Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant; Exemption, 58436-58440 [E6-16262]

Agencies

• NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 191 (Tuesday, October 3, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58436-58440]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-16262]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[ Docket No. 50-333]


Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc.; James A. Fitzpatrick Nuclear 
Power Plant; Exemption

1.0 Background

    Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (ENO or the licensee) is the 
holder of Facility Operating License No. DPR-59, which authorizes 
operation of the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF). The 
license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to 
all rules, regulations, and orders of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect.
    The facility consists of one boiling-water reactor located in 
Oswego County, New York.

2.0 Request/Action

    Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, 
Section 50.48, requires that nuclear power plants that were licensed 
before January 1, 1979, of which JAF is one, must satisfy the 
requirements of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G. Subsection 
III.G.2 addresses fire protection features for ensuring that one of the 
redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown 
conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire. 
Subsection III.G.2.c provides use of a 1-hour fire barrier as one means 
for complying with this fire protection requirement. ENO proposes that 
the absence and/or control of ignition sources, the adequacy of 
detection and suppression systems, and the capability of the existing 
Hemyc fire wrap in this fire area, satisfy the underlying intent of 10 
CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection III.G.2.c.
    In summary, by letter dated July 27, 2005, Agencywide Documents 
Access and Management System (ADAMS) accession number ML052210382, as 
supplemented on May 17, 2006,

[[Page 58437]]

ADAMS accession number ML061530108, ENO submitted an exemption request 
to the NRC for relief from the requirements of Subsection III.G.2.c of 
10 CFR 50, Appendix R, specifically, from the 1-hour rating requirement 
for the fire wrap in the West Cable Tunnel at JAF.

3.0 Discussion

    Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by 
any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from 
the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 when (1) the exemptions are 
authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or 
safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and 
(2) when special circumstances are present. One of these special 
circumstances, described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the 
application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the 
underlying purpose of the rule.
    The NRC staff examined the licensee's rationale to support the 
exemption request and concluded that the existing fire protection 
features in and accessible for the specific fire zone referenced for 
JAF meet the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Subsection 
III.G.2.c. The following technical evaluation provides the basis for 
this conclusion.

3.1 Background

    On May 29, 2001, the NRC granted the licensee an exemption from the 
requirement of Appendix R, Section III.G.2.c, applicable to the West 
Cable Tunnel at JAF. Specifically, although III.G.2.c provides the use 
of a 1-hour rated fire barrier as a means of ensuring adequate fire 
protection for redundant safe shutdown trains in this fire zone, the 
licensee identified that the fire barrier material intended to be rated 
for 1 hour, in fact demonstrated functionality for 52 minutes during 
testing in accordance with American Society for Testing and Materials 
E-119 test criteria. The NRC granted the exemption based on supporting 
evidence that a 30-minute rated fire barrier, in combination with 
existing fire protection features and the absence of significant 
combustibles and ignition sources in the area, provided an equivalent 
level of protection and satisfied the underlying purpose of the rule. 
More than one type of fire barrier is used in this fire area, however 
no specific fire barrier type was identified in the exemption itself.
    In 2005, the NRC identified Hemyc fire barriers as potentially 
nonconforming fire barriers relied on for compliance with fire 
protection regulations for 1-hour or 3-hour rated protection at some 
licensed nuclear power plants. On April 1, 2005, the NRC staff issued 
Information Notice 2005-07, ``Results of HEMYC Electrical Raceway Fire 
Barrier System Full Scale Fire Testing'' (ML050890089), identifying the 
concern. On April 10, 2006, the NRC staff issued Generic Letter 2006-
03, ``Potentially Nonconforming Hemyc and MT Fire Barrier 
Configurations'' (ML053620142), asking that licensees determine whether 
this type of fire barrier is relied on for compliance and, if so, how 
compliance is maintained given the potential for nonconformance 
observed during recent NRC Hemyc testing (ML051190026).
    ENO identified use of Hemyc in the West Cable Tunnel and seeks an 
exemption similar to that granted in May 2001 (specified in the current 
submittal as applicable to Kaowool FP-60 fire barrier wrap), on the 
basis that the existing Hemyc fire barrier in this area is expected to 
provide at least 30 minutes of protection for the redundant safe 
shutdown trains located there and, in combination with existing fire 
protection features and the absence of significant combustibles and 
ignition sources in the area, provides an equivalent level of 
protection to satisfy the underlying purpose of the rule.

3.2 Existing Fire Protection Features

    Fire Area 1C at JAF contains the West Cable Tunnel (Fire Zone [FZ] 
CT-1). FZ CT-1 is protected from adjoining fire zones and other plant 
areas by 3-hour fire barriers. It has a total area of 13,400 square 
feet and contains Division I (Train A) cables for systems relied on for 
post-fire safe shutdown. In the event of a fire in this zone, the High 
Pressure Coolant Injection System and Residual Heat Removal System 
``B'' Train are relied on for hot shutdown of the plant, as well as the 
Alternate Shutdown Cooling System ``B'' Train which is relied on for 
cold shutdown.
    These systems are supported by the ``B'' Train direct current (dc) 
power supply and associated heating, ventilating, and air conditioning 
equipment. Therefore, the power cable for the air handling unit which 
provides proper ventilation for the ``B'' Train dc power supply (or 
Battery Room ``B''), is also relied on for safe shutdown and is the 
subject of this review.
    Hemyc is used to protect approximately 40 feet of the 5-inch 
conduit containing this power cable, for compliance with safe shutdown 
requirements. Within the 40 feet of Hemyc-wrapped conduit are 3.75 feet 
of 5-inch flex-conduit, and an inline pull box approximately 12 inches 
by 18 inches by 8 inches. All structural supports are seismically-
qualified and completely wrapped in Hemyc except for a portion of the 
base plates, which are bolted to a concrete ceiling.
    The licensee describes the Hemyc material used in this application 
as consisting of an inner and outer covering of aluminized 
Siltemp[supreg].\1\ The licensee states that aluminized Siltemp[supreg] 
can be expected to have better heat resistive properties than non-
aluminized Siltemp[supreg] or Refrasil[supreg], since the reflective 
coating serves to reflect more radiant energy than the standard 
Siltemp[supreg] or Refrasil[supreg].
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    \1\ Siltemp[supreg] and Refrasil[supreg] are heat-resistant 
fabrics used as an outer covering for Hemyc. Both were tested by the 
NRC and determined to be essentially equivalent (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML 051190055). Refrasil[supreg] was used during recent NRC Hemyc 
tests.
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    The licensee identifies the in-situ combustible load for this zone 
as cable and fiberglass. Cable is described as making up over 90 
percent of the load, with original cables ordered before Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Standard 383-1974 was 
issued. However, the licensee states that the flame retardant 
capability of the installed cable was analyzed and determined to be 
similar to IEEE 383-1974 rated cable. The fiberglass in this zone is 
comprised of a water tank (shower waste tank), piping, and ladders. The 
tank is approximately 21 feet from the Hemyc wrap, and the ladders are 
stored over 50 feet from the Hemyc wrap. Only the cables have been 
identified as significant in-situ ignition sources.
    Detection in FZ CT-1 is described by the licensee as an automatic 
area-wide early warning smoke detection system monitored in the Main 
Control Room. Although the detection system was designed and installed 
in accordance with National Fire Protection Standards 72D and 72E, 1979 
and 1978 Editions, respectively, the installed system does not meet the 
code of record in some cases. However, the deviations from the code 
were evaluated by the licensee and determined not to adversely impact 
safety performance.
    Automatic suppression for this zone is described as consisting of 
area-wide sprinklers and in-tray water spray. Manual suppression is 
also available within FZ CT-1 and in nearby areas in the form of fire 
extinguishers and hose stations.

3.3 Evaluation

    Hemyc fire barrier is used to wrap a cable in FZ CT-1 that supplies 
power to the air handling unit that supports redundant safe shutdown 
equipment

[[Page 58438]]

described in Section 3.2 above. Although this Hemyc was installed with 
the intention of providing 1 hour of rated fire protection in 
accordance with Appendix R, Subsection III.G.2.c, the licensee has 
evaluated the Hemyc configuration for this power cable and requests an 
exemption from the 1 hour requirement based on the expectation that the 
configuration will provide at least 30 minutes of protection.
    Five-inch conduits were not tested in recent Hemyc tests. However, 
because the mass of the larger sized conduits used in this application 
at JAF should be more resistant to thermal absorption than that of the 
4-inch conduits tested, and because this expectation was confirmed 
during NRC testing where the smaller sized conduits consistently failed 
in less time than the larger sized conduits, the NRC staff expects the 
results of the 4-inch conduit tests to be representative of a 5-inch 
configuration with some conservatism. The NRC testing was described in 
NRC Information Notice 2005-07 and further documented in the Sandia 
National Laboratories test reports (ML051190026).
    In the NRC tests (described in Section 3.1 above), the 4-inch 
conduit was tested with and without cable placed inside. With cable 
inside, indication of thermal failure for the 4-inch conduit was 
reached at 43 minutes. Therefore, for the rigid 5-inch configuration at 
JAF, the NRC staff finds that the test results for the 4-inch conduit 
and the additional time margin for thermal failure to occur due to the 
larger mass of the 5-inch conduit provides reasonable assurance that 
the Hemyc would provide 30 minutes of protection.
    The 5-inch cable configuration at JAF also includes a section of 
flex-conduit and an in-line pull box. Flex-conduit was not included in 
the recent Hemyc tests. However, the licensee provided additional 
information regarding this application of flex-conduit. The size and 
geometry of the flex-conduit is described as identical to that of the 
rigid conduit. However, the weight per unit length of the flex-conduit 
(4.7 pounds per foot (lbs/ft)) was determined to be best represented by 
the empty 2.5-inch conduit tested (5.1 lbs/ft). Because the initiation 
of thermal failure for the 2.5-inch empty conduit was indicated at 41 
minutes during the NRC tests, the NRC staff finds that the flex-conduit 
configuration at JAF would be expected to provide slightly less than 41 
minutes of protection. Because initiation of thermal failure for the 1-
inch filled conduit tested (2.52 lbs/ft) was indicated at 34 minutes 
during the NRC tests, the NRC staff finds that the flex-conduit 
configuration at JAF would be expected to provide 30 minutes of 
protection, with an estimated margin of approximately 10 minutes 
(approximately 33 percent margin).
    The in-line pull box included in the Hemyc configuration is 
approximately 12-inches by 18-inches by 8-inches, and is positioned in-
line with the 5-inch rigid conduit. A larger junction box of the same 
shape as the JAF pull box was included in the recent Hemyc tests, 
tested both with and without bands. Therefore, the NRC test results for 
the junction box should provide a reasonable representation of the 
expected performance of the JAF pull box configuration.
    In the NRC tests the Hemyc material was wrapped around the junction 
box (18-inches by 24-inches by 8-inches) using two Hemyc mats, each 
covering 3 sides of the box and stitched together. In the test with 
bands, the banding kept both mats in place even though the stitching 
failed. The junction box was banded with 2 to 3 bands around each of 
the six sides. When tested with the bands, initiation of thermal 
failure within the junction box was indicated at 31 minutes following 
the onset of the fire. In the test without the bands, initiation of 
thermal failure within the junction box was indicated at 15 minutes 
following the onset of the fire.
    At JAF, the Hemyc material is wrapped around the pull box using one 
Hemyc mat covering four sides, with a seam stitched along the length of 
one side. The remaining two ends are protected by Hemyc end pieces 
stitched in place. Banding is used to keep the four sides secured in 
place; however, the banding does not secure the end pieces. The 
licensee describes the end pieces as partially secured in place with 
the Hemyc that is wrapped around the in-line conduit. However, the NRC 
staff is concerned that without banding of the end pieces similar to 
banding of all sides during NRC tests, failed stitching would result in 
thermal failure at the unbanded end pieces similarly to that 
demonstrated during NRC testing of the unbanded junction box.
    In the licensee's May 17, 2006, response (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML061530108) to the NRC staff's request for additional information 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML060860014) regarding the expected performance of 
the pull box during a severe fire, the licensee stated that the degree 
of thermal shrink observed during NRC testing using Refrasil[supreg] 
was more substantial than that observed during subsequent industry 
testing using Siltemp[supreg], which is the material used in the JAF 
Hemyc configuration. However, this reasoning is not consistent with the 
NRC staff's interpretation of the results of the tests. The NRC staff 
observed both the NRC and industry tests and analyzed the data from 
both tests. The NRC staff observed that the improvements made to the 
industry test configuration (including increased collar widths, double 
wrapped elbows, and larger overlap area at the joints) may have 
resulted in smaller gaps at the joints; however, the resulting thermal 
failures were consistent (and sometimes more severe) than those 
observed during the NRC tests. In addition, these improvements have not 
been incorporated into the JAF pull box configuration. Therefore, the 
NRC staff finds no basis to conclude improved performance at the pull 
box end piece stitching.
    Based on the results of the NRC tests, it appears that the four 
banded sides of the pull box would remain protected for approximately 
31 minutes. However, the protection provided by the two ends of the 
pull box is uncertain. Banding is not used to secure the end pieces of 
the JAF pull box as it was during the NRC test of the junction box. The 
adjoining Hemyc from the in-line conduit may provide some 
reinforcement, but that potential additional protection is uncertain. 
Also, the apparent pinched stitching could provide additional Hemyc 
material that may improve performance, but again with uncertain 
quantification of the potential additional protection. Therefore, based 
on the results of the NRC tests and the absence of banding at the two 
ends of the JAF pull box, it appears that the conduit within the pull 
box would remain protected for 15 to 31 minutes from the onset of a 
fire. With additional margin added to the NRC test results to provide 
reasonable assurance of protection of the cables inside, the NRC staff 
finds that 30 minutes of protection cannot be reasonably expected at 
the pull box.
    Regarding the licensee's expectation that aluminized 
Siltemp[supreg] will improve the heat resistive properties of the JAF 
Hemyc configuration, it is not clear to the NRC staff that this 
expectation has been quantified or analyzed. In response to the NRC 
staff's request for additional information asking for supporting 
evidence of this expectation, the licensee referred to the 
manufacturer's data. Although this reference confirmed the statement 
that, ``(a)luminized Siltemp[supreg] provides thermal reflectivity,'' 
it also provided a table of Siltemp[supreg] products, including 
aluminized Siltemp[supreg] as an entry with a footnote that states, 
``Coatings will lose properties as temperature increases.'' In

[[Page 58439]]

addition, the licensee stated that ``(b)ased on the better thermal 
reflectivity of the aluminized Siltemp[supreg], less heat transfer will 
occur into the Hemyc wrap because it is reflected away.'' However, the 
licensee has provided no quantification for any potential reduction in 
radiant heat transfer. In addition, the stratification of hot gases 
would likely result in the formation of a black body in the vicinity of 
the Hemyc configuration (near the ceiling) which would impede radiant 
heat transfer. Based on the information provided, the NRC staff is 
unable to confirm that the contribution of thermal reflectivity, if 
any, would be effective enough to result in a measurable improvement in 
Hemyc performance. Therefore, the NRC staff finds no basis for the 
expectation of any marked difference in radiant energy reflection 
between aluminized and standard Siltemp[supreg] or Refrasil[supreg].
    All structural supports used in this application are seismically-
qualified and completely wrapped in Hemyc except for a portion of the 
base plates, which are bolted to a concrete ceiling. In response to the 
NRC staff's request for additional information, the licensee provided 
details on the configuration of the structural support. Although the 
area of the exposed portions of the base plates requested was not 
provided, the NRC staff is of the opinion that the concrete ceiling 
should act as a heat sink for a fire in this area, minimizing the heat 
transfer through the supports. Based on the fully-wrapped structural 
support system, the NRC staff finds the heat transfer through the 
exposed based plates or supports would be insufficient to adversely 
impact the functionality of the associated protected cable.
Combustibles and Ignition Sources
    The only significant in-situ combustible and ignition source for 
this zone is cable. Although these cables were installed before IEEE 
Standard 383-1974 was issued, they have been analyzed to determine the 
flame retardant capability and shown to be equivalent to IEEE 383-1974 
rated cable. The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's evaluation of 
the flame retardant characteristics of the cable installed and finds 
acceptable the licensee's determination that a fire in this area will 
propagate slowly.
    Administrative procedures control transient combustibles, ignition 
sources, and hot work in this zone. Procedures are being revised to 
incorporate restrictions on hot work in the proximity of the Hemyc wrap 
under review, similar to that done for the Kaowool FP-60 fire barrier 
wrap.
Detection
    An automatic area-wide smoke detection system is installed in this 
fire area. If actuated, the detector will initiate an alarm in the Main 
Control Room. Because the installed detection system does not meet the 
code of record in some cases, the deviations from the code were 
evaluated by the NRC staff and found to potentially affect the 
availability of the detection system. Therefore, the NRC staff reviewed 
the licensee's program to ensure availability of the detection systems 
in the event detection is unavailable in FZ CT-1. The NRC staff found 
that adequate administrative controls are in effect to apply 
compensatory measures if the system is not available and adequate 
controls maintain the effectiveness of the detection system. Therefore, 
the NRC staff concludes that the detection system code deviations do 
not adversely impact safety performance in this zone.
Suppression
    Automatic suppression for this zone is supplied by area-wide 
sprinklers and an in-tray water spray system. Manual suppression is 
also available through hose stations and fire extinguishers located 
within the fire zone and in nearby areas. In the event that automatic 
or manual suppression systems are out of service, compensatory measures 
have been established to protect safe shutdown equipment in FZ CT-1.
Risk Analysis
    The licensee reviewed the JAF fire probabilistic risk analysis 
database for the air handling unit and the power cable supplying it, 
and found that neither are risk significant. If the power cable was 
damaged by a fire, and therefore ventilation was lost to the B battery 
room, the licensee stated it would take 2 hours for the B battery room 
to heat up to the point it would exceed the manufacturer's 
qualification of the battery. This allows time to fight the fire and 
take corrective actions. Assuming the loss of all the equipment in FZ 
CT-1, the licensee estimated the total core damage frequency for a fire 
in FZ CT-1 as 7.21E-7/year, based on the JAF Individual Plant 
Examination for External Events.
 Defense-in-Depth
    Part 50 of 10 CFR, Appendix R, section II, states that a licensee's 
fire protection program extends the concept of defense-in-depth to fire 
protection with the following objectives:
     To prevent fires from starting,
     To detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those 
fires that do occur, and
     To provide protection for structures, systems and 
components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly 
extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the 
safe shutdown of the plant.
    Regulatory Guide 1.174 also identifies factors to be considered 
when evaluating defense-in-depth for a risk-informed change.
    The NRC staff has evaluated the elements of defense-in-depth used 
for fire protection at JAF, applicable to the fire zone under review. 
Although the NRC staff finds inadequate basis to support the licensee's 
expectation that the existing Hemyc configuration in FZ CT-1 will 
provide 30 minutes of protection for the power cable to the air 
handling unit relied on for post-fire safe shutdown in the event of a 
worst-case fire in FZ CT-1, the NRC staff is reasonably assured that 
the absence of significant combustible loading and ignition sources in 
the area of the Hemyc configuration and low risk significance 
associated with the safe shutdown equipment protected, preclude the 
need for withstanding a fire of the magnitude tested in recent NRC 
tests. In particular, although the Hemyc configuration applied to the 
JAF pull box may not be optimal, the risk significance is low. In 
addition, the existing fire protection capabilities for full area 
detection, full area suppression, and in-tray suppression, provide 
reasonable assurance for prevention of an unmitigated fire. Therefore, 
based on the NRC staff's analysis, defense-in-depth is maintained.
Special Circumstances
    One of the special circumstances, described in 10 CFR 
50.12(a)(2)(ii), is that the application of the regulation is not 
necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying 
purpose of Subsection III.G.2.c of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, is to ensure 
that one of the redundant trains necessary to achieve and maintain hot 
shutdown conditions remains free of fire damage in the event of a fire, 
and allows the use of a 1-hour fire barrier with fire detectors and an 
automatic fire suppression system as one means for complying with this 
fire protection requirement. For FZ CT-1, based on the presence of 
area-wide smoke detection; the presence of automatic area and in-tray 
fire suppression and manual fire suppression; fire barrier protection 
at the boundaries of the fire zone; the existing Hemyc configuration in 
the fire zone; implementation of transient combustibles controls 
including proposed revisions for hot work in the

[[Page 58440]]

vicinity of the Hemyc configuration; and the absence of significant 
combustible loading and ignition sources, the NRC staff finds that a 1-
hour rating for the fire barrier protection in this zone is not 
necessary to ensure the availability of a redundant train necessary to 
achieve and maintain safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire 
in FZ CT-1. Based upon consideration of the information in the 
licensee's Fire Hazards Analysis; administrative controls for transient 
combustibles and ignition sources; responses to NRC staff requests for 
additional information; previously-granted exemptions for this fire 
zone; and the considerations noted above, the NRC staff concludes that 
this exemption meets the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, 
operating in the proposed manner meets the underlying purpose of 
Subsection III.G.2.c to 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, and special 
circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12 for the granting of an exemption 
from 10 CFR 50 exist.
Authorized by Law
    This exemption would allow use of a fire barrier expected to 
provide less than 1 hour of fire protection. As stated above, 10 CFR 
50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 
CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined that granting of the 
licensee's proposed exemption is permissible under the Atomic Energy 
Act of 1954, as amended, or the Commission's regulations. Therefore, 
the exemption is authorized by law.
No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety
    The underlying purpose of Subsection III.G.2.c of 10 CFR 50, 
Appendix R, is to ensure that one of the redundant trains necessary to 
achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions remains free of fire 
damage in the event of a fire. Based on the existing fire barriers, 
fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression equipment, 
administrative controls, the fire hazard analysis, the Hemyc 
configuration, and the absence of significant combustible loads and 
ignition sources, special circumstances are present such that 
application of this rule is not necessary. No new accident precursors 
are created by allowing use of a fire barrier expected to provide less 
than 1 hour of fire protection and the probability of postulated 
accidents is not increased. Similarly, the consequences of postulated 
accidents are not increased. Therefore, there is no undue risk (since 
risk is probability multiplied by consequences) to public health and 
safety.
Consistent With Common Defense and Security
    The proposed exemption would allow use of a fire barrier expected 
to provide less than 1 hour of fire protection based on the existing 
fire barriers, fire detectors, automatic and manual fire suppression 
equipment, administrative controls, the fire hazard analysis, the Hemyc 
configuration, and the absence of significant combustible loads and 
ignition sources. This change to the plant requirements for the 
specific configuration in this fire zone has no relation to security 
issues. Therefore, the common defense and security is not impacted by 
this exemption.

4.0 Conclusion

    Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 
50.12(a), the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue 
risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common 
defense and security. Specifically, special circumstances are present 
in that the application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve 
the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the Commission hereby 
grants ENO an exemption from the requirement of a 1-hour rated fire 
barrier (fire wrap) in Section III.G.2.c of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, 
for the West Cable Tunnel at JAF provided that the proposed revisions 
to the procedures for hot work in the vicinity of the Hemyc 
configuration are implemented. The granting of this exemption is based 
on the implementation of revised administrative controls for hot work 
in the vicinity of the Hemyc configuration in FZ CT-1 (addressed in 
Section 3.3 above), the existing or upgraded fire barrier protection 
features in FZ CT-1, the maintenance of existing automatic detection 
and suppression features in FZ CT-1, and the availability of manual 
fire fighting and associated fire fighting equipment.
    Pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, the Commission has determined that the 
granting of this exemption will not have a significant effect on the 
quality of the human environment (71 FR 54100).
    This exemption is effective upon issuance.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 27th day of September 2006.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Catherine Haney,
Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
 [FR Doc. E6-16262 Filed 10-2-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P