Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 52148-52159 [E6-14568]
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Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to James Curtis Dilday,
M.D. (Respondent) of Little Rock,
Arkansas. The Show Cause Order
proposed to revoke Respondent’s DEA
Certificate of Registration, BD1434872,
as a practitioner, and to deny any
pending applications for renewal or
modification of the registration, on the
grounds that Respondent’s state medical
license had been revoked, see 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(3), and that Respondent had
committed acts that rendered his
registration inconsistent with the public
interest. See id. § 824(a)(4); see also id.
§ 823(f).
The Show Cause Order specifically
alleged that on numerous occasions,
Respondent had improperly prescribed
controlled substances (including
Schedule II controlled substances) to ten
patients. See Show Cause Order at 2–4.
The Show Cause Order also alleged that
between November 28, 2000, and
November 12, 2002, Respondent had
submitted fifteen fraudulent claims to
insurers for medical services that were
not performed. See id. at 4–5. The Show
Cause Order further alleged that
Respondent had pled no contest on
behalf of his medical corporation in a
state criminal proceeding to fifteen
counts of committing fraudulent
insurance acts and fifteen counts of
theft. See id. at 6. Finally, the Show
Cause Order alleged that the Arkansas
State Medical Board had revoked
Respondent’s state medical license. See
id. The Show Cause Order also notified
Respondent of its right to a hearing. See
id. at 7.
Respondent, through his counsel,
requested a hearing; the case was
assigned to Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) Mary Ellen Bittner. Thereafter, on
August 11, 2005, the Government
moved for summary disposition and to
stay the proceeding. The Government’s
motion for summary disposition was
based on the fact that on June 21, 2004,
the Arkansas State Medical Board
revoked Respondent’s state medical
license. The Government asserted that
as a result of the revocation of
Respondent’s medical license,
Respondent was without authority to
handle controlled substances in
Arkansas, the State in which
Respondent was registered with DEA.
Because DEA has consistently
interpreted the Controlled Substances
Act as barring a federal registration if a
practitioner lacks authority under state
law to handle controlled substances in
the State where he practices, the
Government sought a ruling from the
ALJ recommending the revocation of
Respondent’s DEA registration and
terminating the proceeding.
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On August 12, 2005, the ALJ issued a
memorandum to counsel offering
Respondent the opportunity to respond
to the Government’s motion by 4 p.m.
eastern time on August 29, 2005. By
September 23, 2005, when no response
had been filed, the ALJ issued her
Opinion and Recommended Decision.
The ALJ explained that Respondent
did not deny that he lacked authority
under Arkansas law to handle
controlled substances in that State. ALJ
Dec. at 2. Noting that DEA precedents
have ‘‘consistently held that a person
may not hold a DEA registration if he is
without appropriate authority under the
laws of the state in which he does
business,’’ the ALJ concluded that
‘‘[b]ecause Respondent lacks this state
authority * * * he is not entitled to
retain his DEA registration.’’ Id.
(citations omitted). Furthermore, as no
material fact was in dispute, summary
disposition was appropriate. See id. The
ALJ thus granted the government’s
motion and recommended that
Respondent’s registration be revoked
and any pending applications be
denied. See id. at 2–3.
Having considered the record as a
whole, I hereby issue this decision and
final order. I adopt in its entirety the
ALJ’s opinion and recommended
decision. Because the facts are
straightforward and not in dispute, there
is no need to elaborate on them. As the
ALJ found, Respondent is no longer
authorized to distribute controlled
substances under State law. Therefore,
under our precedents, Respondent is not
entitled to maintain his DEA
registration. See Sheran Arden Yeates,
M.D., 71 FR 39130, 39131 (2006);
Dominick A. Ricci, M.D., 58 FR 51104,
51105 (1993); Bobby Watts, M.D., 53 FR
11919, 11920 (1988).
Order
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
§§ 823(f) & 824(a), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104, I hereby order that
DEA Certificate of Registration,
BD1434872, issued to James Curtis
Dilday, M.D., be, and it hereby is,
revoked. I further order that any
pending application for renewal or
modification of such registration be, and
they hereby are, denied. This order is
effective October 2, 2006.
Dated: August 22, 2006.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E6–14521 Filed 8–31–06; 8:45 am]
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 03–8]
Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D.; Revocation
of Registration
Introduction and Procedural History
On October 17, 2002, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement
Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D.
(Respondent), of Clearwater, Florida.
The Show Cause Order proposed to
revoke Respondent’s DEA certification
of registration, No. AK2006648, as a
practitioner on the grounds that
Respondent had committed acts which
rendered her continued registration
inconsistent with the public interest.
See 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). The Show
Cause Order also proposed to deny any
applications for renewal or modification
of her registration.
The Show Cause Order alleged that
between March 24, 1999, and June 24,
1999, the Pinellas County, Florida,
Sheriff’s Office had conducted four
undercover visits to Respondent’s
medical office. In essence, the Show
Cause Order alleged that during three of
the visits, Respondent had met with
three different undercover operatives
who had told her that they were not
currently in pain but that they were
users of various controlled substances
such as Lorcet and Vicodin. See Show
Cause Order at 2–3. The Show Cause
Order further alleged that Respondent
had issued prescriptions for controlled
substances without performing a
physical exam. See Id. The Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent had
indicated in the patient records for each
undercover operative that they had
complained of pain when each had
‘‘clearly stated that they were not in
pain.’’ Id. at 3. The Order also alleged
that that Respondent had told the
undercover operatives that she could
offer them a detox program or could
‘‘arrange an appropriate treatment
plan.’’ Id. at 3.
The Show Cause Order further alleged
that on the second visit of one of the
undercover operatives, the operative
had been seen by a nurse practitioner,
Ben Mastridge. While Mastridge told
him that Respondent would not
prescribe narcotics if the operative was
not in pain, he nonetheless issued him
a prescription, which had been presigned by Respondent, for Lorcet,
Xanax, and Soma. See Id. at 2. The
Order further alleged that Mastridge had
offered ‘‘to initiate Methadone
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treatment, but the [operative] preferred
simply to attempt to reduce his Lorcet
addiction.’’ Id.
Based on the above, the Show Cause
Order alleged that Respondent had
‘‘prescribed controlled substances
without a legitimate medical purpose in
violation of Federal law.’’ Id. at 4. The
Show Cause Order further alleged that
Respondent ‘‘operated a narcotic
treatment program without obtaining a
separate registration for that purpose.’’
Id.
On January 26, 2000, a federal search
warrant was executed at Respondent’s
office. During the search, the authorities
seized the medical records for the
undercover operatives.
Thereafter, on June 21, 2000, a federal
grand jury indicted Respondent on five
counts of illegal distribution of various
controlled substances in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Resp. Ex. 110. These
counts specifically alleged that
Respondent had, on various dates,
‘‘knowingly and intentionally
dispense[d] and distribute[d], outside
the usual course of medical practice,
and without a legitimate medical
purpose,’’ the drugs Lorcet, Vicodin and
Vicodin ES (each being a Schedule III
controlled substance), and Xanax (a
Schedule IV controlled substance). Id. at
1–3. An additional count of the
indictment alleged that Respondent had
conspired to distribute Schedule III and
Schedule IV controlled substances in
violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). See 21
U.S.C. 846. See also Resp. Exh. 110, at
1.
The United States Attorney offered
Respondent pre-trial diversion. The
agreement specifically provided that the
period of supervision would last for no
more than twelve (12) months, and that
if Respondent fulfilled the conditions of
the agreement, the charges would be
dismissed. As part of the diversion
agreement, Respondent also entered a
medical supervision agreement. Under
this agreement, Respondent was to
submit the name of a monitoring
physician for the approval of the United
States Attorney; the monitoring
physician was required to review
twenty-five (25) percent of Respondent’s
patient records on a random basis and
all records involving her prescribing of
controlled substances to determine the
appropriateness of the prescriptions.
Respondent satisfactorily completed the
supervision period and the indictment
was dismissed.
As stated above, on October 17, 2002,
this proceeding was initiated.
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Respondent requested a hearing.1 The
case was assigned to Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) Mary Ellen Bittner,
who conducted a hearing in Tampa,
Florida, on July 1 and 2, and August 5
and 6, 2003. At the hearing, both the
Government and Respondent called
witnesses and introduced documentary
evidence. Following the hearing, both
the Government and Respondent
submitted post-hearing briefs.
On April 15, 2005, the ALJ issued her
recommended decision. The ALJ found
that the Government had shown by a
preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent had, in each of the three
instances involving the undercover
operatives, prescribed controlled
substances without a legitimate medical
purpose and outside of the usual course
of medical practice. See ALJ Dec. at 39–
41. The ALJ further found that
Respondent had ‘‘unlawfully presigned
prescriptions for controlled substances.’’
Id. at 41. The ALJ also found that the
Government had not proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that
Respondent had conducted a narcotic
treatment program without the required
registration. Id. Finally, the ALJ found
that Respondent had refused to
acknowledge her misconduct in
prescribing the controlled substances,
see id. at 43, and was ‘‘unwilling or
unable to accept the responsibilities
inherent in a DEA registration.’’ Id. at
44. The ALJ thus recommended that
Respondent’s registration be revoked.
Following the ALJ’s decision,
Respondent submitted an 87 page brief
(Resp. Exceptions). Respondent’s brief
raised numerous challenges to the ALJ’s
findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Respondent also claimed (1) That DEA’s
pursuit of this proceeding violates the
pre-trial diversion agreement, (2) that
DEA should be estopped from
contending that Respondent’s continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest because of assertions the
Government purportedly made in the
criminal proceeding, and (3) that the
DEA proceeding is a vindictive and
retaliatory prosecution in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.
Having considered the record as a
whole, I hereby issue this decision and
final order adopting the ALJ’s findings
of fact and conclusions of law except as
expressly noted herein. I have also
reviewed Respondent’s various claims
and find them to be without merit. For
reasons set forth below, I concur with
the ALJ’s conclusion that Respondent’s
1 Respondent also sought to enjoin the
proceeding. The district court, however, denied her
motion for an injunction.
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continued registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest. I
therefore adopt the ALJ’s
recommendation that Respondent’s
registration be revoked and that any
pending applications for renewal or
modification be denied.
Findings of Fact
Respondent obtained her doctor of
medicine degree in 1975 from Calicut
University Medical College, in Kerala,
India. Following a one year residency in
New Delhi, Respondent attended the
University Rene Descartes in Paris,
France, from 1977 through 1981. There,
she obtained additional training in
anesthesia, critical care, and pain
medicine. Respondent then moved to
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where she
served a residency in anesthesia at
Allegheny General Hospital from 1981
until 1984. Because Respondent had
already trained in anesthesia, she spent
most of her time in pain management.
Upon completion of her residency,
Respondent moved to Clearwater,
Florida, and took a position as an
anesthesiologist at the Belleair Surgery
Center (Belleair).2
Respondent worked at Belleair from
1984 until 1999, and eventually became
its medical director. While at Belleair,
Respondent treated chronic pain
patients and in 1994 or 1995, opened
her own clinic. In 1999, Respondent left
Belleair to concentrate on her pain
management practice. Respondent
testified at the hearing that she had
approximately 800 to 1000 recurring
patients and saw around 3,000 patients
per year. Respondent has between
fifteen and eighteen employees, and
during the spring of 1999, employed
Ben Mastridge, a Certified Addiction
Registered Nurse. According to
Respondent, Mastridge identified
patients who were addicted to narcotics
and helped patients address their
mental health issues.
The Criminal Investigation
In September 1998, Dale Carnell, a
prescription fraud detective with the
Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office,
contacted Ira Wald, a Diversion
Investigator (DI) assigned to DEA’s
Tampa office. Detective Carnell told the
DI that the Sheriff’s Office had received
‘‘numerous complaints’’ about Dr. Iyer.
Tr. 101–102. The DI proceeded to
contact Walgreen’s, a pharmacy chain,
and obtained from it a printout of Dr.
Iyer’s controlled substance prescriptions
for the previous twelve (12) months. Id.
at 141. The DI testified that the printout
2 Respondent is board certified in anesthesiology
and pain management.
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was ‘‘the most voluminous’’ he had seen
in his twenty-three years as a DI, Id. at
102 & 142, that it ‘‘was many hundreds
of pages,’’ Id. at 140, and that it
‘‘weighed five or six pounds.’’ Id. at 141.
Based on the printout, the DI and
Detective Bernie McKenna of the
Pinellas Sheriff’s Office decided to
conduct undercover visits to
Respondent’s office. The first visit was
conducted by Mr. Chris Massey, an
informant for the local authorities who
was then on probation following his
guilty plea for having obtaining
hydrocodone prescriptions by fraud.
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The First Undercover Visit
On March 24, 1999, Massey went to
Respondent’s clinic and was seen by
her. During the visit, Massey wore a
wire; a transcript of his conversation
with Respondent was admitted into
evidence. According to the transcript,
Respondent asked Massey who had sent
him to see her. See GX–2, at 1. Massey
told Respondent that he had been
referred by a customer of his window
tinting business. See id. Respondent
then asked Massey, ‘‘[w]here is your
pain?’’ Id. Massey answered: ‘‘I’m not
really in pain. He [the customer] said to
come up. He said, you know, you’re real
understanding, just come up and be
honest with you. I, uh, I had a shoulder
surgery about 41⁄2 years ago.’’ Id.
Respondent asked: ‘‘[r]ight shoulder?’’
Massey answered that ‘‘the problem was
more or less cured.’’ Id. at 1–2. Massey
then told Respondent that ‘‘I was
wanting to take Lorcet and Soma.’’ Id.
at 2. Massey also told Respondent that
‘‘I have been taking it * * * [e]ver since
then,’’ an apparent reference to the
surgery. Id. Massey added that he was
‘‘sick of going to look for em.’’ Id.
Respondent then told Massey: ‘‘Okay,
look. We can, look, we can help you
anyway.’’ Id. In response, Massey then
stated, ‘‘I mean I’m being honest, I mean
I’m not really in—I don’t—I mean they
make me feel good, make me get work
done, I mean I’m not abusing them.’’ Id.
Following a discussion of how many
pills Massey was taking per day,
Respondent told Massey ‘‘[w]e’ll give
you your medicine. The question for
you is this—you can tell—you can tell
me that you want to come out of drugs.
We have intensive detox, we can help
you.’’ Id.
Later in the conversation, Respondent
asked Massey ‘‘who gives you the
medicine now?’’ Id. at 3. Massey
replied, ‘‘I’ve been getting them from my
girlfriend but me and her just split up.’’
Id. Respondent then asked Massey what
his job was and again asked about his
shoulder. Massey told Respondent, ‘‘I
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mean like I said, it’s not, it doesn’t
bother me.’’ Id.
Respondent then asked Massey,
‘‘what do you take, Lorcet 10?’’ Id. at 4.
After Massey told her that he took
Lorcet 10/650, Respondent stated:
‘‘Lorcet 10/650. See, this is a shame
then that you have to take the medicine
for the habit, you know.’’ Id.
Respondent once again asked Massey
who had referred him. Massey told
Respondent that his name was Bill and
that he did not know Bill’s last name,
but that ‘‘he’s been going to you for a
while you know, you’re real
understanding.’’ Id. After stating that
‘‘this is a pain center, you know,’’
Respondent added: ‘‘We don’t want to
give out drugs. So that’s why we have
to have a psychologist and a substance
abuse counselor.’’ Id. In response,
Massey said ‘‘Right.’’ Respondent then
added: ‘‘We have massage therapist,
physical therapist and everybody here,
you know. But you are honest, you are
telling the truth, and we are here to help
you.’’ Id. Massey replied: ‘‘That’s what
he said, he said if you’re honest with
her, you know, go in there and tell her
you’re not in pain. This is your problem.
You’ve been taking them.’’ Id.
Respondent then asked Massey how
many Lorcets he was taking per day.
Massey told her four. Respondent stated
‘‘that’s 124 a month’’ and told him not
to lose his medicine or run out of it
because she would not call in a refill. Id.
at 5. Massey then paid Respondent
$175. Id. Respondent then told Massey,
‘‘I’d be happy to see patients like you,’’
and then told him that she could give
him a refill on his SOMA prescription.
She would not, however, give Massey a
refill on the Lorcet. Respondent then
gave Massey a prescription for 120
Lorcet 10 with no refill and 60 SOMA
with one refill.3 See Gov. Exh. 3.
The Government submitted into
evidence the medical record which
Respondent prepared for Massey’s visit.
Under the heading ‘‘Chief Complaint,’’
the History and Physical record states:
Complains of neck and shoulder pain for
the last several years. This began since he
had surgery about 3–4 years ago. He
complains of ongoing pain and has been
taking Lorcet and Soma for a long time. He
is having difficulty coming off of this and
would like to get rid of the narcotics if he
can. It is very difficult because of his daily
activities etc. He has ongoing right shoulder
pain and discomfort. Sometimes it is
3 The ALJ found that ‘‘Respondent * * * said that
she would give him sixty Soma, but would not list
any refills on the prescription until she knew him
better and knew that he was not abusing the
medication.’’ ALJ Dec. at 10. In light of the actual
prescriptions written, I conclude that Respondent’s
statement that ‘‘Sorry there’s no refill on it[,]’’ was
made in reference to the Lorcet.
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manageable and when the pain gets worse he
has to take the medication as soon as
possible.
Gov. Exh. 4, at 1.
The second page of this document
records the findings of a physical exam
although Respondent admitted that she
never performed one on Massey. See Tr.
495. Under the heading
‘‘Musculoskeletal,’’ the record states:
‘‘Bilateral paracervical muscle spasms at
the C6–7 area. Decreased range of
motion of the right shoulder.’’ Id. The
record also includes the diagnosis of
‘‘chronic right shoulder pain.’’ Id.
The medical records also include a
questionnaire on which a patient
indicates such information as the nature
and source of his pain. The first
question on this form is ‘‘How long have
you had this pain?’’ Gov. Exh. 4, at 13.
Massey left this blank. See id. Massey
apparently did make a mark on both the
front and back drawings of the human
body in the area of the right shoulder.
See id. Item 2 of this form directs the
patient to ‘‘circle all the words that best
describe your pain’’ and lists twentyfour adjectives that describe pain. Id.
Massey did not circle any of these
words. See id.
Respondent testified that she
understood the mark that Massey had
made in the shoulder region to indicate
that he was ‘‘suffering from chronic pain
injury’’ and that the marks were ‘‘the
location area of the pain.’’ Tr. 481.
Respondent testified that Massey was
not a typical pain patient as most of her
patients ‘‘have been to many doctors,
many operations and had been through
many treatments.’’ Id. at 482. She
further testified that she ‘‘thought
maybe he’s suffering from chronic pain,
something manageable that which may
not have to be maintained on lots of oral
narcotics’’ because ‘‘[i]t’s not difficult
pain for the patient.’’ Id.
Later on direct examination,
Respondent was asked what she
understood Massey’s statement that
‘‘I’m not really in pain’’ meant. Id. at
483. Respondent answered that because
Massey was ‘‘already on medications[,]
[m]aybe he doesn’t have pain at that
time when I see him in the office,’’ but
that if he wasn’t taking the medication,
‘‘[p]ain would be there.’’ Id. Respondent
further testified that she believed that
Massey’s statement that he had
undergone shoulder surgery four and a
half years earlier to mean that he had
developed a calcification in his
shoulder which leads to chronic pain
even though the pain ‘‘can be
intermittent.’’ Id. at 483–84. Later,
however, Respondent testified that it
was her impression that Massey had a
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work-related shoulder sprain although
she acknowledged that Massey ‘‘did not
say that.’’ Id. at 489. Respondent also
testified that chronic pain patients may
see her on days that they do not have
pain. Id. at 490
Respondent further testified that
Massey’s statement that ‘‘the problem
was more or less cured’’ meant to her
that the problem was ‘‘more or less
cured for the surgeon, but the pain
persists.’’ Id. at 484. Moreover,
Respondent testified that Massey’s
comment that he had been taking Lorcet
and Soma since the surgery meant that
he was taking medications ‘‘[t]o control
the pain, so that they [the patient] can
have a decent, normal life.’’ Id. at 485.
As for Massey’s comment that he was
being honest, that the drugs made him
feel good and get work done, and that
he was not abusing them, Respondent
testified that ‘‘[e]ven today when people
take narcotics they feel ashamed of
themselves’’ and that ‘‘maybe he’s
ashamed of telling me he has to take
pain medication to have a very active
pace of living.’’ Id. at 485–86. She then
stated: ‘‘he’s not abusing, that he’s not
taking too many, that he’s taking the
[drugs] to control the daily activities of
living.’’ Id. at 486. Respondent added:
‘‘Drug addicts don’t take three, four
[pills] a day to get work done. * * *
Drug addicts take to get high and they
don’t do their job. They sit at home and
watch TV.’’ Id.
Respondent testified that ‘‘[o]ur job is
to believe the patient.’’ Id. at 491.
Respondent was then asked what she
meant when she told Massey, ‘‘[t]his is
a shame then that you have to take the
medicine for the habit.’’ Id. Respondent
answered: ‘‘See, whenever there is a
pain, they take a pain pill to feel better.
So, there are other habits we can create
with them like the physical therapy,
home exercises, so they don’t have to
depend on that habit of taking a pill for
every little thing.’’ Id.
Respondent further testified that
Massey appeared honest to her. Id. 494.
When asked whether it was significant
that Massey ‘‘was honest with you and
didn’t exaggerate his symptoms or seek
additional—more medication than he
was taking,’’ Respondent answered:
‘‘Yes, he’s not a drug-seeking person.’’
Id.
Respondent then admitted that she
had not conducted a physical exam and
that it was not ‘‘proper’’ to record the
results of an exam that was never done.
Id. at 496. When asked why she filled
in the form, she answered that it was
‘‘the end of the day when I was
preparing—looking at the charts because
the blanks, probably I filled in what I
could have seen.’’ Id. at 497.
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Respondent insisted, however, that the
comments she entered on the record as
Massey’s ‘‘Chief Complaint’’ were based
on what Massey told her. Id.
The ALJ found disingenuous
Respondent’s testimony that she
thought Massey had told her that he was
not in pain because he was then taking
medication. See ALJ Dec. at 40. I agree
and note that the ALJ observed
Respondent’s testimony and was in the
best position to evaluate her credibility
on these issues of historical fact. See
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340
U.S. 474, 496 (1951). Indeed,
Respondent’s story is implausible and
inconsistent. Respondent testified that
Massey was not ‘‘a typical pain patient,’’
and indeed, showed up without a
referral. Given this, it is strange that
Respondent proceeded to prescribe
controlled substances without
performing a physical exam and did so
notwithstanding that Massey told
Respondent numerous times that he was
not in pain and that he was taking the
drugs because they made him feel good.
Indeed, in light of Respondent’s
testimony that she found Massey to be
honest, and that it was her job ‘‘to
believe the patient,’’ it is puzzling that
she did not accept Massey’s statements
that he was not in pain and was taking
the drugs because they made him feel
good.
Massey’s statement that his girlfriend
had been the source of his drugs begs
the question of why, if he truly was in
pain, he had obtained his drugs that
way rather than through legitimate
means. Furthermore, Respondent’s
statements that (1) ‘‘[w]e’ll give you
your medicine * * * you can tell me
that you want to come out of drugs,’’ (2)
that ‘‘this is a shame * * * that you
have to take the medicine for the habit,’’
and (3) ‘‘we don’t want to give out drugs
* * * that’s why we have * * * a
psychologist and a substance abuse
counselor,’’ demonstrate that
Respondent understood that Massey
was not seeking the prescription to treat
pain, but rather to abuse them.
Finally, the ALJ found that ‘‘the
descriptions of the alleged pain that
Respondent wrote in [Massey’s record
was] not—by any stretch of the
imagination—based on what [he] told
her.’’ ALJ Dec. 43. That is putting it
charitably. The record was false. As Dr.
Rafael Miguel (one of the Government’s
experts) explained, the record was likely
created because Respondent knew
exactly what she had done—prescribed
a controlled substance without a
legitimate medical purpose—and thus
did so ‘‘to justify the opioid
prescriptions.’’ Gov. Exh. 18, at 2.
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The Second Undercover Visit
On April 22, 1999, Massey returned to
Respondent’s office for a follow-up visit.
Massey did not see Respondent during
this visit. Instead, he saw Ben
Mastridge, a Certified Addiction
Registered Nurse. After Mastridge asked
Massey how he was ‘‘pain wise,’’
Massey initially stated that ‘‘it’s into my
joint there,’’ that he had been put on
Lorcet ‘‘years ago for a shoulder
surgery,’’ but then added ‘‘I’m not in no
pain.’’ Gov. Exh. 6, at 2. Massey used
similar language several times to convey
his condition to Mastridge. See id. at 2–
3. Notwithstanding the double negative
in Massey’s statements, Mastridge
clearly understood that Massey did not
have pain. See id. at 3. (Mastridge
stating ‘‘if you’re not having pain then
you don’t need’’ narcotics.).
Mastridge and Massey discussed what
drugs the latter was taking; Mastridge
suggested that ‘‘I can give you like an
Ativan 4 or something.’’ Id. Massey told
Mastridge that ‘‘I don’t want no mind
medication.’’ Id. Massey also told
Mastridge that he could ‘‘function
without’’ the Lorcet, but that he took it
‘‘to work and to get, you know to get
chores done on work days.’’ Id. Massey
then suggested that if Mastridge put him
‘‘on Xanax we could probably level me
out a little bit.’’ Id. Massey also told
Mastridge that he took the Soma
because he was ‘‘so used to taking
them’’ and that he was not having
muscle spasms. Id. at 4.
Mastridge then told Massey that
‘‘using narcotics when there is no pain
isn’t acceptable.’’ Id. Mastridge added
that ‘‘just to prescribe * * * narcotics
because you’re physically dependent on
it * * * that’s, that’s that’s
unacceptable.’’ Id. Mastridge then
suggested that ‘‘we can come up with a
plan [to] decrease by one pill every, one
pill a day every two weeks * * * and
see how you do.’’ Id. at 5. Mastridge also
suggested that he could put Massey on
‘‘just methadone and decrease the
Lorcet or we can * * * just decrease the
Lorcet.’’ Id. at 6. Massey told Mastridge
that he was ‘‘definitely not going to go
without the Lorcet.’’ Id.
Later in the conversation, Massey
again told Mastridge that his shoulder
was ‘‘cured,’’ and added that he was
‘‘over the cocaine and all the stuff I
went through in my early days,’’ but
that ‘‘these pills make me feel good.’’ Id.
at 8. Mastridge told Massey that he was
going to give him a prescription for
Xanax because it ‘‘will help to take the
edge off of bringing the coke down.’’ Id.
at 9. Mastridge further stated that ‘‘we
4 Ativan, or Lorazepam, is a Schedule IV
controlled substance. 21 CFR 1308.14(c).
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are going to put down that you are
starting the detox program and it will
run over a period of fifty to ninety days’’
and that Massey had agreed to start the
program ‘‘over the next 60 days.’’ Id. at
10.
Massey then told Mastridge that ‘‘I
don’t have no physical problem’’ and
‘‘it’s just I like these pills.’’ Id. Mastridge
replied that ‘‘as far as the physical
dependence on it goes * * * we can
come up [with] other treatment options
once we try some things here.’’ Id.
Mastridge then told Massey that he
would be getting 105 Lorcet tablets,
which he should take three times a day,
90 Soma, which he should take three
times a day, and Xanax .5, which he
should take twice a day. Id. at 10–11.
Massey then asked whether
‘‘oxycontin or dilaudid would be easier
on my body?’’ Id. at 11. Mastridge
answered that ‘‘it is not legal to
prescribe narcotics long term if there is
no pain,’’ and that ‘‘it’s easier to take
you down off the Lorcet than it would
be off the oxycontin because of the types
of doses.’’ Id. When Massey suggested
that oxycontin 10 tablets were available,
Mastridge replied that ‘‘the bottom line
is you need to be off the narcotics.’’ Id.
at 11–12.
Mastridge then gave Massey the
prescriptions for Lorcet, Soma, and
Xanax discussed above and a
questionnaire, which he instructed him
to complete in the waiting room. Id. at
12–13. Observing that the prescriptions
were pre-signed, Massey asked
Mastridge, ‘‘So what do you do? You
just fill these out and the doctor already
signs them?’’ Id. at 13. Mastridge
answered: ‘‘Yes.’’ Id. Massey then
stated, ‘‘I thought that the Doctor had to
fill the prescriptions out and sign it.’’ Id.
Mastridge replied: ‘‘Oh no, no * * * as
long as she is in the building I am being
supervised and as long as I’m being
supervised, I can do anything that she
can do because she signs her name to
the treatment agreement, there’s a place
for her to sign it, too.’’ Id.
The Government entered into
evidence the patient chart for Massey’s
April 22nd visit. The chart states that
the patient ‘‘report[s] no current pain.’’
Gov. Ex. 4, at 3. The chart also states
that Massey reported ‘‘good sleep,
appetite’’ and that he had agreed to start
outpatient ‘‘detox over [the] next 60
days.’’ Id. In addition, the questionnaire
which Massey completed on this visit
asked whether, ‘‘[d]uring the past
month,’’ he had ‘‘been bothered by any
illness, bodily disorder, pains, or fears
about your health?’’ Id. at 6. Massey
checked the box for ‘‘none of the time.’’
Id.
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Mr. Mastridge did not testify in this
proceeding. Respondent did, however,
testify regarding this visit. In her
testimony, Respondent acknowledged
that at the time of the visit, Mr.
Mastridge was not authorized under
Florida law to dispense a controlled
substance. Tr. 641. Respondent
attempted to justify her conduct
testifying that she ‘‘was in the office,’’
that Mastridge ‘‘never saw the patient
alone,’’ and that ‘‘I was right there.’’ Id.
at 641–42. Respondent admitted,
however, that she was ‘‘[n]ot in the
same room’’ when Mastridge issued the
prescriptions for Lorcet, Soma, and a
new drug Xanax. Id. at 642.
The Third Undercover Visit
On May 12, 1999, Detective Jeff
Esterline of the Pinellas Sheriff’s Office
went to Respondent’s office to conduct
an undercover visit. Using the name Jeff
Scott, Esterline told Respondent that he
had recently moved from Iowa and that
he worked as an electrician’s helper.
Respondent asked Esterline what had
happened to his back. See Gov. Ex. 9,
at 1. Esterline told Respondent that he
had been referred by Chris Massey, that
Massey had seen her before, and had
‘‘said you were a good doctor to come
to.’’ Id. at 2. Respondent then told
Esterline to ‘‘[t]ell me about your pain.’’
Id. Esterline stated: ‘‘I don’t have any
pain really, I didn’t know if they would
let me in to talk to you if I didn’t tell
them something, so I don’t have any
pain, really.’’ Id. Esterline added that he
was taking four to five Vicodin a day.
Id. Respondent asked Esterline how he
got his drugs. Esterline stated that he
had been ‘‘getting them from a friend.’’
Id.
Respondent then told Esterline that
her clinic offered a detox program. Id.
She then asked, ‘‘you don’t have pain
but you are taking vicodin? Why were
you taking vicodin?’’ Id. After
Respondent repeated her question,
Esterline told her that he had ‘‘started
taking them quite a while ago’’ and that
he thought he ‘‘function[ed] a lot better
with them.’’ Id. at 3. When Respondent
asked if he got the drug from friends,
Esterline answered in the affirmative.
Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he
‘‘want[ed] to go to substance abuse
program or do you want to be
maintained on the vicodin?’’ Id.
Esterline answered that he would like to
remain on drugs as he felt like he
functioned ‘‘real well’’ while taking
them. Id.
Respondent then warned Esterline
that narcotics ‘‘are habit forming’’ and
can cause liver damage. Id. Esterline
responded that he didn’t think he had
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any problems and that he had started
taking them when his mother had died
a year and a half earlier. Id. He added
that ‘‘I feel, just feel like I function real
well with them’’ and ‘‘I don’t abuse
them.’’ Id.
Respondent then told Esterline: ‘‘you
don’t have to start if you don’t want to
be on vicodin’’ and ‘‘there is no reason
you should be on it.’’ Id. at 4. Esterline
responded that ‘‘I feel like I, I function
better,’’ and that ‘‘I don’t think I’m not
taking so many of them that I feel like
I have a real problem, but I just function
better, just keeps me even.’’ Id.
Respondent then stated that ‘‘[i]f you
didn’t get vicodin, you know, you know
it is okay, too, right?’’ Id. She added that
‘‘we don’t want to start you on some
narcotics that you don’t have to be on
it.’’ Id. Esterline responded that Massey
‘‘said that you know if I just was honest
with you that you know, that that you’d
helped him.’’ Id. Respondent then stated
that she thought she remembered
Massey but didn’t know. Id. Respondent
also told Esterline that her assistant Ben
Mastridge ‘‘can help you to get off
narcotics. He can do a methadone,
whatever.’’ Id.
Esterline replied that he ‘‘was just
hoping to get’’ Vicodin and again told
Respondent that he took three or four a
day. Id. Respondent advised Esterline
that drugs could be toxic, that he could
build up a tolerance to them and that
‘‘the more you take the more you need,’’
and then asked him if he was ‘‘willing
to take all these risks?’’ Id. Esterline
stated that he was and that the drug
helped him to ‘‘function better.’’ Id.
Respondent then referred to various
potential causes of pain. Esterline once
more stated that ‘‘I don’t really have any
problem, I don’t really have any pain,’’
and again added that ‘‘I feel like I
function better’’ when taking the drugs.
Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he
‘‘would like to start on the vicodin?’’ Id.
at 5. Esterline told Respondent ‘‘Yeah,
that’s what I was here for.’’ Id.
Respondent told Esterline to ‘‘[s]tart
with the four a day,’’ and that her
employee Ben Mastridge ‘‘can counsel
you with medication and narcotics and
everything.’’ Id.
Later on, Respondent stated ‘‘[s]o you
don’t want to come out to the narcotic
clinic, you know this is for the people
to come here so they don’t do drugs, you
know, and too, maybe I’m sympathetic
to the people that allow themselves to
slip into drugs.’’ Id. Respondent then
told Esterline that ‘‘narcotics are good
and bad,’’ and that ‘‘[y]ou don’t want to
get hooked on drugs.’’ Id. Esterline again
told Respondent that he did not think
that he was addicted, that he went to
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work every day, and that the drugs
made him ‘‘feel better.’’ Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he
had been on vicodin ‘‘for a while?’’ Id.
at 6. When Esterline answered ‘‘yes,’’
Respondent asked him if he could
‘‘confirm it’’ by bringing in ‘‘left over
[prescription] bottles’’ he had gotten
through other doctors. Id. Esterline told
her that he had ‘‘been having trouble
getting them for so long’’ and offered to
look at home for the bottles. See Id. at
6. Respondent then again told Esterline
that ‘‘[y]ou don’t want to make a new
habit’’ and get ‘‘hooked on drugs.’’ Id.
Esterline reassured Respondent that he
was not addicted. See Id.
Respondent then stated that she
would give him a prescription for 60
Vicodin ES with two refills and that the
drugs ‘‘should easily last you for 1
month.’’ Id. Respondent then suggested
that Esterline make an appointment to
see Mastridge. Id. She also told Esterline
that her clinic had a massage therapist
and a physical therapist and that ‘‘you
need to feel good-you’re taking it just to
feel good.’’ Id. at 7. Esterline paid $180
for the visit. Gov. Ex. 10.
The government entered into
evidence various patient records
pertaining to Detective Esterline’s visit.
Describing Esterline’s chief complaint,
the ‘‘History and Physical’’ record
states: ‘‘He has a terrible pain in his
neck. This started 11⁄2 years ago. Ever
since his mother’s death, he has had
ongoing pain. He does a lot of
construction work, wiring, etc., which
makes the condition worse.’’ Gov. Ex.
11, at 1. The entry for Esterline’s
Musculoskeletal system likewise states:
‘‘chronic pain.’’ Id.
The records also include a
questionnaire used by patients to report
their symptoms and other information
relevant in diagnosing and treating their
condition. The first question on the
form is ‘‘How long have you had this
pain?’’ Id. at 2. Esterline wrote ‘‘none.’’
The form also lists twenty-four
adjectives to describe pain and instructs
the patient to ‘‘circle all the words that
best describe your pain.’’ Id. Esterline
did not circle any word. See Id.
The form also contains front and back
representations of the human body, on
which patients are instructed to shade
the area where they have pain. See Id.
The forms have several small markings
in the area of the neck. Id. Detective
Esterline testified that he did not make
the markings. Tr. 58. Respondent
maintained that he did. Id. at 519.
Respondent testified that she
‘‘probably’’ ‘‘missed’’ Detective
Esterline’s answer of ‘‘none’’ to the
question ‘‘How long have you had
pain?’’ Tr. 523. She further testified that
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Esterline was not typical of the pain
patients she sees because ‘‘[h]e has a
soft tissue injury, neck pain. He didn’t
have any x-ray or MRI.’’ Id. She added
that a typical patient would be ‘‘a
construction worker, car accident
patient who had an MRI x-ray workup’’
and that Esterline hadn’t ‘‘had anything
done.’’ Id. at 524.
Respondent’s counsel then asked her
about Esterline’s statements that he
didn’t have any pain, that he had
indicated he did because he did not
think the office staff would let him in
otherwise, that he was taking four to
five Vicodin a day, and that he did so
because he functioned better when he
took them. Respondent testified that
‘‘some patients are very reluctant to
admit that they need Vicodin to control
their pain,’’ and that he was ‘‘taking
medications to be able to do his job.’’ Id.
at 526–27. Respondent also testified that
she believed that Respondent had
obtained his Vicodin through a lawful
prescription. Id. at 528. Respondent
further testified that she asked Esterline
what type of work he did ‘‘to find out
whether he’s having pain because of the
type of job he does,’’ and that
electricians (the job Esterline said he
had) commonly have neck pain. Id. at
529.
When asked on direct what Esterline
meant when he said ‘‘I don’t really have
any pain,’’ Respondent answered: ‘‘He’s
contradicting himself[,]’’ and that ‘‘he is
in pain, but when he takes medications
he doesn’t have any pain.’’ Id. at 530.
When asked whether Esterline had ‘‘in
any way exaggerated his symptoms?,’’
Respondent answered ‘‘No’’; when
asked whether he appeared to be honest,
Respondent answered ‘‘yes.’’ Id. at 531.
Respondent also testified that Esterline
did not seek more medication than he
was currently taking and that he seemed
like a patient who was seeking
treatment for chronic pain. Id. at 532.
Respondent admitted on crossexamination that she did not conduct a
physical examination on Esterline. Id. at
645. She also testified that her
handwritten notes for the physical exam
were based on what she ‘‘would have
done with a patient’’ with neck pain. Id.
at 533–34. She further admitted that it
was inappropriate to make these
notations. Id. at 534. She testified,
however, that she believed her
prescribing of controlled substances to
Esterline was within the standard of
care. Id. at 537.
Here, again, the ALJ, who personally
observed Respondent testify, found
disingenuous Respondent’s testimony
that she thought Esterline was not in
pain because he was taking medication.
See ALJ at 40. I agree and further note
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52153
that it is strange that a patient who is
‘‘honest,’’ does not ‘‘exaggerate his
symptoms,’’ told Respondent multiple
times that he did not have pain, and that
he took the drugs because they helped
him function better, would then be
disbelieved as to why he was taking the
drugs. Furthermore, while Respondent
testified that she believed Esterline had
obtained the drugs through a lawful
prescription, Esterline told her at least
twice that he had gotten them through
friends and that he had also been
‘‘having trouble getting them for so
long.’’ Finally, Respondent made several
incriminating statements such as when
she asked Esterline if he ‘‘want[ed] to go
to substance abuse program or do you
want to be maintained on the vicodin?,’’
and stated ‘‘maybe I’m sympathetic to
the people that allow themselves to slip
into drugs.’’
The Fourth Undercover Visit
On June 24, 1999, Detective Randall
Keys of the Tampa Police Department,5
using the name Ronald Briers, made an
undercover visit to Respondent’s office.
Respondent asked him if he had
abdominal pain. Gov. Ex. 12, at 1. Keys
told Respondent that he did not have
pain, but that he ‘‘had to put something
down on’’ the form. Id. Keys then added
that ‘‘[a] friend of mine suggested that
I come to talk to you about it.’’ Id.
Respondent asked: ‘‘About what?
Detox?’’ Id. Keys told Respondent, ‘‘I
need some * * * vicodin.’’ Id.
Respondent asked Keys why he
needed vicodin. Id. Keys answered,
‘‘Well it, basically it makes me feel
better. It just kind of takes the edge off.’’
Id. After discussing Keys’ job,
Respondent stated: ‘‘We do not give
drugs out to people. And now, if you
want to go to substance abuse program,
we have Ben [Mastridge] here for you.’’
Id. Denying that he was addicted, Keys
stated again that the drug ‘‘just kind of
helps me. Just—it just takes the edge
off.’’ Id.
After stating that she did not want ‘‘to
promote the intake of drugs,’’
Respondent asked Keys who had sent
him. Keys told her Chris Massey. Id. at
2. Respondent reiterated that ‘‘We don’t
want to give drugs out to people, you
know, and ruin our reputation.’’ Id.
Respondent then suggested that Keys try
her acupuncture program. Id.
Respondent declined, stating that he did
not ‘‘have any pain or anything like
that’’ and that he took the Vicodin
because ‘‘they just take the edge off.’’ Id.
Respondent and Keys discussed how
many he took a day. Id. Keys said three.
5 Detective Keys was then assigned to a DEA task
force. Tr. 70.
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Respondent then asked Keys where he
got the drug. Id. At first, Keys said that
he got it from a person, but when asked
how much he paid for it, Keys said it
was actually from ‘‘like a family
member who has a prescription.’’ Id. at
3. Respondent then told Keys that
‘‘[t]his is a real test for me’’ and ‘‘we
don’t want to give narcotics to like
creating drug use.’’ Id.
Thereupon, Respondent apparently
summoned Ben Mastridge to the
examining room. After again discussing
Chris Massey, Respondent briefed
Mastridge on Keys’ situation telling him
that Keys took ‘‘about 2 to 3 vicodin a
day’’ and that ‘‘now he’s wondering
whether we will be able to promote or
support his pain with the 3 Vicodin a
day.’’ Id. After telling Mastridge that
they had not discussed ‘‘[t]he issue of
people coming here asking for a drug,’’
Respondent then told Keys that ‘‘Ben is
our AR and he does my detoxification
for narcotics. He is the director for
narcotics program.’’ Id.
Shortly thereafter, Mastridge asked
Keys how many Vicodin he was taking
and how long had he been taking the
drug? Id. Keys answered that he usually
took about three and had been doing it
for six months. Id. Mastridge then asked
Keys whether the Vicodin had been
prescribed to him. Id. at 4. Keys
answered ‘‘no.’’ Id. Respondent then
told Keys that ‘‘we want to help people
with pain,’’ to which Keys responded
‘‘Right.’’ Id. Respondent then stated that
‘‘we don’t want to promote a drug
habit.’’ Id. Keys responded: ‘‘No, I
understand.’’ Id. Mastridge then told
Keys ‘‘[j]ust throwing pills at the
situation, that’s where people end up
taking—if they are taking 3 Vicodin a
day now, in 6 or 8 or 12 months they’re
taking 15 of them a day.’’ Id.
After discussing the need to provide
‘‘some sort of concurrent treatment to go
along with [the vicodin] to address the
source of the pain,’’ Id., Mastridge asked
‘‘is it muscle spasms that are actually
going on here?’’ Id. at 5. Respondent
interjected, ‘‘Pain, pain, you’re right.’’
Id. Mastridge continued stating: ‘‘What,
what’s the source of the pain? I guess
that’s what the ultimate question is.
And since you weren’t diagnosed by
anybody in primary care or anything.’’
Id. Respondent replied: ‘‘I guess he feels
no pain, he just feels better.’’ Id.
Mastridge then asked Keys, ‘‘You just
feel better?’’ Keys answered, ‘‘They just
kind of mellow you out I guess * * *
it makes me feel okay.’’ Id.
After discussing various treatments
available at her clinic, Respondent told
Keys that she was going to give him a
prescription for 60 vicodin, see Id, and
Mastridge told Keys that they would
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discuss his condition and ‘‘the best
course of treatment’’ during his next
visit. Id. Respondent then explained the
costs for the clinic’s various services
and added ‘‘[i]t’s a way of letting you
know * * * we will not be supporting
just a drug habit.’’ Id. at 6. Respondent
then told Keys that Ben ‘‘will write the
prescription for you too, He writes my
prescriptions. When you see him, you
don’t have to see me.’’ Id.
The government entered into
evidence various patient records
pertaining to Detective Keys’ visit. The
History and Physical record describes
the patient complaint as: ‘‘Ronald
Bryers presents to my office with lowback pain and anterior abdominal pain,
which is ongoing. He works as an
automobile detailer, getting under cars,
etc., and the constant physical labor
makes the pain worse. * * * He has had
this pain for the past several years.’’
Govt. Exh. 14, at 1.
The document also reports the results
of a physical exam. Under the
musculoskeletal heading, the record
states that ‘‘[m]inimal paralumbar
muscle spasm is noted, with minimal
facet tenderness.’’ Id. The report also
contains a diagnosis of ‘‘chronic lowback pain.’’ Id. Respondent admitted,
however, that she did not perform a
physical exam on Keys, Tr. 647, and
Keys testified that he did not believe
that he had discussed his medical
history with Respondent. Id. at 84.
Respondent testified that Detective
Keys was seeing her for abdominal and
lower back pain but that ‘‘[h]is history
was kind of not clear to me.’’ Id. at 541.
Moreover, Keys was a ‘‘very unusual’’
patient. Id. Respondent explained:
‘‘Patients come to me after being
diagnosed, after being treated. * * * I
wonder, what is he doing in my office
without being diagnosed and we don’t
want to be a clinic where we give out
medications for reasons not needed.’’ Id.
at 546.
Respondent testified that because she
‘‘didn’t feel right,’’ Id. at 541, she sought
out Mr. Mastridge to assist her in
evaluating Keys because of Mastridge’s
knowledge of substance abuse and
psychological problems. Respondent
testified that she thought that Mastridge
could help her diagnose whether Keys
was ‘‘taking medicine to control the
pain or for any behavioral problems.’’
Id. at 542.
Respondent testified that Keys’
statement that he took Vicodin because
it took ‘‘the edge off’’ meant that the
drug took the ‘‘[e]dge off the pain,’’ and
that the term ‘‘edge off’’ is commonly
used in the pain context. Id. at 544. As
for Keys’ statements that he didn’t have
pain, Respondent testified that she
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thought this was because he was ‘‘on
pain medication,’’ that ‘‘people do not
have to have the pain all the time,’’ and
that pain levels can fluctuate. Id. at 545.
She further stated that even though Keys
may not have had pain at the time of his
visit, ‘‘they wouldn’t come to my pain
clinic if [they] don’t have the pain.’’ Id.
Respondent also testified that when
she discussed with Mastridge doing
narcotics detoxification, she meant
‘‘medication reduction.’’ Id. at 549. She
further testified that when she told Keys
that ‘‘we want to help people with pain’’
and that ‘‘we don’t want to promote a
drug habit,’’ she understood Keys’
answers as meaning that he was in pain
and was agreeing to her proposed
treatment. Id.
Respondent admitted that because she
had not performed a physical exam, she
should not have filled out the form as
she did but maintained that the patient
record’s ‘‘history part is true.’’ Id. at 647.
Respondent testified that the physical
exam part of the record was ‘‘missing’’
‘‘because I went and got Ben [Mastridge]
because this patients [sic] were not my
true pain patients,’’ Id. at 647–48, and
that she had made it up ‘‘because of the
confused cases brought to me.’’ Id. at
648–49.
Respondent added: ‘‘I don’t see
patients like this at all in the office.
These are like the strange weirdos
coming to my office.’’ Id. at 648.
Respondent further testified that she
was ‘‘astonished to see patients like
[Keys] in the pain clinic’’ and that
‘‘[t]hese are not my typical pain
patients.’’ Id.
Respondent was then asked whether
it was within the standard of care in the
State of Florida to prescribe controlled
substances without performing a
physical exam. In response, Respondent
testified: ‘‘that’s what we learn when we
go to medical school. Take a history and
physical examination. Chronic pain,
these patients who are very difficult to
evaluate. Physical examination is part of
our job.’’ Id. at 650. Upon further
questioning Respondent added that
performing a physical exam ‘‘is the
standard of practice. That’s our Rule No.
1.’’ Id. at 651.
Respondent then denied, however,
that she had intentionally and
knowingly dispensed controlled
substances. See Id. at 652. She testified:
Intentionally I did not dispense
medication, I did not distribute outside of the
usual course of medical practice. In the
context of the clinical pain management, I
knew the medication not to transfer, not to
sell the drug to the street or anything. My
intention here is believe the patient, give
them the benefit of chronic pain, and
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evaluate them, and do what is appropriate for
them.
Id. at 652–53.
As with the other undercover visits,
the ALJ did not find credible
Respondent’s assertion that she
prescribed Vicodin to Keys because she
believed his use of the drug was the
reason he was not in pain. See ALJ Dec.
at 40. Again I agree. The transcript of
the visit provides substantial evidence
that Respondent knew that Keys was
seeking drugs for illegitimate use. Not
only did Keys state that he did not have
pain and that the drug took the ‘‘edge
off,’’ when Mastridge asked what the
source of Key’s pain was, Respondent
stated: ‘‘I guess he feels no pain, he just
feels better.’’ Shortly thereafter,
Respondent explained the costs for the
clinic’s various services and added that
‘‘we will not be supporting just a drug
habit.’’ Finally, I am perplexed as to
why if a patient is a ‘‘strange weirdo’’
and causes astonishment because he is
not a ‘‘typical pain patient,’’ a physician
would then proceed to write a
prescription for a controlled substance
without performing a physical exam as
required by ‘‘Rule No. 1.’’ 6
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The Expert Testimony
Both the Government and Respondent
introduced expert opinion evidence on
the subject of Respondent’s prescribing
practices. Dr. Daniel Frazier, M.D., of
Tampa, Florida, a Board Certified
Family Practice Physician with more
than thirty years of experience, and an
Assistant Clinical Professor of Family
Practice at the University of South
Florida (USF) College of Medicine,
reviewed the tapes and transcriptions of
the undercover visits. In a statement
dated February 1, 2001, Dr. Frazier
declared that ‘‘[i]t is inappropriate to
prescribe pain medication in
uncontrolled environments,’’ and that
‘‘[t]he physician must determine the
level of pain that he/she is treating by
means of examination and discussion
with the patient.’’ Gov. Exh. 16. Dr.
Frazier further stated that ‘‘the
physician must closely monitor the
patient to see that there is a medical
need’’ for a controlled substance. Id.
Dr. Frazier concluded that
Respondent ‘‘was not in control of the
patients; the patients were in control of’’
her. Id. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he patients
actively sought pain pills for nonappropriate reasons and the patients
were given the pain medication without
6 I acknowledge that in December 1999, the
investigators attempted an additional undercover
visit. Respondent’s receptionist refused to admit the
officer because he did not have a referral. See Resp.
Ex. 46.
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examination or significant review of
their symptoms. Such care on the part
of the physician constitutes
inappropriate medical treatment[,]’’ and
‘‘a failure to appropriately practice
medicine within the acceptable
standard of care.’’ Id. I credit Dr.
Frazier’s statement.
The government also submitted the
statement of Rafael Miguel, M.D. At the
time of his review, Dr. Miguel was a
Professor and Interim Chairman of the
Department of Anesthesiology, as well
as the Director of the Pain Management
Program at the USF College of Medicine.
Dr. Miguel clearly states that he
reviewed the medical records,
transcripts of the undercover visits, and
Respondent’s pre-hearing statements.
Gov. Exh. 18, at 1.7 Dr. Miguel stated
that ‘‘[t]here is no currently accepted
therapeutic use of opioids but for the
relief of pain. Administering opioids to
patients with no pain is inappropriate
and clearly constitutes practice below
the standard of care.’’ Gov. Exh. 18, at
2.
Dr. Miguel observed that ‘‘[i]f the
concern was that patients were drug
abusers and the intent was to wean
them from opioids, this should have
been done in an addiction treatment
facility with trained personnel. * * *
Addiction is a complex problem and
physical dependence is a small part of
the pathophysiology of the disease.’’ Id.
Dr. Miguel further explained that
‘‘[p]rescribing opioids to known addicts
is inappropriate and clearly constitutes
practice below the standard of care.’’ Id.
Finally, Dr. Miguel discussed
Respondent’s failure to perform
physical exams and record keeping
practices. According to Dr. Miguel, ‘‘the
documentation does not concur with the
reported complaints. While the reported
complaints did not include pain, high
levels of pain interfering with daily life
were documented. This was apparently
done to justify the opioid
prescriptions.’’ Id. Dr. Miguel also stated
that ‘‘[i]t does not appear that the
patients were physically examined, yet
there is documentation of heart and
lung sounds, abdominal palpitation,
even paracervical muscle spasms and
decreased range of motion in joints
impossible to assess without a physical
exam.’’ Id. Dr. Miguel concluded that
‘‘[t]his may constitute medical fraud and
is clearly practice below the standard of
7 I note and reject Respondent’s contention that
the ALJ did not know what Dr. Miguel based his
opinion on. See Resp. Br. 39–40. The factual basis
for Dr. Miguel’s opinion is clear from his statement.
See Gov. Exh. 18, at 1. Moreover, Respondent could
have sought to subpoena Dr. Miguel to testify if
there was any dispute as to the factual basis of his
opinion. 21 CFR 1316.52(d). She did not.
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care.’’ Id. I likewise credit Dr. Miguel’s
statement.
Respondent introduced a statement of
Walter E. Afield, M.D., a psychiatrist.
Dr. Afield stated that he had reviewed
Dr. Frazier’s statement and was ‘‘not in
agreement.’’ Resp. Ex. 55. He asserted
that ‘‘based on statements made to the
doctor, there are sufficient reasons for
prescribing the medications in
question.’’ Id. In Dr. Afield’s opinion,
Respondent ‘‘felt these patients were
dependent on these medications to
function and were functioning and that
they needed to be placed in a medically
supervised program to detoxify the
patients and find alternative treatments
for them.’’ Id. Dr. Afield further stated
that his ‘‘[r]eview of the entire record of
the patient indicates those medicines
were given within the parameters of her
specialty.’’ Id.
I agree with the ALJ’s declination to
credit Dr. Afield’s statement for several
reasons. First, while Dr. Afield has had
a distinguished career in psychiatry, it
is not clear what expertise he has in the
area of pain management or the general
diagnosis and treatment of physical
injuries. If his opinion was offered as an
expert in treating addiction, I note that
Respondent maintained repeatedly that
she prescribed the drugs to all three
patients because she believed the
patients were in pain and not because
she was treating an addiction.
Second, his opinion is vague and it is
not clear whether he viewed
Respondent’s prescribing to be
appropriate because the patients were in
pain or because they were addicted.
Indeed, to the extent Dr. Afield’s
statement that ‘‘the patients were
dependent on these medications to
function’’ and that the patients ‘‘needed
to be placed in a medically supervised
program to detoxify them,’’ was
intended to suggest that Respondent’s
prescribing was appropriate because the
patients were addicted, it is clearly
wrong because the CSA prohibits the
prescribing of controlled substances for
this purpose. See 26 CFR 1306.04(c) (‘‘A
prescription may not be issued for the
dispensing of narcotic drugs listed in
any schedule for ‘detoxification
treatment’ or ‘maintenance
treatment.’ ’’). DEA’s regulations make
clear that a physician who is not
registered to conduct a narcotics
treatment program may administer, but
not prescribe, ‘‘not more than one day’s
medication’’ of narcotics for up to three
days to a person suffering ‘‘acute
withdrawal systems when necessary
while arrangements are being made for
referral for treatment.’’ 26 CFR
1306.07(b). A physician cannot,
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however, issued a prescription for this
purpose.
Third, to the extent he believed that
Respondent prescribing was appropriate
because the undercover operatives were
in pain, Dr. Afield stated that he
‘‘review[ed] the entire record of the
patient.’’ Id. It is undisputed, however,
that Respondent falsified the medical
records of the three undercover
operatives and there is nothing in the
statement that suggests that Dr. Afield
relied on non-falsified records. An
expert opinion based on falsified
records is obviously not probative of the
issues.
Fourth, Dr. Afield’s statement does
not address why it would be appropriate
to prescribe a controlled substance
without performing a physical exam.
This is especially noteworthy in light of
Respondent’s acknowledgement that
performing a physical exam is ‘‘Rule 1.’’
Respondent also called as a witness
Robert A Guskiewicz, M.D. Dr.
Guskiewicz is the Director of the Pain
Fellowship Program and a Clinical
Assistant Professor in the Department of
Anesthesiology, University of Florida
College of Medicine. Resp. Exh. 57. Dr.
Guskiewciz also served as the court
monitor under the pre-trial diversion
agreement.
Dr. Guskiewicz testified that in his
opinion Respondent had legitimately
prescribed controlled substances to all
three undercover visitors. Tr. 813. He
further testified that his opinion was
based on the indications of pain on the
patient questionnaires that were
completed by the undercover visitors.
Id. at 814. Dr. Guskiewicz added that
Massey had indicated that ‘‘he did have
pain in the past,’’ and that the
medications he had used had ‘‘helped to
improve his function in doing his job.’’
Id. He also testified that the same was
true for the patients portrayed by
Detectives Esterline and Keys. Dr.
Guskiewicz stated that while ‘‘[t]here
was some vagueness,’’ he could
determine that the medications had
helped these patients improve their
functionality. Id. at 815. Dr. Guskiewicz
also testified that he teaches his
students to ‘‘give the patient the benefit
of the doubt,’’ Id. at 824, but to provide
them with a ‘‘limited supply of
medications’’ such as either a two-week
or one-month supply, and to ‘‘do our
due diligence.’’ Id. at 825.
On cross-examination, Dr. Guskiewicz
was asked ‘‘[w]hat is required of a
physician who wanted to establish a
course of treatment?’’ Id. at 818. Dr.
Guskiewicz answered: ‘‘[p]hysical
examination, assessment and
diagnosis.’’ Id. Later in the crossexamination, Dr. Guskiewicz was asked
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a series of questions related to whether
he knew that Respondent had made up
the part of the record that supposedly
were the findings of a physical exam.
One of the questions was whether it was
‘‘outside of the practice in the state of
Florida’’ to falsify a patient record. See
Id. at 827. Dr. Guskiewicz testified that
‘‘[n]ot performing the examination
would not be outside the practice, but
saying you performed the examination
when you did not would be.’’ Id. Dr.
Guskiewicz acknowledged, however,
that the assumption that a person comes
to a pain management clinic because
they are in pain does not relieve a
physician from the responsibilities of
performing a physical exam and
inquiring into the patient’s medical
history. Id. at 829.
The ALJ declined to credit Dr.
Guskiewicz’s opinion that Respondent
had properly prescribed controlled
substances. I likewise decline to credit
Dr. Guskiewicsz’s opinion on this point.
As an initial matter, I note that Dr.
Guskiewicsz’s opinion was based, in
part, on the fact that Massey had
indicated that he had ‘‘pain in the past.’’
But Massey also stated that he had had
shoulder surgery four and a half years
ago and that the ‘‘problem was more or
less cured.’’ Thus, Massey’s statements
do not provide an adequate basis for
concluding that a patient is still in pain,
or would be in pain but for the taking
of a controlled substance.
Indeed, I note that Respondent did
not do ‘‘due diligence’’ by performing a
physical exam even when she admitted
that the undercover patients were ‘‘not
typical’’ or were ‘‘strange weirdos.’’
Furthermore, Dr. Guskiewicz
eventually, although apparently with
some reluctance, conceded that it is
essential to perform a physical exam
before prescribing a controlled
substance. Thus, Dr. Guskiewicz
appears to have rendered his opinion on
direct examination regarding
Respondent’s prescribing to the
undercover patients without
considering material facts.
Other Evidence
I note that Respondent did comply
with the terms of the pre-trial diversion
agreement and that the United States
Attorney dismissed the indictment. I
also note that Respondent retained the
services of a private investigation firm
to review her patient records and
determine which patients were likely
substance abusers and should be
discharged from her practice. I also note
that the private investigation firm
developed procedures to address, and
trained Respondent’s employees in,
such matters as spotting drug abusers,
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doctor shopping, failed drug tests,
claims of lost, stolen or destroyed
medications, prescription fraud and
forgery, and patients with a drug-related
criminal history. The private
investigation firm conducted criminal
history checks on more than 500 people
and interviewed nearly 280 patients and
their associates. I further acknowledge
that one of Respondent’s private
investigators testified that prescription
drug abusers would target foreign
doctors, that they would provide forged
medical records such as MRI reports,
and that most of the patients he
interviewed admitted to lying to
Respondent to obtain narcotics. I note,
however, that none of the undercover
operatives used false records to induce
Respondent to prescribe to them and
that none of them claimed to be in pain.
Respondent testified that she had
discharged or not accepted ‘‘may be in
the hundreds’’ of patients. Id. at 426.
She also testified that she stopped presigning prescriptions and that she was
no longer accepting patients without a
referral. Id. at 470.
Finally, Respondent called several
patients to testify on her behalf. In
general, the patients testified that
Respondent’s treatments had greatly
helped them to control their pain and
had helped them improve their
functionality. Respondent also
submitted numerous letters from
patients that were to similar effect.
Discussion
Respondent’s Challenges to the
Proceeding
Before analyzing this case under the
public interest factors, see 21 U.S.C.
823(f), I note that Respondent has raised
several challenges to DEA’s authority to
bring this proceeding. Therefore, I will
address these claims to determine
whether any of them have merit.
Respondent’s first contention is that
this proceeding ‘‘violates the plain
terms, meaning and understanding of
the’’ pre-trial diversion agreement she
entered into with the United States
Attorney. Resp. Br. 72. In particular,
Respondent asserts that ‘‘the
Government agreed that it would
dismiss the charges against
[Respondent] (assuming [her]
compliance with the [a]greement) and
that she would continue to practice pain
management including the prescribing
of Schedule II–V controlled
substances.’’ Id. at 71. Respondent thus
contends that this proceeding violates
‘‘the understanding that Dr. Iyer would
continue to practice pain management
and to prescribe’’ controlled substances.
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I disagree. Nothing in the plain
language of the agreement manifests the
government’s assent that Respondent
would be able to continue prescribing
controlled substances without being
held to account by DEA, or purports to
waive DEA’s authority to seek the
revocation of her registration. See Resp.
Exh. 52. Nor is there any merit to
Respondent’s contention that this
proceeding violates the understanding
of the parties. Respondent got exactly
what she bargained for—a dismissal of
the federal indictment. Immunity from a
DEA revocation proceeding was not part
of the deal. Beyond that, the United
States does not waive its sovereign
authority by implication. Cf. United
States v. Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma,
480 U.S. 700, 707 (1987) (‘‘[A] waiver of
sovereign authority will not be implied
but instead must be ‘surrendered in
unmistakable terms.’ ’’) (quoting Bowen
v. Public Agencies Opposed To Social
Security Entrapment, 477 U.S. 41, 52
(1986) (int. quotations and other citation
omitted)).
Furthermore, a United States Attorney
does not have authority to bind the Drug
Enforcement Administration from
instituting proceedings seeking the
revocation of a registration under the
Controlled Substances Act. As the
Eleventh Circuit has observed in a case
involving the INS, which was then a
sister agency of DEA in the Department
of Justice, ‘‘Congress did not expressly
grant the United States Attorney
authority to bind the INS, or any other
governmental agency.’’ San Pedro v.
United States, 79 F.3d 1065, 1069 (11th
Cir. 1996).
Rather, Congress vested the authority
to revoke a registration in the Attorney
General, see 21 U.S.C. 823(f) & 824(a),
and this authority has been delegated
exclusively to the Administrator and
Deputy Administrator of DEA. 28 CFR
0.100(b) & 0.104. Therefore, a United
States Attorney cannot enter into either
a pre-trial diversion agreement or a plea
bargain that binds DEA from instituting
revocation proceedings without DEA’s
express written authorization. See
United States v. Fitzhugh, 801 F.2d
1432, 1434–35 (DC Cir. 1986) (rejecting
contention that plea agreement
implicitly prohibited DEA proceeding
noting that AUSA lacked authority to
bind DEA); Noell v. Bensinger, 586 F.2d
554, 559 (1978) (‘‘Neither the prosecutor
nor the district court * * * had the
authority to speak for the’’ DEA.); Cf.
San Pedro, 79 F.3d at 1069–70; United
States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 444 (3d
Cir. 1997) (‘‘[T]he United States
Attorney’s Office lacks the authority to
make a promise pertaining to
deportation in the prosecution of a
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criminal matter that will bind INS
without its express authorization.’’).
Respondent’s estoppel arguments
based on the diversion agreement are
equally unpersuasive. Respondent
asserts that DEA is estopped from
seeking the revocation of her
registration because she ‘‘relied on the
government’s representations in the
* * * Diversion Agreement that it was
in the interest of the United States and
in the interest of justice that she
continue to practice pain management
and to prescribe narcotics.’’ Resp. Br.
72. Respondent further contends that
‘‘[i]f she had known that the
Government would seek to revoke her
DEA Certificate, she would not have
given up her right to a speedy trial and
would not have entered the Pretrial
Diversion Program.’’ Id.
As an initial matter, I note that the
diversion agreement’s ‘‘interest of the
United States’’ language is part of the
standard diversion agreement form,
which is used for a wide variety of
federal crimes, and is thus boiler plate.
The language is clearly not a reference
to the ‘‘public interest’’ standard that
Congress had directed me to apply in
administering the CSA.
More importantly, it well settled that
the United States ‘‘may not be estopped
on the same terms as any other litigant.’’
Heckler v. Community Health Services
of Crawford Cty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 60
(1984). But ‘‘even assuming that the
Government is ever subject to estoppel,
a ‘private party surely cannot prevail
without at least demonstrating that the
traditional elements of an estoppel are
present.’ ’’ Lyng v. Payne, 476 U.S. 926,
935 (1986) (quoting Heckler, 467 U.S. at
61). Most significantly, the Supreme
Court has explained that ‘‘[a]n essential
element of any estoppel is detrimental
reliance on the adverse party’s
misrepresentations.’’ Id. (citing Heckler,
467 U.S. at 59).
Here, Respondent has produced no
evidence of affirmative misconduct by
the government that induced her to
enter into the diversion agreement.
Indeed, it would be strange to make
such an argument in light of the fact that
Respondent was represented in the
criminal proceeding by a former United
States Attorney for the Middle District
of Florida (See Resp. Exh. 64), who was
presumably well aware of the limits on
a United States Attorney’s power to
bind an agency such as DEA and the
Eleventh Circuit’s case law holding that
a United States Attorney has no such
authority. See San Pedro, 79 F.3d at
1069–70. Thus, even if the United States
Attorney had made a representation that
DEA would not seek to revoke her
registration, it would have been
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unreasonable for Respondent to rely on
it.
Moreover, Respondent has not
established detrimental reliance because
Respondent cannot show that she is
worse off for having accepted pre-trial
diversion. Even if Respondent had gone
to trial and been acquitted, DEA could
still have sought to revoke her
registration. See United States v. One
Assortment of 89 Firearms, 465 U.S.
354, 359–62 (1984). As the Court
explained therein: ‘‘an acquittal on
criminal charges does not prove that the
defendant is innocent; it merely proves
the existence of a reasonable doubt as to
his guilt.’’ Id. at 361.
A jury verdict in a criminal action
does ‘‘not negate the possibility that a
preponderance of the evidence could
show that’’ one had engaged in illegal
activity. Id. at 362. Thus, ‘‘it is clear that
the difference in the relative burdens of
proof in * * * criminal and civil
actions precludes the application of the
doctrine of collateral estoppel.’’ Id. See
also Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391,
397 (1938) (‘‘That acquittal on a
criminal charge is not a bar to a civil
action by the Government, remedial in
its nature, arising out of the same facts
on which the criminal proceeding was
based has long been settled.’’). Thus,
Respondent’s estoppel contentions are
meritless.
Finally, Respondent argues that this
proceeding violates the Due Process
Clause because it is vindictive and was
initiated to retaliate against her for
exercising various rights including her
right to complain about governmental
conduct. See Resp. Br. 81. There is,
however, ‘‘a presumption of regularity’’
that supports prosecutorial decisionmaking, and where probable cause
exists the decision to bring a charge
‘‘generally rests entirely’’ in the
prosecutor’s ‘‘discretion.’’ United States
v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)
(int. quotations and citations omitted);
see also Hartman v. Moore, 126 S.Ct.
1695, 1699 (2006) (plaintiff in
retaliatory prosecution action must
plead and prove a lack of probable
cause).
Here, there clearly was probable cause
to believe that Respondent had
committed several violations of the
Controlled Substances Act and that her
continued registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
The grand jury’s indictment of
Respondent provides an independent
determination of probable cause
although such a determination is not
required to initiate a show cause
proceeding. Moreover, the evidence in
this case clearly establishes probable
cause.
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Finally, as far as any claim that the
proceeding was brought to retaliate
against Respondent for complaining
about the conduct of a DEA employee,
the decision to initiate a Show Cause
Proceeding is made by senior officials at
DEA headquarters and not by field
personnel. Respondent has not come
forward with any objective evidence
that established that this proceeding
was brought to retaliate against her.8 I
thus find this contention unpersuasive
as well.
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The Public Interest Factors
The Controlled Substances Act
provides that a practitioner’s
registration ‘‘may be suspended or
revoked * * * upon a finding that the
registrant * * * has committed such
acts as would render [her] registration
* * * inconsistent with the public
interest.’’ 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(4). In making
this determination, the Act requires that
I consider the following factors:
(1) The recommendation of the
appropriate State licensing board or
professional disciplinary authority.
(2) The applicant’s experience in
dispensing * * * controlled substances.
(3) The applicant’s conviction record
under Federal or State laws relating to
the manufacture, distribution, or
dispensing of controlled substances.
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to
controlled substances.
(5) Such other conduct which may
threaten the public health and safety.
Id. § 823(f).
‘‘These factors are considered in the
disjunctive.’’ John H. Kennedy, M.D., 71
FR 35705, 35708 (2006); Robert A.
Leslie, M.D., 68 FR 15227, 15230 (2003).
I ‘‘may rely on any one or a combination
of factors, and may give each factor the
weight I deem appropriate in
determining whether a registration
should be revoked.’’ Leslie, 68 FR at
15230. In this matter, I have considered
the entire record including the evidence
of Respondent’s efforts to improve her
practice’s procedures. Nonetheless, I
remain deeply troubled by Respondent’s
disingenuous insistence that she had a
8 Respondent’s further contention that the
proceeding was brought to penalize her for having
successfully completed the pre-trial diversion
agreement is also unpersuasive. Given that
Respondent had been indicted for multiple
violations of the CSA, and that one of the grounds
for revoking a registration is that a registrant has
been convicted of a felony under the CSA or any
other federal law relating to controlled substances,
see 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2), it makes sense to delay the
administrative proceeding until the criminal case
has been resolved. A Show Cause Proceeding based
on a felony conviction typically takes far less than
the four days of hearings that it took to litigate this
case and requires substantially less in terms of
agency resources.
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legitimate medical purpose for
prescribing the controlled substances to
each of the undercover operatives. I
therefore conclude that revocation of
Respondent’s registration is necessary to
protect the public interest.
Factor One—The Recommendation of
the State Medical Board
It is undisputed that the Florida state
authorities did not suspend or revoke
Respondent’s state medical license. This
factor thus supports a finding that
Respondent’s continued registration
would be in the public interest. It is
well established, however, that a ‘‘state
license is a necessary, but not a
sufficient condition for [DEA]
registration,’’ and thus the fact that
Respondent retains her state license is
not dispositive. Kennedy, 71 FR at
35708.
Factor Two—Respondent’s Experience
in Handling Controlled Substances
For the reasons stated above in the
findings section, I agree with the ALJ
that in each of the undercover visits,
Respondent violated federal law and
DEA regulations by prescribing
controlled substances without a
legitimate medical purpose. See 21 CFR
1306.04(a). As the ALJ found,
Respondent’s contention that she
prescribed controlled substances to each
of the three operatives because she
believed that their taking the drugs was
the reason they were not in pain is
disingenuous. Indeed, as explained
above, Respondent’s testimony was
frequently inconsistent or implausible.
Moreover, in each case she failed to
conduct a physical exam and falsified
medical records.
For example, Respondent testified
that she thought Chris Massey was
honest. Yet she prescribed controlled
substances to him notwithstanding that
he told her repeatedly that he was not
in pain. Furthermore, Respondent made
several statements to Massey that
indicate that she knew he was seeking
the drugs to abuse them. Massey also
told her that his girlfriend had been the
source of his drugs.
The same can be said about
Respondent’s conduct and testimony
regarding Detective Esterline’s visit.
Respondent testified that Esterline was
‘‘honest’’ and did not ‘‘exaggerate his
symptoms.’’ Notwithstanding that
Esterline told her several times that he
did not have pain, that he took the drugs
because they helped him function, and
told her twice that he got the drugs from
friends, Respondent nonetheless gave
him a prescription for a controlled
substance. Here, again Respondent
made several incriminating statements,
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such as when she asked Esterline
whether he wanted ‘‘to go to [a]
substance abuse program’’ or ‘‘be
maintained on the Vicodin?,’’ and when
she stated ‘‘maybe I’m sympathetic to
the people that allow themselves to slip
into drugs.’’ In short, Respondent knew
that Esterline was seeking the drugs to
abuse them and not to treat pain.
Detective Keys told Respondent that
he did not have pain and at one point
during the visit, Respondent stated to
Mr. Mastridge that ‘‘I guess he feels no
pain, he just feels better.’’ Keys also told
Respondent that he was getting the
drugs from non-legitimate sources.
Respondent also made several other
incriminating statements such as when
she told Keys that ‘‘we will not be
supporting just a drug habit.’’
Respondent further violated federal
law and DEA regulations by giving Ben
Mastridge pre-signed prescriptions and
allowing him to issue them to a patient
she had not attended to. While I agree
with the ALJ that this conduct of
Respondent violated 21 CFR 1306.05(a),
see ALJ Dec. at 42, this is not simply a
matter of prescription forms being
improperly completed.
The record makes clear that Mastridge
was not authorized under Florida law to
prescribe controlled substances. See Tr.
641–42. He was therefore without
authority to prescribe under the CSA
and, of course, was not registered to do
so. See 21 U.S.C. 823(f); 21 CFR
1306.03. Nonetheless, Mastridge issued
prescriptions under Respondent’s
signature for two controlled substances,
Lorcet and Xanax. Significantly, he
exercised independent medical
judgment by decreasing the dosage of
Massey’s Lorcet prescription and by
giving him a prescription for a new
drug, Xanax, which he stated was for
the purpose of taking ‘‘the edge off of
bringing the coke down.’’
Indeed, there is substantial evidence
in the record that Respondent delegated
her prescribing authority to Mastridge.
This includes Respondent’s statement to
Det. Keys that Ben ‘‘will write
prescriptions for you too, He writes my
prescriptions. When you see him, you
don’t have to see me.’’ See Gov. Exh. 12,
at 6. Moreover, when Massey stated to
Mastridge that ‘‘I thought that the
Doctor had to fill the prescription out
and sign it,’’ Mastridge replied ‘‘no,’’
and added that ‘‘as long as she is in the
building I am being supervised and
* * * I can do anything that she can do
because she signs her name to the
treatment agreement.’’ See Gov. Exh. 6,
at 13.
While DEA’s regulations authorize ‘‘a
secretary or agent’’ to prepare a
prescription form for the practitioner’s
E:\FR\FM\01SEN1.SGM
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signature, 21 CFR 1306.05(a), the CSA
does not authorize a practitioner to
delegate her authority to prescribe a
controlled substance to another
employee. Respondent clearly delegated
her authority to prescribe controlled
substances to Mastridge, who lacked
authority to prescribe a controlled
substance. This constitutes a serious
violation of the Act. See United States
v. Singh, 390 F.3d 168, 184–87 (2d Cir.
2004) (affirming criminal conviction of
physician for aiding and abetting illegal
distribution of controlled substances
where physician gave pre-signed blank
prescription pads to nurses, who
although not authorized to prescribe,
wrote patients prescriptions for
controlled substances).9
Factor Three—Respondent’s Conviction
Record
It is undisputed that Respondent has
never been convicted of violating any
federal or State law relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing
of controlled substances. While this
factor is not dispositive, it does support
a finding that Respondent’s continued
registration would not be inconsistent
with the public interest.
Factor Four—Respondent’s Compliance
With Applicable Federal, State, or Local
Controlled Substances Laws
As explained above under factor two,
Respondent violated 21 U.S.C. 829(b),
and 21 CFR 1306.04, when she
prescribed controlled substances
without a legitimate medical purpose to
the undercover operatives. While I agree
with the ALJ that Respondent’s presigning of prescriptions violated 21 CFR
1306.05(a), I further find that
Respondent violated Federal law by
giving the prescription forms to Mr.
Mastridge and delegating to him the
authority to prescribe controlled
substances when he was not registered
to do so under Federal law and could
sroberts on PROD1PC70 with NOTICES
9 Respondent
asserts that her conduct in presigning prescriptions ‘‘was not willful or knowing,
but was done in good faith and only after advising
the nurse first of the parameters of the
prescription.’’ Resp. Br. 62. Respondent did not,
however, testify that she met with Mastridge and
discussed what controlled substances Mastridge
was to prescribe for Massey on the April 22nd visit.
Respondent’s testimony contains only vague
generalities on the subject of Mastridge’s
prescribing. See Tr. 469–72.
As for Respondent’s contention that she believed
in good faith that it was legal to do so, there are
numerous DEA final orders sanctioning registrants
for engaging in this practice. See, e.g., Walter S.
Gresham, M.D., 57 FR 44213, 44214 (1992);
Maimoona Hakim Husain, M.D., 54 FR 16173,
16174 (1989); William T. McPhail, M.D., 53 FR
47275, 47276 (1988); Richard T. Robinson, M.D., 53
FR 15153, 15154 (1988); James Beale, M.D., 53 FR
15149, 15150 (1988). I therefore reject Respondent’s
contention.
VerDate Aug<31>2005
16:21 Aug 31, 2006
Jkt 208001
not lawfully prescribe them under State
law. See 21 CFR 1306.03(a). This factor
thus supports a finding that
Respondent’s continued registration
would be inconsistent with the public
interest.
Factor Five—Other Conduct Which May
Threaten Public Health and Safety
As I recently held, DEA precedents
establish that ‘‘an applicant’s
acceptance of responsibility for [her]
prior misconduct is a highly relevant
consideration under this factor.’’
Kennedy, 71 FR35709; see also Barry H.
Brooks, 66 FR 18305, 18309 (2001);
Prince George Daniels, D.D.S., 60 FR
62884, 62887 (1995); Carmel BenEliezer, M.D., 58 FR 65400, 65401
(1993). Here, the ALJ found that
Respondent had refused to accept
responsibility for her misconduct in
prescribing controlled substances to the
three undercover visitors when there
was no legitimate medical purpose for
doing so. See ALJ Dec. at 43.
I recognize that Respondent admitted
that she should not have given presigned prescription forms to Mr.
Mastridge, that she should have
performed a physical exam on the
patients, and that she should not have
created false records. Respondent,
however, persisted in maintaining that
she had validly prescribed controlled
substances to the undercover operatives.
For example, when cross-examined
about whether she had knowingly and
intentionally distributed a controlled
substance to Detective Keys,
Respondent insisted that she had not.
When asked whether she had
committed this offense she testified:
‘‘No, it says here, did knowingly. No,
it’s not true. Patients come to us in
chronic pain. I assume they have pain.’’
Tr. 652. Respondent further testified
that:
Intentionally I did not dispense
medication, I did not distribute outside of the
usual course of medical practice. In the
context of the clinical pain management, I
knew the medication [was] not to transfer,
not to sell the drug to the street or anything.
My intention here is believe the patient, give
them the benefit of chronic pain, and
evaluate them, and do what is appropriate for
them.
Id.
I am deeply troubled by Respondent’s
testimony and her evident
misapprehension of a registrant’s
obligations under the CSA. Contrary to
Respondent’s understanding, a
practitioner violates the Act by
prescribing a controlled substance
without a legitimate medical purpose. It
is no less a violation that the ‘‘patient’’
PO 00000
Frm 00108
Fmt 4703
Sfmt 4703
52159
will personally use the drug rather than
sell it on the street.
I recognize the substantial measures
undertaken by Respondent to reform her
practice. But in the case of a
practitioner, the most important control
against diversion is the individual
registrant herself. When the individual
registrant’s conduct is the source of the
problem, and that registrant refuses to
acknowledge her responsibilities under
the law, all of the aforementioned
reforms will still not adequately protect
public health and safety.
Therefore, I conclude that factor five
supports a finding that Respondent’s
continued registration would threaten
public health and safety and indeed,
that this factor is dispositive in
determining that her continued
registration is inconsistent with the
public interest.
Order
Accordingly, pursuant to the
authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C.
823(f) and 824(a)(4), as well as 28 CFR
0.100(b) and 0.104, I hereby order that
DEA Certificate of Registration, No.
AK2006648, issued to Respondent
Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D., be, and it
hereby is, revoked. I further order that
any pending applications for renewal or
modification of such registration be, and
they hereby are, denied. This order is
effective October 2, 2006.
Dated: August 22, 2006.
Michele M. Leonhart,
Deputy Administrator.
[FR Doc. E6–14568 Filed 8–31–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410–09–P
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
Nashville Wholesale Company, Inc.;
Denial of Application
On July 12, 2005, the Deputy
Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Nashville Wholesale
Company, Inc., (Respondent) of
Nashville and Memphis, Tennessee. The
Show Cause Order proposed to deny
Respondent’s pending application for
registration as a non-retail distributor of
List I chemicals on the ground that
Respondent’s registration would be
inconsistent with the public interest.
See 21 U.S.C. 823(h); Show Cause Order
at 1.
The Show Cause Order specifically
alleged that Respondent, through its
owner Nael Abodabba, submitted an
application to distribute
pseudoephedrine, a List I chemical
E:\FR\FM\01SEN1.SGM
01SEN1
Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 170 (Friday, September 1, 2006)]
[Notices]
[Pages 52148-52159]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-14568]
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Drug Enforcement Administration
[Docket No. 03-8]
Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D.; Revocation of Registration
Introduction and Procedural History
On October 17, 2002, the Deputy Assistant Administrator, Office of
Diversion Control, Drug Enforcement Administration, issued an Order to
Show Cause to Jayam Krishna-Iyer, M.D. (Respondent), of Clearwater,
Florida. The Show Cause Order proposed to revoke Respondent's DEA
certification of registration, No. AK2006648, as a practitioner on the
grounds that Respondent had committed acts which rendered her continued
registration inconsistent with the public interest. See 21 U.S.C.
824(a)(4). The Show Cause Order also proposed to deny any applications
for renewal or modification of her registration.
The Show Cause Order alleged that between March 24, 1999, and June
24, 1999, the Pinellas County, Florida, Sheriff's Office had conducted
four undercover visits to Respondent's medical office. In essence, the
Show Cause Order alleged that during three of the visits, Respondent
had met with three different undercover operatives who had told her
that they were not currently in pain but that they were users of
various controlled substances such as Lorcet and Vicodin. See Show
Cause Order at 2-3. The Show Cause Order further alleged that
Respondent had issued prescriptions for controlled substances without
performing a physical exam. See Id. The Show Cause Order alleged that
Respondent had indicated in the patient records for each undercover
operative that they had complained of pain when each had ``clearly
stated that they were not in pain.'' Id. at 3. The Order also alleged
that that Respondent had told the undercover operatives that she could
offer them a detox program or could ``arrange an appropriate treatment
plan.'' Id. at 3.
The Show Cause Order further alleged that on the second visit of
one of the undercover operatives, the operative had been seen by a
nurse practitioner, Ben Mastridge. While Mastridge told him that
Respondent would not prescribe narcotics if the operative was not in
pain, he nonetheless issued him a prescription, which had been pre-
signed by Respondent, for Lorcet, Xanax, and Soma. See Id. at 2. The
Order further alleged that Mastridge had offered ``to initiate
Methadone
[[Page 52149]]
treatment, but the [operative] preferred simply to attempt to reduce
his Lorcet addiction.'' Id.
Based on the above, the Show Cause Order alleged that Respondent
had ``prescribed controlled substances without a legitimate medical
purpose in violation of Federal law.'' Id. at 4. The Show Cause Order
further alleged that Respondent ``operated a narcotic treatment program
without obtaining a separate registration for that purpose.'' Id.
On January 26, 2000, a federal search warrant was executed at
Respondent's office. During the search, the authorities seized the
medical records for the undercover operatives.
Thereafter, on June 21, 2000, a federal grand jury indicted
Respondent on five counts of illegal distribution of various controlled
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Resp. Ex. 110. These
counts specifically alleged that Respondent had, on various dates,
``knowingly and intentionally dispense[d] and distribute[d], outside
the usual course of medical practice, and without a legitimate medical
purpose,'' the drugs Lorcet, Vicodin and Vicodin ES (each being a
Schedule III controlled substance), and Xanax (a Schedule IV controlled
substance). Id. at 1-3. An additional count of the indictment alleged
that Respondent had conspired to distribute Schedule III and Schedule
IV controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). See 21
U.S.C. 846. See also Resp. Exh. 110, at 1.
The United States Attorney offered Respondent pre-trial diversion.
The agreement specifically provided that the period of supervision
would last for no more than twelve (12) months, and that if Respondent
fulfilled the conditions of the agreement, the charges would be
dismissed. As part of the diversion agreement, Respondent also entered
a medical supervision agreement. Under this agreement, Respondent was
to submit the name of a monitoring physician for the approval of the
United States Attorney; the monitoring physician was required to review
twenty-five (25) percent of Respondent's patient records on a random
basis and all records involving her prescribing of controlled
substances to determine the appropriateness of the prescriptions.
Respondent satisfactorily completed the supervision period and the
indictment was dismissed.
As stated above, on October 17, 2002, this proceeding was
initiated. Respondent requested a hearing.\1\ The case was assigned to
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mary Ellen Bittner, who conducted a
hearing in Tampa, Florida, on July 1 and 2, and August 5 and 6, 2003.
At the hearing, both the Government and Respondent called witnesses and
introduced documentary evidence. Following the hearing, both the
Government and Respondent submitted post-hearing briefs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Respondent also sought to enjoin the proceeding. The
district court, however, denied her motion for an injunction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On April 15, 2005, the ALJ issued her recommended decision. The ALJ
found that the Government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that Respondent had, in each of the three instances involving the
undercover operatives, prescribed controlled substances without a
legitimate medical purpose and outside of the usual course of medical
practice. See ALJ Dec. at 39-41. The ALJ further found that Respondent
had ``unlawfully presigned prescriptions for controlled substances.''
Id. at 41. The ALJ also found that the Government had not proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Respondent had conducted a narcotic
treatment program without the required registration. Id. Finally, the
ALJ found that Respondent had refused to acknowledge her misconduct in
prescribing the controlled substances, see id. at 43, and was
``unwilling or unable to accept the responsibilities inherent in a DEA
registration.'' Id. at 44. The ALJ thus recommended that Respondent's
registration be revoked.
Following the ALJ's decision, Respondent submitted an 87 page brief
(Resp. Exceptions). Respondent's brief raised numerous challenges to
the ALJ's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent also
claimed (1) That DEA's pursuit of this proceeding violates the pre-
trial diversion agreement, (2) that DEA should be estopped from
contending that Respondent's continued registration is inconsistent
with the public interest because of assertions the Government
purportedly made in the criminal proceeding, and (3) that the DEA
proceeding is a vindictive and retaliatory prosecution in violation of
the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.
Having considered the record as a whole, I hereby issue this
decision and final order adopting the ALJ's findings of fact and
conclusions of law except as expressly noted herein. I have also
reviewed Respondent's various claims and find them to be without merit.
For reasons set forth below, I concur with the ALJ's conclusion that
Respondent's continued registration would be inconsistent with the
public interest. I therefore adopt the ALJ's recommendation that
Respondent's registration be revoked and that any pending applications
for renewal or modification be denied.
Findings of Fact
Respondent obtained her doctor of medicine degree in 1975 from
Calicut University Medical College, in Kerala, India. Following a one
year residency in New Delhi, Respondent attended the University Rene
Descartes in Paris, France, from 1977 through 1981. There, she obtained
additional training in anesthesia, critical care, and pain medicine.
Respondent then moved to Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, where she served a
residency in anesthesia at Allegheny General Hospital from 1981 until
1984. Because Respondent had already trained in anesthesia, she spent
most of her time in pain management. Upon completion of her residency,
Respondent moved to Clearwater, Florida, and took a position as an
anesthesiologist at the Belleair Surgery Center (Belleair).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Respondent is board certified in anesthesiology and pain
management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent worked at Belleair from 1984 until 1999, and eventually
became its medical director. While at Belleair, Respondent treated
chronic pain patients and in 1994 or 1995, opened her own clinic. In
1999, Respondent left Belleair to concentrate on her pain management
practice. Respondent testified at the hearing that she had
approximately 800 to 1000 recurring patients and saw around 3,000
patients per year. Respondent has between fifteen and eighteen
employees, and during the spring of 1999, employed Ben Mastridge, a
Certified Addiction Registered Nurse. According to Respondent,
Mastridge identified patients who were addicted to narcotics and helped
patients address their mental health issues.
The Criminal Investigation
In September 1998, Dale Carnell, a prescription fraud detective
with the Pinellas County Sheriff's Office, contacted Ira Wald, a
Diversion Investigator (DI) assigned to DEA's Tampa office. Detective
Carnell told the DI that the Sheriff's Office had received ``numerous
complaints'' about Dr. Iyer. Tr. 101-102. The DI proceeded to contact
Walgreen's, a pharmacy chain, and obtained from it a printout of Dr.
Iyer's controlled substance prescriptions for the previous twelve (12)
months. Id. at 141. The DI testified that the printout
[[Page 52150]]
was ``the most voluminous'' he had seen in his twenty-three years as a
DI, Id. at 102 & 142, that it ``was many hundreds of pages,'' Id. at
140, and that it ``weighed five or six pounds.'' Id. at 141.
Based on the printout, the DI and Detective Bernie McKenna of the
Pinellas Sheriff's Office decided to conduct undercover visits to
Respondent's office. The first visit was conducted by Mr. Chris Massey,
an informant for the local authorities who was then on probation
following his guilty plea for having obtaining hydrocodone
prescriptions by fraud.
The First Undercover Visit
On March 24, 1999, Massey went to Respondent's clinic and was seen
by her. During the visit, Massey wore a wire; a transcript of his
conversation with Respondent was admitted into evidence. According to
the transcript, Respondent asked Massey who had sent him to see her.
See GX-2, at 1. Massey told Respondent that he had been referred by a
customer of his window tinting business. See id. Respondent then asked
Massey, ``[w]here is your pain?'' Id. Massey answered: ``I'm not really
in pain. He [the customer] said to come up. He said, you know, you're
real understanding, just come up and be honest with you. I, uh, I had a
shoulder surgery about 4\1/2\ years ago.'' Id.
Respondent asked: ``[r]ight shoulder?'' Massey answered that ``the
problem was more or less cured.'' Id. at 1-2. Massey then told
Respondent that ``I was wanting to take Lorcet and Soma.'' Id. at 2.
Massey also told Respondent that ``I have been taking it * * * [e]ver
since then,'' an apparent reference to the surgery. Id. Massey added
that he was ``sick of going to look for em.'' Id.
Respondent then told Massey: ``Okay, look. We can, look, we can
help you anyway.'' Id. In response, Massey then stated, ``I mean I'm
being honest, I mean I'm not really in--I don't--I mean they make me
feel good, make me get work done, I mean I'm not abusing them.'' Id.
Following a discussion of how many pills Massey was taking per day,
Respondent told Massey ``[w]e'll give you your medicine. The question
for you is this--you can tell--you can tell me that you want to come
out of drugs. We have intensive detox, we can help you.'' Id.
Later in the conversation, Respondent asked Massey ``who gives you
the medicine now?'' Id. at 3. Massey replied, ``I've been getting them
from my girlfriend but me and her just split up.'' Id. Respondent then
asked Massey what his job was and again asked about his shoulder.
Massey told Respondent, ``I mean like I said, it's not, it doesn't
bother me.'' Id.
Respondent then asked Massey, ``what do you take, Lorcet 10?'' Id.
at 4. After Massey told her that he took Lorcet 10/650, Respondent
stated: ``Lorcet 10/650. See, this is a shame then that you have to
take the medicine for the habit, you know.'' Id. Respondent once again
asked Massey who had referred him. Massey told Respondent that his name
was Bill and that he did not know Bill's last name, but that ``he's
been going to you for a while you know, you're real understanding.''
Id. After stating that ``this is a pain center, you know,'' Respondent
added: ``We don't want to give out drugs. So that's why we have to have
a psychologist and a substance abuse counselor.'' Id. In response,
Massey said ``Right.'' Respondent then added: ``We have massage
therapist, physical therapist and everybody here, you know. But you are
honest, you are telling the truth, and we are here to help you.'' Id.
Massey replied: ``That's what he said, he said if you're honest with
her, you know, go in there and tell her you're not in pain. This is
your problem. You've been taking them.'' Id.
Respondent then asked Massey how many Lorcets he was taking per
day. Massey told her four. Respondent stated ``that's 124 a month'' and
told him not to lose his medicine or run out of it because she would
not call in a refill. Id. at 5. Massey then paid Respondent $175. Id.
Respondent then told Massey, ``I'd be happy to see patients like you,''
and then told him that she could give him a refill on his SOMA
prescription. She would not, however, give Massey a refill on the
Lorcet. Respondent then gave Massey a prescription for 120 Lorcet 10
with no refill and 60 SOMA with one refill.\3\ See Gov. Exh. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The ALJ found that ``Respondent * * * said that she would
give him sixty Soma, but would not list any refills on the
prescription until she knew him better and knew that he was not
abusing the medication.'' ALJ Dec. at 10. In light of the actual
prescriptions written, I conclude that Respondent's statement that
``Sorry there's no refill on it[,]'' was made in reference to the
Lorcet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Government submitted into evidence the medical record which
Respondent prepared for Massey's visit. Under the heading ``Chief
Complaint,'' the History and Physical record states:
Complains of neck and shoulder pain for the last several years.
This began since he had surgery about 3-4 years ago. He complains of
ongoing pain and has been taking Lorcet and Soma for a long time. He
is having difficulty coming off of this and would like to get rid of
the narcotics if he can. It is very difficult because of his daily
activities etc. He has ongoing right shoulder pain and discomfort.
Sometimes it is manageable and when the pain gets worse he has to
take the medication as soon as possible.
Gov. Exh. 4, at 1.
The second page of this document records the findings of a physical
exam although Respondent admitted that she never performed one on
Massey. See Tr. 495. Under the heading ``Musculoskeletal,'' the record
states: ``Bilateral paracervical muscle spasms at the C6-7 area.
Decreased range of motion of the right shoulder.'' Id. The record also
includes the diagnosis of ``chronic right shoulder pain.'' Id.
The medical records also include a questionnaire on which a patient
indicates such information as the nature and source of his pain. The
first question on this form is ``How long have you had this pain?''
Gov. Exh. 4, at 13. Massey left this blank. See id. Massey apparently
did make a mark on both the front and back drawings of the human body
in the area of the right shoulder. See id. Item 2 of this form directs
the patient to ``circle all the words that best describe your pain''
and lists twenty-four adjectives that describe pain. Id. Massey did not
circle any of these words. See id.
Respondent testified that she understood the mark that Massey had
made in the shoulder region to indicate that he was ``suffering from
chronic pain injury'' and that the marks were ``the location area of
the pain.'' Tr. 481. Respondent testified that Massey was not a typical
pain patient as most of her patients ``have been to many doctors, many
operations and had been through many treatments.'' Id. at 482. She
further testified that she ``thought maybe he's suffering from chronic
pain, something manageable that which may not have to be maintained on
lots of oral narcotics'' because ``[i]t's not difficult pain for the
patient.'' Id.
Later on direct examination, Respondent was asked what she
understood Massey's statement that ``I'm not really in pain'' meant.
Id. at 483. Respondent answered that because Massey was ``already on
medications[,] [m]aybe he doesn't have pain at that time when I see him
in the office,'' but that if he wasn't taking the medication, ``[p]ain
would be there.'' Id. Respondent further testified that she believed
that Massey's statement that he had undergone shoulder surgery four and
a half years earlier to mean that he had developed a calcification in
his shoulder which leads to chronic pain even though the pain ``can be
intermittent.'' Id. at 483-84. Later, however, Respondent testified
that it was her impression that Massey had a
[[Page 52151]]
work-related shoulder sprain although she acknowledged that Massey
``did not say that.'' Id. at 489. Respondent also testified that
chronic pain patients may see her on days that they do not have pain.
Id. at 490
Respondent further testified that Massey's statement that ``the
problem was more or less cured'' meant to her that the problem was
``more or less cured for the surgeon, but the pain persists.'' Id. at
484. Moreover, Respondent testified that Massey's comment that he had
been taking Lorcet and Soma since the surgery meant that he was taking
medications ``[t]o control the pain, so that they [the patient] can
have a decent, normal life.'' Id. at 485. As for Massey's comment that
he was being honest, that the drugs made him feel good and get work
done, and that he was not abusing them, Respondent testified that
``[e]ven today when people take narcotics they feel ashamed of
themselves'' and that ``maybe he's ashamed of telling me he has to take
pain medication to have a very active pace of living.'' Id. at 485-86.
She then stated: ``he's not abusing, that he's not taking too many,
that he's taking the [drugs] to control the daily activities of
living.'' Id. at 486. Respondent added: ``Drug addicts don't take
three, four [pills] a day to get work done. * * * Drug addicts take to
get high and they don't do their job. They sit at home and watch TV.''
Id.
Respondent testified that ``[o]ur job is to believe the patient.''
Id. at 491. Respondent was then asked what she meant when she told
Massey, ``[t]his is a shame then that you have to take the medicine for
the habit.'' Id. Respondent answered: ``See, whenever there is a pain,
they take a pain pill to feel better. So, there are other habits we can
create with them like the physical therapy, home exercises, so they
don't have to depend on that habit of taking a pill for every little
thing.'' Id.
Respondent further testified that Massey appeared honest to her.
Id. 494. When asked whether it was significant that Massey ``was honest
with you and didn't exaggerate his symptoms or seek additional--more
medication than he was taking,'' Respondent answered: ``Yes, he's not a
drug-seeking person.'' Id.
Respondent then admitted that she had not conducted a physical exam
and that it was not ``proper'' to record the results of an exam that
was never done. Id. at 496. When asked why she filled in the form, she
answered that it was ``the end of the day when I was preparing--looking
at the charts because the blanks, probably I filled in what I could
have seen.'' Id. at 497. Respondent insisted, however, that the
comments she entered on the record as Massey's ``Chief Complaint'' were
based on what Massey told her. Id.
The ALJ found disingenuous Respondent's testimony that she thought
Massey had told her that he was not in pain because he was then taking
medication. See ALJ Dec. at 40. I agree and note that the ALJ observed
Respondent's testimony and was in the best position to evaluate her
credibility on these issues of historical fact. See Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951). Indeed, Respondent's story is
implausible and inconsistent. Respondent testified that Massey was not
``a typical pain patient,'' and indeed, showed up without a referral.
Given this, it is strange that Respondent proceeded to prescribe
controlled substances without performing a physical exam and did so
notwithstanding that Massey told Respondent numerous times that he was
not in pain and that he was taking the drugs because they made him feel
good. Indeed, in light of Respondent's testimony that she found Massey
to be honest, and that it was her job ``to believe the patient,'' it is
puzzling that she did not accept Massey's statements that he was not in
pain and was taking the drugs because they made him feel good.
Massey's statement that his girlfriend had been the source of his
drugs begs the question of why, if he truly was in pain, he had
obtained his drugs that way rather than through legitimate means.
Furthermore, Respondent's statements that (1) ``[w]e'll give you your
medicine * * * you can tell me that you want to come out of drugs,''
(2) that ``this is a shame * * * that you have to take the medicine for
the habit,'' and (3) ``we don't want to give out drugs * * * that's why
we have * * * a psychologist and a substance abuse counselor,''
demonstrate that Respondent understood that Massey was not seeking the
prescription to treat pain, but rather to abuse them.
Finally, the ALJ found that ``the descriptions of the alleged pain
that Respondent wrote in [Massey's record was] not--by any stretch of
the imagination--based on what [he] told her.'' ALJ Dec. 43. That is
putting it charitably. The record was false. As Dr. Rafael Miguel (one
of the Government's experts) explained, the record was likely created
because Respondent knew exactly what she had done--prescribed a
controlled substance without a legitimate medical purpose--and thus did
so ``to justify the opioid prescriptions.'' Gov. Exh. 18, at 2.
The Second Undercover Visit
On April 22, 1999, Massey returned to Respondent's office for a
follow-up visit. Massey did not see Respondent during this visit.
Instead, he saw Ben Mastridge, a Certified Addiction Registered Nurse.
After Mastridge asked Massey how he was ``pain wise,'' Massey initially
stated that ``it's into my joint there,'' that he had been put on
Lorcet ``years ago for a shoulder surgery,'' but then added ``I'm not
in no pain.'' Gov. Exh. 6, at 2. Massey used similar language several
times to convey his condition to Mastridge. See id. at 2-3.
Notwithstanding the double negative in Massey's statements, Mastridge
clearly understood that Massey did not have pain. See id. at 3.
(Mastridge stating ``if you're not having pain then you don't need''
narcotics.).
Mastridge and Massey discussed what drugs the latter was taking;
Mastridge suggested that ``I can give you like an Ativan \4\ or
something.'' Id. Massey told Mastridge that ``I don't want no mind
medication.'' Id. Massey also told Mastridge that he could ``function
without'' the Lorcet, but that he took it ``to work and to get, you
know to get chores done on work days.'' Id. Massey then suggested that
if Mastridge put him ``on Xanax we could probably level me out a little
bit.'' Id. Massey also told Mastridge that he took the Soma because he
was ``so used to taking them'' and that he was not having muscle
spasms. Id. at 4.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Ativan, or Lorazepam, is a Schedule IV controlled substance.
21 CFR 1308.14(c).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mastridge then told Massey that ``using narcotics when there is no
pain isn't acceptable.'' Id. Mastridge added that ``just to prescribe *
* * narcotics because you're physically dependent on it * * * that's,
that's that's unacceptable.'' Id. Mastridge then suggested that ``we
can come up with a plan [to] decrease by one pill every, one pill a day
every two weeks * * * and see how you do.'' Id. at 5. Mastridge also
suggested that he could put Massey on ``just methadone and decrease the
Lorcet or we can * * * just decrease the Lorcet.'' Id. at 6. Massey
told Mastridge that he was ``definitely not going to go without the
Lorcet.'' Id.
Later in the conversation, Massey again told Mastridge that his
shoulder was ``cured,'' and added that he was ``over the cocaine and
all the stuff I went through in my early days,'' but that ``these pills
make me feel good.'' Id. at 8. Mastridge told Massey that he was going
to give him a prescription for Xanax because it ``will help to take the
edge off of bringing the coke down.'' Id. at 9. Mastridge further
stated that ``we
[[Page 52152]]
are going to put down that you are starting the detox program and it
will run over a period of fifty to ninety days'' and that Massey had
agreed to start the program ``over the next 60 days.'' Id. at 10.
Massey then told Mastridge that ``I don't have no physical
problem'' and ``it's just I like these pills.'' Id. Mastridge replied
that ``as far as the physical dependence on it goes * * * we can come
up [with] other treatment options once we try some things here.'' Id.
Mastridge then told Massey that he would be getting 105 Lorcet tablets,
which he should take three times a day, 90 Soma, which he should take
three times a day, and Xanax .5, which he should take twice a day. Id.
at 10-11.
Massey then asked whether ``oxycontin or dilaudid would be easier
on my body?'' Id. at 11. Mastridge answered that ``it is not legal to
prescribe narcotics long term if there is no pain,'' and that ``it's
easier to take you down off the Lorcet than it would be off the
oxycontin because of the types of doses.'' Id. When Massey suggested
that oxycontin 10 tablets were available, Mastridge replied that ``the
bottom line is you need to be off the narcotics.'' Id. at 11-12.
Mastridge then gave Massey the prescriptions for Lorcet, Soma, and
Xanax discussed above and a questionnaire, which he instructed him to
complete in the waiting room. Id. at 12-13. Observing that the
prescriptions were pre-signed, Massey asked Mastridge, ``So what do you
do? You just fill these out and the doctor already signs them?'' Id. at
13. Mastridge answered: ``Yes.'' Id. Massey then stated, ``I thought
that the Doctor had to fill the prescriptions out and sign it.'' Id.
Mastridge replied: ``Oh no, no * * * as long as she is in the building
I am being supervised and as long as I'm being supervised, I can do
anything that she can do because she signs her name to the treatment
agreement, there's a place for her to sign it, too.'' Id.
The Government entered into evidence the patient chart for Massey's
April 22nd visit. The chart states that the patient ``report[s] no
current pain.'' Gov. Ex. 4, at 3. The chart also states that Massey
reported ``good sleep, appetite'' and that he had agreed to start
outpatient ``detox over [the] next 60 days.'' Id. In addition, the
questionnaire which Massey completed on this visit asked whether,
``[d]uring the past month,'' he had ``been bothered by any illness,
bodily disorder, pains, or fears about your health?'' Id. at 6. Massey
checked the box for ``none of the time.'' Id.
Mr. Mastridge did not testify in this proceeding. Respondent did,
however, testify regarding this visit. In her testimony, Respondent
acknowledged that at the time of the visit, Mr. Mastridge was not
authorized under Florida law to dispense a controlled substance. Tr.
641. Respondent attempted to justify her conduct testifying that she
``was in the office,'' that Mastridge ``never saw the patient alone,''
and that ``I was right there.'' Id. at 641-42. Respondent admitted,
however, that she was ``[n]ot in the same room'' when Mastridge issued
the prescriptions for Lorcet, Soma, and a new drug Xanax. Id. at 642.
The Third Undercover Visit
On May 12, 1999, Detective Jeff Esterline of the Pinellas Sheriff's
Office went to Respondent's office to conduct an undercover visit.
Using the name Jeff Scott, Esterline told Respondent that he had
recently moved from Iowa and that he worked as an electrician's helper.
Respondent asked Esterline what had happened to his back. See Gov. Ex.
9, at 1. Esterline told Respondent that he had been referred by Chris
Massey, that Massey had seen her before, and had ``said you were a good
doctor to come to.'' Id. at 2. Respondent then told Esterline to
``[t]ell me about your pain.'' Id. Esterline stated: ``I don't have any
pain really, I didn't know if they would let me in to talk to you if I
didn't tell them something, so I don't have any pain, really.'' Id.
Esterline added that he was taking four to five Vicodin a day. Id.
Respondent asked Esterline how he got his drugs. Esterline stated that
he had been ``getting them from a friend.'' Id.
Respondent then told Esterline that her clinic offered a detox
program. Id. She then asked, ``you don't have pain but you are taking
vicodin? Why were you taking vicodin?'' Id. After Respondent repeated
her question, Esterline told her that he had ``started taking them
quite a while ago'' and that he thought he ``function[ed] a lot better
with them.'' Id. at 3. When Respondent asked if he got the drug from
friends, Esterline answered in the affirmative. Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he ``want[ed] to go to substance
abuse program or do you want to be maintained on the vicodin?'' Id.
Esterline answered that he would like to remain on drugs as he felt
like he functioned ``real well'' while taking them. Id.
Respondent then warned Esterline that narcotics ``are habit
forming'' and can cause liver damage. Id. Esterline responded that he
didn't think he had any problems and that he had started taking them
when his mother had died a year and a half earlier. Id. He added that
``I feel, just feel like I function real well with them'' and ``I don't
abuse them.'' Id.
Respondent then told Esterline: ``you don't have to start if you
don't want to be on vicodin'' and ``there is no reason you should be on
it.'' Id. at 4. Esterline responded that ``I feel like I, I function
better,'' and that ``I don't think I'm not taking so many of them that
I feel like I have a real problem, but I just function better, just
keeps me even.'' Id.
Respondent then stated that ``[i]f you didn't get vicodin, you
know, you know it is okay, too, right?'' Id. She added that ``we don't
want to start you on some narcotics that you don't have to be on it.''
Id. Esterline responded that Massey ``said that you know if I just was
honest with you that you know, that that you'd helped him.'' Id.
Respondent then stated that she thought she remembered Massey but
didn't know. Id. Respondent also told Esterline that her assistant Ben
Mastridge ``can help you to get off narcotics. He can do a methadone,
whatever.'' Id.
Esterline replied that he ``was just hoping to get'' Vicodin and
again told Respondent that he took three or four a day. Id. Respondent
advised Esterline that drugs could be toxic, that he could build up a
tolerance to them and that ``the more you take the more you need,'' and
then asked him if he was ``willing to take all these risks?'' Id.
Esterline stated that he was and that the drug helped him to ``function
better.'' Id. Respondent then referred to various potential causes of
pain. Esterline once more stated that ``I don't really have any
problem, I don't really have any pain,'' and again added that ``I feel
like I function better'' when taking the drugs. Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he ``would like to start on the
vicodin?'' Id. at 5. Esterline told Respondent ``Yeah, that's what I
was here for.'' Id. Respondent told Esterline to ``[s]tart with the
four a day,'' and that her employee Ben Mastridge ``can counsel you
with medication and narcotics and everything.'' Id.
Later on, Respondent stated ``[s]o you don't want to come out to
the narcotic clinic, you know this is for the people to come here so
they don't do drugs, you know, and too, maybe I'm sympathetic to the
people that allow themselves to slip into drugs.'' Id. Respondent then
told Esterline that ``narcotics are good and bad,'' and that ``[y]ou
don't want to get hooked on drugs.'' Id. Esterline again told
Respondent that he did not think that he was addicted, that he went to
[[Page 52153]]
work every day, and that the drugs made him ``feel better.'' Id.
Respondent then asked Esterline if he had been on vicodin ``for a
while?'' Id. at 6. When Esterline answered ``yes,'' Respondent asked
him if he could ``confirm it'' by bringing in ``left over
[prescription] bottles'' he had gotten through other doctors. Id.
Esterline told her that he had ``been having trouble getting them for
so long'' and offered to look at home for the bottles. See Id. at 6.
Respondent then again told Esterline that ``[y]ou don't want to make a
new habit'' and get ``hooked on drugs.'' Id. Esterline reassured
Respondent that he was not addicted. See Id.
Respondent then stated that she would give him a prescription for
60 Vicodin ES with two refills and that the drugs ``should easily last
you for 1 month.'' Id. Respondent then suggested that Esterline make an
appointment to see Mastridge. Id. She also told Esterline that her
clinic had a massage therapist and a physical therapist and that ``you
need to feel good-you're taking it just to feel good.'' Id. at 7.
Esterline paid $180 for the visit. Gov. Ex. 10.
The government entered into evidence various patient records
pertaining to Detective Esterline's visit. Describing Esterline's chief
complaint, the ``History and Physical'' record states: ``He has a
terrible pain in his neck. This started 1\1/2\ years ago. Ever since
his mother's death, he has had ongoing pain. He does a lot of
construction work, wiring, etc., which makes the condition worse.''
Gov. Ex. 11, at 1. The entry for Esterline's Musculoskeletal system
likewise states: ``chronic pain.'' Id.
The records also include a questionnaire used by patients to report
their symptoms and other information relevant in diagnosing and
treating their condition. The first question on the form is ``How long
have you had this pain?'' Id. at 2. Esterline wrote ``none.'' The form
also lists twenty-four adjectives to describe pain and instructs the
patient to ``circle all the words that best describe your pain.'' Id.
Esterline did not circle any word. See Id.
The form also contains front and back representations of the human
body, on which patients are instructed to shade the area where they
have pain. See Id. The forms have several small markings in the area of
the neck. Id. Detective Esterline testified that he did not make the
markings. Tr. 58. Respondent maintained that he did. Id. at 519.
Respondent testified that she ``probably'' ``missed'' Detective
Esterline's answer of ``none'' to the question ``How long have you had
pain?'' Tr. 523. She further testified that Esterline was not typical
of the pain patients she sees because ``[h]e has a soft tissue injury,
neck pain. He didn't have any x-ray or MRI.'' Id. She added that a
typical patient would be ``a construction worker, car accident patient
who had an MRI x-ray workup'' and that Esterline hadn't ``had anything
done.'' Id. at 524.
Respondent's counsel then asked her about Esterline's statements
that he didn't have any pain, that he had indicated he did because he
did not think the office staff would let him in otherwise, that he was
taking four to five Vicodin a day, and that he did so because he
functioned better when he took them. Respondent testified that ``some
patients are very reluctant to admit that they need Vicodin to control
their pain,'' and that he was ``taking medications to be able to do his
job.'' Id. at 526-27. Respondent also testified that she believed that
Respondent had obtained his Vicodin through a lawful prescription. Id.
at 528. Respondent further testified that she asked Esterline what type
of work he did ``to find out whether he's having pain because of the
type of job he does,'' and that electricians (the job Esterline said he
had) commonly have neck pain. Id. at 529.
When asked on direct what Esterline meant when he said ``I don't
really have any pain,'' Respondent answered: ``He's contradicting
himself[,]'' and that ``he is in pain, but when he takes medications he
doesn't have any pain.'' Id. at 530. When asked whether Esterline had
``in any way exaggerated his symptoms?,'' Respondent answered ``No'';
when asked whether he appeared to be honest, Respondent answered
``yes.'' Id. at 531. Respondent also testified that Esterline did not
seek more medication than he was currently taking and that he seemed
like a patient who was seeking treatment for chronic pain. Id. at 532.
Respondent admitted on cross-examination that she did not conduct a
physical examination on Esterline. Id. at 645. She also testified that
her handwritten notes for the physical exam were based on what she
``would have done with a patient'' with neck pain. Id. at 533-34. She
further admitted that it was inappropriate to make these notations. Id.
at 534. She testified, however, that she believed her prescribing of
controlled substances to Esterline was within the standard of care. Id.
at 537.
Here, again, the ALJ, who personally observed Respondent testify,
found disingenuous Respondent's testimony that she thought Esterline
was not in pain because he was taking medication. See ALJ at 40. I
agree and further note that it is strange that a patient who is
``honest,'' does not ``exaggerate his symptoms,'' told Respondent
multiple times that he did not have pain, and that he took the drugs
because they helped him function better, would then be disbelieved as
to why he was taking the drugs. Furthermore, while Respondent testified
that she believed Esterline had obtained the drugs through a lawful
prescription, Esterline told her at least twice that he had gotten them
through friends and that he had also been ``having trouble getting them
for so long.'' Finally, Respondent made several incriminating
statements such as when she asked Esterline if he ``want[ed] to go to
substance abuse program or do you want to be maintained on the
vicodin?,'' and stated ``maybe I'm sympathetic to the people that allow
themselves to slip into drugs.''
The Fourth Undercover Visit
On June 24, 1999, Detective Randall Keys of the Tampa Police
Department,\5\ using the name Ronald Briers, made an undercover visit
to Respondent's office. Respondent asked him if he had abdominal pain.
Gov. Ex. 12, at 1. Keys told Respondent that he did not have pain, but
that he ``had to put something down on'' the form. Id. Keys then added
that ``[a] friend of mine suggested that I come to talk to you about
it.'' Id. Respondent asked: ``About what? Detox?'' Id. Keys told
Respondent, ``I need some * * * vicodin.'' Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Detective Keys was then assigned to a DEA task force. Tr.
70.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Respondent asked Keys why he needed vicodin. Id. Keys answered,
``Well it, basically it makes me feel better. It just kind of takes the
edge off.'' Id. After discussing Keys' job, Respondent stated: ``We do
not give drugs out to people. And now, if you want to go to substance
abuse program, we have Ben [Mastridge] here for you.'' Id. Denying that
he was addicted, Keys stated again that the drug ``just kind of helps
me. Just--it just takes the edge off.'' Id.
After stating that she did not want ``to promote the intake of
drugs,'' Respondent asked Keys who had sent him. Keys told her Chris
Massey. Id. at 2. Respondent reiterated that ``We don't want to give
drugs out to people, you know, and ruin our reputation.'' Id.
Respondent then suggested that Keys try her acupuncture program. Id.
Respondent declined, stating that he did not ``have any pain or
anything like that'' and that he took the Vicodin because ``they just
take the edge off.'' Id.
Respondent and Keys discussed how many he took a day. Id. Keys said
three.
[[Page 52154]]
Respondent then asked Keys where he got the drug. Id. At first, Keys
said that he got it from a person, but when asked how much he paid for
it, Keys said it was actually from ``like a family member who has a
prescription.'' Id. at 3. Respondent then told Keys that ``[t]his is a
real test for me'' and ``we don't want to give narcotics to like
creating drug use.'' Id.
Thereupon, Respondent apparently summoned Ben Mastridge to the
examining room. After again discussing Chris Massey, Respondent briefed
Mastridge on Keys' situation telling him that Keys took ``about 2 to 3
vicodin a day'' and that ``now he's wondering whether we will be able
to promote or support his pain with the 3 Vicodin a day.'' Id. After
telling Mastridge that they had not discussed ``[t]he issue of people
coming here asking for a drug,'' Respondent then told Keys that ``Ben
is our AR and he does my detoxification for narcotics. He is the
director for narcotics program.'' Id.
Shortly thereafter, Mastridge asked Keys how many Vicodin he was
taking and how long had he been taking the drug? Id. Keys answered that
he usually took about three and had been doing it for six months. Id.
Mastridge then asked Keys whether the Vicodin had been prescribed to
him. Id. at 4. Keys answered ``no.'' Id. Respondent then told Keys that
``we want to help people with pain,'' to which Keys responded
``Right.'' Id. Respondent then stated that ``we don't want to promote a
drug habit.'' Id. Keys responded: ``No, I understand.'' Id. Mastridge
then told Keys ``[j]ust throwing pills at the situation, that's where
people end up taking--if they are taking 3 Vicodin a day now, in 6 or 8
or 12 months they're taking 15 of them a day.'' Id.
After discussing the need to provide ``some sort of concurrent
treatment to go along with [the vicodin] to address the source of the
pain,'' Id., Mastridge asked ``is it muscle spasms that are actually
going on here?'' Id. at 5. Respondent interjected, ``Pain, pain, you're
right.'' Id. Mastridge continued stating: ``What, what's the source of
the pain? I guess that's what the ultimate question is. And since you
weren't diagnosed by anybody in primary care or anything.'' Id.
Respondent replied: ``I guess he feels no pain, he just feels better.''
Id. Mastridge then asked Keys, ``You just feel better?'' Keys answered,
``They just kind of mellow you out I guess * * * it makes me feel
okay.'' Id.
After discussing various treatments available at her clinic,
Respondent told Keys that she was going to give him a prescription for
60 vicodin, see Id, and Mastridge told Keys that they would discuss his
condition and ``the best course of treatment'' during his next visit.
Id. Respondent then explained the costs for the clinic's various
services and added ``[i]t's a way of letting you know * * * we will not
be supporting just a drug habit.'' Id. at 6. Respondent then told Keys
that Ben ``will write the prescription for you too, He writes my
prescriptions. When you see him, you don't have to see me.'' Id.
The government entered into evidence various patient records
pertaining to Detective Keys' visit. The History and Physical record
describes the patient complaint as: ``Ronald Bryers presents to my
office with low-back pain and anterior abdominal pain, which is
ongoing. He works as an automobile detailer, getting under cars, etc.,
and the constant physical labor makes the pain worse. * * * He has had
this pain for the past several years.'' Govt. Exh. 14, at 1.
The document also reports the results of a physical exam. Under the
musculoskeletal heading, the record states that ``[m]inimal paralumbar
muscle spasm is noted, with minimal facet tenderness.'' Id. The report
also contains a diagnosis of ``chronic low-back pain.'' Id. Respondent
admitted, however, that she did not perform a physical exam on Keys,
Tr. 647, and Keys testified that he did not believe that he had
discussed his medical history with Respondent. Id. at 84.
Respondent testified that Detective Keys was seeing her for
abdominal and lower back pain but that ``[h]is history was kind of not
clear to me.'' Id. at 541. Moreover, Keys was a ``very unusual''
patient. Id. Respondent explained: ``Patients come to me after being
diagnosed, after being treated. * * * I wonder, what is he doing in my
office without being diagnosed and we don't want to be a clinic where
we give out medications for reasons not needed.'' Id. at 546.
Respondent testified that because she ``didn't feel right,'' Id. at
541, she sought out Mr. Mastridge to assist her in evaluating Keys
because of Mastridge's knowledge of substance abuse and psychological
problems. Respondent testified that she thought that Mastridge could
help her diagnose whether Keys was ``taking medicine to control the
pain or for any behavioral problems.'' Id. at 542.
Respondent testified that Keys' statement that he took Vicodin
because it took ``the edge off'' meant that the drug took the ``[e]dge
off the pain,'' and that the term ``edge off'' is commonly used in the
pain context. Id. at 544. As for Keys' statements that he didn't have
pain, Respondent testified that she thought this was because he was
``on pain medication,'' that ``people do not have to have the pain all
the time,'' and that pain levels can fluctuate. Id. at 545. She further
stated that even though Keys may not have had pain at the time of his
visit, ``they wouldn't come to my pain clinic if [they] don't have the
pain.'' Id.
Respondent also testified that when she discussed with Mastridge
doing narcotics detoxification, she meant ``medication reduction.'' Id.
at 549. She further testified that when she told Keys that ``we want to
help people with pain'' and that ``we don't want to promote a drug
habit,'' she understood Keys' answers as meaning that he was in pain
and was agreeing to her proposed treatment. Id.
Respondent admitted that because she had not performed a physical
exam, she should not have filled out the form as she did but maintained
that the patient record's ``history part is true.'' Id. at 647.
Respondent testified that the physical exam part of the record was
``missing'' ``because I went and got Ben [Mastridge] because this
patients [sic] were not my true pain patients,'' Id. at 647-48, and
that she had made it up ``because of the confused cases brought to
me.'' Id. at 648-49.
Respondent added: ``I don't see patients like this at all in the
office. These are like the strange weirdos coming to my office.'' Id.
at 648. Respondent further testified that she was ``astonished to see
patients like [Keys] in the pain clinic'' and that ``[t]hese are not my
typical pain patients.'' Id.
Respondent was then asked whether it was within the standard of
care in the State of Florida to prescribe controlled substances without
performing a physical exam. In response, Respondent testified: ``that's
what we learn when we go to medical school. Take a history and physical
examination. Chronic pain, these patients who are very difficult to
evaluate. Physical examination is part of our job.'' Id. at 650. Upon
further questioning Respondent added that performing a physical exam
``is the standard of practice. That's our Rule No. 1.'' Id. at 651.
Respondent then denied, however, that she had intentionally and
knowingly dispensed controlled substances. See Id. at 652. She
testified:
Intentionally I did not dispense medication, I did not
distribute outside of the usual course of medical practice. In the
context of the clinical pain management, I knew the medication not
to transfer, not to sell the drug to the street or anything. My
intention here is believe the patient, give them the benefit of
chronic pain, and
[[Page 52155]]
evaluate them, and do what is appropriate for them.
Id. at 652-53.
As with the other undercover visits, the ALJ did not find credible
Respondent's assertion that she prescribed Vicodin to Keys because she
believed his use of the drug was the reason he was not in pain. See ALJ
Dec. at 40. Again I agree. The transcript of the visit provides
substantial evidence that Respondent knew that Keys was seeking drugs
for illegitimate use. Not only did Keys state that he did not have pain
and that the drug took the ``edge off,'' when Mastridge asked what the
source of Key's pain was, Respondent stated: ``I guess he feels no
pain, he just feels better.'' Shortly thereafter, Respondent explained
the costs for the clinic's various services and added that ``we will
not be supporting just a drug habit.'' Finally, I am perplexed as to
why if a patient is a ``strange weirdo'' and causes astonishment
because he is not a ``typical pain patient,'' a physician would then
proceed to write a prescription for a controlled substance without
performing a physical exam as required by ``Rule No. 1.'' \6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ I acknowledge that in December 1999, the investigators
attempted an additional undercover visit. Respondent's receptionist
refused to admit the officer because he did not have a referral. See
Resp. Ex. 46.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Expert Testimony
Both the Government and Respondent introduced expert opinion
evidence on the subject of Respondent's prescribing practices. Dr.
Daniel Frazier, M.D., of Tampa, Florida, a Board Certified Family
Practice Physician with more than thirty years of experience, and an
Assistant Clinical Professor of Family Practice at the University of
South Florida (USF) College of Medicine, reviewed the tapes and
transcriptions of the undercover visits. In a statement dated February
1, 2001, Dr. Frazier declared that ``[i]t is inappropriate to prescribe
pain medication in uncontrolled environments,'' and that ``[t]he
physician must determine the level of pain that he/she is treating by
means of examination and discussion with the patient.'' Gov. Exh. 16.
Dr. Frazier further stated that ``the physician must closely monitor
the patient to see that there is a medical need'' for a controlled
substance. Id.
Dr. Frazier concluded that Respondent ``was not in control of the
patients; the patients were in control of'' her. Id. Moreover, ``[t]he
patients actively sought pain pills for non-appropriate reasons and the
patients were given the pain medication without examination or
significant review of their symptoms. Such care on the part of the
physician constitutes inappropriate medical treatment[,]'' and ``a
failure to appropriately practice medicine within the acceptable
standard of care.'' Id. I credit Dr. Frazier's statement.
The government also submitted the statement of Rafael Miguel, M.D.
At the time of his review, Dr. Miguel was a Professor and Interim
Chairman of the Department of Anesthesiology, as well as the Director
of the Pain Management Program at the USF College of Medicine. Dr.
Miguel clearly states that he reviewed the medical records, transcripts
of the undercover visits, and Respondent's pre-hearing statements. Gov.
Exh. 18, at 1.\7\ Dr. Miguel stated that ``[t]here is no currently
accepted therapeutic use of opioids but for the relief of pain.
Administering opioids to patients with no pain is inappropriate and
clearly constitutes practice below the standard of care.'' Gov. Exh.
18, at 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ I note and reject Respondent's contention that the ALJ did
not know what Dr. Miguel based his opinion on. See Resp. Br. 39-40.
The factual basis for Dr. Miguel's opinion is clear from his
statement. See Gov. Exh. 18, at 1. Moreover, Respondent could have
sought to subpoena Dr. Miguel to testify if there was any dispute as
to the factual basis of his opinion. 21 CFR 1316.52(d). She did not.
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Dr. Miguel observed that ``[i]f the concern was that patients were
drug abusers and the intent was to wean them from opioids, this should
have been done in an addiction treatment facility with trained
personnel. * * * Addiction is a complex problem and physical dependence
is a small part of the pathophysiology of the disease.'' Id. Dr. Miguel
further explained that ``[p]rescribing opioids to known addicts is
inappropriate and clearly constitutes practice below the standard of
care.'' Id.
Finally, Dr. Miguel discussed Respondent's failure to perform
physical exams and record keeping practices. According to Dr. Miguel,
``the documentation does not concur with the reported complaints. While
the reported complaints did not include pain, high levels of pain
interfering with daily life were documented. This was apparently done
to justify the opioid prescriptions.'' Id. Dr. Miguel also stated that
``[i]t does not appear that the patients were physically examined, yet
there is documentation of heart and lung sounds, abdominal palpitation,
even paracervical muscle spasms and decreased range of motion in joints
impossible to assess without a physical exam.'' Id. Dr. Miguel
concluded that ``[t]his may constitute medical fraud and is clearly
practice below the standard of care.'' Id. I likewise credit Dr.
Miguel's statement.
Respondent introduced a statement of Walter E. Afield, M.D., a
psychiatrist. Dr. Afield stated that he had reviewed Dr. Frazier's
statement and was ``not in agreement.'' Resp. Ex. 55. He asserted that
``based on statements made to the doctor, there are sufficient reasons
for prescribing the medications in question.'' Id. In Dr. Afield's
opinion, Respondent ``felt these patients were dependent on these
medications to function and were functioning and that they needed to be
placed in a medically supervised program to detoxify the patients and
find alternative treatments for them.'' Id. Dr. Afield further stated
that his ``[r]eview of the entire record of the patient indicates those
medicines were given within the parameters of her specialty.'' Id.
I agree with the ALJ's declination to credit Dr. Afield's statement
for several reasons. First, while Dr. Afield has had a distinguished
career in psychiatry, it is not clear what expertise he has in the area
of pain management or the general diagnosis and treatment of physical
injuries. If his opinion was offered as an expert in treating
addiction, I note that Respondent maintained repeatedly that she
prescribed the drugs to all three patients because she believed the
patients were in pain and not because she was treating an addiction.
Second, his opinion is vague and it is not clear whether he viewed
Respondent's prescribing to be appropriate because the patients were in
pain or because they were addicted. Indeed, to the extent Dr. Afield's
statement that ``the patients were dependent on these medications to
function'' and that the patients ``needed to be placed in a medically
supervised program to detoxify them,'' was intended to suggest that
Respondent's prescribing was appropriate because the patients were
addicted, it is clearly wrong because the CSA prohibits the prescribing
of controlled substances for this purpose. See 26 CFR 1306.04(c) (``A
prescription may not be issued for the dispensing of narcotic drugs
listed in any schedule for `detoxification treatment' or `maintenance
treatment.' ''). DEA's regulations make clear that a physician who is
not registered to conduct a narcotics treatment program may administer,
but not prescribe, ``not more than one day's medication'' of narcotics
for up to three days to a person suffering ``acute withdrawal systems
when necessary while arrangements are being made for referral for
treatment.'' 26 CFR 1306.07(b). A physician cannot,
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however, issued a prescription for this purpose.
Third, to the extent he believed that Respondent prescribing was
appropriate because the undercover operatives were in pain, Dr. Afield
stated that he ``review[ed] the entire record of the patient.'' Id. It
is undisputed, however, that Respondent falsified the medical records
of the three undercover operatives and there is nothing in the
statement that suggests that Dr. Afield relied on non-falsified
records. An expert opinion based on falsified records is obviously not
probative of the issues.
Fourth, Dr. Afield's statement does not address why it would be
appropriate to prescribe a controlled substance without performing a
physical exam. This is especially noteworthy in light of Respondent's
acknowledgement that performing a physical exam is ``Rule 1.''
Respondent also called as a witness Robert A Guskiewicz, M.D. Dr.
Guskiewicz is the Director of the Pain Fellowship Program and a
Clinical Assistant Professor in the Department of Anesthesiology,
University of Florida College of Medicine. Resp. Exh. 57. Dr.
Guskiewciz also served as the court monitor under the pre-trial
diversion agreement.
Dr. Guskiewicz testified that in his opinion Respondent had
legitimately prescribed controlled substances to all three undercover
visitors. Tr. 813. He further testified that his opinion was based on
the indications of pain on the patient questionnaires that were
completed by the undercover visitors. Id. at 814. Dr. Guskiewicz added
that Massey had indicated that ``he did have pain in the past,'' and
that the medications he had used had ``helped to improve his function
in doing his job.'' Id. He also testified that the same was true for
the patients portrayed by Detectives Esterline and Keys. Dr. Guskiewicz
stated that while ``[t]here was some vagueness,'' he could determine
that the medications had helped these patients improve their
functionality. Id. at 815. Dr. Guskiewicz also testified that he
teaches his students to ``give the patient the benefit of the doubt,''
Id. at 824, but to provide them with a ``limited supply of
medications'' such as either a two-week or one-month supply, and to
``do our due diligence.'' Id. at 825.
On cross-examination, Dr. Guskiewicz was asked ``[w]hat is required
of a physician who wanted to establish a course of treatment?'' Id. at
818. Dr. Guskiewicz answered: ``[p]hysical examination, assessment and
diagnosis.'' Id. Later in the cross-examination, Dr. Guskiewicz was
asked a series of questions related to whether he knew that Respondent
had made up the part of the record that supposedly were the findings of
a physical exam. One of the questions was whether it was ``outside of
the practice in the state of Florida'' to falsify a patient record. See
Id. at 827. Dr. Guskiewicz testified that ``[n]ot performing the
examination would not be outside the practice, but saying you performed
the examination when you did not would be.'' Id. Dr. Guskiewicz
acknowledged, however, that the assumption that a person comes to a
pain management clinic because they are in pain does not relieve a
physician from the responsibilities of performing a physical exam and
inquiring into the patient's medical history. Id. at 829.
The ALJ declined to credit Dr. Guskiewicz's opinion that Respondent
had properly prescribed controlled substances. I likewise decline to
credit Dr. Guskiewicsz's opinion on this point. As an initial matter, I
note that Dr. Guskiewicsz's opinion was based, in part, on the fact
that Massey had indicated that he had ``pain in the past.'' But Massey
also stated that he had had shoulder surgery four and a half years ago
and that the ``problem was more or less cured.'' Thus, Massey's
statements do not provide an adequate basis for concluding that a
patient is still in pain, or would be in pain but for the taking of a
controlled substance.
Indeed, I note that Respondent did not do ``due diligence'' by
performing a physical exam even when she admitted that the undercover
patients were ``not typical'' or were ``strange weirdos.'' Furthermore,
Dr. Guskiewicz eventually, although apparently with some reluctance,
conceded that it is essential to perform a physical exam before
prescribing a controlled substance. Thus, Dr. Guskiewicz appears to
have rendered his opinion on direct examination regarding Respondent's
prescribing to the undercover patients without considering material
facts.
Other Evidence
I note that Respondent did comply with the terms of the pre-trial
diversion agreement and that the United States Attorney dismissed the
indictment. I also note that Respondent retained the services of a
private investigation firm to review her patient records and determine
which patients were likely substance abusers and should be discharged
from her practice. I also note that the private investigation firm
developed procedures to address, and trained Respondent's employees in,
such matters as spotting drug abusers, doctor shopping, failed drug
tests, claims of lost, stolen or destroyed medications, prescription
fraud and forgery, and patients with a drug-related criminal history.
The private investigation firm conducted criminal history checks on
more than 500 people and interviewed nearly 280 patients and their
associates. I further acknowledge that one of Respondent's private
investigators testified that prescription drug abusers would target
foreign doctors, that they would provide forged medical records such as
MRI reports, and that most of the patients he interviewed admitted to
lying to Respondent to obtain narcotics. I note, however, that none of
the undercover operatives used false records to induce Respondent to
prescribe to them and that none of them claimed to be in pain.
Respondent testified that she had discharged or not accepted ``may
be in the hundreds'' of patients. Id. at 426. She also testified that
she stopped pre-signing prescriptions and that she was no longer
accepting patients without a referral. Id. at 470.
Finally, Respondent called several patients to testify on her
behalf. In general, the patients testified that Respondent's treatments
had greatly helped them to control their pain and had helped them
improve their functionality. Respondent also submitted numerous letters
from patients that were to similar effect.
Discussion
Respondent's Challenges to the Proceeding
Before analyzing this case under the public interest factors, see
21 U.S.C. 823(f), I note that Respondent has raised several challenges
to DEA's authority to bring this proceeding. Therefore, I will address
these claims to determine whether any of them have merit.
Respondent's first contention is that this proceeding ``violates
the plain terms, meaning and understanding of the'' pre-trial diversion
agreement she entered into with the United States Attorney. Resp. Br.
72. In particular, Respondent asserts that ``the Government agreed that
it would dismiss the charges against [Respondent] (assuming [her]
compliance with the [a]greement) and that she would continue to
practice pain management including the prescribing of Schedule II-V
controlled substances.'' Id. at 71. Respondent thus contends that this
proceeding violates ``the understanding that Dr. Iyer would continue to
practice pain management and to prescribe'' controlled substances.
[[Page 52157]]
I disagre