Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch, 50508-50727 [06-6743]

Agencies

• Federal Aviation Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 165 (Friday, August 25, 2006)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 50508-50727]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-6743]



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Part II





Department of Transportation





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Federal Aviation Administration



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14 CFR Parts 401, 406, 413, et al.



Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch; Final Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 165 / Friday, August 25, 2006 / Rules 
and Regulations

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Parts 401, 406, 413, 415, and 417

[Docket No. FAA-2000-7953; Amendment Nos. 401-4, 406-3, 413-7, 415-4 , 
417-0]
RIN 2120-AG37


Licensing and Safety Requirements for Launch

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: This final rule amends commercial space transportation 
regulations governing the launch of expendable launch vehicles. This 
action is necessary to codify current launch practices at Federal 
launch ranges and codify rules for launches from a non-Federal launch 
site. These safety requirements currently apply to a launch operator 
through its FAA license. The intended effect of this action is to 
ensure that the public continues to be protected from the hazards of 
launch from either a Federal launch range or a non-Federal launch site.

DATES: These amendments become effective September 25, 2006. Compliance 
is required by August 27, 2007.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Ren[eacute] Rey, Licensing and Safety 
Division, AST-200, Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591; telephone (202) 267-7538; e-mail 
Rene.Rey@faa.gov. For questions regarding legal interpretation, contact 
Laura Montgomery, AGC-200, (202) 267-3150; e-mail 
laura.montgomery@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Availability of Rulemaking Documents

    You can get an electronic copy using the Internet by:
    (1) Searching the Department of Transportation's electronic Docket 
Management System (DMS) Web page (https://dms.dot.gov/search);
    (2) Visiting the FAA's Regulations and Policies Web page at https://
www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/; or
    (3) Accessing the Government Printing Office's Web page at https://
www.gpoaccess.gov/fr/.
    You can also get a copy by sending a request to the Federal 
Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking, ARM-1, 800 Independence 
Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by calling (202) 267-9680. Make 
sure to identify the amendment number or docket number of this 
rulemaking.
    Anyone is able to search the electronic form of all comments 
received into any of our dockets by the name of the individual 
submitting the comment (or signing the comment, if submitted on behalf 
of an association, business, labor union, etc.). You may review DOT's 
complete Privacy Act statement in the Federal Register published on 
April 11, 2000 (Volume 65, Number 70; Pages 19477-78) or you may visit 
https://dms.dot.gov.

Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act

    The Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act (SBREFA) of 
1996 requires FAA to comply with small entity requests for information 
or advice about compliance with statutes and regulations within its 
jurisdiction. If you are a small entity and you have a question 
regarding this document, you may contact a local FAA official, or the 
person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. You can find out 
more about SBREFA on the Internet at https://www.faa.gov/regulations_
policies/rulemaking/sbre_act.

Authority for This Rulemaking

    The Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, as codified and amended at 
49 U.S.C. Subtitle IX--Commercial Space Transportation, ch. 701, 
Commercial Space Launch Activities, 49 U.S.C. 70101-70121 (the Act), 
authorizes the Department of Transportation and thus the FAA, through 
delegations (64 FR 19586, Apr. 21, 1999), to oversee, license, and 
regulate commercial launch and reentry activities and the operation of 
launch and reentry sites as carried out by U.S. citizens or within the 
United States. 49 U.S.C. 70104, 70105. The Act directs the FAA to 
exercise this responsibility consistent with public health and safety, 
safety of property, and the national security and foreign policy 
interests of the United States. 49 U.S.C. 70105. The FAA is also 
responsible for encouraging, facilitating and promoting commercial 
space launches by the private sector. 49 U.S.C. 70103. A 1996 National 
Space Policy recognizes the Department of Transportation as the lead 
Federal agency for regulatory guidance regarding commercial space 
transportation activities. The FAA's authority to issue rules regarding 
commercial space transportation safety is found under the general 
rulemaking authority, 49 U.S.C. 322(a), of the Secretary of 
Transportation to carry out Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, 49 U.S.C. 70101-
70121 (Chapter 701).

Background

    This final rule addressing licensing and safety requirements for 
launch was preceded by two proposals and a draft rule made available to 
the public through the docket. The FAA published a comprehensive notice 
of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) on October 25, 2000. 65 FR 63921. The FAA 
received comments until April 23, 2001. The FAA addressed commenters' 
concerns in a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking (SNPRM) 
published on July 30, 2002. 67 FR 49456 (``2002 SNPRM''). The FAA held 
a public meeting on the SNPRM on September 6, 2002 and received 
comments until October 28, 2002. Commenters were concerned with the 
anticipated cost of complying with the proposal. On February 28, 2005, 
the FAA placed a series of documents in the docket, including draft 
regulatory text, a draft analysis of comments (February 2005 Analysis 
of Comments), a summary of major changes since the SNPRM, and an 
independent economic assessment from SAIC. 70 FR 9885 (Mar. 1, 2005).
    SAIC estimated that the rule would cost the industry a discounted 
$3.8 million \1\ over the years 2005 through 2009. This is less than 
the $7.3 million discounted cost to industry estimated by this 
Regulatory Evaluation. SAIC estimated recurring costs ranging from 
$110,000 to $165,000 per launch and fixed costs of either $0 or 
$100,000. However, in deriving the total industry cost of $3.8 million 
(discounted at 7%), SAIC estimated that there would be four to six 
launches per year. The current FAA launch forecast is about twelve per 
year. SAIC also estimated and discounted costs over the period 2005 
through 2009, while the FAA estimated and discounted costs over the 
period 2006 through 2010. SAIC costs are in 2002 dollars while FAA 
estimates are in 2004 dollars.
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    \1\ Using a discount rate of 7%.
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    The FAA converted the SAIC cost estimates to 2004 dollars, used the 
latest FAA ELV forecast and discounted costs over the five-year period 
2006 through 2010. The result was an estimated cost of $10.5 million 
(discounted to $8.6 million) over the period. This estimate is a 
conservative one because it uses the higher per launch cost of 
$165,000.\2\ It is also very close to the estimate derived

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independently in FAA's own Regulatory Evaluation.
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    \2\ We did not estimate a lower range using the lower per launch 
estimate.
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    The FAA held a public meeting on March 29-30, 2005 and received 
public comment on these documents until June 1, 2005. The draft 
analysis of comments in the docket is a detailed analysis of voluminous 
comments the FAA received during this rulemaking process. The FAA 
encourages the public to review this analysis of comments for specific 
concerns regarding this rule. The resolution of those comments is part 
of the record of this rulemaking.
    This final rule codifies the successful safety measures that the 
Department of Defense and NASA have implemented at Federal launch 
ranges in the U.S. A launch operator must comply with both FAA 
commercial space transportation regulations and Federal range launch 
safety requirements, the latter through its launch license. In 
addition, some Federal range safety practices are incorporated into 
vehicle specific documents, also known as ``tailored documents,'' and 
these practices need to be codified to give all launch operators notice 
regarding other permissible alternatives. Until this rulemaking, the 
FAA has not adopted clear safety requirements for launches from a non-
Federal launch site. The FAA evaluates applications for launch from a 
non-Federal launch site on a case-by-case basis, weighing the safety of 
launches from non-Federal launch sites against Federal launch range 
practices, procedures and requirements, including the safety 
requirements of the U.S. Air Force. See 14 CFR part 415, subpart F.
    This final rule identifies and establishes the requirements for a 
launch operator launching from a Federal launch range or a non-Federal 
launch site. This rule allows a launch operator to interact with a 
Federal launch range in the same manner it does now. This rule also 
adopts the latest safety practices of Federal ranges, determined 
through the Common Standards Working Group (CSWG), a joint FAA and Air 
Force task force. By standardizing safety requirements between the 
Federal ranges and the FAA, the same level of safety is achieved 
throughout the United States. This standardization also improves 
efficiency in the launch industry, because launch operators have one 
set of clear rules. Codification improves transparency in the 
regulatory process for both established launch operators and new 
entrants.

Summary of the Final Rule

    This final rule establishes requirements for obtaining a license to 
launch an expendable launch vehicle (ELV) from a non-Federal launch 
site. This rule also codifies safety responsibilities and requirements 
that apply to any licensed launch, regardless of where it takes place. 
The rule prescribes standardized application requirements and clarifies 
safety issues that an applicant must address. These application 
requirements, contained in 14 CFR part 415, subpart F, require an 
applicant to demonstrate how it would satisfy the safety requirements 
of the new part 417 in order to obtain a launch license.
    A launch operator currently supplies a Federal launch range much of 
the information needed for the various safety analyses and 
verifications that a Federal launch range performs. However, the 
Federal launch range staffs and controls the launch. Launch operators 
will do more of their own safety work at a non-Federal launch site than 
they have at the Federal launch ranges because they will not be able to 
take advantage of the Federal range personnel and oversight as they do 
now. This does not mean that the requirements adopted today are new, 
only that a launch operator at a non-Federal launch site must work with 
the FAA to determine how to satisfy the safety requirements normally 
performed by a Federal launch range.

Definitions

    The FAA adopts new definitions in this final rule. They include:
    Equivalent level of safety. The FAA adopts a different definition 
than was proposed in the 2002 NPRM. An equivalent level of safety now 
means an approximately equal level of safety as determined by 
qualitative or quantitative means. The FAA does not adopt its proposed 
reference to risk in this definition, because demonstration by 
qualitative or quantitative means need not be risk based. The 
definition is now broad enough to adapt to new circumstances.
    Launch site safety assessment. The FAA adopts a definition of a 
Launch Site Safety Assessment (LSSA), formerly called a baseline 
assessment. The FAA will assess each Federal launch range and determine 
if the range meets FAA safety requirements. If there are any 
differences between range practice and FAA requirements, the 
differences will be documented in the LSSA. The FAA does not anticipate 
many, if any, differences for Federal launch ranges because it derived 
most of the requirements for part 417 from the safety requirements of 
the Federal launch ranges themselves. A launch operator relying on a 
LSSA to demonstrate compliance with FAA regulations should pay 
particular attention to any differences because a launch operator will 
still be responsible for satisfying FAA safety requirements but may 
have to perform work or conduct analysis previously performed by a 
Federal launch range.

Requirements for Obtaining a Launch License for an Expendable Launch 
Vehicle

    Part 415 contains requirements that an applicant must meet in order 
to obtain a license, and part 417 contains requirements that a licensee 
must comply with during the term of the license. The FAA moved all 
post-licensing requirements and responsibilities out of part 415 and 
placed them in part 417, subpart A to group them together. Part 415 
references part 417 requirements where appropriate. The FAA did not 
change its part 415, subpart C application requirements for launching 
from a Federal launch range, except to clarify the role of a LSSA, and 
to consolidate and clarify the flight readiness requirements of section 
415.37, as discussed in the docketed draft analysis of comments.

Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Federal Launch Range

    Subpart C of part 415 describes how the FAA reviews the safety of 
licensed launches from Federal launch ranges. Subpart C contains safety 
requirements and recognizes that a launch operator may use a LSSA to 
demonstrate compliance of FAA safety-related launch services and 
property provisions.
    Section 415.31 explains how the FAA conducts a safety review of an 
applicant proposing to launch from a Federal launch range. The FAA 
clarified section 415.31 and other sections in part 417 to make it 
absolutely clear that an applicant may contract with a Federal range 
for many Federal range safety-related launch services and property. 
These provisions should clarify that a launch operator will maintain 
the same relationship it has with a Federal launch range.

Safety Review and Approval for Launch From a Non-Federal Launch Site

    Subpart F of part 415 contains requirements that an applicant must 
meet to obtain a safety approval for a launch from a non-Federal launch 
site. Subpart F requires an applicant to demonstrate how it would 
satisfy the safety requirements of part 417 in order to obtain a launch 
license.

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Launch Safety Generally

    Part 417 contains the standards by which the FAA assesses the 
adequacy of both a licensee and a Federal launch range. The FAA 
assesses a launch operator through the licensing process and a Federal 
launch range through a LSSA. The FAA developed the standards in part 
417 after extensive negotiation in the CSWG. These standards include 
not only current Federal launch range standards but also current 
practice at the Federal ranges. This rulemaking incorporates any 
lessons learned through tailoring of launch operator requirements. 
Therefore, the FAA anticipates that the LSSA for each Federal launch 
range will disclose few, if any, range differences with part 417 
requirements. Nonetheless, it is possible some FAA requirements may 
differ from range requirements. In such a case, any differences will be 
documented in a LSSA.

General and License Terms and Conditions

    The FAA moved existing part 415 subpart E, Post-Licensing 
Requirements--Launch License Terms and Conditions into subpart A of 
part 417. This change enables a launch operator to reference one 
source, instead of two or more for the post-licensing responsibilities 
and requirements. The requirements of part 417, subpart A apply to 
launch operators launching from both Federal and non-Federal launch 
sites, except where noted. As a result, part 415 includes all the 
responsibilities and requirements that an applicant needs to fulfill in 
order to obtain a license, and part 417 includes all the 
responsibilities and requirements that a launch operator needs to 
fulfill in order to keep a license.

Requests for Relief and Tailoring

    The Federal ranges permit tailoring of requirements. With 
tailoring, range and launch operator personnel produce a document that 
details all areas where the Air Force grants some form of relief 
without a degradation of safety. The FAA will accept prior agreements 
between the Air Force and a launch operator, as long as the FAA and the 
Air Force determine there is no change in circumstance that would 
degrade safety.
    The FAA will utilize equivalent level of safety determinations, 
similar to the Air Force tailoring process, and FAA waivers to grant 
relief to launch operators. The FAA will also accept written evidence 
of Air Force ``meets intent'' certifications (MIC) and previously 
granted Air Force waivers. The FAA will also accept Air Force 
grandfathering of prior practices.

Definition of Public

    This final rule does not change the existing FAA definition of the 
``public.'' As discussed in greater detail in the draft final rule in 
the docket, it is impossible for industry to determine the implications 
of a change in definition at this time because there has not been 
opportunity to discuss concerns in depth. Commenters pointed out that a 
change may impose burdens, place logistical, schedule, and programmatic 
activities at risk, and adversely impact the cost or availability of 
insurance. The current FAA definition of public is different from the 
definition of public that the ranges use. However, recent Federal range 
safety analysis determined that commercially licensed launches from the 
Eastern and Western ranges complied with the risk criterion of less 
than 30 x 10-6 when using the FAA definition of the public. 
In addition, the Western Range has not assessed the impact of the 
current FAA definition of public for launches of the Evolved Expendable 
Launch Vehicle scheduled to launch from that range in the near future. 
The Western Range will conduct a similar safety analysis once the EELV 
operators provide the appropriate data.

Launch Services and Liability

    As discussed in the public meeting, the FAA seeks to clarify that a 
launch operator is responsible for its launches, including launches 
from a Federal range or from a non-Federal launch site. Even if a 
launch operator contracts with a Federal range to perform many 
services, the launch operator must still conduct a launch that complies 
with part 417. In addition, although a launch operator may contract 
certain duties and responsibilities required by part 417, the launch 
operator cannot delegate its accountability for safe operations under 
part 417.

Launch Reporting Requirements

    A launch operator is required to provide launch specific 
information at various times to the FAA after receiving a launch 
license. All information updates not covered by section 417.17 should 
be filed under the license modification requirements of section 417.11. 
The FAA will work with launch operators concerning the availability of 
information at various points in the launch schedule and the FAA is 
willing to consider waiver requests for certain reporting requirements.

Post Launch Report

    This rule requires a launch operator to identify discrepancies or 
anomalies that occur during the launch countdown or flight, including 
any deviations from the terms of the launch license or to the operating 
environments. This rule requires post launch reporting for every 
launch.

Launch Safety Responsibilities

    Subpart B of part 417 is a road map describing the responsibilities 
of a launch operator when conducting a licensed launch of an ELV. 
Subpart B covers all of the safety issues that a launch operator's 
safety program needs to address. A launch operator should pay 
particular attention to section 417.107, because its requirements rely 
on many of the analyses covered in other subparts. Subpart B contains 
the requirement to implement the results of analysis, other subparts 
contain the performance requirements governing those analyses and the 
appendices include the methodologies to satisfy the performance 
requirements.
    The FAA has clarified in this rule that a launch operator launching 
from a Federal launch range and contracting with a range for certain 
safety-related launch services and property may use a LSSA to 
demonstrate compliance with part 417 requirements. In essence, use of a 
LSSA preserves the current relationship a launch operator has with a 
range. If a LSSA finds differences between part 417 requirements and 
range requirements, the FAA will document any differences in the LSSA, 
and the FAA and the Air Force will work with a launch operator to 
resolve these differences.
    It is also important to reinforce the change from the FAA's 
original proposal concerning public risk criteria in paragraph 
417.107(b). As discussed in the SNPRM, the FAA originally proposed to 
aggregate the risks attributable to all mission hazards and set a cap 
on the total mission risk of all hazards at an expected average 
casualty of 30 x 10-6. The FAA now limits the acceptable 
risk attributable to each hazard, rather than to an aggregate of the 
risk for all hazards.

Flight Safety Analysis

    A flight safety analysis is one of the cornerstones of a safe 
launch. A flight safety analysis determines where a launch vehicle may 
safely fly, where it may not, and monitors and controls risk to the 
public from normal and malfunctioning launch vehicle flight. A launch 
operator is required to conduct a flight safety analysis by section

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417.107(f). Subpart C of part 417 contains the performance requirements 
for conducting such an analysis. Appendices A, B, C, and I contain the 
methodologies for meeting the performance requirements of Subpart C.
    This final rule does not change current practice between a launch 
operator and a Federal launch range. A launch operator launching from a 
Federal launch range may still contract with that range to provide 
flight safety analyses. Any launch operator contracting with a Federal 
launch range for flight safety analysis may rely on a LSSA to determine 
whether the range can ensure compliance with this subpart. That launch 
operator must ensure that it satisfies any requirement that a range 
does not meet. The FAA and the Air Force will work with the launch 
operator to ensure compliance. A launch operator may also file an 
alternate flight safety analysis for FAA approval.
    Under a flight safety analysis the FAA requires a launch operator 
to use a flight safety system, a wind-weighting safety system for any 
unguided suborbital launch vehicle, or an alternative flight safety 
system approved by the FAA during the licensing process. The chart 
below describes the flight safety analysis requirements for each type 
of system.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TR25AU06.000

    The performance requirements for a flight safety system and a wind-
weighting system are both located in subpart C. However, the 
methodologies for meeting the performance requirements are different 
for each system. Appendices A, B, and I contain the methodologies for a 
flight safety system and Appendices B, C, and I contain the 
methodologies for a wind-weighting system. All of the following 
performance requirements adopt current range practices, as identified 
through FAA consultation with range safety personnel. Below is a 
description of each of the analyses that together constitute a flight 
safety analysis. The results of a flight safety analysis using a flight 
safety system or a wind-weighting safety system are then used to 
establish rules governing when it is safe to launch, which are referred 
to as flight commit criteria. A flight safety analysis using a flight 
safety system also establishes rules governing the termination of 
flight.
    A trajectory analysis establishes, for any time after lift-off, the 
limits of a launch vehicle's normal flight, as defined by the nominal 
trajectory and potential three-sigma trajectory dispersions about the 
nominal trajectory. The trajectory analysis must also establish a fuel 
exhaustion trajectory and a straight up trajectory. A fuel exhaustion 
trajectory produces instantaneous impact points with the greatest range 
for any given time-after-liftoff for any stage that has the potential 
to impact the Earth and does not burn to propellant depletion before a 
programmed thrust termination. For example, a stage that fails to 
terminate at its programmed thrust termination point will continue 
flight until burnout if the stage contains residual fuel. A straight-up 
trajectory projects the results that would occur if a launch vehicle 
malfunctioned and flew in a vertical or near vertical direction above 
the launch point.

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    A malfunction turn analysis describes a launch vehicle's turning 
capability in the event of a malfunction during flight. This analysis 
accounts for where a vehicle would go in the event of a malfunction by 
plotting a series of malfunction turns that must account for numerous 
factors. This analysis determines, for any point in flight, how far off 
course a vehicle can travel before either the flight safety system 
takes action or the vehicle breaks apart due to aerodynamic forces.
    A debris analysis accounts for the debris produced by both normal 
events, such as the planned jettison of stages in an ocean, and 
abnormal events, such as destruction of the launch vehicle. This 
analysis must identify the inert, explosive and other hazardous launch 
vehicle debris that results from normal and malfunctioning launch 
vehicle flight. A debris analysis also requires a debris list, which is 
commonly referred to as a ``debris model,'' and must account for each 
cause of launch vehicle breakup. The debris lists describe and account 
for all debris fragments and their physical characteristics. A debris 
model categorizes, or groups, debris fragments into classes where the 
characteristics of the mean fragment in each class represent every 
fragment in the class. These debris lists are used as input to other 
flight safety analyses, such as those performed to establish flight 
safety limits and hazard areas and to determine whether a launch 
satisfies the public risk criteria of section 417.107.
    A flight safety limits analysis identifies when flight must 
terminate to limit the hazardous effects of debris impacts on any 
populated or other protected area, establishes designated impact limits 
to bound the area where debris with a ballistic coefficient of three or 
more is allowed to impact without a flight safety system failure, and 
ensures that a launch satisfies the public risk criteria.
    A straight-up time analysis accounts for how long a vehicle may fly 
straight up before it poses a hazard to the public if it fails to turn 
downrange. This analysis also identifies the point in flight where 
termination is no longer required. This analysis establishes the latest 
time after liftoff, assuming a launch vehicle malfunctioned and flew in 
a vertical or near vertical direction above the launch point, that 
activation of the launch vehicle's flight termination system or breakup 
of the launch vehicle would not cause hazardous debris or critical 
overpressure to affect any populated or other protected area.
    Data loss flight time and no longer terminate time analyses 
establish time periods during the nominal flight of a launch vehicle 
when flight termination is not necessary even if tracking data is not 
available. Generally, termination is not required because either the 
data loss is so brief a vehicle could not reach a populated or 
protected area or the vehicle has reached a point where the remaining 
thrusting potential, in a worst case scenario, does not let the vehicle 
reach a populated or protected area.
    A time delay analysis establishes the mean elapsed time between the 
violation of a flight termination rule and the time it takes a flight 
safety system to terminate flight. This analysis is used in 
establishing a vehicle's flight safety limits.
    A flight hazard area analysis determines what areas of land, air, 
and sea must be controlled, by evacuation or notices to mariners and 
airmen, because of the risk to the public from debris impact hazards. 
The FAA does not adopt a specific impact probability or casualty 
expectation protection criterion for ship and aircraft hazard areas 
because the different federal ranges use different criterion. The FAA 
simply requires a launch operator to provide the same level of 
protection as that of a federal range when performing the analysis. The 
FAA does require a launch operator to conduct a hazard analysis and 
inform the public as to the location of any resulting hazardous areas. 
In addition, the FAA provides a methodology in appendix B for 
quantitatively constructing these hazard areas as part of the hazard 
analysis using the same construction methods that a federal ranges 
uses.
    A probability of failure analysis requires a launch operator to 
establish a launch vehicle failure probability, regardless of hazard or 
phase of flight, in a consistent manner, using accurate data, 
scientific principles, and a statistically valid method. For a launch 
vehicle with fewer than two flights, the failure probability estimate 
must account for the outcome of all previous launches of vehicles 
developed and launched in similar circumstances. For a launch vehicle 
with two or more flights, launch vehicle failure probability estimates 
must account for the outcomes of all previous flights of the vehicle in 
a statistically valid manner.
    A debris risk analysis determines the expected number of casualties 
(Ec) to the collective members of the public, if the public 
were exposed to inert and explosive debris hazards from the proposed 
flight of a launch vehicle.
    A toxic release hazard analysis determines any potential public 
hazards from any toxic release during the proposed flight of a launch 
vehicle or that would occur in the event of a flight mishap. A launch 
operator performs a toxic release hazard analysis using the 
methodologies of appendix I of part 417. The FAA requires a toxic 
release analysis to establish flight commit criteria to protect the 
public from any toxic release, and to demonstrate compliance with the 
public risk criterion of section 417.107(b).
    A launch operator's flight safety analysis must also establish 
flight commit criteria that will protect the public from any hazard 
associated with far field blast overpressure effects due to potential 
explosions during flight, and to demonstrate compliance with the public 
risk criterion of section 417.107(b). This analysis applies to any far-
field overpressure blast effects analysis such as the potential for 
overpressure effects based upon meteorological conditions and terrain 
characteristics, potential for broken windows, launch vehicle explosive 
capability, population shelter types, window characteristics, and 
hazard characteristics of glass shards.
    A collision avoidance analysis requires a launch operator to 
establish a period in a planned launch window during which a launch 
operator could not initiate flight, so as to maintain a 200-kilometer 
separation from any habitable orbiting object. This analysis must 
account for all variances associated with launch vehicle performance 
and timing and ensure that any calculated launch hold incorporates all 
additional time periods associated with such variances. This standard 
is in keeping with current practice because a Federal range launch wait 
already accounts for such variances. A launch vehicle performing 
nominally within its three-sigma performance envelope could have a 
different separation distance or intercept time with a resident space 
object as compared to the same launch vehicle performing on its nominal 
trajectory. A launch wait, as part of a collision avoidance analysis, 
accounts for these variances.
    An overflight gate analysis determines whether a vehicle can 
overfly populated areas. This analysis requires a launch operator to 
file information to explain why it is safe to allow flight through a 
flight safety limit, the limit that protects populated or protected 
areas, without terminating a flight. This analysis accounts for the 
fact that it is potentially more dangerous to populated or protected 
areas to destroy a malfunctioning vehicle during certain

[[Page 50513]]

portions of a launch than not to destroy it. In some circumstances, a 
destroyed vehicle may disperse debris over a wider area affecting more 
people than if the vehicle were to impact intact.
    A hold and resume gate analysis may, in the event a launch operator 
has lost tracking data information, still allow a normally performing 
launch vehicle to overfly or nearly overfly a populated or otherwise 
protected area to avoid dispersing debris over a populated area when a 
launch vehicle might still be performing normally. This analysis would 
expand the range of acceptable trajectories for coastal launch sites 
whose flight corridors could contain isolated populated or protected 
islands. It would also increase the availability of inland launch 
locations by allowing a normally performing vehicle to overfly 
populated or otherwise protected areas from a site that is wholly 
contained within a populated or otherwise protected area.
    The launch of an unguided suborbital launch vehicle (USLV) flown 
with a wind weighting safety system also requires analysis to establish 
wind constraints and other corrections for wind effects on a launch. 
The flight safety analysis of such a flight must also demonstrate 
compliance with the safety criteria and operational requirements for 
the launch of a USLV contained in section 417.125. A launch operator 
must also ensure the flight safety analysis for a USLV is conducted in 
accordance with the methodologies in Appendices B, C, and I.

Flight Safety System

    The FAA also adopts standards for a flight safety system. As 
discussed earlier, subpart B of part 417 describes when a launch 
operator must use a flight safety system. Subpart D of part 417 
contains the performance requirements of any flight safety system that 
a launch operator must use. Appendix D has methodologies for meeting 
the performance requirements of a flight termination system. Appendix E 
has the test requirements for a flight termination system.
    A flight safety system is a system that provides a means of control 
during flight for preventing a hazard from a launch vehicle, including 
any payload hazard, from reaching any populated or other protected area 
in the event of a launch vehicle failure. A flight safety system 
includes all hardware and software used to protect the public in the 
event of a launch vehicle failure, and the functions of any flight 
safety crew. A typical flight safety system is composed of a flight 
termination system (FTS) and a command control system. The FAA adopts 
requirements for the flight termination system components onboard a 
launch vehicle as well as command control components that are typically 
ground based. This final rule also defines a process for determining 
the reliability of a flight safety system. The reliability process 
consists of specific flight termination system design standards and 
criteria, a reliability analysis of the FTS design, and comprehensive 
testing to qualify the FTS design and certify and accept FTS 
components.
    A launch operator may employ an alternate flight safety system if 
approved by the FAA. An alternate flight safety system must undergo 
analysis and testing that is comparable to that required by Subpart D 
of part 417 to demonstrate its reliability to perform its intended 
functions. In addition, the FAA built flexibility into this area by 
permitting entities, other than a launch operator to conduct required 
tests or analysis. The FAA recognizes that a vendor, contractor, or 
Federal range may perform the required tests and analysis of this 
subpart. However, the FAA notes that a launch operator is ultimately 
responsible for employing a flight termination system that satisfies 
all FAA requirements of subpart D and appendices D and E of part 417.
    For launch from a non-Federal launch site, compliance with the 
flight safety system requirements is demonstrated through the licensing 
process. For a launch from a Federal launch range, the FAA will accept 
the flight safety system used or approved on a Federal launch range, if 
a launch operator has contracted with a Federal launch range for the 
provision of flight safety system services and property, and the FAA 
has assessed the range through a LSSA and found that the range's 
property and services satisfy the requirements of this subpart. In this 
case, the FAA will treat the Federal launch range's flight safety 
system's property and services as that of a launch operator. This is 
consistent with the FAA's current practice for launches from Federal 
ranges. Under this provision, the FAA expects that launch operators at 
Federal ranges will continue to rely on the Federal range to approve 
flight termination systems and provide command control and support 
systems that comply with the requirements of this part.
    A flight safety system must have a command control system to 
transmit a command signal that has the radio frequency characteristics 
and power needed for receipt of the signal by the flight termination 
system onboard the launch vehicle. The command control system must 
include equipment to ensure that an onboard vehicle termination system 
will receive a transmitted command signal and must meet subpart D's 
performance requirements, including those addressing reliability 
prediction, fault tolerance, configuration control, electromagnetic 
interference, command transmitter failover, the ability to switch 
between transmitter systems, radio carrier, command control system 
monitoring, command transmitter system, and command control antennas. 
Each command control system, subsystem, component, and part that can 
affect the reliability of a component must have written performance 
specifications that demonstrate, and contain the details of, how each 
satisfies the performance requirements of subpart D.
    Testing requirements apply to a new or modified command control 
system. This testing includes preflight testing. Each test must follow 
a written plan that specifies procedures and test parameters, and must 
include instructions on how to handle procedural deviations and react 
to test failures. A launch operator must also prepare written test 
reports for each test. In accordance with a launch site safety 
assessment, for a launch from a Federal launch range, a launch operator 
may continue to rely on the range's verification that the system 
satisfies all the test requirements. Appendix D of part 417 contains 
methodologies that a launch operator can use to conduct the tests. 
Appendix D provides one means of satisfying the requirements of this 
rule. A launch operator may also file an alternative means for FAA 
review and approval.
    A flight safety system must also have design, test, and functional 
requirements for systems that support the functions of a flight safety 
crew, including any determination to terminate a flight. The vehicle 
tracking system is one of these support systems. It must include two 
independent tracking sources and provide the launch vehicle position 
and status to the flight safety crew from liftoff until the vehicle 
reaches its planned safe flight state. Other support systems include 
telemetry, a communications network, data processing, display and 
recording, displays and controls, support equipment calibration, 
destruct initiator simulator, and timing. The data processing, display 
and recording system must display and record raw input and processed 
data at no less than 0.1 second intervals. Again, appendices D and E of 
part 417 provide the methodologies that a launch operator

[[Page 50514]]

must use, absent an equivalent alternative, to conduct the above tests.
    This rule also requires a launch operator to demonstrate the 
predicted reliability of a flight safety system, including a flight 
termination system, command and control system, and each of its 
components. This reliability analysis must use a reliability model that 
is statistically valid and that accurately represents the actual 
system. These analyses must identify all possible failure points and 
undesired events, the probability that they would occur, and their 
effects on system performance. The analyses must demonstrate the 
reliability of a radio frequency link, any software or firmware, any 
battery, and the survivability of a flight termination system, when 
exposed to various hostile environments.
    A flight safety system must be operated by a qualified flight 
safety crew. The flight safety crew's capabilities are verified through 
a training program and approved during the licensing process. The FAA's 
training and qualification approach is an adaptation of Federal launch 
range practices.

Ground Safety

    The FAA also adopts ground safety standards governing the 
preparation of a launch vehicle for flight. The FAA recognizes that 
other Federal agencies regulate various aspects of ground safety. This 
final rule addresses ground safety issues not otherwise addressed by 
other Federal regulations, that are unique to space launch processing 
and that could affect the general public. A launch operator licensee is 
responsible for developing and implementing a ground safety program in 
compliance with the specified standards. This final rule does not 
supersede the ground safety requirements of other regulatory agencies.
    In order for a launch operator to meet the ground safety 
requirements of subpart E of part 417 and the methodologies of 
appendices I and J, a launch operator must conduct a ground safety 
analysis. In addition to the Subpart E requirements, a launch operator 
is also required to conduct a toxic release hazard analysis as part of 
subpart C, flight safety analysis. For a launch from a range, a launch 
operator may rely on a launch site safety assessment to demonstrate 
compliance with both the ground safety analysis and the toxic release 
analysis. In addition, a launch operator may also demonstrate the 
acceptability of an alternative method of compliance.
    A ground safety analysis consists of identifying each potential 
hazard, each associated cause, and each hazard control that a launch 
operator must establish and maintain to keep each identified hazard 
from affecting the public. A launch operator not relying on a LSSA must 
conduct this analysis for launch vehicle hardware, ground hardware 
(including launch site and ground support equipment), launch 
processing, and post-launch operations. A launch operator not relying 
on a LSSA must record all of this analysis in a ground safety report, 
the format for which is located in appendix J.
    A launch operator must classify each hazard in the analysis 
described above as a public hazard, a launch location hazard, an 
employee hazard, or a non-credible hazard. For some hazards capable of 
creating catastrophic consequences, a launch operator must implement a 
dual fault system, so that no single act could cause the catastrophic 
event. Once a hazard is identified, classified, and a corresponding 
control is in place, a launch operator must also conduct periodic 
inspections to ensure safety devices and hazard controls remain in 
working order. A launch operator must also establish a safety clear 
zone and prohibit public access during hazardous operations.

Discussion of Comments

    At the conclusion of the public comment period on June 1, 2005 the 
FAA received written comments from The Boeing Company, Lockheed Martin 
Corp., NASA, Orbital Sciences Corp., Sea Launch Company, Space 
Exploration Technologies, XCOR Aerospace, and three comments from 
private citizens. The following discussion responds to substantive 
comments that explain the reasons for the comment and that were not 
already submitted and responded to in the past.

General Comments

    A number of comments repeat suggested changes for several sections. 
We address these comments here, instead of in every section. First, for 
several sections commenters suggested repeating the FAA's willingness 
to accept alternative approaches that provide an equivalent level of 
safety.\3\ However, it is better to state this only once at the 
beginning of each subpart, so that a finding of an equivalent level of 
safety may be made for any requirement in a subpart, rather than just 
in a few select sections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \3\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(c), 
D417.1(a) E417.1(a).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Second, if a comment submitted in 2005 repeats a comment submitted 
in response to earlier notices, but raises no new issues or adds no new 
information, the FAA will continue to rely on its own earlier response, 
including those placed in the docket on February 28, 2005. For example, 
XCOR Aerospace, in addition to providing new comments, also submitted a 
copy of the same comments given in response to the 2001 NPRM.\4\
    Third, the FAA is unable to respond to comments that do not provide 
an explanation or a reason for a suggested change for a comment.\5\ 
Likewise, a number of comments request a change to the proposal based 
on cost concerns, but do not provide cost data to substantiate that 
concern.\6\ In addition, we do not specifically address requests for 
clarifying or editorial changes, even though we may accept some of 
those changes.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \4\ See also, Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(g), 
417.105(a) and (b), 417.111(d)(4), 417.231(a), 417.303(c), 
417.303(d), 417.307(b)(8), 417.307(h)(4), 417.309(b)(2), 
417.309(c)(4), 417.309(j), 417.407(a), 417.407(b), 417.417(b), 
D417.5(c)(3), D417.13(c), D417.17(b)(6), D417.29(b)(2)(ii), 
D417.33(d), D417.33(g)(6), D417.31(h), D417.31 (i), E417.1(d)(3), 
Lockheed proposed E417.1(j), E417.3(f)(3), E417.11(g)(1), 
E417.19(e)(2)(ii), E417.19(e)(2)(vi), E417.25(f)(2), E417.29(b)(6); 
Boeing's comments concerning sections D417.41(c), D417.45(m), 
D417.47(b), E417.1(d)(3).
    \5\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.3, 417.107(f), 
417.111(e)(2), 417.207(b), 417.303(l)(6), D417.3(b), D417.21(a), 
E417.9(l), E417.19(d), E417.25(c)(2), E417.25(i), E417.25(j)(4); 
Boeing comments concerning D417.7(l), E417.15(b), E417.21(b)(iii), 
E417.25(c)(2), E417.25(i), E417.35(b).
    \6\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.1(f), 
E417.35(c).
    \7\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.11(c)(2)(ii), 
417.301(c)(1), 417.307(b)(4), 417.307(e)(2), 417.3079(e)(7), 
417.307(f)(8), 417.309(b), 417.309(c), 417.309(f)(3)(i), 
417.311(b)(2), 417.402(e), 417.403(c), 417.405(e), 417.405(f), 
417.405(g)(3), 417.405(j)(5), D417.5(i), D417.9(b) & (d), 
D417.21(e), D417.25(b), D417.29(a)(1), D417.29(b)(1)(i), 
D417.33(h)(2), E417.1(g), E417.5(g)(3), E417.7(d), E417.9(a), (b), 
and (e), E417.11(f)(2), E417.11(h)(1), E417.19(d)(1), E417.19(d)(5), 
E417.9(e)(1); Boeing comment concerning B417.13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fourth, some commenters continue to suggest that they do not 
satisfy the part 417 requirements or they are currently operating to a 
different standard. This is because a range found an equivalent level 
of safety through tailoring or a meets intent certification. The FAA's 
grandfathering policies should address these concerns. Also, as noted 
in the Analysis of Comments the FAA placed in the docket on February 
28, 2005, the FAA did consult with the ranges regarding a number of 
these concerns when they were raised earlier in the rulemaking, and 
operators are

[[Page 50515]]

apparently in compliance, but unaware that they are.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \8\ See, e.g., Boeing comments concerning sections 
417.209(a)(6), A417.7(2)(g)(1), D417.5(c), D417.7(c)(1), 
D417.7(c)(4), D417.7(g)(1)(i), D417.13(c), D417.15(b)(1), 
D417.35(d), D417.45(b) and (o), D417.47(i), E417.33(c), 
E417.41(e)(1); Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.301(d)(2), 
D417.7(g)(1)(i), D417.19(g)(2), D417.27(h), D417.29(b)(9), D417.53 
(d), E417.9(j), E417.11 (b)(3), E417.11(c)(2), E417.11(c)(3), 
E417.11(c)(6), E417.11(e)(2), E417.11(e)(4), E417.11 (h)(1)(ii), 
E417.11 (h)(4)(ii), E417.11(i)(2)(ii), E417.13(d)(2)(v), 
E417.13(e)(1)(i), E417.13(e)(2)(ii), Table E417.17-2, Table E417.19-
1, E417.19(e)(2)(i), E417.19(e)(2)(v)(A), E417.19 (e)(2)(xiii), 
E417.19(f)(2), E417.19(f)(10), E417.19(f)(11), all Lockheed comments 
concerning section E417.19(j), E417.21(b)(iv), E417.21 (g)(2), 
E417.21(j)(4)(i), (j)(4)(ii) E417.21(p)(1), E417.21(p)(3)(ii), 
E417.21(q)(6), E417.21(r)(5), E417.22(a), E417.25(g)(4), E417.25(h), 
E417.31(b)(4), E417.33(c), E417.37(b)(2), E417.41(h)(1)(ii), 
E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(iii), 
E417.41(h)(2)(i)(5)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(6).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Fifth, the FAA received several comments concerning requirements 
for a launch operator to file information during a particular time 
period, e.g., thirty days before a launch. The FAA did not change the 
suggested timing requirement because the FAA already provides a process 
for granting waivers under part 404. As noted at the 2005 public 
meeting, the FAA routinely grants waivers to administrative timing 
requirements. Additionally, the FAA plans to permit the coordination of 
timing issues at Federal launch ranges to be taken care of by the 
Federal launch ranges.\9\
    Sixth, the FAA received some comments claiming that a proposed 
requirement was not current practice. The FAA reviewed current practice 
with the Federal launch ranges, and received confirmation that the 
commenters suggestion is current practice at the ranges. The FAA 
therefore adopts the commenters suggestions.\10\ In addition, some 
comments simply claimed that a proposed requirement is not current 
practice, without further explaining what the commenter considers 
current practice.\11\ The FAA was able to confirm with the Federal 
ranges that the FAA requirement is current practice. In this regard, 
commenters who questioned whether a requirement was current practice in 
this latest round of comments may be assured that the FAA checked again 
with U.S. Air Force range safety personnel on each comment discussed in 
detail below.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \9\ See Boeing comments concerning sections 417.117(b)(2), 
E417.41(e)(1); Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.17(c)(4), 
417.17(c)(7), E417.41(d)(2), E417.41(e)(1), E417.41(h)(2), 
E417.41(h)(2)(i), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(1)(v), E417.41(h)(2)(i)(2)(i), 
E417.41(h)(2)(i)(3), and Sea Launch comments concerning sections 
415.115 and 415.121.
    \10\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.9(c), 
E417.3(e)(1), E417.11(b)(4)(iii).
    \11\ See Lockheed comments concerning sections 417.303(b), 
417.307(a)(2), 417.309(c)(6), D417.5(e), D417.7(c)(6), D417.19(e), 
E417.5(g), E417.7 (f)(5), E417.25(f)(4).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Finally, XCOR submitted general comments concerning the latest 
draft documents placed in the docket on February 28, 2005. These 
comments included the general statement that the FAA should abandon 
this rulemaking, start over, and engage industry in real dialogue 
because this rulemaking will destroy industry, is too burdensome, and 
actually decreases public safety. The FAA notes that this rulemaking 
adopts current practice, so there is no degradation to public safety. 
In addition, the industry's relationship with the Federal launch ranges 
will not change. To the extent that XCOR is concerned that current 
practice is too burdensome, the FAA is not proposing any changes.

Launch Site Safety Assessments

    In accordance with comments from industry, if the FAA has assessed 
a Federal launch range, through its launch site safety assessment, and 
found that an applicable range safety-related launch service or 
property satisfies FAA requirements, then the FAA will treat the 
Federal launch range's launch service or property as that of a launch 
operator's, and there will be no need for further demonstration of 
compliance to the FAA. The FAA agrees with most commenters that 
existing Federal launch range safety requirements and processes have 
worked well in protecting the safety of the public and property. The 
March 2005 Draft Regulatory Language and Analysis of Comments, at 106, 
stated that the FAA had assessed the Federal launch ranges through the 
FAA's launch site safety assessment, and found that applicable range 
safety-related launch analyses, services or property satisfied the 
requirements. Therefore, the FAA proposal intended to treat a Federal 
launch range's launch service or property as that of a launch 
operator's. The FAA remains committed to this position. Participants at 
the 2005 public meeting referred to this practice as an ``off-ramp.''
    The FAA discussed the sufficiency of the launch site assessment 
process at a public meeting held on March 29-30, 2005 (``2005 public 
meeting''). At that public meeting, FAA officials thoroughly briefed, 
discussed, and entertained multiple questions from industry 
representatives in an attempt to assure the launch operators of the 
FAA's plan to allow launch operators to continue using the ranges as 
their primary interface. The FAA encouraged the launch operators to 
work with the FAA in determining appropriate language if the proposed 
language did not satisfy industry concerns. Industry was encouraged to 
act immediately and not wait until the end of the comment period. 
Industry responded at the close of the comment period.
    Orbital \12\ described the FAA's previously established approach to 
accepting a Federal launch range's range safety-related launch service 
or property as an ``off-ramp'' for launch operators operating on a 
Federal launch range. Orbital requested that the FAA expressly provide 
that no further demonstration of compliance to the FAA be required of a 
launch operator, and the FAA adopts this clarification. Lockheed 
suggested similar language for section 417.1(g). The FAA provides this 
assurance at the beginning of every substantive subpart of this rule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    \12\ See also, Boeing, at 1, and Lockheed, subpart A at 1-2, 7-
9, subpart B at 1-2, 4-6, 8-13, subpart C at 1-2, subpart D at 1-3, 
subpart E at 1-4, 7-9, Appendix A at 1, Appendix B at 1, Appendix D 
at 2-3, Appendix E at 1-2, Appendix G at 1, Appendix I at 1, 
Appendix J at 1, also commented on the off-ramp process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Boeing suggested removing any suggestion that a Federal launch 
range's analyses might not satisfy an FAA requirement, and that the 
provision should not entertain that possibility. The FAA does not 
accept this suggestion. Federal launch range practices change over 
time. Ideally, the FAA's launch site safety assessment reflects those 
changes. However, a Federal launch range could change a requirement 
without the agreement of the FAA. This is highly unlikely due to the 
CSWG goal of maintaining common standards. A Federal launch range 
could, however, decide that it no longer will perform a flight safety 
analysis or some other service for launch operators due to a decreasing 
budget or other reasons. Therefore, the FAA's acceptance of Federal 
launch range work must recognize that theoretical possibility.

Application Requirements

    Section 415.111 requires that an applicant's safety review document 
identify all persons with whom the applicant has contracted to provide 
goods or services for the launch of the launch vehicle. Sea Launch 
commented that this is an overly detailed requirement and it would be 
nearly impossible to meet because it includes all persons with whom the 
applicant has contracted. Sea Launch recommends that the requirement be 
limited to only persons who provide safety-related services. The FAA 
agrees

[[Page 50516]]

and adopts the requirement as suggested.
    Section 415.123 contains requirements for computing systems and 
software. Sea Launch commented that these requirements are not current 
practice. AFSPCMAN 91-710, Volume 1, Attachment 2 , ``System Safety 
Program Requirements,'' requires analysis of software and computing 
systems hazards and risks as part of a comprehensive analysis of system 
safety, and verification and validation. Therefore, the FAA did not 
change this section in response to this comment.

Launch Safety

Requests for Relief

    Paragraphs (c) and (d) of section 417.1 require written evidence of 
a meets intent certification or waiver for a launch operator to be 
eligible for relief. Lockheed and Boeing commented at the 2005 public 
meeting that such evidence may not exist in the way of a meets intent 
certification. The FAA clarifies that other forms of written evidence 
are acceptable and now provides examples
    Section 417.1(c) provides a launch operator with an alternative 
means to satisfy an FAA requirement through an equivalent level of 
safety if written evidence demonstrates that a Federal launch range 
has, by the effective date of this part, granted a ``meets intent 
certification.'' Section 417.1(d) states that a requirement of this 
part does not apply to a launch if written evidence demonstrates that a 
Federal launch range has, by the effective date of this part, granted a 
waiver that allows noncompliance with the requirement. Lockheed 
requested the FAA strike the term, ``by the effective date of this 
part.'' Lockheed stated that suspension of the ``meets intent'' 
certification process and waiver process as of the effective date of 
the final rule promulgated by the FAA would result in a significant 
impact to the Atlas program, although Lockheed did not state in its 
written comments how or why this impact might occur.
    As discussed in the 2005 public meeting, the FAA cannot eliminate 
the reference to the effective date. This effective date is retained 
because any relief granted before the effective date requires proof 
that the Federal launch range granted such relief. After the effective 
date, the FAA will coordinate with the Federal launch range to 
determine whether relief should be granted. Also, as discussed in the 
SNPRM, agencies cannot waive each other's requirements. This rulemaking 
remedies that problem. The effective date requirement must remain 
because the requirement applies to all previously grandfathered 
requirements. The effective date does not terminate the relief process, 
as suggested by Lockheed and Boeing.
    Lockheed Martin also suggested that the FAA add a new section 
adopting the practice of ``tailoring'' at the Federal ranges. The FAA 
does not need to add the section because although the FAA in practice 
will continue the tailoring process, it will do so through the use of 
an equivalent level of safety determination.

License Terms and Conditions

    Section 417.7 states that a launch operator is responsible for 
ensuring public safety and the safety of property at all times during 
the conduct of a licensed launch. Lockheed requested the FAA add that 
for licensed launches from a Federal launch range, compliance with 
section 417.13, which says a launch operator must enter into an 
agreement with and comply with range requirements, satisfies the launch 
operator's public safety requirements. Lockheed reasoned that the 
Federal launch ranges play a key role in conducting launch activities 
and the range has its own authorities and responsibility with regard to 
ensuring public safety. A launch operator cannot subsume these 
responsibilities. Although Lockheed is correct about the important role 
of the Federal launch ranges, the role of the range does not detract 
from a launch operator's responsibilities for safety under its license. 
A Federal launch range cannot subsume a launch operator's 
responsibilities either. The FAA's description of the launch operator's 
responsibility has been part of the regulations for years. See 14 CFR 
415.71. That a range has responsibilities does not mean that a launch 
operator does not have these same responsibilities. As explained in 
previous rulemakings, a launch operator must comply with the 
requirements of both the ranges and the FAA. See, Commercial Space 
Transportation Licensing Regulations, NPRM, 62 FR 13234 (Mar. 19, 
1997).

Scheduling

    Proposed section 417.17(b)(1) would have required that for each 
launch, a launch operator must file a launch schedule that identified 
each point of contact by name and position for each scheduled activity. 
The FAA proposed that the points of contact be filed no later than six 
months before flight. Sea Launch commented at the 2005 public meeting 
and both Boeing and Sea Launch commented in written comments, that a 
single schedule point of contact is current practice and that requiring 
the information six months before flight was excessive. The FAA agrees 
and instead requires a single point of contact for the schedule and 
that the launch schedule must be filed and updated in time to allow FAA 
personnel to participate in the reviews, rehearsals, and safety 
critical launch processing.
    Proposed paragraph (b) of section 417.25 would have required that 
for a launch operator launching from a non-Federal launch site, a 
launch operator must file a post launch report with the FAA 90 days 
after the launch. Sea Launch commented that current practice requires a 
30 and 60 day report and that the 90 day report is not current 
practice. The reports filed by Sea Launch under current practice meet 
the requirement of section 417.25(b). To clarify, the FAA now requires 
the report be filed no later than 90 days after launch. The 
clarification is also made to section 417.25(a).

Launch Safety Responsibilities

    Section 417.103(b)(2) requires that a safety official have direct 
access to a launch operator's launch director. The FAA had proposed 
that a safety official report directly to the launch director, but 
Lockheed pointed out that these employees may be stationed in different 
parts of the country. The FAA clarifies that direct access means a 
safety official can communicate safety concerns to the launch director. 
This provision does not mandate the organizational structure of a 
launch operator.

Flight Safety

    Section 417.107(b) requires a launch operator to demonstrate that 
any risk to the public satisfies public risk criteria of Ec 
<= 30 x 10-6 for each hazard before initiating the flight of 
a launch vehicle. Boeing suggested that the FAA use 30 x 
10-6 as a level defining acceptable launch risk without high 
management review. As it has in the past, Boeing suggested that the 
Ec criterion lacks mathematical justification and therefore 
should not represent a hard limit. The acceptable risk criterion for 
debris at 30x10-6 is current practice and has been an FAA 
requirement since 1999 under section 415.35(a), which is not changed by 
this rulemaking. Previous FAA discussions in the July 2002 SNPRM, the 
February 2005 Analysis of Comments, and the FAA's 2005 public meeting 
discussed the 30 x 10-6 criterion and its acceptability.