Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2007, 57865-57870 [06-8302]

Agencies

• Executive Office of the President
• Presidential Documents

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 189 (Friday, September 29, 2006)]
[Presidential Documents]
[Pages 57865-57870]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-8302]



[[Page 57863]]

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Part VII





The President





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Presidential Determination No. 2006-24 of September 15, 2006--
Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit or Major Illicit Drug 
Producing Countries for Fiscal Year 2007


                        Presidential Documents 



Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 189 / Friday, September 29, 2006 / 
Presidential Documents

___________________________________________________________________

Title 3--
The President

[[Page 57865]]

                Presidential Determination No. 2006-24 of September 15, 
                2006

                
Presidential Determination on Major Drug Transit 
                or Major Illicit Drug Producing Countries for Fiscal 
                Year 2007

                Memorandum for the Secretary of State

                Pursuant to section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations 
                Authorization Act, FY03 (Public Law 107-228) (FRAA), I 
                hereby identify the following countries as major drug 
                transit or major illicit drug producing countries: 
                Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, 
                Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
                Haiti, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
                Panama, Paraguay, Peru, and Venezuela.

                A country's presence on the Majors List is not 
                necessarily an adverse reflection of its government's 
                counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with 
                the United States. Consistent with the statutory 
                definition of a major drug transit or drug producing 
                country set forth in section 481(e)(2) and (5) of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one 
                of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit drug 
                producing countries are placed on the list is the 
                combination of geographical, commercial, and economic 
                factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced 
                despite the concerned government's most assiduous 
                enforcement measures.

                Pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the FRAA, I hereby 
                designate Burma and Venezuela as countries that have 
                failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to 
                adhere to their obligations under international 
                counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set 
                forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. Attached to this 
                report (Tab A) are justifications for the 
                determinations on Burma and Venezuela, as required by 
                section 706(2)(B).

                I have also determined, in accordance with provisions 
                of section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that support for 
                programs to aid Venezuela's democratic institutions is 
                vital to the national interests of the United States.

                Although President Karzai has strongly attacked 
                narcotrafficking as the greatest threat to Afghanistan, 
                one third of the Afghan economy remains opium-based, 
                which contributes to widespread public corruption. The 
                government at all levels must be held accountable to 
                deter and eradicate poppy cultivation; remove and 
                prosecute corrupt officials; and investigate, 
                prosecute, or extradite narcotraffickers and those 
                financing their activities. We are concerned that 
                failure to act decisively now could undermine security, 
                compromise democratic legitimacy, and imperil 
                international support for vital assistance.

                My Administration is concerned with the decline in 
                Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation since October 
                2005. Bolivia, the world's third largest producer of 
                cocaine, has undertaken policies that have allowed the 
                expansion of coca cultivation and slowed the pace of 
                eradication until mid-year, when it picked up. The 
                Government of Bolivia's (GOB) policy of ``zero cocaine, 
                but not zero coca'' has focused primarily on 
                interdiction, to the near exclusion of its necessary 
                complements, eradication and alternative development. 
                However, the GOB has been supportive of interdiction 
                initiatives and has had positive results in seizing 
                cocaine and decommissioning rustic labs. We would 
                encourage the GOB to refocus its efforts on eliminating 
                excess coca, the source of cocaine. This would include 
                eradicating at least 5,000 hectares, including in the 
                Chapare region; eliminating the ``cato'' exemption to 
                Bolivian law; rescinding Ministerial Resolution 112, 
                Administrative Resolution 083,

[[Page 57866]]

                and establishing tight controls on the sale of licit 
                coca leaf for traditional use; and implementing strong 
                precursor chemical control measures to prevent 
                conversion of coca to cocaine. My Administration plans 
                to review Bolivia's performance in these specific areas 
                within 6 months.

                The Government of Canada (GOC) continued to effectively 
                curb the diversion of precursor chemicals that are 
                required for methamphetamine production to feed U.S. 
                illegal markets. The GOC also continued to seize 
                laboratories that produce MDMA/Ecstasy consumed in both 
                Canada and the United States. The principal drug 
                concern was the continuing large-scale production of 
                high-potency, indoor-grown marijuana for export to the 
                United States. The United States enjoyed excellent 
                cooperation with Canada across a broad range of law 
                enforcement issues and shared goals.

                The Government of Ecuador (GOE) has made considerable 
                progress in combating narcotics trafficking destined 
                for the United States. However, a dramatic increase in 
                the quantity of cocaine transported toward the United 
                States using Ecuadorian-flagged ships and indications 
                of increased illegal armed group activity along 
                Ecuador's northern border with Colombia remain areas of 
                serious concern. Effective cooperation and streamlined 
                maritime operational procedures between the U.S. Coast 
                Guard and the Ecuadorian Navy are resulting in an 
                increase in the amount of cocaine interdicted. Building 
                on that cooperation, we will work with Ecuador to 
                change the circumstances that make Ecuadorian-flagged 
                vessels and Ecuadorian citizenship so attractive to 
                drug traffickers.

                As a result of the elections in Haiti, the new 
                government now has a clear mandate from the Haitian 
                people to bring crime, violent gangs, and drug 
                trafficking under control. We urge the new government 
                to strengthen and accelerate ongoing efforts to rebuild 
                and reform Haiti's law enforcement and judicial 
                institutions and to consult closely with the United 
                States to define achievable and verifiable steps to 
                accomplish these goals.

                While the Government of Nigeria continues to take 
                substantive steps to curb official corruption, it 
                remains a major challenge in Nigeria. We strongly 
                encourage the government to continue to adequately fund 
                and support the anti-corruption bodies that have been 
                established there in order to fully address Nigeria's 
                ongoing fight against corruption. We urge Nigeria to 
                continue improving the effectiveness of the National 
                Drug and Law Enforcement Agency and, in particular, 
                improve enforcement operations at major airports/
                seaports and against major drug kingpins, to include 
                targeting their financial assets. We look forward to 
                working with Nigerian officials to increase 
                extraditions and assisting in drug enforcement 
                operations.

                Although there have not been any drug seizures or 
                apprehensions of drug traffickers with a connection to 
                the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) since 
                2004, we remain concerned about DPRK state-directed 
                criminal activity. The United States Government has 
                made clear to the DPRK that an end to all involvement 
                in criminal activity is a necessary prerequisite to 
                entry into the international community.

                Under provisions of the Combat Methamphetamine Epidemic 
                Act (CMEA), which modified section 489(a) of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and section 
                490(a) of the FAA, a report will be made to the 
                Congress on March 1, 2007, naming the five countries 
                that legally exported the largest amount of 
                methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as the top 
                five methamphetamine precursor importers with the 
                highest rate of diversion for illicit drug production. 
                This report will be sent concurrently with the 
                International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, which 
                will also contain additional reporting on 
                methamphetamine precursor chemicals pursuant to the 
                CMEA.

[[Page 57867]]

                You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this 
                report under section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to 
                the Congress, and publish it in the Federal Register.

                    (Presidential Sig.)B

                THE WHITE HOUSE,

                    Washington, September 15, 2006.

Billing code 4710-10-P



[[Page 57868]]

                MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL 
                DETERMINATION ON MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG 
                PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2007

                Burma

                Burma failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts 
                during the last 12 months to meet its obligations under 
                international counternarcotics agreements and U.S. 
                domestic counternarcotics requirements as set forth in 
                section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
                1961, as amended.

                Burma remains the world's second largest producer of 
                illicit opium. Burmese opiates continue to pose a 
                threat in Asia. Additionally, amphetamine-type 
                stimulants (ATS) produced and trafficked from Burmese 
                territory continue to threaten the entire region. Burma 
                has not taken decisive action against drug gangs, such 
                as the United Wa State Army (UWSA), which continue to 
                operate freely along Burma's borders with China and 
                Thailand. These criminal organizations increasingly 
                threaten Asia with the crystalline form of 
                methamphetamine called ``Ice''.

                The efforts of the Government of Burma (GOB) to combat 
                the production and trafficking of methamphetamine have 
                been unsatisfactory. Even as methamphetamine production 
                and trafficking have increased in recent years, 
                seizures continue to be disappointing, and the GOB has 
                not been forthcoming with verifiable statistics. It 
                failed to establish a mechanism for the reliable 
                measurement of ATS production and, once again, did not 
                cooperate in the joint United States/Burma crop survey.

                The GOB continued to take no action in response to the 
                indictments in January 2005 by the U.S. Justice 
                Department against eight leaders of the UWSA. The 
                failure to take action against these accused 
                ringleaders, responsible for a good deal of human 
                misery in Asia and beyond, demonstrates the Burmese 
                Government's failure to take serious action against 
                drug activity on its territory.

                The Government of Burma has failed to indict and 
                prosecute any Burmese military official above the rank 
                of colonel for drug-related corruption.

                Burma has failed to expand demand-reduction, 
                prevention, and drug-treatment programs to reduce drug 
                use and control the spread of HIV/AIDS. The Global Fund 
                for Aids, TB and Malaria had approved grants totaling 
                $98.5 million for Burma but withdrew in late 2005 due 
                to the Government's onerous restrictions and lack of 
                full cooperation.

                The international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
                continues to list Burma as one of only two ``Non-
                cooperative Countries.'' At the heart of Burma's 
                problems with international financial authorities is 
                its weak implementation of anti-money laundering 
                controls, with the result that narcotics traffickers 
                and other criminal elements are still able to launder 
                the proceeds of their crimes through Burmese financial 
                institutions.

                While the picture of Burma's counternarcotics efforts 
                remains overwhelmingly negative, there were some 
                positive aspects. The GOB, with the U.S. Drug 
                Enforcement Administration and the Australian Federal 
                Police, disrupted two international trafficking 
                syndicates that are associated with the United Wa State 
                Army (UWSA), a kingpin organization, and have ties 
                throughout Asia, India, and North America. In September 
                2005, the GOB seized a UWSA-related shipment of 
                approximately 496 kilograms of heroin bound for China 
                via Laos. The seizure led to the arrest of 80 suspects, 
                including two of UWSA Chairman Bao Yu Xiang's family 
                members, and the seizure of assets, including $1.3 
                million in cash. A second, related investigation from 
                December 2005 through April 2006 culminated in the 
                arrest of 30 subjects and the seizure of $2.2 million 
                in assets and significant quantities of morphine base, 
                heroin, opium, weapons, methamphetamine tablets and 
                powder, crystal methamphetamine, pill presses, and 
                precursor chemicals.

[[Page 57869]]

                MEMORANDUM OF JUSTIFICATION FOR PRESIDENTIAL 
                DETERMINATION ON MAJOR DRUG TRANSIT OR ILLICIT DRUG 
                PRODUCING COUNTRIES FOR FY 2007

                Venezuela

                Venezuela failed demonstrably to make sufficient 
                efforts during the last 12 months to meet its 
                obligations under international counternarcotics 
                agreements and U.S. domestic counternarcotics 
                requirements as set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the 
                Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.

                This determination comes as the result of Venezuela's 
                lack of effective response to specific United States 
                Government requests for counternarcotics cooperation as 
                well as the country's continued lack of action against 
                drug trafficking within and through its borders 
                commensurate with its responsibilities to the 
                international community.

                Venezuela's importance as a transshipment point for 
                drugs bound for the United States and Europe has 
                continued to increase in the past 12 months, a 
                situation both enabled and exploited by corrupt 
                Venezuelan officials. The Venezuelan media provided an 
                example of this corruption when they reported that 
                Venezuelan police re-sold the vast majority of a 9,400 
                kilogram cocaine seizure to drug traffickers in July of 
                this year (Venezuela does not allow independent 
                verification of seizure amounts). Seizures of illegal 
                drugs transiting the country have fallen, according to 
                DEA estimates. The volume of cocaine transiting the 
                country is expected to continue to rise substantially 
                in 2006. The most dramatic increase in cocaine 
                departing Venezuela was to non-U.S. destinations, 
                primarily Europe. The vast majority of cocaine going to 
                the United States or Europe goes by sea. However, an 
                increasing proportion is being moved by non-commercial 
                air through the Caribbean toward the United States. The 
                number of suspected drug flights departing Venezuela 
                and going to Hispaniola and the Caribbean more than 
                doubled in 2005 and has continued that rising trend in 
                the first half of 2006.

                Venezuela has not used available tools to counter the 
                growing drug threat. It has not strengthened 
                inspections or security along its border with Colombia; 
                it has not utilized judicial wiretap orders to 
                investigate drug cases; it has not attempted meaningful 
                prosecution of corrupt officials; and it has not 
                renewed formal counternarcotics cooperation agreements 
                with the United States Government. The role and status 
                of the DEA in Venezuela remains in limbo since the host 
                country refuses to sign a memorandum of understanding 
                authorizing Drug Enforcement Administration presence, 
                even after successfully concluding a lengthy process of 
                negotiation with U.S. officials. Venezuela also has not 
                signed a letter of agreement that would make nearly $3 
                million from FY 2005 available for United States 
                Government cooperative counternarcotics efforts.

                Last year Venezuela was found to have ``failed 
                demonstrably'' as a partner in the war on drugs, in 
                part because it ended most air interdiction 
                cooperation, refused to grant U.S. counternarcotics 
                overflights of Venezuela, curtailed most military and 
                law enforcement counternarcotics cooperation, replaced 
                its most effective counternarcotics officials, and 
                failed to effectively implement its own money 
                laundering and organized crime legislation. All of 
                these issues remain outstanding in 2006.

                The United States is very concerned about the continued 
                deterioration of democratic institutions in Venezuela 
                as reflected in the increased executive control over 
                the other branches of government, threats to judicial 
                independence and human rights, and attacks on press 
                freedoms and freedom of expression.

[[Page 57870]]

                A vital national interests certification will allow the 
                United States Government to provide funds that support 
                programs to aid Venezuela's democratic institutions, 
                establish selected community development projects, and 
                strengthen Venezuela's political party system.

[FR Doc. 06-8302 

Filed 8-28-06; 9:04 am]

Billing code 4710-10-P