Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability Using the Consolidated Line Item Improvement Process, 61075-61084 [E6-17246]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 200 (Tuesday, October 17, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 61075-61084]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-17246]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION


Notice of Opportunity To Comment on Model Safety Evaluation on 
Technical Specification Improvement To Modify Requirements Regarding 
Control Room Envelope HabitabilityUsing the Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Request for comment.

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SUMMARY: Notice is hereby given that the staff of the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) has prepared a model safety evaluation (SE) 
and model application relating to the modification of technical 
specification (TS) requirements regarding the habitability of the 
control room envelope (CRE). The NRC staff has also prepared a model 
no-significant-hazards-consideration (NSHC) determination relating to 
this matter. The purpose of these models is to permit the NRC to 
efficiently process amendments that propose to revise the CRE emergency 
ventilation system TS action and surveillance requirements for the CRE 
boundary, and to add a new TS administrative controls program, 
``Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.'' Licensees of nuclear 
power reactors to which the models apply could then request amendments, 
confirming the applicability of the SE and NSHC determination to their 
reactors. The NRC staff is requesting comment on the model SE and model 
NSHC determination prior to announcing their availability for 
referencing in license amendment applications.

DATES: The comment period expires November 16, 2006. Comments received 
after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but the 
Commission

[[Page 61076]]

is able to ensure consideration only for comments received on or before 
this date.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be submitted either electronically or via U.S. 
mail. Submit written comments to Chief, Rulemaking, Directives, and 
Editing Branch, Division of Administrative Services, Office of 
Administration, Mail Stop: T-6 D59, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, DC 20555-0001. Hand deliver comments to: 11545 Rockville 
Pike, Rockville, Maryland, between 7:45 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. on Federal 
workdays. Copies of comments received may be examined at the NRC's 
Public Document Room, 11555 Rockville Pike (Room O-1F21), Rockville, 
Maryland. Comments may be submitted by electronic mail to 
CLIIP@nrc.gov.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: C. Craig Harbuck, Mail Stop: O-12H2, 
Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional 
Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001, telephone 301-415-3140.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background

    Regulatory Issue Summary 2000-06, ``Consolidated Line Item 
Improvement Process for Adopting Standard Technical Specification 
Changes for Power Reactors,'' was issued on March 20, 2000. The 
consolidated line item improvement process (CLIIP) is intended to 
improve the efficiency of NRC licensing processes by processing 
proposed changes to the standard technical specifications (STS) in a 
manner that supports subsequent license amendment applications. The 
CLIIP includes an opportunity for the public to comment on a proposed 
change to the STS after a preliminary assessment by the NRC staff and a 
finding that the change will likely be offered for adoption by 
licensees. This notice solicits comments on a proposed change to 
establish more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and 
administrative TS requirements related to maintaining CRE habitability. 
The CLIIP directs the NRC staff to evaluate any comments received for a 
proposed change to the STS and to either reconsider the change or 
announce the availability of the change for adoption by licensees. 
Licensees opting to apply for this TS change are responsible for 
reviewing the staff's evaluation, referencing the applicable technical 
justifications, and providing any necessary plant-specific information. 
Each amendment application made in response to the notice of 
availability will be processed and noticed in accordance with 
applicable rules and NRC procedures.
    This notice involves a change to establish more effective and 
appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative TS requirements 
related to ensuring CRE habitability. This change was proposed for 
incorporation into the STS by the owners groups participants in the 
Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) and is designated TSTF-448, 
Revision 3 (Rev 3). TSTF-448, Rev 3, can be viewed on the NRC's Web 
page at https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/licensing/techspecs.html 
.

Applicability

    This proposal to modify TS to establish more effective and 
appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative requirements 
related to maintaining CRE habitability, as proposed in TSTF-448, Rev 
3, is applicable to all licensees.
    To efficiently process the incoming license amendment applications, 
the staff requests that each licensee applying for the changes proposed 
in TSTF-448, Rev 3, use the CLIIP. The CLIIP does not prevent licensees 
from requesting an alternative approach or proposing the changes 
without the requested TS bases and TS bases control program. Variations 
from the approach recommended in this notice may require additional 
review by the NRC staff, and may increase the time and resources needed 
for the review. Significant variations from the approach, or inclusion 
of additional changes to the license, will result in staff rejection of 
the submittal. Instead, licensees desiring significant variations and/
or additional changes should submit a license amendment request (LAR) 
that does not claim to adopt TSTF-448, Rev 3.

Public Notices

    This notice requests comments from interested members of the public 
within 30 days of the date of publication in the Federal Register. 
After evaluating the comments received as a result of this notice, the 
staff will either reconsider the proposed change or announce the 
availability of the change in a subsequent notice (perhaps with some 
changes to the safety evaluation or the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination as a result of public comments). If the 
staff announces the availability of the change, licensees wishing to 
adopt the change must submit an application in accordance with 
applicable rules and other regulatory requirements. For each 
application the staff will publish a notice of consideration of 
issuance of amendment to facility operating licenses, a proposed no 
significant hazards consideration determination, and a notice of 
opportunity for a hearing. The staff will also publish a notice of 
issuance of an amendment to an operating license to announce the 
modification of TS requirements related to CRE habitability, for each 
plant that receives the requested change.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4th day of October, 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Timothy J. Kobetz,
Chief, Technical Specifications Branch, Division of Inspection and 
Regional Support, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

Model Safety Evaluation

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission; Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation; Consolidated Line Item Improvement; Adoption of Changes to 
Standard Technical Specifications; Under Technical Specifications Task 
Force (TSTF) Change Number TSTF-448, Revision 3; Regarding Control Room 
Envelope Habitability

1.0 Introduction

    By application dated [ ] [as supplemented by letters dated[ and ]], 
[Name of Licensee] (the licensee) requested changes to the Technical 
Specifications (TS) for the [Name of Facility]. [The supplements dated 
[and], provided additional information that clarified the application, 
did not expand the scope of the application as originally noticed, and 
did not change the staff's original proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination as published in the Federal Register on 
[Date (PM/LA will fill in FR information)] (XX FR XXXX).]
    On August 8, 2006, the commercial nuclear electrical power 
generation industry owners group Technical Specifications Task Force 
(TSTF) submitted a proposed change, TSTF-448, Revision 3, to the 
improved standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430-1434) on 
behalf of the industry (TSTF-448, Revisions 0, 1, and 2 were prior 
draft iterations). TSTF-448, Revision 3, is a proposal to establish 
more effective and appropriate action, surveillance, and administrative 
STS requirements related to ensuring the habitability of the control 
room envelope (CRE).
    In United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Generic Letter 
2003-01 (Reference 1), licensees were alerted to findings at facilities 
that existing TS surveillance requirements for the [Control Room 
Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)] may not

[[Page 61077]]

be adequate. Specifically, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) 
tracer gas tests to measure control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered 
inleakage at facilities indicated that the differential pressure 
surveillance is not a reliable method for demonstrating CRE boundary 
operability. Licensees were requested to address existing TS as 
follows:

    Provide confirmation that your technical specifications verify 
the integrity [i.e., operability] of the CRE [boundary], and the 
assumed [unfiltered] inleakage rates of potentially contaminated 
air. If you currently have a differential pressure surveillance 
requirement to demonstrate CRE [boundary] integrity, provide the 
basis for your conclusion that it remains adequate to demonstrate 
CRE integrity in light of the ASTM E741 testing results. If you 
conclude that your differential pressure surveillance requirement is 
no longer adequate, provide a schedule for: 1) revising the 
surveillance requirement in your technical specification to 
reference an acceptable surveillance methodology (e.g., ASTM E741), 
and 2) making any necessary modifications to your CRE [boundary] so 
that compliance with your new surveillance requirement can be 
demonstrated.
    If your facility does not currently have a technical 
specification surveillance requirement for your CRE integrity, 
explain how and at what frequency you confirm your CRE integrity and 
why this is adequate to demonstrate CRE integrity.

    To promote standardization and to minimize the resources that would 
be needed to create and process plant-specific amendment applications 
in response to the concerns described in the generic letter, the 
industry and the NRC proposed revisions to CRE habitability system 
requirements contained in the STS, using the STS change traveler 
process. This effort culminated in Revision 3 to traveler TSTF-448, 
``Control Room Habitability,'' which the NRC staff approved on [month 
dd, 2006].
    Consistent with the traveler as incorporated into NUREG-143xx, the 
licensee proposed revising action and surveillance requirements in 
[Specification 3.7.10, ``Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation 
System (CREEVS),''] and adding a new administrative controls program, 
[Specification 5.5.18, ``CRE Habitability Program.''] The purpose of 
the changes is to ensure that CRE boundary operability is maintained 
and verified through effective surveillance and programmatic 
requirements, and that appropriate remedial actions are taken in the 
event of an inoperable CRE boundary.

2.0 Regulatory Evaluation

2.1 Control Room and Control Room Envelope

    NRC Regulatory Guide 1.196, ``Control Room Habitability at Light-
water Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003, (Reference 4) 
uses the term ``control room envelope (CRE)'' in addition to the term 
``control room'' and defines each term as follows:

    Control Room: The plant area, defined in the facility licensing 
basis, in which actions can be taken to operate the plant safely 
under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe 
condition during accident situations. It encompasses the 
instrumentation and controls necessary for a safe shutdown of the 
plant and typically includes the critical document reference file, 
computer room (if used as an integral part of the emergency response 
plan), shift supervisor's office, operator wash room and kitchen, 
and other critical areas to which frequent personnel access or 
continuous occupancy may be necessary in the event of an accident.
    Control Room Envelope: The plant area, defined in the facility 
licensing basis, that in the event of an emergency, can be isolated 
from the plant areas and the environment external to the CRE. This 
area is served by an emergency ventilation system, with the intent 
of maintaining the habitability of the control room. This area 
encompasses the control room, and may encompass other non-critical 
areas to which frequent personnel access or continuous occupancy is 
not necessary in the event of an accident.

    NRC Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 
Integrity At Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003 (Reference 
5), also contains these definitions, but uses the term CRE to mean 
both. This is because the protected environment provided for operators 
varies with the nuclear power facility. At some facilities, this 
environment is limited to the control room; at others, it is the CRE. 
In this safety evaluation, consistent with the proposed changes to the 
STS, the CRE will be used to designate both. For consistency, 
facilities should use the term CRE with an appropriate facility-
specific definition derived from the above CRE definition.

2.2 [Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)]

    The [CREEVS] provides a protected environment from which operators 
can control the unit, during airborne challenges from radioactivity, 
hazardous chemicals, and fire byproducts, such as fire suppression 
agents and smoke, during both normal and accident conditions.
    The [CREEVS] is designed to maintain a habitable environment in the 
control room envelope for 30 days of continuous occupancy after a 
Design Basis Accident (DBA) without exceeding a [5 rem whole body dose 
or its equivalent to any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose 
equivalent (TEDE)].
    The [CREEVS] consists of two redundant trains [subsystems], each 
capable of maintaining the habitability of the CRE. The [CREEVS] is 
considered operable when the individual components necessary to limit 
operator exposure are operable in both trains [subsystems]. A [CREEVS] 
train [subsystem] is considered operable when the associated:
     Fan is operable;
     High efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filters and 
charcoal adsorbers are not excessively restricting flow, and are 
capable of performing their filtration functions;
     Heater, demister, ductwork, valves, and dampers are 
operable, and air circulation can be maintained; and
     CRE boundary is operable (the single boundary supports 
both trains [subsystems]).
    The CRE boundary is considered operable when the measured 
unfiltered air inleakage is less than or equal to the inleakage value 
assumed by the licensing basis analyses of design basis accident 
consequences to CRE occupants.

2.3 Regulations Applicable to Control Room Habitability

    In Appendix A, ``General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power 
Plants,'' to 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing of Production and 
Utilization Facilities,'' General Design Criteria (GDC) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 
and 19 apply to CRE habitability. A summary of these GDCs follows.
    GDC 1, ``Quality Standards and Records,'' requires that structures, 
systems, and components (SSCs) important to safety be designed, 
fabricated, erected, and tested to quality standards commensurate with 
the importance of the safety functions performed.
    GDC 2, ``Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena,'' 
requires that structures, systems, and components (SSCs) important to 
safety be designed to withstand the effects of earthquakes and other 
natural hazards.
    GDC 3, ``Fire Protection,'' requires SSCs important to safety be 
designed and located to minimize the effects of fires and explosions.
    GDC 4, ``Environmental and Dynamic Effects Design Bases,'' requires 
SSCs important to safety to be designed to accommodate the effects of 
and to be compatible with the environmental

[[Page 61078]]

conditions associated with normal operation, maintenance, testing, and 
postulated accidents, including loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCAs).
    GDC 5, ``Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components,'' requires 
that SSCs important to safety not be shared among nuclear power units 
unless it can be shown that such sharing will not significantly impair 
their ability to perform their safety functions, including, in the 
event of an accident in one unit, the orderly shutdown and cooldown of 
the remaining units.
    GDC 19, ``Control Room,'' requires that a control room be provided 
from which actions can be taken to operate the nuclear reactor safely 
under normal conditions and to maintain the reactor in a safe condition 
under accident conditions, including a LOCA. Adequate radiation 
protection is to be provided to permit access and occupancy of the 
control room under accident conditions without personnel receiving 
radiation exposures in excess of specified values.
    Prior to incorporation of TSTF-448, Revision 3, the STS 
requirements addressing control room habitability resided only in the 
following CRE ventilation system specifications:
     NUREG-1430, TS 3.7.10, ``Control Room Emergency 
Ventilation System (CREVS);''
     NUREG-1431, TS 3.7.10, ``Control Room Emergency Filtration 
System (CREFS);''
     NUREG-1432, TS 3.7.11, ``Control Room Emergency Air 
Cleanup System (CREACS);''
     REG-1433, TS 3.7.4, ``[Main Control Room Environmental 
Control (MCREC)] System;'' and
     NUREG-1434, TS 3.7.3, ``[Control Room Fresh Air (CRFA)] 
System.''
    In these specifications, the surveillance requirement associated 
with demonstrating the operability of the CRE boundary requires 
verifying that one [CREEVS] train [subsystem] can maintain a positive 
pressure of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent 
[turbine building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a 
makeup flow rate of [3000] cfm. Facilities that pressurize the CRE 
during the emergency mode of operation of the [CREEVS] have similar 
surveillance requirements. Other facilities that do not pressurize the 
CRE have only a system flow rate criterion for the emergency mode of 
operation. Regardless, the results of ASTM E741 (Reference 2) tracer 
gas tests to measure CRE unfiltered inleakage at facilities indicated 
that the differential pressure surveillance (or the alternative 
surveillance at non-pressurization facilities) is not a reliable method 
for demonstrating CRE boundary operability. That is, licensees were 
able to obtain differential pressure and flow measurements satisfying 
the SR limits even though unfiltered inleakage was determined to exceed 
the value assumed in the safety analyses.
    In addition to an inadequate surveillance requirement, the action 
requirements of these specifications were ambiguous regarding CRE 
boundary operability in the event CRE unfiltered inleakage is found to 
exceed the analysis assumption. The ambiguity stemmed from the view 
that the CRE boundary may be considered operable but degraded in this 
condition, and that it would be deemed inoperable only if calculated 
radiological exposure limits for CRE occupants exceeded a licensing 
basis limit; e.g., as stated in GDC-19, even while crediting 
compensatory measures.
    NRC Administrative Letter 98-10, ``Dispositioning of Technical 
Specifications That Are Insufficient to Assure Plant Safety,'' (AL 98-
10) states that `` the discovery of an improper or inadequate TS value 
or required action is considered a degraded or nonconforming 
condition,'' which is defined in [NRC Inspection Manual Chapter 9900; 
see latest guidance in RIS 2005-20 (Reference 3)]. ``Imposing 
administrative controls in response to an improper or inadequate TS is 
considered an acceptable short-term corrective action. The [NRC] staff 
expects that, following the imposition of administrative controls, an 
amendment to the [inadequate] TS, with appropriate justification and 
schedule, will be submitted in a timely fashion.''
    Licensees that have found unfiltered inleakage in excess of the 
limit assumed in the safety analyses and have yet to either reduce the 
inleakage below the limit or establish a higher bounding limit through 
re-analysis, have implemented compensatory actions to ensure the safety 
of CRE occupants, pending final resolution of the condition, consistent 
with RIS 2005-20. However, based on GL 2003-01 and AL 98-10, the staff 
expects each licensee to propose TS changes that include a surveillance 
to periodically measure CRE unfiltered inleakage in order to satisfy 10 
CFR 50.36(c)(3), which requires a facility's TS to include surveillance 
requirements, which it defines as ``requirements relating to test, 
calibration, or inspection to assure that the necessary quality of 
systems and components is maintained, that facility operation will be 
within safety limits, and that limiting conditions for operation will 
be met.'' (Emphasis added.)
    The NRC staff also expects facilities to propose unambiguous 
remedial actions, consistent with 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2), for the condition 
of not meeting the limiting condition for operation (LCO) due to an 
inoperable CRE boundary. The action requirements should specify a 
reasonable completion time to restore conformance to the LCO before 
requiring a facility to be shut down. This completion time should be 
based on the benefits of implementing mitigating actions to ensure CRE 
occupant safety and sufficient time to resolve most problems 
anticipated with the CRE boundary, while minimizing the chance that 
operators in the CRE will need to use mitigating actions during 
accident conditions.

2.4 Adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, by [Facility Name]

    Adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, will assure that the facility's 
TS LCO for the [CREEVS] is met by demonstrating unfiltered leakage into 
the CRE is within limits; i.e., the operability of the CRE boundary. In 
support of this surveillance, which specifies a relatively long test 
interval (frequency) of 6 years, TSTF-448 also adds TS administrative 
controls to assure the habitability of the CRE between performances of 
the ASTM E741 test. In addition, adoption of TSTF-448 will establish 
clearly stated and reasonable required actions in the event CRE 
unfiltered inleakage is found to exceed the analysis assumption.
    The changes made by TSTF-448 to the STS requirements for the 
[CREEVS] and the CRE boundary conform to 10 CFR 50.36(c)(2) and 10 CFR 
50.36(c)(3). Their adoption will better assure that [facility name]'s 
CRE will remain habitable during normal operation and design basis 
accident conditions. These changes are, therefore, acceptable from a 
regulatory standpoint.

3.0 Technical Evaluation

    The NRC staff reviewed the proposed changes against the 
corresponding changes made to the STS by TSTF-448, Revision 3, which 
the NRC staff has found to satisfy applicable regulatory requirements, 
as described above in Section 2.0. [The emergency operational mode of 
the [CREEVS] at [facility name] [pressurizes] [isolates but does not 
pressurize] the CRE to minimize unfiltered air inleakage.] The proposed 
changes are consistent with this design.

3.1 Proposed Changes

    The proposed amendment would strengthen CRE habitability TS

[[Page 61079]]

requirements by changing TS [3.7.10, CREEVS] and adding a new TS 
administrative controls program on CRE habitability. Accompanying the 
proposed TS changes are appropriate conforming technical changes to the 
TS Bases.
    The proposed revision to the Bases also includes editorial and 
administrative changes to reflect applicable changes to the 
corresponding STS Bases, which were made to improve clarity, conform 
with the latest information and references, correct factual errors, and 
achieve more consistency among the STS NUREGs. [Except for plant 
specific differences, all of] these changes are consistent with STS as 
revised by TSTF-448, Revision 3.
    The NRC staff compared the proposed TS changes to the STS and the 
STS markups and evaluations in TSTF-448. [The staff verified that 
differences from the STS were adequately justified on the basis of 
plant-specific design or retention of current licensing basis.] The NRC 
staff also reviewed the proposed changes to the TS Bases for 
consistency with the STS Bases and the plant-specific design and 
licensing bases, although approval of the Bases is not a condition for 
accepting the proposed amendment. However, TS 5.5.[11], ``TS Bases 
Control Program,'' provides assurance that the licensee has established 
and will maintain the adequacy of the Bases.
    [The proposed Bases for TS 3.7.10 reference NEI 99-03, ``Control 
Room Habitability Assessment Guidance,'' Revision 1, dated March 2003, 
which the NRC staff has not formally endorsed. However, NEI 99-03, 
Revision 0 (Reference 6), dated June 2001, has been endorsed through 
Regulatory Guide 1.196, ``Control Room Habitability at Light-Water 
Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dated May 2003 (Reference 4). Listing 
Revision 1 instead of Revision 0 is acceptable because the NRC staff 
reviewed the descriptions and justifications of the differences between 
Revision 0 and Revision 1, provided in the licensee's application, and 
has determined that referencing Revision 1 does not conflict with the 
endorsement of Revision 0, as stated in RG 1.196.]

3.2 Editorial Changes

    The licensee proposed editorial changes to TS [3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] 
to establish standard terminology, such as ``control room envelope 
(CRE)'' in place of ``control room,'' except for the plant-specific 
name for the [CREEVS], and ``radiological, chemical, and smoke hazards 
(or challenges)'' in place of various phrases to describe the hazards 
that CRE occupants are protected from by the [CREEVS]. [The licensee 
also proposed to correct a typographical error by replacing 
``irradiate'' with ``irradiated'' in TS 3.7.10 Condition E.] These 
changes improve the usability and quality of the presentation of the 
TS, have no impact on safety, and therefore, are acceptable.

3.3 TS [3.7.10, CREEVS]


    The licensee proposed to revise the action requirements of TS 
[3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] to acknowledge that an inoperable CRE boundary, 
depending upon the location of the associated degradation, could cause 
just one, instead of both [CREEVS] [trains] to be inoperable. This is 
accomplished by revising Condition A to exclude Condition B, and 
revising Condition B to address one or more [CREEVS] [trains], as 
follows:
     Condition A One [CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons 
other than Condition B.
     Condition B One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due 
to inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4].
    This change clarifies how to apply the action requirements in the 
event just one [CREEVS] [train] is unable to ensure CRE occupant safety 
within licensing basis limits because of an inoperable CRE boundary. It 
enhances the usability of Conditions A and B with a presentation that 
is more consistent with the intent of the existing requirements. This 
change is an administrative change because it neither reduces nor 
increases the existing action requirements, and, therefore, is 
acceptable.
    The licensee proposed to replace existing Required Action B.1, 
``Restore control room boundary to OPERABLE status,'' which has a 24-
hour Completion Time, with Required Action B.1, to immediately initiate 
action to implement mitigating actions; Required Action B.2, to verify, 
within 24 hours, that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant radiological 
exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the licensing basis 
analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants are protected from 
hazardous chemicals and smoke; and Required Action B.3, to restore CRE 
boundary to operable status within 90 days.
    The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is 
reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this 
time period, and the use of mitigating actions as directed by Required 
Action B.1. The 90-day Completion Time of new Required Action B.3 is 
reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating actions will 
ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits while 
limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to implement 
protective measures that may adversely affect their ability to control 
the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in the event 
of a DBA. The 90-day Completion Time is a reasonable time to diagnose, 
plan and possibly repair, and test most anticipated problems with the 
CRE boundary. Therefore, proposed Action B is acceptable.


    The licensee proposed to establish new action requirements in TS 
[3.7.10, ``CREEVS,''] for an inoperable CRE boundary. Currently, if one 
[CREEVS] [train] is determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable 
CRE boundary, existing Action A would apply and require restoring the 
[train] (and the CRE boundary) to operable status in 7 days. If two 
[trains] are determined to be inoperable due to an inoperable CRE 
boundary, existing Action [E] specifies no time to restore the [trains] 
(and the CRE boundary) to operable status, but requires immediate entry 
into the shutdown actions of LCO 3.0.3. These existing Actions are more 
restrictive than would be appropriate in situations for which CRE 
occupant implementation of compensatory measures or mitigating actions 
would temporarily afford adequate CRE occupant protection from 
postulated airborne hazards. To account for such situations, the 
licensee proposed to revise the action requirements to add a new 
Condition B, ``One or more [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable due to 
inoperable CRE boundary in MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4].'' New Action B 
would allow 90 days to restore the CRE boundary (and consequently, the 
affected [CREEVS] [trains]) to operable status, provided that 
mitigating actions are immediately implemented and within 24 hours are 
verified to ensure, that in the event of a DBA, CRE occupant 
radiological exposures will not exceed the calculated dose of the 
licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences, and that CRE occupants 
are protected from hazardous chemicals and smoke.

[[Page 61080]]

    The 24-hour Completion Time of new Required Action B.2 is 
reasonable based on the low probability of a DBA occurring during this 
time period, and the use of mitigating actions. The 90-day Completion 
Time is reasonable based on the determination that the mitigating 
actions will ensure protection of CRE occupants within analyzed limits 
while limiting the probability that CRE occupants will have to 
implement protective measures that may adversely affect their ability 
to control the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition in 
the event of a DBA. The 90-day Completion Time of new Required Action 
B.3 is a reasonable time to diagnose, plan and possibly repair, and 
test most anticipated problems with the CRE boundary. Therefore, 
proposed Action B is acceptable.
    To distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for one 
[CREEVS] [train] inoperable, Condition A is revised to state, ``One 
[CREEVS] [train] inoperable for reasons other than Condition B.'' To 
distinguish new Condition B from the existing condition for two 
[CREEVS] [trains] inoperable, Condition [E] (renumbered as Condition 
[F]) is revised to state, ``Two [CREEVS] [trains] inoperable during 
MODE 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4] for reasons other than Condition B.'' The 
changes to existing Conditions A and [E] are less restrictive because 
these Conditions will no longer apply in the event one or two [CREEVS] 
[trains] are inoperable due to an inoperable CRE boundary during unit 
operation in Mode 1, 2, [or] 3[, or 4]. This is acceptable because the 
new Action B establishes adequate remedial measures in this condition. 
With the addition of a new Condition B, existing Conditions B, C, D, 
and E are re-designated C, D, E, and F, respectively.
    The licensee also proposed to modify the [CREEVS] LCO by adding a 
note allowing the CRE boundary to be opened intermittently under 
administrative controls. As stated in the LCO Bases, this Note ``only 
applies to openings in the CRE boundary that can be rapidly restored to 
the design condition, such as doors, hatches, floor plugs, and access 
panels. For entry and exit through doors, the administrative control of 
the opening is performed by the person(s) entering or exiting the area. 
For other openings, these controls should be proceduralized and consist 
of stationing a dedicated individual at the opening who is in 
continuous communication with operators in the CRE. This individual 
will have a method to rapidly close the opening and to restore the CRE 
boundary to a condition equivalent to the design condition when a need 
for CRE isolation is indicated.'' The allowance of this note is 
acceptable because the administrative controls will ensure that the 
opening will be quickly sealed to maintain the validity of the 
licensing basis analyses of DBA consequences.


    The existing TS 3.7.10 condition for two control room emergency 
ventilation system (CREVS) trains inoperable during refueling, 
Condition E, is revised to also apply during plant operation in Modes 5 
and 6. It will state, ``Two CREVS trains inoperable [in MODE 5 or 6, 
or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.'' This 
change clarifies the applicability of this condition for dual unit 
facilities when the unit is in Mode 5 or 6, and the other unit is 
moving [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies. Similarly, Condition D, 
for failing to meet Action A during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies, is revised to also apply in Modes 5 and 6. These 
changes are administrative because they only clarify the intended 
applicability of the existing conditions, and are, therefore, 
acceptable. Required Actions D.2 and E.1, to immediately suspend 
movement of [recently] irradiated fuel assemblies, ensures that a fuel 
handling accident cannot occur while the unit is in these conditions. 
With only one CREVS train inoperable, Required Action D.1 specifies an 
alternative to immediately suspending fuel movement; it requires 
immediately placing the operable CREVS train in its emergency operating 
alignment, or mode, to minimize the chance the train will fail to 
properly switch to this mode if called upon in response to a fuel 
handling accident, or other airborne hazards challenge.


    The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action E of TS 
3.7.10 that states, ``One or more [CREEVS] trains inoperable due to an 
inoperable CRE boundary [in Mode 5 or 6, or] during movement of 
[recently] irradiated fuel assemblies.'' The specified Required Action 
proposed for this condition is the same as for the existing condition 
of Action E [(revised as discussed previously) ], which states ``[Two [CREEVS] trains inoperable 
[in MODE 5 or 6, or] during movement of [recently] irradiated fuel 
assemblies.'' Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other 
condition in Action E using the logical connector ``OR'' in accordance 
with the STS writer's guide (TSTF-GG-05-01, ``Writer's Guide for Plant-
Specific Improved Technical Specifications,'' June 2005). The practical 
result of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two 
separately numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is 
to make the TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an 
additional numbered row in the Actions table. The new condition in 
Action E is needed because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 
1, 2, 3, and 4. As such, this change will ensure that the Actions table 
continues to specify a condition for an inoperable CRE boundary during 
Modes 5 and 6 and during refueling. Therefore, this change is 
administrative and acceptable.


    The licensee proposed to add a new condition to Action F of TS 
3.7.4 that states, ``One or more [CREEVS] subsystems inoperable due to 
an inoperable CRE boundary during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies in the [[primary or] secondary] containment or during 
operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel (OPDRVs).'' 
The specified Required Actions proposed for this condition are the same 
as for the other existing condition for Action F, which states, ``Two 
[CREEVS] subsystems inoperable during movement of [recently] irradiated 
fuel assemblies in the [secondary] containment or during OPDRVs.'' 
Accordingly, the new condition is stated with the other condition in 
Action F using the logical connector ``OR'' in accordance with the STS 
writer's guide (TSTF-GG-05-01, ``Writer's Guide for Plant-Specific 
Improved Technical Specifications,'' June 2005). The practical result 
of this presentation in format is the same as specifying two separately 
numbered Actions, one for each condition. Its advantage is to make the 
TS Actions table easier to use by avoiding having an additional 
numbered row in the Actions table. This new actions condition is needed 
because proposed Action B will only apply in Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4. As 
such, this change will ensure that the Actions table continues to 
specify a condition for an inoperable CRE boundary during refueling and 
OPDRVs. Therefore, this change is administrative and acceptable.

[[Page 61081]]



    In the [emergency radiation state] of operation, the [CREEVS] 
isolates unfiltered ventilation air supply intakes, filters the 
emergency ventilation air supply to the CRE, and pressurizes the CRE to 
minimize unfiltered air inleakage past the CRE boundary. The licensee 
proposed to delete the CRE pressurization surveillance requirement 
(SR). This SR requires verifying that one [CREEVS] [train][subsystem], 
operating in the [emergency radiation state], can maintain a pressure 
of [0.125] inches water gauge, relative to the adjacent [turbine 
building] during the pressurization mode of operation at a makeup flow 
rate of [3000] cfm. The deletion of this SR is proposed because 
measurements of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE at numerous reactor 
facilities demonstrated that a basic assumption of this SR, an 
essentially leak-tight CRE boundary, was incorrect for most facilities. 
Hence, meeting this SR by achieving the required CRE pressure is not 
necessarily a conclusive indication of CRE boundary leak tightness, 
i.e., CRE boundary operability. In its response to GL 2003-01, [dated 
month, dd, yyyy], the licensee reported that it had determined that the 
[facility name] CRE pressurization surveillance, SR 3.7.[10].[4], was 
inadequate to demonstrate the operability of the CRE boundary, and 
proposed to replace it with an inleakage measurement SR and a CRE 
Habitability Program in TS Section 5.5, in accordance with the approved 
version of TSTF-448. Based on the adoption of TSTF-448, Revision 3, the 
licensee's proposal to delete SR 3.7.[10].[4] is acceptable.

    The proposed CRE inleakage measurement SR states, ``Perform 
required CRE unfiltered air inleakage testing in accordance with the 
Control Room Envelope Habitability Program.'' The CRE Habitability 
Program TS, proposed TS 5.5.[18], requires that the program include 
``Requirements for determining the unfiltered air inleakage past the 
CRE boundary into the CRE in accordance with the testing methods and at 
the Frequencies specified in Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 
1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 5). This guidance references ASTM E741 
(Reference 2) as an acceptable method for ascertaining the unfiltered 
leakage into the CRE. The licensee has [,however, not] proposed to 
follow this method. [The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's proposed 
alternative method for measuring CRE inleakage to ensure it meets the 
criteria for such methods given in RG 1.197.] [Insert plant-specific 
technical evaluation by the staff of the alternative method.] [The NRC 
staff finds that the proposed alternative method is adequate for 
satisfying the criteria of RG 1.197.] Therefore, the proposed CRE 
inleakage measurement SR is acceptable.

3.4 TS 5.5.[18], CRE Habitability Program

    The proposed administrative controls program TS is consistent with 
the model program TS in TSTF-448, Revision 3. In combination with SR 
3.7.[10].[4], this program is intended to ensure the operability of the 
CRE boundary, which as part of an operable [CREEVS] will ensure that 
CRE habitability is maintained such that CRE occupants can control the 
reactor safely under normal conditions and maintain it in a safe 
condition following a radiological event, hazardous chemical release, 
or a smoke challenge. The program shall ensure that adequate radiation 
protection is provided to permit access and occupancy of the CRE under 
design basis accident (DBA) conditions without personnel receiving 
radiation exposures in excess of [5 rem whole body or its equivalent to 
any part of the body] [5 rem total effective dose equivalent (TEDE)] 
for the duration of the accident.
    A CRE Habitability Program TS acceptable to the NRC staff requires 
the program to contain the following elements:
    Definitions of CRE and CRE boundary. This element is intended to 
ensure that these definitions accurately describe the plant areas that 
are within the CRE, and also the interfaces that form the CRE boundary, 
and are consistent with the general definitions discussed in Section 
2.1 of this safety evaluation. Establishing what is meant by the CRE 
and the CRE boundary will preclude ambiguity in the implementation of 
the program.
    Configuration control and preventive maintenance of the CRE 
boundary. This element is intended to ensure the CRE boundary is 
maintained in its design condition. Guidance for implementing this 
element is contained in NEI 99-03 (Reference 6) and Regulatory Guide 
1.196 (Reference 4). Maintaining the CRE boundary in its design 
condition provides assurance that its leak-tightness will not 
significantly degrade between CRE inleakage determinations.
    Assessment of CRE habitability at the frequencies stated in 
Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197, Revision 0 (Reference 
5), and measurement of unfiltered air leakage into the CRE in 
accordance with the testing methods and at the frequencies stated in 
Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197. [The licensee proposed 
the following exception[s] to Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 
1.197, to be listed in the TS with this program element.] [Insert 
plant-specific evaluation of licensee's proposed exceptions.] This 
element is intended to ensure that the plant assesses CRE habitability 
consistent with Sections C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197 [and NRC 
approved exceptions]. Assessing CRE habitability at the NRC accepted 
frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of the CRE 
boundary will not go undetected between CRE inleakage determinations. 
Determination of CRE inleakage using test methods acceptable to the NRC 
staff assures that test results are reliable for ascertaining CRE 
boundary operability. Determination of CRE inleakage at the NRC 
accepted frequencies provides assurance that significant degradation of 
the CRE boundary will not occur between CRE inleakage determinations.
    Measurement of CRE pressure with respect to all areas adjacent to 
the CRE boundary at designated locations for use in assessing the CRE 
boundary at a frequency of [18] months on a staggered test basis (with 
respect to the [CREEVS] trains). This element is intended to ensure 
that CRE differential pressure is regularly measured to identify 
changes in pressure warranting evaluation of the condition of the CRE 
boundary. Obtaining and trending pressure data provides additional 
assurance that significant degradation of the CRE boundary will not go 
undetected between CRE inleakage determinations.
    Quantitative limits on unfiltered inleakage. This element is 
intended to establish the CRE inleakage limit as the CRE unfiltered 
infiltration rate assumed in the CRE occupant radiological consequence 
analyses of design basis accidents. Having an unambiguous criterion for 
the CRE boundary to be considered operable in order to meet LCO 
3.7.[10], will ensure that associated action requirements will be 
consistently applied in the event of CRE degradation resulting in 
inleakage exceeding the limit.
    Consistent with TSTF-448, Revision 3, the program states that the 
provisions of SR 3.0.2 are applicable to the program frequencies for 
performing the activities required by program paragraph number c, parts 
(i) and (ii) (assessment of CRE habitability and measurement of CRE 
inleakage), and paragraph number d (measurement of CRE differential

[[Page 61082]]

pressure). This statement is needed to avoid confusion. SR 3.0.2 is 
applicable to the surveillance that references the testing in the CRE 
Habitability Program. However, SR 3.0.2 is not applicable to 
Administrative Controls unless specifically invoked. Providing this 
statement in the program eliminates any confusion regarding whether SR 
3.0.2 is applicable, and is acceptable.
    Consistent with TSTF-448, Revision 3, proposed TS 5.5.[18] states 
that (1) a CRE Habitability Program shall be established and 
implemented, (2) the program shall include all of the NRC-staff 
required elements, as described above, and (3) the provisions of SR 
3.0.2 shall apply to program frequencies. Therefore, TS 5.5.[18], which 
is consistent with the model program TS approved by the NRC staff in 
TSTF-448, Revision 3, is acceptable.

4.0 State Consultation

    In accordance with the Commission's regulations, the [ ] State 
official was notified of the proposed issuance of the amendment. The 
State official had [(1) no comments or (2) the following comments--with 
subsequent disposition by the staff].

5.0 Environmental Consideration

    The amendments change a requirement with respect to the 
installation or use of a facility component located within the 
restricted area as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and change surveillance 
requirements. The NRC staff has determined that the amendments involve 
no significant increase in the amounts and no significant change in the 
types of any effluents that may be released offsite, and that there is 
no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational 
radiation exposure. The Commission has previously issued a proposed 
finding that the amendments involve no-significant-hazards 
considerations, and there has been no public comment on the finding [xx 
FR xxxx]. Accordingly, the amendments meet the eligibility criteria for 
categorical exclusion set forth in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) [and (c)(10)]. 
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or 
environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the 
issuance of the amendments.

6.0 Conclusion

    The Commission has concluded, on the basis of the considerations 
discussed above, that (1) There is reasonable assurance that the health 
and safety of the public will not be endangered by operation in the 
proposed manner, (2) such activities will be conducted in compliance 
with the Commission's regulations, and (3) the issuance of the 
amendments will not be inimical to the common defense and security or 
to the health and safety of the public.

7.0 References

    1. NRC Generic Letter 2003-01, ``Control Room Habitability,'' dated 
June 12, 2003, (GL 2003-01).
    2. ASTM E 741-00, ``Standard Test Method for Determining Air Change 
in a Single Zone by Means of a Tracer Gas Dilution,'' 2000, (ASTM 
E741).
    3. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2005-20: Revision to Guidance 
Formerly Contained in NRC Generic Letter 91-18,'' Information to 
Licensees Regarding Two NRC Inspection Manual Sections on Resolution of 
Degraded and Nonconforming Conditions and on Operability,'' dated 
September 26, 2005 (RIS 2005-20).
    4. Regulatory Guide 1.196, ``Control Room Habitability at Light-
Water Nuclear Power Reactors,'' dated May 2003.
    5. Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope 
Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003.
    6. NEI 99-03, Revision 0, ``Control Room Habitability Assessment 
Guidance'' datedJune 2001.
    Principal contributors: C. Harbuck.

Proposed No-Significant-Hazards-Consideration Determination

    Description of Amendment Request: A change is proposed to the 
standard technical specifications (STS) (NUREGs 1430 through 1434) and 
plant specific technical specifications (TS), to strengthen TS 
requirements regarding control room envelope (CRE) habitability by 
changing the action and surveillance requirements associated with the 
limiting condition for operation operability requirements for the CRE 
emergency ventilation system, and by adding a new TS administrative 
controls program on CRE habitability. Accompanying the proposed TS 
change are appropriate conforming technical changes to the TS Bases. 
The proposed revision to the Bases also includes editorial and 
administrative changes to reflect applicable changes to the 
corresponding STS Bases, which were made to improve clarity, conform 
with the latest information and references, correct factual errors, and 
achieve more consistency among the STS NUREGs. The proposed revision to 
the TS and associated Bases is consistent with STS as revised by TSTF-
448, Revision 3.
    Basis for proposed no significant hazards consideration 
determination: As required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), an analysis of the issue 
of no significant hazards consideration is presented below:

Criterion 1--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Increase in theProbability or Consequences of an Accident Previously 
Evaluated

    The proposed change does not adversely affect accident initiators 
or precursors nor alter the design assumptions, conditions, or 
configuration of the facility. The proposed change does not alter or 
prevent the ability of structures, systems, and components (SSCs) to 
perform their intended function to mitigate the consequences of an 
initiating event within the assumed acceptance limits. The proposed 
change revises the TS for the CRE emergency ventilation system, which 
is a mitigation system designed to minimize unfiltered air leakage into 
the CRE and to filter the CRE atmosphere to protect the CRE occupants 
in the event of accidents previously analyzed. An important part of the 
CRE emergency ventilation system is the CRE boundary. The CRE emergency 
ventilation system is not an initiator or precursor to any accident 
previously evaluated. Therefore, the probability of any accident 
previously evaluated is not increased. Performing tests to verify the 
operability of the CRE boundary and implementing a program to assess 
and maintain CRE habitability ensure that the CRE emergency ventilation 
system is capable of adequately mitigating radiological consequences to 
CRE occupants during accident conditions, and that the CRE emergency 
ventilation system will perform as assumed in the consequence analyses 
of design basis accidents. Thus, the consequences of any accident 
previously evaluated are not increased. Therefore, the proposed change 
does not involve a significant increase in the probability or 
consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 2--The Proposed Change Does Not Create the Possibility of a 
New or Different Kind of Accident From Any Previously Evaluated

    The proposed change does not impact the accident analysis. The 
proposed change does not alter the required mitigation capability of 
the CRE emergency ventilation system, or its functioning during 
accident conditions as assumed in the licensing basis analyses of 
design basis accident radiological consequences to CRE occupants. No 
new or different accidents result from performing the new surveillance 
or following the new

[[Page 61083]]

program. The proposed change does not involve a physical alteration of 
the plant (i.e., no new or different type of equipment will be 
installed) or a significant change in the methods governing normal 
plant operation. The proposed change does not alter any safety analysis 
assumptions and is consistent with current plant operating practice. 
Therefore, this change does not create the possibility of a new or 
different kind of accident from an accident previously evaluated.

Criterion 3--The Proposed Change Does Not Involve a Significant 
Reduction in the Margin of Safety

    The proposed change does not alter the manner in which safety 
limits, limiting safety system settings or limiting conditions for 
operation are determined. The proposed change does not affect safety 
analysis acceptance criteria. The proposed change will not result in 
plant operation in a configuration outside the design basis for an 
unacceptable period of time without compensatory measures. The proposed 
change does not adversely affect systems that respond to safely shut 
down the plant and to maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition. 
Therefore, the proposed change does not involve a significant reduction 
in a margin of safety.
    Based upon the reasoning presented above and the previous 
discussion of the amendment request, the requested change does not 
involve a no-significant-hazards consideration.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 4 day of October, 2006.
    For The Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Timothy J. Kobetz, Branch Chief , Technical Specifications Branch, 
Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.

    The Following Example Of An Application Was Prepared By The NRC 
Staff To Facilitate Use Of The Consolidated Line Item Improvement 
Process (Cliip). The Model Provides The Expected Level Of Detail And 
Content For An Application To Revise According To Tstf-448, Revision 3, 
Technical Specifications Regarding Control Room Envelope Habitability 
Using Cliip. Licensees Remain Responsible For Ensuring That Their 
Actual Application Fulfills Their Administrative Requirements As Well 
As Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regulations.
U.S. Nuclear Regular Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT: PLANT NAME DOCKET NO. 50-APPLICATION TO REVISE TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS REGARDING CONTROL ROOM ENVELOPE HABITABILITY IN 
ACCORDANCE WITH TSTF-448, REVISION 3, USING THE CONSOLIDATED LINE ITEM 
IMPROVEMENT PROCESS
    Gentlemen:
    In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90 [LICENSEE] is 
submitting a request for an amendment to the technical specifications 
(TS) for [PLANT NAME, UNIT NOS.].
    The proposed amendment would modify TS requirements related to 
control room envelope habitability in accordance with TSTF-448, 
Revision 3.
    Attachment 1 provides a description of the proposed change, the 
requested confirmation of applicability, and plant-specific 
verifications. Attachment 2 provides the existing TS pages marked up to 
show the proposed change. Attachment 3 provides revised (clean) TS 
pages. Attachment 4 provides a summary of the regulatory commitments 
made in this submittal.
    [LICENSEE] requests approval of the proposed License Amendment by 
[DATE], with the amendment being implemented [BY DATE OR WITHIN X 
DAYS].
    In accordance with 10 CFR 50.91, a copy of this application, with 
attachments, is being provided to the designated [STATE] Official.
    I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United 
States of America that I am authorized by [LICENSEE] to make this 
request and that the foregoing is true and correct. (Note that request 
may be notarized in lieu of using this oath or affirmation statement).
    If you should have any questions regarding this submittal, please 
contact [NAME, TELEPHONE NUMBER]
     Sincerely,
     [Name, Title]
    Attachments: 1. Description and Assessment
    2. Proposed Technical Specification Changes
    3. Revised Technical Specification Pages
    4. Regulatory Commitments
    5. Proposed Technical Specification Bases Changes
cc: NRC Project Manager
NRC Regional Office
NRC Resident Inspector
State Contact

Attachment 1--Description and Assessment

1.0 Description

    The proposed amendment would modify technical specification (TS) 
requirements related to control room envelope habitability in TS 
3.7.[10], [Control Room Envelope Emergency Ventilation System (CREEVS)] 
and TS Section 5.5, ``Administrative Controls--Programs.''
    The changes are consistent with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
approved Industry/Technical Specification Task Force (TSTF) STS change 
TSTF-448 Revision 3. The availability of this TS improvement was 
published in the Federal Register on [DATE] as part of the consolidated 
line item improvement process (CLIIP).

2.0 Assessment

2.1 Applicability of Published Safety Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part 
of the CLIIP. This review included a review of the NRC staff's 
evaluation, as well as the supporting information provided to support 
TSTF-448. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the justifications presented in 
the TSTF proposal and the safety evaluation prepared by the NRC staff 
are applicable to [PLANT, UNIT NOS.] and justify this amendment for the 
incorporation of the changes to the [PLANT] TS.

2.2 Optional Changes and Variations

    [LICENSEE] is not proposing any variations or deviations from the 
TS changes described in the TSTF-448, Revision 3, or the NRC staff's 
model safety evaluation dated [DATE].

    [Note: The Applicant should choose one of the following.]

    [LICENSEE] proposes to reference NEI 99-03, Revision 0, dated June 
2001, in the TS bases for TS 3.7.[10], instead of Revision 1, dated 
March 2003, because the NRC has not formally endorsed Revision 1.
    [LICENSEE] proposes to reference NEI 99-03, Revision 1, dated March 
2003, in the TS bases for TS 3.7.[10], and provides the following 
descriptions and justifications of the differences with Revision 0, 
dated June 2003. These justifications demonstrate that referencing 
Revision 1 does not conflict with the positions taken by the NRC staff 
in its endorsement of Revision 0 as stated in Regulatory Guide 1.196, 
``Control Room Habitability at Light-Water Nuclear Power Reactors,'' 
dated May 2003.
    [Insert descriptions and justifications for differences between 
Revision 0 and Revision 1 here.]

[[Page 61084]]

2.3 License Condition Regarding Initial Performance of New Surveillance 
and Assessment Requirements

    [LICENSEE] proposes the following as a license condition to support 
implementation of the proposed TS changes:
    Upon implementation of Amendment No. xxx adopting TSTF-448, 
Revision 3, the determination of control room envelope (CRE) unfiltered 
air inleakage as required by SR 3.7.[10].[4], in accordance with TS 
5.5.[18].c.(i), the assessment of CRE habitability as required by 
Specification 5.5.[18].c.(ii), and the measurement of CRE pressure as 
required by Specification 5.5.[18].d, shall be considered met. 
Following implementation:
    (a) The first performance of SR 3.7.[10.5], in accordance with 
Specification 5.5.[18].c.(i), shall be within the specified Frequency 
of 6 years, plus the 15-month allowance of SR 3.0.2, as measured from 
[date], the date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as 
stated in the [date] letter response to Generic Letter 2003-01, or 
within the next 15 months if the time period since the most recent 
successful tracer gas test is greater than 6 years.
    (b) The first performance of the periodic assessment of CRE 
habitability, Specification 5.5.[18].c.(ii), shall be within 3 years, 
plus the 9-month allowance of SR 3.0.2, as measured from [date], the 
date of the most recent successful tracer gas test, as stated in the 
[date] letter response to Generic Letter 2003-01, or within the next 9 
months if the time period since the most recent successful tracer gas 
test is greater than 3 years.
    (c) The first performance of the periodic measurement of CRE 
pressure, Specification 5.5.[18].d, shall be within [18] months, plus 
the [138] days allowed by SR 3.0.2, as measured from [date], the date 
of the most recent successful pressure measurement test, or within 
[138] days if not performed previously.

3.0 Regulatory Analysis

3.1 No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the proposed no significant hazards 
consideration determination (NSHCD) published in the Federal Register 
as part of the CLIIP. [LICENSEE] has concluded that the proposed NSHCD 
presented in the Federal Register notice is applicable to [PLANT] and 
is hereby incorporated by reference to satisfy the requirements of 10 
CFR 50.91(a).

3.2 Verification and Commitments

    As discussed in the notice of availability published in the Federal 
Register on [DATE] for this TS improvement, plant-specific 
verifications were performed as follows:
    1. [LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of NEI 99-03, Revision 0, 
``Control Room Habitability Assessment Guidance'' dated June 2001, 
which provides guidance and details on the assessment and management of 
control room envelope (CRE) habitability.
    2. [LICENSEE] will revise procedures to implement the new 
surveillance and programmatic TS requirements related to CRE 
habitability.
    3. [LICENSEE] commits to Regulatory Positions C.1 and C.2 of 
Regulatory Guide 1.197, ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope Integrity 
at Nuclear Power Reactors,'' Revision 0, May 2003, with the following 
exceptions:
    [Add descriptions of proposed exceptions.]

4.0 Environmental Evaluation

    [LICENSEE] has reviewed the environmental evaluation included in 
the model safety evaluation dated [DATE] as part of the CLIIP. 
[LICENSEE] has concluded that the staff's findings presented in that 
evaluation are applicable to [PLANT] and the evaluation is hereby 
incorporated by reference for this application.

Attachment 2--Proposed Technical Specification Changes (Mark-Up)

Attachment 3--Proposed Technical Specification Pages

Attachment 4--List of Regulatory Commitments

    The following table identifies those actions committed to by 
[LICENSEE] in this document. Any other statements in this submittal are 
provided for information purposes and are not considered to be 
regulatory commitments. Please direct questions regarding these 
commitments to [CONTACT NAME].

------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Regulatory commitments                   Due date/event
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[LICENSEE] commits to the guidance of NEI    [Ongoing or implement with
 99-03, Revision 0, ``Control Room            amendment].
 Habitability Assessment Guidance'' dated
 June 2001, which provides guidance and
 details on the assessment and management
 of control room envelope (CRE)
 habitability.
[LICENSEE] will revise procedures to         [Implement with amendment].
 implement the new surveillance and
 programmatic TS requirements related to
 CRE habitability.
[LICENSEE] commits to Regulatory Positions   [Implement with amendment].
 C.1 and C.2 of Regulatory Guide 1.197,
 ``Demonstrating Control Room Envelope
 Integrity at Nuclear Power Reactors,''
 Revision 0, May 2003, with the following
 exceptions:.
[Add descriptions of proposed exceptions.]
------------------------------------------------------------------------

Attachment 5--Proposed Changes to Technical Specification Bases Pages

 [FR Doc. E6-17246 Filed 10-16-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P