Department of Defense Personnel Security Program Regulation, 51474-51479 [E6-14361]

Agencies

• Office of the Secretary
• DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 168 (Wednesday, August 30, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 51474-51479]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: E6-14361]


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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 154

[DoD-2006-OS-0038]


Department of Defense Personnel Security Program Regulation

AGENCY: Office of the Secretary, DoD.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule is published to streamline personnel security 
clearance procedures and make the process more efficient within the 
Department of Defense. This will simplify security processing and allow 
the deserving public to obtain a security clearance in a more efficient 
manner.

DATES: This rule is effective September 1, 2006. Written comments 
received at the address indicated below by October 30, 2006 will be 
accepted.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number and or 
RIN number and title, by any of the following methods:
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. 
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
     Mail: Federal Docket Management System Office, 1160 
Defense Pentagon, Washington, DC 20301-1160.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and docket number or Regulatory Information Number (RIN) for this 
Federal Register document. The general policy for comments and other 
submissions from members of the public is to make these submissions 
available for public viewing on the Internet at https://regulations.gov 
as they are received without change, including any personal identifiers 
or contact information.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charleen Wright, 703-697-3039.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This rule is published as an interim rule 
because it takes effect on September 1 under the authority of National 
Security Adviser directing immediate implementation.

Executive Order 12866, ``Regulatory Planning and Review''

    It has been determined that 32 CFR part 154 is not a significant 
regulatory action. The rule does not:
    (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or 
adversely affect in a material way the economy; a section of the 
economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public 
health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or 
communities;
    (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an 
action taken or planned by another Agency;
    (3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, 
user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of 
recipients thereof; or
    (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal 
mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in 
this Executive Order.

Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (Sec. 202, Pub. L. 104-4)

    It has been certified that this rule does not contain a Federal 
mandate that may result in the expenditure by State, local and tribal 
governments, in aggregate, or by the private sector, of $100 million or 
more in any one year.

Public Law 96-354, ``Regulatory Flexibility Act'' (5 U.S.C. 601)

    It has been certified that this rule is not subject to the 
Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not, if 
promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number 
of small entities. This part will streamline personnel security 
clearance procedures and make the process more efficient.

Public Law 96-511, ``Paperwork Reduction Act'' (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

    It has been certified that this rule does impose reporting or 
recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995. 
The reporting and recordkeeping requirements have been submitted to OMB 
for review.

Executive Order 13132, ``Federalism''

    It has been certified that this rule does not have federalism 
implications, as set forth in Executive Order 13132. This rule does not 
have substantial direct effects on:
    (1) The States;
    (2) The relationship between the National Government and the 
States; or
    (3) The distribution of power and responsibilities among the 
various levels of Government.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 154

    Classified information; Government employees; Investigations; 
Security measures.

0
Accordingly, 32 CFR part 154 is amended as follows:

PART 154--DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM 
REGULATION

0
1. The authority citation for 32 CFR part 154 continues to read as 
follows:

    Authority: E.O. 10450, 18 FR 2489, 3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 
936; E.O. 12356, 47 FR

[[Page 51475]]

14874 and 15557, 3 CFR, 1982 Comp., p. 166; E.O. 10865, 25 FR 1583, 
3 CFR, 1959-1963 Comp., p. 398; E.O. 12333, 46 FR 59941, 3 CFR, 1981 
Comp., p. 200

0
2. Appendix H to part 154 is revised to read as follows:

Appendix H to Part 154--Adjudicative Guidelines for Determining 
Eligibility for Access to Classified Information

    1. Introduction. The following adjudicative guidelines are 
established for all U.S. Government civilian and military personnel, 
consultants, contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, 
certificate holders or grantees and their employees, and other 
individuals who require access to classified information. They apply 
to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility for 
access to classified information, to include sensitive compartmented 
information and special access programs, and are to be used by 
government departments and agencies in all final clearance 
determinations. Government departments and agencies may also choose 
to apply these guidelines to analogous situations regarding persons 
being considered for access to other types of protected information.
    Decisions regarding eligibility for access to classified 
information take into account factors that could cause a conflict of 
interest and place a person in the position of having to choose 
between his or her commitments to the United States, including the 
commitment to protect classified information, and any other 
compelling loyalty. Accesses decisions also take into account a 
person's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. No coercive policing could replace the self-
discipline and integrity of the person entrusted with the nation's 
secrets as the most effective means of protecting them. When a 
person's life history shows evidence of unreliability or 
untrustworthiness, questions arise whether the person can be relied 
on and trusted to exercise the responsibility necessary for working 
in a secure environment where protecting classified information is 
paramount.
    2. The adjudicative process.
    (a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient 
period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that 
the person is an acceptable security risk. Eligibility for access to 
classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting 
these personnel security guidelines. The adjudication process is the 
careful weighing of a number of variables known as the whole-person 
concept. Available, reliable information about the person, past and 
present, favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching 
a determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's 
conduct, the adjudicator should consider the following factors:
    (1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;
    (2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include 
knowledgeable participation;
    (3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;
    (4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the 
conduct;
    (5) The extent to which participation is voluntary;
    (6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other 
permanent behavioral changes;
    (7) The motivation for the conduct;
    (8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or 
duress; and
    (9) The likelihood of continuation or recurrence;
    (b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final 
determination remains the responsibility of the specific department 
or agency. Any doubt concerning personnel being considered for 
access to classified information will be resolved in favor of the 
national security.
    (c) The ability to develop specific thresholds for action under 
these guidelines is limited by the nature and complexity of human 
behavior. The ultimate determination of whether the granting or 
continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly 
consistent with the interests of national security must be an 
overall common sense judgment based upon careful consideration of 
the following guidelines, each of which is to be evaluated in the 
context of the whole person.
    (1) GUIDELINE A: Allegiance to the United States;
    (2) GUIDELINE B: Foreign Influence;
    (3) GUIDELINE C: Foreign Preference;
    (4) GUIDELINE D: Sexual Behavior;
    (5) GUIDELINE E: Personal Conduct;
    (6) GUIDELINE F: Financial Considerations;
    (7) GUIDELINE G: Alcohol Consumption;
    (8) GUIDELINE H: Drug Involvement;
    (9) GUIDELINE I: Psychological Conditions;
    (10) GUIDELINE J: Criminal Conduct;
    (11) GUIDELINE K: Handling Protected Information;
    (12) GUIDELINE L: Outside Activities;
    (13) GUIDELINE M: Use of Information Technology Systems
    (d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion 
may not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the 
individual may be disqualified if available information reflects a 
recent or recurring pattern of questionable judgment, 
irresponsibility, or emotionally unstable behavior. Notwithstanding 
the whole-person concept, pursuit of further investigation may be 
terminated by an appropriate adjudicative agency in the face of 
reliable, significant, disqualifying, adverse information.
    (e) When information of security concern becomes known about an 
individual who is currently eligible for access to classified 
information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:
    (1) Voluntarily reported the information;
    (2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
    (3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where 
appropriate;
    (4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security 
concern;
    (5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and 
employment;
    (6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending 
final adjudication of the information.
    (f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the 
adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to 
warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the 
security clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with 
a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in 
revocation of access.

Guideline A: Allegiance To The United States

    3. The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance 
to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified 
information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an 
individual's allegiance to the United States.
    4. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Involvement in, support of, training to commit, or advocacy 
of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason, terrorism, or sedition 
against the United States of America;
    (b) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to 
commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
    (c) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that 
advocate, threaten, or use force or violence, or use any other 
illegal or unconstitutional means, in an effort to:
    (1) Overthrow or influence the government of the United States 
or any state or local government;
    (2) Prevent Federal, state, or local government personnel from 
performing their official duties;
    (3) Gain retribution for perceived wrongs caused by the Federal, 
state, or local government;
    (4) Prevent others from exercising their rights under the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
    5. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the 
individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
    (b) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or 
humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
    (c) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a 
short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic 
interest;
    (d) The involvement or association with such activities occurred 
under such unusual circumstances, or so much time has elapsed, that 
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or loyalty.

Guideline B: Foreign Influence

    6. The concern. Foreign contacts and interests may be a security 
concern if the individual has divided loyalties or foreign financial 
interests, may be manipulated or induced to help a foreign person, 
group, organization, or government in a way that is not in U.S. 
interests, or is vulnerable to pressure or coercion by any foreign 
interest. Adjudication under this Guideline can and should consider 
the identity of the foreign

[[Page 51476]]

country in which the foreign contact or financial interest is 
located, including, but not limited to, such considerations as 
whether the foreign country is known to target United States 
citizens to obtain protected information and/or is associated with a 
risk of terrorism.
    7. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Contact with a foreign family member, business or 
professional associate, friend, or other person who is a citizen of 
or resident in a foreign country if that contact creates a 
heightened risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation, 
pressure, or coercion;
    (b) Connections to a foreign person, group, government, or 
country that create a potential conflict of interest between the 
individual's obligation to protect sensitive information or 
technology and the individual's desire to help a foreign person, 
group, or country by providing that information;
    (c) Counterintelligence information, that may be classified, 
indicates that the individual's access to protected information may 
involve unacceptable risk to national security;
    (d) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless 
of citizenship status, if that relationship creates a heightened 
risk of foreign inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion;
    (e) A substantial business, financial, or property interest in a 
foreign country, or in any foreign-owned or foreign-operated 
business, which could subject the individual to heightened risk of 
foreign influence or exploitation;
    (f) Failure to report, when required, association with a foreign 
national;
    (g) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known agent, 
associate, or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
    (h) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign 
country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual 
to possible future exploitation, inducement, manipulation, pressure, 
or coercion;
    (i) Conduct, especially while traveling outside the U.S., which 
may make the individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or 
coercion by a foreign person, group, government, or country.
    8. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The nature of the relationships with foreign persons, the 
country in which these persons are located, or the positions or 
activities of those persons in that country are such that it is 
unlikely the individual will be placed in a position of having to 
choose between the interests of a foreign individual, group, 
organization, or government and the interests of the U.S.;
    (b) There is no conflict of interest, either because the 
individual's sense of loyalty or obligation to the foreign person, 
group, government, or country is so minimal, or the individual has 
such deep and longstanding relationships and loyalties in the U.S., 
that the individual can be expected to resolve any conflict of 
interest in favor of the U.S. interest;
    (c) Contact or communication with foreign citizens is so casual 
and infrequent that there is little likelihood that it could create 
a risk for foreign influence or exploitation;
    (d) The foreign contacts and activities are on U.S. Government 
business or are approved by the cognizant security authority;
    (e) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency 
requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or 
threats from persons, groups, or organizations from a foreign 
country;
    (f) The value or routine nature of the foreign business, 
financial, or property interests is such that they are unlikely to 
result in a conflict and could not be used effectively to influence, 
manipulate, or pressure the individual.

Guideline C: Foreign Preference

    9. The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to 
indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States, 
then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions 
that are harmful to the interests of the United States.
    10. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Exercise of any right, privilege or obligation of foreign 
citizenship after becoming a U.S. citizen or through the foreign 
citizenship of a family member. This includes but is not limited to:
    (1) Possession of a current foreign passport;
    (2) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign 
country;
    (3) Accepting educational, medical, retirement, social welfare, 
or other such benefits from a foreign country;
    (4) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship 
requirements;
    (5) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business 
interests in another country;
    (6) Seeking or holding political office in a foreign country;
    (7) Voting in a foreign election;
    (b) Action to acquire or obtain recognition of a foreign 
citizenship by an American citizen;
    (c) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise 
acting, so as to serve the interests of a foreign person, group, 
organization, or government in conflict with the national security 
interest;
    (d) Any statement or action that shows allegiance to a country 
other than the United States: for example, declaration of intent to 
renounce United States citizenship; renunciation of United States 
citizenship.
    11. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or 
birth in a foreign country;
    (b) The individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual 
citizenship;
    (c) Exercise of the rights, privileges, or obligations of 
foreign citizenship occurred before the individual became a U.S. 
citizen or when the individual was a minor;
    (d) Use of a foreign passport is approved by the cognizant 
security authority.
    (e) The passport has been destroyed, surrendered to the 
cognizant security authority, or otherwise invalidated;
    (f) The vote in a foreign election was encouraged by the United 
States Government.

Guideline D: Sexual Behavior

    12. The concern. Sexual behavior that involves a criminal 
offense indicates a personality or emotional disorder, reflects lack 
of judgment or discretion, or which may subject the individual to 
undue influence or coercion, exploitation, or duress can raise 
questions about an individual's reliability, trustworthiness and 
ability to protect classified information. No adverse inference 
concerning the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on 
the basis of the sexual orientation of the individual.
    13. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the 
individual has been prosecuted;
    (b) A pattern of compulsive, self-destructive, or high risk 
sexual behavior that the person is unable to stop or that may be 
symptomatic of a personality disorder;
    (c) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable 
to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
    (d) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that reflects lack 
of discretion or judgment.
    14. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The behavior occurred prior to or during adolescence and 
there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
    (b) The sexual behavior happened so long ago, so infrequently, 
or under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to recur 
and does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (c) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, 
exploitation, or duress.
    (d) The sexual behavior is strictly private, consensual, and 
discreet.

Guideline E: Personal Conduct

    15. The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment, lack 
of candor, dishonesty, or unwillingness to comply with rules and 
regulations can raise questions about an individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness and ability to protect classified information. Of 
special interest is any failure to provide truthful and candid 
answers during the security clearance process or any other failure 
to cooperate with the security clearance process.
    The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance 
action or administrative termination of further processing for 
clearance eligibility:
    (a) Refusal, or failure without reasonable cause, to undergo or 
cooperate with security processing, including but not limited to 
meeting with a security investigator for subject interview, 
completing security forms or releases, and cooperation with medical 
or psychological evaluation;
    (b) Refusal to provide full, frank and truthful answers to 
lawful questions of investigators, security officials, or other 
official representatives in connection with a personnel security or 
trustworthiness determination.
    16. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of 
relevant facts from any

[[Page 51477]]

personnel security questionnaire, personal history statement, or 
similar form used to conduct investigations, determine employment 
qualifications, award benefits or status, determine security 
clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or award fiduciary 
responsibilities;
    (b) Deliberately providing false or misleading information 
concerning relevant facts to an employer, investigator, security 
official, competent medical authority, or other official government 
representative;
    (c) Credible adverse information in several adjudicative issue 
areas that is not sufficient for an adverse determination under any 
other single guideline, but which, when considered as a whole, 
supports a whole-person assessment of questionable judgment, 
untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, unwillingness to 
comply with rules and regulations, or other characteristics 
indicating that the person may not properly safeguard protected 
information;
    (d) Credible adverse information that is not explicitly covered 
under any other guideline and may not be sufficient by itself for an 
adverse determination, but which, when combined with all available 
information supports a whole-person assessment of questionable 
judgment, untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, 
unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations, or other 
characteristics indicating that the person may not properly 
safeguard protected information. This includes but is not limited to 
consideration of:
    (1) Untrustworthy or unreliable behavior to include breach of 
client confidentiality, release of proprietary information, 
unauthorized release of sensitive corporate or other government 
protected information:
    (2) Disruptive, violent, or other inappropriate behavior in the 
workplace;
    (3) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations;
    (4) Evidence of significant misuse of Government or other 
employer's time or resources;
    (e) Personal conduct or concealment of information about one's 
conduct that creates a vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, 
or duress, such as:
    (1) Engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the 
person's personal, professional, or community standing, or
    (2) While in another country, engaging in any activity that is 
illegal in that country or that is legal in that country but illegal 
in the United States and may serve as a basis for exploitation or 
pressure by the foreign security or intelligence service or other 
group;
    (f) violation of a written or recorded commitment made by the 
individual to the employer as a condition of employment;
    (g) association with persons involved in criminal activity.
    17. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct 
the omission, concealment, or falsification before being confronted 
with the facts;
    (b) The refusal or failure to cooperate, omission, or 
concealment was caused or significantly contributed to by improper 
or inadequate advice of authorized personnel or legal counsel 
advising or instructing the individual specifically concerning the 
security clearance process. Upon being made aware of the requirement 
to cooperate or provide the information, the individual cooperated 
fully and truthfully.
    (c) The offense is so minor, or so much time has passed, or the 
behavior is so infrequent, or it happened under such unique 
circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt 
on the individual's reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (d) The individual has acknowledged the behavior and obtained 
counseling to change the behavior or taken other positive steps to 
alleviate the stressors, circumstances, or factors that caused 
untrustworthy, unreliable, or other inappropriate behavior, and such 
behavior is unlikely to recur;
    (e) The individual has taken positive steps to reduce or 
eliminate vulnerability to exploitation, manipulation, or duress;
    (f) The information was unsubstantiated or from a source of 
questionable reliability;
    (g) Association with persons involved in criminal activity has 
ceased or occurs under circumstances that do not cast doubt upon the 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness, judgment, or willingness 
to comply with rules and regulations.

Guideline F: Financial Considerations

    18. The concern. Failure or inability to live within one's 
means, satisfy debts, and meet financial obligations may indicate 
poor self-control, lack of judgment, or unwillingness to abide by 
rules and regulations, all of which can raise questions about an 
individual's reliability, trustworthiness and ability to protect 
classified information. An individual who is financially 
overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to 
generate funds. Compulsive gambling is a concern as it may lead to 
financial crimes including espionage. Affluence that cannot be 
explained by known sources of income is also a security concern. It 
may indicate proceeds from financially profitable criminal acts.
    19. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
    (b) Indebtedness caused by frivolous or irresponsible spending 
and the absence of any evidence of willingness or intent to pay the 
debt or establish a realistic plan to pay the debt.
    (c) A history of not meeting financial obligations;
    (d) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as 
embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, 
expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other 
intentional financial breaches of trust;
    (e) Consistent spending beyond one's means, which may be 
indicated by excessive indebtedness, significant negative cash flow, 
high debt-to-income ratio, and/or other financial analysis;
    (f) Financial problems that are linked to drug abuse, 
alcoholism, gambling problems, or other issues of security concern;
    (g) Failure to file annual Federal, state, or local income tax 
returns as required or the fraudulent filing of the same;
    (h) Unexplained affluence, as shown by a lifestyle or standard 
of living, increase in net worth, or money transfers that cannot be 
explained by subject's known legal sources of income;
    (i) Compulsive or addictive gambling as indicated by an 
unsuccessful attempt to stop gambling, ``chasing losses'' (i.e. 
increasing the bets or returning another day in an effort to get 
even), concealment of gambling losses, borrowing money to fund 
gambling or pay gambling debts, family conflict or other problems 
caused by gambling.
    20. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
occurred under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur and 
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) The conditions that resulted in the financial problem were 
largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a 
business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce 
or separation), and the individual acted responsibly under the 
circumstances;
    (c) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the 
problem and/or there are clear indications that the problem is being 
resolved or is under control;
    (d) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay 
overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts;
    (e) The individual has a reasonable basis to dispute the 
legitimacy of the past-due debt which is the cause of the problem 
and provides documented proof to substantiate the basis of the 
dispute or provides evidence of actions to resolve the issue;
    (f) The affluence resulted from a legal source of income.

Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption

    21. The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to 
the exercise of questionable judgment or the failure to control 
impulses, and can raise questions about an individual's reliability 
and trustworthiness.
    22. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Alcohol-related incidents away from work, such as driving 
while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, 
disturbing the peace, or other incidents of concern, regardless of 
whether the individual is diagnosed as an alcohol abuser or alcohol 
dependent;
    (b) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for 
work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on 
the job, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed as an 
alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
    (c) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of 
impaired judgment, regardless of whether the individual is diagnosed 
as an alcohol abuser or alcohol dependent;
    (d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., 
physician, clinical

[[Page 51478]]

psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or alcohol 
dependence;
    (e) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a 
licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member of a 
recognized alcohol treatment program;
    (f) Relapse after diagnosis of alcohol abuse or dependence and 
completion of an alcohol rehabilitation program;
    (g) Failure to follow any court order regarding alcohol 
education, evaluation, treatment, or abstinence.
    23. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) So much time has passed, or the behavior was so infrequent, 
or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is unlikely 
to recur or does not cast doubt on the individual's current 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) The individual acknowledges his or her alcoholism or issues 
of alcohol abuse, provides evidence of actions taken to overcome 
this problem, and has established a pattern of abstinence (if 
alcohol dependent) or responsible use (if an alcohol abuser);
    (c) The individual is a current employee who is participating in 
a counseling or treatment program, has no history of previous 
treatment and relapse, and is making satisfactory progress;
    (d) The individual has successfully completed inpatient or 
outpatient counseling or rehabilitation along with any required 
aftercare, has demonstrated a clear and established pattern of 
modified consumption or abstinence in accordance with treatment 
recommendations, such as participation in meetings of Alcoholics 
Anonymous or a similar organization and has received a favorable 
prognosis by a duly qualified medical professional or a licensed 
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized alcohol 
treatment program.

Guideline H: Drug Involvement

    24. The concern. Use of an illegal drug or misuse of a 
prescription drug can raise questions about an individual's 
reliability and trustworthiness, both because it may impair judgment 
and because it raises questions about a person's ability or 
willingness to comply with laws, rules, and regulations.
    (a) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, 
and include:
    (1) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified 
and listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended 
(e.g., marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, 
and hallucinogens), and
    (2) Inhalants and other similar substances;
    (b) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal 
drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.
    25. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Any drug abuse (see above definition); \1\
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    \1\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986 any person who is an 
unlawful user of, or is addicted to, a controlled substance as 
defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
802), may not be granted or have renewed their access to classified 
information.
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    (b) Testing positive for illegal drug use;
    (c) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, 
manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution; or possession of drug 
paraphernalia;
    (d) Diagnosis by a duly qualified medical professional (e.g., 
physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or 
drug dependence;
    (e) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed 
clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug 
treatment program;
    (f) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program 
prescribed by a duly qualified medical professional;
    (g) Any illegal drug use after being granted a security 
clearance;
    (h) Expressed intent to continue illegal drug use, or failure to 
clearly and convincingly commit to discontinue drug use.
    26. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The behavior happened so long ago, was so infrequent, or 
happened under such circumstances that it is unlikely to recur or 
does not cast doubt on the individual's current reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future, 
such as:
    (1) Disassociation from drug-using associates and contacts;
    (2) Changing or avoiding the environment where drugs were used;
    (3) An appropriate period of abstinence;
    (4) A signed statement of intent with automatic revocation of 
clearance for any violation;
    (c) Abuse of prescription drugs was after a severe or prolonged 
illness during which these drugs were prescribed, and abuse has 
since ended;
    (d) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment 
program, including but not limited to rehabilitation and aftercare 
requirements, without recurrence of abuse, and a favorable prognosis 
by a duly qualified medical professional.

Guideline I: Psychological Conditions

    27. The concern. Certain emotional, mental, and personality 
conditions can impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness. A 
formal diagnosis of a disorder is not required for there to be a 
concern under this guideline. A duly qualified mental health 
professional (e.g., clinical psychologist or psychiatrist) employed 
by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. Government, should be 
consulted when evaluating potentially disqualifying and mitigating 
information under this guideline. No negative inference concerning 
the standards in this Guideline may be raised solely on the basis of 
seeking mental health counseling.
    28. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Behavior that casts doubt on an individual's judgment, 
reliability, or trustworthiness that is not covered under any other 
guideline, including but not limited to emotionally unstable, 
irresponsible, dysfunctional, violent, paranoid, or bizarre 
behavior;
    (b) An opinion by a duly qualified mental health professional 
that the individual has a condition not covered under any other 
guideline that may impair judgment, reliability, or trustworthiness; 
\2\
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    \2\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, any person who is 
mentally incompetent, as determined by a credentialed mental health 
professional approved by the Department of Defense, may not be 
granted or have renewed their access to classified information.
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    (c) The individual has failed to follow treatment advice related 
to a diagnosed emotional, mental, or personality condition, e.g., 
failure to take prescribed medication.
    29. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) The identified condition is readily controllable with 
treatment, and the individual has demonstrated ongoing and 
consistent compliance with the treatment plan;
    (b) The individual has voluntarily entered a counseling or 
treatment program for a condition that is amenable to treatment, and 
the individual is currently receiving counseling or treatment with a 
favorable prognosis by a duly qualified mental health professional;
    (c) Recent opinion by a duly qualified mental health 
professional employed by, or acceptable to and approved by the U.S. 
Government that an individual's previous condition is under control 
or in remission, and has a low probability of recurrence or 
exacerbation;
    (d) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition 
(e.g., one caused by death, illness, or marital breakup), the 
situation has been resolved, and the individual no longer shows 
indications of emotional instability;
    (e) There is no indication of a current problem.

Guideline J: Criminal Conduct

    30. The concern. Criminal activity creates doubt about a 
person's judgment, reliability, and trustworthiness. By its very 
nature, it calls into question a person's ability or willingness to 
comply with laws, rules and regulations.
    31. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses;
    (b) Discharge or dismissal from the Armed Forces under 
dishonorable conditions; \3\
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    \3\ Under the provisions of 10 U.S.C. 986, a person who has 
received a dishonorable discharge or has been dismissed from the 
Armed Forces may not be granted or have renewed access to classified 
information. In a meritorious case, the Secretaries of the Military 
Departments or designee; or the Directors of WHS, DIA, NSA, DOHA or 
designee may authorize a waiver of this prohibition.
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    (c) Allegation or admission of criminal conduct, regardless of 
whether the person was formally charged, formally prosecuted or 
convicted;
    (d) Individual is currently on parole or probation;
    (e) Violation of parole or probation, or failure to complete a 
court-mandated rehabilitation program;
    (f) Conviction in a Federal or State court, including a court-
martial of a crime,

[[Page 51479]]

sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and 
incarcerated as a result of that sentence for not less than a 
year.\4\
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    \4\ Under the above mentioned statute, a person who has been 
convicted in a Federal or State court, including courts martial, 
sentenced to imprisonment for a term exceeding one year and 
incarcerated for not less than one year, may not be granted or have 
renewed access to classified information. The same waiver provision 
also applies.
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    32. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) So much time has elapsed since the criminal behavior 
happened, or it happened under such unusual circumstances that it is 
unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act 
and those pressures are no longer present in the person's life;
    (c) Evidence that the person did not commit the offense;
    (d) There is evidence of successful rehabilitation; including 
but not limited to the passage of time without recurrence of 
criminal activity, remorse or restitution, job training or higher 
education, good employment record, or constructive community 
involvement;
    (e) Potentially disqualifying conditions 31. (b) and (f) may not 
be mitigated unless, where meritorious circumstances exist, the 
Secretaries of the Military Departments or designee; or the 
Directors of Washington Headquarters Services (WHS), Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA), National Security Agency (NSA), Defense 
Office of Hearings and Appeals (DOHA) or designee has granted a 
waiver.

Guideline K: Handling Protected Information

    33. The concern. Deliberate or negligent failure to comply with 
rules and regulations for protecting classified or other sensitive 
information raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, 
judgment, reliability, or willingness and ability to safeguard such 
information, and is a serious security concern.
    34. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Deliberate or negligent disclosure of classified or other 
protected information to unauthorized persons, including but not 
limited to personal or business contacts, to the media, or to 
persons present at seminars, meetings, or conferences;
    (b) Collecting or storing classified or other protected 
information at home or in any other unauthorized location;
    (c) Loading, drafting, editing, modifying, storing, 
transmitting, or otherwise handling classified reports, data, or 
other information on any unapproved equipment including but not 
limited to any typewriter, word processor, or computer hardware, 
software, drive, system, gameboard, handheld, ``palm'' or pocket 
device or other adjunct equipment;
    (d) Inappropriate efforts to obtain or view classified or other 
protected information outside one's need to know;
    (e) Copying classified or other protected information in a 
manner designed to conceal or remove classification or other 
document control markings;
    (f) Viewing or downloading information from a secure system when 
the information is beyond the individual's need-to-know;
    (g) Any failure to comply with rules for the protection of 
classified or other sensitive information;
    (h) Negligence or lax security habits that persist despite 
counseling by management.
    (i) Failure to comply with rules or regulations that results in 
damage to the National Security, regardless of whether it was 
deliberate or negligent.
    35. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior, or it has 
happened so infrequently or under such unusual circumstances, that 
it is unlikely to recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's 
current reliability, trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) The individual responded favorably to counseling or remedial 
security training and now demonstrates a positive attitude toward 
the discharge of security responsibilities;
    (c) The security violations were due to improper or inadequate 
training.

Guideline L: Outside Activities

    36. The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside 
employment or activities is of security concern if it poses a 
conflict of interest with an individual's security responsibilities 
and could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of 
classified information.
    37. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Any employment or service, whether compensated or volunteer, 
with:
    (1) The government of a foreign country;
    (2) Any foreign national, organization, or other entity;
    (3) A representative of any foreign interest;
    (4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or 
person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material 
on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology;
    (b) Failure to report or fully disclose an outside activity when 
this is required.
    38. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) Evaluation of the outside employment or activity by the 
appropriate security or counterintelligence office indicates that it 
does not pose a conflict with an individual's security 
responsibilities or with the national security interests of the 
United States;
    (b) The individual terminated the employment or discontinued the 
activity upon being notified that it was in conflict with his or her 
security responsibilities.

Guideline M: Use of Information Technology Systems

    39. The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, 
guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology 
systems may raise security concerns about an individual's 
reliability and trustworthiness, calling into question the 
willingness or ability to properly protect sensitive systems, 
networks, and information. Information Technology Systems include 
all related computer hardware, software, firmware, and data used for 
the communication, transmission, processing, manipulation, storage, 
or protection of information.
    40. Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be 
disqualifying include:
    (a) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information 
technology system or component thereof;
    (b) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, 
manipulation or denial of access to information, software, firmware, 
or hardware in an information technology system;
    (c) Use of any information technology system to gain 
unauthorized access to another system or to a compartmented area 
within the same system;
    (d) Downloading, storing, or transmitting classified information 
on or to any unauthorized software, hardware, or information 
technology system;
    (e) Unauthorized use of a government or other information 
technology system;
    (f) Introduction, removal, or duplication of hardware, firmware, 
software, or media to or from any information technology system 
without authorization, when prohibited by rules, procedures, 
guidelines or regulations;
    (g) Negligence or lax security habits in handling information 
technology that persist despite counseling by management;
    (h) Any misuse of information technology, whether deliberate or 
negligent, that results in damage to the national security.
    41. Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
    (a) So much time has elapsed since the behavior happened, or it 
happened under such unusual circumstances, that it is unlikely to 
recur and does not cast doubt on the individual's reliability, 
trustworthiness, or good judgment;
    (b) The misuse was minor and done only in the interest of 
organizational efficiency and effectiveness, such as letting another 
person use one's password or computer when no other timely 
alternative was readily available;
    (c) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent and was 
followed by a prompt, good-faith effort to correct the situation and 
by notification of supervisor.

    Dated: August 23, 2006.
L.M. Bynum,
OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, DoD.
 [FR Doc. E6-14361 Filed 8-29-06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 5001-06-P