Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport, 51360-51380 [06-7207]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 167 (Tuesday, August 29, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 51360-51380]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-7207]



[[Page 51359]]

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Part III





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Part 93



Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 167 / Tuesday, August 29, 2006 / 
Proposed Rules

[[Page 51360]]


DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION




Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 93

[Docket No. FAA-2006-25709; Notice No. 06-13]
RIN 2120-AI70


Congestion Management Rule for LaGuardia Airport

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: The FAA is proposing a rule to address the potential for 
increased congestion and delay at New York's LaGuardia Airport 
(LaGuardia) when the High Density Rule (HDR) expires there on January 
1, 2007. The rule, if adopted, would establish an operational limit on 
the number of aircraft landing and taking off at the airport. To offset 
the effect of this limit, the proposed rule would increase utilization 
of the airport by encouraging the use of larger aircraft through 
implementing an airport-wide, average aircraft size requirement 
designed to increase the number of passengers that may use the airport 
within the overall proposed operational limits.

DATES: Send your comments on or before October 30, 2006.

ADDRESSES: You may send comments [identified by Docket Number FAA-2006-
25709] using any of the following methods:
     DOT Docket Web site: Go to https://dms.dot.gov and follow 
the instructions for sending your comments electronically.
     Government-wide rulemaking Web site: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov and follow the instructions for sending your 
comments electronically.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility; U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590-0001.
     Fax: 1-202-493-2251.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
    For more information on the rulemaking process, see the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.
    Privacy: We will post all comments we receive, without change, to 
https://dms.dot.gov, including any personal information you provide. For 
more information, see the Privacy Act discussion in the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION section of this document.
    Docket: To read background documents or comments received, go to 
https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to Room PL-401 on the plaza level of 
the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC, between 9 
a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Molly W. Smith, Office of Aviation 
Policy and Plans, APO-001, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 
Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-
3275; e-mail molly.w.smith@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited

    The FAA invites interested persons to participate in this 
rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also 
invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or 
federalism impacts that might result from adopting the proposals in 
this document. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion 
of the proposal, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include supporting data. We ask that you send us two copies of written 
comments.
    We will file in the docket all comments we receive, as well as a 
report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel 
concerning this proposed rulemaking. The docket is available for public 
inspection before and after the comment closing date. If you wish to 
review the docket in person, go to the address in the ADDRESSES section 
of this preamble between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 
except Federal holidays. You may also review the docket using the 
Internet at the Web address in the ADDRESSES section.
    Privacy Act: Using the search function of our docket Web site, 
anyone can find and read the comments received into any of our dockets, 
including the name of the individual sending the comment (or signing 
the comment on behalf of an association, business, labor union, etc.). 
You may review DOT's complete Privacy Act Statement in the Federal 
Register published on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477-78) or you may visit 
https://dms.dot.gov. 
    Before acting on this proposal, we will consider all comments we 
receive on or before the closing date for comments. We will consider 
comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring 
expense or delay. We may change this proposal in light of the comments 
we receive.
    If you want the FAA to acknowledge receipt of your comments on this 
proposal, include with your comments a pre-addressed, stamped postcard 
on which the docket number appears. We will stamp the date on the 
postcard and mail it to you.

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/. 
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the docket number, notice number, or amendment number 
of this rulemaking.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The FAA has broad authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103 to regulate the 
use of the navigable airspace of the United States. This section 
authorizes the FAA to develop plans and policy for the use of navigable 
airspace and to assign the use that the FAA deems necessary for its 
safe and efficient utilization. It further directs the FAA to prescribe 
air traffic rules and regulations governing the efficient utilization 
of the navigable airspace. The FAA interprets its broad statutory 
authority to ensure the efficient use of the navigable airspace to 
encompass management of the nationwide system of air commerce and air 
traffic control.
    In addition to the FAA's authority and responsibilities with 
respect to the efficient use of airspace, the Secretary of 
Transportation is required to consider several other objectives as 
being in the public interest, including: Keeping available a variety of 
adequate, economic, efficient, and low-priced air services; placing 
maximum reliance on competitive market forces and on actual and 
potential competition; avoiding airline industry conditions that would 
tend to allow at least one air carrier unreasonably to increase prices, 
reduce services, or exclude competition in air transportation; 
encouraging, developing, and maintaining an air transportation system 
relying on actual and potential

[[Page 51361]]

competition; encouraging entry into air transportation markets by new 
and existing air carriers and the continued strengthening of small air 
carriers to ensure a more effective and competitive airline industry; 
maintaining a complete and convenient system of scheduled air 
transportation for small communities; ensuring that consumers in all 
regions of the United States, including those in small communities and 
rural and remote areas, have access to affordable, regularly scheduled 
air service; and acting consistently with obligations of the U.S. 
Government under international agreements. See 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(4), 
(6), (10)-(13) and (16), and 40105(b).

I. Background

A. The High Density Traffic Airports Rule at LaGuardia

    The FAA manages congestion and delay at LaGuardia by means of the 
HDR, which is codified under 14 CFR part 93, subpart K. The HDR took 
effect in 1969 as a temporary rule, but since it was effective in 
reducing congestion and delays, it became permanent in 1973.
    The HDR establishes limits on the number of take-offs and landings 
during certain hours at five airports, including LaGuardia.\1\ In order 
to operate during the restricted hours, a carrier needs a reservation, 
commonly known as a ``slot.'' Slots were initially allocated through 
airline scheduling committees, operating under then-authorized 
antitrust immunity, and the airlines would agree to the allocation. 
After the Airline Deregulation Act in 1978, new entrant airlines 
formed, and the pre-existing legacy carriers sought to expand their 
operations. This increased competition made it even more difficult for 
airlines to reach agreement, and the scheduling committees began to 
deadlock.
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    \1\ The limits at Newark were suspended in 1970 and were 
eliminated at Chicago O'Hare International Airport in July 2002.
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    In 1985, a new Subpart S was added to Part 93 by the Department of 
Transportation that established allocation procedures for slots, 
including Use-or-Lose provisions and permission to buy and sell slots 
in a secondary market (50 FR 52195, December 20, 1985). These 
procedures replaced the scheduling committees.
    On April 5, 2000, Congress enacted the Wendell H. Ford Aviation 
Investment and Reform Act of the 21st Century (AIR-21 or the Act). The 
Act phases out the HDR at three of the covered airports, with the rule 
scheduled to terminate at LaGuardia on January 1, 2007. Additionally, 
AIR-21 expanded existing operations at LaGuardia by directing the 
Secretary of Transportation to grant exemptions for certain flights 
from the HDR's operational limits prior to the HDR's termination at 
that airport. Specifically, AIR-21 authorized exemptions for flights 
operated by new entrant carriers or certain flights that would serve 
Small-Hub and Non-Hub Airports as long as the aircraft being used has 
fewer than 71 seats.
    In phasing out the HDR, Congress recognized the possibility that 
there could be an increase in congestion and delay at the affected 
airports. Therefore, under the section that phases out the rule, the 
Act states that ``[n]othing in this section * * * shall be construed * 
* * as affecting the Federal Aviation Administration's authority for 
safety and the movement of air traffic.'' 49 U.S.C. 41715(b).

B. Resurgence of Unacceptable Levels of Congestion at LaGuardia

    As a result of the AIR-21 legislation, the DOT approved more than 
600 exemption requests for flights at LaGuardia. By fall 2000, air 
carriers had added over 300 new scheduled flights at LaGuardia, with 
plans to operate more in the coming months.
    With no new airport infrastructure or air traffic control 
procedures, overall airport capacity remained the same while the number 
of aircraft operations and delays soared. The average minutes of delay 
for all arriving flights at LaGuardia increased 144%: From 15.52 
minutes in March 2000 (the month before AIR-21 was enacted) to 37.86 
minutes in September 2000.\2\ The increase in delay as a result of AIR-
21 was not limited to delays at LaGuardia. Flights that arrived and 
departed late at LaGuardia affected flights at other airports and in 
adjacent airspace as well, and by September 2000, flight delays at 
LaGuardia accounted for 25 percent of the nation's delays, compared to 
10 percent for the previous year.\3\
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    \2\ Source: FAA's Aviation System Performance Metrics (ASPM).
    \3\ Calculated from FAA's Air Traffic Operations Network 
Database (OPSNET).
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    Concerned about the accelerating levels of congestion, flight 
delays, and cancellations and the prospects of reaching gridlock, the 
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (Port Authority) attempted to 
impose a temporary moratorium on new flights at LaGuardia and requested 
the assistance of the FAA. Using its authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103, 
and pending the development of a longer term solution, the FAA 
published a Notice of Intent in the Federal Register on November 15, 
2000, announcing its intention to temporarily cap AIR-21 slot 
exemptions at LaGuardia and to allocate them via a lottery (65 FR 
69126, November 15, 2000). The lottery, which was conducted on December 
4, 2000, was premised on the imposition of an airfield and airspace 
capacity management limit of 75 scheduled operations per hour (plus 6 
unscheduled operations primarily used by the general aviation 
community) beginning January 31, 2001 (65 FR 75765, December 4, 2000). 
This limit still allowed a significant increase in operations at the 
airport above the regulatory limits, thus serving Congressional 
objectives while stretching capacity to its practical limits. The 
number of AIR-21 slot exemptions at LaGuardia was restricted to a total 
of 159 a day between the hours of 7 a.m. and 9:59 p.m. As a result of 
the hourly restrictions, the average number of aircraft delays at 
LaGuardia fell from 330 per day in October 2000 to 98 per day in April 
2001.
    The December 4, 2000, limits on AIR-21 slot exemptions and the 
lottery allocation has been extended several times to allow the FAA to 
explore other options to control delay at the airport. Most recently, 
the FAA announced in the Federal Register a fourteen months extension 
to the current limits and allocation of slot exemptions at LaGuardia 
through December 31, 2006 (70 FR 36998, June 27, 2005).
    Because LaGuardia airport is relatively close to mid-town 
Manhattan, many travelers prefer it, and airlines wish to meet that 
demand by operating many flights to LaGuardia. LaGuardia Airport 
consistently has been one of most congested airports in the nation. 
These facts, coupled with the inability to expand the physical airspace 
and airfield capacity of the airport, makes LaGuardia one of the most 
constrained airports in our national system. Passenger demand for 
access to LaGuardia exceeds available airspace and airfield capacity at 
the airport. This proposed rule aims to maximize the utilization of 
this airport, without generating unacceptable congestion and delay.

C. Research Into Market-Based and Administrative Alternatives at 
LaGuardia

    Over the past several years, the FAA and the DOT's Office of the 
Secretary of Transportation (OST) have taken a number of steps to 
identify and develop a market-based mechanism to allocate limited 
capacity at LaGuardia.

[[Page 51362]]

    On June 12, 2001, the FAA published a variety of congestion 
management alternatives in the Federal Register, including the use of 
auctions, congestion pricing and administrative alternatives, and 
sought the public's views on the potential use of each of these 
mechanisms at LaGuardia (66 FR 31731). Due to the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks, the immediate need to develop a solution at 
LaGuardia was tempered because of the corresponding decrease in 
passenger demand. The FAA still received a substantial number of 
comments. The comments varied--some supported market-based measures, 
such as congestion pricing, while others recognized that the best 
solution might incorporate administrative allocation mechanisms. The 
FAA and OST have evaluated the comments and considered them in our 
research initiatives. We also have incorporated the views of the 
industry in the development of both this proposal and the legislation 
we intend to seek that would permit a market-based means of controlling 
congestion and delay at LaGuardia.
1. Auction Roundtable
    In July 2004, the FAA held a roundtable to discuss the use of 
auctions to allocate capacity at LaGuardia. The purpose of the 
roundtable was twofold. First, the roundtable exposed senior FAA and 
OST officials to auctions and the issues surrounding their potential 
implementation at LaGuardia. Second, it served as an initial 
stakeholder meeting to seek comment on the possible use of auctions.
    Several participants pointed to issues that would need to be 
addressed prior to implementing an auction of take-off or landing 
authorizations at LaGuardia, including the notion of incumbency; 
associated property rights and their duration, if any; the impact that 
auctions may have on airport revenues; predictability of the auction 
outcome; the impact on small communities; and the financial impact on 
the air carriers and their customers. Because of these concerns, the 
air carriers that participated in the roundtable appeared largely 
unenthusiastic about the potential use of auctions at LaGuardia.
    However, several advantages to an auction also were noted. For 
example, auctions effectively allocate scarce resources under market 
conditions and thus seem less arbitrary in nature than allocating slots 
under an administrative solution (such as a lottery). Another benefit 
to auctions is that they rely on markets, which are more robust and 
responsive to industry changes than administrative regulations. These 
potential benefits have been echoed by the Department of Justice in its 
comments on another congestion management rulemaking involving 
operations at Chicago's O'Hare International Airport. In its comments, 
the Department stated that, ``a well-designed slot auction would both 
assign prices and allocate efficiently scarce airport resources, and 
limit the maintenance or accumulation of market power by individual 
carriers.'' \4\
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    \4\ Comments of the United States Department of Justice in 
Docket No. FAA-2005-20704. May 24, 2005, pp. 11-13.
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    Thus, if the complexities associated with implementing an auction 
at LaGuardia can be resolved, an auction could provide an economically 
efficient mechanism for allocating ``Operating Authorizations'' \5\ at 
the airport in the future.
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    \5\ As proposed, an Operating Authorization is the operational 
authority assigned to an air carrier by the FAA to conduct one 
scheduled IFR arrival or departure operation each week on a specific 
day of the week during a specific 15-minute period at LaGuardia.
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2. Congestion Pricing Forum
    The FAA arranged a forum in February 2005 to explore the use of 
congestion pricing at airports. The series of presentations addressed 
the applicability of congestion pricing to control aviation capacity, 
with a focus on LaGuardia, and included presentations on the 
Massachusetts Port Authority's (Massport) congestion pricing proposal 
for Logan International Airport, as well as highway and energy peak 
period pricing programs. Several participants believed that Massport's 
model could not be successfully deployed at LaGuardia because the level 
of demand at LaGuardia is perceived to be too high to implement a 
revenue-neutral congestion pricing policy, as adopted at Boston Logan 
Airport. However, other participants believed a congestion pricing 
mechanism was feasible and would provide benefits associated with 
allowing the market to allocate capacity without the need for 
government imposed slot restrictions.
3. National Center of Excellence for Aviation Operations Research
    The FAA and OST also contracted with the National Center of 
Excellence for Aviation Operations Research (NEXTOR) to conduct 
research on various proposals to implement at LaGuardia upon the 
expiration of the HDR. As part of that research, NEXTOR has conducted a 
number of strategic simulations with industry in an effort to design 
and assess the potential effectiveness of various allocation 
mechanisms. These mechanisms include auctions, congestion pricing, and 
various administrative measures.
    In November 2004, NEXTOR conducted a 2-day simulation of congestion 
pricing and various administrative measures at LaGuardia. The FAA, OST, 
several industry stakeholders and airlines attended the workshop. The 
simulation measured airline responses to a variety of congestion 
pricing fees and administrative rules.
    In February 2005, NEXTOR conducted a second strategic simulation in 
which it demonstrated how an auction model could be used to allocate 
capacity. The simulation was structured around a mock auction for 
arrival and departure slots at LaGuardia. The purpose of this 
simulation was to familiarize the relevant industry and government 
communities with auction processes and the specifics of modern slot 
auction design. The exercise also elicited views from industry and 
government representatives on the overall policy of using auctions to 
allocate arrival and departure capacity. The feedback gathered during 
this simulation exercise has generated further FAA and OST research on 
auctions. In particular, more work has been done to better anticipate 
the impact of aligning ``slots'' with necessary gate space. 
Additionally, the FAA and OST have worked with NEXTOR to develop 
auction rules that could incorporate exemptions for service to small 
communities.
    This information will also be incorporated in a legislative 
proposal to Congress that will seek authority to utilize market-based 
mechanisms at LaGuardia in the future. Such legislation would be 
necessary to employ market-based approaches such as auctions or 
congestion pricing at LaGuardia because the FAA currently does not have 
the statutory authority to assess market-clearing charges for a landing 
or departure authorization. If Congress approves the use of market-
based mechanisms as we plan to propose, a new rulemaking would be 
necessary to implement such measures at LaGuardia.

II. Continued Need To Limit Operations at LaGuardia

    Today's proposal anticipates the complete phase-out of the HDR at 
LaGuardia on January 1, 2007, as required by AIR-21. In response, the 
FAA could simply allow the HDR to expire and to let events run their 
course without FAA intervention. This approach would permit each 
individual airline to manage (and potentially

[[Page 51363]]

increase) its own flights. Air traffic control procedures and traffic 
management initiatives such as ground delay programs, miles-in-trail 
restrictions, and aircraft re-routing, would help to ensure that any 
additional flights did not affect air safety. However, the congestion 
and delays experienced in the wake of AIR-21 flight additions would 
likely recur if limitations on the hourly operations at LaGuardia were 
not adopted. Indeed, because the delays in late 2000 resulted from just 
two types of operations, it is likely that a complete expiration of the 
HDR would lead to even greater delays absent a regulation designed to 
avert precipitous growth in operations.
    Because the cost of delays is not fully internalized by any 
individual carrier, both experience and theory suggest that without any 
constraint, each carrier would, at least initially, continue adding 
flights despite an unacceptable level of congestion and delay. This was 
precisely the situation in 2000, and the airport cannot accommodate, 
nor can the FAA permit, such unrestrained growth at LaGuardia. Delays 
at LaGuardia have a significant detrimental impact on the rest of the 
national airspace system, leading to nationwide delay and inefficiency. 
Because simply allowing the HDR to expire is not a desirable option at 
LaGuardia, the FAA believes that some regulatory action to limit 
congestion at the airport is necessary.
    LaGuardia cannot realistically expand its runway infrastructure 
because it borders on Bowery Bay and Flushing Bay. Thus, an airport 
expansion project like that proposed for Chicago's O'Hare International 
Airport is not feasible. Because of these groundside constraints, air 
traffic management improvements such as airspace redesign or changes to 
separation standards would permit minimal capacity increases at most. 
Even if these efficiencies can be realized, operating constraints 
likely still will be needed at LaGuardia because of its physical 
limitations, including runway and taxiway constraints.
    The FAA is committed to ensuring that excessive delays and 
congestion do not return at LaGuardia after the HDR expires. The FAA 
and OST are evaluating appropriate market-based mechanisms, such as 
auctions or congestion pricing, for allocating capacity at LaGuardia 
over the long-term. The FAA currently does not have full legislative 
authority to employ such mechanisms at LaGuardia or at other airports, 
although the Port Authority could currently implement revenue-neutral 
congestion pricing or other mechanisms regarding operating rights so 
long as such changes did not require a fee or assessment by the Federal 
Government and the Port Authority's program otherwise would be 
reasonable, nonarbitrary and nondiscriminatory; would not create an 
undue burden on interstate or foreign commerce; would maintain the safe 
and efficient use of the navigable airspace; would not conflict with 
any existing Federal statute or regulation including Federal grant 
agreements; and would not create an undue burden on the national 
aviation system. As discussed above, Massport has developed a revenue-
neutral congestion pricing program for use at Boston's Logan airport; 
\6\ however, we do not believe that a revenue-neutral policy would be 
effective at LaGuardia. The demand for access at LaGuardia is so high 
that carriers may simply pay any fee imposed in a revenue-neutral model 
rather than changing their practices.
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    \6\ The FAA has not had the occasion to issue a final opinion on 
Massport's program since the program has not yet been implemented.
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    Consequently, we are seeking the legislative authority to conduct 
auctions or congestion pricing at LaGuardia in the future. If Congress 
approves the use of market-based mechanisms, a new rulemaking would be 
necessary to implement such measures at LaGuardia.
    The FAA has broad authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103 to regulate the 
use of the navigable airspace of the United States. This authority is 
exclusive to the FAA. Section 40103 authorizes the FAA to develop plans 
and policy for the use of navigable airspace and to assign the use that 
the FAA deems necessary to its safe and efficient utilization. It 
further directs the FAA to prescribe air traffic rules and regulations 
governing the efficient utilization of the navigable airspace. The FAA 
interprets its broad statutory authority to ensure the efficient use of 
the navigable airspace to encompass management of the nationwide system 
of air commerce and air traffic control. AIR-21, while phasing out the 
HDR, did not strip the FAA of its authority to place operating 
limitations on air carriers to preserve the efficient utilization of 
the National Airspace System (NAS). Indeed, the FAA has, out of 
necessity, restricted the number of exemptions to the HDR since 2001 at 
LaGuardia, and no one has challenged its authority to do so at that 
airport.
    In addition to the FAA's authority and responsibilities over the 
efficient use of airspace, the Secretary of Transportation is required 
to consider several other objectives as being in the public interest, 
including: Keeping available a variety of adequate, economic, 
efficient, and low-priced air services; placing maximum reliance on 
competitive market forces and on actual and potential competition; 
avoiding airline industry conditions that would tend to allow at least 
one air carrier unreasonably to increase prices, reduce services, or 
exclude competition in air transportation; encouraging, developing, and 
maintaining an air transportation system relying on actual and 
potential competition; encouraging entry into air transportation 
markets by new and existing air carriers and the continued 
strengthening of small air carriers to ensure a more effective and 
competitive airline industry; maintaining a complete and convenient 
system of scheduled air transportation for small communities; ensuring 
that consumers in all regions of the United States, including those in 
small communities and rural and remote areas, have access to 
affordable, regularly scheduled air service; and acting consistently 
with obligations of the U.S. Government under international agreements. 
See 49 U.S.C. 40101(a)(4), (6), (10)-(13) and (16), and 40105(b).

III. Summary of Proposed Rule

    The FAA proposes to cap hourly operations at LaGuardia. Under the 
proposed rule, the FAA would limit the number of scheduled flight 
arrivals and departures at LaGuardia Monday through Friday from 6:30 
a.m. to 9:59 p.m. and Sunday from noon to 9:59 p.m. Similar limits 
would be placed on unscheduled arrivals and departures, excluding 
helicopters, conducted under instrument flight rules (IFR). The FAA 
would create ``Operating Authorizations'' according to the hourly limit 
on operations of 75 scheduled operations and 6 ``Reservations'' for 
unscheduled operations. The Operating Authorizations would be allocated 
to carriers at the airport based on historic usage subject to 
adjustments required to meet the proposed limits. The Operating 
Authorizations would be allocated in 15-minute increments (i.e., 6:30 
a.m. through 6:44 a.m., 6:45 a.m. through 6:59 a.m.), with specified 
arrivals and departures, in order to minimize congestion from schedule 
peaking. The FAA believes that the relationship of schedule peaks and 
delays at LaGuardia is particularly significant since the current 
airport demand approaches the airport's optimal, good weather capacity. 
Reservations would be allocated on a half-hourly basis using a 
reservation system similar to the one currently in effect for 
unscheduled flights at the high density airports, Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport,

[[Page 51364]]

and at airports under special traffic management programs, whereby an 
operator may obtain a Reservation beginning 72 hours in advance of the 
proposed operation.
    To encourage efficient use of scarce airspace, holders of Operating 
Authorizations would be required to meet an airport-wide average 
aircraft size target annually. Passenger demand for access to LaGuardia 
airport exceeds the number of passengers being accommodated today. 
Although the airport cannot currently, or in the foreseeable future, 
accommodate a greater number of flight operations, the airport's 
terminal and other groundside facilities could accommodate a greater 
number of passengers on the existing number of flights.
    The use of commuter equipment (aircraft with fewer than 71 seats) 
arriving at LaGuardia from medium and large hub airports has increased 
by more than 50 percent since August 2001.\7\ This trend has resulted 
in the underutilization of airport facilities at LaGuardia.
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    \7\ Source: OAG, August 2001 and August 2005.
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    For example, on April 19, 2005, there were 16 flights to Baltimore, 
MD (a large hub) on aircraft with an average of 38 seats. Similarly, on 
the same day, there were 44 operations to Raleigh-Durham, NC (medium 
hub) on aircraft with an average of 50 seats, and 20 flights to 
Philadelphia, PA (large hub) on aircraft with an average of 58 seats. 
While we recognize that service to non-hub and Small-Hub Airports may 
only support commuter aircraft, serving medium and large hub airports 
repeatedly throughout the day with the smaller gauge aircraft does not 
maximize passenger throughput or the use of a constrained resource. For 
this reason, the proposed rule explicitly encourages the use of larger 
aircraft within the constrained operating environment.
    Through this rule the FAA therefore proposes to encourage airlines 
to use larger aircraft, on average, than are being operated at the 
airport now (and in the recent past) so that a larger share of consumer 
demand will be satisfied. Compliance with the airport-wide target would 
be enforced through a Use-or-Lose provision, which would require 
carriers to report the average number of seats offered on all non-
exempt Operating Authorizations each year.\8\ Each carrier's annual 
``average seat size'' would have to be equal to or greater than the 
airport-wide target or the FAA would withdraw Operating Authorizations 
from the carrier. The FAA first would withdraw the Operating 
Authorization(s) operated using the smallest aircraft. The number of 
Operating Authorizations withdrawn would depend on how far off the 
target the carrier's operations were over the preceding year. If 
removing one Operating Authorization was sufficient to raise the 
carrier's average seat size to the target level, only that Operating 
Authorization would be withdrawn. If more withdrawals were needed in 
order to meet the target, additional Operating Authorizations would be 
withdrawn until the target was met.\9\
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    \8\ Average seat size would be equal to the total number of 
seats offered over the year divided by the total Operating 
Authorization days in the year. For further detail on the average 
seat size calculation see the ``Use or Lose Requirements'' section 
in the pages below.
    \9\ For example, if the airport-wide target was 100, and a 
carrier's average seat size over all its Operating Authorizations 
was 99 seats then the air carrier would not have met the ``target'' 
and FAA would withdraw the Operating Authorization(s) that used the 
smallest aircraft. If one Operating Authorization was withdrawn and 
the air carrier's average aircraft size was re-calculated to equal 
100 seats or more, that carrier would only lose a single Operating 
Authorization. If the re-calculation did not result in an average 
aircraft size of 100 seats or more, the FAA would withdraw a second 
Operating Authorization. This process would be repeated until the 
carrier's average aircraft size was equal to or greater than the 
``target.''
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    While an important goal of this rule is to promote efficiency at 
LaGuardia, another objective is to avoid the elimination of service to 
the small and non-hub communities that rely on service at the airport. 
Accordingly, the FAA proposes that Operating Authorizations used for 
service to certain small and non-hub communities are exempt from the 
target aircraft size requirement.
    The proposed rule would assign expiration dates to all Operating 
Authorizations. Operating Authorizations would be allocated in 2007 
with expiration dates ranging from 2010 through 2019. As Operating 
Authorizations expire they would be reallocated with a renewed life 
span of ten years. Establishing a finite lives for Operating 
Authorizations can improve efficiency at LaGuardia over time by 
encouraging all airlines to maximize the use of a scarce resource and 
to maximize their investment at the airport. The authorization's finite 
life would influence carriers to recognize the present value of 
operating at LaGuardia because an Operating Authorization ultimately 
expires, at which point it would be worth nothing to the existing 
holder. If a carrier is not able to use an Operating Authorization 
profitably, the carrier may sell the authorization on the secondary 
market rather than hold the authorization and operate it at a loss. 
This incentive, coupled with the Use-or-Lose provision which enforces 
usage of Operating Authorizations, would promote efficient use of 
scarce airport resources because the carriers that value them the most 
will use the Operating Authorizations.\10\
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    \10\ The FAA has also proposed a congestion management rule at 
Chicago O'Hare (Docket No. FAA-2005-20704). This proposed rule 
differs from that which was proposed at O'Hare because the 
operational characteristics at LaGuardia and O'Hare are 
significantly different. The primary differences between these two 
proposed rules are (1) that the rule at LaGuardia would not be 
temporary (as is anticipated at O'Hare) because increased capacity 
is not expected at LaGuardia, (2) Operating Authorizations at 
LaGuardia would expire and be reallocated, and (3) air carriers 
would be required to meet an airport-wide ``target'' aircraft size 
at LaGuardia.
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IV. The Proposal To Limit Operations at LaGuardia

A. Initial Allocation of Operating Authorizations

    Upon expiration of the HDR on January 1, 2007, slots will no longer 
exist at LaGuardia. Under today's proposed rule, the FAA would place an 
hourly cap on operations at LaGuardia to prevent unacceptable delay 
that would impact the National Airspace System. The proposed number of 
operations is consistent with the cap that has been in place since 
January 2001--75 scheduled operations per hour. The FAA's procedures 
for allocating AIR-21 slot exemptions since January 31, 2001, 
accommodate some new entrant carriers' operations above the hourly 
limit. Under this proposed rule, these operations would be 
``grandfathered'' within the allocated hour. However, any Operating 
Authorizations that revert to the FAA in those hours would be moved to 
an hour with fewer than 75 operations prior to reallocation and 
assigned within the adopted 15 and 30 minute limits. Arrival and 
departure authorizations would be distributed in fifteen-minute time 
increments, and Reservations would be limited to six per hour.
    The existing cap at LaGuardia represents the FAA's estimate of the 
maximum number of operations that can be accommodated at the airport 
with its current configuration and without causing excessive additional 
congestion and delay. The FAA is not proposing to increase the cap at 
this time, because it is premised on favorable weather conditions. 
Furthermore, even with the existing cap of 75 scheduled and 6 
unscheduled operations per hour, LaGuardia has consistently been one of 
the top five delayed airports in the United States. In fiscal year 
2005, LaGuardia ranked as the third most delayed airport in the

[[Page 51365]]

nation, with only 71 percent of operations arriving on time.\11\
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    \11\ Source: ASPM. The Inspector General's FY 2006 Top 
Management Challenges also recently highlighted the fact that 
LaGuardia Airport is severely delayed. The report points out that in 
the summer of 2005 LaGuardia Airport ranked as the fifth most 
delayed airport in terms of percentage of delayed flights and had 
the longest average minutes of delay, with an average of 70.03 
minutes of delay (p. 23).
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    Operating Authorizations and Reservations would not be required on 
Saturdays or Sunday mornings, as there is a significant drop in traffic 
on those days, and we have not experienced nor do we expect to 
experience excessive congestion during those times. However, the FAA 
would consider additional rulemaking to cap operations on those days if 
traffic and delays become unacceptable.
    Although operations would be kept at the current level of service 
at LaGuardia, the FAA would have the authority under this proposal to 
retain expired and returned Operating Authorizations, or to retime them 
to less congested periods, if necessary to reduce congestion and 
delays. Operational or navigational improvements could mitigate the 
need to retain or retime expired or returned Operating Authorizations, 
and the FAA believes that such efficiency enhancements may be possible. 
However, this authority would enable the FAA to take appropriate action 
against growing delay and to manage capacity over the life of this 
rule.\12\
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    \12\ The FAA has determined that delays are not so excessive 
that it is necessary to reduce the hourly cap at the airport at the 
outset of this proposed rule but there would be some schedule 
depeaking required to meet the proposed 15-minute limits. If the FAA 
reduced hourly operations, this would impede current service levels 
and disadvantage the carriers as well as the traveling public.
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1. ``Grandfather'' Provision
    Operating Authorizations initially would be grandfathered to each 
carrier at LaGuardia operating slots and slot exemptions based on 
schedules as of October 1-6, 2006, provided that the published 
schedules are consistent with the 15 and 30 minute limits in this 
proposal. Since carriers are currently able to schedule flights anytime 
within the 30-minute slot window, these schedules may contribute to the 
current congestion and delays at the airport because this practice 
occasionally allows operations to exceed the airport's capacity. This 
is particularly apparent in the peak morning and early evening periods. 
Further, because we will use October 1-6, 2006, schedules, which are 
not currently finalized, there is potential for the 15-minute schedule 
peaks to increase. One objective of this rule is to improve operational 
performance at the airport, and we do not believe it would be prudent 
to grant historic status to schedule levels that are not realistic.
    While one way to improve performance would be to reduce the 
permitted number of hourly scheduled and/or unscheduled operations, we 
are proposing instead to spread demand in certain peak periods. If it 
is necessary to de-peak the October 1-6, 2006 schedules to meet the 15 
and 30 minute limits in this proposal, we do not propose to require any 
carrier to reduce overall hourly operations below its initial base or 
to operate in a different hour from the hour allocated under the HDR. 
To achieve the necessary de-peaking, the FAA proposes to call for 
voluntary measures to reallocate the grandfathered Operating 
Authorizations to less congested time periods within the same hour or 
proposes an administrative mechanism such as a lottery. We seek comment 
on these options.
    In the event that the HDR expires prior to the publication of a 
Final Rule, the FAA would continue to rely on the October 1-6, 2006 
timeframe as the basis for future grandfathering of aircraft Operating 
Authorizations. If a carrier were using a slot that is ``held'' by 
another carrier, the Operating Authorization would be grandfathered to 
the carrier that actually holds the slot.\13\ Alternatively, if a 
carrier were using a slot that is held by an entity that is not a 
certificated carrier, the operating carrier would be grandfathered the 
Operating Authorization. The FAA proposes grandfathering operating 
rights to carriers in an effort to preserve service to communities with 
existing service at LaGuardia and to minimize disruption at the airport 
and to the traveling public. Although the initial ``grandfathering'' of 
Operating Authorizations to incumbent carriers does not provide new 
entrant carriers with immediate access to the airport, other aspects of 
this rule, such as finite Operating Authorization lives, would give 
those carriers not already operating at LaGuardia access to the airport 
as Operating Authorizations expire and are reallocated.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \13\ A slot ``holder'' is the air carrier that has operational 
authority, assigned by the FAA, to conduct scheduled arrival or 
departure operations at LaGuardia on a particular day of the week 
during a specific time of the day. Each FAA slot under the HDR has 
both a ``holder'' status and an ``operator'' status. The ``holder'' 
status typically reflects long-term slot rights and does not need to 
be an air carrier. The ``operator'' status reflects which particular 
carrier is authorized to utilize a slot on a particular day. 
Operator status commonly differs from holder status to reflect the 
assignment of slots to a commuter affiliate or partner airline, the 
lease or transfer of slots for a defined period of time, or one for 
one trades or swaps of slots with other carriers to accommodate 
schedule changes.
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2. Finite Operating Authorizations
    Under the proposed rule, Operating Authorizations would have finite 
lives. Operating Authorizations would be allocated initially in 2007 
with an expiration date ranging from the year 2010 through 2019. The 
initial authorizations would be distributed based on actual operations 
and FAA slot allocation records for LaGuardia by scheduled carriers as 
of the week October 1-6, 2006. Operating Authorizations would then be 
divided into regular Operating Authorizations and Operating 
Authorizations that are exempt from the minimum airport seat targets. 
Each authorization would then be assigned an expiration date using the 
method discussed below (see ``Schedule of Expiration Dates for 
Grandfathered Operating Authorizations''). The method for determining 
when initial allocations expire would ensure that the expiration of 
Operating Authorizations is evenly distributed among all carriers so 
that no carrier loses a disproportionate number of Operating 
Authorizations at any one time.
    Operating Authorizations that are initially allocated in 2007 would 
be granted a life of three to thirteen years. The fourth year after the 
rule is in effect (2010), 10 percent of the authorizations would expire 
and be reallocated with a renewed ten-year life. Each year thereafter, 
10 percent of the Operating Authorizations would expire and be 
reallocated for 10 years.
    This reallocation approach should encourage dynamic access to air 
services at LaGuardia. Determining the percentage of capacity that 
should be subject to reallocation annually requires establishing a 
balance between exposing airport access to market forces, providing 
access for new entrants, and preserving stability at the airport. The 
first three years after the initial grandfathering in 2007 would 
provide incumbent carriers with a degree of certainty regarding 
operations at the airport. The FAA believes that after 2009, use of 
ten-year operating lives would strike an appropriate balance between 
very large annual withdrawals of Operating Authorizations (which could 
make it less attractive for carriers to develop service at the airport) 
and very slow (or no) turnover of Operating Authorizations (which could 
result in barriers to entry to the airport). Operating Authorizations 
need to expire at varying times so that air service at LaGuardia 
remains stable even as some authorizations are subject to reallocation. 
We expect that any

[[Page 51366]]

reallocation process adopted through subsequent rulemaking would 
provide sufficient lead time for an orderly schedule planning process 
by the impacted carrier(s). We invite comments and analysis on the 
appropriate lifespan of Operating Authorizations.
    If carriers were granted perpetual operating rights they may not 
have sufficient incentive to sell or lease Operating Authorizations on 
the secondary market to a competitor placing a higher value on their 
use. The expiration and reallocation of Operating Authorizations should 
drive carriers to maximize the value of their authorization because the 
authorization would no longer represent an infinite investment 
interest. The revolving allocation process also would provide new 
entrant airlines and incumbent airlines wishing to expand service at 
LaGuardia the opportunity to acquire Operating Authorizations at 
LaGuardia because there would be a new stock of authorizations 
available each year after 2010. Establishing finite life for Operating 
Authorizations also meets the Department's mandate of ``placing maximum 
reliance on the competitive market forces and on the actual and 
potential competition in airline markets.'' \14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \14\ Federal Register, Vol. 70, No. 57 page 15523: ``Congestion, 
Delay Reduction and Operating Limitations at Chicago O'Hare 
Airport.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The first Operating Authorizations would not expire at LaGuardia 
until 2010. The FAA is planning to seek legislative authority to 
provide the opportunity for market-based solutions to address 
congestion at LaGuardia. Should the agency receive this authority, a 
market-based process would be the agency's preferred reallocation 
methodology, and we would issue a proposed rule to implement measures 
for redistributing expired Operating Authorizations at that time.
3. Schedule of Expiration Dates for Grandfathered Operating 
Authorizations
    On January 1, 2007, when the Operating Authorizations initially are 
allocated to the carriers, the FAA also would establish a schedule for 
when each Operating Authorization would expire. This procedure for 
assigning rolling expiration dates would only occur one time, at the 
initial grandfathering of Operating Authorizations, because as the 
grandfathered Operating Authorizations expire each one would be 
reallocated with a 10-year life.
    All ``grandfathered'' Operating Authorizations would have a minimum 
life of 3 years. Beginning in 2010, 10 percent of the total Operating 
Authorizations allocated to all carriers would be withdrawn annually 
and then redistributed. The life of each ``grandfathered'' Operating 
Authorization, anywhere from three to 13 years, would be determined 
using the methodology explained below.
    Under the expiration schedule, each carrier's holdings of Operating 
Authorizations would satisfy two conditions: (1) The average ``life'' 
of the Operating Authorizations would be approximately the same for all 
carriers; and (2) expiration of Operating Authorizations would be 
staggered so that no carrier would lose a disproportionate number of 
Operating Authorizations in a given time period.
    In order to assign expiration dates to ``grandfathered'' Operating 
Authorizations the FAA would segregate each carrier's schedule. Non-hub 
and Small Community Operating Authorizations (service to Small-Hub or 
Non-Hub Airports) would be separated from the other Operating 
Authorizations. All Operating Authorizations would be assigned a 
scheduled expiration date, but segregating the authorizations should 
ensure that a disproportionate number of Small Community Operating 
Authorizations do not expire any given year.
    Each carrier would be entitled to authorization life (beyond 2009) 
on average equal to 5.5 years for the Operating Authorizations that 
they hold. The average life of Operating Authorizations would be equal 
to 5.5 years because that is the arithmetic mean between one and ten 
years of life beyond 2009. (If Operating Authorizations expired over 20 
years then 5 percent of the Operating Authorizations would expire each 
year and the average ``life'' of an Operating Authorization would be 
10.5 years.) \15\ The expiration dates of the authorizations in each 
quarter-hour would be assigned as follows:
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    \15\ For 10 year Operating Authorizations the average ``life'' 
would be 5.5 years. The average ``life'' is calculated as follows: 
(Year 1*10%) + (year 2*10%) + (year 3*10%) + (year 4*10%) + (year 
5*10%) + (year 6*10%) + (year 7*10%) + (year 8*10%) + (year 9*10%) + 
(year 10*10%) = 5.5 years (the first Operating Authorizations expire 
in 2010 so their ``life'' after 2009 is zero years. The last 
Operating Authorizations to expire from the initial grandfathering 
will expire in 2019 so their ``life'' is ten years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    (1) The number of Operating Authorizations is equal to the average 
number of ``slot and slot exemption'' operations held under the HDR in 
each quarter-hour time period;
    (2) The average remaining years of life (beyond 2009) for all 
authorizations is roughly 5.5 years; and
    (3) The total years of remaining life among all authorizations 
would be distributed so that 10 percent of the total Operating 
Authorizations at the airport expire each year.
    The following example illustrates how an individual carrier's 
Operating Authorizations would be assigned expiration dates in each 
quarter-hour time period.

                                       Allocation Carrier A's Commercial Operating Authorization Expiration Dates
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Time window                                     9:00-9:14                       . . .                      14:00-14:14
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Carrier A's Operating Authorization (OA)                         4 OAs                        .......                        2 OAs
 Holdings.
 
Expiration Dates.........................  OA 1--expiration in 2 years.                       .......  OA 1--expiration in 2 years.
                                           OA 2--expiration in 3 years.                                OA 2--expiration in 9 years.
                                           OA 3--expiration in 8 years.                                .................................................
                                           OA 4--expiration in 9 years.                                .................................................
                                           Average = 5.5 years.                               .......  Average = 5.5 years.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    In this example, Carrier A has 4 slots in the 9:00 to 9:14 time 
period and 2 slots in the 14:00-14:14 time period. The carrier would 
initially be grandfathered these 6 operations (in the same time 
periods) as Operating Authorizations under this rule. On average, these 
new authorizations would have 5.5 years of life remaining after 2009. 
An equitable allocation for this carrier's 9:00-9:14 Operating 
Authorizations that would average 5.5 years of life would be the 
following years of remaining life beyond 2009: 2, 3, 8, and 9. In this 
case the four

[[Page 51367]]

operating authorizations would expire at the end of 2011, 2012, 2017, 
and 2018. Likewise, an equitable allocation for Carrier A's 14:00-14:14 
Operating Authorizations would be 2 years and 9 years; therefore these 
Operating Authorizations would expire in 2011 and 2018.\16\ It should 
be noted that the allocation in this case would depend on: (1) 
Satisfying this carrier's existing number of both arrival and departure 
authorizations in each quarter-hour of the day; (2) satisfying all 
other carriers' existing operations in that quarter-hour; and (3) 
ensuring that 10 percent of all authorizations expire each year. The 
FAA is developing a programming tool to solve this allocation 
process.\17\
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    \16\ This illustration provides one possible distribution of 
expiration dates for the given Operating Authorizations although not 
the only possible expiration schedule; several combinations of 
expiration dates could generate the same ``remaining life'' outcome 
of 5.5 years.
    \17\ Anomalies could occur in order to balance these criteria. 
Rather than 10% of Operating Authorizations expiring in a particular 
quarter hour it might be 10% plus or minus 1% in order to get the 
proper total integrated number of Operating Authorizations.
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    The same process would be repeated in order to assign expiration 
dates to the Non-hub and Small Community Operating Authorizations.
    The programming tool would use two objective functions to guide the 
allocation process. The first measures the discrepancy between the 
total of all authorization lifetimes allocated to each carrier in a 
quarter-hour and a presumed preferred distribution based on that 
carrier's current holdings. The second measures the discrepancy between 
the total of all authorization lifetimes allocated to each carrier over 
the entire day and the presumed preferred total for the day. By 
defining two objective functions the procedure is able to compensate in 
a later period for any discrepancies from the ideal in an earlier 
period.

B. Congestion Management Upgauging Rule at LaGuardia

1. Average Aircraft Size
    To encourage efficient use of scarce air traffic system capacity at 
LaGuardia, the FAA, in consultation with the Port Authority, intends to 
set an airport-wide target for the average aircraft size used by 
carriers on scheduled Operating Authorizations. The size of an aircraft 
would be measured by the number of seats that are offered for sale on 
the aircraft. The target for average fleet seat capacity would be based 
on a passenger throughput target for the airport, based on the 
limitations on various terminal and ground facilities to handle 
passengers. Thus, the target would be based on engineering measures of 
the capacities of the ground facilities. The target would be phased in 
so that carriers at LaGuardia would have sufficient time to make 
adjustments to their fleets and service routes. The target also needs 
to be consistent with safety issues associated with runway length, 
takeoff performance, and landing performance.
    The proposed target would range from 105 seats to 122 seats per 
aircraft depending on which alternatives for the proposed exemptions 
for Non-Hub and Small-Hub Airport services is adopted, as explained 
below in the discussion of more options. On January 1, 2008, one year 
after the Final Rule is in effect, carriers would have to report their 
use of Operating Authorizations over the preceding year.\18\ However, 
the ``target'' would not be enforced until the following year, January 
1, 2009. At that point, any carrier that fails to meet the ``target'' 
would be subject to the provisions outlined in the Use-or-Lose 
requirement. The FAA believes that this phase-in period provides 
carriers a sufficient amount of time after publication of the Final 
Rule to adjust their operations as necessary to meet the airport-wide 
target. An FAA required average aircraft size target would encourage 
efficient use of the airport facilities by increasing passenger 
throughput at LaGuardia and by providing incentives for more efficient 
use of the airport's physical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \18\ Reporting requirements are discussed in the Use-or-Lose 
section in the pages below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The preference for larger aircraft is a special approach to a 
unique situation at LaGuardia. Demand at LaGuardia exceeds the 
airport's capacity for flight operations throughout the day, and there 
is no prospect for any significant increase in capacity for aircraft 
operations at the airport because of its physical limitations. On the 
other hand, the airport's groundside facilities can handle more 
passengers than now use the airport.\19\ Promoting larger aircraft is 
the only means to increase passenger access to LaGuardia. Accordingly, 
in these limited circumstances, the increase in passenger throughput 
can be considered as a measure of efficiency of the use of airspace, 
and is within the FAA's authority under 49 U.S.C. 40103(b) to establish 
regulations for the efficient use of airspace.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \19\ According to the Port Authority's 2004 Airport Traffic 
Report, 24.5 million domestic and international passengers flew 
through LaGuardia in 2004. In various forums the Port Authority has 
indicated that approximately 28.5 million passengers could be 
accommodated at the airport on existing facilities and 
infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The upgauging policy proposed for LaGuardia is based on the FAA's 
authority for efficient management of airspace under 49 U.S.C. 40103. 
This limited application of an upgauging policy under the FAA's 
airspace management authority is unrelated to airport proprietary 
authority. The FAA's exercise of its statutory authority for efficient 
airspace management does not affect the obligation of airport sponsors 
under Airport Improvement Program (AIP) sponsor assurances to provide 
access to all types, kinds, and classes of aeronautical use on 
reasonable and not unjustly discriminatory terms.
    The average aircraft size target would be monitored on an annual 
basis, which would afford carriers the business flexibility to meet the 
overall average fleet goal with whatever combination of aircraft they 
determine is right for each route and service over the course of the 
year. Each year, carriers would be required to operate, on average, 
aircraft with at least as many seats as specified by the target 
aircraft size or they would lose one or more Operating Authorizations.
    Every twelve months, the FAA, after consultation with the Port 
Authority, would re-evaluate the target and modify it as necessary to 
account for changes in the airport's operations or modifications to the 
capacity at the airport. For example, if gate usage requirements change 
or airport infrastructure is developed that allows more efficient use 
(e.g., terminal modifications), the target could be adjusted upward. In 
fact, the effectiveness of this rule could be augmented by sponsor gate 
use policies that maximize the potential of the infrastructure. 
Alternatively, if the operations at the airport were negatively 
impacted due to an overly optimistic target, the FAA would have the 
ability to adjust the target downward. Because the target affects 
carrier planning of fleet mix, routes, staffing requirements, and gate 
usage, the FAA would limit target increases to no greater than a 3-seat 
increase in any year.\20\ On the other hand, a decrease in the 
``target'' would likely only occur if it were necessary to correct 
unforeseen problems that result from an inflated ``target.'' Carriers 
would not be penalized from operating aircraft that are larger than the 
airport-wide target, so a decrease in the target

[[Page 51368]]

is not expected to have a negative impact on carriers.
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    \20\ An annual increase to the target aircraft size of up to 3 
seats per year provides sufficient flexibility to adjust the target, 
if necessary. If it were determined that a more significant target 
increase were appropriate in any given year, FAA would publish the 
proposed target increase in the Federal Register and seek comments 
on the proposed target.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    To assess the impact of upgauging at LaGuardia, NEXTOR has 
conducted simulations that examine the behavior of the airport runway, 
taxiway, and gate operations in the presence