Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Escape Systems Inflation Systems, 53316-53318 [E6-15010]
Download as PDF
<![CDATA[
53316
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 175 / Monday, September 11, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
certification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue
a finding of regulatory adequacy
pursuant to section 611 of Public Law
93–574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of
1972.’’
Special conditions, as defined in 14
CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance
with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of
the type certification basis in
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2),
Amendment 21–69, effective September
16, 1991.
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101.
bjneal on PROD1PC71 with RULES
Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design
Features
While the main deck of the A380–800
airplane has five pairs of type A exits,
these are not sufficient for the total
number of persons on board the
airplane. Therefore, the upper deck exits
must also be used as ditching exits. As
a result, the upper deck exits are being
equipped with slide/rafts. With two
decks, there is the possibility of
interference between the slides/rafts of
the upper deck and the slide/rafts or
rafts of the main deck.
Since 14 CFR part 25 does not address
the use of upper deck exits as ditching
exits, special conditions are necessary to
ensure that occupants can be safely
evacuated from these exits following a
ditching event.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special
Conditions No. 25–05–12–SC,
pertaining to flotation and ditching,
were published in the Federal Register
on August 9, 2005 (70 FR 46115).
Comments were received from the
Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) and
an individual commenter.
Requested change 1: ALPA suggests
that in general the special conditions
‘‘should evaluate the arrangement and
utility of the slide/rafts at each exit
using a realistic range of aircraft
configurations and sea state.’’
Regarding proposed Special
Condition b., ALPA recommends that
‘‘The demonstration of the boarding of
the upper deck slide/rafts should be
done using crewmembers from air
carriers operating the aircraft. In
addition, these crewmembers should
have had no training beyond that which
will be provided to regular line
crewmembers.’’
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:44 Sep 08, 2006
Jkt 208001
FAA response: Demonstrations of the
slide/rafts will consider a realistic range
of airplane configurations and sea states.
These demonstrations and the
associated crew training will be
consistent with current practice. The
A380–800 is not novel with respect to
those matters. Therefore, we have made
no change to the special conditions, as
proposed.
Requested change 2: In terms of
proposed Special Condition c., an
individual commenter expressed
concern about interference between the
M3 slide/raft and other slide/rafts.
ALPA commented that preventing such
interference should not rely on crew
procedures.
FAA response: Since the M3 exit will
not be used as a ditching exit, proposed
Special Condition c. is not included in
these Final Special Conditions. Should
this exit later be reinstated as a ditching
exit, appropriate requirements will be
developed for its use.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the Airbus
A380–800 airplane. Should Airbus
apply at a later date for a change to the
type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design features, these special
conditions would apply to that model as
well under the provisions of § 21.101.
and overload capacity of the slide/rafts
from the representative door sill heights
associated with planned and unplanned
ditching. The boarding procedure must
ensure that the occupants boarding the
slide/rafts remain on the slide/raft
whether the occupants enter the slide/
raft or raft by walking, jumping or
sliding. In addition, the boarding
procedure must not result in injury
either to occupants entering the slide/
raft or to occupants already in the slide/
raft.
c. It must be demonstrated that the
upper deck slide/rafts located at doors
U1 and U2 (just forward and just aft of
the wing) can be safely separated from
the airplane. Safety considerations
include damage to the slide/rafts, injury
to occupants of the slide/raft, ejection of
the occupants from the slide/raft into
the water as a result of the contact with
the wing, and the slide/raft becoming
beached on the wing. Probable damage
to the wing leading and trailing edge
flight control structure during a water
landing must be considered when
assessing the damage caused to the
slide/rafts or life rafts.
d. It must be demonstrated that when
the upper deck slide/rafts are separated
from the airplane, they do not injure
occupants of the slide/raft, eject
occupants of the slide/raft into the
water, or damage the slide/raft in a way
that affects its seaworthiness.
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features of the Airbus
A380–800 airplane. It is not a rule of
general applicability.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August
28, 2006
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–15012 Filed 9–8–06; 8:45 am]
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
Federal Aviation Administration
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
14 CFR Part 25
The Special Conditions
[Docket No. NM320; Special Conditions No.
25–330–SC]
Conclusion
I
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the following special conditions are
issued as part of the type certification
basis for the Airbus A380–800 airplane.
In addition to the requirements of
§§ 25.801, 25.807(i), 25.810, 25.1411,
and 25.1415, the following special
conditions apply:
a. For door sill heights that would be
greater than six (6) feet above the
waterline during a ditching event, an
assist means must be provided from the
airplane to the water.
b. Boarding of the upper deck slide/
rafts must be demonstrated for the rated
I
PO 00000
Frm 00018
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
Special Conditions: Airbus Model
A380–800 Airplane, Escape Systems
Inflation Systems
Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: These special conditions are
issued for the Airbus A380–800
airplane. This airplane will have novel
or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology
envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category
airplanes. Many of these novel or
E:\FR\FM\11SER1.SGM
11SER1
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 175 / Monday, September 11, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
unusual design features are associated
with the complex systems and the
configuration of the airplane, including
its full-length double deck. For these
design features, the applicable
airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards
regarding escape system reliability.
These special conditions contain the
additional safety standards that the
Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to
that established by the existing
airworthiness standards. Additional
special conditions will be issued for
other novel or unusual design features
of the Airbus Model A380–800 airplane.
DATES: Effective Date: The effective date
of these special conditions is August 28,
2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
Holly Thorson, FAA, International
Branch, ANM–116, Transport Airplane
Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW.,
Renton, Washington 98055–4056;
telephone (425) 227–1357; facsimile
(425) 227–1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
bjneal on PROD1PC71 with RULES
Background
Airbus applied for FAA certification/
validation of the provisionallydesignated Model A3XX–100 in its
letter AI/L 810.0223/98, dated August
12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for
certification by the Joint Aviation
Authorities (JAA) of Europe had been
made on January 16, 1998, reference AI/
L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA,
Airbus requested an extension to the 5year period for type certification in
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c).
The request was for an extension to a
7-year period, using the date of the
initial application letter to the JAA as
the reference date. The reason given by
Airbus for the request for extension is
related to the technical challenges,
complexity, and the number of new and
novel features on the airplane. On
November 12, 1998, the Manager,
Aircraft Engineering Division, AIR–100,
granted Airbus’ request for the 7-year
period, based on the date of application
to the JAA.
In its letter AI/LE–A 828.0040/99
Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001, Airbus
stated that its target date for type
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:10 Sep 08, 2006
Jkt 208001
certification of the Model A380–800 had
been moved from May 2005, to January
2006, to match the delivery date of the
first production airplane. In a
subsequent letter (AI/L 810.0223/98
issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus
stated that its target date for type
certification is October 2, 2006. In
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2),
Airbus chose a new application date of
December 20, 1999, and requested that
the 7-year certification period which
had already been approved be
continued. The FAA has reviewed the
part 25 certification basis for the Model
A380–800 airplane, and no changes are
required based on the new application
date.
The Model A380–800 airplane will be
an all-new, four-engine jet transport
airplane with a full double-deck, twoaisle cabin. The maximum takeoff
weight will be 1.235 million pounds
with a typical three-class layout of 555
passengers.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17,
Airbus must show that the Model A380–
800 airplane meets the applicable
provisions of 14 CFR part 25, as
amended by Amendments 25–1 through
25–98. If the Administrator finds that
the applicable airworthiness regulations
do not contain adequate or appropriate
safety standards for the Airbus A380–
800 airplane because of novel or
unusual design features, special
conditions are prescribed under the
provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
In addition to the applicable
airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Airbus Model A380–800
airplane must comply with the fuel vent
and exhaust emission requirements of
14 CFR part 34 and the noise
certification requirements of 14 CFR
part 36. In addition, the FAA must issue
a finding of regulatory adequacy
pursuant to section 611 of Public Law
93–574, the ‘‘Noise Control Act of
1972.’’
Special conditions, as defined in 14
CFR 11.19, are issued in accordance
with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of
the type certification basis in
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially
applicable to the model for which they
PO 00000
Frm 00019
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
53317
are issued. Should the type certificate
for that model be amended later to
include any other model that
incorporates the same novel or unusual
design feature, the special conditions
would also apply to the other model
under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101.
Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design
Features
The inflation system for the escape
systems associated with the exits
includes a pressurized cylinder with a
mixture of carbon dioxide and argon in
both gaseous and liquid states. The
inflation system also includes a smaller
cylinder containing a solid propellant
that burns to generate gaseous
propellant. The opening of the valve
and the ignition of the propellant are
accomplished by the firing of squibs.
The firing of these squibs is sequenced
to improve their performance in the
extreme temperatures to which they are
subjected. Firing of the squibs is
controlled by a system mounted on the
emergency exit.
The proposed design for the escape
systems on the A380 is much more
complex than the design of systems
currently in use. Typically, inflation
systems for escape systems consist of a
pressurized cylinder containing a
mixture of gases and a regulator valve
that reduces the outlet pressure
supplied from the inflation cylinder.
The regulator valve is opened either by
mechanical means or by the firing of a
squib.
The regulations governing the
certification of the A380 do not
adequately address the certification
requirements of this type of inflation
system for an escape system.
Furthermore, the Technical Standard
Order (TSO) that addresses escape
systems (i.e., TSO–C69c) does not
adequately address this type of inflation
system. The current requirements for
escape system reliability are predicated
on a simple inflation system, where
reliability is driven by the performance
of the inflatable itself. The existing
requirements do not account for an
inflation system that could adversely
affect the overall reliability of the escape
system.
E:\FR\FM\11SER1.SGM
11SER1
53318
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 175 / Monday, September 11, 2006 / Rules and Regulations
bjneal on PROD1PC71 with RULES
Since the A380 has 16 emergency
exits, the requirements of § 25.810
require a total of 80 successful
deployments (5 successive deployments
for each exit). However, since the
requirements apply to each system
independently, failures in a system
common to all the escape systems
would not be adequately addressed.
Therefore, the inflation system needs a
specific requirement that will show
adequate system reliability. With a goal
of achieving 95% reliability of the
inflation system with a 95% confidence,
we are establishing such a requirement.
As we noted above, the propellant used
is designed to burn. The regulations do
not address this type of propellant, and
some measure of fire safety protection is
needed. United Nations document No.
ST/SG/AC.10/I1/Rev.3 ‘‘Transport of
Dangerous Goods, Manual of Tests and
Criteria,’’ section 13.7.1, contains a
small scale test that addresses this
concern. Propellants that pass this test
will not be a fire hazard.
Therefore, a special condition is
needed to ensure that the inflation
system for the A380 escape system is
reliable and that the propellant itself
does not constitute a fire hazard.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special
Conditions No. 25–05–15–SC,
pertaining to escape systems inflation
systems, was published in the Federal
Register on August 9, 2005, (70 FR
46100). Comments were received from
the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA)
and an individual commenter.
Requested change 1: ALPA
recommends that the tests of the
inflation system ‘‘be conducted on the
aircraft (or a mockup). Bench testing
does not adequately ensure that the
entire system will have the declared
reliability. The system and its
components should be subjected to
accelerated aging representative of longterm storage (temperature and pressure
cycling), long term exposure (high and
low frequency vibration) as part of each
test.’’ ALPA adds that ‘‘the inflation
systems should be demonstrated to
function in winds from the most severe
angle at speeds up to at least the
maximum wind speed (gust included)
for which flight operations can occur.’’
FAA response: Many of these
recommendations go beyond current
regulatory requirements for inflation
systems. For example, wind
performance is already specified in 14
CFR part 25. The purpose of the special
conditions is to establish criteria that
will validate that the reliability of the
inflation system as a component will
not drive the overall reliability of the
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:10 Sep 08, 2006
Jkt 208001
escape system. Thus tests on the escape
slides installed on the airplane will be
performed as is consistent with current
practice, and additional tests will be
performed on the inflation system itself.
Accordingly, we have not changed the
special conditions, as proposed.
Requested change 2: An individual
commenter expresses concern about
various aspects of the inflation system,
including its output of high temperature
gas; residue from combustion of the
solid propellant; high pressure
produced in the inflation system;
activation of the inflation system,
including inadvertent activation by a
lightning strike; and the need for a
redundant manual (backup) power
source for the inflation system.
FAA response: These comments relate
to the general safety and suitability of
the inflation system for the escape
system and its related components.
These are fundamental considerations
for any airplane system. Although the
inflation system may warrant highly
specific considerations, it is the need to
show the reliability of the system
relative to conventional design that
makes it novel. Showing that the system
elements are compatible with one
another is a basic certification
requirement for any system.
To address the novel features of the
inflation system requires imposition of
special conditions in addition to the
applicable requirements of § 25.1301.
The slide must be both soaked and
inflated at a range of temperatures to
determine its operating range. The
minimum pressures are determined to
establish evacuation rate and stiffness.
Therefore, the initial internal pressure
of the slide will not be an issue in the
qualification. The electrical systems are
protected against lightning by other
requirements. The manual backup is,
indeed, an alternative electrical supply,
which is addressed in the system safety
analysis. Accordingly, we have not
changed the special conditions, as
proposed.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special
conditions are applicable to the Airbus
A380–800 airplane. Should Airbus
apply at a later date for a change to the
type certificate to include another
model incorporating the same novel or
unusual design features, these special
conditions would apply to that model as
well under the provisions of § 21.101.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting
and recordkeeping requirements.
The authority citation for these
special conditions is as follows:
I
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701,
44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority
delegated to me by the Administrator,
the following special conditions are
issued as part of the type certification
basis for the Airbus A380–800 airplane.
a. In addition to the requirements of
§ 25.810, the following special condition
applies:
To ensure that the inflation system is
a reliable design, it must be tested using
84 inflation/firing system bench tests
with no more than one failure. For these
special conditions, the inflation/firing
system is defined as everything
upstream of the outlet connection to the
inflation valve, which includes but is
not limited to the door-mounted
systems that provide the firing signals to
the squibs, the squibs themselves, the
solid propellant, and the valve.
b. In addition to the requirements of
§ 25.853(a) and Appendix F Part I (a)(ii),
in standard atmosphere conditions, the
following special condition applies:
To ensure that the propellant itself
does not contribute significantly to a
fire, the propellant must be subjected to
and must pass a standard ‘‘Small-Scale
Burning Test,’’ as specified in United
Nations document No. ST/SG/AC.10/
11/Rev. 3 ‘‘Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria,’’
section 13.7.1.
I
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August
28, 2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. E6–15010 Filed 9–8–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910–13–P
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel
or unusual design features of the Airbus
A380–800 airplane. It is not a rule of
general applicability.
PO 00000
Frm 00020
Fmt 4700
Sfmt 4700
E:\FR\FM\11SER1.SGM
11SER1
]]>Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 175 (Monday, September 11, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 53316-53318]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-15010]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 25
[Docket No. NM320; Special Conditions No. 25-330-SC]
Special Conditions: Airbus Model A380-800 Airplane, Escape
Systems Inflation Systems
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final special conditions.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: These special conditions are issued for the Airbus A380-800
airplane. This airplane will have novel or unusual design features when
compared to the state of technology envisioned in the airworthiness
standards for transport category airplanes. Many of these novel or
[[Page 53317]]
unusual design features are associated with the complex systems and the
configuration of the airplane, including its full-length double deck.
For these design features, the applicable airworthiness regulations do
not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards regarding escape
system reliability. These special conditions contain the additional
safety standards that the Administrator considers necessary to
establish a level of safety equivalent to that established by the
existing airworthiness standards. Additional special conditions will be
issued for other novel or unusual design features of the Airbus Model
A380-800 airplane.
DATES: Effective Date: The effective date of these special conditions
is August 28, 2006.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Holly Thorson, FAA, International
Branch, ANM-116, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service, 1601 Lind Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 98055-4056;
telephone (425) 227-1357; facsimile (425) 227-1149.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
Airbus applied for FAA certification/validation of the
provisionally-designated Model A3XX-100 in its letter AI/L 810.0223/98,
dated August 12, 1998, to the FAA. Application for certification by the
Joint Aviation Authorities (JAA) of Europe had been made on January 16,
1998, reference AI/L 810.0019/98. In its letter to the FAA, Airbus
requested an extension to the 5-year period for type certification in
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(c).
The request was for an extension to a 7-year period, using the date
of the initial application letter to the JAA as the reference date. The
reason given by Airbus for the request for extension is related to the
technical challenges, complexity, and the number of new and novel
features on the airplane. On November 12, 1998, the Manager, Aircraft
Engineering Division, AIR-100, granted Airbus' request for the 7-year
period, based on the date of application to the JAA.
In its letter AI/LE-A 828.0040/99 Issue 3, dated July 20, 2001,
Airbus stated that its target date for type certification of the Model
A380-800 had been moved from May 2005, to January 2006, to match the
delivery date of the first production airplane. In a subsequent letter
(AI/L 810.0223/98 issue 3, dated January 27, 2006), Airbus stated that
its target date for type certification is October 2, 2006. In
accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(d)(2), Airbus chose a new application date
of December 20, 1999, and requested that the 7-year certification
period which had already been approved be continued. The FAA has
reviewed the part 25 certification basis for the Model A380-800
airplane, and no changes are required based on the new application
date.
The Model A380-800 airplane will be an all-new, four-engine jet
transport airplane with a full double-deck, two-aisle cabin. The
maximum takeoff weight will be 1.235 million pounds with a typical
three-class layout of 555 passengers.
Type Certification Basis
Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, Airbus must show that the
Model A380-800 airplane meets the applicable provisions of 14 CFR part
25, as amended by Amendments 25-1 through 25-98. If the Administrator
finds that the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain
adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Airbus A380-800
airplane because of novel or unusual design features, special
conditions are prescribed under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.16.
In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special
conditions, the Airbus Model A380-800 airplane must comply with the
fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the
noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36. In addition, the
FAA must issue a finding of regulatory adequacy pursuant to section 611
of Public Law 93-574, the ``Noise Control Act of 1972.''
Special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, are issued in
accordance with 14 CFR 11.38 and become part of the type certification
basis in accordance with 14 CFR 21.17(a)(2).
Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which
they are issued. Should the type certificate for that model be amended
later to include any other model that incorporates the same novel or
unusual design feature, the special conditions would also apply to the
other model under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.101.
Discussion of Novel or Unusual Design Features
The inflation system for the escape systems associated with the
exits includes a pressurized cylinder with a mixture of carbon dioxide
and argon in both gaseous and liquid states. The inflation system also
includes a smaller cylinder containing a solid propellant that burns to
generate gaseous propellant. The opening of the valve and the ignition
of the propellant are accomplished by the firing of squibs. The firing
of these squibs is sequenced to improve their performance in the
extreme temperatures to which they are subjected. Firing of the squibs
is controlled by a system mounted on the emergency exit.
The proposed design for the escape systems on the A380 is much more
complex than the design of systems currently in use. Typically,
inflation systems for escape systems consist of a pressurized cylinder
containing a mixture of gases and a regulator valve that reduces the
outlet pressure supplied from the inflation cylinder. The regulator
valve is opened either by mechanical means or by the firing of a squib.
The regulations governing the certification of the A380 do not
adequately address the certification requirements of this type of
inflation system for an escape system. Furthermore, the Technical
Standard Order (TSO) that addresses escape systems (i.e., TSO-C69c)
does not adequately address this type of inflation system. The current
requirements for escape system reliability are predicated on a simple
inflation system, where reliability is driven by the performance of the
inflatable itself. The existing requirements do not account for an
inflation system that could adversely affect the overall reliability of
the escape system.
[[Page 53318]]
Since the A380 has 16 emergency exits, the requirements of Sec.
25.810 require a total of 80 successful deployments (5 successive
deployments for each exit). However, since the requirements apply to
each system independently, failures in a system common to all the
escape systems would not be adequately addressed. Therefore, the
inflation system needs a specific requirement that will show adequate
system reliability. With a goal of achieving 95% reliability of the
inflation system with a 95% confidence, we are establishing such a
requirement. As we noted above, the propellant used is designed to
burn. The regulations do not address this type of propellant, and some
measure of fire safety protection is needed. United Nations document
No. ST/SG/AC.10/I1/Rev.3 ``Transport of Dangerous Goods, Manual of
Tests and Criteria,'' section 13.7.1, contains a small scale test that
addresses this concern. Propellants that pass this test will not be a
fire hazard.
Therefore, a special condition is needed to ensure that the
inflation system for the A380 escape system is reliable and that the
propellant itself does not constitute a fire hazard.
Discussion of Comments
Notice of Proposed Special Conditions No. 25-05-15-SC, pertaining
to escape systems inflation systems, was published in the Federal
Register on August 9, 2005, (70 FR 46100). Comments were received from
the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) and an individual commenter.
Requested change 1: ALPA recommends that the tests of the inflation
system ``be conducted on the aircraft (or a mockup). Bench testing does
not adequately ensure that the entire system will have the declared
reliability. The system and its components should be subjected to
accelerated aging representative of long-term storage (temperature and
pressure cycling), long term exposure (high and low frequency
vibration) as part of each test.'' ALPA adds that ``the inflation
systems should be demonstrated to function in winds from the most
severe angle at speeds up to at least the maximum wind speed (gust
included) for which flight operations can occur.''
FAA response: Many of these recommendations go beyond current
regulatory requirements for inflation systems. For example, wind
performance is already specified in 14 CFR part 25. The purpose of the
special conditions is to establish criteria that will validate that the
reliability of the inflation system as a component will not drive the
overall reliability of the escape system. Thus tests on the escape
slides installed on the airplane will be performed as is consistent
with current practice, and additional tests will be performed on the
inflation system itself. Accordingly, we have not changed the special
conditions, as proposed.
Requested change 2: An individual commenter expresses concern about
various aspects of the inflation system, including its output of high
temperature gas; residue from combustion of the solid propellant; high
pressure produced in the inflation system; activation of the inflation
system, including inadvertent activation by a lightning strike; and the
need for a redundant manual (backup) power source for the inflation
system.
FAA response: These comments relate to the general safety and
suitability of the inflation system for the escape system and its
related components. These are fundamental considerations for any
airplane system. Although the inflation system may warrant highly
specific considerations, it is the need to show the reliability of the
system relative to conventional design that makes it novel. Showing
that the system elements are compatible with one another is a basic
certification requirement for any system.
To address the novel features of the inflation system requires
imposition of special conditions in addition to the applicable
requirements of Sec. 25.1301. The slide must be both soaked and
inflated at a range of temperatures to determine its operating range.
The minimum pressures are determined to establish evacuation rate and
stiffness. Therefore, the initial internal pressure of the slide will
not be an issue in the qualification. The electrical systems are
protected against lightning by other requirements. The manual backup
is, indeed, an alternative electrical supply, which is addressed in the
system safety analysis. Accordingly, we have not changed the special
conditions, as proposed.
Applicability
As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the
Airbus A380-800 airplane. Should Airbus apply at a later date for a
change to the type certificate to include another model incorporating
the same novel or unusual design features, these special conditions
would apply to that model as well under the provisions of Sec. 21.101.
Conclusion
This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features
of the Airbus A380-800 airplane. It is not a rule of general
applicability.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 25
Aircraft, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping
requirements.
0
The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 44702, 44704.
The Special Conditions
0
Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the
Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of
the type certification basis for the Airbus A380-800 airplane.
a. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 25.810, the following
special condition applies:
To ensure that the inflation system is a reliable design, it must
be tested using 84 inflation/firing system bench tests with no more
than one failure. For these special conditions, the inflation/firing
system is defined as everything upstream of the outlet connection to
the inflation valve, which includes but is not limited to the door-
mounted systems that provide the firing signals to the squibs, the
squibs themselves, the solid propellant, and the valve.
b. In addition to the requirements of Sec. 25.853(a) and Appendix
F Part I (a)(ii), in standard atmosphere conditions, the following
special condition applies:
To ensure that the propellant itself does not contribute
significantly to a fire, the propellant must be subjected to and must
pass a standard ``Small-Scale Burning Test,'' as specified in United
Nations document No. ST/SG/AC.10/11/Rev. 3 ``Transport of Dangerous
Goods, Manual of Tests and Criteria,'' section 13.7.1.
Issued in Renton, Washington, on August 28, 2006.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification
Service.
[FR Doc. E6-15010 Filed 9-8-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
