Florida Power & Light Company; Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4 Exemption, 58634-58638 [E6-16357]
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58634
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 192 / Wednesday, October 4, 2006 / Notices
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 28th day
of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Brendan T. Moroney,
Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch II–
2, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing,
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6–16359 Filed 10–3–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[ Docket Nos. 50–250 and 50–251]
Florida Power & Light Company;
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and
4 Exemption
1.0
Background
The Florida Power & Light Company
(FPL, the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License Nos. DPR–31
and DPR–41, which authorize operation
of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units
3 and 4. The licenses provide, among
other things, that the facility is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission)
now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of two
pressurized-water reactors located in
Miami-Dade County, approximately 25
miles south of Miami, Florida.
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2.0
Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix
R, Subsection III.G.3 addresses fire
protection features for assuring
alternative or dedicated shutdown
capability in the event of a fire, and
requires that fire detection and a fixed
fire suppression system be installed in
the area, room, or zone where
equipment or components are relied on
for the assured shutdown capability.
FPL requests exemption from the
requirements of Subsection III.G.3 of 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, for fixed
suppression in the Mechanical
Equipment Room and for detection and
fixed suppression on the Control Room
Roof, at Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, on
the basis that the existing fire barriers at
Turkey Point, together with fire
protection measures, low combustible
loading, and administrative controls in
place, satisfy the underlying intent of 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3.
In summary, by letter dated December
27, 2004, as supplemented May 23,
2005, January 13, 2006, and July 12,
2006, FPL requests exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Subsection III.G.3, for fixed suppression
in the Mechanical Equipment Room and
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for detection and fixed suppression on
the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point,
Units 3 and 4.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)
the exemptions are authorized by law,
will not present an undue risk to public
health or safety, and are consistent with
the common defense and security, and
(2) when special circumstances are
present.
The underlying purpose of Subsection
III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R is to
require alternative or dedicated
shutdown capability where (a) fire
protection of systems necessary for hot
shutdown does not meet Subsection
III.G.2, or (b) redundant trains of
systems necessary for hot shutdown are
located in the same fire area and may be
subject to damage from fire suppression
activities or systems. In addition, III.G.3
requires fire detection and a fixed fire
suppression system in the area, room, or
zone under consideration.
The staff examined information
supplied by the licensee in support of
the exemption request and concluded
that special circumstances exist in that,
with the installation of the fire detection
system in the Mechanical Equipment
Room proposed by the licensee, the
existing fire protection features in and
accessible for the specific fire zones
(FZs) referenced for Turkey Point Units
3 and 4, and the administrative controls
for combustibles, the facility meets the
underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. The
following evaluation provides the basis
for this conclusion.
3.1 Background
The NRC approved the alternate
shutdown capability proposed by the
licensee for Turkey Point, Units 3 and
4, for compliance with the requirements
of III.G.3, in a safety evaluation dated
April 16, 1984. At that time, the licensee
identified three fire areas that could be
subject to the condition specified in
III.G.3.b, which states, ‘‘(w)here
redundant trains of systems required for
hot shutdown located in the same fire
area may be subject to damage from fire
suppression activities * * *, fire
detection and a fixed fire suppression
system shall be installed in the area,
room, or zone under consideration.’’
The three affected fire areas were the
Control Room, Cable Spreading Room,
and North-South Breezeway. To resolve
these vulnerabilities, the licensee
proposed plant modifications and
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procedure revisions that the staff found
acceptable for compliance with III.G.3.
However, in February 2004, during an
NRC triennial fire inspection at Turkey
Point, the inspection team reviewed fire
protection systems, features, and
equipment, and found that all FZs
supporting the alternate safe shutdown
function for the Control Room (Fire
Area MM) do not provide full area fire
detection and a fixed suppression
system in accordance with the
requirements of III.G.3, quoted above,
for both reactor units. Specifically, the
Mechanical Equipment Room, the Main
Control Room, and Control Room Roof
are identified in the plant fire protection
program report as alternative safe
shutdown areas for, and thereby part of,
the Control Room. However, the
Mechanical Equipment Room does not
have full area detection and fixed
suppression.
In response to this inspection finding,
the licensee declared the detection and
suppression inoperable for the
Mechanical Equipment Room (and the
Control Room Roof, which also fails to
provide detection and fixed
suppression) and established an hourly
fire watch. An exemption from these
detection and suppression requirements
is now requested for the Control Room
Roof, and an exemption from
suppression requirements is requested
for the Mechanical Equipment Room.
The licensee proposes installation of
area detection in the Mechanical
Equipment Room.
3.2
Existing Fire Protection Features
Fire Area MM is the Unit 3 and 4
Control Room, located at the 42-foot
elevation level of the plant. It is a
multiple zone area consisting of FZs 106
(the Main Control Room), 106R (the
Control Room Roof), and 97 (the
Mechanical Equipment Room). FZs 97
and 106R contain redundant trains of
air-conditioning equipment that support
the habitability and operability of Fire
Area MM. The licensee’s fire protection
program report identifies FZs 97, 106,
and 106R as the alternative shutdown
capability for Fire Area MM. FZ 106R is
located outdoors at the plant’s 58-foot
elevation on the control building roof.
The flooring is tar and gravel on a
concrete base, occupying a section of
the roof with an area of approximately
640 square feet. Three heating,
ventilating, and air conditioning
(HVAC) condensing units for the control
room are located here. The licensee’s
submittal states that motors, cable and
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raceway protection, and tar material
make up its in situ 1 combustible load.
The licensee states that redundant
safe shutdown components and circuits
in this zone are protected by at least 10
feet of separation or by 25-minute rated
Thermo-Lag fire barrier. This is in
conformance with an exemption from
separation and protection requirements
for the control room roof, which the
NRC granted on May 4, 1999. The
licensee’s submittal states that the
proposed exemption request does not
supersede the exemption from
separation and protection requirements
granted by the NRC in May 1999.
The submittal describes the
suppression capability for this zone as
consisting of three portable fire
extinguishers located near the roof
access stairs at the 42-foot elevation on
the turbine deck, with an additional
three extinguishers located at the 30foot elevation on the mezzanine level. In
addition, a hose station with 75 feet of
hose is located on the turbine deck near
the roof access stairs and a hose station
with 100 feet of hose is located at the
mezzanine level near the stairway. The
hose in this building is 1.5 inches
(minimum), with 1.5 inch (minimum)
electrically-safe fog nozzles, and
threading compatible with that used by
local fire departments. No area detection
is provided in FZ 106R.
FZ 97 is an enclosed room located
adjacent to the Cable Spreading Room at
the 30-foot elevation, just below the
Main Control Room. It has 377 square
feet of floor area and houses the safetyrelated emergency recirculating filter
unit and the air handling supply fans for
the main control room. The licensee’s
submittal identifies cable insulation,
charcoal, and motors as the in situ
combustible loading for this zone. The
walls, floor, and ceiling are concrete
block or reinforced concrete, providing
3-hour rated fire barrier protection.
An ionization smoke detector is
installed in FZ 97 inside the airhandling exhaust downstream of the
motors and charcoal filter. If actuated,
the detector initiates an alarm in the
Control Room to alert operators to
summon the fire brigade to respond
with manual (not fixed) fire
suppression. No full area detection is
provided in FZ 97. No fixed suppression
is provided.
The submittal identifies nearby
suppression capabilities for this zone
consisting of four portable fire
extinguishers located at the 30-foot
elevation on the mezzanine level. In
1 Fixed in place as part of the construction,
fabrication, or installation of a plant structure,
system, or component.
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addition, a hose station is located on the
mezzanine level outside the cable
spreading room with 100 feet of hose.
Area detection and a Halon suppression
system are also provided in the cable
spreading room adjacent to FZ 97.
3.3
Evaluation
The 2001 fire hazards analysis (FHA)
in the Turkey Point Fire Protection
Program Report describes each fire area,
including details (i.e., listings of
essential equipment, combustible
loadings, fire boundaries and barriers,
detection capability, suppression
systems, and venting capability) for
each FZ in the fire area. The NRC staff
reviewed these details for FZs 106R and
97 to determine what fire protection
features were relied on to assure the
defense-in-depth elements of adequate
fire suppression and detection. In situ
combustible loading must be considered
in determining the level of suppression
and detection needed. The staff’s
evaluation of in situ combustible
loadings for each FZ is discussed below.
For transient combustibles, Turkey
Point has implemented administrative
controls through programs and
procedures such as the Transient
Combustible Permit Program and
designated Transient Combustible
Control Areas. Associated procedures
include such controls as visual posting
of transient fire loads, labeling of storage
containers, and required attendance
while certain types of combustibles are
located in the specific FZ. During plant
activities, these controls also ensure that
restrictions are placed on fire loading
added and/or that appropriate fire
suppression is available during
temporary increases in combustible
loading. They also control the location
and duration of hot work. These
administrative controls for the transport
and storage of combustible material
apply throughout the plant, including
FZs 106R and 97, and are based on the
in situ combustible load and ignition
sources in the zone (identified in the
FHA), the types and amounts of
combustibles introduced into the area,
how the transient combustibles are
stored, and on the potential for spillage
(which is minimized by procedure).
3.3.1
FZ 106R—Control Room Roof
The safe shutdown equipment in this
FZ consists of three HVAC condensing
units for the control room. Fire
protection features include an absence
of significant fire loading, separation
and fire barriers to protect redundant
trains of equipment, nearby suppression
capabilities, and an open air
configuration.
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The in situ combustible load for this
zone is identified in the licensee’s
submittal as motors, cable and raceway
protection, and tar and gravel roofing
materials. However, the staff found that
the FHA list of in situ combustibles for
this FZ (on page 9.6A–230 (Rev. 8) of
the Updated Final Safety Analysis
Report (UFSAR)) excludes the tar
roofing material. Therefore, as stated in
its July 12, 2006, letter, the licensee
intends to revise this page of the FHA
to include the combustible tar material
in the list of combustibles. In addition,
the licensee estimated the potential heat
load contribution from the tar material,
using the specific heat value for
petroleum-based materials (i.e., 20,000
British Thermal Units (BTU) per
pound), as 52,000 BTU per square foot.
The FHA considers a significant
combustible load for outdoor areas to be
greater than the equivalent of 200
gallons of combustible liquid, or 68
million BTU. Therefore, with
approximately 640 square feet of floor
area in this zone, the revised heat load
estimate would be 34 million BTU,
which is not a significant combustible
load. However, since it is not a
negligible quantity, the FHA heat load
characterization for this FZ on UFSAR
page 9.6A–230 will also be revised
accordingly. This revision to the FHA
will not significantly affect the results of
the FHA, but will provide completeness
and consistency with the description in
the licensee’s submittal. The FHA page
revisions will be handled under the
licensee’s normal process for UFSAR
updates. The licensee’s evaluation and
supporting calculations confirmed the
staff’s expectation that the roofing
material is not a significant fire load.
This, together with the licensee’s
actions to include the roofing material
in the FHA, resolved the staff’s concern.
The licensee’s December 27, 2004,
submittal states that ‘‘redundant safe
shutdown components and circuits are
protected by at least 10 feet of
separation or by 25-minute Thermo-Lag
fire rated barrier’’ for FZ 106R. The
licensee further states that ‘‘this
exemption request does not supersede
the exemption from separation and
protection requirements granted by the
NRC in May 4, 1999.’’ These issues refer
to an earlier review of an exemption
request for this FZ which relates to this
review.
In 1998, the staff denied the licensee’s
exemption request for FZ 106R from the
requirements of III.G.2.a, based on the
uncertainty of the combustibility and
fire classification of the roof. In 1999,
the staff granted the licensee an
exemption for FZ 106R from the
requirements of III.G.2.a, based on
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raceway protection and separation
consistent with that described in
Section 3.2 above. Also, based on the
licensee’s evaluation of the construction
of the roof flooring composite (e.g., the
type and amount of tar material used,
the specifications of gravel applied over
the tar material to improve its fire
protection performance, and its
similarity to other Class A 2 roofing
configurations), the staff concluded
there was reasonable assurance that the
level of fire safety provided by the roof
is equivalent to a Class A design.
The licensee now seeks an exemption
from III.G.3 for this FZ since it functions
as a component of Fire Area MM, which
provides an alternate shutdown
capability in accordance with III.G.3.
The staff’s conclusion in 1999 was
based on the licensee’s comparative
evaluation and the existing separation
and protection configuration. However,
the exemption request currently under
review applies to III.G.3, which does not
impose separation and protection
requirements for safety-related
equipment in the area.
Because the composite tar and gravel
flooring in FZ 106R was not tested by
the Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and,
therefore, is not listed by UL, and the
licensee has performed no separate
combustible loading analysis on this
unique flooring, the licensee’s
comparative evaluation in 1999 requires
the additional defense-in-depth element
of the separation and protection (or
comparable) configuration, described in
Section 3.2 above, to provide reasonable
assurance that the control room roof
will provide an adequate level of fire
safety for post-fire safe shutdown.
Primary suppression for this FZ is
supplied by eleven nearby portable fire
extinguishers. The licensee’s submittal
identifies six extinguishers in FZs 105
and 117 (described in Section 3.2). The
staff found that the FHA (on page 9.6A–
230 of the UFSAR) also identifies the
five fire extinguishers in the Control
Room for primary suppression in this
zone. Therefore, operators responding to
a fire in this zone, from the Control
Room or from nearby areas, can
minimize their response times by using
those extinguishers that are most
accessible. The licensee stated in its July
12, 2006, letter that it intends to revise
2 According to the Underwriters Laboratories,
Inc., Roofing Materials and Systems Directory, Class
A includes roof coverings which are effective
against severe fire exposures. Under such exposures
roof coverings of this class are not readily
flammable and do not carry or communicate fire;
afford a fairly high degree of fire protection to the
roof deck; do not slip from position; possess no
flying brand hazard; and do not require frequent
repairs in order to maintain their fire resisting
properties.
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14:45 Oct 03, 2006
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this page of the FHA to include all
eleven extinguishers.
Secondary suppression is provided by
nearby hose stations. The nearest hose
station, which is located at the 42-foot
elevation (the turbine deck) just outside
the roof access stairway, has 75 feet of
hose for additional suppression
capability, providing stream access to
all points in FZ 106R located on the 58foot elevation.
The combination of the primary and
secondary sources of suppression
provide reasonable assurance of
adequate suppression capability, given
the open air configuration and absence
of any significant combustible and
ignition source loading in this zone.
3.3.2 FZ 97—Mechanical Equipment
Room
The safe shutdown equipment in this
FZ consists of the emergency
recirculating filter unit and the air
handling supply fans for the control
room. Fire protection features in FZ 97
include nearby suppression capabilities,
a component-specific detector,
administrative controls for
combustibles, ventilation capability,
and rated fire barriers for the walls,
floor, and ceiling.
In situ combustible loadings are
identified in the FHA as cable
insulation, oil (motor), pipe insulation,
and charcoal. Cable insulation was
quantified as 252 pounds (lbs), for a
potential heat load of 3.3 million BTU,
and Charcoal as 250 lbs, with a potential
heat load of 4.5 million BTU. Oil and
pipe insulation are present in such
small quantities that they contribute a
negligible heat load. The staff, therefore,
concludes that the combustible and
ignition source loading in this zone is
not significant.
The walls, floor, and ceiling are
concrete block or reinforced concrete,
providing 3-hour rated fire barrier
protection.
Although no full area detection is
provided in FZ 97, the licensee
proposes to install area detection to
satisfy the detection requirements of
III.G.3. New ionization detectors that
meet the requirements of the latest
edition of National Fire Protection
Association Standard 72 will be
installed outside of any direct, forcedair flow paths in FZ 97. If actuated, the
detectors will initiate an alarm in the
Main Control Room to alert operators to
summon the fire brigade to respond
with manual fire suppression. An
existing ionization smoke detector is
located inside the air handling duct
work downstream of the motors and
charcoal filter, also with a Main Control
Room alarm. With the installation of
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area detection as described above, the
detection provided in FZ 97 will be
acceptable for compliance with III.G.3.
No fixed suppression is located in this
zone. However, four nearby portable fire
extinguishers (described in Section 3.2)
provide an adequate primary
suppression capability for the
combustible and ignition source loading
in this zone, with the hose station at the
30-foot elevation (the mezzanine level)
as a secondary means of suppression
with 100 feet of hose providing stream
access to all points in FZ 97. The
primary and secondary sources of
suppression provide reasonable
assurance of adequate suppression
capability, given the installation of
detection, as described above, and the
absence of any significant combustible
and ignition source loading in this zone.
The staff asked the licensee to provide
information on whether a fire that
caused failure of the safety-related
equipment in either FZ 97 or 106R,
resulting in loss of Main Control Room
HVAC equipment, would challenge the
safe shutdown capability of the plant.
The licensee responded that, with no
reduction in the Main Control Room
heat load, the rise in Main Control
Room temperature for this scenario,
although not analyzed for these FZs
specifically, is expected to be consistent
with or bounded by the rate of
temperature increase during a complete
loss of HVAC for other individual rooms
in the Control Building, including the
Computer Room, which results in bulk
ambient temperatures that remain below
104° F during the first hour of the event
without compensatory cooling.
Therefore, there is reasonable assurance
that a minimum of greater than 30
minutes would be available before a loss
of Control Room habitability. If the
Control Room is evacuated, the plant is
shut down from the Alternate Shutdown
Panel. Each unit has an Alternate
Shutdown Panel, located in the Unit’s
‘‘B’’ Switchgear Room, with adequate
controls to bring the plant to hot
standby. A minimum of greater than 30
minutes is sufficient time for operators
to either shut down the plant from the
Main Control Room or to evacuate the
Main Control Room due to high
temperature and safely shut down the
plant from the Alternate Shutdown
Panel.
3.3.3 Risk Analysis
Because the combustibles and ignition
source loading are not significant for
this zone and the suppression capability
more than adequate, no risk analysis
was performed by the licensee for lack
of detection and fixed suppression.
However, the NRC’s Turkey Point
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Triennial Fire Inspection Report, dated
March 2004 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML040890083), states that the NRC staff
analyzed the safety significance of the
lack of detection and fixed suppression
using NRC Inspection Manual Chapter
609, ‘‘Significance Determination
Process,’’ Appendix F. The staff
concluded that the condition had very
low safety significance.
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3.3.4
Defense-in-Depth
Section II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
states that a licensee’s fire protection
program shall extend the concept of
defense-in-depth to fire protection with
the following objectives:
• To prevent fires from starting,
• To detect rapidly, control, and
extinguish promptly those fires that do
occur, and
• To provide protection for
structures, systems and components
important to safety so that a fire that is
not promptly extinguished by the fire
suppression activities will not prevent
the safe shutdown of the plant.
Regulatory Guide 1.174, ‘‘An
Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions
on Plant-Specific Changes to the
Licensing Basis,’’ also identifies factors
to be considered when evaluating
defense-in-depth for a risk-informed
change. The staff has evaluated the
elements of defense-in-depth used for
fire protection at Turkey Point Nuclear
Plant that are applicable to the FZs
under review. For FZ 106R, based on a
configuration of separation and fire
barrier protection of redundant trains of
safety-related equipment, the absence of
significant fire loading, adequate
primary and secondary suppression
capabilities, the open-air configuration,
implementation of transient
combustibles controls, and sufficient
time for operators to respond to a fire in
this zone, the staff finds that fixed
suppression and detection are not
necessary to ensure safe shutdown of
the plant and meet the underlying intent
of the rule (Subsection III.G.3 to 10 CFR
50, Appendix R). For FZ 97, based on
fire barrier protection in the walls, floor
and ceiling; existing (and installation of
proposed) fire detection, adequate
primary and secondary suppression
capabilities, implementation of transient
combustibles controls, sufficient time
for operators to respond to a fire in this
zone, and the absence of significant fire
loading, the staff finds that fixed
suppression is not necessary to ensure
safe shutdown of the plant and meet the
underlying intent of the rule. Therefore,
based on the staff’s analysis, defense-indepth is maintained.
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Special Circumstances. Special
circumstances, in accordance with 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present
whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances would
not serve the underlying purpose of the
rule or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. The
underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. is to
assure alternative or dedicated
shutdown capability in the event of a
fire. Based on the evaluation presented
in Section 3.3, the staff finds that fixed
suppression and detection in FZ 106R
and fixed suppression in FZ 97 are not
necessary to ensure safe shutdown of
the plant and meet the underlying intent
of the rule. For FZ 106R, the
combination of the primary and
secondary sources of suppression
provide reasonable assurance of
adequate suppression capability, given
the open air configuration and absence
of any significant combustible and
ignition source loading in this zone. For
FZ 97, the primary and secondary
sources of suppression provide
reasonable assurance of adequate
suppression capability, given the
proposed installation of detection, as
described above, and the absence of any
significant combustible and ignition
source loading in this zone. Also, for a
fire in either zone, there would be
adequate time to evacuate the Control
Room, if necessary, and shut down the
plant from the Alternate Shutdown
Panel. Therefore, since the underlying
purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Subsection II.G.3 is achieved, the
special circumstances required by 10
CFR 50.12 for the granting of an
exemption from 10 CFR 50 exist.
Authorized by Law. This exemption
would waive the requirements of
Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, for fixed suppression in
the Mechanical Equipment Room and
for fixed suppression and detection on
the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point,
Units 3 and 4. As stated above, 10 CFR
50.12 allows the NRC to grant
exemptions from the requirements of 10
CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has
determined that granting of the
licensee’s proposed exemption is
permissible under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, and the
Commission’s regulations. Therefore,
the exemption is authorized by law.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and
Safety. The underlying purpose of 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3.
is to assure alternative or dedicated
shutdown capability in the event of a
fire. As noted above, the staff finds that
the proposed exemption utilizes the
existing fire barriers at Turkey Point,
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58637
together with fire protection measures,
low combustible loading, and
administrative controls in place, to
satisfy the underlying intent of 10 CFR
50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3.
Thus, no new accident precursors are
created by the proposed exemption, and
the probability of postulated accidents
is not increased. Similarly, the
consequences of postulated accidents
are not increased. Therefore, there is no
undue risk [since risk is probability ×
consequences] to public health and
safety.
Consistent with Common Defense and
Security. The proposed exemption
would waive the requirements of
Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, for fixed suppression in
the Mechanical Equipment Room and
for fixed suppression and detection on
the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point,
Units 3 and 4. This change in fire
protection requirements has no relation
to security issues. Therefore, the
common defense and security are not
impacted by this exemption.
4.0
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), special circumstances are
present such that application of the
regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. In addition, the
Commission has determined that the
exemption is authorized by law, will not
present an undue risk to the public
health and safety, and is consistent with
the common defense and security.
Therefore, the Commission hereby
grants FPL an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3, to provide area detection
and a fixed fire suppression system in
FZ 106R and to provide a fixed fire
suppression system in FZ 97 for the
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and
4, subject to the installation of proposed
area fire detection in FZ 97 (discussed
in Section 3.3.2 above). The granting of
this exemption is contingent upon
installation of the proposed area fire
detection in FZ 97, maintaining existing
or comparable separation and protection
for redundant safe shutdown equipment
in FZ 106R, the availability of manual
firefighting and associated firefighting
equipment, and maintaining existing or
comparable administrative controls for
combustibles.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 192 / Wednesday, October 4, 2006 / Notices
human environment (71 FR 56188,
dated September 26, 2006).
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day
of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6–16357 Filed 10–3–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
TRADE REPRESENTATIVE
Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA),
as Amended: Notice Regarding the
2004 and 2005 Annual Reviews
Office of the United States
Trade Representative.
ACTION: Notice.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Office of the United
States Trade Representative (USTR)
received petitions in September 2005 to
review certain practices in certain
beneficiary developing countries to
determine whether such countries are in
compliance with the ATPA eligibility
criteria. In a November 22, 2005 notice,
USTR published a list of responsive
petitions that were accepted for review.
In a February 27, 2006 notice, USTR
specified the results of the preliminary
review of those petitions as well as the
status of the petitions filed in 2004 that
have remained under review. This
notice provides an update on the status
of those reviews.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Bennett M. Harman, Deputy Assistant
U.S. Trade Representative for Latin
America, at (202) 395–9446.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The ATPA
(19 U.S.C. 3201 et seq.), as renewed and
amended by the Andean Trade
Promotion and Drug Eradication Act of
2002 (ATPDEA) in the Trade Act of
2002 (Public Law 107–210), provides
trade benefits for eligible Andean
countries. Pursuant to section 3103(d) of
the ATPDEA, USTR promulgated
regulations (15 CFR part 2016) (68 FR
43922) regarding the review of
eligibility of countries for the benefits of
the ATPA, as amended.
In a Federal Register notice dated
August 18, 2005, USTR initiated the
2005 ATPA Annual Review and
announced a deadline of September 19,
2005 for the filing of petitions (69 FR
51138). Several of these petitions
requested the review of certain practices
in certain beneficiary developing
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:45 Oct 03, 2006
Jkt 211001
countries regarding compliance with the
eligibility criteria set forth in sections
203(c) and (d) and section 204(b)(6)(B)
of the ATPA, as amended (19 U.S.C.
3203(c) and (d); 19 U.S.C. 3203(b)(6)(B)).
In a Federal Register notice dated
November 22, 2005, USTR published a
list of the responsive petitions filed
pursuant to the announcement of the
annual review (69 FR 65674). In a
Federal Register notice dated February
27, 2006, USTR announced the results
of the preliminary review by the Trade
Policy Staff Committee (TPSC) of these
petitions. The notice also indicated that
the TPSC would continue to review the
remaining 2004 petitions. The TPSC has
now determined that the issues raised in
the petition filed by LeTourneau of
Peru, Inc. with respect to Peru have
been resolved. Therefore, that petition
does not require further action, and the
TPSC is terminating its review.
With respect to the remaining
petitions, the TPSC is modifying the
schedule for this review, in accordance
with 15 CFR 2016.2(b). This review will
continue through December 31, 2006,
which is the period that the ATPDEA is
in effect. Following is the list of all
petitions that remain under review:
Peru: Engelhard;
Peru: Princeton Dover;
Peru: Duke Energy;
Ecuador: AFL–CIO; Human Rights
Watch; and US/LEAP;
Ecuador: Chevron Texaco.
workforce and those supporting
personnel assigned to work directly
with it. [See Section 4308 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1996 (Pub. L. 104–106; 10
U.S.C.A. section 1701 note), as amended
by section 845 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(Pub. L. 105–85)]. The project was
developed under legislative authority
granted in Fiscal Year 1996 and
modified in Fiscal Year 1998.
Subsequent legislation authorized
establishment of NSPS, a human
resources management system for DoD
under 5 U.S.C. 9902, as enacted by
section 1101 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004
(Pub. L. 108–136). This notice provides
authorization for an out-of-cycle payout
under CCAS prior to transition to NSPS
and addresses procedures for
conversion of employees from this
demonstration project to NSPS.
DATES: This amendment is effective
upon publication of this notice.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
DoD: Mary S. Thomas, Civilian
Acquisition Workforce Personnel
Demonstration Project, 2001 North
Beauregard Street, Suite 210,
Alexandria, VA 22311, 703–681–3508.
OPM: Michael Carmichael, U.S. Office
of Personnel Management, 1900 E Street
NW., Room 7412, Washington, DC
20415, 202–606–1868.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Carmen Suro-Bredie,
Chairman, Trade Policy Staff Committee.
[FR Doc. E6–16421 Filed 10–3–06; 8:45 am]
1. Background
OPM approved and published the
project plan for the Civilian Acquisition
Workforce Personnel Demonstration
Project in the Federal Register on
January 8, 1999 (Volume 64, Number 5,
Part VII). Since that time, three
amendments have been published. The
first amendment was published in the
May 21, 2001, Federal Register, Volume
66, Number 98, to (1) correct
discrepancies in the list of occupational
series included in the project and (2)
authorize managers to offer a buy-in to
Federal employees entering the project
after initial implementation. A second
amendment was published in the April
24, 2002, Federal Register, Volume 67,
Number 79, to (1) make employees in
the top broadband level of their career
path eligible to receive a ‘‘very high’’
overall contribution score and (2)
reduce the minimum rating period
under CCAS to 90 consecutive calendar
days. Finally, the third amendment was
published in the July 1, 2002, Federal
Register, Volume 67, Number 126, to (1)
list all organizations that are eligible to
participate in the project and (2) make
the resulting adjustments to the table
BILLING CODE 3190–W6–P
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL
MANAGEMENT
Civilian Acquisition Workforce
Personnel Demonstration Project;
Department of Defense
Office of Personnel
Management.
ACTION: Notice of amendment to this
demonstration to facilitate the transition
of Acquisition Demonstration Project
employees to the National Security
Personnel System (NSPS) by authorizing
an out-of-cycle Contribution-based
Compensation and Appraisal System
(CCAS) payout and amending
conversion-out procedures.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: The Department of Defense
(DoD or ‘‘the Department’’), with the
approval of the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), received authority
to conduct a personnel demonstration
project within DoD’s civilian acquisition
PO 00000
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 192 (Wednesday, October 4, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58634-58638]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-16357]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[ Docket Nos. 50-250 and 50-251]
Florida Power & Light Company; Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units
3 and 4 Exemption
1.0 Background
The Florida Power & Light Company (FPL, the licensee) is the holder
of Facility Operating License Nos. DPR-31 and DPR-41, which authorize
operation of the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4. The
licenses provide, among other things, that the facility is subject to
all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The facility consists of two pressurized-water reactors located in
Miami-Dade County, approximately 25 miles south of Miami, Florida.
2.0 Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50,
Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3 addresses fire protection features for
assuring alternative or dedicated shutdown capability in the event of a
fire, and requires that fire detection and a fixed fire suppression
system be installed in the area, room, or zone where equipment or
components are relied on for the assured shutdown capability. FPL
requests exemption from the requirements of Subsection III.G.3 of 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, for fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment
Room and for detection and fixed suppression on the Control Room Roof,
at Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, on the basis that the existing fire
barriers at Turkey Point, together with fire protection measures, low
combustible loading, and administrative controls in place, satisfy the
underlying intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3.
In summary, by letter dated December 27, 2004, as supplemented May
23, 2005, January 13, 2006, and July 12, 2006, FPL requests exemption
from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3, for
fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment Room and for detection
and fixed suppression on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point, Units
3 and 4.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1) the exemptions are
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security, and
(2) when special circumstances are present.
The underlying purpose of Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
R is to require alternative or dedicated shutdown capability where (a)
fire protection of systems necessary for hot shutdown does not meet
Subsection III.G.2, or (b) redundant trains of systems necessary for
hot shutdown are located in the same fire area and may be subject to
damage from fire suppression activities or systems. In addition,
III.G.3 requires fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system in
the area, room, or zone under consideration.
The staff examined information supplied by the licensee in support
of the exemption request and concluded that special circumstances exist
in that, with the installation of the fire detection system in the
Mechanical Equipment Room proposed by the licensee, the existing fire
protection features in and accessible for the specific fire zones (FZs)
referenced for Turkey Point Units 3 and 4, and the administrative
controls for combustibles, the facility meets the underlying purpose of
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. The following evaluation
provides the basis for this conclusion.
3.1 Background
The NRC approved the alternate shutdown capability proposed by the
licensee for Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4, for compliance with the
requirements of III.G.3, in a safety evaluation dated April 16, 1984.
At that time, the licensee identified three fire areas that could be
subject to the condition specified in III.G.3.b, which states,
``(w)here redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown located
in the same fire area may be subject to damage from fire suppression
activities * * *, fire detection and a fixed fire suppression system
shall be installed in the area, room, or zone under consideration.''
The three affected fire areas were the Control Room, Cable Spreading
Room, and North-South Breezeway. To resolve these vulnerabilities, the
licensee proposed plant modifications and procedure revisions that the
staff found acceptable for compliance with III.G.3.
However, in February 2004, during an NRC triennial fire inspection
at Turkey Point, the inspection team reviewed fire protection systems,
features, and equipment, and found that all FZs supporting the
alternate safe shutdown function for the Control Room (Fire Area MM) do
not provide full area fire detection and a fixed suppression system in
accordance with the requirements of III.G.3, quoted above, for both
reactor units. Specifically, the Mechanical Equipment Room, the Main
Control Room, and Control Room Roof are identified in the plant fire
protection program report as alternative safe shutdown areas for, and
thereby part of, the Control Room. However, the Mechanical Equipment
Room does not have full area detection and fixed suppression.
In response to this inspection finding, the licensee declared the
detection and suppression inoperable for the Mechanical Equipment Room
(and the Control Room Roof, which also fails to provide detection and
fixed suppression) and established an hourly fire watch. An exemption
from these detection and suppression requirements is now requested for
the Control Room Roof, and an exemption from suppression requirements
is requested for the Mechanical Equipment Room. The licensee proposes
installation of area detection in the Mechanical Equipment Room.
3.2 Existing Fire Protection Features
Fire Area MM is the Unit 3 and 4 Control Room, located at the 42-
foot elevation level of the plant. It is a multiple zone area
consisting of FZs 106 (the Main Control Room), 106R (the Control Room
Roof), and 97 (the Mechanical Equipment Room). FZs 97 and 106R contain
redundant trains of air-conditioning equipment that support the
habitability and operability of Fire Area MM. The licensee's fire
protection program report identifies FZs 97, 106, and 106R as the
alternative shutdown capability for Fire Area MM. FZ 106R is located
outdoors at the plant's 58-foot elevation on the control building roof.
The flooring is tar and gravel on a concrete base, occupying a section
of the roof with an area of approximately 640 square feet. Three
heating, ventilating, and air conditioning (HVAC) condensing units for
the control room are located here. The licensee's submittal states that
motors, cable and
[[Page 58635]]
raceway protection, and tar material make up its in situ \1\
combustible load.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Fixed in place as part of the construction, fabrication, or
installation of a plant structure, system, or component.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The licensee states that redundant safe shutdown components and
circuits in this zone are protected by at least 10 feet of separation
or by 25-minute rated Thermo-Lag fire barrier. This is in conformance
with an exemption from separation and protection requirements for the
control room roof, which the NRC granted on May 4, 1999. The licensee's
submittal states that the proposed exemption request does not supersede
the exemption from separation and protection requirements granted by
the NRC in May 1999.
The submittal describes the suppression capability for this zone as
consisting of three portable fire extinguishers located near the roof
access stairs at the 42-foot elevation on the turbine deck, with an
additional three extinguishers located at the 30-foot elevation on the
mezzanine level. In addition, a hose station with 75 feet of hose is
located on the turbine deck near the roof access stairs and a hose
station with 100 feet of hose is located at the mezzanine level near
the stairway. The hose in this building is 1.5 inches (minimum), with
1.5 inch (minimum) electrically-safe fog nozzles, and threading
compatible with that used by local fire departments. No area detection
is provided in FZ 106R.
FZ 97 is an enclosed room located adjacent to the Cable Spreading
Room at the 30-foot elevation, just below the Main Control Room. It has
377 square feet of floor area and houses the safety-related emergency
recirculating filter unit and the air handling supply fans for the main
control room. The licensee's submittal identifies cable insulation,
charcoal, and motors as the in situ combustible loading for this zone.
The walls, floor, and ceiling are concrete block or reinforced
concrete, providing 3-hour rated fire barrier protection.
An ionization smoke detector is installed in FZ 97 inside the air-
handling exhaust downstream of the motors and charcoal filter. If
actuated, the detector initiates an alarm in the Control Room to alert
operators to summon the fire brigade to respond with manual (not fixed)
fire suppression. No full area detection is provided in FZ 97. No fixed
suppression is provided.
The submittal identifies nearby suppression capabilities for this
zone consisting of four portable fire extinguishers located at the 30-
foot elevation on the mezzanine level. In addition, a hose station is
located on the mezzanine level outside the cable spreading room with
100 feet of hose. Area detection and a Halon suppression system are
also provided in the cable spreading room adjacent to FZ 97.
3.3 Evaluation
The 2001 fire hazards analysis (FHA) in the Turkey Point Fire
Protection Program Report describes each fire area, including details
(i.e., listings of essential equipment, combustible loadings, fire
boundaries and barriers, detection capability, suppression systems, and
venting capability) for each FZ in the fire area. The NRC staff
reviewed these details for FZs 106R and 97 to determine what fire
protection features were relied on to assure the defense-in-depth
elements of adequate fire suppression and detection. In situ
combustible loading must be considered in determining the level of
suppression and detection needed. The staff's evaluation of in situ
combustible loadings for each FZ is discussed below.
For transient combustibles, Turkey Point has implemented
administrative controls through programs and procedures such as the
Transient Combustible Permit Program and designated Transient
Combustible Control Areas. Associated procedures include such controls
as visual posting of transient fire loads, labeling of storage
containers, and required attendance while certain types of combustibles
are located in the specific FZ. During plant activities, these controls
also ensure that restrictions are placed on fire loading added and/or
that appropriate fire suppression is available during temporary
increases in combustible loading. They also control the location and
duration of hot work. These administrative controls for the transport
and storage of combustible material apply throughout the plant,
including FZs 106R and 97, and are based on the in situ combustible
load and ignition sources in the zone (identified in the FHA), the
types and amounts of combustibles introduced into the area, how the
transient combustibles are stored, and on the potential for spillage
(which is minimized by procedure).
3.3.1 FZ 106R--Control Room Roof
The safe shutdown equipment in this FZ consists of three HVAC
condensing units for the control room. Fire protection features include
an absence of significant fire loading, separation and fire barriers to
protect redundant trains of equipment, nearby suppression capabilities,
and an open air configuration.
The in situ combustible load for this zone is identified in the
licensee's submittal as motors, cable and raceway protection, and tar
and gravel roofing materials. However, the staff found that the FHA
list of in situ combustibles for this FZ (on page 9.6A-230 (Rev. 8) of
the Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR)) excludes the tar
roofing material. Therefore, as stated in its July 12, 2006, letter,
the licensee intends to revise this page of the FHA to include the
combustible tar material in the list of combustibles. In addition, the
licensee estimated the potential heat load contribution from the tar
material, using the specific heat value for petroleum-based materials
(i.e., 20,000 British Thermal Units (BTU) per pound), as 52,000 BTU per
square foot. The FHA considers a significant combustible load for
outdoor areas to be greater than the equivalent of 200 gallons of
combustible liquid, or 68 million BTU. Therefore, with approximately
640 square feet of floor area in this zone, the revised heat load
estimate would be 34 million BTU, which is not a significant
combustible load. However, since it is not a negligible quantity, the
FHA heat load characterization for this FZ on UFSAR page 9.6A-230 will
also be revised accordingly. This revision to the FHA will not
significantly affect the results of the FHA, but will provide
completeness and consistency with the description in the licensee's
submittal. The FHA page revisions will be handled under the licensee's
normal process for UFSAR updates. The licensee's evaluation and
supporting calculations confirmed the staff's expectation that the
roofing material is not a significant fire load. This, together with
the licensee's actions to include the roofing material in the FHA,
resolved the staff's concern.
The licensee's December 27, 2004, submittal states that ``redundant
safe shutdown components and circuits are protected by at least 10 feet
of separation or by 25-minute Thermo-Lag fire rated barrier'' for FZ
106R. The licensee further states that ``this exemption request does
not supersede the exemption from separation and protection requirements
granted by the NRC in May 4, 1999.'' These issues refer to an earlier
review of an exemption request for this FZ which relates to this
review.
In 1998, the staff denied the licensee's exemption request for FZ
106R from the requirements of III.G.2.a, based on the uncertainty of
the combustibility and fire classification of the roof. In 1999, the
staff granted the licensee an exemption for FZ 106R from the
requirements of III.G.2.a, based on
[[Page 58636]]
raceway protection and separation consistent with that described in
Section 3.2 above. Also, based on the licensee's evaluation of the
construction of the roof flooring composite (e.g., the type and amount
of tar material used, the specifications of gravel applied over the tar
material to improve its fire protection performance, and its similarity
to other Class A \2\ roofing configurations), the staff concluded there
was reasonable assurance that the level of fire safety provided by the
roof is equivalent to a Class A design.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ According to the Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., Roofing
Materials and Systems Directory, Class A includes roof coverings
which are effective against severe fire exposures. Under such
exposures roof coverings of this class are not readily flammable and
do not carry or communicate fire; afford a fairly high degree of
fire protection to the roof deck; do not slip from position; possess
no flying brand hazard; and do not require frequent repairs in order
to maintain their fire resisting properties.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The licensee now seeks an exemption from III.G.3 for this FZ since
it functions as a component of Fire Area MM, which provides an
alternate shutdown capability in accordance with III.G.3. The staff's
conclusion in 1999 was based on the licensee's comparative evaluation
and the existing separation and protection configuration. However, the
exemption request currently under review applies to III.G.3, which does
not impose separation and protection requirements for safety-related
equipment in the area.
Because the composite tar and gravel flooring in FZ 106R was not
tested by the Underwriters Laboratories (UL) and, therefore, is not
listed by UL, and the licensee has performed no separate combustible
loading analysis on this unique flooring, the licensee's comparative
evaluation in 1999 requires the additional defense-in-depth element of
the separation and protection (or comparable) configuration, described
in Section 3.2 above, to provide reasonable assurance that the control
room roof will provide an adequate level of fire safety for post-fire
safe shutdown.
Primary suppression for this FZ is supplied by eleven nearby
portable fire extinguishers. The licensee's submittal identifies six
extinguishers in FZs 105 and 117 (described in Section 3.2). The staff
found that the FHA (on page 9.6A-230 of the UFSAR) also identifies the
five fire extinguishers in the Control Room for primary suppression in
this zone. Therefore, operators responding to a fire in this zone, from
the Control Room or from nearby areas, can minimize their response
times by using those extinguishers that are most accessible. The
licensee stated in its July 12, 2006, letter that it intends to revise
this page of the FHA to include all eleven extinguishers.
Secondary suppression is provided by nearby hose stations. The
nearest hose station, which is located at the 42-foot elevation (the
turbine deck) just outside the roof access stairway, has 75 feet of
hose for additional suppression capability, providing stream access to
all points in FZ 106R located on the 58-foot elevation.
The combination of the primary and secondary sources of suppression
provide reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given
the open air configuration and absence of any significant combustible
and ignition source loading in this zone.
3.3.2 FZ 97--Mechanical Equipment Room
The safe shutdown equipment in this FZ consists of the emergency
recirculating filter unit and the air handling supply fans for the
control room. Fire protection features in FZ 97 include nearby
suppression capabilities, a component-specific detector, administrative
controls for combustibles, ventilation capability, and rated fire
barriers for the walls, floor, and ceiling.
In situ combustible loadings are identified in the FHA as cable
insulation, oil (motor), pipe insulation, and charcoal. Cable
insulation was quantified as 252 pounds (lbs), for a potential heat
load of 3.3 million BTU, and Charcoal as 250 lbs, with a potential heat
load of 4.5 million BTU. Oil and pipe insulation are present in such
small quantities that they contribute a negligible heat load. The
staff, therefore, concludes that the combustible and ignition source
loading in this zone is not significant.
The walls, floor, and ceiling are concrete block or reinforced
concrete, providing 3-hour rated fire barrier protection.
Although no full area detection is provided in FZ 97, the licensee
proposes to install area detection to satisfy the detection
requirements of III.G.3. New ionization detectors that meet the
requirements of the latest edition of National Fire Protection
Association Standard 72 will be installed outside of any direct,
forced-air flow paths in FZ 97. If actuated, the detectors will
initiate an alarm in the Main Control Room to alert operators to summon
the fire brigade to respond with manual fire suppression. An existing
ionization smoke detector is located inside the air handling duct work
downstream of the motors and charcoal filter, also with a Main Control
Room alarm. With the installation of area detection as described above,
the detection provided in FZ 97 will be acceptable for compliance with
III.G.3.
No fixed suppression is located in this zone. However, four nearby
portable fire extinguishers (described in Section 3.2) provide an
adequate primary suppression capability for the combustible and
ignition source loading in this zone, with the hose station at the 30-
foot elevation (the mezzanine level) as a secondary means of
suppression with 100 feet of hose providing stream access to all points
in FZ 97. The primary and secondary sources of suppression provide
reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given the
installation of detection, as described above, and the absence of any
significant combustible and ignition source loading in this zone.
The staff asked the licensee to provide information on whether a
fire that caused failure of the safety-related equipment in either FZ
97 or 106R, resulting in loss of Main Control Room HVAC equipment,
would challenge the safe shutdown capability of the plant. The licensee
responded that, with no reduction in the Main Control Room heat load,
the rise in Main Control Room temperature for this scenario, although
not analyzed for these FZs specifically, is expected to be consistent
with or bounded by the rate of temperature increase during a complete
loss of HVAC for other individual rooms in the Control Building,
including the Computer Room, which results in bulk ambient temperatures
that remain below 104[deg] F during the first hour of the event without
compensatory cooling. Therefore, there is reasonable assurance that a
minimum of greater than 30 minutes would be available before a loss of
Control Room habitability. If the Control Room is evacuated, the plant
is shut down from the Alternate Shutdown Panel. Each unit has an
Alternate Shutdown Panel, located in the Unit's ``B'' Switchgear Room,
with adequate controls to bring the plant to hot standby. A minimum of
greater than 30 minutes is sufficient time for operators to either shut
down the plant from the Main Control Room or to evacuate the Main
Control Room due to high temperature and safely shut down the plant
from the Alternate Shutdown Panel.
3.3.3 Risk Analysis
Because the combustibles and ignition source loading are not
significant for this zone and the suppression capability more than
adequate, no risk analysis was performed by the licensee for lack of
detection and fixed suppression. However, the NRC's Turkey Point
[[Page 58637]]
Triennial Fire Inspection Report, dated March 2004 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML040890083), states that the NRC staff analyzed the safety
significance of the lack of detection and fixed suppression using NRC
Inspection Manual Chapter 609, ``Significance Determination Process,''
Appendix F. The staff concluded that the condition had very low safety
significance.
3.3.4 Defense-in-Depth
Section II of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, states that a licensee's fire
protection program shall extend the concept of defense-in-depth to fire
protection with the following objectives:
To prevent fires from starting,
To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those
fires that do occur, and
To provide protection for structures, systems and
components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly
extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the
safe shutdown of the plant.
Regulatory Guide 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk
Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the
Licensing Basis,'' also identifies factors to be considered when
evaluating defense-in-depth for a risk-informed change. The staff has
evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used for fire protection at
Turkey Point Nuclear Plant that are applicable to the FZs under review.
For FZ 106R, based on a configuration of separation and fire barrier
protection of redundant trains of safety-related equipment, the absence
of significant fire loading, adequate primary and secondary suppression
capabilities, the open-air configuration, implementation of transient
combustibles controls, and sufficient time for operators to respond to
a fire in this zone, the staff finds that fixed suppression and
detection are not necessary to ensure safe shutdown of the plant and
meet the underlying intent of the rule (Subsection III.G.3 to 10 CFR
50, Appendix R). For FZ 97, based on fire barrier protection in the
walls, floor and ceiling; existing (and installation of proposed) fire
detection, adequate primary and secondary suppression capabilities,
implementation of transient combustibles controls, sufficient time for
operators to respond to a fire in this zone, and the absence of
significant fire loading, the staff finds that fixed suppression is not
necessary to ensure safe shutdown of the plant and meet the underlying
intent of the rule. Therefore, based on the staff's analysis, defense-
in-depth is maintained.
Special Circumstances. Special circumstances, in accordance with 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), are present whenever application of the regulation
in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose
of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of
the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection
III.G.3. is to assure alternative or dedicated shutdown capability in
the event of a fire. Based on the evaluation presented in Section 3.3,
the staff finds that fixed suppression and detection in FZ 106R and
fixed suppression in FZ 97 are not necessary to ensure safe shutdown of
the plant and meet the underlying intent of the rule. For FZ 106R, the
combination of the primary and secondary sources of suppression provide
reasonable assurance of adequate suppression capability, given the open
air configuration and absence of any significant combustible and
ignition source loading in this zone. For FZ 97, the primary and
secondary sources of suppression provide reasonable assurance of
adequate suppression capability, given the proposed installation of
detection, as described above, and the absence of any significant
combustible and ignition source loading in this zone. Also, for a fire
in either zone, there would be adequate time to evacuate the Control
Room, if necessary, and shut down the plant from the Alternate Shutdown
Panel. Therefore, since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix
R, Subsection II.G.3 is achieved, the special circumstances required by
10 CFR 50.12 for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR 50 exist.
Authorized by Law. This exemption would waive the requirements of
Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, for fixed suppression in
the Mechanical Equipment Room and for fixed suppression and detection
on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey Point, Units 3 and 4. As stated
above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that
granting of the licensee's proposed exemption is permissible under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and the Commission's
regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety. The underlying purpose
of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.3. is to assure alternative
or dedicated shutdown capability in the event of a fire. As noted
above, the staff finds that the proposed exemption utilizes the
existing fire barriers at Turkey Point, together with fire protection
measures, low combustible loading, and administrative controls in
place, to satisfy the underlying intent of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Subsection III.G.3. Thus, no new accident precursors are created by the
proposed exemption, and the probability of postulated accidents is not
increased. Similarly, the consequences of postulated accidents are not
increased. Therefore, there is no undue risk [since risk is probability
x consequences] to public health and safety.
Consistent with Common Defense and Security. The proposed exemption
would waive the requirements of Subsection III.G.3 of 10 CFR 50,
Appendix R, for fixed suppression in the Mechanical Equipment Room and
for fixed suppression and detection on the Control Room Roof, at Turkey
Point, Units 3 and 4. This change in fire protection requirements has
no relation to security issues. Therefore, the common defense and
security are not impacted by this exemption.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), special circumstances are present such that application of
the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule. In addition, the Commission has
determined that the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an
undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the
common defense and security. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants
FPL an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R,
Section III.G.3, to provide area detection and a fixed fire suppression
system in FZ 106R and to provide a fixed fire suppression system in FZ
97 for the Turkey Point Nuclear Plant, Units 3 and 4, subject to the
installation of proposed area fire detection in FZ 97 (discussed in
Section 3.3.2 above). The granting of this exemption is contingent upon
installation of the proposed area fire detection in FZ 97, maintaining
existing or comparable separation and protection for redundant safe
shutdown equipment in FZ 106R, the availability of manual firefighting
and associated firefighting equipment, and maintaining existing or
comparable administrative controls for combustibles.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the
[[Page 58638]]
human environment (71 FR 56188, dated September 26, 2006).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6-16357 Filed 10-3-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
