Tennessee Valley Authority; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Exemption, 58440-58442 [E6-16270]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices
vicinity of the Hemyc configuration; and
the absence of significant combustible
loading and ignition sources, the NRC
staff finds that a 1-hour rating for the
fire barrier protection in this zone is not
necessary to ensure the availability of a
redundant train necessary to achieve
and maintain safe shutdown of the plant
in the event of a fire in FZ CT–1. Based
upon consideration of the information
in the licensee’s Fire Hazards Analysis;
administrative controls for transient
combustibles and ignition sources;
responses to NRC staff requests for
additional information; previouslygranted exemptions for this fire zone;
and the considerations noted above, the
NRC staff concludes that this exemption
meets the underlying purpose of the
rule. Therefore, operating in the
proposed manner meets the underlying
purpose of Subsection III.G.2.c to 10
CFR 50, Appendix R, and special
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12
for the granting of an exemption from 10
CFR 50 exist.
Authorized by Law
This exemption would allow use of a
fire barrier expected to provide less than
1 hour of fire protection. As stated
above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to
grant exemptions from the requirements
of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has
determined that granting of the
licensee’s proposed exemption is
permissible under the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954, as amended, or the
Commission’s regulations. Therefore,
the exemption is authorized by law.
rwilkins on PROD1PC63 with NOTICES
No Undue Risk to Public Health and
Safety
The underlying purpose of Subsection
III.G.2.c of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, is
to ensure that one of the redundant
trains necessary to achieve and maintain
hot shutdown conditions remains free of
fire damage in the event of a fire. Based
on the existing fire barriers, fire
detectors, automatic and manual fire
suppression equipment, administrative
controls, the fire hazard analysis, the
Hemyc configuration, and the absence
of significant combustible loads and
ignition sources, special circumstances
are present such that application of this
rule is not necessary. No new accident
precursors are created by allowing use
of a fire barrier expected to provide less
than 1 hour of fire protection and the
probability of postulated accidents is
not increased. Similarly, the
consequences of postulated accidents
are not increased. Therefore, there is no
undue risk (since risk is probability
multiplied by consequences) to public
health and safety.
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Consistent With Common Defense and
Security
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
The proposed exemption would allow
use of a fire barrier expected to provide
less than 1 hour of fire protection based
on the existing fire barriers, fire
detectors, automatic and manual fire
suppression equipment, administrative
controls, the fire hazard analysis, the
Hemyc configuration, and the absence
of significant combustible loads and
ignition sources. This change to the
plant requirements for the specific
configuration in this fire zone has no
relation to security issues. Therefore,
the common defense and security is not
impacted by this exemption.
[Docket No. 50–259]
4.0
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Specifically, special
circumstances are present in that the
application of the regulation is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule. Therefore, the
Commission hereby grants ENO an
exemption from the requirement of a 1hour rated fire barrier (fire wrap) in
Section III.G.2.c of 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix R, for the West Cable Tunnel
at JAF provided that the proposed
revisions to the procedures for hot work
in the vicinity of the Hemyc
configuration are implemented. The
granting of this exemption is based on
the implementation of revised
administrative controls for hot work in
the vicinity of the Hemyc configuration
in FZ CT–1 (addressed in Section 3.3
above), the existing or upgraded fire
barrier protection features in FZ CT–1,
the maintenance of existing automatic
detection and suppression features in
FZ CT–1, and the availability of manual
fire fighting and associated fire fighting
equipment.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment (71 FR 54100).
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day
of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6–16262 Filed 10–2–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
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Tennessee Valley Authority; Browns
Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1; Exemption
1.0
Background
The Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA, the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License No. DPR–33,
which authorizes operation of the
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1
(BFN–1). The license provides, among
other things, that the facility is subject
to all rules, regulations, and orders of
the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC, the Commission)
now or hereafter in effect.
The BFN–1 facility consists of a
boiling water reactor (BWR) located in
Limestone County, Alabama.
2.0
Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (10 CFR), 50.54(o), requires
that primary reactor containments for
water-cooled power reactors be subject
to the requirements of Appendix J to 10
CFR part 50. Appendix J specifies the
leakage test requirements, schedules,
and acceptance criteria for tests of the
leak tight integrity of the primary
reactor containment and systems and
components which penetrate the
containment. Appendix J, Option B,
Section III.A requires that the overall
integrated leak rate must not exceed the
allowable leakage with margin, as
specified in the Technical
Specifications (TSs). The overall
integrated leak rate, as specified in the
10 CFR part 50, Appendix J definitions,
includes the contribution from main
steam isolation valve (MSIV) leakage. By
letter dated July 9, 2004, the licensee
requested exemption from Option B,
Section III.A, requirements to permit
exclusion of MSIV leakage from the
overall integrated leak rate test
measurement.
Option B, Section III.B of 10 CFR part
50, Appendix J, requires that the sum of
the leakage rates of all Type B and Type
C local leak rate tests be less than the
performance criterion with margin, as
specified in the TSs. The licensee also
requests exemption from this
requirement, to permit exclusion of the
MSIV contribution to the sum of the
Type B and Type C tests.
3.0
Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the
Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own
initiative, grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices
the exemptions are authorized by law,
will not present an undue risk to public
health and safety, and are consistent
with the common defense and security;
and (2) special circumstances are
present. Section 50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR
states that special circumstances are
present when ‘‘Application of the
regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the
underlying purpose of the rule or is not
necessary to achieve the underlying
purpose of the rule.’’ In addition,
§ 50.12(a)(2)(iii) of 10 CFR states that
special circumstances are present when
‘‘Compliance would result in undue
hardship or other costs that are
significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.’’
Testing in accordance with 10 CFR
part 50, Appendix J, ensures that
primary containment leakage following
a design basis loss-of-coolant accident
will be within the allowable leakage
limits specified in the TSs and assumed
in the safety analyses for determining
radiological consequences. For BFN–1,
the containment integrated leakage rate
test currently includes leakage through
closed MSIVs. However, the MSIV
leakage effluent has a different pathway
to the environment compared to other
containment penetrations. It is not
directed into the secondary containment
and filtered through the standby gas
treatment system as is other
containment leakage. Instead, the MSIV
leakage is directed through the main
steam drain piping into the condenser
and is released to the environment as an
unfiltered ground level effluent. The
licensee analyzed the MSIV leakage
pathway for the increased leakage (from
less than or equal to 11.5 standard cubic
feet per hour (scfh) per valve to less
than or equal to 100 scfh per valve, with
combined leakage for all four main
steam lines less than or equal to 150
scfh), and the containment leakage
pathway separately in a dose
consequences analysis. The calculated
radiological consequences of the
combined leakages were found to be
within the criteria of 10 CFR part 100
and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix A,
General Design Criterion 19. The NRC
staff reviewed the licensee’s analyses
and found them acceptable, as described
in the safety evaluation associated with
Amendment No. 251, dated September
27, 2004. In approving Amendment No.
251, the NRC staff added license
condition 2.C(15):
The licensee is required to confirm that the
conclusions made in TVA’s letter dated
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58441
September 17, 2004 [Agencywide Documents
Access and Management System Accession
No. ML042730342], for the turbine building
remain acceptable using seismic demand
accelerations based on dynamic seismic
analysis prior to the restart of Unit 1.
proposed exemptions will not result in
a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission’s
regulations. Therefore, the exemptions
are authorized by law.
In approving these exemptions, the
NRC staff notes that the licensee must
satisfy license condition 2.C(15).
By separating the MSIV leakage
acceptance criteria from the overall
integrated leak rate test criteria, and
from the Type B and C leakage sum
limitation, the BFN–1 containment
leakage testing program will be made
more consistent with the limiting
assumptions used in the associated
accident consequences analyses. It will
also allow additional operational
flexibility by, in effect, increasing the
total containment leakage rate limit
while remaining within the applicable
dose consequence guidelines and
requirements. The licensee’s exemption
request was submitted in conjunction
with a proposed amendment to the TSs
to increase the allowable leak rate for
MSIVs, which is being evaluated by the
NRC staff separately. The amendment
associated with this exemption will
revise TS Surveillance Requirement
(SR) 3.6.1.3.10 to limit the maximum
allowable MSIV leakage through each
individual valve to 100 scfh and
combined MSIV leakage to 150 scfh.
The requested exemption from
Appendix J requirements for MSIV
leakage will allow BFN–1 to operate
with the proposed TS increased
allowable MSIV leakage rates with
reduced radiological exposure to plant
personnel for maintaining MSIV leakage
limits. The licensee’s exemption request
and proposed changes to the TSs
together would implement the
recommendation of BWR Owners Group
Topical Report NEDC–31858, ‘‘BWR
Report for Increasing MSIV Leakage
Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage
Control Systems,’’ which was approved
by the NRC staff in a safety evaluation
dated March 3, 1999. Therefore, the
NRC staff finds the proposed
exemptions from Appendix J to separate
MSIV leakage from other containment
leakage to be acceptable.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and
Safety
The underlying purpose of Appendix
J is to assure that containment leak tight
integrity is maintained (a) as tight as
reasonably achievable, and (b)
sufficiently tight so as to limit effluent
release to values bounded by the
analyses of radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents (DBAs). The
proposed changes require the use of the
main steam piping and the condenser to
process MSIV leakage. This additional
function does not compromise the
reliability of these systems. They will
continue to function as intended and
not be subject to a failure of a different
kind than previously considered. Since
no new accident precursors are created
by permitting the exclusion of MSIV
leakage from the overall integrated leak
rate test measurement and permitting
the exclusion of the MSIV contribution
to the sum of the Type B and Type C
local leak rate tests, the probability of
postulated accidents is not increased.
The allowable leak rate specified for the
MSIVs is used to quantify a maximum
amount of leakage assumed to bypass
containment. Sufficient margin relative
to the regulatory limits is maintained
even when conservative assumptions
and methods are utilized. Also, the
proposed change does not involve
changes to the structures, systems, or
components which would affect the
probability of an accident previously
evaluated in the BFN–1 updated final
safety analysis report. Thus, the
consequences of postulated accidents
are not increased. Therefore, there is no
undue risk to public health and safety.
Authorized by Law
This proposed exemptions would
permit exclusion of MSIV leakage from
the overall integrated leak rate test
measurement and permit exclusion of
the MSIV contribution to the sum of the
Type B and Type C local leak rate tests.
As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows
the NRC to grant exemptions from the
requirements of 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix J. The NRC staff has
determined that granting the licensee’s
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Consistent With Common Defense and
Security
The proposed exemptions would
permit exclusion of MSIV leakage from
the overall integrated leak rate test
measurement and permit exclusion of
the MSIV contribution to the sum of the
Type B and Type C local leak rate tests.
This change to the operation of the plant
has no relation to security issues.
Therefore, the common defense and
security are not impacted by these
exemptions.
Special Circumstances
Section 50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR states
that special circumstances are present
when ‘‘Application of the regulation in
the particular circumstances would not
serve the underlying purpose of the rule
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58442
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 191 / Tuesday, October 3, 2006 / Notices
or is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule.’’ The
NRC staff examined the licensee’s
rationale to support the exemption
request and concluded that it would
meet the underlying purpose of
Appendix J, Option B, Sections III.A
and III.B. The underlying purpose of
Appendix J is to assure that
containment leak tight integrity is
maintained (a) as tight as reasonably
achievable, and (b) sufficiently tight so
as to limit effluent release to values
bounded by the analyses of radiological
consequences of DBAs. Including the
MSIV leakage in the test acceptance
criteria is not necessary to achieve the
underlying purpose of the rule because
MSIV leakage is not directed into the
secondary containment. Also, TS SR
3.6.1.3.10 specifies a specific leak rate
limit to assure operation of BFN–1
remains within the bounds of the DBA
analysis. Therefore, the underlying
purpose of the rule continues to be met.
In addition, § 50.12(a)(2)(iii) of 10
CFR states that special circumstances
are present when ‘‘Compliance would
result in undue hardship or other costs
that are significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was
adopted, or that are significantly in
excess of those incurred by others
similarly situated.’’ The licensee’s
exemption request and proposed
changes to the TSs together would
implement the recommendation of
Topical Report NEDC–31858. The
special circumstances associated with
MSIV leakage testing are fully described
in the topical report. These
circumstances include the monetary
costs and personnel radiation exposure
involved with maintaining MSIV
leakage limits more restrictive than
necessary to meet offsite dose criteria
and control room habitability criteria.
The exemption from Appendix J
requirements for MSIV leakage rates is
required so that BFN–1 can operate with
the proposed TS increased allowable
MSIV leakage rates. This results in
reduced radiological exposure to plant
personnel, greater MSIV reliability, and
significant monetary benefit to TVA as
a result of reduced plant outage
durations.
Therefore, since the underlying
purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J,
is achieved and the circumstances
described in NEDC–31858 are met, the
special circumstances required by 10
CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and 50.12(a)(2)(iii)
for the granting of an exemption from 10
CFR part 50, Appendix J exist.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
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19:59 Oct 02, 2006
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50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by
law, will not present an undue risk to
the public health and safety, and is
consistent with the common defense
and security. Also, special
circumstances are present. Therefore,
the Commission hereby grants TVA an
exemption from the requirements of 10
CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B,
Sections III.A and III.B with respect to
MSIV leakage, for BFN–1.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the
Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have
a significant effect on the quality of the
human environment (71 FR 33777).
This exemption is effective upon
issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day
of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor
Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6–16270 Filed 10–2–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50–255]
Nuclear Management Company, LLC;
Palisades Plant; Environmental
Assessment and Finding of No
Significant Impact
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) is considering
issuance of an exemption from Title 10
of the Code of Federal Regulations (10
CFR) Part 50, Section 50.46, and
Appendix K to 10 CFR Part 50 for
Facility Operating License No. DPR–20,
issued to Nuclear Management
Company, LLC (the licensee), for
operation of the Palisades Nuclear Plant
(Palisades), located in VanBuren
County, Michigan. Therefore, as
required by 10 CFR 51.21, the NRC is
issuing this environmental assessment
and finding of no significant impact.
Environmental Assessment
Identification of the Proposed Action
The proposed action would provide
an exemption from the requirements of:
(1) 10 CFR 50.46, ‘‘Acceptance criteria
for emergency core cooling systems for
light-water nuclear power reactors,’’
which requires that the calculated
emergency core cooling system (ECCS)
performance for reactors with zircaloy
or ZIRLO fuel cladding meet certain
criteria, and (2) 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix K, ‘‘ECCS Evaluation
Models,’’ which presumes the use of
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zircaloy or ZIRLO fuel cladding when
doing calculations for energy release,
cladding oxidation, and hydrogen
generation after a postulated loss-ofcoolant accident.
The proposed action would allow the
licensee to use the M5 advanced alloy
in lieu of zircaloy or ZIRLO for fuel rod
cladding in fuel assemblies at Palisades.
The proposed action is in accordance
with the licensee’s application dated
October 4, 2005, as supplemented by
letter dated June 14, 2006.
The Need for the Proposed Action
The Commission’s regulations in 10
CFR 50.46 and 10 CFR Part 50,
Appendix K, require the demonstration
of adequate ECCS performance for lightwater reactors that contain fuel
consisting of uranium oxide pellets
enclosed in zircaloy or ZIRLO tubes.
Each of these regulations, either
implicitly or explicitly, assumes that
either zircaloy or ZIRLO is used as the
fuel rod cladding material.
In order to accommodate the high
fuel-rod burnups that are necessary for
modern fuel management and core
designs, Framatome ANP developed the
M5 advanced fuel rod cladding material.
M5 is an alloy comprised primarily of
zirconium (∼99 percent) and niobium
(∼1 percent) that has demonstrated
superior corrosion resistance and
reduced irradiation-induced growth
relative to both standard and low-tin
zircaloy. However, since the chemical
composition of the M5 advanced alloy
differs from the specifications of either
zircaloy or ZIRLO, use of the M5
advanced alloy falls outside of the strict
interpretation of NRC regulations.
Therefore, approval of this exemption
request is needed to permit the use of
the M5 advanced alloy as a fuel rod
cladding material at Palisades.
Environmental Impacts of the Proposed
Action
The NRC staff has completed its
evaluation of the proposed action and
concludes that use of M5 clad fuel
would not result in changes in the
operations or configuration of the
facility. There would be no change in
the level of controls or methodology
used for processing radioactive effluents
or handling solid radioactive waste.
The proposed action will not
significantly increase the probability or
consequences of accidents. No changes
are being made in the types of effluents
that may be released off site. There is no
significant increase in the amount of
any effluent released off site. There is no
significant increase in occupational or
public radiation exposure. Therefore,
there are no significant radiological
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]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 191 (Tuesday, October 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58440-58442]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-16270]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
[Docket No. 50-259]
Tennessee Valley Authority; Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1;
Exemption
1.0 Background
The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA, the licensee) is the holder of
Facility Operating License No. DPR-33, which authorizes operation of
the Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 (BFN-1). The license provides,
among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules,
regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC,
the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
The BFN-1 facility consists of a boiling water reactor (BWR)
located in Limestone County, Alabama.
2.0 Request/Action
Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), 50.54(o),
requires that primary reactor containments for water-cooled power
reactors be subject to the requirements of Appendix J to 10 CFR part
50. Appendix J specifies the leakage test requirements, schedules, and
acceptance criteria for tests of the leak tight integrity of the
primary reactor containment and systems and components which penetrate
the containment. Appendix J, Option B, Section III.A requires that the
overall integrated leak rate must not exceed the allowable leakage with
margin, as specified in the Technical Specifications (TSs). The overall
integrated leak rate, as specified in the 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J
definitions, includes the contribution from main steam isolation valve
(MSIV) leakage. By letter dated July 9, 2004, the licensee requested
exemption from Option B, Section III.A, requirements to permit
exclusion of MSIV leakage from the overall integrated leak rate test
measurement.
Option B, Section III.B of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, requires
that the sum of the leakage rates of all Type B and Type C local leak
rate tests be less than the performance criterion with margin, as
specified in the TSs. The licensee also requests exemption from this
requirement, to permit exclusion of the MSIV contribution to the sum of
the Type B and Type C tests.
3.0 Discussion
Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from
the requirements of 10 CFR part 50 when (1)
[[Page 58441]]
the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to
public health and safety, and are consistent with the common defense
and security; and (2) special circumstances are present. Section
50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR states that special circumstances are present
when ``Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances
would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule or is not necessary
to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.'' In addition, Sec.
50.12(a)(2)(iii) of 10 CFR states that special circumstances are
present when ``Compliance would result in undue hardship or other costs
that are significantly in excess of those contemplated when the
regulation was adopted, or that are significantly in excess of those
incurred by others similarly situated.''
Testing in accordance with 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J, ensures that
primary containment leakage following a design basis loss-of-coolant
accident will be within the allowable leakage limits specified in the
TSs and assumed in the safety analyses for determining radiological
consequences. For BFN-1, the containment integrated leakage rate test
currently includes leakage through closed MSIVs. However, the MSIV
leakage effluent has a different pathway to the environment compared to
other containment penetrations. It is not directed into the secondary
containment and filtered through the standby gas treatment system as is
other containment leakage. Instead, the MSIV leakage is directed
through the main steam drain piping into the condenser and is released
to the environment as an unfiltered ground level effluent. The licensee
analyzed the MSIV leakage pathway for the increased leakage (from less
than or equal to 11.5 standard cubic feet per hour (scfh) per valve to
less than or equal to 100 scfh per valve, with combined leakage for all
four main steam lines less than or equal to 150 scfh), and the
containment leakage pathway separately in a dose consequences analysis.
The calculated radiological consequences of the combined leakages were
found to be within the criteria of 10 CFR part 100 and 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix A, General Design Criterion 19. The NRC staff reviewed the
licensee's analyses and found them acceptable, as described in the
safety evaluation associated with Amendment No. 251, dated September
27, 2004. In approving Amendment No. 251, the NRC staff added license
condition 2.C(15):
The licensee is required to confirm that the conclusions made in
TVA's letter dated September 17, 2004 [Agencywide Documents Access
and Management System Accession No. ML042730342], for the turbine
building remain acceptable using seismic demand accelerations based
on dynamic seismic analysis prior to the restart of Unit 1.
In approving these exemptions, the NRC staff notes that the
licensee must satisfy license condition 2.C(15).
By separating the MSIV leakage acceptance criteria from the overall
integrated leak rate test criteria, and from the Type B and C leakage
sum limitation, the BFN-1 containment leakage testing program will be
made more consistent with the limiting assumptions used in the
associated accident consequences analyses. It will also allow
additional operational flexibility by, in effect, increasing the total
containment leakage rate limit while remaining within the applicable
dose consequence guidelines and requirements. The licensee's exemption
request was submitted in conjunction with a proposed amendment to the
TSs to increase the allowable leak rate for MSIVs, which is being
evaluated by the NRC staff separately. The amendment associated with
this exemption will revise TS Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.6.1.3.10
to limit the maximum allowable MSIV leakage through each individual
valve to 100 scfh and combined MSIV leakage to 150 scfh. The requested
exemption from Appendix J requirements for MSIV leakage will allow BFN-
1 to operate with the proposed TS increased allowable MSIV leakage
rates with reduced radiological exposure to plant personnel for
maintaining MSIV leakage limits. The licensee's exemption request and
proposed changes to the TSs together would implement the recommendation
of BWR Owners Group Topical Report NEDC-31858, ``BWR Report for
Increasing MSIV Leakage Rate Limits and Elimination of Leakage Control
Systems,'' which was approved by the NRC staff in a safety evaluation
dated March 3, 1999. Therefore, the NRC staff finds the proposed
exemptions from Appendix J to separate MSIV leakage from other
containment leakage to be acceptable.
Authorized by Law
This proposed exemptions would permit exclusion of MSIV leakage
from the overall integrated leak rate test measurement and permit
exclusion of the MSIV contribution to the sum of the Type B and Type C
local leak rate tests. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to
grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix J.
The NRC staff has determined that granting the licensee's proposed
exemptions will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the
exemptions are authorized by law.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
The underlying purpose of Appendix J is to assure that containment
leak tight integrity is maintained (a) as tight as reasonably
achievable, and (b) sufficiently tight so as to limit effluent release
to values bounded by the analyses of radiological consequences of
design-basis accidents (DBAs). The proposed changes require the use of
the main steam piping and the condenser to process MSIV leakage. This
additional function does not compromise the reliability of these
systems. They will continue to function as intended and not be subject
to a failure of a different kind than previously considered. Since no
new accident precursors are created by permitting the exclusion of MSIV
leakage from the overall integrated leak rate test measurement and
permitting the exclusion of the MSIV contribution to the sum of the
Type B and Type C local leak rate tests, the probability of postulated
accidents is not increased. The allowable leak rate specified for the
MSIVs is used to quantify a maximum amount of leakage assumed to bypass
containment. Sufficient margin relative to the regulatory limits is
maintained even when conservative assumptions and methods are utilized.
Also, the proposed change does not involve changes to the structures,
systems, or components which would affect the probability of an
accident previously evaluated in the BFN-1 updated final safety
analysis report. Thus, the consequences of postulated accidents are not
increased. Therefore, there is no undue risk to public health and
safety.
Consistent With Common Defense and Security
The proposed exemptions would permit exclusion of MSIV leakage from
the overall integrated leak rate test measurement and permit exclusion
of the MSIV contribution to the sum of the Type B and Type C local leak
rate tests. This change to the operation of the plant has no relation
to security issues. Therefore, the common defense and security are not
impacted by these exemptions.
Special Circumstances
Section 50.12(a)(2)(ii) of 10 CFR states that special circumstances
are present when ``Application of the regulation in the particular
circumstances would not serve the underlying purpose of the rule
[[Page 58442]]
or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule.''
The NRC staff examined the licensee's rationale to support the
exemption request and concluded that it would meet the underlying
purpose of Appendix J, Option B, Sections III.A and III.B. The
underlying purpose of Appendix J is to assure that containment leak
tight integrity is maintained (a) as tight as reasonably achievable,
and (b) sufficiently tight so as to limit effluent release to values
bounded by the analyses of radiological consequences of DBAs. Including
the MSIV leakage in the test acceptance criteria is not necessary to
achieve the underlying purpose of the rule because MSIV leakage is not
directed into the secondary containment. Also, TS SR 3.6.1.3.10
specifies a specific leak rate limit to assure operation of BFN-1
remains within the bounds of the DBA analysis. Therefore, the
underlying purpose of the rule continues to be met.
In addition, Sec. 50.12(a)(2)(iii) of 10 CFR states that special
circumstances are present when ``Compliance would result in undue
hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those
contemplated when the regulation was adopted, or that are significantly
in excess of those incurred by others similarly situated.'' The
licensee's exemption request and proposed changes to the TSs together
would implement the recommendation of Topical Report NEDC-31858. The
special circumstances associated with MSIV leakage testing are fully
described in the topical report. These circumstances include the
monetary costs and personnel radiation exposure involved with
maintaining MSIV leakage limits more restrictive than necessary to meet
offsite dose criteria and control room habitability criteria. The
exemption from Appendix J requirements for MSIV leakage rates is
required so that BFN-1 can operate with the proposed TS increased
allowable MSIV leakage rates. This results in reduced radiological
exposure to plant personnel, greater MSIV reliability, and significant
monetary benefit to TVA as a result of reduced plant outage durations.
Therefore, since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix
J, is achieved and the circumstances described in NEDC-31858 are met,
the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) and
50.12(a)(2)(iii) for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR part 50,
Appendix J exist.
4.0 Conclusion
Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common
defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants TVA an exemption from the
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix J, Option B, Sections III.A
and III.B with respect to MSIV leakage, for BFN-1.
Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment (71 FR 33777).
This exemption is effective upon issuance.
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of September 2006.
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. E6-16270 Filed 10-2-06; 8:45 am]
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