Passenger Manifests for Commercial Aircraft Arriving in and Departing From the United States; Passenger and Crew Manifests for Commercial Vessels Departing From the United States, 40035-40048 [06-6237]

Agencies

• DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
• Bureau of Customs and Border Protection
• Customs and Border Protection Bureau

[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 135 (Friday, July 14, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 40035-40048]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-6237]


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DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Bureau of Customs and Border Protection

19 CFR Parts 4 and 122

[USCBP-2005-0003]
RIN 1651-AA62


Passenger Manifests for Commercial Aircraft Arriving in and 
Departing From the United States; Passenger and Crew Manifests for 
Commercial Vessels Departing From the United States

AGENCY: Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security.

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.

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SUMMARY: This rule proposes to amend existing Bureau of Customs and 
Border Protection regulations concerning electronic manifest 
transmission requirements relative to passengers, crew members, and 
non-crew members traveling onboard international commercial flights and 
voyages. Under current regulations, air carriers must transmit to the 
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), passenger manifest information for aircraft en route to 
the United States no later than 15 minutes after the departure of the 
aircraft. This proposed rule implements the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 requirement that such information be 
provided to the government before departure of the aircraft. This 
proposed rule provides air carriers a choice between transmitting 
complete manifests no later than 60-minutes prior to departure of the 
aircraft or transmitting manifest information on passengers as each 
passenger checks in for the flight, up to but no later than 15 minutes 
prior to departure. The rule also proposes to amend the definition of 
``departure'' for aircraft to mean the moment the aircraft is pushed 
back from the gate. For vessel departures from the United States, the 
rule proposes transmission of passenger and crew manifests no later 
than 60 minutes prior to departure of the vessel.

DATES: Written comments must be received on or before August 14, 2006.

ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, identified by docket number USCBP-
2005-0003, by one of the following methods:
    (1) Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov. Follow 
the instructions for submitting comments.
    (2) Mail: Comments by mail are to be addressed to the Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection, Office of Regulations and Rulings, 
Regulations Branch, 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW. (Mint Annex), 
Washington, DC 20229.
    (3) Hand delivery/courier: 799 9th Street, NW., Washington, DC 
20220.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Charles Perez, Program Manager, Office 
of Field Operations, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (202-344-
2605).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The Supplementary Information section is 
organized as follows:

I. Public Participation
II. Background and Purpose
III. Proposed Rule
    A. Change Regarding Definition of ``Departure'' for Aircraft
    B. Proposed Options for Transmission of Manifest Data by Air 
Carriers
    1. APIS 60 (Interactive Batch Transmission) Option
    2. APIS Quick Query (Interactive Real-Time Transmission) Option
    3. System Certification; Delayed Effective Date
    4. Carriers Opting Out; Non-Interactive Batch Transmission 
Process
    C. Proposed Change for Transmission of Manifests by Departing 
Vessels
IV. Rationale for Change
    A. Terrorist Threat
    B. IRTPA
V. Impact on Parties Affected by the Proposed Rule
VI. Regulatory Requirements
    A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)
    B. Regulatory Flexibility Act
    C. Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
    D. Executive Order 13132 (Federalism)
    E. Executive Order 12988 (Civil Justice Reform)
    F. National Environmental Policy Act
    G. Paperwork Reduction Act
    H. Signing Authority
    I. Privacy Statement

I. Public Participation

    Interested persons are invited to participate in this rulemaking by 
submitting written data, views, or arguments on all aspects of the 
proposed rule. CBP also invites comments that relate to the economic, 
environmental, or federalism effects that might result from this 
proposed rule. Comments that will provide the most assistance to CBP in 
developing these procedures will reference a specific portion of the 
proposed rule, explain the reason for any recommended change, and 
include data, information, or authority that support such recommended 
change.
    Instructions: All submissions received must include the agency name 
and docket number for this rulemaking (USCBP-2005-0003). All comments 
received will be posted without change to https://www.regulations.gov, 
including any personal information provided.
    Docket: For access to the docket to read background documents or 
comments received, go to https://www.regulations.gov. Submitted comments 
may also be inspected at the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection, 
799 9th Street, NW., Washington, DC 20220. To inspect comments, please 
call (202) 572-8768 to arrange for an appointment.

II. Background and Purpose

    The Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) is a widely 
utilized electronic data interchange system approved by DHS for use by 
international commercial air and vessel carriers to transmit 
electronically to CBP certain data on passengers, crew members, and 
non-crew members, as required under CBP regulations. APIS was developed 
by the former U.S. Customs Service (Customs) in 1988, in cooperation 
with the former Immigration and Naturalization Service

[[Page 40036]]

(INS) and the airline industry. Although initially voluntary, APIS 
participation grew, making it nearly an industry standard. Requirements 
governing the electronic transmission of passenger, crew member, and 
non-crew member (cargo flights only) manifests for commercial aircraft 
and/or vessels involved in international travel operations were 
established in accordance with several statutory mandates, including, 
but not limited to: section 115 of the Aviation and Transportation 
Security Act (ATSA; Public Law 107-71, 115 Stat. 623; 49 U.S.C. 44909), 
section 402 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act 
of 2002 (abbreviated here to Enhanced Border Security Act or EBSA; 
Public Law 107-173, 116 Stat. 557; 8 U.S.C. 1221), and certain 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) laws and regulations (49 
U.S.C. 114; 49 CFR 1544, 1546, 1550). A more detailed description of 
the histories of electronic manifest information requirements, and of 
these authorities, is set forth in a final rule published by CBP on 
April 7, 2005 at 70 FR 17820.
    The information transmitted by carriers using APIS consists, in 
part, of information that appears on the biographical data page of 
travel documents, such as passports issued by governments worldwide. 
Many APIS data elements (such as name, date of birth, gender, country 
of citizenship, passport or other travel document information) have 
been collected routinely over the years by governments of countries 
into which a traveler seeks entry (by requiring the traveler to present 
a government-issued travel document). CBP uses this biographical data 
to perform enforcement and security queries against various multi-
agency law enforcement and terrorist databases in connection with, as 
appropriate, international flights to, from, continuing within, and 
overflying the United States and international voyages to and from the 
United States.
    Current CBP regulations require air carriers to electronically 
transmit passenger arrival manifests to CBP no later than 15 minutes 
after the departure of the aircraft from any place outside the United 
States (19 CFR 122.49a(b)(2)) and passenger departure manifests no 
later than 15 minutes prior to departure of the aircraft from the 
United States (19 CFR 122.75a(b)(2)). Manifests for crew members on 
passenger and all-cargo flights and non-crew members on all-cargo 
flights must be electronically transmitted to CBP no later than 60 
minutes prior to the departure of any covered flight to, continuing 
within, or overflying the United States (19 CFR 122.49b(b)(2)) and no 
later than 60 minutes prior to the departure of any covered flight from 
the United States (19 CFR 122.75b(b)(2)) (a covered flight being one 
covered by these regulations).
    Current CBP regulations require vessel carriers to electronically 
transmit arrival passenger and crew member manifests at least 24 hours 
and up to 96 hours prior to the vessel's entry at a U.S. port or place 
of destination, depending on the length of the voyage (for voyages of 
24 but less than 96 hours, transmission must be prior to departure of 
the vessel from any place outside the United States) (19 CFR 
4.7b(b)(2)). Also, a vessel carrier must electronically transmit 
passenger and crew member departure manifests to CBP no later than 15 
minutes prior to the vessel's departure from the United States (19 CFR 
4.64(b)(2)).
    These CBP regulations, referred to as the ``APIS regulations'' (19 
CFR 4.7b, 4.64, 122.49a-122.49c, 122.75a, and 122.75b), established a 
framework for requiring that manifest information for passengers, crew 
members, and non-crew members, as appropriate, be electronically 
transmitted for these arrivals and departures, and for requiring crew 
and non-crew member manifest information for flights continuing within 
and overflying the United States. These regulations serve to provide 
the nation, the carrier industries, and the international traveling 
public, additional security from the threat of terrorism and enhance 
CBP's ability to carry out its border enforcement mission.
    The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA); Public Law 108-458, was enacted on December 17, 2004. Sections 
4012 and 4071 of the IRTPA require DHS to issue regulations and 
procedures to allow for pre-departure vetting of passengers onboard 
aircraft arriving in and departing from the United States and of 
passengers and crew onboard vessels arriving in and departing from the 
United States. This proposed rule is designed to implement these 
important IRTPA requirements and to further enhance national security 
and the security of the air and vessel travel industries in accordance 
with the ATSA and EBSA (both of which formed the statutory basis for 
the APIS regulations).
    This proposed rule would require transmission of, as appropriate, 
passenger and/or crew member information early enough in the process to 
prevent a high-risk passenger from boarding an aircraft and to prevent 
the departure of a vessel with such a passenger or crew member onboard. 
CBP's purpose in proposing this change is to place itself in a better 
position to: (1) Fully vet passenger and crew member information with 
sufficient time to effectively secure the aircraft or vessel, including 
time to coordinate with carrier personnel and domestic or foreign 
government authorities in order to take appropriate action warranted by 
the threat; (2) identify high-risk passengers and prevent them from 
boarding aircraft bound for or departing from the United States; and 
(3) identify high-risk passengers and crew members to prevent the 
departure of vessels from the United States with a high-risk passenger 
or crew member onboard. Achieving these goals would permit CBP to more 
effectively prevent an identified high-risk traveler from becoming a 
threat to passengers, crew, aircraft, vessels, or the public and would 
ensure that the electronic data transmission and screening process 
required under CBP regulations comports with the purposes of ATSA, 
EBSA, and IRTPA.

III. Proposed Rule

    Under the manifest transmission time requirements of the existing 
APIS regulations, which mandate transmission of passenger manifests no 
later than 15 minutes after departure of an aircraft en route to the 
United States, CBP has the ability to fully vet commercial aircraft 
passenger information after the aircraft has departed. The 
identification of a high-risk passenger soon after the aircraft becomes 
airborne may result in the diversion of the aircraft to a U.S. port 
other than the original destination or the return of the aircraft to 
the port of departure (referred to as a ``turnback''). This action 
could prevent the hijacking of the aircraft and the potential use of 
the plane as a weapon of mass destruction against U.S. or other 
targets, and would enable CBP to detain, or arrange for the detention 
of, the high-risk passenger. The same results could be obtained with 
respect to aircraft departing from the United States when 
identification of a high-risk passenger occurs after the aircraft is 
airborne. This post-departure identification could occur since the APIS 
regulations require the transmission of manifests only 15 minutes prior 
to departure.
    However, high-risk passengers allowed to board before they have 
been fully vetted may pose a security risk for aircraft en route to or 
departing from the United States. A boarded high-risk passenger would 
have the opportunity to plant or retrieve a disassembled improvised 
explosive device or other weapon. The detonation of an explosive device 
could have devastating

[[Page 40037]]

consequences, both in terms of human life and from an economic 
perspective (damage to aircraft and airport infrastructure and any 
ripple effects on the airport's and the carrier's business and across 
the U.S. economy). Thus, requiring the collection and vetting of 
passenger information before the boarding of passengers on flights en 
route to or departing from the United States would allow CBP to 
identify high risk passengers before such passengers could pose a 
threat to fellow passengers or to the aircraft and airport.
    Therefore, CBP has concluded that the prevention of a high-risk 
passenger from boarding an aircraft is the appropriate level of 
security in the commercial air travel environment. Manifest data 
received and vetted prior to passenger boarding will enable CBP to 
attain this level of security. Further, this vetting of passengers on 
international flights should eliminate the need for passenger carriers 
to conduct watch list screening of these passengers, upon publication 
and implementation of a final rule. Accordingly, with this proposed 
rule, CBP is proposing two transmission options for air carriers to 
select from at their discretion: (i) the submission of complete 
manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to departure or (ii) 
transmitting passenger data as individual, real-time transactions, 
i.e., as each passenger checks in, up to but no later than 15 minutes 
prior to departure. Under both options, the carrier will not permit the 
boarding of a passenger unless the passenger has been cleared by CBP.
    With respect to the commercial vessel travel environment, CBP has 
determined that the appropriate level of security for departing vessels 
is to prevent vessel departures with a high-risk passenger or crew 
member onboard. Thus, the proposed rule requires vessel carriers to 
transmit complete manifests no later than 60 minutes prior to 
departure. An alternative procedure based on individual passenger/crew 
transactions, as is provided in the air travel environment to address a 
need for flexibility, is not offered given the generally less time-
critical nature of the commercial vessel travel environment.
    Finally, with this rule, CBP also is proposing to change the 
definition of ``departure,'' as discussed immediately below.

A. Change Regarding Definition of ``Departure'' for Aircraft

    Under the existing APIS regulations, the departure of an aircraft 
occurs at the moment an aircraft is ``wheels-up,'' meaning that the 
landing gear is retracted into the aircraft after liftoff and the 
aircraft is en route to its destination (19 CFR 122.49a(a)). In 
practice, wheels-up can occur as much as 15 to 25 or more minutes after 
an aircraft leaves the gate (which is referred to as ``push-back''). 
This meaning of ``departure,'' applied under either the existing 
regulations or the proposed regulations, would result in CBP receiving 
manifest data later in the process than is sufficient to perform full 
vetting and prevent high-risk boardings. CBP believes that departure 
for aircraft, as applied to manifests for passengers, crew members, and 
non-crew members under the APIS regulations, should mean the moment 
when an aircraft pushes-back from the gate. This change would assist in 
providing CBP with sufficient time to complete the full vetting 
process. Therefore, this rule proposes to revise the definition of 
``departure'' in 19 CFR 122.49a(a) accordingly (which will be 
applicable to other APIS aircraft provisions as well: 19 CFR 122.49b, 
122.75a, 122.75b).

B. Proposed Options for Transmission of Manifest Data by Air Carriers

    To provide maximum flexibility for the air travel industry and 
aircraft passengers while improving the ability of DHS to safeguard air 
travel, CBP is proposing two options for the electronic transmission of 
manifest information by air carriers. The two transmission options 
proposed in this rule differ to some degree in timing, programming, and 
procedures. Nevertheless, both are equally effective in obtaining the 
advance information needed to achieve the appropriate level of security 
necessary for aircraft (prevent a high-risk boarding) and thereby to 
ensure that the purposes of the governing statutes are met. An air 
carrier's election of either option would depend on the individual 
carrier's particular operations and its capability to electronically 
transmit the manifest data to CBP. CBP also notes that the current APIS 
regulations providing for electronic transmission of manifest data 60 
minutes prior to departure for crew and non-crew on flights to, from, 
continuing within, and overflying the United States are unchanged (19 
CFR 122.49b and 122.75b).
    Under one option, air carriers would transmit all required 
passenger data to CBP in batch form (all passenger names and associated 
data at once) no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the 
aircraft. This option, known as APIS 60, is similar to the current 
electronic transmission process to the extent that manifest data would 
be transmitted in batch form and CBP would perform security vetting 
against all data at once. Under the other option, known as APIS Quick 
Query (AQQ), air carriers would transmit required passenger data to CBP 
individually as each passenger checks in for the flight, from the 
beginning of the check-in process up to 15 minutes prior to departure. 
CBP would perform its security vetting as it receives the data.
    The electronic transmission system employed under these options 
would be ``interactive,'' allowing the carrier to electronically 
receive return messages from CBP that can be sent within seconds or 
minutes, as opposed to the capability of the APIS manifest transmission 
process as implemented under the current regulation where any 
communication by CBP with the carrier is performed by telephone. Thus, 
the term ``interactive'' is used in this document to refer to or 
describe the electronic communication system employed under the APIS 60 
option and the AQQ option described further below.
    CBP believes that both APIS 60 and AQQ provide sufficient time to 
achieve the appropriate level of security sought in the commercial air 
travel environment, i.e., to prevent a high-risk boarding. These 
options are offered because the unique ``just in time'' nature of the 
commercial air travel environment, characterized by busy airports, 
tight arrival and departure schedules, the carriers' need to minimize 
time aircraft spend at the gate, and the immense focus on timeliness as 
a performance measure, justifies flexibility in this environment.
    CBP anticipates that both options will be well-utilized, and the 
comment period is expected to provide an indication of which option the 
carriers are likely to select. However, CBP expects that the AQQ option 
would be selected by those carriers that have pre-existing reservations 
control systems, whereas smaller or charter carriers may be more likely 
to use the APIS 60 option. A subset of air carriers would not be able 
to adopt either option; this is discussed further below.
    Throughout the period that these proposed amendments were in 
development, CBP consulted with various industry associations and 
considered their comments concerning the impact various manifest 
transmission alternatives would have on business processes, operating 
costs, and legitimate passengers who might experience travel delays and 
miss connecting flights. The dual-option approach for air carriers 
described above is responsive to those comments and is designed to 
balance the security

[[Page 40038]]

and facilitation goals of government with the needs of the industry.
    CBP submits that these options, if adopted in a final rule, will 
result in CBP and the air carriers achieving a far higher success rate 
in keeping high-risk passengers from boarding aircraft than is possible 
under the current regulations. With this change, instances of 
diversions and turnbacks will be greatly reduced, if not eliminated, 
due to the increased effectiveness of the process. Further, the impact 
on the industry will be substantially less than would be the case with 
other alternatives due to the greater flexibility provided by the dual-
option approach.
    CBP notes that there is a subcategory of air carriers that would be 
unable to adopt either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ option as 
described in this document. These carriers, typically unscheduled air 
carrier operators that employ eAPIS (Internet method) for manifest data 
transmission, such as seasonal charters, air taxis, and air ambulances, 
would not be able to adopt the interactive communication functionality 
that the APIS 60 and AQQ options employ. Consequently, CBP would 
manually (i.e., by e-mail or telephone) communicate vetting results to 
these carriers. These carriers, however, would be bound by the 
requirement proposed in this rule to transmit passenger manifest data 
no later than 60 minutes prior to departure. The proposed regulation 
treats these carriers as a subset of air carriers that will transmit 
complete manifests, as opposed to carriers that will transmit manifest 
data per individual passenger as passengers check in for the flight. 
This document discusses primarily the two major options that will be 
available to the air carriers that will employ an interactive 
communication system for manifest data transmission, as set forth in 
this section (Section B of Part III) (but see subsection (4) of this 
section further below).
1. APIS 60 (Interactive Batch Transmission) Option
    APIS 60 would apply as one option to transmit passenger manifests 
prior to departure for aircraft arriving in and departing from the 
United States, and as the sole requirement for transmitting passenger 
and crew manifests for vessels departing from the United States (see 
Section C of this part for these vessels). The APIS 60 procedure is, 
with some exception relating to transmission time requirements and 
interactive communication between carriers and CBP, similar to the APIS 
procedure currently employed to implement the current APIS regulations. 
For arriving and departing aircraft, air carriers would be required to 
transmit passenger manifests in batch form (all names and associated 
data at once) to CBP no later than 60 minutes prior to departure of the 
aircraft (as defined under this proposed rule) at which time the 
vetting process would begin.
    Under APIS 60, the vetting of aircraft passenger data would be 
performed in two stages. The first would be an initial automated 
vetting of passenger data against appropriate law enforcement 
(including terrorist) databases. The second would be the further 
vetting of names identified as a match or possible match during the 
initial automated vetting stage, as well as names associated with 
incomplete or inadequate transmitted data.
    When the initial automated vetting process identifies a match 
between an individual passenger's data and data on a terrorist watch 
list, a close possible match, or an incomplete or inadequate passenger 
record, CBP would send by electronic return message a ``not-cleared'' 
instruction to the carrier within minutes of CBP's receipt of the 
manifest data (CBP return messages relative to not-cleared instructions 
based on an inadequate record would also instruct the carrier to 
retransmit complete/corrected data). Since boarding usually commences 
30 to 45 minutes prior to departure (as defined in this proposed rule), 
a not-cleared instruction relative to a match or possible match, or an 
inadequate record, would ensure, in most cases, that the associated 
passenger will not be allowed to board the aircraft (subject to the 
occasional instance of unexpected results due to error, technical 
anomaly, etc., or a carrier beginning the boarding process outside the 
60-minute vetting window.) The manifest transmission requirements under 
the current regulations--no later than 15 minutes after departure for 
flights en route to the United States and no later than 15 minutes 
prior to departure for flights departing from the United States--do not 
achieve this critical result (even if departure were defined as push-
back). An aircraft en route to the United States is already airborne 
before CBP even receives the manifest. For flights departing from the 
United States, no manifest information is received by CBP until--at the 
earliest--15 minutes, and often 30 minutes or more, after boarding 
begins (CBP notes that under the current procedure, only a passenger 
who is a match or possible match would be subject to further vetting).
    The further vetting of passengers who generate a not-cleared 
instruction during the initial vetting stage would be handled by an 
analyst with access to additional data resources. During this stage, 
CBP would be able to confirm or correct matches and resolve possible 
matches and incomplete or inadequate passenger records, enabling most 
passengers who are eventually cleared to make their flights. CBP would 
notify a carrier by return message where the results of further vetting 
clear a passenger for boarding.
    When the initial automated vetting procedure results in CBP's 
returning not-cleared instructions to the air carrier, the carrier's 
personnel would have to ensure that the identified passenger is not 
permitted to board with other passengers and that the passenger's 
baggage is not loaded onto, or is removed from, the aircraft. In rare 
instances, the carrier may have to remove the passenger from the 
aircraft (which may occur in the case of an oversight or other error in 
the boarding process or should a carrier begin the boarding process 
outside the 60-minute vetting window). When further vetting confirms a 
not-cleared passenger as high-risk, the next step in the process would 
include CBP communicating to the appropriate authorities the results of 
the vetting and any action to be taken to secure the confirmed high-
risk passenger. In some circumstances, during the further vetting 
process, either the carrier, CBP, or other appropriate domestic or 
foreign government official would have to interview the passenger to 
complete the confirmation (or further vetting) process, a step that 
would take additional time.
    The further vetting process, the communication step that follows, 
and the taking of appropriate action are the steps that, together, 
would consume the most time under the APIS 60 procedure. With passenger 
data being transmitted in a batch, CBP could have several names that 
require further vetting. Each query pursued in further vetting is 
unique and some queries will take more time than others. Further, the 
communication and appropriate action steps of the process are subject 
to additional complexities, especially when foreign carriers or 
government personnel are involved or an interview is required. Thus, 
the full process and related steps described above require more time 
than the current regulation provides to meet the appropriate level of 
security sought.
    While the not-cleared instruction after the initial automated 
vetting stage would prevent a high-risk or potential high-risk 
passenger from boarding the aircraft when the carrier begins the 
boarding process, thereby achieving CBP's security goal, completion of 
the

[[Page 40039]]

further vetting process is necessary to make a final determination 
regarding the passenger subject to the not-cleared instruction. This 
final resolution is especially critical with respect to possible 
matches and incomplete or inadequate passenger records. A required 
transmission time frame of 60-minutes prior to departure would provide 
the time necessary to accommodate this process and thereby effectively 
achieve the appropriate level of security. CBP notes that further 
vetting, in most cases, would be completed in time for the passenger to 
make his intended flight; however, in some circumstances, further 
vetting could take longer than normally expected, resulting in the 
passenger having to be rebooked on a later flight (if ultimately 
cleared for flight by CBP).
    As a final step in the process, the air carrier would have to 
transmit to CBP a list, referred to as a close-out message, consisting 
of a unique passenger identifier for each passenger who checked in for 
the flight but was not boarded for any reason. The close-out message 
must be transmitted as soon as possible after departure and in no 
instance later than 30 minutes after departure.
    CBP is committed to having the APIS 60 option for pre-departure 
interactive electronic transmission fully available for industry use 
prior to publication of a final rule.
2. APIS Quick Query (Interactive Real-time Transmission) Option
    Under the AQQ option, which is applicable only to aircraft arrival 
and departure passenger manifests, air carriers would transmit 
passenger data to CBP in real time, i.e., as individual passengers 
check in, up to but no later than 15 minutes prior to departure of the 
aircraft; data received by CBP less than 15 minutes prior to departure 
would not meet the requirement.
    Under the AQQ procedure, the carrier would be able to transmit data 
relative to a passenger as soon as passengers begin checking in for the 
flight, as early as 2 hours or more prior to departure (as defined in 
this document). Since passengers on international flights are routinely 
advised to arrive as much as 2 hours before departure for check-in, 
manifest data for most passengers would be transmitted to CBP well 
before departure of the flight. Moreover, fewer names and associated 
data would be transmitted to CBP at one time than would be the case 
with the batch transmissions made under the APIS 60 procedure. Under 
APIS 60, over 200 passenger records may be included in one batch 
transmission, while under AQQ, a transmission would contain the name 
and data for one passenger (or up to 10 passengers traveling on one 
itinerary).
    Also, under AQQ, the messaging for CBP vetting results could be 
returned directly to the carrier's reservation system, reducing the 
time needed for human intervention. Thus, CBP would be able to respond 
within seconds of the carrier's transmission of data. Carriers then 
would have to return a message to CBP confirming receipt of any not-
cleared instructions and would not issue a boarding pass to any 
passenger unless cleared by CBP. As with the APIS 60 option, any 
passenger data generating a match, possible match, or inadequate record 
would be forwarded to an analyst for further vetting. CBP would 
electronically notify the carrier as soon as possible if, upon 
additional analysis, a change to the not-cleared instruction is 
warranted (such as would be the case if a match or possible match was 
determined during further vetting to be cleared for boarding).
    At its discretion, a carrier would be able to use a dedicated 
telephone number provided by CBP to seek a resolution of a not-cleared 
instruction by providing additional information relative to the not-
cleared passenger if available, such as a physical description. CBP 
would consider the additional information as it proceeds with the 
further vetting of the passenger already in progress. In some 
instances, CBP would instruct the carrier to retransmit data (as in the 
case of inadequate data). In any case, CBP would return a message to 
the carrier to clear a passenger for boarding if warranted by the 
results of additional analysis.
    Where CBP is unable to complete its additional analysis prior to 
departure, the carrier would be bound by the not-cleared instruction 
and would not be permitted to issue a boarding pass for that passenger. 
This could result in a passenger not making his flight and having to be 
rebooked should the not-cleared instruction eventually be corrected and 
the passenger be cleared for flight. Alternatively, and at its sole 
discretion, the carrier could delay the flight until CBP could clear 
the passenger for boarding. Finally, as with the APIS 60 option, the 
carrier would have to transmit to CBP, no later than 30 minutes after 
departure, a close-out message consisting of a unique passenger 
identifier for each passenger who checked in for the flight but was not 
boarded for any reason.
    Under the AQQ procedure, carrier real-time manifest data 
transmission would provide sufficient time for CBP to perform an 
effective vetting of the passengers. Most passengers check in well 
before departure of international flights, so very late arrivals are 
likely to be comparatively few. These facts enable CBP to propose a 
transmission time frame that some carriers will find more compatible 
with their business operations.
    For passengers checking in early, there generally would be ample 
time for completion of the vetting process. For the few passengers 
checking in late, CBP would be able to quickly vet the data in most 
instances. Thus, CBP expects that no identified high-risk passenger 
will receive a boarding pass and, for most flights, any passengers 
subject to further vetting and cleared for flight will make the flight. 
Also, more connecting passengers would be able to check in, be vetted, 
and make their flights than is anticipated under the APIS 60 procedure. 
This is a major advantage over the APIS 60 procedure for air carriers 
with connecting flight operations.
    Accordingly, AQQ would achieve the appropriate level of security 
sought in a way that some airlines may prefer to the APIS 60 method. In 
addition, this procedure would prevent a high-risk passenger from 
gaining access to the security area, since access for domestic and most 
international airports is restricted to those with boarding passes. 
Also, a high-risk passenger's baggage would not be loaded onto the 
aircraft which avoids the necessity of having it removed, as may 
sometimes be necessary under the APIS 60 procedure.
    There is, however, one exception to the foregoing: connecting 
passengers arriving by aircraft at the departure airport, for a flight 
en route to or departing from the United States, who were issued 
boarding passes (for the flight to or from the United States) prior to 
arrival at that departure airport and whose data was not previously 
transmitted to CBP for vetting. These passengers will already be within 
the security area as they transit the airport from the gate they 
arrived at to the gate of the connecting flight. For this unique group 
of passengers, CBP, in implementing AQQ, would consider the boarding 
passes they possess as provisional and would require that carriers 
obtain required data from these passengers in a manner compatible with 
their procedures and transmit such data to CBP as required. The carrier 
would be required to wait for CBP to clear any such passengers before 
validating the boarding passes or permitting the passengers to board 
the aircraft.
    CBP currently is developing user requirements for the programming

[[Page 40040]]

necessary to implement the AQQ transmission procedure. CBP will have to 
make adjustments to its automated systems to offer this data 
transmission option to the carriers, as will carriers who elect to use 
this option. CBP will consider these factors, as well as others 
identified during the comment period, in structuring an implementation 
plan and schedule that coincides with the readiness of CBP's IT 
infrastructure to support the AQQ option. CBP is committed to having 
the AQQ option for pre-departure interactive electronic transmission 
fully available for industry use prior to publication of a final rule.
3. System Certification and Delayed Effective Date
    Prior to a carrier's commencement of manifest transmission using 
either of the above-described APIS 60 or AQQ options, the carrier would 
receive a ``system certification'' from CBP indicating that its 
electronic transmission system is capable of interactively 
communicating with CBP's APIS system as configured for these options. 
Carriers already operating under the APIS procedure (under the current 
APIS regulation which requires batch manifest transmission but under 
different time requirements and a less interactive process) who opt to 
employ the APIS 60 option for their manifest transmissions would obtain 
certification only for new functionalities (relating to system 
interactivity) and would not undergo a full system certification.
    To accommodate carriers who choose the interactive system for 
manifest transmission under either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ 
option, CBP, in this rule, is proposing that the effective date of a 
final rule be delayed for 180 days from the date of its publication. 
This should provide all such carriers sufficient time to make any 
necessary program changes or system modifications and to obtain system 
certification and implementation. CBP strongly encourages carriers to 
begin efforts to obtain system interactivity and certification by 
contacting CBP as soon as possible.
4. Carriers Opting Out; Non-Interactive Batch Transmission Process
    As stated previously, some carriers, notably those currently using 
the eAPIS Internet method of transmitting required manifest data 
(typically, small, unscheduled air carrier operators, such as seasonal 
charters, air taxis, and air ambulances), may not be able to adopt 
either the APIS 60 option or the AQQ option. These carriers do not seek 
an interactive electronic communication method to make transmissions, 
as such a system does not fit their operations, technical capabilities, 
or budgets. Nonetheless, these carriers would be bound by a requirement 
to transmit manifest data no later than 60 minutes prior to departure, 
as proposed in this rule. The proposed rule contains a subparagraph 
that accommodates these carriers as transmitters of batch manifest data 
without interactive electronic communication capability. These carriers 
would not have to seek system certification. CBP will employ a manual 
process using email or telephone communication (by which CBP would send 
not-cleared messages) to accommodate these carriers. This manual 
procedure may slow the vetting process to some extent, but CBP believes 
that the goal of preventing a high-risk boarding would be achieved, as 
carriers would not board passengers subject to a not-cleared 
instruction unless cleared by CBP.

C. Proposed Change for Transmission of Manifests by Departing Vessels

    Typically, vessel carriers allow boarding several hours (typically 
3 to 6 hours) prior to departure. Thus, a manifest transmission 
requirement designed to prevent the possibility of a high-risk vessel-
boarding likely would require substantial adjustments to the carriers' 
operations. This would frustrate CBP's intent, and the purpose of 
various requirements governing Federal rulemaking, to achieve the 
agency's goal (enhanced security) without imposing an unreasonable 
burden on affected parties.
    CBP believes that, under this circumstance, the appropriate level 
of security sought in this scenario is to prevent the departure of a 
vessel with a high-risk passenger or crew member onboard. The change 
proposed in this rule is designed to achieve this level of security for 
vessels departing from the United States and to thereby meet the 
purposes of the governing statutes. Thus, for vessels departing from 
the United States, the proposed amendment provides for transmission of 
passenger and crew manifests 60 minutes prior to departure. CBP notes 
that the electronic system for transmission of required vessel manifest 
data (arrival and departure) is the U.S. Coast Guard's (Internet based) 
eNOA/D system. This is not an interactive system, and, unlike air 
carriers operating under the APIS 60 or AQQ options described above, 
vessel carriers would not have to obtain system certification.
    After transmission of the manifest data, the initial automated 
vetting would result in a not-cleared instruction for matches, possible 
matches, and incomplete/inadequate passenger records or crew data. 
Carriers would attempt to prevent the boarding of such persons if it 
had not already occurred due to the very early boarding allowed. CBP 
notes that a not-cleared message returned to the carrier by CBP for an 
inadequate record would instruct the carrier to retransmit complete/
corrected data.
    During further vetting, passengers and crew for whom not-cleared 
instructions were sent during the initial automated vetting procedure 
would be either confirmed as high-risks or resolved and cleared. CBP 
would communicate with the carrier where further vetting resulted in 
the clearing of a passenger. In some instances, CBP would communicate 
with the carrier and other CBP personnel to take necessary action to 
verify (by conducting an interview if necessary) the high-risk status 
of passengers or crew and, as needed, secure a confirmed high-risk 
passenger or crew member. In this process, a confirmed high-risk 
passenger or crew member likely would have to be located and removed 
from the vessel before departure, in which case his baggage would be 
removed as well. Whether a further search of the vessel is warranted 
would be determined by CBP on a case-by-case basis. (The carrier would 
be free to undertake a further search at its discretion.)
    The current requirement for batch manifest transmission no later 
than 15 minutes prior to a vessel's departure does not provide enough 
time to fully vet passengers or crew members or allow, where necessary, 
for the removal of a confirmed high-risk passenger or crew member from 
a vessel prior to departure. In contrast, the proposed APIS 60 
procedure is expected to provide CBP the time it needs to fully vet 
not-cleared passengers and crew members and to remove those confirmed 
as a high-risk from the vessel prior to departure. The APIS 60 
procedure therefore would achieve the appropriate level of security 
sought by CBP.
    In addition to preventing a high-risk departure, this procedure 
would enhance CBP's capability, in some circumstances (where carriers 
allow already checked-in passengers to board within 60 minutes of 
departure), to prevent high-risk vessel boardings, as compared to what 
is achievable under the current regulation. An alternative option (such 
as AQQ or something similar) is not as necessary, given the less time-
critical nature of the commercial vessel travel environment.
    For vessels departing from foreign ports destined to arrive at a 
U.S. port,

[[Page 40041]]

CBP is retaining the requirement to transmit passenger and crew 
manifest data at least 24 hours and up to 96 hours prior to a vessel's 
entering the U.S. port of arrival. This requirement is consistent with 
the U.S. Coast Guard's ``Notice of Arrival'' (NOA) requirements. (Under 
33 CFR 160.212, arriving vessel carriers transmit manifest data to the 
U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) to meet its NOA requirement. The data is then 
forwarded to CBP, permitting additional compliance with CBP's APIS 
requirement with the one carrier transmission.) Moreover, the threat 
posed by a high-risk passenger or crew member once onboard a vessel is 
different from that posed by a high-risk passenger onboard an aircraft. 
A hijacked vessel's movements over the water and its range of available 
targets could be more readily contained than those of an aircraft, thus 
reducing the opportunity for a terrorist to use the vessel as a weapon 
against a U.S. port or another vessel.

IV. Rationale for Change

A. Terrorist Threat

    In proposing this rule, as discussed above, CBP points to the 
primary impetus for this entire rulemaking initiative (including the 
April 7, 2005 final rule and previous rulemaking efforts as explained 
in the final rule): to respond to the continuing terrorist threat 
facing the United States, the international trade and transportation 
industries, and the international traveling public since the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001. Under the governing statutes and 
regulations, DHS and the air and vessel carrier industries must take 
steps to alleviate the risk to these vital industries and the public 
posed by the threat of terrorism, while also increasing national 
security. Ensuring security is an ongoing process, and CBP is 
endeavoring to put in place a regulatory scheme that includes 
electronic information transmission and pre-departure transmission time 
requirements. Together, these requirements are intended to serve as a 
layer of protection against high-risk travelers while facilitating 
lawful travel. While progress has been made, CBP continues its efforts 
to achieve the level of security mandated by Congress (under ATSA, 
EBSA, and IRTPA). CBP notes that this rulemaking initiative also would 
enhance CBP's ability to carry out its more traditional, but equally 
important, border enforcement mission.
    With regard to commercial aviation, the terrorist threat has been a 
constant presence on the international stage since the hijackings of 
the 1970s. More recently, Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups have 
shown a consistent interest in exploiting civil aviation both as a 
potential target and as a means of attack. This interest has been 
highlighted in advanced planning, such as the thwarted plot of former 
Al Qaeda leader Khalid Shaikh Mohammed to explode 12 commercial 
airliners over a 48-hour period in 1996, as well as other attempted and 
successful attacks. Al Qaeda's interest in attacking civil aviation 
came to grim fruition in the attacks of September 11, 2001--the most 
costly terrorist attack in U.S. history. Even after September 11, 2001, 
terrorists continue to demonstrate an interest in attacking civil 
aviation. In August 2003, specific credible intelligence led DHS to 
suspend the Transit Without Visa (TWOV) program due to concerns that it 
might be exploited to conduct a terrorist attack. See 68 FR 46926 (Aug. 
7, 2003); 68 FR 46948 (Aug. 7, 2003). About four months later, during 
the 2003 holiday period, international flights destined for the United 
States faced cancellations and delays based on threat information. The 
necessity of this rule is underscored further by repeated instances of 
higher threat levels over time, such as the higher alerts announced 
during the summer of 2004 for financial centers in New York City and 
Washington DC, and during the period prior to the 2004 U.S. 
Presidential election. It is noted also that terrorists seek targets of 
opportunity and, as such, the terrorist threat extends beyond civil 
aviation, as evidenced by past terrorist acts against passenger 
vessels. Therefore, efforts made to increase security for commercial 
vessels also would contribute to foreclosing an opportunity for 
terrorist exploitation.
    It is important to note that the threat from terrorist activity is 
not just to human life, but also to the economic well-being of the 
commercial air and vessel carrier industries--two industries of great 
importance to the U.S. and world economies. Since the Fall of 2004, 
there have been several instances when the identification of a high-
risk passenger by CBP or the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA) after departure of an aircraft en route to the United States 
resulted in the diversion of the aircraft to a different U.S. port or a 
turnback (the return of the aircraft to the foreign port of departure). 
Those security measures, while necessary to safeguard the passengers on 
the aircraft as well as national security, are costly to the affected 
carriers. Accordingly, CBP proposes to collect and vet required APIS 
passenger data before passengers board aircraft bound for or departing 
from the United States, and to collect and vet earlier than is 
permitted under existing regulations required passenger and crew APIS 
data in order to achieve the maximum ability reasonably attainable for 
detecting high-risk persons before they can perpetrate a terrorist act.

B. IRTPA

    With the passage of IRTPA, Congress expressly recognized the need 
to fully perform vetting of manifest information prior to the departure 
of commercial aircraft and vessels traveling to and from the United 
States. Section 4012(a)(2) of IRTPA directs DHS to issue a proposed 
rule providing for the collection of passenger information from 
international flights to or from the United States and comparison of 
such information with the consolidated terrorist watch list maintained 
by the Federal Government before departure of the aircraft. Section 
4071(1) of IRTPA requires DHS to compare vessel passenger and crew 
information with information from the consolidated terrorist database 
before departure of a vessel bound for or departing from the United 
States. Section 4071(2) permits DHS to waive (based on 
impracticability) the requirement of section 4071(1) for vessels bound 
for the United States from foreign ports. CBP has determined that 
requiring the data comparison before departure of such vessels is 
impracticable because the requirement would conflict, in some 
instances, with the current APIS manifest data transmission 
requirements for vessel arrivals (which are to be retained in the 
regulations)(cited previously) and the current USCG NOA requirements 
(cited previously). Accordingly, DHS has elected to implement the 
waiver provided for in this section for arriving vessels.
    The Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) and use of the consolidated 
terrorist watch list required by IRTPA provide the means to vet 
passenger and crew manifest data for known and suspected terrorists, 
including for flights to and from the United States and for cruise 
vessels subject to this regulation.

V. Impact on Parties Affected by the Proposed Rule

    Should the proposed rule become final and effective, large air 
carriers (i.e., those with over 1,500 employees) will bear the greatest 
percentage of the regulatory burden of the proposed rule due to the 
number of international travelers these entities carry and their method 
of transmitting APIS data.
    If carriers exercise the APIS 60 option, it is anticipated that any 
adverse impact on passengers would fall

[[Page 40042]]

disproportionately on connecting passengers (those arriving from a 
foreign airport and continuing on to a foreign destination and those 
making a connecting foreign flight en route to the U.S.), rather than 
on originating passengers.
    Passengers conducting foreign travel, either coming to or leaving 
the United States, are instructed to check in for international flights 
well in advance, usually at least 2 hours prior to departure. Thus, 60 
minutes prior to departure, most originating passengers' APIS data will 
have been collected and verified by the carriers and could thus be 
transmitted. Connecting passengers, however, may not have a full 2 
hours between flights. Partnering airlines will likely share APIS 
information for an entire trip, but non-partner airlines may not. We 
believe, therefore, that under the APIS 60 option, a small number of 
connecting passengers may not make their flights, will be delayed, and 
will have to be rerouted. Alternatively, if large carriers use the AQQ 
option, delays to travelers will be minimized, but carriers will need 
to develop and implement their systems to support AQQ.
    Under the proposed rule, small carriers may still use ``eAPIS,'' a 
web-based application designed to electronically transmit manifests 
between small carriers and CBP. CBP does not believe that small 
carriers will develop and implement AQQ because they will not find it 
cost effective given their operations and their current utilization of 
eAPIS. Thus, small carriers will probably choose the APIS 60 option 
rather than the AQQ option.
    While large carriers have connecting flights where affected 
passengers could face short layover times, small air carriers operate 
predominantly on charter schedules and make point-to-point trips 
without connecting flights. Accordingly, very few passengers traveling 
on small carriers will be delayed or rerouted as a result of this 
proposed rulemaking.
    CBP does not know which carriers will choose which regulatory 
option. The Regulatory Assessment, summarized below in the ``Executive 
Order 12866'' section, presents two endpoints of the likely range of 
costs. For the ``high cost estimate,'' CBP assumes that all carriers 
will employ the APIS 60 regulatory option (the 60-minute transmission 
requirement). For the ``low cost estimate,'' CBP assumes that large 
carriers will employ the AQQ regulatory option.
    The impacts on carriers, travelers, and others potentially affected 
by this rule are examined in detail in the ``Regulatory Assessment'' 
which is available in the docket for this rulemaking (https://
www.eparegulations.gov; see also https://www.cbp.gov). CBP is soliciting 
comments on the assumptions and estimates made in the economic 
analysis.

VI. Regulatory Requirements

A. Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review)

    This rule is considered to be an economically significant 
regulatory action under Executive Order 12866 because it may result in 
the expenditure of over $100 million in any one year. Accordingly, this 
proposed rule has been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget 
(OMB). The following summary presents the costs and benefits of the 
proposed rule plus a range of alternatives considered. The complete 
``Regulatory Assessment'' can be found in the docket for this 
rulemaking (https://www.regulations.gov; see also https://www.cbp.gov). 
Comments regarding the analysis may be submitted by any of the methods 
described under the ADDRESSES section of this document.
Summary
    Should the proposed rule become final and effective, air carriers 
and air passengers will be the parties primarily affected by the 
proposed rule. For APIS 60, costs will be driven by the number of air 
travelers that will need to arrive at their originating airports 
earlier and the number of air travelers who miss connecting flights and 
require rerouting as a result. For AQQ, costs will be driven by 
implementation expenses, data transmission costs, and a small number of 
air travelers who miss connecting flights.
    CBP estimates a range of costs in this analysis. For the high end 
of the range (i.e., under the APIS 60 procedure), CBP anticipates that 
passengers will provide APIS data upon check-in for their flights and 
that all carriers will transmit that data, as an entire passenger and 
crew manifest, to CBP at least 60 minutes prior to departure of the 
aircraft. CBP estimates that this will result in 2 percent of 
passengers on large carriers and 0.25 percent of passengers on small 
carriers missing connecting flights and needing to be rerouted, with an 
average delay of 4 hours. Additionally, we estimate that 15 percent of 
passengers will need to arrive at the airport an average of 15 minutes 
earlier in order to make their flights. For the low end of the range 
(under the AQQ procedure), we assume that all large air carriers will 
implement AQQ to transmit information on individual passengers as each 
checks in. CBP estimates that this will significantly drive down even 
further the percentage of passengers requiring rerouting on large 
carriers to 0.5 percent. Travelers will not need to modify their 
behavior to arrive at the airport earlier. The percentage on small 
carriers remains 0.25 percent because we assume that small carriers 
will not implement AQQ; rather, they will continue to submit manifests 
at least 60 minutes prior to departure through eAPIS, CBP's web-based 
application for small carriers. Thus, costs for small air carriers are 
the same regardless of the regulatory option considered.
    The endpoints of this range are presented below. As shown, the 
present value (PV) costs of the proposed rule are estimated to range 
from $612 million to $1.9 billion over the next 10 years (2006-2015, 
2005 dollars, 7 percent discount rate).

                                           Costs of the Proposed Rule
                                      [$Millions, 2006-2015, 2005 dollars]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       High Estimate (60-minute option)           Low esimate (AQQ option)
                                   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       Large        Small                     Large        Small
                                      carriers     carriers      Total       carriers     carriers      Total
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First-Year Costs..................         $245           $5         $250         $184           $5         $189
Average Recurring Costs...........          268            6          274           66            6           72
10-Year PV Costs (7%).............        1,865           39        1,904          573           39          612
10-Year PV Costs (3%).............        2,279           48        2,327          677           48          726
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


[[Page 40043]]

    We estimate four categories of benefits, or costs that could be 
avoided, under the APIS 60 procedure: (1) Costs for conducting 
interviews with identified high-risk individuals upon arrival in the 
United States; (2) costs for deporting a percentage of these 
individuals; (3) costs of delaying a high-risk aircraft at an airport; 
and (4) costs of rerouting aircraft if high-risk individuals are 
identified after takeoff. Monetizing the benefits of avoiding an actual 
terrorist incident has proven difficult because the damages caused by 
terrorism are a function of where the attack takes place, the nature of 
the attack, the number of people affected, the casualty rates, the 
psychological impacts of the attack, and, perhaps most importantly, the 
``ripple effects'' as damages permeate throughout our society and 
economy far beyond the initial target. One limited scenario is 
presented below.
    The average recurring benefits of the proposed rule are an 
estimated $15 million per year. This is in addition to the non-
quantified security benefits, which are the primary impetus for this 
rule. Over the 10-year period of analysis, PV benefits are an estimated 
$105 million at a 7 percent discount rate ($128 million at a 3 percent 
discount rate).
    Given the quantified costs and benefits of the proposed rule, we 
can determine how much non-quantified security benefits would have to 
be for this rule to be cost-beneficial. The 10-year costs range from 
$612 million to $1.9 billion, and the benefits are an estimated $103 
million (all at the 7 percent discount rate). Thus, the non-quantified 
security benefits would have to be $509 million to $1.8 billion over 
the 10-year period in order for this proposed rule to be cost-
beneficial. In one hypothetical security scenario involving only one 
aircraft and the people aboard, estimated costs of an incident could 
exceed $790 million. This rule may not prevent such an incident, but if 
it did, the value of preventing such a limited incident would outweigh 
the costs at the low end of the range. See the Regulatory Assessment at 
https://www.regulations.gov or https://www.cbp.gov for details of these 
calculations.
Regulatory Alternatives
    CBP considered a number of regulatory alternatives to the proposed 
rule. Complete details regarding the costs and benefits of these 
alternatives can be found in the ``Regulatory Assessment'' available in 
the docket for this rulemaking (https://www.regulations.gov; see also 
https://www.cbp.gov). The following is a summary of these alternatives:
    (1) Do not promulgate any further manifest transmission 
requirements (No Action)--the baseline case where carriers would 
continue to submit APIS manifests for arriving aircraft passengers 15 
minutes after departure and, for departing aircraft passengers, 15 
minutes prior to departure. There are no additional costs or benefits 
associated with this alternative. High-risk passengers would continue 
to board aircraft both destined to and departing from the United 
States, and instances of such aircraft departing with a high-risk 
passenger onboard would continue. As explained previously in this 
document, these results are inconsistent with the protective security 
objectives of ATSA, EBSA, and IRTPA. Because this is the status quo, 
and therefore has no additional costs or benefits, it is not analyzed 
further.
    (2) A pre-departure transmission requirement--this would require 
carriers to submit manifests earlier than is required under the status 
quo requirements for flights to and from the United States. 
Transmission of manifest information would be made at least 30 minutes 
prior to departure. CBP concludes that 1 percent of passengers on large 
carriers would be delayed while no passengers on small carriers would 
be affected. We assume small carriers would not need to reroute any 
passengers under a pre-departure transmission requirement; accordingly, 
this alternative is a no-cost option for small carriers. We assume that 
5 percent of travelers would need to arrive at the airport 15 minutes 
earlier than normal in order to make their flights.
    For large carriers, transmission of manifest data at this time 
would not provide enough of a window for CBP to respond to a hit on the 
watch lists, regardless of the boarding time. Benefits of this 
alternative would be largely negated when compared to the proposed rule 
because the ability to intercept a high-risk individual before the 
boarding process begins would be severely limited. Because in many 
instances the high-risk passenger is likely to board under this 
alternative, the individual and his bags would have to be removed from 
the plane; in some circumstances, depending on the level of the threat, 
all remaining passengers and bags would have to be removed and re-
screened and, in particularly urgent circumstances, the aircraft would 
have to be ``re-sterilized'' prior to re-boarding.
    First-year costs are $111 million, average recurring costs are $122 
million per year, and 10-year present value costs are $845 million (7 
percent discount rate) and $1.0 billion (3 percent discount rate).
    Benefits are slightly higher than the No Action alternative because 
while the boarding of a high-risk passenger would not be prevented, a 
high-risk individual would be identified prior to the departure of a 
flight to or from the United States in most instances. Benefits are 
lower than under the proposed rule because CBP would be unable to plan 
and coordinate a response before boarding begins, and thus the high-
risk passenger could still board the aircraft. As explained previously 
in this document, these results would be inconsistent with the 
protective security objectives of ATSA, EBSA, and IRTPA.
    (3) A