM–174–AD; Amendment
39–14827; AD 2006–23–15]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing
Model 757 Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD
requires installing a control wheel
damper assembly at the first officer’s
drum bracket assembly and aileron
quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in
section 41; doing a functional test and
adjustment of the new installation; and
doing related investigative/corrective
actions if necessary. For certain
airplanes, this AD also requires doing an
additional adjustment test of the relocated control wheel position sensor,
and an operational test of the flight data
recorder and the digital flight data
acquisition unit. This AD also requires
installing vortex generators (vortilons)
on the leading edge of the outboard
main flap on certain airplanes. This AD
results from several reports that
flightcrews experienced unintended roll
oscillations during final approach, just
before landing. We are issuing this AD
to prevent unintended roll oscillations
near touchdown, which could result in
loss of directional control of the
airplane, and consequent airplane
damage and/or injury to flightcrew and
passengers.
DATES: This AD becomes effective
December 21, 2006.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
The Director of the Federal Register
approved the incorporation by reference
of certain publications listed in the AD
as of December 21, 2006.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD
docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket
Management Facility, U.S. Department
of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street,
SW., Nassif Building, Room PL–401,
Washington, DC.
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207, for service
information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John
Neff, Aerospace Engineer, Flight Test
Branch, ANM–160S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6521;
fax (425) 917–6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Examining the Docket
You may examine the airworthiness
directive (AD) docket on the Internet at
https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the
Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
The Docket Management Facility office
(telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building at
the street address stated in the
ADDRESSES section.
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Discussion
The FAA issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to include an AD that would
apply to certain Boeing Model 757
airplanes. That NPRM was published in
the Federal Register on January 31,
2006 (71 FR 5021). That NPRM
proposed to require installing a control
wheel damper assembly at the first
officer’s drum bracket assembly and
aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck
floor in section 41; doing a functional
test and adjustment of the new
installation; and doing related
investigative/corrective actions if
necessary. For certain airplanes, that
NPRM also proposed to require doing an
additional adjustment test of the relocated control wheel position sensor,
and an operational test of the flight data
recorder and the digital flight data
acquisition unit. That NPRM also
proposed to require installing vortex
generators (vortilons) on the leading
edge of the outboard main flap on
certain airplanes.
Comments
We provided the public the
opportunity to participate in the
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development of this AD. We have
considered the comments received.
Support for the NPRM
American Airlines supports the
NPRM.
Requests To Change Compliance Time
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)
supports the intent of the NPRM, but
feels that the 24-month compliance time
should be reduced. ALPA states that,
given the serious consequences of
unintended roll oscillations near the
ground, a shorter compliance time
should be imposed.
Air Transport Association (ATA), on
behalf of US Airways and United
Airlines, requests that we lengthen the
compliance time from 24 months to the
later of 36 months or the next heavy
maintenance check. ATA states that the
NPRM would impose more work and
elapsed hours than stated in the
preamble of the NPRM and would
require operational tests after certain
modifications, and that the
accomplishment would be constrained
by long production lead times for vortex
generators. Further, ATA states that the
manufacturer’s service instructions
recommend compliance within 36
months. US Airways comments that a
longer compliance time is appropriate
because of the long lead time for getting
the vortex generator installation kits (40
weeks, as stated in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 757–57A0058, Revision 1,
dated January 10, 2002).
We disagree. In developing the
compliance time for this AD action, we
considered not only the safety
implications of the identified unsafe
condition, but also the average
utilization rate of the affected fleet, the
practical aspects of an orderly
modification of the fleet, the availability
of required parts, and the time necessary
for the rulemaking process. After the
release of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757–57A0058, Revision 1 (which was
referenced in the NPRM as an
appropriate source of service
information for accomplishing certain
required actions), we came to an
agreement with Boeing that a
compliance time of 24 months was
appropriate. When we notified Boeing
of this NPRM, Boeing increased the
procurement of the vortex generator
installation kits to ensure an adequate
supply to support the proposed
compliance time. Therefore, we have
determined that the compliance time, as
proposed, represents the maximum
interval of time allowable for the
affected airplanes to continue to safely
operate before the installations are done.
In addition, since maintenance
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schedules vary among operators, we
could not assure that the airplanes
would be modified during that
maximum interval if we changed the
compliance time to incorporate the
heavy maintenance visit. We have not
changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Include Part Number (P/N)
Change for Vortex Generators
America West states that the NPRM
does not include a change in P/N after
installation of vortex generators in
accordance with paragraph (f)(2) of the
NPRM. America West points out that
this could result in the installation of
pre-modification outboard main flaps on
post-modification airplanes. America
West recommends that Boeing revise
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–
57A0058, Revision 1, to include a
change in P/N; and that the NPRM be
revised to prohibit installation of premodification flaps on an airplane after
it has been brought into compliance
with the AD.
We disagree. Determining whether or
not an airplane is in compliance with
the vortex generator installation can be
confirmed easily by visual inspection,
on or off the wing. Therefore, we
determined that renumbering the flap
assembly is an unnecessary burden to
the manufacturer and to the operators of
the affected airplanes, as the part
marking, drawings, and other
documentation would have to be
revised as well. Boeing agrees that the
renumbering is unnecessary. In
addition, section 39.7 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 39.7)
prohibits operation of an aircraft that is
not in compliance with an AD.
Therefore, it is not necessary to include
the specified prohibition in the AD. We
have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Differences
Paragraph
Boeing and UPS both request that we
clarify the third paragraph in the section
of the NPRM titled ‘‘Differences
Between the Proposed AD and the
Service Bulletins.’’ That paragraph
states:
‘‘Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757–27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 757–27A0147 specify that operators
may contact the manufacturer if a justinstalled (new) wheel damper does not
function properly, this proposed AD would
require operators to correct that condition
according to a method approved by the
FAA.’’
Boeing also states that clarification is
needed because customers have asked if
Boeing is about to revise the existing
service bulletins referenced in the
NPRM to incorporate possible
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
alternative modifications. Other
customers have asked Boeing if the FAA
will be adding another requirement to
the AD that is not currently in the
NPRM regarding the replacement of a
damper assembly.
UPS asks that, if possible, we provide
additional information on the approved
method that we are considering to
correct any problems with the newly
installed damper. UPS suggests that, if
we are considering a requirement to
install a new damper and/or flight tests
to certify the installation, we include
these specifics and have a new comment
period after the specific actions have
been defined.
We agree that the paragraph Boeing
quoted needs clarification. However,
since that section of the preamble does
not reappear in the final rule, we have
instead changed the following to
provide clarification:
• We have changed the ‘‘Interim
Action’’ section of the AD to specify that
no additional fixes have been identified;
however, as investigation into the
unsafe condition continues, additional
fixes may be deemed necessary in the
future.
• We have revised paragraph (f)(1) of
the AD to specify that, if a just-installed
(new) wheel damper does not function
properly, operators should correct the
condition in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i) of
the AD, Alternative Methods of
Compliance (AMOCs). An AMOC for
this condition could include removing
the defective part and returning the
airplane to the original configuration, or
securing the installation in a method
acceptable to us until the affected part
can be replaced or repaired within the
compliance time of the AD.
Request To Revise Parts Installation
Paragraph
Boeing requests that we change
paragraph (g), ‘‘Parts Installation,’’ of the
NPRM to allow operators that have not
yet performed the new damper
installation to replace any part for the
existing control wheel position
installation during the initial 24-month
compliance time. Boeing explains that if
an operator needs to replace an existing
control wheel position sensor
installation before the service bulletin
kit can be delivered, they would appear
to be out of compliance in just repairing
the airplane to the as-delivered
condition. Boeing suggests revising
paragraph (g) to include these words,
‘‘After the incorporation of the wheel
damper assembly to comply with this
AD * * *.’’
We agree that operators may continue
to install the existing affected parts and
assemblies until the airplane is
modified to bring it into compliance
with this AD. Therefore, we find that
the Parts Installation paragraph is not
necessary, and we have removed that
paragraph and reidentified the following
paragraphs accordingly.
Request To Include Cost for ‘‘Lost
Time’’
United Airlines states that Boeing
Alert Service Bulletins 757–27A0146,
dated October 14, 2004; and 757–
57A0058, Revision 1, dated January 10,
2002, state that no ‘‘lost time’’ work
hours are included in the cost estimates
in the NPRM. United Airlines states
that, if the tasks specified in the service
bulletins are accomplished during nonroutine maintenance, then lost-time
hours must be included in the cost
estimates, and unscheduled downtime
must also be considered in those cost
estimates. If lost time is included,
United Airlines states that the total
work hours would increase to
approximately 31 total work hours and
19 elapsed-time hours. In addition,
United Airlines states that unscheduled
downtime for accomplishing the
required tasks is estimated to cost
$35,000 per day. United Airlines
estimates the additional cost for
accomplishing both service bulletins
during an unscheduled maintenance
visit to be $36,000 per day. Therefore,
United Airlines requests that the cost
estimates be updated to reflect the work
accomplished for both service bulletins.
We disagree. The cost information
below describes only the direct costs of
the specific actions required by the AD.
The manufacturer provided us with the
66659
number of work hours necessary to do
the required actions based on the best
data available. This number represents
the time necessary to perform only the
actions actually required by the AD. We
recognize that, in doing the actions
required by an AD, operators may incur
incidental costs in addition to the direct
costs. The cost analysis in AD
rulemaking actions, however, typically
does not include incidental costs such
as the time required to gain access and
close up, time necessary for planning, or
time necessitated by other
administrative actions. Those incidental
costs, which may vary significantly
among operators, are almost impossible
to calculate. We have not changed the
AD in this regard.
Conclusion
We have carefully reviewed the
available data, including the comments
received, and determined that air safety
and the public interest require adopting
the AD with the changes described
previously. We have determined that
these changes will neither increase the
economic burden on any operator nor
increase the scope of the AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action.
The manufacturer is currently
investigating an additional modification
that may further reduce or eliminate the
unsafe condition identified in this AD.
Once this modification is developed,
approved, and available, we may
consider additional rulemaking. Should
any additional modification be required
as a result of further rulemaking
activities, that modification would be in
addition to, not a replacement for, the
modifications required by this AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 1,036 airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet
and about 629 U.S.-registered airplanes.
The following table provides the
estimated costs for U.S. operators to
comply with this AD. Not all of the
required actions must be done on all
U.S.-registered airplanes.
ESTIMATED COSTS
Average
labor rate
per hour
Parts
9 to 11 ...
$65
$7,640 to
$10,550.
$8,225 to
$11,265.
15 ...........
65
$10,550 ............
$11,525 ............
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Action
Work
hours
Install control wheel damper assembly, and do
functional test (Model 757–200, –200PF, and
–200CB series airplanes).
Install control wheel damper assembly, and do
functional test (Model 757–300 series airplanes).
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Cost per
airplane
E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM
Number
of U.S.registered
airplanes
578
16NOR1
51
Fleet cost
$4,754,050 to
$6,511,170.
$587,775.
66660
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 221 / Thursday, November 16, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
ESTIMATED COSTS—Continued
Action
Work
hours
Install vortex generators (Model 757–200,
–200PF, and –200CB series airplanes).
10 ...........
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in subtitle VII,
part A, subpart III, section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will
not have federalism implications under
Executive Order 13132. This AD will
not have a substantial direct effect on
Average
labor rate
per hour
Number
of U.S.registered
airplanes
Parts
$3,336 ..............
65
Cost per
airplane
$3,986 ..............
the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States,
or on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this AD and placed it in the AD docket.
See the ADDRESSES section for a location
to examine the regulatory evaluation.
527
Fleet cost
$2,100,622.
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as
follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
I
2006–23–15 Boeing: Amendment 39–14827.
Docket No. FAA–2006–23734;
Directorate Identifier 2005–NM–174–AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective December
21, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Incorporation by reference,
Safety.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Model 757–200,
–200PF, –200CB, and –300 series airplanes,
certificated in any category; as identified in
the applicable service bulletin or bulletins in
Table 1 of this AD.
Adoption of the Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
I
TABLE 1.—BOEING SERVICE BULLETINS
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
Revision
Date
Model
757–27A0146 ....................................
757–27A0147 ....................................
757–57A0058 ....................................
Original ........
Original ........
1 ..................
October 14, 2004 ..............................
October 14, 2004 ..............................
January 10, 2002 ..............................
757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes.
757–300 series airplanes.
757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series airplanes.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from several reports
that flightcrews experienced unintended roll
oscillations during final approach, just before
landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent
unintended roll oscillations near touchdown,
which could result in loss of directional
control of the airplane, and consequent
airplane damage and/or injury to flightcrew
and passengers.
rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
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Installations
(f) Within 24 months after the effective
date of this AD, do the actions in paragraphs
(f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable.
(1) For all airplanes: Install a control wheel
damper assembly at the first officer’s drum
bracket assembly and aileron quadrant
beneath the flight deck floor in section 41;
and do all applicable functional and
operational tests and adjustments of the new
installation, and all applicable related
investigative/corrective actions before further
flight after the installation. Do all actions in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757–27A0146, dated October 14, 2004 (for
Model 757–200, –200PF, and –200CB series
airplanes); or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757–27A0147, dated October 14, 2004 (for
Model 757–300 series airplanes). Where
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Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757–27A0146
specifies to contact Boeing if a just-installed
(new) wheel damper does not function
properly, correct that condition in
accordance with the procedures in paragraph
(i) of this AD.
(2) For Model 757–200, –200PF, and
–200CB series airplanes: Install vortex
generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of
the outboard main flap in accordance with
the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 757–57A0058,
Revision 1, dated January 10, 2002.
Actions Accomplished in Accordance With
Previous Revision of Service Bulletin
(g) Actions done before the effective date
of this AD in accordance with Boeing Special
Attention Service Bulletin 757–57–0058,
dated March 9, 2000, are acceptable for
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compliance with the actions in paragraph
(f)(2) of this AD.
No Reporting Required
(h) Although the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757–27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 757–27A0147, both dated October
14, 2004, describe procedures for submitting
a sheet recording accomplishment of the
service bulletin, this AD does not require that
action.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office (ACO), FAA, has the
authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if
requested in accordance with the procedures
found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(j) You must use the service information in
Table 2 of this AD to perform the actions that
are required by this AD, unless the AD
specifies otherwise. The Director of the
Federal Register approved the incorporation
by reference of these documents in
66661
accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207, for a copy of this
service information. You may review copies
at the Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Room PL–401, Nassif Building,
Washington, DC; on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For
information on the availability of this
material at the NARA, call (202) 741–6030,
or go to https://www.archives.gov/
federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/
ibr_locations.html.
TABLE 2.—MATERIAL INCORPORATED BY REFERENCE
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
Revision level
757–27A0146 ..........................................................................................................................
757–27A0147 ..........................................................................................................................
757–57A0058 ..........................................................................................................................
Original .............................
Original .............................
1 .......................................
Issued in Renton, Washington, on October
31, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–19164 Filed 11–15–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–25260; Directorate
Identifier 2006–CE–37–AD; Amendment 39–
14826; AD 2006–23–14]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Air Tractor,
Inc. Models AT–502, AT–502A, AT–
502B, AT–602, AT–802, and AT–802A
Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
rmajette on PROD1PC67 with RULES1
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new
airworthiness directive (AD) for certain
Air Tractor, Inc. (Air Tractor) Models
AT–502, AT–502A, AT–502B, AT–602,
AT–802, and AT–802A airplanes. This
AD requires you to repetitively visually
inspect the rudder and vertical fin hinge
attaching structure (vertical fin skins,
spars, hinges, and brackets) for loose
fasteners, cracks, and/or corrosion. This
AD also requires you to replace any
damaged parts found as a result of the
inspection and install an external
doubler at the upper rudder hinge. This
AD results from two reports of in-flight
rudder separation from the vertical fin
VerDate Aug<31>2005
15:50 Nov 15, 2006
Jkt 211001
at the upper attach hinge area, and other
reports of airplanes with loose hinges,
skin cracks, or signs of repairs to the
affected area. We are issuing this AD to
detect and correct loose fasteners; any
cracks in the rudder or vertical fin skins,
spars, hinges or brackets; and/or
corrosion of the rudder and vertical fin
hinge attaching structure. Hinge failure
adversely affects ability to control yaw
and has led to the rudder folding over
in flight. This condition could allow the
rudder to contact the elevator and affect
ability to control pitch with consequent
loss of control.
This AD becomes effective on
December 21, 2006.
As of December 21, 2006, the Director
of the Federal Register approved the
incorporation by reference of certain
publications listed in the regulation.
DATES:
To get the service
information identified in this AD,
contact Air Tractor, Inc., P.O. Box 485,
Olney, Texas 76374; telephone: (940)
564–5616; fax: (940) 564–5612.
To view the AD docket, go to the
Docket Management Facility; U.S.
Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590 or
on the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov.
The docket number is FAA–2006–
25260; Directorate Identifier 2006–CE–
37–AD.
ADDRESSES:
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Andrew McAnaul, Aerospace Engineer,
ASW–150 (c/o MIDO–43), 10100
Reunion Place, Suite 650, San Antonio,
Texas 78216; telephone: (210) 308–
3365; fax: (210) 308–3370.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Date
October 14, 2004.
October 14, 2004.
January 10, 2002.
Discussion
On August 3, 2006, we issued a
proposal to amend part 39 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to
include an AD that would apply to
certain Air Tractor Models AT–502,
AT–502A, AT–502B, AT–602, AT–802,
and AT–802A airplanes. This proposal
was published in the Federal Register
as a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) on August 3, 2006 (71 FR
45451). The NPRM proposed to require
you to repetitively visually inspect the
rudder and vertical fin hinge attaching
structure for loose fasteners, any cracks
in the rudder or vertical fin skins, spars,
hinges or brackets, or corrosion. The AD
would also require you to replace any
damaged parts found as a result of the
inspection and install an external
doubler at the upper rudder hinge.
Installation of the external doubler at
the upper rudder hinge is terminating
action for the repetitive inspection
requirements.
Comments
We provided the public the
opportunity to participate in developing
this AD. The following presents the
comments received on the proposal and
FAA’s response to each comment:
Comment Issue No. 1: Availability of
Manufacturer Service Information for
the Proposed AD
Jack Buster with the Modification and
Replacement Parts Association
(MARPA) provides comments on the AD
process pertaining to how the FAA
addresses publishing manufacturer
service information as part of a
proposed AD action. Mr. Buster states
that the proposed rule attempts to
E:\FR\FM\16NOR1.SGM
16NOR1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 221 (Thursday, November 16, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 66657-66661]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-19164]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2006-23734; Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-174-AD;
Amendment 39-14827; AD 2006-23-15]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 757 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Final rule.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for
certain Boeing Model 757 airplanes. This AD requires installing a
control wheel damper assembly at the first officer's drum bracket
assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section
41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and
doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For
certain airplanes, this AD also requires doing an additional adjustment
test of the re-located control wheel position sensor, and an
operational test of the flight data recorder and the digital flight
data acquisition unit. This AD also requires installing vortex
generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the outboard main flap on
certain airplanes. This AD results from several reports that
flightcrews experienced unintended roll oscillations during final
approach, just before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent
unintended roll oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss
of directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage
and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers.
DATES: This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006.
[[Page 66658]]
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by
reference of certain publications listed in the AD as of December 21,
2006.
ADDRESSES: You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management Facility, U.S.
Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL-401, Washington, DC.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John Neff, Aerospace Engineer, Flight
Test Branch, ANM-160S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, 1601
Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone (425) 917-
6521; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Examining the Docket
You may examine the airworthiness directive (AD) docket on the
Internet at https://dms.dot.gov or in person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday,
except Federal holidays. The Docket Management Facility office
(telephone (800) 647-5227) is located on the plaza level of the Nassif
Building at the street address stated in the ADDRESSES section.
Discussion
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14
CFR part 39 to include an AD that would apply to certain Boeing Model
757 airplanes. That NPRM was published in the Federal Register on
January 31, 2006 (71 FR 5021). That NPRM proposed to require installing
a control wheel damper assembly at the first officer's drum bracket
assembly and aileron quadrant beneath the flight deck floor in section
41; doing a functional test and adjustment of the new installation; and
doing related investigative/corrective actions if necessary. For
certain airplanes, that NPRM also proposed to require doing an
additional adjustment test of the re-located control wheel position
sensor, and an operational test of the flight data recorder and the
digital flight data acquisition unit. That NPRM also proposed to
require installing vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of
the outboard main flap on certain airplanes.
Comments
We provided the public the opportunity to participate in the
development of this AD. We have considered the comments received.
Support for the NPRM
American Airlines supports the NPRM.
Requests To Change Compliance Time
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) supports the intent of the NPRM,
but feels that the 24-month compliance time should be reduced. ALPA
states that, given the serious consequences of unintended roll
oscillations near the ground, a shorter compliance time should be
imposed.
Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of US Airways and United
Airlines, requests that we lengthen the compliance time from 24 months
to the later of 36 months or the next heavy maintenance check. ATA
states that the NPRM would impose more work and elapsed hours than
stated in the preamble of the NPRM and would require operational tests
after certain modifications, and that the accomplishment would be
constrained by long production lead times for vortex generators.
Further, ATA states that the manufacturer's service instructions
recommend compliance within 36 months. US Airways comments that a
longer compliance time is appropriate because of the long lead time for
getting the vortex generator installation kits (40 weeks, as stated in
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision 1, dated January
10, 2002).
We disagree. In developing the compliance time for this AD action,
we considered not only the safety implications of the identified unsafe
condition, but also the average utilization rate of the affected fleet,
the practical aspects of an orderly modification of the fleet, the
availability of required parts, and the time necessary for the
rulemaking process. After the release of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin
757-57A0058, Revision 1 (which was referenced in the NPRM as an
appropriate source of service information for accomplishing certain
required actions), we came to an agreement with Boeing that a
compliance time of 24 months was appropriate. When we notified Boeing
of this NPRM, Boeing increased the procurement of the vortex generator
installation kits to ensure an adequate supply to support the proposed
compliance time. Therefore, we have determined that the compliance
time, as proposed, represents the maximum interval of time allowable
for the affected airplanes to continue to safely operate before the
installations are done. In addition, since maintenance schedules vary
among operators, we could not assure that the airplanes would be
modified during that maximum interval if we changed the compliance time
to incorporate the heavy maintenance visit. We have not changed the AD
in this regard.
Request To Include Part Number (P/N) Change for Vortex Generators
America West states that the NPRM does not include a change in P/N
after installation of vortex generators in accordance with paragraph
(f)(2) of the NPRM. America West points out that this could result in
the installation of pre-modification outboard main flaps on post-
modification airplanes. America West recommends that Boeing revise
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision 1, to include a
change in P/N; and that the NPRM be revised to prohibit installation of
pre-modification flaps on an airplane after it has been brought into
compliance with the AD.
We disagree. Determining whether or not an airplane is in
compliance with the vortex generator installation can be confirmed
easily by visual inspection, on or off the wing. Therefore, we
determined that renumbering the flap assembly is an unnecessary burden
to the manufacturer and to the operators of the affected airplanes, as
the part marking, drawings, and other documentation would have to be
revised as well. Boeing agrees that the renumbering is unnecessary. In
addition, section 39.7 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR
39.7) prohibits operation of an aircraft that is not in compliance with
an AD. Therefore, it is not necessary to include the specified
prohibition in the AD. We have not changed the AD in this regard.
Request To Clarify Differences Paragraph
Boeing and UPS both request that we clarify the third paragraph in
the section of the NPRM titled ``Differences Between the Proposed AD
and the Service Bulletins.'' That paragraph states:
``Although Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0146 and Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0147 specify that operators may
contact the manufacturer if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does
not function properly, this proposed AD would require operators to
correct that condition according to a method approved by the FAA.''
Boeing also states that clarification is needed because customers
have asked if Boeing is about to revise the existing service bulletins
referenced in the NPRM to incorporate possible
[[Page 66659]]
alternative modifications. Other customers have asked Boeing if the FAA
will be adding another requirement to the AD that is not currently in
the NPRM regarding the replacement of a damper assembly.
UPS asks that, if possible, we provide additional information on
the approved method that we are considering to correct any problems
with the newly installed damper. UPS suggests that, if we are
considering a requirement to install a new damper and/or flight tests
to certify the installation, we include these specifics and have a new
comment period after the specific actions have been defined.
We agree that the paragraph Boeing quoted needs clarification.
However, since that section of the preamble does not reappear in the
final rule, we have instead changed the following to provide
clarification:
We have changed the ``Interim Action'' section of the AD
to specify that no additional fixes have been identified; however, as
investigation into the unsafe condition continues, additional fixes may
be deemed necessary in the future.
We have revised paragraph (f)(1) of the AD to specify
that, if a just-installed (new) wheel damper does not function
properly, operators should correct the condition in accordance with the
procedures specified in paragraph (i) of the AD, Alternative Methods of
Compliance (AMOCs). An AMOC for this condition could include removing
the defective part and returning the airplane to the original
configuration, or securing the installation in a method acceptable to
us until the affected part can be replaced or repaired within the
compliance time of the AD.
Request To Revise Parts Installation Paragraph
Boeing requests that we change paragraph (g), ``Parts
Installation,'' of the NPRM to allow operators that have not yet
performed the new damper installation to replace any part for the
existing control wheel position installation during the initial 24-
month compliance time. Boeing explains that if an operator needs to
replace an existing control wheel position sensor installation before
the service bulletin kit can be delivered, they would appear to be out
of compliance in just repairing the airplane to the as-delivered
condition. Boeing suggests revising paragraph (g) to include these
words, ``After the incorporation of the wheel damper assembly to comply
with this AD * * *.''
We agree that operators may continue to install the existing
affected parts and assemblies until the airplane is modified to bring
it into compliance with this AD. Therefore, we find that the Parts
Installation paragraph is not necessary, and we have removed that
paragraph and reidentified the following paragraphs accordingly.
Request To Include Cost for ``Lost Time''
United Airlines states that Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 757-
27A0146, dated October 14, 2004; and 757-57A0058, Revision 1, dated
January 10, 2002, state that no ``lost time'' work hours are included
in the cost estimates in the NPRM. United Airlines states that, if the
tasks specified in the service bulletins are accomplished during non-
routine maintenance, then lost-time hours must be included in the cost
estimates, and unscheduled downtime must also be considered in those
cost estimates. If lost time is included, United Airlines states that
the total work hours would increase to approximately 31 total work
hours and 19 elapsed-time hours. In addition, United Airlines states
that unscheduled downtime for accomplishing the required tasks is
estimated to cost $35,000 per day. United Airlines estimates the
additional cost for accomplishing both service bulletins during an
unscheduled maintenance visit to be $36,000 per day. Therefore, United
Airlines requests that the cost estimates be updated to reflect the
work accomplished for both service bulletins.
We disagree. The cost information below describes only the direct
costs of the specific actions required by the AD. The manufacturer
provided us with the number of work hours necessary to do the required
actions based on the best data available. This number represents the
time necessary to perform only the actions actually required by the AD.
We recognize that, in doing the actions required by an AD, operators
may incur incidental costs in addition to the direct costs. The cost
analysis in AD rulemaking actions, however, typically does not include
incidental costs such as the time required to gain access and close up,
time necessary for planning, or time necessitated by other
administrative actions. Those incidental costs, which may vary
significantly among operators, are almost impossible to calculate. We
have not changed the AD in this regard.
Conclusion
We have carefully reviewed the available data, including the
comments received, and determined that air safety and the public
interest require adopting the AD with the changes described previously.
We have determined that these changes will neither increase the
economic burden on any operator nor increase the scope of the AD.
Interim Action
We consider this AD interim action. The manufacturer is currently
investigating an additional modification that may further reduce or
eliminate the unsafe condition identified in this AD. Once this
modification is developed, approved, and available, we may consider
additional rulemaking. Should any additional modification be required
as a result of further rulemaking activities, that modification would
be in addition to, not a replacement for, the modifications required by
this AD.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 1,036 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet and about 629 U.S.-registered airplanes. The following
table provides the estimated costs for U.S. operators to comply with
this AD. Not all of the required actions must be done on all U.S.-
registered airplanes.
Estimated Costs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Average Number of
labor U.S.-
Action Work hours rate per Parts Cost per airplane registered Fleet cost
hour airplanes
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Install control wheel damper 9 to 11............ $65 $7,640 to $10,550..... $8,225 to $11,265..... 578 $4,754,050 to
assembly, and do functional test $6,511,170.
(Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB
series airplanes).
Install control wheel damper 15................. 65 $10,550............... $11,525............... 51 $587,775.
assembly, and do functional test
(Model 757-300 series airplanes).
[[Page 66660]]
Install vortex generators (Model 10................. 65 $3,336................ $3,986................ 527 $2,100,622.
757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series
airplanes).
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
subtitle VII, part A, subpart III, section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this AD will not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a
substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between
the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power
and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive
Order 12866;
(2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the regulatory evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by
reference, Safety.
Adoption of the Amendment
0
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
0
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
2006-23-15 Boeing: Amendment 39-14827. Docket No. FAA-2006-23734;
Directorate Identifier 2005-NM-174-AD.
Effective Date
(a) This AD becomes effective December 21, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Model 757-200, -200PF, -200CB, and -300
series airplanes, certificated in any category; as identified in the
applicable service bulletin or bulletins in Table 1 of this AD.
Table 1.--Boeing Service Bulletins
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Revision Date Model
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-27A0146........................ Original............... October 14, 2004...... 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes.
757-27A0147........................ Original............... October 14, 2004...... 757-300 series airplanes.
757-57A0058........................ 1...................... January 10, 2002...... 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from several reports that flightcrews
experienced unintended roll oscillations during final approach, just
before landing. We are issuing this AD to prevent unintended roll
oscillations near touchdown, which could result in loss of
directional control of the airplane, and consequent airplane damage
and/or injury to flightcrew and passengers.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Installations
(f) Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD, do the
actions in paragraphs (f)(1) and (f)(2) of this AD, as applicable.
(1) For all airplanes: Install a control wheel damper assembly
at the first officer's drum bracket assembly and aileron quadrant
beneath the flight deck floor in section 41; and do all applicable
functional and operational tests and adjustments of the new
installation, and all applicable related investigative/corrective
actions before further flight after the installation. Do all actions
in accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 757-27A0146, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757-
200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes); or Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 757-27A0147, dated October 14, 2004 (for Model 757-300
series airplanes). Where Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-27A0146
specifies to contact Boeing if a just-installed (new) wheel damper
does not function properly, correct that condition in accordance
with the procedures in paragraph (i) of this AD.
(2) For Model 757-200, -200PF, and -200CB series airplanes:
Install vortex generators (vortilons) on the leading edge of the
outboard main flap in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-57A0058, Revision
1, dated January 10, 2002.
Actions Accomplished in Accordance With Previous Revision of Service
Bulletin
(g) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Special Attention Service Bulletin 757-57-
0058, dated March 9, 2000, are acceptable for
[[Page 66661]]
compliance with the actions in paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.
No Reporting Required
(h) Although the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert
Service Bulletin 757-27A0146 and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 757-
27A0147, both dated October 14, 2004, describe procedures for
submitting a sheet recording accomplishment of the service bulletin,
this AD does not require that action.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(i)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO),
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
Material Incorporated by Reference
(j) You must use the service information in Table 2 of this AD
to perform the actions that are required by this AD, unless the AD
specifies otherwise. The Director of the Federal Register approved
the incorporation by reference of these documents in accordance with
5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124-2207, for a copy
of this service information. You may review copies at the Docket
Management Facility, U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 Seventh
Street, SW., Room PL-401, Nassif Building, Washington, DC; on the
Internet at https://dms.dot.gov; or at the National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA). For information on the availability
of this material at the NARA, call (202) 741-6030, or go to https://
www.archives.gov/federal_register/code_of_
federal_regulations/ibr_locations.html.
Table 2.--Material Incorporated by Reference
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Boeing Alert Service Bulletin Revision level Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
757-27A0146................................ Original.......................... October 14, 2004.
757-27A0147................................ Original.......................... October 14, 2004.
757-57A0058................................ 1................................. January 10, 2002.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Issued in Renton, Washington, on October 31, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-19164 Filed 11-15-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P