Passenger Train Emergency Systems, 50276-50313 [06-7099]

Agencies

• Federal Railroad Administration
• DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 164 (Thursday, August 24, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 50276-50313]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-7099]



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Part VI





Department of Transportation





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Federal Railroad Administration



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49 CFR Parts 223 and 238



Passenger Train Emergency Systems; Proposed Rule

Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 164 / Thursday, August 24, 2006 / 
Proposed Rules

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 223 and 238

[Docket No. FRA-2006-25273, Notice No. 1]
RIN 2130-AB72


Passenger Train Emergency Systems

AGENCY: Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), Department of 
Transportation (DOT).

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).

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SUMMARY: This NPRM is intended to further the safety of passenger train 
occupants through both enhancements and additions to FRA's existing 
requirements for emergency systems on passenger trains. In this NPRM, 
FRA proposes to enhance existing requirements for emergency window 
exits and to establish requirements for rescue access windows to 
evacuate passenger train occupants. FRA also proposes to enhance 
passenger train emergency system requirements by expanding the 
application of requirements that are currently applicable only to 
passenger trains operating at speeds in excess of 125 mph (Tier II 
passenger trains) to passenger trains operating at speeds at or below 
125 mph (Tier I passenger trains); these proposed enhancements would 
require that Tier I passenger trains be equipped with public address 
and intercom systems for emergency communication and that passenger 
cars provide emergency roof access for use by emergency responders. FRA 
is proposing to apply certain of the requirements to both existing and 
new passenger equipment, while other requirements would apply to new 
passenger equipment only.

DATES: (1) Written comments must be received by October 23, 2006. 
Comments received after that date will be considered to the extent 
possible without incurring additional expense or delay.
    (2) FRA anticipates being able to resolve this rulemaking without a 
public, oral hearing. However, if FRA receives a specific request for a 
public, oral hearing prior to September 25, 2006, one will be scheduled 
and FRA will publish a supplemental notice in the Federal Register to 
inform interested parties of the date, time, and location of any such 
hearing.

ADDRESSES: Comments: Comments related to Docket No. FRA-2006-25273 may 
be submitted by any of the following methods:
     Web site: https://dms.dot.gov. Follow the instructions for 
submitting comments on the DOT electronic docket site.
     Fax: 202-493-2251.
     Mail: Docket Management Facility, U.S. Department of 
Transportation, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Nassif Building, Room PL-401, 
Washington, DC 20590.
     Hand Delivery: Room PL-401 on the plaza level of the 
Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., Washington, DC between 9 a.m. 
and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays.
     Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to https://
www.regulations.gov. Follow the online instructions for submitting 
comments.
    Instructions: All submissions must include the agency name and 
docket number or Regulatory Identification Number (RIN) for this 
rulemaking. Note that all comments received will be posted without 
change to https://dms.dot.gov including any personal information. Please 
see the Privacy Act heading in the ``Supplementary Information'' 
section of this document for Privacy Act information related to any 
submitted comments or materials.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://dms.dot.gov at any time or to PL-401 on 
the plaza level of the Nassif Building, 400 Seventh Street, SW., 
Washington, DC between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. Monday through Friday, except 
Federal Holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Brenda J. Moscoso, Office of Safety, 
Operations Research Analyst, RRS-23, Mail Stop 25, Federal Railroad 
Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590 
(telephone 202-493-6282); Daniel L. Alpert, Trial Attorney, Office of 
Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 
Vermont Avenue, NW., Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6026); or 
Anna Nassif Winkle, Trial Attorney, Office of Chief Counsel, Mail Stop 
10, Federal Railroad Administration, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW., 
Washington, DC 20590 (telephone 202-493-6166).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents for Supplementary Information

I. Statutory Background
II. Proceedings to Date
    A. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview
    B. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group
    C. Establishment of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force
    D. Development of the NPRM
III. Technical Background
    A. Change in Passenger Car Fleet Composition
    B. NTSB Safety Recommendation on Windows
    C. Need for Emergency Communication Systems
    D. Window Technology
    E. APTA's Standard for Emergency Evacuation Units
IV. General Overview of Proposed Requirements
    A. Emergency Window Exits and Rescue Access Windows
    B. Emergency Communications--Public Address and Intercom Systems
    C. Emergency Roof Access
    D. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance
V. Section-by-Section Analysis
VI. Regulatory Impact and Notices
    A. Executive Order 12866 and DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act and Executive Order 13272
    C. Paperwork Reduction Act
    D. Federalism Implications
    E. Environmental Impact
    F. Unfunded Mandates Act of 1995
    G. Energy Impact
    H. Privacy Act
List of Subjects

I. Statutory Background

    In September of 1994, the Secretary of Transportation convened a 
meeting of representatives from all sectors of the rail industry with 
the goal of enhancing rail safety. As one of the initiatives arising 
from this Rail Safety Summit, the Secretary announced that DOT would 
begin developing safety standards for rail passenger equipment over a 
5-year period. In November of 1994, Congress adopted the Secretary's 
schedule for implementing rail passenger equipment safety regulations 
and included it in the Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 
1994 (the Act), Public Law No. 103-440, 108 Stat. 4619, 4623-4624 
(November 2, 1994). Congress also authorized the Secretary to consult 
with various organizations involved in passenger train operations for 
purposes of prescribing and amending these regulations, as well as 
issuing orders pursuant to them. Section 215 of the Act is codified at 
49 U.S.C. 20133.

II. Proceedings to Date

    The Secretary of Transportation delegated these rulemaking 
responsibilities to the Federal Railroad Administrator, see 49 CFR 
1.49(m), and FRA formed the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
Working Group to provide FRA advice in developing the regulations. On 
June 17, 1996, FRA published an advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPRM) concerning the establishment of

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comprehensive safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 61 
FR 30672. The ANPRM provided background information on the need for 
such standards, offered preliminary ideas on approaching passenger 
safety issues, and presented questions on various passenger safety 
topics. Following consideration of comments received on the ANPRM and 
advice from FRA's Passenger Equipment Safety Standards Working Group, 
FRA published an NPRM on September 23, 1997, to establish comprehensive 
safety standards for railroad passenger equipment. See 62 FR 49728. In 
addition to requesting written comment on the NPRM, FRA also solicited 
oral comment at a public hearing held on November 21, 1997. FRA 
considered the comments received on the NPRM and prepared a final rule 
establishing comprehensive safety standards for passenger equipment, 
which was published on May 12, 1999. See 64 FR 25540.
    After publication of the final rule, interested parties filed 
petitions seeking FRA's reconsideration of certain requirements 
contained in the rule. These petitions generally related to the 
following subject areas: structural design; fire safety; training; 
inspection, testing, and maintenance; and movement of defective 
equipment. To address the petitions, FRA grouped issues together and 
published in the Federal Register three sets of amendments to the final 
rule. Each set of amendments summarized the petition requests at issue, 
explained what action, if any, FRA decided to take in response to the 
issues raised, and described FRA's justifications for its decisions and 
any action taken. Specifically, on July 3, 2000, FRA issued a response 
to the petitions for reconsideration relating to the inspection, 
testing, and maintenance of passenger equipment, the movement of 
defective passenger equipment, and other miscellaneous provisions 
related to mechanical issues contained in the final rule. See 65 FR 
41284. On April 23, 2002, FRA responded to all remaining issues raised 
in the petitions for reconsideration, with the exception of those 
relating to fire safety. See 67 FR 19970. Finally, on June 25, 2002, 
FRA completed its response to the petitions for reconsideration by 
publishing a response to the petitions for reconsideration concerning 
the fire safety portion of the rule. See 67 FR 42892. (For more 
detailed information on the petitions for reconsideration and FRA's 
response to them, please see these three rulemaking documents.) The 
product of this rulemaking was codified primarily at 49 CFR part 238 
and secondarily at 49 CFR parts 216, 223, 229, 231, and 232.
    Meanwhile, another rulemaking on passenger train emergency 
preparedness produced a final rule codified at 49 CFR part 239. See 63 
FR 24629; May 4, 1998. The rule addresses passenger train emergencies 
of various kinds, including security situations, and requires the 
preparation, adoption, and implementation of emergency preparedness 
plans by railroads connected with the operation of passenger trains. 
The emergency preparedness plans must include elements such as 
communication, employee training and qualification, joint operations, 
tunnel safety, liaison with emergency responders, on-board emergency 
equipment, and passenger safety information. The rule requires each 
affected railroad to instruct its employees on the applicable 
provisions of its plan, and the plan adopted by each railroad is 
subject to formal review and approval by FRA. The rule also requires 
each railroad operating passenger train service to conduct emergency 
simulations to determine its capability to execute the emergency 
preparedness plan under the variety of emergency scenarios that could 
reasonably be expected to occur. In addition, among the rule's other 
requirements, the rule provides that (i) all emergency window exits and 
all windows intended for rescue access by emergency responders be 
marked and that instructions be provided for their use (see 49 CFR 
223.9(d)); and (ii) all door exits intended for egress be lighted or 
marked, all door exits intended for rescue access by emergency 
responders be marked, and that instructions be provided for the use of 
both (see 49 CFR 239.107(a)).
    Although FRA had completed these rulemakings, FRA had identified 
various issues for possible future rulemaking, including those to be 
addressed following the completion of additional research, the 
gathering of additional operating experience, or the development of 
industry standards, or all three. One such issue concerned expanding 
the application of emergency system requirements applicable to Tier II 
passenger equipment to Tier I passenger equipment as well. FRA and 
interested industry members also began identifying other issues related 
to the new passenger equipment safety standards and the passenger train 
emergency preparedness regulations. FRA decided to address these issues 
with the assistance of FRA's Railroad Safety Advisory Committee.

A. Railroad Safety Advisory Committee (RSAC) Overview

    In March 1996, FRA established RSAC, which provides a forum for 
developing consensus recommendations to FRA's Administrator on 
rulemakings and other safety program issues. The Committee includes 
representation from all of the agency's major customer groups, 
including railroads, labor organizations, suppliers and manufacturers, 
and other interested parties. A list of member groups follows:

American Association of Private Railroad Car Owners (AARPCO);
American Association of State Highway & Transportation Officials 
(AASHTO);
American Public Transportation Association (APTA);
American Short Line and Regional Railroad Association (ASLRRA);
American Train Dispatchers Association (ATDA);
Association of American Railroads (AAR);
Association of Railway Museums (ARM);
Association of State Rail Safety Managers (ASRSM);
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET);
Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees Division (BMWED);
Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS);
Federal Transit Administration (FTA)*;
High Speed Ground Transportation Association (HSGTA);
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers;
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW);
Labor Council for Latin American Advancement (LCLAA)*;
League of Railway Industry Women*;
National Association of Railroad Passengers (NARP);
National Association of Railway Business Women*;
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers;
National Railroad Construction and Maintenance Association;
National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak);
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)*;
Railway Supply Institute (RSI);
Safe Travel America (STA);
Secretaria de Comunicaciones y Transporte*;
Sheet Metal Workers International Association (SMWIA);
Tourist Railway Association Inc.;
Transport Canada*;
Transport Workers Union of America (TWU);
Transportation Communications International Union/BRC (TCIU/BRC); and

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United Transportation Union (UTU).

*Indicates associate, non-voting membership.

    When appropriate, FRA assigns a task to RSAC, and after 
consideration and debate, RSAC may accept or reject the task. If the 
task is accepted, RSAC establishes a working group that possesses the 
appropriate expertise and representation of interests to develop 
recommendations to FRA for action on the task. These recommendations 
are developed by consensus. A working group may establish one or more 
task forces to develop facts and options on a particular aspect of a 
given task. The task force then provides that information to the 
working group for consideration. If a working group comes to unanimous 
consensus on recommendations for action, the package is presented to 
the full RSAC for a vote. If the proposal is accepted by a simple 
majority of RSAC, the proposal is formally recommended to FRA. FRA then 
determines what action to take on the recommendation. Because FRA staff 
play an active role at the working group level in discussing the issues 
and options and in drafting the language of the consensus proposal, FRA 
is often favorably inclined toward the RSAC recommendation. However, 
FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and the agency 
exercises its independent judgment on whether the recommended rule 
achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly supported, and is in 
accordance with policy and legal requirements. Often, FRA varies in 
some respects from the RSAC recommendation in developing the actual 
regulatory proposal or final rule. Any such variations would be noted 
and explained in the rulemaking document issued by FRA. If the working 
group or RSAC is unable to reach consensus on recommendations for 
action, FRA moves ahead to resolve the issue through traditional 
rulemaking proceedings.

B. Establishment of the Passenger Safety Working Group

    On May 20, 2003, FRA presented, and RSAC accepted, the task of 
reviewing existing passenger equipment safety needs and programs and 
recommending consideration of specific actions that could be useful in 
advancing the safety of rail passenger service. The RSAC established 
the Passenger Safety Working Group (Working Group) to handle this task 
and develop recommendations for the full RSAC to consider. Members of 
the Working Group, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     AAR, including members from BNSF Railway Company (BNSF), 
CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSX), and Union Pacific Railroad 
Company (UP);
     AAPRCO;
     AASHTO;
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Long Island Rail Road (LIRR), 
Metro-North Railroad (MNR), Northeast Illinois Regional Commuter 
Railroad Corporation (Metra), Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation 
Authority (SEPTA), Southern California Regional Rail Authority 
(Metrolink), Saint Gobian Sully NA, LDK Engineering, and Herzog Transit 
Services, Incorporated;
     BLET;
     BRS;
     FTA;
     HSGTA;
     IBEW;
     NARP;
     RSI;
     SMWIA;
     STA;
     TCIU/BRC;
     TWU; and
     UTU.
    Staff from DOT's John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center (Volpe Center) attended all of the meetings and contributed to 
the technical discussions. In addition, staff from the NTSB met with 
the Working Group when possible. The Working Group met on the following 
dates at the following locations:
     September 9-10, 2003, in Washington, DC;
     November 6, 2003, in Philadelphia, PA;
     May 11, 2004, in Schaumburg, IL;
     October 26-27, 2004 in Linthicum/Baltimore, MD;
     March 9-10, 2005, in Ft. Lauderdale, FL; and
     September 7, 2005 in Chicago, IL.
    At the meetings in Ft. Lauderdale and Chicago, FRA met with 
representatives of Tri-County Commuter Rail and Metra, respectively, 
and toured their passenger equipment. The visits, which included 
demonstrations of emergency system features, were open to all members 
of the Working Group, and FRA believes they have added to the 
collective understanding of the Group in identifying and addressing 
passenger train emergency system issues.

C. Establishment of the Emergency Preparedness Task Force

    Due to the variety of issues involved, at its November 2003 meeting 
the Working Group established four smaller task forces, with specific 
expertise, to develop recommendations on those issues within each 
group's particular area of expertise. Members of the task forces 
include various representatives from the respective organizations that 
were part of the larger Working Group. One of these task forces was 
assigned the job of identifying and developing issues and 
recommendations specifically related to the inspection, testing, and 
operation of passenger equipment as well as concerns related to the 
attachment of safety appliances on passenger equipment, and helped to 
develop an NPRM on these topics that was published on December 8, 2005. 
See 70 FR 73069. Another of these task forces, the Emergency 
Preparedness Task Force (Task Force), was established to identify 
issues and develop recommendations related to emergency systems, 
procedures, and equipment. Specifically, the Task Force was charged 
with evaluating APTA's standards for emergency systems for their 
incorporation by reference as Federal standards and requirements. These 
APTA standards are aimed at promoting the ability of passenger car 
occupants to reach, identify, and operate emergency exits under various 
conditions. The Task Force was also given the responsibility of 
addressing a number of other emergency system issues and to recommend 
any research necessary to facilitate their resolution. Members of the 
Task Force, in addition to FRA, include the following:
     Amtrak;
     APTA, including members from Bombardier, Ellcon National, 
Interfleet, Jacobs Civil Engineering, Jessup Manufacturing Company, 
Kawasaki Rail Car, Inc., LDK Engineering, LIRR, LTK, Luminator, 
Maryland Transit Administration, Massachusetts Bay Commuter Rail 
Corporation (MBCR), Metrolink, MNR, Northern Indiana Commuter Transit 
District (NICTD), SEPTA, San Diego Northern Commuter Railroad 
(Coaster), Permalight, PO's Ability USA, Inc, Prolink, Transit Design 
Group (TDG), Transit Safety Management (TSM), Translite, and STV Inc.;
     BLET;
     California Department of Transportation (Caltrans);
     NARP;
     RSI, including Globe Transportation Graphics; and
     UTU.
    While not voting members of the Task Force, representatives from 
the NTSB and from the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) of 
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attended certain of the 
meetings and contributed to the discussions of the Task Force. In 
addition, staff from the Volpe Center attended all of the

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meetings and contributed to the technical discussions through their 
comments and presentations and by setting up various lighting, marking, 
and signage demonstrations.
    The Task Force met on the following dates at the following 
locations:
     February 25-26, 2004, in Los Angeles, CA;
     April 14-15, 2004, in Cambridge, MA;
     July 7-8, 2004, in Washington, DC;
     September 13-14, 2004, in New York, NY;
     December 1-2, 2004, in San Diego, CA;
     February 16-17, 2005, in Philadelphia, PA;
     April 19-20, 2005, in Cambridge, MA;
     August 2-3, 2005, in Cambridge, MA; and
     December 13-14, 2005, in Baltimore, MD.
    At the meetings in Los Angeles, Cambridge, Washington, New York, 
San Diego, and Philadelphia, FRA met with representatives of Metrolink, 
MBCR, Amtrak, LIRR, Coaster, and SEPTA, respectively, and toured their 
passenger equipment. The visits were open to all members of the Task 
Force and included demonstration of emergency system features. As in 
the case of the Working Group visits, FRA believes they have added to 
the collective understanding of the Task Force in identifying and 
addressing passenger train emergency system issues.

D. Development of the NPRM

    This NPRM was developed to address a number of the concerns raised 
and issues discussed during the various Task Force and Working Group 
meetings. Minutes of each of these meetings have been made part of the 
docket in this proceeding and are available for public inspection. The 
Working Group reached full consensus on all the regulatory provisions 
contained in this proposal at its meetings in March and September 2005. 
After the March 2005 meeting, the Working Group presented its 
recommendations to the full RSAC for concurrence at its meeting in May 
2005. All of the members of the full RSAC in attendance at its May 2005 
meeting accepted the regulatory recommendations submitted by the 
Working Group. Thus, the Working Group's recommendations became the 
full RSAC's recommendations to FRA in this matter. In October 2005, the 
full RSAC also recommended that FRA adopt a further recommendation from 
the Working Group at its September 2005 meeting: That FRA grant 
additional time for compliance with the proposal on rescue access 
windows. After reviewing the full RSAC's recommendations, FRA agreed 
that the recommendations provided a sound basis for a proposed rule and 
adopted the recommendations with generally minor changes for purposes 
of clarity and formatting in the Federal Register.
    This NPRM is the product of FRA's review, consideration, and 
acceptance of the recommendations of the Task Force, Working Group, and 
full RSAC. Throughout the preamble discussion of this proposal, FRA 
refers to comments, views, suggestions, or recommendations made by 
members of the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC, as they are 
identified or contained in the minutes of their meetings. FRA does so 
to show the origin of certain issues and the nature of discussions 
concerning those issues at the Task Force, Working Group, and full RSAC 
level. FRA believes this serves to illuminate factors it has weighed in 
making its regulatory decisions, as well as the logic behind those 
decisions. The reader should keep in mind, of course, that only the 
full RSAC makes recommendations to FRA, and it is the consensus 
recommendation of the full RSAC on which FRA is acting. However, as 
noted above, FRA is in no way bound to follow the recommendation, and 
the agency exercises its independent judgment on whether the 
recommended rule achieves the agency's regulatory goal, is soundly 
supported, and is in accordance with policy and legal requirements.

III. Technical Background

    Trends in new passenger car orders, recent experience with train 
accidents, concern about emergency communication, and technological 
advances in emergency systems provided the main impetus for these 
proposed enhancements and additions to FRA's standards for passenger 
train emergency systems, as highlighted below.

A. Change in Passenger Car Fleet Composition

    While FRA was developing regulations on Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards and Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness in the 1990s, the 
operation of multi-level passenger cars having two seating levels for 
passengers (i.e., bi-level cars) was common. However, the operation of 
multi-level passengers cars having three seating levels for passengers 
(i.e., cars with intermediate (or mezzanine) seating levels) was not as 
prevalent in the U.S. as it is today. As a result, in those rulemakings 
there was less focus on the need for applying emergency system safety 
standards to intermediate seating levels of multi-level passenger cars.
    Since that time, the composition of the Nation's commuter rail 
fleet has changed. Multi-level passenger cars with passenger seating in 
intermediate levels have become more prevalent and now account for over 
15 percent of all passenger cars. The intermediate seating levels in 
these multi-level passenger cars are normally located at the far ends 
of the cars and are connected to the upper and lower seating levels by 
stairs. Exterior side doors are also normally located toward the ends 
of these cars to facilitate boarding and de-boarding. Given the 
constraint posed by station platform lengths and the desire to minimize 
station dwell time, railroads have turned to multi-level passenger cars 
with intermediate seating levels to meet much of the increased demand 
for service, to the extent vertical clearances permit their operation.
    In light of the growing use of multi-level passenger cars with 
intermediate seating levels, this NPRM addresses the need to provide 
more explicit emergency system safety standards for these passenger 
cars.

B. NTSB Safety Recommendation on Windows

    On April 23, 2002, a BNSF freight train collided head on with a 
standing Metrolink passenger train near Placentia, CA, resulting in two 
fatalities and numerous injuries on the Metrolink train. Though not a 
contributing factor to the fatalities or injuries, the force of the 
collision blocked the rear end door and also blocked the rear stairway 
linking the upper and lower seating levels to the seating area on the 
intermediate level at the rear of the Metrolink cab car. Although 
passengers in that intermediate level seating area did exit through an 
emergency window, no windows on the intermediate level had been 
designated for rescue access, and consequently no instructions for 
emergency responders to gain access to the intermediate level through a 
window had been posted. Concerned with the extent of Federal 
requirements relating to rescuing passengers from the intermediate 
level of a multi-level passenger car, the NTSB issued Safety 
Recommendation R-03-21 to FRA on November 6, 2003. Safety 
Recommendation R-03-21 provides in full as follows:

    Revise the language of 49 Code of Federal Regulations 
238.113(a)(1) to reflect that appropriate exterior instructional 
signage describing the emergency removal procedure

[[Page 50280]]

be required at emergency windows on all levels of a multiple-level 
passenger railcar.

    In a February 20, 2004 letter to the NTSB, FRA noted that its 
existing regulations do require that windows intended for emergency 
responder access on every level of a multi-level passenger car be 
clearly marked and that clear and understandable instructions for their 
removal be posted at or near the windows on the car's exterior. See 49 
CFR 223.9(d)(2). FRA also sent a letter to passenger railroads to make 
this clear in the event there was any confusion about these 
requirements. Nevertheless, the NTSB's recommendation highlighted the 
fact that several related concerns were not specifically addressed in 
FRA's regulations. One of these concerns was specifying minimum numbers 
and locations of windows intended for emergency responder access to 
passenger cars, as 49 CFR 223.9(d)(2) addresses only marking and 
instruction requirements and does not provide any express requirement 
that any such rescue access windows exist. A second prominent issue 
concerned specifying minimum numbers and locations of emergency window 
exits on any level of a multi-level passenger car--not just main 
levels, as provided in 49 CFR 238.113(a)(1).
    FRA informed the NTSB that it was reviewing and considering the 
necessity of making amendments to its safety standards for passenger 
trains through the RSAC process and that these and other passenger 
safety issues would be presented to the Working Group and the Task 
Force for their consideration. Therefore, FRA asked that the NTSB 
classify Safety Recommendation R-03-21 as ``Open--Acceptable 
Response,'' pending the results of this effort. (The NTSB 
classification ``Open--Acceptable Response'' means a ``[r]esponse by 
recipient indicates a planned action that would comply with the safety 
recommendation when completed.'') By letter dated June 2, 2004, the 
NTSB formally classified the recommendation as FRA requested.
    The Task Force reviewed the NTSB's recommendation and the related 
issues FRA presented to it and agreed to address emergency window exits 
and rescue access windows on a broad basis, with the goal that windows 
for emergency egress and rescue access would be available on every 
level of a passenger car in the event that a stairway or interior door 
is compromised and access to the primary means of exit (doors) is 
blocked. To this end, the Task Force agreed to develop requirements for 
emergency window exits on non-main levels of multi-level passenger 
cars, and rescue access windows on all levels of these cars, thus 
addressing requirements for every seating level of a passenger car.

C. Need for Emergency Communication Systems

    Traditionally, conductors and assistant conductors have been relied 
upon to relay information to passengers in both normal and emergency 
situations through face-to-face communication or by use of the PA 
system. However, with smaller crew sizes, passengers may not be able to 
communicate to the crew a medical emergency, report a fire on board the 
train, or provide notification of other safety issues as quickly as may 
be necessary. For instance, a passenger in the last car of a train 
needing to report an emergency situation could potentially have to walk 
the entire length of the train to communicate with the conductor 
(assuming the crew is composed of an engineer and only one conductor). 
Further, if the conductor became incapacitated, passengers would need 
to communicate directly with the engineer.
    FRA also notes that the NTSB accident investigation report of the 
February 9, 1996 collision near Secaucus, NJ, that involved two New 
Jersey Transit Rail Operations (NJTR) trains and resulted in three 
fatalities and numerous injuries, touches on the importance of 
emergency communications to prevent panic and further injuries. 
According to the NTSB report of the accident investigation,

    [a]lthough the train crews said that they went from car to car 
instructing passengers to remain seated, passengers said that they 
were not told about the severity of the situation and were concerned 
about a possible fire or being struck by an oncoming train. They 
therefore left the train and wandered around the tracks waiting for 
guidance, potentially posing a greater hazard because of the leaking 
fuel from train 1107.
    No crewmember used the public address system to communicate with 
passengers. By using the public address system, all passengers would 
have received the same message in less time than it would have taken 
the NJT employees to walk from car to car.

    The report also stated that

    [i]nformation about the possibility of a fire or a collision 
with an oncoming train could have been provided to passengers over 
the public address system to address their concerns and prevent them 
from leaving the train. The Safety Board concludes that the lack of 
public announcements addressing the passengers' concerns caused them 
to act independently, evacuate the train, and wander along the 
tracks, thus potentially contributing to the dangerous conditions at 
the collision site. NTSB/RAR-97/01, at p. 27.

    In 1998, APTA recognized the importance of emergency communications 
when it issued APTA SS-PS-001-98, ``Standard for Passenger Railroad 
Emergency Communications,'' noting that the establishment and execution 
of communications among train crews, operations control personnel and 
train passengers are of the utmost importance under normal 
circumstances. According to the APTA standard, during emergency 
situations such communications take on added importance in the task of 
assuring the safety of all involved.
    While the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards issued in 1999 by 
FRA contain requirements for two-way emergency communication systems 
for Tier II passenger equipment (trains operating at speeds exceeding 
125 mph, but not exceeding 150 mph), there are no requirements that 
Tier I passenger cars be equipped with any emergency communication 
system. In that rulemaking, concern had been raised about the 
practicality of applying such requirements to Tier I passenger 
equipment because of the interoperability of such equipment and the 
possible incompatibility of communications equipment in a Tier I 
passenger train. See 64 FR 25540, 25641; May 12, 1999. Nevertheless, 
today most existing passenger cars are equipped with PA systems, and 
intercom systems are common in new passenger cars.
    FRA notes that, while there are many possible ways for an emergency 
situation to arise on a passenger train, an emergency system may be 
useful in many situations, regardless of the origin of the emergency. 
In this regard, emergency communication systems provide the added 
benefit of conveying information about security threats and handling 
security concerns. According to TSA, terrorists have considered attacks 
on subways and trains in the U.S., and TSA has found that passenger 
railroads and subways in the U.S. are particularly high-consequence 
targets in terms of potential loss of life and economic disruption. 
DHS, including TSA, as well as DOT's FRA and FTA have been actively 
engaged in responding to the threat of terrorism to our Nation's rail 
system, and the initiatives that have been undertaken to do so are too 
numerous to detail in this NPRM. Consistent with this response, the 
ability of passengers to timely report suspicious items and suspicious 
activity onboard passenger trains to appropriate personnel increases 
the likelihood of

[[Page 50281]]

detecting a terrorist attack and thwarting it, or at least disrupting 
it and minimizing its consequences. This would also be facilitated by 
the ability of the train crew to timely communicate emergency 
information and instructions to passengers in response to a security 
threat.
    FRA also notes that emergency system requirements for such features 
as emergency window exits and emergency lighting, which were not 
specifically developed to address security threats, may play a critical 
role in minimizing the consequences of a terrorist attack on board a 
passenger train. The safety and security functions that passenger train 
emergency systems may serve make them vital, and further enhancements 
and additions to emergency systems should be explored both to minimize 
the risk of a terrorist attack to passenger trains, to reduce the 
death, injuries, and other consequences of such an attack if it occurs, 
and to promote passenger train safety overall.

D. Window Technology

    A ``zip-strip'' is a strip of rubber gasketing that holds a window 
panel in place and is capable of being pulled, or pried and then 
pulled, like a zipper from the panel it holds. Use of zip-strips for 
window removal has been around for some time. Yet, the introduction of 
windows using zips-strips on both faces of the same window has allowed 
railroads to designate for rescue access those windows that are best 
suited for that purpose without impacting the selection of emergency 
window exits, or compromising compliance with safety glazing 
requirements. Before this technology was available, railroads that used 
zip-strips for window removal had to decide which windows would be 
designated for emergency egress and which would be designated for 
rescue access, as there was only one zip-strip available to open. 
Equipping cars with more rescue access windows with zip-strips meant 
having fewer emergency window exits, all things being equal, even 
though it would be preferable to have more emergency window exits than 
rescue access windows as occupants should normally begin to self-
evacuate via emergency window exits before emergency responders arrive 
to assist. Whereas railroads could generally designate any window for 
rescue access by providing instructions for removal using tools 
normally available to emergency responders to pop out a window, such as 
a sledge hammer or a fire axe, some railroads prefer to equip windows 
with exterior zips-strips for rescue access because they allow for 
window removal with less effort.
    Although FRA is not proposing to require the use of zip-strips for 
rescue access windows, FRA is proposing to recognize ``dual-function 
windows,'' which serve as both emergency exit and rescue access 
windows, through the use of zip-strips on both faces of the window. 
This recognition would afford railroads more flexibility in the 
location of their windows, as it would not require railroads to find 
locations for emergency window exits distinct from the locations 
specified for rescue access windows, and vice versa.

E. APTA's Standard for Emergency Evacuation Units

    As FRA noted in the preamble to the final rule promulgating the 
Passenger Equipment Safety Standards, FRA has had under consideration a 
performance standard for emergency evacuation similar to that used in 
commercial aviation where a sufficient number of emergency exits must 
be provided to evacuate the maximum passenger load in a specified time 
for various types of emergency situations. See 64 FR 25550. FRA further 
noted that it would evaluate whether an APTA performance standard for 
emergency egress, then under development in APTA's PRESS Task Force, 
should be incorporated into FRA's standards. 64 FR 25551. FRA's intent 
is that such a performance standard would serve to supplement, as 
necessary, FRA's minimum requirements for emergency window exits and 
door exits.
    In 1999, APTA issued APTA SS-PS-003-98, ``Standard for Emergency 
Evacuation Units for Rail Passenger Cars.'' This standard assigns to 
doors and window exits a numerical value, referred to as an ``emergency 
evacuation unit'' (EEU), that is intended to correlate to the speed and 
ease of passenger egress. Each emergency window exit is assigned an EEU 
of 1, and each door leaf an EEU of 2. It defines the ``usable exit 
path'' (UXP) as the number of emergency window and door exits that can 
be used by passengers after an incident that requires emergency egress 
from the vehicle, and requires that it be calculated as ``the sum of 
EEUs for one side of the car less 50% of car end doors.'' The APTA 
standard requires railroads to assign to each new passenger car a 
``capacity exit factor'' (CXF), which is a value equal to the seating 
capacity of the car divided by 17 and rounded up to the next whole 
number, and to designate a sufficient number of exits to achieve a 
total EEU value equal to the larger of the CXF or the UXP.
    Although the basic approach to establishing egress requirements 
based on car configuration and occupant capacity was widely accepted, 
during development of the APTA standard several organizations raised 
issues regarding the methodology for assigning EEU values to exits. For 
instance, Volpe Center staff suggested that point values for windows be 
reduced to numbers that are approximately in proportion to estimated 
passenger flow rates as compared with low-platform doors without steps, 
and that upper-level windows receive no credit toward the minimum EEU 
criterion but still be required to provide exit paths for certain rare 
accident scenarios. It was also questioned whether egress rates through 
windows could be half as great as through single-leaf doors, as implied 
by the standard.
    The Emergency Preparedness Task Force reviewed the APTA standard 
and recommended the continuation of evacuation tests and research to 
establish relative exit flow rates using different types of exits at 
distinct locations in the car, prior to considering adoption of the 
APTA standard into FRA's standards. To this end, the Volpe Center is 
conducting a series of evacuations tests. FRA does note that the 
emergency evacuation approach underlying the proposals in this NPRM is 
consistent with the basic approach taken in developing APTA's standard, 
as FRA proposals do take into consideration car configuration and 
occupant capacity.

IV. General Overview of Proposed Requirements

A. Emergency Window Exits and Rescue Access Windows

    Among the most prominent issues identified for consideration by the 
Working Group were those involving emergency window exits and rescue 
access windows and how these windows relate to the emergency systems 
requirements overall. Emergency window exits are intended to supplement 
door exits, which serve as the preferred means of egress in an 
emergency situation, and provide an alternative means of emergency 
egress in life-threatening situations, should doors be rendered 
inaccessible or inoperable. Existing regulations require that each 
single-level car and each main level of a multi-level passenger car 
have a minimum of four emergency window exits, either in a staggered 
configuration where practical or with one exit located in each side of 
each end, on each level. These windows must be designed to permit rapid 
and easy removal during

[[Page 50282]]

an emergency without the use of a tool or other implement. Conspicuous 
photo-luminescent marking of the windows, as well as instructions for 
their use, are also required. Windows intended for rescue access must 
be marked with retroreflective material, and instructions for their use 
must also be provided. However, FRA's regulations currently do not 
require any minimum number of rescue access windows for passenger cars.
    One of the basic principles underlying the proposed requirements 
for both emergency window exits and rescue access windows has been to 
locate these windows in such a manner that passengers would be able to 
exit from, and emergency responders would be able to gain direct access 
to, each passenger compartment without requiring that they first go to 
another level of a car or through an interior door. Optimally, there 
would be a sufficient number of windows for passengers to exit from, 
and for emergency responders to get access to, the following: (i) Every 
level with passenger seating of a multiple-level passenger railcar; 
(ii) both sides of the car, in the event of a derailment where the 
exits on one side are compromised; and (iii) each end (half) of the 
car, in the event that one end is crushed or the exits on that end are 
otherwise rendered inaccessible or inoperable. A constraint for both 
new and existing intermediate levels of multi-level passenger car 
designs is that there is limited space for side windows due to the 
presence of bathrooms, equipment closets, and side door exits. Thus, 
the Task Force agreed to make the proposed requirements flexible and 
consistent with existing car designs and, in certain cases, provide for 
exceptions. The exceptions for new equipment are limited to situations 
that arise from the need to provide accessible accommodations under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in compartments where there are 
no more than four seats and a suitable alternative is provided. The 
Task Force recommended greater flexibility for existing equipment to 
avoid costly window installations where none had previously existed 
(e.g., relocating an electrical closet so that a space large enough to 
accommodate a new window could be cut into the side of the car).
    During Task Force discussions, it became apparent that the phrase 
``rapid and easy'' in the emergency window exit regulation was being 
interpreted in different ways by commuter railroads and car 
manufacturers. Some believed that only the removal of the gasket had to 
be rapid and easy; however, FRA clarified that while FRA may have cited 
examples of gaskets that were becoming stuck and were therefore not 
removable in a rapid and easy fashion, the central goal of this 
provision was to create an opening that could be used for egress, which 
necessarily includes removal of the window panel as well. If the 
removal of the gasket is rapid and easy, but the removal of the window 
panel is not, the opening becomes less useful in an emergency 
situation, or in some cases, effectively non-existent. Several members 
of the Task Force also expressed their concern that the phrase ``rapid 
and easy'' was too subjective and not quantifiable. They requested that 
FRA adopt a more measurable performance-based standard instead. Yet, 
various proposals to do so based on a specific allotment of time to 
open the window were not adopted, as consensus was not reached on how 
that time would be determined. Variables such as height, weight, 
strength, and awareness of emergency exit operation and procedures all 
could affect the ease of opening a window. For example, a railroad 
maintenance employee who installs emergency window exits or is 
otherwise trained on their use should be able to open a window more 
quickly than many passengers would be able to do. While there was 
general agreement that a time-performance standard should be based on 
the time taken by a representative sample of people to open the window, 
the Task Force was not in a position to specify that sample.
    Although unsuccessful at reaching consensus on an actual measure of 
``rapid and easy,'' the Task Force was able to agree that promoting 
``rapid and easy'' removal of emergency windows is desirable. A 
combination of fixtures, such as headrests and luggage racks, as well 
as larger and heavier windows, can create a situation where the most 
effective and efficient method for removing a window is not immediately 
apparent. As a step towards promoting rapid and easy removal of the 
window and to address the situation of particular concern, the Task 
Force recommended requiring that instructions specifically take into 
account potential hindrances. The instructions may be in written or 
pictorial format, since including pictorials depicting the window 
removal method as part of the instructions can be extremely helpful.
    As for rescue access windows, the Task Force generally recommended 
requiring two windows on each level of a passenger car for rescue 
access (versus four as is required for emergency exit). The principal 
reason for requiring only two windows for rescue access is that rescue 
access windows are the third means of egress in the overall emergency 
evacuation approach, in which door exits serve as the first (preferred) 
means of egress and emergency window exits serve as the second. Rescue 
access windows have this tertiary role because they would be used as a 
means of last resort when passengers cannot evacuate themselves and 
require aid from emergency responders. The design of window gaskets 
also affects how many rescue access windows can be placed in a car, 
especially on levels where there is limited space for windows. For 
instance, on certain types of cars, zip-strips installed to facilitate 
rapid and easy removal of a window can be installed either on the 
interior or the exterior of the car, but not on both. In this case, if 
FRA were to require four rescue access windows, then a railroad that 
has cars with additional emergency window exits (i.e., beyond the 
minimum of four per main level) would likely just replace some of its 
emergency window exits with rescue access windows, resulting in fewer 
emergency window exits, and thereby limiting the more preferred means 
of egress. For the above reasons, as well as for the cost of 
retrofitting existing equipment, flexibility for locating rescue access 
windows in side doors was added for existing equipment.
    FRA is not proposing changes to existing requirements for emergency 
window exits in sleeping compartments or similar private compartments. 
Yet, FRA is proposing rescue access window requirements for such 
compartments. Although this proposal would establish new requirements, 
the proposal reflects current practice.

B. Emergency Communication Systems--Public Address and Intercom Systems

    As discussed above, while the Passenger Equipment Safety Standards 
issued in 1999 by FRA contain requirements for two-way emergency 
communication systems for Tier II passenger equipment, there are 
currently no requirements that Tier I passenger cars be equipped with 
any emergency communication system. Nevertheless, today most existing 
passenger cars are equipped with PA systems, and after discussing the 
benefits of PA systems in light of the challenge and expense of 
retrofitting older, existing passenger equipment with limited service 
life, the Task Force agreed that all passenger cars should, at a 
minimum, have functioning PA systems. The PA system would allow the 
train crew to keep their passengers informed in an emergency situation 
and provide guidance to all passengers in a

[[Page 50283]]

timely manner, thereby reducing the likelihood that passengers would 
take an action that could place them in any greater danger.
    The Task Force also agreed that emergency communication systems in 
all new passenger cars should include intercom systems that would 
enable passengers to quickly communicate in emergency situations with 
the train crew. During the discussions concerning whether to require 
intercom systems on Tier I passenger equipment, some Task Force members 
expressed concern that if intercom systems were added at each end of a 
car, were conspicuously marked, and had instructions provided for their 
use, passengers may use them in non-emergency situations. Amtrak and 
various commuter railroads that operate cars with intercom systems 
indicated that they have successfully implemented measures to deter 
misuse, however, such as by placing the intercom transmission button 
under a protective covering (which also prevents accidental operation 
by a passenger leaning against it) and by marking it ``FOR EMERGENCY 
USE ONLY.''
    The recommended emergency communication system requirements 
developed by the Task Force generally reflect current practice for Tier 
I passenger equipment operating with intercom systems and existing 
requirements for Tier II passenger equipment. FRA understands that 
those Tier I passenger cars that currently do not have PA systems are 
scheduled to be retired from service before the proposed requirement to 
have PA systems on existing Tier I passenger equipment would become 
effective.

C. Emergency Roof Access Locations

    Emergency roof access locations (roof hatches or structural weak 
points) can be especially useful in emergency situations where 
passenger cars have rolled onto their sides following certain collision 
and derailment scenarios. In such situations, doors, which are the 
preferred means of egress and access under normal circumstances, may be 
rendered inoperable due to structural damage to the door or the door 
pocket, or extremely difficult to use because the car is no longer 
upright. Moreover, although emergency responders may be able to enter a 
car that is on its side via a rescue access window, the removal of an 
injured occupant through a side window in such circumstances would 
likewise be difficult or complicated, especially depending upon the 
condition of the occupant.
    Existing FRA regulations require emergency roof access locations 
for Tier II passenger equipment, but not for Tier I passenger 
equipment. The Task Force examined these requirements and APTA PRESS 
recommended practice RP-C&S-001-98, ``Recommended Practice for 
Passenger Equipment Roof Emergency Access,'' in recommending that 
emergency roof access requirements be applied to Tier I passenger 
equipment. FRA adopted the Task Force's recommendation and, in general, 
is proposing that each new passenger car (both Tier I and Tier II) have 
a minimum of two emergency roof access locations. Existing Tier I 
passenger cars would not be subject to the proposed requirements, while 
existing Tier II passenger cars would continue to be subject to 
existing requirements. For further discussion and explanation of the 
proposed requirements, please see the Section-by-Section Analysis of 
this preamble at Section V.

D. Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance

    FRA is proposing to modify Sec. Sec.  238.17, 238.303, and 238.305 
(which contain standards for movement of passenger equipment with other 
than power brake defects, for inspection of passenger equipment, and 
for repair of passenger equipment) to include requirements for the 
inspection, testing, maintenance and repair of emergency communication 
systems, emergency roof access points, and rescue access markings. To 
allow railroads sufficient time to repair the equipment with minimal 
disruption to normal operations, flexibility would be provided for 
operating equipment in passenger service with certain non-compliant 
conditions. In affording this flexibility, the rule would require the 
railroad to adhere to specified procedures for the safe operation of 
the equipment.

V. Section-by-Section Analysis

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 223, Safety Glazing Standards--
Locomotives, Passenger Cars and Cabooses

Subpart A--General

Section 223.5 Definitions
    This section, which contains a set of definitions relevant to the 
regulations contained in part 223, would be modified to clarify a 
definition, and to delete two definitions that would no longer be 
relevant due to proposed modifications of this part, specifically, the 
deletion of Sec.  223.9(d)(2).
    The definition of ``emergency window'' would be revised to clarify 
that the purpose of an emergency window is for egress, and thus needs 
to be removable only from the inside of a passenger car. Accordingly, 
FRA proposes to revise the definition of ``emergency window'' to mean 
that segment of a side-facing glazing panel which has been designed to 
permit rapid and easy removal from inside a passenger car in an 
emergency situation. FRA is also proposing that the terms ``emergency 
responder'' and ``passenger train service'' be deleted in accordance 
with the proposal to delete Sec.  223.9(d)(2), the only section in part 
223 that references these terms. The term ``emergency responder'' would 
be moved to part 238.

Subpart B--Specific Requirements

Section 223.9 Requirements for new or rebuilt equipment
    In the discussion of Sec.  223.5, FRA noted that the definition of 
``emergency window'' would be amended to clarify that the purpose of 
the windows is for egress, and thus would need to be removable only 
from the inside of a passenger car. Section 223.9(c) currently requires 
``at least four emergency opening windows.'' As the term ``emergency 
opening window'' is not specifically defined--but has been understood 
to mean ``emergency window''--FRA believed that it would be best to 
modify the rule text in Sec.  223.9(c) to require ``at least four 
emergency windows'' in order to provide more clarity.
    FRA is proposing to delete the requirements in Sec.  223.9(d) and 
merge them into Sec. Sec.  238.113 and 238.114 of part 238. The 
requirements in Sec.  223.9(d) were added by FRA's May 4, 1998 final 
rule on Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness. See 63 FR 24629, 24643. 
The Passenger Train Emergency Preparedness final rule required the 
marking of both emergency window exits and windows intended for rescue 
access, and also required that instructions be provided their use. 
However, the requirements applied only to ``each railroad providing 
passenger train service,'' a class of train service purposefully 
narrower than the general application section in part 223. See Sec.  
223.3. Because FRA is proposing to address marking and instruction 
requirements for such windows in this train service in part 238, and 
because the requirements of Sec.  223.9(d) do not apply to other 
equipment covered by part 223, they may be removed from part 223, along 
with the corresponding definition of ``emergency responder'' and 
``passenger train service.'' Further, deletion of Sec.  223.9(d) would 
avoid creating any confusion due to duplication of the marking and 
instruction requirements in two different parts of the CFR, especially

[[Page 50284]]

since the proposed marking requirements in part 238 that were adopted 
by the full RSAC vary somewhat from the ones currently found in Sec.  
223.9(d). Nevertheless, Sec.  223.8 will continue to alert the reader 
to additional requirements for emergency window exits for ``passenger 
equipment'' in part 238, as defined in that part.
    However, because the general application section of part 223 is 
broader than that in part 238, FRA has been mindful not to alter the 
application of those requirements unaffected by the May 4, 1998 
amendments. Part 238 does not apply to ``tourist, scenic, historic, or 
excursion operations, whether on or off the general railroad system of 
transportation,'' see Sec.  238.3(c)(3); whereas, part 223 does not 
apply to ``locomotives, passenger cars and cabooses that are historical 
or antiquated equipment'' and are also ``used only for excursion, 
educational, recreational purposes or private transportation 
purposes,'' see Sec.  223.3(b)(3). As a result, to the extent tourist 
equipment is covered by part 223 because the equipment is not 
historical or antiquated and is required to be equipped with certified 
glazing in all windows pursuant to Sec. Sec.  223.9(c) or 223.15(c), 
such equipment would still be required to have four emergency windows 
(emergency window exits), despite its exclusion from the part 238 
requirements.

Appendix B to Part 223--Schedule of Civil Penalties

    This appendix contains a schedule of civil penalties to be used in 
connection with this part. Because such penalty schedules are 
statements of agency policy, notice and comment are not required prior 
to their issuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A). Nevertheless, as 
discussed above, FRA is proposing that the requirements of Sec.  
223.9(d) be merged into Sec. Sec.  238.113 and 238.114 of part 238. 
Thus, FRA is proposing that the schedule of civil penalties in appendix 
B to part 223 be modified accordingly, by deleting the entries for 
paragraphs (d)(1)(i), (d)(1)(ii), (d)(2)(i), and (d)(2)(ii) and the 
associated penalties.

Proposed Amendments to 49 CFR Part 238, Passenger Equipment Safety 
Standards

Subpart A--General

Section 238.5 Definitions
    This section, which contains a set of definitions relevant to the 
regulations contained in part 238, would be modified to include new 
definitions relevant to the proposed modifications to part 238.
    FRA proposes to add the definition of ``dual-function window'' to 
mean a window that is intended to serve as both an emergency window 
exit and a rescue access window. This term generally refers to a window 
that has a zip-strip, which is a strip in a window gasket that can be 
pulled from end to end to unlock the gasket and thus release the 
glazing, on both faces so that it can be opened from both the inside of 
the car and the outside. (This definition would also cover other 
methods of opening the same window from both the inside of the car and 
the outside.) The term is being added because it is referenced in Sec.  
238.114(a)(5) as an exception to the requirements on the location of 
rescue access windows set forth in Sec.  238.114. Dual-function windows 
installed to meet the minimum requirements proposed in Sec.  238.113 
would not be required to meet the Sec.  238.114 location requirements, 
in order to recognize that a railroad that installs four compliant 
emergency window exits that are the dual-function type has also 
installed twice the number of rescue access windows that would be 
required.
    FRA proposes to revise the definition of ``emergency window'' to 
clarify that the purpose of an emergency window is for egress, and thus 
only needs to be removable from the inside of a passenger car. 
Accordingly, FRA proposes to revise the definition to mean that segment 
of a side-facing glazing panel which has been designed to permit rapid 
and easy removal from inside a passenger car in an emergency situation. 
FRA is also proposing to revise the definition of this term in Sec.  
223.5 for consistency and clarity.
    FRA proposes to add the definition of ``intercom'' to mean a device 
through which voice communication can be transmitted and received. A 
transmission unit normally has a button, which has to be depressed to 
begin transmission or notify the crew on the receiving end of the 
intention to communicate using the system. An intercom may be a 
telephone apparatus. FRA is also proposing to add the definition of 
``intercom system'' (or ``intercommunication system'') to mean a two-
way, voice communication system. This system allows a passenger to 
communicate with a crew member, typically by depressing a button, or 
lifting a telephone handset, or both.
    FRA proposes to add the definition of ``intermediate level'' to 
mean a level of a multi-level passenger car that is used for passenger 
seating and is normally located between two main levels. An 
intermediate level normally contains two, separate seating areas, one 
at each end of the car, and is normally connected to each main level by 
stairs. The term ``intermediate level'' is intended to distinguish a 
level used for passenger seating of a multi-level passenger car from a 
``main level'' of such as car, as FRA is proposing to apply different 
requirements to the different passenger seating levels. Please see the 
discussion of ``main level.''
    Currently, the regulatory text of part 238 does not define the term 
``main level,'' as used in Sec.  238.113. However, in the preamble to 
the April 23, 2002 final rule, FRA explained that the term ``main 
level'' was intended to exclude a level of a car that is ``principally 
used for passage between the door exits and passenger seating areas, or 
between seating areas,'' and noted that such an area is not 
``principally used for seating'' and includes a stairwell landing. See 
67 FR 19973. This distinction raised some concerns with respect to 
intermediate levels because their designation as main levels would 
hinge upon an interpretation of ``principally used'' for passenger 
seating. Some Task Force members believed that these levels were 
principally used for passenger seating because passengers who are 
seated there are spending more time on that level than the passengers 
who simply use that level to reach the upper level (or lower level). 
Others believed that the intermediate level was principally used for 
passage between levels because there was a greate