Notice of Availability of Model Safety Evaluation on Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding LCO 3.10.1, Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, 63050-63053 [E6-18076]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 208 / Friday, October 27, 2006 / Notices
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3 The Atomic Energy Act, as amended by the Energy Policy Act of 2005, authorizes NRC to regulate Ra–226 and NRC is in the process of
amending its regulations for discrete sources of Ra–226.
4 Radioactive materials are to be considered aggregated or collocated if breaching a common physical security barrier (e.g., a locked door at
the entrance to a storage room) would allow access to the radioactive material or devices containing the radioactive material.
5 If several radionuclides are aggregated, the sum of the ratios of the activity of each source, I of radionuclide, n, A
(i,n), to the quantity of concern for radionuclide n, Q(n), listed for that radionuclide equals or exceeds one. [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide A) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide A)] + [(aggregated source activity for radionuclide B) ÷ (quantity of concern for radionuclide B)] + etc. * * * ≥1.
Guidance for Aggregation of Sources
NRC supports the use of the
International Atomic Energy
Association’s (IAEA) source
categorization methodology as defined
in IAEA Safety Standards Series No.
RS–G–1.9, ‘‘Categorization of
Radioactive Sources,’’ (2005) (see https://
www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/
PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf) and as endorsed
by the agency’s Code of Conduct for the
Safety and Security of Radioactive
Sources, January 2004 (see https://wwwpub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/
Code-2004_web.pdf). The Code defines
a three-tiered source categorization
scheme. Category 1 corresponds to the
largest source strength (equal to or
greater than 100 times the quantity of
concern values listed in Table 1.) and
Category 3, the smallest (equal or
exceeding one-tenth the quantity of
concern values listed in Table 1.).
Additional security measures apply to
sources that are equal to or greater than
the quantity of concern values listed in
Table 1, plus aggregations of smaller
sources that are equal to or greater than
the quantities in Table 1. Aggregation
only applies to sources that are
collocated.
Licensees who possess individual
sources in total quantities that equal or
exceed the Table 1 quantities are
required to implement additional
security measures. Where there are
many small (less than the quantity of
concern values) collocated sources
whose total aggregate activity equals or
exceeds the Table 1 values, licensees are
to implement additional security
measures.
Some source handling or storage
activities may cover several buildings,
or several locations within specific
buildings. The question then becomes,
‘‘When are sources considered
collocated for purposes of aggregation?’’
For purposes of the additional controls,
sources are considered collocated if
breaching a single barrier (e.g., a locked
door at the entrance to a storage room)
would allow access to the sources.
Sources behind an outer barrier should
be aggregated separately from those
behind an inner barrier (e.g., a locked
source safe inside the locked storage
room). However, if both barriers are
simultaneously open, then all sources
within these two barriers are considered
to be collocated. This logic should be
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16:53 Oct 26, 2006
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continued for other barriers within or
behind the inner barrier.
The following example illustrates the
point: A lockable room has sources
stored in it. Inside the lockable room,
there are two shielded safes with
additional sources in them. Inventories
are as follows:
The room has the following sources
outside the safes: Cf–252, 0.12 TBq (3.2 Ci);
Co–60, 0.18 TBq (4.9 Ci), and Pu–238, 0.3
TBq (8.1 Ci). Application of the unity rule
yields: (0.12 ÷ 0.2) + (0.18 ÷ 0.3) + (0.3 ÷ 0.6)
= 0.6 + 0.6 + 0.5 = 1.7. Therefore, the sources
would require additional security measures.
Shielded safe #1 has a 1.9 TBq (51 Ci) Cs–
137 source and a 0.8 TBq (22 Ci) Am–241
source. In this case, the sources would
require additional security measures,
regardless of location, because they each
exceed the quantities in Table 1.
Shielded safe #2 has two Ir–192 sources,
each having an activity of 0.3 TBq (8.1 Ci).
In this case, the sources would not require
additional security measures while locked in
the safe. The combined activity does not
exceed the threshold quantity 0.8 TBq (22
Ci).
Because certain barriers may cease to
exist during source handling operations
(e.g., a storage location may be unlocked
during periods of active source usage),
licensees should, to the extent
practicable, consider two modes of
source usage—‘‘operations’’ (active
source usage) and ‘‘shutdown’’ (source
storage mode). Whichever mode results
in the greatest inventory (considering
barrier status) would require additional
security measures for each location.
Use the following method to
determine which sources of radioactive
material require implementation of the
Additional Security Measures (ASMs):
• Include any single source equal to
or greater than the quantity of concern
in Table A.
• Include multiple collocated sources
of the same radionuclide when the
combined quantity equals or exceeds
the quantity of concern.
• For combinations of radionuclides,
include multiple collocated sources of
different radionuclides when the
aggregate quantities satisfy the following
unity rule: [(amount of radionuclide A)
÷ (quantity of concern of radionuclide
A)] + [(amount of radionuclide B) ÷
(quantity of concern of radionuclide B)]
+ etc. . . . ≥1.
[FR Doc. E6–18066 Filed 10–26–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
Notice of Availability of Model Safety
Evaluation on Technical Specification
Improvement To Modify Requirements
Regarding LCO 3.10.1, Inservice Leak
and Hydrostatic Testing Operation
Using the Consolidated Line Item
Improvement Process
Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that
the staff of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) has prepared a
model safety evaluation (SE) relating to
the modification of shutdown testing
requirements in technical specifications
(TS) for Boiling Water Reactors (BWR).
The NRC staff has also prepared a model
no-significant-hazards-consideration
(NSHC) determination relating to this
matter. The purpose of these models is
to permit the NRC to efficiently process
amendments that propose to modify
LCO 3.10.1. The proposed changes
would revise LCO 3.10.1, and the
associated Bases, to expand its scope to
include provisions for temperature
excursions greater than [200] °F as a
consequence of inservice leak and
hydrostatic testing, and as a
consequence of scram time testing
initiated in conjunction with an
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while
considering operational conditions to be
in Mode 4. Licensees of nuclear power
reactors to which the models apply
could then request amendments,
confirming the applicability of the SE
and NSHC determination to their
reactors.
The NRC staff issued a Federal
Register notice on August 21, 2006 (71
FR 48561) that provided a model safety
evaluation (SE) and a model no
significant hazards consideration
(NSHC) determination relating to
modification of requirements regarding
LCO 3.10.1, ‘‘Inservice Leak and
Hydrostatic Testing Operation.’’ The
NRC staff hereby announces that the
model SE and NSHC determination may
be referenced in plant-specific
applications to adopt the changes. The
staff will post a model application on
the NRC web site to assist licensees in
using the consolidated line item
DATES:
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 208 / Friday, October 27, 2006 / Notices
improvement process (CLIIP) to revise
the TS on LCO 3.10.1, ‘‘Inservice Leak
and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.’’
Tim
Kobetz, Mail Stop: O–12H2, Division of
Inspections and Regional Support,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Washington, DC 20555–0001, telephone
301–415–1932.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
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Regulatory Issue Summary 2000–06,
‘‘Consolidated Line Item Improvement
Process for Adopting Standard
Technical Specification Changes for
Power Reactors,’’ was issued on March
20, 2000. The consolidated line item
improvement process (CLIIP) is
intended to improve the efficiency of
NRC licensing processes by processing
proposed changes to the standard
technical specifications (STS) in a
manner that supports subsequent
license amendment applications. The
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the
public to comment on a proposed
change to the STS after a preliminary
assessment by the NRC staff and a
finding that the change will likely be
offered for adoption by licensees. The
CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate
any comments received for a proposed
change to the STS and to either
reconsider the change or announce the
availability of the change for adoption
by licensees.
This notice involves the modification
of LCO 3.10.1. The proposed changes
would revise LCO 3.10.1, and the
associated Bases, to expand its scope to
include provisions for temperature
excursions greater than [200] °F as a
consequence of inservice leak and
hydrostatic testing, and as a
consequence of scram time testing
initiated in conjunction with an
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while
considering operational conditions to be
in Mode 4. This change was proposed
for incorporation into the standard
technical specifications by the owners
groups participants in the Technical
Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is
designated TSTF–484. TSTF–484 can be
viewed on the NRC’s web page utilizing
the Agencywide Documents Access and
Management System (ADAMS). ADAMS
accession numbers are ML052930102
(TSTF–484 Submittal), ML060970568
(NRC Request for Additional
Information, RAI), ML061560523 (TSTF
Response to NRC RAIs), and
ML062650171 (TSTF Response to NRC
Notice for Comment).
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Licensees opting to apply for this TS
change are responsible for reviewing the
staff’s evaluation, referencing the
applicable technical justifications, and
providing any necessary plant-specific
information. Each amendment
application made in response to the
notice of availability will be processed
and noticed in accordance with
applicable rules and NRC procedures.
Public Notices
Background
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Applicability
In a notice in the Federal Register
dated August 21, 2006 (71 FR 48561),
the staff requested comment on the use
of the CLIIP to process requests to revise
the TS regarding LCO 3.10.1, ‘‘Inservice
Leak and Hydrostatic Testing
Operation.’’ In addition, there have been
several plant-specific amendment
requests to adopt changes similar to
those described in TSTF–484 and
notices have been published for these
applications. TSTF–484, as well as the
NRC staff’s safety evaluation and model
application, may be examined, and/or
copied for a fee, at the NRC/s Public
Document Room, located at One White
Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike (first
floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly
available records are accessible
electronically from the ADAMS Public
Library component on the NRC Web
site, (the Electronic Reading Room).
The staff received one response with
seven comments following the notice
published August 21, 2006 (71 FR
48561), soliciting comments on the
model SE and NSHC determination
related to TSTF–484, Revision 0. The
comments were offered by the TSTF in
a letter dated September 20, 2006
(ADAMS# ML062650171). The
comments are administrative in nature
in that they provide clarification and do
not have a material impact on the model
SE and NSHC determination published
August 21, 2006 (71 FR 48561). TSTF
comments that were incorporated
include the comment on the Federal
Register Notice for Comment and
comments 1, 3, 4, and 5 on the Model
Safety Evaluation. The TSTF has been
informed of NRC staff decision not to
incorporate comments 2 and 6.
Comment 2 provides for additional
information about TSTF–484 regarding
scram time testing to be included in
paragraph one of section 3.0. In the
original Model Safety Evaluation
published for comment on August 21,
2006 (71 FR 48561), the first half of
section 3.0 discusses hydrostatic and
leakage testing, while the second half of
section 3.0 discusses scram time testing.
NRC staff believe that there may be
confusion if the comment is
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incorporated into the first section of 3.0
while scram time testing is not
discussed until the second half of
section 3.0. The information provided in
the comment is captured in the second
half of section 3.0. Comment 6 was not
incorporated due to possible confusion
regarding the term ‘‘conservatively’’. In
reviewing the TSTF–484, Revision 0
submittal, the NRC has concluded that
there is reasonable assurance that the
health and safety of the public will not
be endangered by operation in the
proposed manner, such activities will be
conducted in compliance with the
Commission’s regulations, and the
issuance of the amendment will not be
inimical to the common defense and
security or to the health and safety of
the public. Therefore, it was decided
that comment 6 was not needed in order
to justify TSTF–484, Revision 0
approval. The revised model SE is
included in this notice for use by
licensees. As described in the model
application prepared by the staff,
licensees may reference in their plantspecific applications to adopt TSTF–
484, the SE and NSHC determination.
Model Safety Evaluation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation,
Consolidated Line Item Improvement,
Technical Specification Task Force
Change TSTF–484, Revision 0, Use of
TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities
1.0 Introduction
By application dated [Date], [Name of
Licensee] (the licensee) requested
changes to the Technical Specifications
(TS) for the [Name of Facility].
The proposed changes would revise
Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO)
3.10.1, and the associated Bases, to
expand its scope to include provisions
for temperature excursions greater than
[200] °F as a consequence of inservice
leak and hydrostatic testing, and as a
consequence of scram time testing
initiated in conjunction with an
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while
considering operational conditions to be
in Mode 4.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
2.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic
Testing. The Reactor Coolant System
(RCS) serves as a pressure boundary and
also serves to provide a flow path for the
circulation of coolant past the fuel. In
order to maintain RCS integrity, Section
XI of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure
Vessel Code requires periodic
hydrostatic and leakage testing.
Hydrostatic tests are required to be
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 208 / Friday, October 27, 2006 / Notices
performed once every ten years and
leakage tests are required to be
performed each refueling outage.
Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 states
that pressure tests and leak tests of the
reactor vessel that are required by
Section XI of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure
Vessel Code must be completed before
the core is critical.
NUREG–1433, General Electric Plants,
BWR/4, Revision 3, Standard Technical
Specifications (STS) and NUREG–1434,
General Electric Plants, BWR/6,
Revision 3, STS both currently contain
LCO 3.10.1, ‘‘Inservice Leak and
Hydrostatic Testing Operation.’’ LCO
3.10.1 was created to allow for
hydrostatic and leakage testing to be
conducted while in Mode 4 with
average reactor coolant temperature
greater than [200] °F provided certain
secondary containment LCOs are met.
TSTF–484, Revision 0, Use of TS
3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to allow
a licensee to implement LCO 3.10.1,
while hydrostatic and leakage testing is
being conducted, should average reactor
coolant temperature exceed [200] °F
during testing. This modification does
not alter current requirements for
hydrostatic and leakage testing as
required by Appendix G to 10 CFR Part
50.
2.2 Control Rod Scram Time
Testing. Control rods function to control
reactor power level and to provide
adequate excess negative reactivity to
shut down the reactor from any normal
operating or accident condition at any
time during core life. The control rods
are scrammed by using hydraulic
pressure exerted by the control rod
drive (CRD) system. Criterion 10 of
Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 states
that the reactor core and associated
coolant, control, and protection systems
shall be designed with appropriate
margin to assure that specified
acceptable fuel limits are not exceeded
during any condition of normal
operation, including the effects of
anticipated operational occurrences.
The scram reactivity used in design
basis accidents (DBA) and transient
analyses is based on an assumed control
rod scram time.
NUREG–1433, General Electric Plants,
BWR/4, Revision 3, STS and NUREG–
1434, General Electric Plants, BWR/6,
Revision 3, STS both currently contain
surveillance requirements (SR) to
conduct scram time testing when certain
conditions are met in order to ensure
that Criterion 10 of Appendix A to 10
CFR Part 50 is satisfied. SR 3.1.4.1
requires scram time testing to be
conducted following a shutdown greater
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than 120 days while SR 3.1.4.4 requires
scram time testing to be conducted
following work on the CRD system or
following fuel movement within the
affected core cell. Both SRs must be
performed at reactor steam dome
pressure greater than or equal to [800]
psig and prior to exceeding 40 percent
rated thermal power (RTP).
TSTF–484, Revision 0, Use of TS
3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, would modify LCO 3.10.1 to
allow SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4 to be
conducted in Mode 4 with average
reactor coolant temperature greater than
[200] °F. Scram time testing would be
performed in accordance with LCO
3.10.4, ‘‘Single Control Rod
Withdrawal—Cold Shutdown.’’ This
modification to LCO 3.10.1 does not
alter the means of compliance with
Criterion 10 of Appendix A to 10 CFR
Part 50.
3.0 Technical Evaluation
The existing provisions of LCO 3.10.1
allow for hydrostatic and leakage testing
to be conducted while in Mode 4 with
average reactor coolant temperature
greater than [200] °F, while imposing
Mode 3 secondary containment
requirements. Under the existing
provision, LCO 3.10.1 would have to be
implemented prior to hydrostatic and
leakage testing. As a result, if LCO
3.10.1 was not implemented prior to
hydrostatic and leakage testing,
hydrostatic and leakage testing would
have to be terminated if average reactor
coolant temperature exceeded [200] °F
during the conduct of the hydrostatic
and leakage test. TSTF–484, Revision 0,
Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to allow
a licensee to implement LCO 3.10.1,
while hydrostatic and leakage testing is
being conducted, should average reactor
coolant temperature exceed [200] °F
during testing. The modification will
allow completion of testing without the
potential for interrupting the test in
order to reduce reactor vessel pressure,
cool the RCS, and restart the test below
[200] °F. Since the current LCO 3.10.1
allows testing to be conducted while in
Mode 4 with average reactor coolant
temperature greater than [200] °F, the
proposed change does not introduce any
new operational conditions beyond
those currently allowed.
SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4 require that
control rod scram time be tested at
reactor steam dome pressure greater
than or equal to [800] psig and before
exceeding 40 percent rated thermal
power (RTP). Performance of control rod
scram time testing is typically
scheduled concurrent with inservice
leak or hydrostatic testing while the
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RCS is pressurized. Because of the
number of control rods that must be
tested, it is possible for the inservice
leak or hydrostatic test to be completed
prior to completing the scram time test.
Under existing provisions, if scram time
testing can not be completed during the
LCO 3.10.1 inservice leak or hydrostatic
test, scram time testing must be
suspended. Additionally, if LCO 3.10.1
is not implemented and average reactor
coolant temperature exceeds [200] °F
while performing the scram time test,
scram time testing must also be
suspended. In both situations, scram
time testing is resumed during startup
and is completed prior to exceeding 40
percent RTP. TSTF–484, Revision 0, Use
of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to allow
a licensee to complete scram time
testing initiated during inservice leak or
hydrostatic testing. As stated earlier,
since the current LCO 3.10.1 allows
testing to be conducted while in Mode
4 with average reactor coolant
temperature greater than [200] °F, the
proposed change does not introduce any
new operational conditions beyond
those currently allowed. Completion of
scram time testing prior to reactor
criticality and power operations results
in a more conservative operating
philosophy with attendant potential
safety benefits.
It is acceptable to perform other
testing concurrent with the inservice
leak or hydrostatic test provided that
this testing can be performed safely and
does not interfere with the leak or
hydrostatic test. However, it is not
permissible to remain in TS 3.10.1
solely to complete such testing
following the completion of inservice
leak or hydrostatic testing and scram
time testing.
Since the tests are performed with the
reactor pressure vessel (RPV) nearly
water solid, at low decay heat values,
and near Mode 4 conditions, the stored
energy in the reactor core will be very
low. Small leaks from the RCS would be
detected by inspections before a
significant loss of inventory occurred. In
addition, two low-pressure emergency
core cooling systems (ECCS) injection/
spray subsystems are required to be
operable in Mode 4 by TS 3.5.2, ECCSShutdown. In the event of a large RCS
leak, the RPV would rapidly
depressurize and allow operation of the
low pressure ECCS. The capability of
the low pressure ECCS would be
adequate to maintain the fuel covered
under the low decay heat conditions
during these tests. Also, LCO 3.10.1
requires that secondary containment
and standby gas treatment system be
operable and capable of handling any
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airborne radioactivity or steam leaks
that may occur during performance of
testing.
The protection provided by the
normally required Mode 4 applicable
LCOs, in addition to the secondary
containment requirements required to
be met by LCO 3.10.1, minimizes
potential consequences in the event of
any postulated abnormal event during
testing. In addition, the requested
modification to LCO 3.10.1 does not
create any new modes of operation or
operating conditions that are not
currently allowed. Therefore, the staff
finds the proposed change acceptable.
4.0
State Consultation
In accordance with the Commission’s
regulations, the [Name of State] State
official was notified of the proposed
issuance of the amendment. The State
official had [no] comments. [If
comments were provided, they should
be addressed here].
5.0
Environmental Consideration
The amendment changes a
requirement with respect to installation
or use of a facility component located
within the restricted area as defined in
10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has
determined that the amendment
involves no significant increase in the
amounts, and no significant change in
the types, of any effluents that may be
released offsite, and that there is no
significant increase in individual or
cumulative occupational radiation
exposure. The Commission has
previously issued a proposed finding
that the amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration, and
there has been no public comment on
such finding issued on [Date] ([ ] FR
[ ]). Accordingly, the amendment meets
the eligibility criteria for categorical
exclusion set forth in 10 CFR
51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b)
no environmental impact statement or
environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the
issuance of the amendment.
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6.0
Conclusion
The Commission has concluded,
based on the considerations discussed
above, that: (1) There is reasonable
assurance that the health and safety of
the public will not be endangered by
operation in the proposed manner, (2)
such activities will be conducted in
compliance with the Commission’s
regulations, and (3) the issuance of the
amendment will not be inimical to the
common defense and security or to the
health and safety of the public.
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16:53 Oct 26, 2006
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7.0
References
1. NUREG–1433, ‘‘General Electric Plants,
BWR/4, Revision 3, Standard Technical
Specifications (STS)’’, August 31, 2003.
2. NUREG–1434, General Electric Plants,
BWR/6, Revision 3, Standard Technical
Specifications (STS)’’, August 31, 2003.
3. Request for Additional Information (RAI)
Regarding TSTF–484, April 7, 2006, ADAMS
accession number ML060970568.
4. Response to NRC RAIs Regarding TSTF–
484, June 5, 2006, ADAMS accession number
ML061560523.
5. TSTF–484 Revision 0, ‘‘Use of TS 3.10.1
for Scram Times Testing Activities’’, May 5,
2005, ADAMS accession number
ML052930102.
6. TSTF Response to NRC Notice for
Comment, September 20, 2006, ADAMS
accession number ML062650171.
Principal Contributor: Aron Lewin.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 12th of
October 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Timothy Kobetz,
Branch Chief, Technical Specifications
Branch, Division of Inspections and Regional
Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6–18076 Filed 10–26–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
[Docket No. WTO/DS350]
WTO Dispute Settlement Proceeding
Regarding Measures Related to
Zeroing and Certain Investigations,
Administrative Reviews and Sunset
Reviews Involving Products From the
European Communities
Office of the United States
Trade Representative.
ACTION: Notice; request for comments.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Office of the United
States Trade Representative (‘‘USTR’’) is
providing notice that the European
Communities (EC) has requested
consultations with the United States
under the Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade
Organization (‘‘WTO Agreement’’)
concerning various measures relating to
zeroing and antidumping duty orders on
certain products from the EC. The EC
alleges that determinations made by
U.S. authorities concerning these
products, and certain related matters,
are inconsistent with Articles 1, 2.1, 2.4,
2.4.2, 5.8, 9.1, 9.3, 9.5, 11, 18.3 and 18.4
of the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (‘‘AD
Agreement’’), Article VI of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994
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63053
(‘‘GATT 1994’’), and Article XVI:4 of the
WTO Agreement. That request may be
found at https://www.wto.org contained
in documents designated as WT/DS350/
1 and WT/DS350/1/Add.1. USTR
invites written comments from the
public concerning the issues raised in
this dispute. In connection with the
issues raised in the request for
consultations, the public should be
aware that on March 6, 2006, the
Department of Commerce announced
that it will no longer use ‘‘zeroing’’
when making average-to-average
comparisons in an antidumping
investigation. See 71 FR 11189.
DATES: Although USTR will accept any
comments received during the course of
the dispute settlement proceedings,
comments should be submitted on or
before November 15, 2006 to be assured
of timely consideration by USTR.
ADDRESSES: Comments should be
submitted (i) electronically, to
FR0702@ustr.eop.gov, Attn: ‘‘EC Zeroing
II (DS350)’’ in the subject line, or (ii) by
fax, to Sandy McKinzy at (202) 395–
3640. For documents sent by fax, USTR
requests that the submitter provide a
confirmation copy to the electronic mail
address listed above.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Elissa Alben, Assistant General Counsel,
Office of the United States Trade
Representative, 600 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20508, (202) 395–9622.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: USTR is
providing notice that consultations have
been requested pursuant to the WTO
Understanding on Rules and Procedures
Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(‘‘DSU’’). If such consultations should
fail to resolve the matter and a dispute
settlement panel is established pursuant
to the DSU, such panel, which would
hold its meetings in Geneva,
Switzerland, would be expected to issue
a report on its findings and
recommendations within nine months
after it is established.
Major Issues Raised by the EC
With respect to the measures at issue,
the EC’s request for consultations refers
to the following:
1. The implementing regulations of
the U.S. Department of Commerce
(‘‘DOC’’), § 19 CFR Part 351, in
particular § 351.414(c)(2);
2. The methodology of the DOC for
determining the dumping margin in
reviews on the basis of the comparison
of a weighted average normal value with
individual export prices;
3. The determinations of dumping by
the DOC, the determinations of injury
by the U.S. International Trade
Commission (‘‘ITC’’), the DOC notices
E:\FR\FM\27OCN1.SGM
27OCN1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 208 (Friday, October 27, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 63050-63053]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-18076]
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
Notice of Availability of Model Safety Evaluation on Technical
Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding LCO 3.10.1,
Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation Using the Consolidated
Line Item Improvement Process
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Notice of availability.
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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE)
relating to the modification of shutdown testing requirements in
technical specifications (TS) for Boiling Water Reactors (BWR). The NRC
staff has also prepared a model no-significant-hazards-consideration
(NSHC) determination relating to this matter. The purpose of these
models is to permit the NRC to efficiently process amendments that
propose to modify LCO 3.10.1. The proposed changes would revise LCO
3.10.1, and the associated Bases, to expand its scope to include
provisions for temperature excursions greater than [200] [deg]F as a
consequence of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and as a
consequence of scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while considering operational
conditions to be in Mode 4. Licensees of nuclear power reactors to
which the models apply could then request amendments, confirming the
applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to their reactors.
DATES: The NRC staff issued a Federal Register notice on August 21,
2006 (71 FR 48561) that provided a model safety evaluation (SE) and a
model no significant hazards consideration (NSHC) determination
relating to modification of requirements regarding LCO 3.10.1,
``Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.'' The NRC staff
hereby announces that the model SE and NSHC determination may be
referenced in plant-specific applications to adopt the changes. The
staff will post a model application on the NRC web site to assist
licensees in using the consolidated line item
[[Page 63051]]
improvement process (CLIIP) to revise the TS on LCO 3.10.1, ``Inservice
Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.''
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tim Kobetz, Mail Stop: O-12H2,
Division of Inspections and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-
0001, telephone 301-415-1932.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing
proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed
change to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a
finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by
licensees. The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments
received for a proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the
change or announce the availability of the change for adoption by
licensees.
This notice involves the modification of LCO 3.10.1. The proposed
changes would revise LCO 3.10.1, and the associated Bases, to expand
its scope to include provisions for temperature excursions greater than
[200] [deg]F as a consequence of inservice leak and hydrostatic
testing, and as a consequence of scram time testing initiated in
conjunction with an inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while
considering operational conditions to be in Mode 4. This change was
proposed for incorporation into the standard technical specifications
by the owners groups participants in the Technical Specification Task
Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-484. TSTF-484 can be viewed on the
NRC's web page utilizing the Agencywide Documents Access and Management
System (ADAMS). ADAMS accession numbers are ML052930102 (TSTF-484
Submittal), ML060970568 (NRC Request for Additional Information, RAI),
ML061560523 (TSTF Response to NRC RAIs), and ML062650171 (TSTF Response
to NRC Notice for Comment).
Applicability
Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible for
reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical
justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information.
Each amendment application made in response to the notice of
availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with
applicable rules and NRC procedures.
Public Notices
In a notice in the Federal Register dated August 21, 2006 (71 FR
48561), the staff requested comment on the use of the CLIIP to process
requests to revise the TS regarding LCO 3.10.1, ``Inservice Leak and
Hydrostatic Testing Operation.'' In addition, there have been several
plant-specific amendment requests to adopt changes similar to those
described in TSTF-484 and notices have been published for these
applications. TSTF-484, as well as the NRC staff's safety evaluation
and model application, may be examined, and/or copied for a fee, at the
NRC/s Public Document Room, located at One White Flint North, 11555
Rockville Pike (first floor), Rockville, Maryland. Publicly available
records are accessible electronically from the ADAMS Public Library
component on the NRC Web site, (the Electronic Reading Room).
The staff received one response with seven comments following the
notice published August 21, 2006 (71 FR 48561), soliciting comments on
the model SE and NSHC determination related to TSTF-484, Revision 0.
The comments were offered by the TSTF in a letter dated September 20,
2006 (ADAMS ML062650171). The comments are administrative in
nature in that they provide clarification and do not have a material
impact on the model SE and NSHC determination published August 21, 2006
(71 FR 48561). TSTF comments that were incorporated include the comment
on the Federal Register Notice for Comment and comments 1, 3, 4, and 5
on the Model Safety Evaluation. The TSTF has been informed of NRC staff
decision not to incorporate comments 2 and 6. Comment 2 provides for
additional information about TSTF-484 regarding scram time testing to
be included in paragraph one of section 3.0. In the original Model
Safety Evaluation published for comment on August 21, 2006 (71 FR
48561), the first half of section 3.0 discusses hydrostatic and leakage
testing, while the second half of section 3.0 discusses scram time
testing. NRC staff believe that there may be confusion if the comment
is incorporated into the first section of 3.0 while scram time testing
is not discussed until the second half of section 3.0. The information
provided in the comment is captured in the second half of section 3.0.
Comment 6 was not incorporated due to possible confusion regarding the
term ``conservatively''. In reviewing the TSTF-484, Revision 0
submittal, the NRC has concluded that there is reasonable assurance
that the health and safety of the public will not be endangered by
operation in the proposed manner, such activities will be conducted in
compliance with the Commission's regulations, and the issuance of the
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public. Therefore, it was decided that
comment 6 was not needed in order to justify TSTF-484, Revision 0
approval. The revised model SE is included in this notice for use by
licensees. As described in the model application prepared by the staff,
licensees may reference in their plant-specific applications to adopt
TSTF-484, the SE and NSHC determination.
Model Safety Evaluation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation, Consolidated Line Item Improvement, Technical Specification
Task Force Change TSTF-484, Revision 0, Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time
Testing Activities
1.0 Introduction
By application dated [Date], [Name of Licensee] (the licensee)
requested changes to the Technical Specifications (TS) for the [Name of
Facility].
The proposed changes would revise Limiting Condition for Operation
(LCO) 3.10.1, and the associated Bases, to expand its scope to include
provisions for temperature excursions greater than [200] [deg]F as a
consequence of inservice leak and hydrostatic testing, and as a
consequence of scram time testing initiated in conjunction with an
inservice leak or hydrostatic test, while considering operational
conditions to be in Mode 4.
2.0 Regulatory Evaluation
2.1 Inservice Leak and Hydrostatic Testing. The Reactor Coolant
System (RCS) serves as a pressure boundary and also serves to provide a
flow path for the circulation of coolant past the fuel. In order to
maintain RCS integrity, Section XI of the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Pressure Vessel Code requires periodic
hydrostatic and leakage testing. Hydrostatic tests are required to be
[[Page 63052]]
performed once every ten years and leakage tests are required to be
performed each refueling outage. Appendix G to 10 CFR Part 50 states
that pressure tests and leak tests of the reactor vessel that are
required by Section XI of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers
(ASME) Pressure Vessel Code must be completed before the core is
critical.
NUREG-1433, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 3, Standard
Technical Specifications (STS) and NUREG-1434, General Electric Plants,
BWR/6, Revision 3, STS both currently contain LCO 3.10.1, ``Inservice
Leak and Hydrostatic Testing Operation.'' LCO 3.10.1 was created to
allow for hydrostatic and leakage testing to be conducted while in Mode
4 with average reactor coolant temperature greater than [200] [deg]F
provided certain secondary containment LCOs are met.
TSTF-484, Revision 0, Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to allow a licensee to implement LCO
3.10.1, while hydrostatic and leakage testing is being conducted,
should average reactor coolant temperature exceed [200] [deg]F during
testing. This modification does not alter current requirements for
hydrostatic and leakage testing as required by Appendix G to 10 CFR
Part 50.
2.2 Control Rod Scram Time Testing. Control rods function to
control reactor power level and to provide adequate excess negative
reactivity to shut down the reactor from any normal operating or
accident condition at any time during core life. The control rods are
scrammed by using hydraulic pressure exerted by the control rod drive
(CRD) system. Criterion 10 of Appendix A to 10 CFR part 50 states that
the reactor core and associated coolant, control, and protection
systems shall be designed with appropriate margin to assure that
specified acceptable fuel limits are not exceeded during any condition
of normal operation, including the effects of anticipated operational
occurrences. The scram reactivity used in design basis accidents (DBA)
and transient analyses is based on an assumed control rod scram time.
NUREG-1433, General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 3, STS and
NUREG-1434, General Electric Plants, BWR/6, Revision 3, STS both
currently contain surveillance requirements (SR) to conduct scram time
testing when certain conditions are met in order to ensure that
Criterion 10 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 is satisfied. SR 3.1.4.1
requires scram time testing to be conducted following a shutdown
greater than 120 days while SR 3.1.4.4 requires scram time testing to
be conducted following work on the CRD system or following fuel
movement within the affected core cell. Both SRs must be performed at
reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to [800] psig and
prior to exceeding 40 percent rated thermal power (RTP).
TSTF-484, Revision 0, Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, would modify LCO 3.10.1 to allow SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4
to be conducted in Mode 4 with average reactor coolant temperature
greater than [200] [deg]F. Scram time testing would be performed in
accordance with LCO 3.10.4, ``Single Control Rod Withdrawal--Cold
Shutdown.'' This modification to LCO 3.10.1 does not alter the means of
compliance with Criterion 10 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50.
3.0 Technical Evaluation
The existing provisions of LCO 3.10.1 allow for hydrostatic and
leakage testing to be conducted while in Mode 4 with average reactor
coolant temperature greater than [200] [deg]F, while imposing Mode 3
secondary containment requirements. Under the existing provision, LCO
3.10.1 would have to be implemented prior to hydrostatic and leakage
testing. As a result, if LCO 3.10.1 was not implemented prior to
hydrostatic and leakage testing, hydrostatic and leakage testing would
have to be terminated if average reactor coolant temperature exceeded
[200] [deg]F during the conduct of the hydrostatic and leakage test.
TSTF-484, Revision 0, Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing
Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to allow a licensee to implement LCO
3.10.1, while hydrostatic and leakage testing is being conducted,
should average reactor coolant temperature exceed [200] [deg]F during
testing. The modification will allow completion of testing without the
potential for interrupting the test in order to reduce reactor vessel
pressure, cool the RCS, and restart the test below [200] [deg]F. Since
the current LCO 3.10.1 allows testing to be conducted while in Mode 4
with average reactor coolant temperature greater than [200] [deg]F, the
proposed change does not introduce any new operational conditions
beyond those currently allowed.
SR 3.1.4.1 and SR 3.1.4.4 require that control rod scram time be
tested at reactor steam dome pressure greater than or equal to [800]
psig and before exceeding 40 percent rated thermal power (RTP).
Performance of control rod scram time testing is typically scheduled
concurrent with inservice leak or hydrostatic testing while the RCS is
pressurized. Because of the number of control rods that must be tested,
it is possible for the inservice leak or hydrostatic test to be
completed prior to completing the scram time test. Under existing
provisions, if scram time testing can not be completed during the LCO
3.10.1 inservice leak or hydrostatic test, scram time testing must be
suspended. Additionally, if LCO 3.10.1 is not implemented and average
reactor coolant temperature exceeds [200] [deg]F while performing the
scram time test, scram time testing must also be suspended. In both
situations, scram time testing is resumed during startup and is
completed prior to exceeding 40 percent RTP. TSTF-484, Revision 0, Use
of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Time Testing Activities, modifies LCO 3.10.1 to
allow a licensee to complete scram time testing initiated during
inservice leak or hydrostatic testing. As stated earlier, since the
current LCO 3.10.1 allows testing to be conducted while in Mode 4 with
average reactor coolant temperature greater than [200] [deg]F, the
proposed change does not introduce any new operational conditions
beyond those currently allowed. Completion of scram time testing prior
to reactor criticality and power operations results in a more
conservative operating philosophy with attendant potential safety
benefits.
It is acceptable to perform other testing concurrent with the
inservice leak or hydrostatic test provided that this testing can be
performed safely and does not interfere with the leak or hydrostatic
test. However, it is not permissible to remain in TS 3.10.1 solely to
complete such testing following the completion of inservice leak or
hydrostatic testing and scram time testing.
Since the tests are performed with the reactor pressure vessel
(RPV) nearly water solid, at low decay heat values, and near Mode 4
conditions, the stored energy in the reactor core will be very low.
Small leaks from the RCS would be detected by inspections before a
significant loss of inventory occurred. In addition, two low-pressure
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS) injection/spray subsystems are
required to be operable in Mode 4 by TS 3.5.2, ECCS-Shutdown. In the
event of a large RCS leak, the RPV would rapidly depressurize and allow
operation of the low pressure ECCS. The capability of the low pressure
ECCS would be adequate to maintain the fuel covered under the low decay
heat conditions during these tests. Also, LCO 3.10.1 requires that
secondary containment and standby gas treatment system be operable and
capable of handling any
[[Page 63053]]
airborne radioactivity or steam leaks that may occur during performance
of testing.
The protection provided by the normally required Mode 4 applicable
LCOs, in addition to the secondary containment requirements required to
be met by LCO 3.10.1, minimizes potential consequences in the event of
any postulated abnormal event during testing. In addition, the
requested modification to LCO 3.10.1 does not create any new modes of
operation or operating conditions that are not currently allowed.
Therefore, the staff finds the proposed change acceptable.
4.0 State Consultation
In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [Name of
State] State official was notified of the proposed issuance of the
amendment. The State official had [no] comments. [If comments were
provided, they should be addressed here].
5.0 Environmental Consideration
The amendment changes a requirement with respect to installation or
use of a facility component located within the restricted area as
defined in 10 CFR Part 20. The NRC staff has determined that the
amendment involves no significant increase in the amounts, and no
significant change in the types, of any effluents that may be released
offsite, and that there is no significant increase in individual or
cumulative occupational radiation exposure. The Commission has
previously issued a proposed finding that the amendment involves no
significant hazards consideration, and there has been no public comment
on such finding issued on [Date] ([ ] FR [ ]). Accordingly, the
amendment meets the eligibility criteria for categorical exclusion set
forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9). Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b) no
environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be
prepared in connection with the issuance of the amendment.
6.0 Conclusion
The Commission has concluded, based on the considerations discussed
above, that: (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health and
safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the
amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to
the health and safety of the public.
7.0 References
1. NUREG-1433, ``General Electric Plants, BWR/4, Revision 3,
Standard Technical Specifications (STS)'', August 31, 2003.
2. NUREG-1434, General Electric Plants, BWR/6, Revision 3,
Standard Technical Specifications (STS)'', August 31, 2003.
3. Request for Additional Information (RAI) Regarding TSTF-484,
April 7, 2006, ADAMS accession number ML060970568.
4. Response to NRC RAIs Regarding TSTF-484, June 5, 2006, ADAMS
accession number ML061560523.
5. TSTF-484 Revision 0, ``Use of TS 3.10.1 for Scram Times
Testing Activities'', May 5, 2005, ADAMS accession number
ML052930102.
6. TSTF Response to NRC Notice for Comment, September 20, 2006,
ADAMS accession number ML062650171.
Principal Contributor: Aron Lewin.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland this 12th of October 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Timothy Kobetz,
Branch Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspections
and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6-18076 Filed 10-26-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
