Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 Airplanes, 56064-56070 [06-8232]
Download as PDF
56064
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Applicability
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
(c) This AD applies to EMBRAER Model
ERJ 170–100 LR, –100 STD, –100 SE, and
–100 SU airplanes, certificated in any
category; serial numbers 17000007,
17000033, 17000034, 17000036 through
17000046 inclusive, and 17000050 through
17000067 inclusive.
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2004–19755; Directorate
Identifier 2004–NM–23–AD]
Unsafe Condition
RIN 2120–AA64
(d) This AD results from failure of an
electrical bonding clamp, used to attach the
electrical bonding straps to the fuel system
lines. We are issuing this AD to prevent loss
of bonding protection in the interior of the
fuel tanks or adjacent areas that, in
combination with lightning strike, could
result in a fuel tank explosion and
consequent loss of the airplane.
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing
Model 747 Airplanes
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Replacement
(f) Within 5,000 flight hours after the
effective date of this AD: Replace all
electrical bonding clamps having part
number AN735D4 or AN735D6 with new
clamps and replace the attaching hardware
with new or serviceable attaching hardware,
and do the other specified action, by
accomplishing all of the actions specified in
the Accomplishment Instructions of
EMBRAER Service Bulletin 170–28–0009,
Revision 01, dated February 23, 2006. The
other specified action must be done before
further flight.
Credit for Previous Service Bulletin
(g) Actions done before the effective date
of this AD in accordance with EMBRAER
Service Bulletin 170–28–0009, dated
December 30, 2005, are acceptable for
compliance with the requirements of
paragraph (f) of this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
(h)(1) The Manager, International Branch,
ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate,
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs
for this AD, if requested in accordance with
the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
Related Information
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
(i) Brazilian airworthiness directive 2006–
06–03, effective July 7, 2006, also addresses
the subject of this AD.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 14, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 06–8225 Filed 9–25–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial
Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124–2207, for service
information identified in this proposed
AD.
Dan
Kinney, Aerospace Engineer, Propulsion
Branch, ANM–140S, FAA, Seattle
Aircraft Certification Office, 1601 Lind
Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington
98057–3356; telephone (425) 917–6499;
fax (425) 917–6590.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Supplemental notice of
proposed rulemaking (NPRM);
reopening of comment period.
AGENCY:
The FAA is revising an earlier
proposed airworthiness directive (AD)
for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes.
The original NPRM would have
required repetitive tests to detect hot air
leaking from the trim air diffuser ducts
or sidewall riser duct assemblies
(collectively referred to in this proposed
AD as ‘‘TADDs’’), related investigative
actions, and corrective actions if
necessary. The original NPRM also
would have provided an optional
terminating action for the repetitive
tests. The original NPRM resulted from
reports of sealant deteriorating on the
outside of the center wing fuel tank and
analysis that sealant may deteriorate
inside the tank due to excess heat from
leaking TADDs. This action revises the
original NPRM by referring to improved
inspection procedures and extending
the repetitive interval for certain related
investigative actions. We are proposing
this supplemental NPRM to prevent
leakage of fuel or fuel vapors into areas
where ignition sources may be present,
which could result in a fire or
explosion.
SUMMARY:
We must receive comments on
this supplemental NPRM by October 23,
2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
supplemental NPRM.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://
dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions
for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
DATES:
PO 00000
Frm 00016
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this supplemental NPRM.
Send your comments to an address
listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include
the docket number ‘‘Docket No. FAA–
2004–19755; Directorate Identifier
2004–NM–23–AD’’ at the beginning of
your comments. We specifically invite
comments on the overall regulatory,
economic, environmental, and energy
aspects of this supplemental NPRM. We
will consider all comments received by
the closing date and may amend this
supplemental NPRM in light of those
comments.
We will post all comments submitted,
without change, to https://dms.dot.gov,
including any personal information you
provide. We will also post a report
summarizing each substantive verbal
contact with FAA personnel concerning
this supplemental NPRM. Using the
search function of that Web site, anyone
can find and read the comments in any
of our dockets, including the name of
the individual who sent the comment
(or signed the comment on behalf of an
association, business, labor union, etc.).
You may review the DOT’s complete
Privacy Act Statement in the Federal
Register published on April 11, 2000
(65 FR 19477–78), or you may visit
https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level in the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in ADDRESSES.
Comments will be available in the AD
docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Discussion
We proposed to amend 14 CFR part
39 with a notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM) for an AD (the ‘‘original
NPRM’’) for certain Boeing Model 747
airplanes. The original NPRM was
published in the Federal Register on
December 1, 2004 (69 FR 69844). The
original NPRM proposed to require
repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking
from the trim air diffuser ducts or
sidewall riser duct assemblies
(collectively referred to in this
supplemental NPRM as ‘‘TADDs’’),
related investigative actions, and
corrective actions if necessary. The
original NPRM also would have
provided an optional terminating action
for the repetitive tests.
Actions Since Original NPRM Was
Issued
Since we issued the original NPRM,
we have received reports indicating that
the procedures referenced in Boeing
Alert Service Bulletin 747–21A2418,
Revision 2, dated March 4, 2004 (which
we referenced in the original NPRM as
the applicable source of service
information for the proposed actions),
are not sufficient to detect a damaged
TADD in a timely manner.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service
Bulletin 747–21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005. Revision 4 of
the service bulletin describes
procedures that are similar to those in
Revision 2. However, Revision 4 revises
the part numbers for certain improved
sidewall riser duct assemblies for
installation on Boeing Model 747–400
series airplanes that are not freighters.
This change is due to new
environmental and flammabilityresistance standards required under
amendments 25–110, 91–279, 121–301,
125–43, and 135–90 of the Federal
Aviation Regulations. (Refer to the final
rule, docket no. FAA–2000–7909,
‘‘Improved Flammability Standards for
Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Materials
Used in Transport Category Airplanes’’
(68 FR 45046, July 31, 2003; with
corrections published 68 FR 50054,
August 20, 2003; and 69 FR 6532,
February 11, 2004).) Revision 4 of the
service bulletin also recommends
increasing the initial inspection
threshold from 27,000 flight hours to
32,000 flight hours, and the repetitive
inspection interval from 7,000 flight
hours to 12,000 flight hours, for the
general visual inspection for damage or
discrepancies of the TADDs.
Certain changes to the service
information that were originally
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
introduced in Boeing Service Bulletin
747–21A2418, Revision 3, dated
December 21, 2004, are retained in
Revision 4 of the service bulletin:
• Chapter 21–61–20 of the airplane
maintenance manual (AMM) has been
revised to contain more definitive pass/
fail criteria for the repetitive tests and
inspections of the TADDs. These revised
criteria increase the chances of a
defective TADD being detected in a
timely manner.
• Chapter 21–61–21 of the AMM
contains procedures for unwrapping
insulation blankets as necessary before
the general visual inspection to detect
defective TADDs is done on Boeing
Model 747–400 non-freighter series
airplanes.
Accomplishing the actions specified
in Revision 4 of the service information
is intended to adequately address the
unsafe condition. We have revised
paragraphs (f), (g), (h), and (j) and Note
2 of this supplemental NPRM to refer to
Revision 4 of the service information.
We have also added a new paragraph (k)
to this supplemental NPRM, and reidentified the subsequent paragraph, to
give credit for actions done before the
effective date of the AD in accordance
with previous issues of the service
bulletin.
With regard to extending compliance
times for the general visual inspection,
we have revised Table 1 of this
supplemental NPRM to extend the
repetitive interval for the general visual
inspections from 7,000 flight hours to
12,000 flight hours. We have also
revised Table 1 of this supplemental
NPRM to extend the initial compliance
threshold from 27,000 total flight hours
to 32,000 total flight hours.
Comments
We have considered the following
comments on the original NPRM.
Request To Relieve Testing
Requirement
British Airways requests that we
revise paragraph (f) of the original
NPRM to relieve operators of the
requirement to do a test to detect hot air
leaking from the TADDs at the same
time as the general visual inspection for
damage or discrepancies of the TADDs.
The commenter notes that, if the
inspection is being accomplished, there
is no need to do the test during the same
maintenance check. The commenter
assumes that the inspection exceeds the
intent of the test in that the inspection
would detect discrepancies of the
TADDs that the test may not.
We concur with the commenter’s
request. We agree that it would be
redundant to perform a hot air leak test
PO 00000
Frm 00017
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
56065
at the same time as the general visual
inspection when the repetitive intervals
for these actions coincide. Therefore, we
have revised paragraph (f) of this
supplemental NPRM to clarify that,
when the compliance times for a hot air
leak test and a general visual inspection
coincide, the hot air leak test is not
required at that time.
Request To Allow Installation of
Serviceable Improved TADDs
The Air Transport Association (ATA),
on behalf of its member Northwest
Airlines (NWA), and Boeing request that
we revise paragraphs (h) and (j) and
Note 3 of the original NPRM to allow
installation of serviceable improved
TADDs. Boeing states that the improved
TADDs are expected to hold up well in
service, and its customers are concerned
about the proposed restriction on
installing serviceable TADDs. In its
comment submitted through ATA, NWA
states that it does not believe that the
failure rate of new TADDs is a
significant improvement over properly
repaired or serviceable used TADDs.
NWA states that only a very small
percentage of high-time TADDS have
failed in service, and it believes that all
duct leaks will be sufficiently addressed
by the repetitive tests and inspections
proposed in the original NPRM. NWA
also disagrees that the TADDs
deteriorate at a known rate in service,
which was the justification stated in the
original NPRM for not allowing
installation of used TADDs. Similarly,
Boeing comments that the deterioration
rate is highly variable.
We agree with the commenters’
request to allow installing serviceable
improved TADDs. Our intent was to
prohibit installing used ducts of the old
type, not used ducts of the improved
type. We have determined that
installing serviceable improved parts
will provide an acceptable level of
safety. We have revised paragraphs (h)
and (j) of this supplemental NPRM
accordingly, and we have omitted Note
3 from this supplemental NPRM.
However, as mentioned in the
discussion of New Relevant Service
Information, improved flammability
standards may prohibit installing
certain new, improved TADDs on nonfreighter airplanes. Subsequent to the
publication of the original NPRM, some
of the improved TADDs failed a test of
their insulation that is required by the
improved flammability standards. Thus,
under the requirements of that rule,
certain improved TADDs that were
listed in revisions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747–21A2418 prior to Revision
4, can no longer be installed (although
they need not be removed if they were
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
56066
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
installed prior to September 2, 2003, the
effective date of FAA–2000–7909).
Also, we do not agree with the
commenters’ statements that the rate of
deterioration is unknown, although we
acknowledge that there are many
variables that contribute to the
deterioration of the TADDs. The rate of
deterioration is known to the extent that
we know that TADDs having
accumulated more than 20,000 total
flight hours are suspect. Also, we do not
know of an inspection process that
would be adequate to ensure the
integrity of a used duct of the old
material. For these reasons, we have
determined that it is not appropriate to
allow installation of used TADDs made
of the old material.
Request To Remove References to
Deteriorated Sealant
Boeing requests that we revise the
original NPRM to remove references to
‘‘reports of deteriorating sealants both
inside and outside the center wing fuel
tank due to heat damage from leaking
TADDs.’’ Boeing states that it is not
aware of reports of damaged fuel tanks
caused by leaking TADDs.
We agree to revise the statement of
what prompted the proposed AD to
remove the references to reports of
deterioration of the sealant inside the
center wing fuel tank. We are unable to
confirm direct observation of primary
seal deterioration.
However, we disagree that primary or
secondary seal deterioration is unlikely.
Following reports of TADD leaks,
Boeing analyzed the temperatures that
the primary (inside) and secondary
(outside) fuel barriers could reach.
Analysis revealed that the secondary
barrier could reach temperatures
between 300 °F and 450 °F, and that
internal tank temperatures could reach
378 °F. The sealants are not effective
above 325 °F and are not qualified for
prolonged exposure above 160 °F. In
addition, FAA personnel observed
deterioration of the secondary sealant in
the center wing fuel tank. Therefore, if
any damage or discrepancy of a TADD
is found, we find it necessary to require
a general visual inspection for damage
of the primary and secondary fuel
barriers of the center wing tank, and
adjacent areas and items, as specified in
paragraph (h) of this supplemental
NPRM.
Based on this information, we have
revised the Summary of this
supplemental NPRM to state that the
original NPRM ‘‘resulted from reports of
sealant deteriorating on the outside of
the center wing fuel tank and analysis
that sealant may deteriorate inside the
tank due to excess heat from leaking
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
TADDs.’’ We have similarly revised
paragraph (d) of this supplemental
NPRM.
Request To Require Inspections Only
on Affected Side
ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that
we revise paragraph (h) of the original
NPRM to require an inspection for
damage of the fuel barriers and adjacent
areas only on the side of the airplane
where a TADD failed. In its comment
submitted through ATA, NWA states
that the original NPRM does not
acknowledge that the TADDs are located
on both the left and right sides of the
airplane. Neither ATA nor NWA state a
justification for the request.
We infer that the commenter’s request
is intended to reduce the amount of
work that needs to be accomplished to
allow a quicker return of the airplane to
service. We agree that it would be
acceptable to inspect the fuel barriers
and adjacent areas only on the side of
the airplane where a TADD failed if no
damage is found on the side of the
airplane where a TADD failed. However,
if any damage of the fuel barriers or
adjacent areas is found on the side of
the airplane where a TADD failed, both
sides of the airplane must be inspected.
Both sides must be inspected because
the barrier damage is caused by hot air
and if there is damage to one side, then
there may be enough leakage to damage
the other side.
We have revised paragraph (h)(1) of
this AD to state that, ‘‘If no damage is
found on the side of the airplane where
the damaged or discrepant TADD is
found, inspecting the other side of the
airplane is not required.’’
In addition, we have revised
paragraph (j) of this AD to clarify the
specific circumstances under which
tests and inspections required by
paragraph (f) of this AD are terminated.
These changes better acknowledge that,
as the commenter points out, there are
TADDs on both the left and right sides
of the airplane.
Request To Revise Repetitive Inspection
Intervals
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM)
requests that we extend the repetitive
interval for the hot air leak test specified
in paragraph (f)(1) of the original NPRM
from 1,200 flight hours to 1,600 flight
hours. The commenter states that the
repetitive interval of 1,200 flight hours
is not consistent with its maintenance
intervals. KLM explains that its A-check
is 770 flight hours, so it would have to
perform this test either every A-check or
in between A-checks. KLM states that
either alternative would result in
excessive cost. KLM notes that a
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
repetitive interval of 1,600 flight hours
would allow it to perform the test every
second A-check. Boeing also
commented that the interval for the hot
air leak test should coincide with actual
A-check intervals.
We do not agree with the request to
extend the repetitive interval for the hot
air leak test. The extension of the
repetitive interval for the general visual
inspections to 12,000 flight hours, as
discussed previously, is contingent on
the repetitive hot air leak tests being
performed at intervals not to exceed
1,200 flight hours. We find that this
repetitive interval is necessary to ensure
that any discrepant TADD will be
detected in a timely manner. We note
that the 1,200-flight-hour repetitive
interval is consistent with Boeing’s
recommendation in Revision 4 of the
service bulletin and in its re-evaluation
of compliance times. Further, since
maintenance schedules vary among
operators, it is not possible for us to
revise the repetitive interval to meet the
needs of a specific operator. In
developing an appropriate repetitive
interval for this action, we considered
the manufacturer’s recommendation, the
degree of urgency associated with the
subject unsafe condition, the average
utilization of the affected fleet, and the
time necessary to perform the test
(estimated at 3 work hours). In light of
all of these factors, we find that 1,200
flight hours is an appropriate interval of
time for affected airplanes to continue to
operate between repetitive tests without
compromising safety. We have not
changed the supplemental NPRM in this
regard. However, paragraph (l) of the
supplemental NPRM provides operators
the opportunity to request an extension
of the compliance time if data are
presented to justify such an extension.
Request To Revise Compliance Time for
Inspection of Replaced TADDs
ATA, on behalf of NWA, suggests that
we revise the compliance time for the
general visual inspection for damaged or
replaced TADDs made of the original
material. Paragraph (i) of the original
NPRM specifies a compliance time of
27,000 flight hours after the TADD is
replaced for this inspection. The
commenter suggests that this
compliance time be revised to ‘‘the next
C-check after 21,200 flight hours.’’
We partially agree with this request.
We do not agree with the request to state
the compliance time in relation to a Ccheck. We find that such a non-specific
compliance time would not ensure that
damaged TADDs are detected in a
timely manner. However, we agree to
extend the compliance time for
inspecting replaced TADDs from 27,000
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
flight hours to 32,000 flight hours after
replacement. We note that affected
operators may elect to do the general
visual inspection of the TADDs earlier
than the stated compliance time, if it is
more convenient to their maintenance
schedules. We have revised paragraph
(i) of this supplemental NPRM
accordingly.
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Request To Revise Compliance Time for
Initial Leak Test
ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that
we revise the compliance time for the
initial test specified in paragraph (f)(1)
of the original NPRM. NWA states
support for the test but believes that an
equivalent level of safety can be
achieved by doing the initial test at the
compliance time specified in the
referenced service bulletin, which the
commenter interprets as 180 days or
2,000 hours, whichever is first. NWA
states that a failed duct is often detected
when floorboards or sidewalls become
hot, or when the airplane crew has
difficulty controlling cabin
temperatures. Thus, a failed duct is
often corrected by normal maintenance
practices that limit exposure to high
temperatures. For this reason, NWA
states that compliance time for the
initial inspection recommended in the
service bulletin is sufficient to detect
duct leaks that are not detected during
normal operations.
We do not agree with the commenter’s
request. We note that 180 days or 2,000
flight hours (whichever is first) is the
compliance time recommended by the
referenced service bulletin for airplanes
with 20,000 or more total flight hours.
However, as we explained in the
‘‘Differences Between the Proposed AD
and Service Information’’ section of the
original NPRM, the compliance
threshold of 21,200 total flight hours is
the equivalent of the inspection
threshold of 20,000 total flight hours
specified in the service bulletin, plus
one repeat interval (1,200 flight hours).
In addition, the manufacturer has not
requested that we revise the compliance
time proposed in the original NPRM. In
developing an appropriate compliance
time for the initial test, we considered
the manufacturer’s recommendation,
and the degree of urgency associated
with the subject unsafe condition. In
light of these factors, we find that the
compliance time of 21,200 total flight
hours, or 1,200 flight hours after the
effective date of the AD, whichever is
later, represents an appropriate interval
of time for affected airplanes to continue
to operate without compromising safety.
We have not changed the supplemental
NPRM in this regard.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
Request To Ensure Adequate Supply of
Replacement Parts
Lufthansa requests that we ensure that
an adequate supply of replacement parts
will be available for operators to comply
with the proposed requirements. The
commenter notes that there have been
delays in obtaining material for planned
modifications in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 747–21A2418.
The commenter states that it anticipates
that it will find TADDs that must be
replaced.
We acknowledge the commenter’s
concerns and the delays it experienced.
Parts availability is one of the factors
that we consider when establishing a
compliance time for an AD. In this case,
we have determined through the
manufacturer that an adequate supply of
replacement parts will be available for
operators to accomplish the proposed
requirements within the proposed
compliance time. We find that no
additional changes to the supplemental
NPRM are needed in this regard.
Request To Clarify Requirements of
Paragraph (h)
Boeing requests that we revise
paragraph (h) of the original NPRM to
state that the actions in that paragraph
apply if any discrepancy is found
during either the hot air leak test or the
general visual inspection for damage in
accordance with paragraph (f) of the
original NPRM.
We contacted Boeing for clarification
of the meaning and intent of its
comment. Upon further review of
paragraph (h) of the original NPRM,
Boeing concluded its comment was not
necessary and could be withdrawn. We
have not changed the supplemental
NPRM in this regard.
Request To Allow Use of Later
Revisions of Service Information
Air New Zealand (ANZ) requests that
we revise paragraph (j) of the original
NPRM, Optional Terminating Action, to
allow use of later revisions of the
referenced service information. ANZ
notes that, when the AD refers to a
specific revision of the service bulletin,
e.g., Revision 2, operators may not use
the later revisions without being out of
compliance with the requirements of the
AD when new service information is
released that contains new part numbers
for equivalent or better parts. ANZ
suggests that we include language
referring to ‘‘any subsequent documents,
which list a new or equivalent part
number or better, that does not have this
unsafe condition.’’
We do not agree with the request to
refer to later revisions of the service
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
56067
information that have not yet been
released. (As explained previously, we
have revised this supplemental NPRM
to refer to Boeing Service Bulletin 747–
21A2418, Revision 4.) When we refer to
a specific service bulletin in an AD,
using a phrase such as that suggested by
the commenter, or a phrase like ‘‘or later
FAA-approved revisions,’’ violates
Office of the Federal Register
regulations for approving materials that
are incorporated by reference. However,
affected operators may request approval
to use a later revision of the referenced
service bulletin as an alternative method
of compliance, under the provisions of
paragraph (l) of this supplemental
NPRM. We have not changed the
supplemental NPRM further in this
regard.
Request To Revise Cost Impact
Qantas Airways (QANTAS) requests
that we revise the cost impact stated in
the original NPRM. The commenter
believes that the original NPRM
underestimates the number of work
hours necessary to do the general visual
inspection for damage or discrepancies
of the TADDs. QANTAS notes that
significant time is necessary to gain
access to the TADDs to perform the
inspection and to close up after the
inspection, in addition to testing the inseat entertainment equipment. The
commenter notes that the estimate of 43
work hours in Boeing Service Bulletin
747–21A2418 is more realistic.
We do not agree. The cost analysis in
AD rulemaking actions typically does
not include incidental costs such as the
time required to gain access and close
up, time necessary for planning, or time
necessitated by other administrative
actions. Those incidental costs, which
may vary significantly among operators,
are almost impossible to calculate. We
have not changed the supplemental
NPRM in this regard.
Requests for Editorial Changes
Boeing requests that we revise the
Relevant Service Information section of
the original NPRM as follows:
• Revise the statement, ‘‘The related
investigative actions are repetitive
general visual inspections for
discrepancies or damage of the
TADDs* * * ’’ to also refer to the hot air
leak tests as related investigative
actions.
• Revise the statement, ‘‘After a
TADD is replaced with a new, improved
TADD, the repetitive inspections are no
longer needed for that TADD,’’ to note
that neither the repetitive leak tests nor
the repetitive inspections are needed
after a new, improved TADD is
installed.
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
56068
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Boeing’s rationale for the first change
is that the statement in the original
NPRM implies that only the visual
inspections constitute valid
investigative actions. Boeing’s rationale
for the second change is to avoid
questions (from operators) and
misinterpretation.
We acknowledge the commenter’s
requests. However, we do not agree that
any change is necessary. The Relevant
Service Information section of the
original NPRM states that the referenced
service bulletin ‘‘describes procedures
for repetitive tests to detect hot air
leaking from the TADDs, related
investigative actions, and corrective
actions if necessary.’’ The statement to
which the commenter refers defines
what we mean by ‘‘related investigative
actions.’’ We find that the contents of
the Relevant Service Information section
are sufficiently clear as written in the
original NPRM. With regard to the
commenter’s second item, we agree with
the statement as revised by the
commenter. However, the Relevant
Service Information section of the
original NPRM is not restated in this
supplemental NPRM. Thus, no change
is possible in this regard.
Explanation of Additional Changes
We have reduced the estimated
number of airplanes that would be
affected by this supplemental NPRM to
be consistent with the number of
airplanes identified in the service
bulletin.
After the original NPRM was issued,
we reviewed the figures we have used
over the past several years to calculate
AD costs to operators. To account for
various inflationary costs in the airline
industry, we find it necessary to
increase the labor rate used in these
calculations from $65 per work hour to
$80 per work hour. The cost impact
information, below, reflects this
increase in the specified hourly labor
rate.
We have revised this action to clarify
the appropriate procedure for notifying
the principal inspector before using any
approved AMOC on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies.
FAA’s Determination and Proposed
Requirements of the Supplemental
NPRM
Certain changes discussed above
expand the scope of the original NPRM;
therefore, we have determined that it is
necessary to reopen the comment period
to provide additional opportunity for
public comment on this supplemental
NPRM.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 1,081 airplanes of the
affected design in the worldwide fleet.
The following table provides the
estimated costs for U.S. operators to
comply with this supplemental NPRM.
ESTIMATED COSTS
Work
hours
Action
Average
labor rate per
hour
Number
of U.S.registered
airplanes
Cost per airplane
Hot air leak test ........................................
3
$80
$240, per test cycle .................................
216
General visual inspection .........................
5
80
400, per inspection cycle .........................
216
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code
specifies the FAA’s authority to issue
rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I,
Section 106, describes the authority of
the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII,
Aviation Programs, describes in more
detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under
the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701,
‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that
section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in
air commerce by prescribing regulations
for practices, methods, and procedures
the Administrator finds necessary for
safety in air commerce. This regulation
is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on
products identified in this rulemaking
action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this
proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
Fleet cost
$51,840, per
test cycle.
86,400, per inspection
cycle.
13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the
States, on the relationship between the
national Government and the States, or
on the distribution of power and
responsibilities among the various
levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I
certify that the proposed regulation:
1. Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory
action’’ under Executive Order 12866;
2. Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under the
DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures
(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant
economic impact, positive or negative,
on a substantial number of small entities
under the criteria of the Regulatory
Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation
of the estimated costs to comply with
this supplemental NPRM and placed it
in the AD docket. See the ADDRESSES
section for a location to examine the
regulatory evaluation.
The Proposed Amendment
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747–
100, 747–100B, 747–100B SUD, 747–200B,
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation
safety, Safety.
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Accordingly, under the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part
39 as follows:
PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS
DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39
continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
§ 39.13
[Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) amends § 39.13
by adding the following new
airworthiness directive (AD):
Boeing: Docket No. FAA–2004–19755;
Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–23–AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on
this AD action by October 23, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
747–200C, 747–200F, 747–300, 747–400,
747–400D, 747–400F, 747SR, and 747SP
series airplanes; certificated in any category;
line numbers 1 through 1316 inclusive.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from reports of sealant
deteriorating on the outside of the center
wing fuel tank and analysis that sealant may
deteriorate inside the tank due to excess heat
from leaking trim air diffuser ducts or
sidewall riser duct assemblies (collectively
referred to in this AD as ‘‘TADDs’’). We are
issuing this AD to prevent leakage of fuel or
fuel vapors into areas where ignition sources
may be present, which could result in a fire
or explosion.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the
actions required by this AD performed within
the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
56069
Repetitive Tests and Inspections
(f) Do the actions in Table 1 of this AD at
the times specified in Table 1 of this AD, in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747–
21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17,
2005. When the compliance times for a hot
air leak test and a general visual inspection
coincide, the hot air leak test is not required
at that time, but is required within 1,200
flight hours (i.e., one repeat interval) after the
general visual inspection.
TABLE 1.—COMPLIANCE TIMES
Then repeat within
this interval until paragraph (j) is done—
Do this action—
Initially at the later of—
(1) Repetitive test to detect hot air leaking from TADDs ......
Prior to the accumulation of 21,200 total flight hours, or
within 1,200 flight hours after the effective date of this
AD.
Prior to the accumulation of 32,000 total flight hours, or
within 12,000 flight hours after the effective date of this
AD, except as provided by paragraph (g) of this AD.
(2) General visual inspection for damage or discrepancies
of the TADDs.
Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a
general visual inspection is: ‘‘A visual
examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious
damage, failure, or irregularity. This level of
inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror
may be necessary to ensure visual access to
all surfaces in the inspection area. This level
of inspection is made under normally
available lighting conditions such as
daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or
opening of access panels or doors. Stands,
ladders, or platforms may be required to gain
proximity to the area being checked.’’
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
Note 2: Boeing Service Bulletin 747–
21A2418, Revision 4, refers to Chapters 21–
61–20 and 21–61–21 of the 747 Airplane
Maintenance Manual as an additional source
for service information for the test and
inspections of the TADDs.
(g) If any hot air leak is found during any
test required by paragraph (f) of this AD:
Before further flight, do the general visual
inspection for damage or discrepancies of the
TADDs, in accordance with the
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing
Service Bulletin 747–21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005.
Corrective Actions
(h) If any damage or discrepancy is found
during any general visual inspection for
damage required by paragraph (f) or (g) of
this AD: Do the actions in paragraphs (h)(1),
(h)(2), (h)(3), and (h)(4) of this AD, as
applicable. Do all of these actions in
accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747–
21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17,
2005.
(1) Before further flight: Perform a general
visual inspection for damage of the primary
and secondary fuel barriers of the center
wing tank; structure adjacent to the
discrepant TADD; and cables, cable pulleys,
and raised cable seals in the over-wing area.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
1,200 flight hours.
12,000 flight hours.
If no damage is found on the side of the
airplane where the damaged or discrepant
TADD is found, inspecting the other side of
the airplane is not required.
(2) Before further flight: Repair all damage
or discrepancies found.
(3) Before further flight: Replace any
damaged TADD with a new TADD having the
same part number or a new or serviceable,
improved TADD having a part number listed
in the ‘‘New TADD Part Number’’ or ‘‘New
Sidewall Riser Duct Assy Part Number’’
column, as applicable, of the tables in
Section 2.C.2. of the service bulletin.
(4) Repeat the test and inspection required
by paragraph (f) of this AD at the times
specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as
provided by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD.
(i) For any original-material TADD that is
replaced with a new TADD having the same
part number as the TADD being replaced:
Within 21,200 flight hours after the TADD is
replaced, do the test to detect hot air leaking
from the replaced TADD, and within 32,000
flight hours after the TADD is replaced, do
the general visual inspection for damage, as
specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.
Thereafter, repeat the test and inspection at
the repetitive intervals specified in Table 1
of this AD, except when the times for a hot
air leak test and a general visual inspection
coincide, the leak test is not required.
this AD are terminated for each TADD that
is replaced with a new or serviceable,
improved TADD.
(2) Replacing all TADDs on one side of the
airplane with new or serviceable, improved
TADDs terminates all repetitive tests
required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and
all repetitive inspections required by
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD only for the side
of the airplane on which the improved
TADDs are installed.
(3) Replacing all TADDs on both sides of
the airplane with new or serviceable,
improved TADDs terminates all repetitive
tests required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD
and all repetitive inspections required by
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.
Optional Terminating Action
(j) Replacing existing TADDs with new or
serviceable, improved TADDs terminates
repetitive test and inspection requirements as
specified in paragraphs (j)(1), (j)(2), and (j)(3)
of this AD. New or serviceable, improved
TADDs are those having a part number listed
in the ‘‘New TADD Part Number’’ or ‘‘New
Sidewall Riser Duct Assy Part Number’’
column, as applicable, of the tables in
Section 2.C.2. of Boeing Service Bulletin
747–21A2418, Revision 3, dated December
21, 2004; or Revision 4, dated November 17,
2005.
(1) The repetitive general visual
inspections required by paragraph (f)(2) of
(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft
Certification Office, FAA, has the authority to
approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14
CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in
accordance with § 39.19 on any airplane to
which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA
Flight Standards Certificate Holding District
Office.
PO 00000
Frm 00021
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Previously Accomplished Actions
(k) Actions done before the effective date
of this AD in accordance with Boeing Service
Bulletin 747–21A2418, dated November 14,
2002; Revision 1, dated October 16, 2003;
Revision 2, dated March 4, 2004; or Revision
3, dated December 21, 2004; are acceptable
for compliance with the corresponding
actions required by this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance
(AMOCs)
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
56070
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 186 / Tuesday, September 26, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Issued in Renton, Washington, on
September 14, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 06–8232 Filed 9–25–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA–2006–25904; Directorate
Identifier 2006–NM–077–AD]
RIN 2120–AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Bombardier
Model DHC–8–100, –200, and –300
Series Airplanes
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking
(NPRM).
AGENCY:
The FAA proposes to
supersede an existing airworthiness
directive (AD) that applies to certain
Bombardier Model DHC–8–100, –200,
and –300 series airplanes. The existing
AD currently requires modification of
the flight compartment door; repetitive
inspections for wear of the flight
compartment door hinges following
modification; and repair or replacement
of the hinges with new hinges if
necessary. This proposed AD would
require using revised procedures for
modifying and inspecting the flight
compartment door and would reduce
the applicability of the existing AD.
This proposed AD results from a
determination that certain cockpit doors
are no longer subject to the existing
requirements. We are proposing this AD
to prevent failure of the alternate release
mechanism of the flight compartment
door, which could delay or impede the
evacuation of the flightcrew during an
emergency. This failure also could
result in the flightcrew not being able to
assist passengers in the event of an
emergency.
SUMMARY:
We must receive comments on
this proposed AD by October 26, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following
addresses to submit comments on this
proposed AD.
• DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://
dms.dot.gov and follow the instructions
for sending your comments
electronically.
• Government-wide rulemaking Web
site: Go to https://www.regulations.gov
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with PROPOSALS
DATES:
VerDate Aug<31>2005
14:58 Sep 25, 2006
Jkt 208001
and follow the instructions for sending
your comments electronically.
• Mail: Docket Management Facility;
U.S. Department of Transportation, 400
Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building,
Room PL–401, Washington, DC 20590.
• Fax: (202) 493–2251.
• Hand Delivery: Room PL–401 on
the plaza level of the Nassif Building,
400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington,
DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Bombardier, Inc., Bombardier
Regional Aircraft Division, 123 Garratt
Boulevard, Downsview, Ontario M3K
1Y5, Canada, for service information
identified in this proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ezra
Sasson, Aerospace Engineer, Systems
and Flight Test Branch, ANE–172, FAA,
New York Aircraft Certification Office,
1600 Stewart Avenue, Suite 410,
Westbury, New York 11590; telephone
(516) 228–7320; fax (516) 794–5531.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant
written data, views, or arguments
regarding this proposed AD. Send your
comments to an address listed in the
ADDRESSES section. Include the docket
number ‘‘Docket No. FAA–2006–25904;
Directorate Identifier 2006–NM–077–
AD’’ at the beginning of your comments.
We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic,
environmental, and energy aspects of
the proposed AD. We will consider all
comments received by the closing date
and may amend the proposed AD in
light of those comments.
We will post all comments we
receive, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal
information you provide. We will also
post a report summarizing each
substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this proposed AD.
Using the search function of that Web
site, anyone can find and read the
comments in any of our dockets,
including the name of the individual
who sent the comment (or signed the
comment on behalf of an association,
business, labor union, etc.). You may
review the DOT’s complete Privacy Act
Statement in the Federal Register
published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR
19477–78), or you may visit https://
dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on
the Internet at https://dms.dot.gov, or in
person at the Docket Management
Facility office between 9 a.m. and 5
p.m., Monday through Friday, except
PO 00000
Frm 00022
Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
Federal holidays. The Docket
Management Facility office (telephone
(800) 647–5227) is located on the plaza
level of the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in the ADDRESSES
section. Comments will be available in
the AD docket shortly after the Docket
Management System receives them.
Discussion
On March 30, 1999, we issued AD 99–
08–04, amendment 39–11109 (64 FR
16803, April 7, 1999), for certain
Bombardier Model DHC–8–100, –200,
and –300 series airplanes. That AD
requires modification of the flight
compartment door; repetitive
inspections for wear of the flight
compartment door hinges following
modification; and repair or replacement
of the hinges with new hinges, if
necessary. That AD resulted from a
report that the door lock mechanism of
the flight compartment door jammed
and could not be opened using the
alternate release mechanism. We issued
that AD to prevent failure of the
alternate release mechanism of the flight
compartment door, which could delay
or impede the evacuation of the
flightcrew during an emergency. This
failure also could result in the
flightcrew not being able to assist
passengers in the event of an
emergency.
Actions Since Existing AD Was Issued
Since we issued AD 99–08–04,
various civil aviation authorities have
mandated the installation of reinforced
flight compartment doors, which
negates the need for the modification
required by paragraph (a) of the existing
AD (Modification 8/2337) for airplanes
on which the doors were installed in
production. Modifications 8/2228, 8/
2229, 8/2231, 8/2232, 8Q100859,
8Q900267, 8Q420101, 8Q420143,
8Q200131, or 8Q420440 are equivalent
to Modification 8/2337 (specified in
paragraph (a) of the existing AD) for the
flight compartment door alternate
release mechanism. In addition,
Bombardier has issued revised
procedures for modifying and
inspecting the flight compartment door.
Relevant Service Information
Bombardier has issued Service
Bulletin 8–52–39, Revision ‘‘H,’’ dated
September 9, 2004. Revision ‘‘H’’ is
similar to Revision ‘‘D,’’ dated February
27, 1998, which was cited in the
existing AD as the appropriate source of
service information for accomplishing
the required actions. Among other
things, Revision ‘‘H’’ revises the
procedures used for modifying and
inspecting the flight compartment door,
E:\FR\FM\26SEP1.SGM
26SEP1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 186 (Tuesday, September 26, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 56064-56070]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-8232]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-23-AD]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 747 Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Department of
Transportation (DOT).
ACTION: Supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM); reopening of
comment period.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: The FAA is revising an earlier proposed airworthiness
directive (AD) for certain Boeing Model 747 airplanes. The original
NPRM would have required repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking
from the trim air diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies
(collectively referred to in this proposed AD as ``TADDs''), related
investigative actions, and corrective actions if necessary. The
original NPRM also would have provided an optional terminating action
for the repetitive tests. The original NPRM resulted from reports of
sealant deteriorating on the outside of the center wing fuel tank and
analysis that sealant may deteriorate inside the tank due to excess
heat from leaking TADDs. This action revises the original NPRM by
referring to improved inspection procedures and extending the
repetitive interval for certain related investigative actions. We are
proposing this supplemental NPRM to prevent leakage of fuel or fuel
vapors into areas where ignition sources may be present, which could
result in a fire or explosion.
DATES: We must receive comments on this supplemental NPRM by October
23, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Use one of the following addresses to submit comments on
this supplemental NPRM.
DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your
comments electronically.
Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401,
Washington, DC 20590.
Fax: (202) 493-2251.
Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
Contact Boeing Commercial Airplanes, P.O. Box 3707, Seattle,
Washington 98124-2207, for service information identified in this
proposed AD.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan Kinney, Aerospace Engineer,
Propulsion Branch, ANM-140S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft Certification
Office, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98057-3356; telephone
(425) 917-6499; fax (425) 917-6590.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Comments Invited
We invite you to submit any relevant written data, views, or
arguments regarding this supplemental NPRM. Send your comments to an
address listed in the ADDRESSES section. Include the docket number
``Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-23-AD'' at
the beginning of your comments. We specifically invite comments on the
overall regulatory, economic, environmental, and energy aspects of this
supplemental NPRM. We will consider all comments received by the
closing date and may amend this supplemental NPRM in light of those
comments.
We will post all comments submitted, without change, to https://
dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. We will
also post a report summarizing each substantive verbal contact with FAA
personnel concerning this supplemental NPRM. Using the search function
of that Web site, anyone can find and read the comments in any of our
dockets, including the name of the individual who sent the comment (or
signed the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union,
etc.). You may review the DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the
Federal Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78), or you
may visit https://dms.dot.gov.
Examining the Docket
You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at https://
dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket Management Facility office
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal
holidays. The Docket Management Facility office (telephone (800) 647-
5227) is located on the plaza level in the Nassif Building at the DOT
street address stated in ADDRESSES. Comments will be available in the
AD docket shortly after the Docket Management System receives them.
[[Page 56065]]
Discussion
We proposed to amend 14 CFR part 39 with a notice of proposed
rulemaking (NPRM) for an AD (the ``original NPRM'') for certain Boeing
Model 747 airplanes. The original NPRM was published in the Federal
Register on December 1, 2004 (69 FR 69844). The original NPRM proposed
to require repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking from the trim air
diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies (collectively referred
to in this supplemental NPRM as ``TADDs''), related investigative
actions, and corrective actions if necessary. The original NPRM also
would have provided an optional terminating action for the repetitive
tests.
Actions Since Original NPRM Was Issued
Since we issued the original NPRM, we have received reports
indicating that the procedures referenced in Boeing Alert Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 2, dated March 4, 2004 (which we
referenced in the original NPRM as the applicable source of service
information for the proposed actions), are not sufficient to detect a
damaged TADD in a timely manner.
Relevant Service Information
We have reviewed Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005. Revision 4 of the service bulletin describes
procedures that are similar to those in Revision 2. However, Revision 4
revises the part numbers for certain improved sidewall riser duct
assemblies for installation on Boeing Model 747-400 series airplanes
that are not freighters. This change is due to new environmental and
flammability-resistance standards required under amendments 25-110, 91-
279, 121-301, 125-43, and 135-90 of the Federal Aviation Regulations.
(Refer to the final rule, docket no. FAA-2000-7909, ``Improved
Flammability Standards for Thermal/Acoustic Insulation Materials Used
in Transport Category Airplanes'' (68 FR 45046, July 31, 2003; with
corrections published 68 FR 50054, August 20, 2003; and 69 FR 6532,
February 11, 2004).) Revision 4 of the service bulletin also recommends
increasing the initial inspection threshold from 27,000 flight hours to
32,000 flight hours, and the repetitive inspection interval from 7,000
flight hours to 12,000 flight hours, for the general visual inspection
for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs.
Certain changes to the service information that were originally
introduced in Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 3, dated
December 21, 2004, are retained in Revision 4 of the service bulletin:
Chapter 21-61-20 of the airplane maintenance manual (AMM)
has been revised to contain more definitive pass/fail criteria for the
repetitive tests and inspections of the TADDs. These revised criteria
increase the chances of a defective TADD being detected in a timely
manner.
Chapter 21-61-21 of the AMM contains procedures for
unwrapping insulation blankets as necessary before the general visual
inspection to detect defective TADDs is done on Boeing Model 747-400
non-freighter series airplanes.
Accomplishing the actions specified in Revision 4 of the service
information is intended to adequately address the unsafe condition. We
have revised paragraphs (f), (g), (h), and (j) and Note 2 of this
supplemental NPRM to refer to Revision 4 of the service information. We
have also added a new paragraph (k) to this supplemental NPRM, and re-
identified the subsequent paragraph, to give credit for actions done
before the effective date of the AD in accordance with previous issues
of the service bulletin.
With regard to extending compliance times for the general visual
inspection, we have revised Table 1 of this supplemental NPRM to extend
the repetitive interval for the general visual inspections from 7,000
flight hours to 12,000 flight hours. We have also revised Table 1 of
this supplemental NPRM to extend the initial compliance threshold from
27,000 total flight hours to 32,000 total flight hours.
Comments
We have considered the following comments on the original NPRM.
Request To Relieve Testing Requirement
British Airways requests that we revise paragraph (f) of the
original NPRM to relieve operators of the requirement to do a test to
detect hot air leaking from the TADDs at the same time as the general
visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs. The
commenter notes that, if the inspection is being accomplished, there is
no need to do the test during the same maintenance check. The commenter
assumes that the inspection exceeds the intent of the test in that the
inspection would detect discrepancies of the TADDs that the test may
not.
We concur with the commenter's request. We agree that it would be
redundant to perform a hot air leak test at the same time as the
general visual inspection when the repetitive intervals for these
actions coincide. Therefore, we have revised paragraph (f) of this
supplemental NPRM to clarify that, when the compliance times for a hot
air leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the hot air
leak test is not required at that time.
Request To Allow Installation of Serviceable Improved TADDs
The Air Transport Association (ATA), on behalf of its member
Northwest Airlines (NWA), and Boeing request that we revise paragraphs
(h) and (j) and Note 3 of the original NPRM to allow installation of
serviceable improved TADDs. Boeing states that the improved TADDs are
expected to hold up well in service, and its customers are concerned
about the proposed restriction on installing serviceable TADDs. In its
comment submitted through ATA, NWA states that it does not believe that
the failure rate of new TADDs is a significant improvement over
properly repaired or serviceable used TADDs. NWA states that only a
very small percentage of high-time TADDS have failed in service, and it
believes that all duct leaks will be sufficiently addressed by the
repetitive tests and inspections proposed in the original NPRM. NWA
also disagrees that the TADDs deteriorate at a known rate in service,
which was the justification stated in the original NPRM for not
allowing installation of used TADDs. Similarly, Boeing comments that
the deterioration rate is highly variable.
We agree with the commenters' request to allow installing
serviceable improved TADDs. Our intent was to prohibit installing used
ducts of the old type, not used ducts of the improved type. We have
determined that installing serviceable improved parts will provide an
acceptable level of safety. We have revised paragraphs (h) and (j) of
this supplemental NPRM accordingly, and we have omitted Note 3 from
this supplemental NPRM. However, as mentioned in the discussion of New
Relevant Service Information, improved flammability standards may
prohibit installing certain new, improved TADDs on non-freighter
airplanes. Subsequent to the publication of the original NPRM, some of
the improved TADDs failed a test of their insulation that is required
by the improved flammability standards. Thus, under the requirements of
that rule, certain improved TADDs that were listed in revisions of
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418 prior to Revision 4, can no longer
be installed (although they need not be removed if they were
[[Page 56066]]
installed prior to September 2, 2003, the effective date of FAA-2000-
7909).
Also, we do not agree with the commenters' statements that the rate
of deterioration is unknown, although we acknowledge that there are
many variables that contribute to the deterioration of the TADDs. The
rate of deterioration is known to the extent that we know that TADDs
having accumulated more than 20,000 total flight hours are suspect.
Also, we do not know of an inspection process that would be adequate to
ensure the integrity of a used duct of the old material. For these
reasons, we have determined that it is not appropriate to allow
installation of used TADDs made of the old material.
Request To Remove References to Deteriorated Sealant
Boeing requests that we revise the original NPRM to remove
references to ``reports of deteriorating sealants both inside and
outside the center wing fuel tank due to heat damage from leaking
TADDs.'' Boeing states that it is not aware of reports of damaged fuel
tanks caused by leaking TADDs.
We agree to revise the statement of what prompted the proposed AD
to remove the references to reports of deterioration of the sealant
inside the center wing fuel tank. We are unable to confirm direct
observation of primary seal deterioration.
However, we disagree that primary or secondary seal deterioration
is unlikely. Following reports of TADD leaks, Boeing analyzed the
temperatures that the primary (inside) and secondary (outside) fuel
barriers could reach. Analysis revealed that the secondary barrier
could reach temperatures between 300 [deg]F and 450 [deg]F, and that
internal tank temperatures could reach 378 [deg]F. The sealants are not
effective above 325 [deg]F and are not qualified for prolonged exposure
above 160 [deg]F. In addition, FAA personnel observed deterioration of
the secondary sealant in the center wing fuel tank. Therefore, if any
damage or discrepancy of a TADD is found, we find it necessary to
require a general visual inspection for damage of the primary and
secondary fuel barriers of the center wing tank, and adjacent areas and
items, as specified in paragraph (h) of this supplemental NPRM.
Based on this information, we have revised the Summary of this
supplemental NPRM to state that the original NPRM ``resulted from
reports of sealant deteriorating on the outside of the center wing fuel
tank and analysis that sealant may deteriorate inside the tank due to
excess heat from leaking TADDs.'' We have similarly revised paragraph
(d) of this supplemental NPRM.
Request To Require Inspections Only on Affected Side
ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that we revise paragraph (h) of the
original NPRM to require an inspection for damage of the fuel barriers
and adjacent areas only on the side of the airplane where a TADD
failed. In its comment submitted through ATA, NWA states that the
original NPRM does not acknowledge that the TADDs are located on both
the left and right sides of the airplane. Neither ATA nor NWA state a
justification for the request.
We infer that the commenter's request is intended to reduce the
amount of work that needs to be accomplished to allow a quicker return
of the airplane to service. We agree that it would be acceptable to
inspect the fuel barriers and adjacent areas only on the side of the
airplane where a TADD failed if no damage is found on the side of the
airplane where a TADD failed. However, if any damage of the fuel
barriers or adjacent areas is found on the side of the airplane where a
TADD failed, both sides of the airplane must be inspected. Both sides
must be inspected because the barrier damage is caused by hot air and
if there is damage to one side, then there may be enough leakage to
damage the other side.
We have revised paragraph (h)(1) of this AD to state that, ``If no
damage is found on the side of the airplane where the damaged or
discrepant TADD is found, inspecting the other side of the airplane is
not required.''
In addition, we have revised paragraph (j) of this AD to clarify
the specific circumstances under which tests and inspections required
by paragraph (f) of this AD are terminated. These changes better
acknowledge that, as the commenter points out, there are TADDs on both
the left and right sides of the airplane.
Request To Revise Repetitive Inspection Intervals
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) requests that we extend the
repetitive interval for the hot air leak test specified in paragraph
(f)(1) of the original NPRM from 1,200 flight hours to 1,600 flight
hours. The commenter states that the repetitive interval of 1,200
flight hours is not consistent with its maintenance intervals. KLM
explains that its A-check is 770 flight hours, so it would have to
perform this test either every A-check or in between A-checks. KLM
states that either alternative would result in excessive cost. KLM
notes that a repetitive interval of 1,600 flight hours would allow it
to perform the test every second A-check. Boeing also commented that
the interval for the hot air leak test should coincide with actual A-
check intervals.
We do not agree with the request to extend the repetitive interval
for the hot air leak test. The extension of the repetitive interval for
the general visual inspections to 12,000 flight hours, as discussed
previously, is contingent on the repetitive hot air leak tests being
performed at intervals not to exceed 1,200 flight hours. We find that
this repetitive interval is necessary to ensure that any discrepant
TADD will be detected in a timely manner. We note that the 1,200-
flight-hour repetitive interval is consistent with Boeing's
recommendation in Revision 4 of the service bulletin and in its re-
evaluation of compliance times. Further, since maintenance schedules
vary among operators, it is not possible for us to revise the
repetitive interval to meet the needs of a specific operator. In
developing an appropriate repetitive interval for this action, we
considered the manufacturer's recommendation, the degree of urgency
associated with the subject unsafe condition, the average utilization
of the affected fleet, and the time necessary to perform the test
(estimated at 3 work hours). In light of all of these factors, we find
that 1,200 flight hours is an appropriate interval of time for affected
airplanes to continue to operate between repetitive tests without
compromising safety. We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this
regard. However, paragraph (l) of the supplemental NPRM provides
operators the opportunity to request an extension of the compliance
time if data are presented to justify such an extension.
Request To Revise Compliance Time for Inspection of Replaced TADDs
ATA, on behalf of NWA, suggests that we revise the compliance time
for the general visual inspection for damaged or replaced TADDs made of
the original material. Paragraph (i) of the original NPRM specifies a
compliance time of 27,000 flight hours after the TADD is replaced for
this inspection. The commenter suggests that this compliance time be
revised to ``the next C-check after 21,200 flight hours.''
We partially agree with this request. We do not agree with the
request to state the compliance time in relation to a C-check. We find
that such a non-specific compliance time would not ensure that damaged
TADDs are detected in a timely manner. However, we agree to extend the
compliance time for inspecting replaced TADDs from 27,000
[[Page 56067]]
flight hours to 32,000 flight hours after replacement. We note that
affected operators may elect to do the general visual inspection of the
TADDs earlier than the stated compliance time, if it is more convenient
to their maintenance schedules. We have revised paragraph (i) of this
supplemental NPRM accordingly.
Request To Revise Compliance Time for Initial Leak Test
ATA, on behalf of NWA, requests that we revise the compliance time
for the initial test specified in paragraph (f)(1) of the original
NPRM. NWA states support for the test but believes that an equivalent
level of safety can be achieved by doing the initial test at the
compliance time specified in the referenced service bulletin, which the
commenter interprets as 180 days or 2,000 hours, whichever is first.
NWA states that a failed duct is often detected when floorboards or
sidewalls become hot, or when the airplane crew has difficulty
controlling cabin temperatures. Thus, a failed duct is often corrected
by normal maintenance practices that limit exposure to high
temperatures. For this reason, NWA states that compliance time for the
initial inspection recommended in the service bulletin is sufficient to
detect duct leaks that are not detected during normal operations.
We do not agree with the commenter's request. We note that 180 days
or 2,000 flight hours (whichever is first) is the compliance time
recommended by the referenced service bulletin for airplanes with
20,000 or more total flight hours. However, as we explained in the
``Differences Between the Proposed AD and Service Information'' section
of the original NPRM, the compliance threshold of 21,200 total flight
hours is the equivalent of the inspection threshold of 20,000 total
flight hours specified in the service bulletin, plus one repeat
interval (1,200 flight hours). In addition, the manufacturer has not
requested that we revise the compliance time proposed in the original
NPRM. In developing an appropriate compliance time for the initial
test, we considered the manufacturer's recommendation, and the degree
of urgency associated with the subject unsafe condition. In light of
these factors, we find that the compliance time of 21,200 total flight
hours, or 1,200 flight hours after the effective date of the AD,
whichever is later, represents an appropriate interval of time for
affected airplanes to continue to operate without compromising safety.
We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.
Request To Ensure Adequate Supply of Replacement Parts
Lufthansa requests that we ensure that an adequate supply of
replacement parts will be available for operators to comply with the
proposed requirements. The commenter notes that there have been delays
in obtaining material for planned modifications in accordance with
Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418. The commenter states that it
anticipates that it will find TADDs that must be replaced.
We acknowledge the commenter's concerns and the delays it
experienced. Parts availability is one of the factors that we consider
when establishing a compliance time for an AD. In this case, we have
determined through the manufacturer that an adequate supply of
replacement parts will be available for operators to accomplish the
proposed requirements within the proposed compliance time. We find that
no additional changes to the supplemental NPRM are needed in this
regard.
Request To Clarify Requirements of Paragraph (h)
Boeing requests that we revise paragraph (h) of the original NPRM
to state that the actions in that paragraph apply if any discrepancy is
found during either the hot air leak test or the general visual
inspection for damage in accordance with paragraph (f) of the original
NPRM.
We contacted Boeing for clarification of the meaning and intent of
its comment. Upon further review of paragraph (h) of the original NPRM,
Boeing concluded its comment was not necessary and could be withdrawn.
We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.
Request To Allow Use of Later Revisions of Service Information
Air New Zealand (ANZ) requests that we revise paragraph (j) of the
original NPRM, Optional Terminating Action, to allow use of later
revisions of the referenced service information. ANZ notes that, when
the AD refers to a specific revision of the service bulletin, e.g.,
Revision 2, operators may not use the later revisions without being out
of compliance with the requirements of the AD when new service
information is released that contains new part numbers for equivalent
or better parts. ANZ suggests that we include language referring to
``any subsequent documents, which list a new or equivalent part number
or better, that does not have this unsafe condition.''
We do not agree with the request to refer to later revisions of the
service information that have not yet been released. (As explained
previously, we have revised this supplemental NPRM to refer to Boeing
Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4.) When we refer to a specific
service bulletin in an AD, using a phrase such as that suggested by the
commenter, or a phrase like ``or later FAA-approved revisions,''
violates Office of the Federal Register regulations for approving
materials that are incorporated by reference. However, affected
operators may request approval to use a later revision of the
referenced service bulletin as an alternative method of compliance,
under the provisions of paragraph (l) of this supplemental NPRM. We
have not changed the supplemental NPRM further in this regard.
Request To Revise Cost Impact
Qantas Airways (QANTAS) requests that we revise the cost impact
stated in the original NPRM. The commenter believes that the original
NPRM underestimates the number of work hours necessary to do the
general visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs.
QANTAS notes that significant time is necessary to gain access to the
TADDs to perform the inspection and to close up after the inspection,
in addition to testing the in-seat entertainment equipment. The
commenter notes that the estimate of 43 work hours in Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418 is more realistic.
We do not agree. The cost analysis in AD rulemaking actions
typically does not include incidental costs such as the time required
to gain access and close up, time necessary for planning, or time
necessitated by other administrative actions. Those incidental costs,
which may vary significantly among operators, are almost impossible to
calculate. We have not changed the supplemental NPRM in this regard.
Requests for Editorial Changes
Boeing requests that we revise the Relevant Service Information
section of the original NPRM as follows:
Revise the statement, ``The related investigative actions
are repetitive general visual inspections for discrepancies or damage
of the TADDs* * * '' to also refer to the hot air leak tests as related
investigative actions.
Revise the statement, ``After a TADD is replaced with a
new, improved TADD, the repetitive inspections are no longer needed for
that TADD,'' to note that neither the repetitive leak tests nor the
repetitive inspections are needed after a new, improved TADD is
installed.
[[Page 56068]]
Boeing's rationale for the first change is that the statement in
the original NPRM implies that only the visual inspections constitute
valid investigative actions. Boeing's rationale for the second change
is to avoid questions (from operators) and misinterpretation.
We acknowledge the commenter's requests. However, we do not agree
that any change is necessary. The Relevant Service Information section
of the original NPRM states that the referenced service bulletin
``describes procedures for repetitive tests to detect hot air leaking
from the TADDs, related investigative actions, and corrective actions
if necessary.'' The statement to which the commenter refers defines
what we mean by ``related investigative actions.'' We find that the
contents of the Relevant Service Information section are sufficiently
clear as written in the original NPRM. With regard to the commenter's
second item, we agree with the statement as revised by the commenter.
However, the Relevant Service Information section of the original NPRM
is not restated in this supplemental NPRM. Thus, no change is possible
in this regard.
Explanation of Additional Changes
We have reduced the estimated number of airplanes that would be
affected by this supplemental NPRM to be consistent with the number of
airplanes identified in the service bulletin.
After the original NPRM was issued, we reviewed the figures we have
used over the past several years to calculate AD costs to operators. To
account for various inflationary costs in the airline industry, we find
it necessary to increase the labor rate used in these calculations from
$65 per work hour to $80 per work hour. The cost impact information,
below, reflects this increase in the specified hourly labor rate.
We have revised this action to clarify the appropriate procedure
for notifying the principal inspector before using any approved AMOC on
any airplane to which the AMOC applies.
FAA's Determination and Proposed Requirements of the Supplemental NPRM
Certain changes discussed above expand the scope of the original
NPRM; therefore, we have determined that it is necessary to reopen the
comment period to provide additional opportunity for public comment on
this supplemental NPRM.
Costs of Compliance
There are about 1,081 airplanes of the affected design in the
worldwide fleet. The following table provides the estimated costs for
U.S. operators to comply with this supplemental NPRM.
Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of
Work Average U.S.-
Action hours labor rate Cost per airplane registered Fleet cost
per hour airplanes
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Hot air leak test............... 3 $80 $240, per test 216 $51,840, per test
cycle. cycle.
General visual inspection....... 5 80 400, per 216 86,400, per
inspection cycle. inspection cycle.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs,
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701, ``General
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this
rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
We have determined that this proposed AD would not have federalism
implications under Executive Order 13132. This proposed AD would not
have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship
between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution
of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that the proposed
regulation:
1. Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive Order
12866;
2. Is not a ``significant rule'' under the DOT Regulatory Policies
and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and
3. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
We prepared a regulatory evaluation of the estimated costs to
comply with this supplemental NPRM and placed it in the AD docket. See
the ADDRESSES section for a location to examine the regulatory
evaluation.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Safety.
The Proposed Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the FAA proposes to amend 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.
Sec. 39.13 [Amended]
2. The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) amends Sec. 39.13 by
adding the following new airworthiness directive (AD):
Boeing: Docket No. FAA-2004-19755; Directorate Identifier 2004-NM-
23-AD.
Comments Due Date
(a) The FAA must receive comments on this AD action by October
23, 2006.
Affected ADs
(b) None.
Applicability
(c) This AD applies to Boeing Model 747-100, 747-100B, 747-100B
SUD, 747-200B,
[[Page 56069]]
747-200C, 747-200F, 747-300, 747-400, 747-400D, 747-400F, 747SR, and
747SP series airplanes; certificated in any category; line numbers 1
through 1316 inclusive.
Unsafe Condition
(d) This AD results from reports of sealant deteriorating on the
outside of the center wing fuel tank and analysis that sealant may
deteriorate inside the tank due to excess heat from leaking trim air
diffuser ducts or sidewall riser duct assemblies (collectively
referred to in this AD as ``TADDs''). We are issuing this AD to
prevent leakage of fuel or fuel vapors into areas where ignition
sources may be present, which could result in a fire or explosion.
Compliance
(e) You are responsible for having the actions required by this
AD performed within the compliance times specified, unless the
actions have already been done.
Repetitive Tests and Inspections
(f) Do the actions in Table 1 of this AD at the times specified
in Table 1 of this AD, in accordance with the Accomplishment
Instructions of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4,
dated November 17, 2005. When the compliance times for a hot air
leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the hot air leak
test is not required at that time, but is required within 1,200
flight hours (i.e., one repeat interval) after the general visual
inspection.
Table 1.--Compliance Times
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Then repeat within this interval
Do this action-- Initially at the later of-- until paragraph (j) is done--
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Repetitive test to detect hot air Prior to the accumulation of 1,200 flight hours.
leaking from TADDs. 21,200 total flight hours, or
within 1,200 flight hours
after the effective date of
this AD.
(2) General visual inspection for damage Prior to the accumulation of 12,000 flight hours.
or discrepancies of the TADDs. 32,000 total flight hours, or
within 12,000 flight hours
after the effective date of
this AD, except as provided by
paragraph (g) of this AD.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note 1: For the purposes of this AD, a general visual inspection
is: ``A visual examination of an interior or exterior area,
installation, or assembly to detect obvious damage, failure, or
irregularity. This level of inspection is made from within touching
distance unless otherwise specified. A mirror may be necessary to
ensure visual access to all surfaces in the inspection area. This
level of inspection is made under normally available lighting
conditions such as daylight, hangar lighting, flashlight, or
droplight and may require removal or opening of access panels or
doors. Stands, ladders, or platforms may be required to gain
proximity to the area being checked.''
Note 2: Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, refers
to Chapters 21-61-20 and 21-61-21 of the 747 Airplane Maintenance
Manual as an additional source for service information for the test
and inspections of the TADDs.
(g) If any hot air leak is found during any test required by
paragraph (f) of this AD: Before further flight, do the general
visual inspection for damage or discrepancies of the TADDs, in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.
Corrective Actions
(h) If any damage or discrepancy is found during any general
visual inspection for damage required by paragraph (f) or (g) of
this AD: Do the actions in paragraphs (h)(1), (h)(2), (h)(3), and
(h)(4) of this AD, as applicable. Do all of these actions in
accordance with the Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Service
Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.
(1) Before further flight: Perform a general visual inspection
for damage of the primary and secondary fuel barriers of the center
wing tank; structure adjacent to the discrepant TADD; and cables,
cable pulleys, and raised cable seals in the over-wing area. If no
damage is found on the side of the airplane where the damaged or
discrepant TADD is found, inspecting the other side of the airplane
is not required.
(2) Before further flight: Repair all damage or discrepancies
found.
(3) Before further flight: Replace any damaged TADD with a new
TADD having the same part number or a new or serviceable, improved
TADD having a part number listed in the ``New TADD Part Number'' or
``New Sidewall Riser Duct Assy Part Number'' column, as applicable,
of the tables in Section 2.C.2. of the service bulletin.
(4) Repeat the test and inspection required by paragraph (f) of
this AD at the times specified in Table 1 of this AD, except as
provided by paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD.
(i) For any original-material TADD that is replaced with a new
TADD having the same part number as the TADD being replaced: Within
21,200 flight hours after the TADD is replaced, do the test to
detect hot air leaking from the replaced TADD, and within 32,000
flight hours after the TADD is replaced, do the general visual
inspection for damage, as specified in paragraph (f) of this AD.
Thereafter, repeat the test and inspection at the repetitive
intervals specified in Table 1 of this AD, except when the times for
a hot air leak test and a general visual inspection coincide, the
leak test is not required.
Optional Terminating Action
(j) Replacing existing TADDs with new or serviceable, improved
TADDs terminates repetitive test and inspection requirements as
specified in paragraphs (j)(1), (j)(2), and (j)(3) of this AD. New
or serviceable, improved TADDs are those having a part number listed
in the ``New TADD Part Number'' or ``New Sidewall Riser Duct Assy
Part Number'' column, as applicable, of the tables in Section 2.C.2.
of Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, Revision 3, dated December
21, 2004; or Revision 4, dated November 17, 2005.
(1) The repetitive general visual inspections required by
paragraph (f)(2) of this AD are terminated for each TADD that is
replaced with a new or serviceable, improved TADD.
(2) Replacing all TADDs on one side of the airplane with new or
serviceable, improved TADDs terminates all repetitive tests required
by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and all repetitive inspections
required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD only for the side of the
airplane on which the improved TADDs are installed.
(3) Replacing all TADDs on both sides of the airplane with new
or serviceable, improved TADDs terminates all repetitive tests
required by paragraph (f)(1) of this AD and all repetitive
inspections required by paragraph (f)(2) of this AD.
Previously Accomplished Actions
(k) Actions done before the effective date of this AD in
accordance with Boeing Service Bulletin 747-21A2418, dated November
14, 2002; Revision 1, dated October 16, 2003; Revision 2, dated
March 4, 2004; or Revision 3, dated December 21, 2004; are
acceptable for compliance with the corresponding actions required by
this AD.
Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)
(l)(1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office, FAA,
has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested in
accordance with the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19.
(2) Before using any AMOC approved in accordance with Sec.
39.19 on any airplane to which the AMOC applies, notify the
appropriate principal inspector in the FAA Flight Standards
Certificate Holding District Office.
[[Page 56070]]
Issued in Renton, Washington, on September 14, 2006.
Kalene C. Yanamura,
Acting Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. 06-8232 Filed 9-25-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P