In the Matter of Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, 38564-38593 [06-6013]
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 130 / Friday, July 7, 2006 / Proposed Rules
the PVAAC report. After reviewing the
PVAAC report in detail, the Board’s ad
hoc committee prepared draft guidelines
addressing accessibility to and in
passenger vessels which carry more
than 150 passengers or more than 49
overnight passengers. The Access Board
made the recommendations of the ad
hoc committee available in the form of
draft guidelines for public review and
comment. A notice of availability of the
draft guidelines was published in the
Federal Register (69 FR 69244;
November 26, 2004). At the same time
the 2004 draft was released, the Board
also published an advance notice of
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) on
small passenger vessels (69 FR 69245;
November 26, 2004). In addition to
seeking written comment, the Board
held public hearings in Washington, DC
and Los Angeles, CA.
Over 90 comments were received
from the public in response to the
publication of the 2004 draft and
ANRPM. Key issues from the comments
were identified for analysis. Issues
regarding the 2004 draft included which
vessels should be subject to the
guidelines, coverage of employee areas,
criteria for embarking and
disembarking, high door thresholds
(coamings), alterations, methods for
swimming pool access, elevator car size,
guest room scoping, dispersion of
wheelchair spaces in assembly areas,
and visual emergency alarms.
Comments on the ANPRM ranged from
requesting the Board to exempt small
passenger vessels to recommending that
the Board concentrate its efforts on
addressing large passenger vessels first.
Based on public comments and other
information collected, the Board has
made changes to some of the provisions
in the 2004 draft. The Board has also
decided to address small passenger
vessels after completing this
rulemaking.
To facilitate the gathering of cost data
necessary for the next step in this
rulemaking which is the preparation of
a regulatory assessment (costs and
benefits) and a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NPRM), the Board is
placing this revised draft in the
rulemaking docket. In order to develop
an accurate picture of the potential costs
and benefits of this rulemaking, the
Board intends to work closely with
passenger vessel industry
representatives and others who have
data on both current costs and industry
practices and the knowledge and skills
to assess potential effects.
The Board is interested in receiving
public comments on this entire second
draft. Changes made in this draft from
the November 26, 2004 draft are
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summarized in the supplementary
information provided on the Board’s
Web site (https://www.access-board.gov).
In addition, the supplementary
information discusses the changes made
to the draft plan for conducting the
regulatory assessment.
Availability of Copies and Electronic
Access
Single copies of this rulemaking may
be obtained at no cost by calling the
Access Board’s automated publications
order line (202) 272–0080, by pressing
2 on the telephone keypad, then 1 and
requesting the second draft of the
Passenger Vessels Guidelines. Persons
using a TTY should call (202) 272–0082.
Documents are available in alternate
formats upon request. Persons who want
a publication in an alternate format
should specify the type of format
(cassette tape, Braille, large print, or
ASCII disk). Documents are also
available on the Board’s Web site
(https://www.access-board.gov).
David L. Bibb,
Chair, Architectural and Transportation
Barriers Compliance Board.
[FR Doc. E6–10576 Filed 7–6–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8150–01–P
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15,
17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25, 27, 52, 53, 54, 63,
64, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 90, 95, 97 and
101
[EB Docket No. 06–119; FCC 06–83]
In the Matter of Recommendations of
the Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks
Federal Communications
Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
AGENCY:
SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal
Communications Commission
(Commission) initiates a comprehensive
rulemaking to address and implement
the recommendations presented by the
Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks
(Independent Panel). The Independent
Panel’s report described the impact of
the worst natural disaster in the
Nation’s history as well as the overall
public and private response efforts. In
addition, the report included
recommendations which relate to: prepositioning the communications
industry and the government for
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disasters in order to achieve greater
network reliability and resiliency;
improving recovery coordination to
address existing shortcomings and to
maximize the use of existing resources;
improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis; and
improving communication of emergency
information to the public. The
Commission, in this proceeding, is to
take the lessons learned from this
disaster and build upon them to
promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts as well as
heightened readiness and preparedness
in the future. To accomplish this goal,
the Commission invites comment on
what actions the Commission can take
to address the Independent Panel’s
recommendations.
DATES: Comments are due on or before
August 7, 2006, and reply comments are
due on or before August 21, 2006.
Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information
collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of
Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before
September 5, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Send comments and reply
comments to the Office of the Secretary,
Federal Communications Commission,
445 12th Street, SW., Room TW–A325,
Washington, DC 20554. You may submit
comments, identified by EB Docket No.
06–119, by any of the following
methods:
• Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://
www.regulations.gov/. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• Federal Communications
Commission’s Web site: https://
www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
• People with Disabilities: Contact
the FCC to request reasonable
accommodations (accessible format
documents, sign language interpreters,
CART, etc.) by e-mail; FCC504@fcc.gov
or phone: 202–418–0530 or TTY: 202–
418–0432.
In addition to filing with the
Secretary, a copy of any comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained herein should be submitted to
Judith B. Herman, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 1–
C804, 445 12th Street, SW., Washington,
DC 20554, or via the Internet to
PRA@fcc.gov, and to Kristy L. LaLonde,
OMB Desk Officer, Room 10234, NEOB,
725 17th Street, NW., Washington, DC
20503, via the Internet to
Kristy_L.LaLonde@omb.eop.gov or via
fax at 202–395–5167.
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Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 130 / Friday, July 7, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Lisa
M. Fowlkes, Assistant Bureau Chief,
Enforcement Bureau, at (202) 418–7450
or Jean Ann Collins, Senior Counsel,
Office of Homeland Security,
Enforcement Bureau at (202) 418–1199.
For additional information concerning
the Paperwork Reduction Act
information collection requirements
contained in this document, contact
Judith B. Herman at (202) 418–0214 or
via the Internet at PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a
summary of the Commission’s Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in EB
Docket No. 06–119, FCC 06–83, adopted
June 16, 2006 and released June 19,
2006. The complete text of this
document is available for inspection
and copying during normal business
hours in the FCC Reference Information
Center, Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Room CY–A257, Washington, DC 20554.
This document may also be purchased
from the Commission’s duplicating
contractor Best Copy and Printing, Inc.,
Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room
CY–B402, Washington, DC 20554,
telephone (800) 378–3160 or (202) 488–
5300, facsimile (202) 488–5563, or via email at fcc@bcpiweb.com. It is also
available on the Commission’s Web site
at https://www.fcc.gov.
This document contains proposed
information collection requirements.
The Commission, as part of its
continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public and
the OMB to comment on the proposed
information collection requirements
contained in this document, as required
by the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1995, Public Law 104–13. Public and
agency comments are due September 5,
2006.
Comments should address: (a)
Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper
performance of the functions of the
Commission, including whether the
information shall have practical utility;
(b) the accuracy of the Commission’s
burden estimates; (c) ways to enhance
the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and (d) ways to
minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents,
including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of
information technology. In addition,
pursuant to the Small Business
Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public
Law 107–198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4),
we seek specific comment on how it
might ‘‘further reduce the information
collection burden for small business
concerns with fewer than 25
employees.’’
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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
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OMB Control Number: None
Title: Emergency Communications
Status and Contact Information.
Form No.: N/A.
Type of Review: New Collection.
Respondents: Business or other forprofit, not-for-profit, state, local or tribal
governments.
Estimated Number of Respondents:
1,300.
Frequency of Response: Contact
information—0.167 hours for initial
collection; 0.084 hours for updates;
Readiness Checklist—40 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion.
Estimated Total Annual Burden:
16,113 hours.
Estimated Total Annual Costs: $0.
Privacy Act Impact Assessment: N/A.
Needs and Uses: The Commission
will use the information collected to
promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts in the
event of a natural disaster or emergency
situation, as well as heightened
readiness and preparedness.
Additionally, this information
collection will be used to compile a
roster of key communications providers
and other emergency personnel
throughout the United States and in
determining the extent of
communications disruption and the
appropriate agency response. This
information collection will be used to
compile a list of outages to
communications infrastructure within
an area affected by a disaster. This
information will assist in ensuring rapid
restoration of communications
capabilities after disruption by a natural
disaster, terrorist attack or other
emergency and will assist in ensuring
the public safety, public health, and
other emergency and defense personnel
have effective communications services
available to them.
Synopsis of the Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking
1. Background. On Monday, August
29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the
Gulf Coast of the United States, causing
significant damage in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The
destruction to communications
companies’ facilities in the region, and
therefore to the services upon which
citizens rely, was extraordinary.
Hurricane Katrina knocked out more
than three million customer phone lines
in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
The wireline telecommunications
network sustained enormous damage—
dozens of central offices and countless
miles of outside plant were damaged or
destroyed as a result of the hurricane or
the subsequent flooding. Local wireless
networks also sustained considerable
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damage—more than a thousand cell
sites were knocked out of service by the
hurricane. At the hurricane’s height,
more than thirty-five Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of
service, and some parishes in Louisiana
remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
2. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J.
Martin established the Independent
Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Public Law 92–463, as
amended (71 FR 933, January 6, 2006).
The mission of the Independent Panel
was to review the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on the telecommunications and
media infrastructure in the areas
affected by the hurricane. Specifically,
the Independent Panel was to study the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on all
sectors of the telecommunications and
media industries, including public
safety communications. In addition, the
Independent Panel was to review the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery effort with respect to the
communications infrastructure. The
Independent Panel was tasked with
making recommendations to the
Commission by June 15, 2006, regarding
ways to improve disaster preparedness,
network reliability, and
communications among first responders
such as police, fire fighters, and
emergency medical personnel.
3. The Independent Panel met directly
on five occasions. Four of these
meetings were used to examine the facts
surrounding the impact of Hurricane
Katrina and to obtain evidence
concerning the extent of the damage and
the sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery efforts. On one occasion, the
Independent Panel met in the area
struck by Hurricane Katrina to hear firsthand from victims of the disaster. In
addition to the in-person meetings, the
Independent Panel also received written
comments from interested members of
the public. Finally, the Independent
Panel’s informal working groups met on
numerous occasions via conference call
and in person to discuss their progress.
4. On June 9, 2006, the Independent
Panel held its final meeting in
Washington, DC to conclude its analysis
and deliberations. The Independent
Panel finalized its findings and
recommendations and submitted its
report on June 12, 2006. A copy of the
report is attached to this NPRM.
5. Introduction. In this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, the Commission
initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to
address and implement the
recommendations presented by the
Independent Panel. Congress has
charged the Commission with
promoting the safety of life and property
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through the use of wire and radio
communications. In this regard, the
Commission has already taken a number
of steps to fulfill this mandate and we
will continue to do so. The Independent
Panel’s report described the impact of
the worst natural disaster in the
Nation’s history, as well as the overall
public and private response and
recovery efforts. Our goal in this
proceeding is to take the lessons learned
from this disaster and build upon them
to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts, as well as
heightened readiness and preparedness,
in the future. To accomplish this goal,
we invite comment on what actions the
Commission can take to address the
Independent Panel’s recommendations.
6. We seek comment on the
recommendations presented by the
Independent Panel in its final report.
The Independent Panel’s
recommendations are organized into
four areas: (1) Pre-positioning the
communications industry and the
government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and
resiliency; (2) improving recovery
coordination to address existing
shortcomings and to maximize the use
of existing resources; (3) improving the
operability and interoperability of
public safety and 911 communications
in times of crisis; and (4) improving
communication of emergency
information to the public. In some cases,
the Independent Panel recommends
actions that require the Commission to
modify its rules pursuant to notice-andcomment rulemaking. In other cases, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission take actions that are not
dependent upon rulemakings, such as
increased outreach and education
campaigns, or recommends measures
that may not fall within the
Commission’s statutory authority and
jurisdiction. In advocating
implementation of the Independent
Panel’s recommendations, commenters
should note what actions would fall
within the Commission’s statutory
authority and jurisdiction, and what the
Commission could do to encourage the
appropriate entities (e.g., state and local
authorities) to take action. In evaluating
the Independent Panel’s
recommendations, our goal is to
determine what actions the Commission
should take to promote greater
resiliency and reliability of
communications infrastructure, as well
as the actions the Commission should
take to strengthen and improve response
and recovery efforts. We therefore invite
broad comment on the Independent
Panel’s recommendations and on the
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measures the Commission should take
to address the problems identified. We
also generally seek comment on
whether, in adopting any of the
Independent Panel’s recommendations,
any additional safeguards should be
implemented to limit disclosure of
sensitive infrastructure information or
commercial information to prevent
exposing potential targets to wrongdoers
and subjecting regulated entities to
competitive harm.
7. In addition to presenting
recommendations, the Independent
Panel’s final report describes the
Independent Panel’s observations
regarding the hurricane’s impact and the
sufficiency of the recovery efforts. We
also seek comment on whether the
Independent Panel’s observations
warrant additional measures or steps
beyond the report’s specific
recommendations. Thus, to the extent
parties believe additional measures
beyond the Independent Panel’s
recommendations or different actions
are warranted, we welcome these
suggestions and recommendations. We
also seek comment whether we should
rely on voluntary consensus
recommendations, as advocated by the
Independent Panel, or whether we
should rely on other measures for
enhancing readiness and promoting
more effective response efforts.
8. Pre-Positioning for Disasters. The
Independent Panel recommendation
notes that the sheer force of Hurricane
Katrina and the extensive flooding that
occurred severely tested the reliability
and resiliency of communications
networks in the Gulf Coast region. To
help speed response efforts, the
Independent Panel recommends the
adoption of a proactive (rather than
reactive) program for network reliability
and resiliency. At the heart of the
Independent Panel’s recommendations
are steps the Independent Panel believes
the communications industry, public
safety organizations, and the
Commission should take for a faster,
more effective response to disasters and
emergencies. In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with industry sectors,
associations, and other organizations to
establish a ‘‘Readiness Checklist’’ for the
communications industry that would
include developing formal business
continuity plans, conducting training
exercises, developing suitable plans and
procedures, and maintaining prepositioned supplies and equipment to
help in disaster response. We seek
comment on these recommendations.
The Independent Panel recommends
that we rely on checklists developed by
industry consensus groups, such as the
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Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council (NRIC) and the Media Security
and Reliability Council (MSRC). We
seek comment on this recommendation,
including whether we should rely on
the results of voluntary consensus
recommendations or instead rely on
other measures. We invite parties to
comment on the appropriate breadth of
business continuity plans. Are the
suggested elements presented by the
Independent Panel adequate, or are
other elements useful or necessary? We
seek comment on whether we should
adopt guidance or criteria for
developing business continuity plans,
conducting exercises, developing and
practicing communications plans, or
routinely archiving critical system backups for secure off-site facilities.
9. The Independent Panel also
recommends enhancing the awareness
of the public safety community in nontraditional emergency alternatives
through community education
campaigns. We seek comment on this
recommendation and on other steps we
can take within our jurisdiction and
statutory authority to assist the public
safety community response to disasters
and other emergencies. The
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission establish a prioritized
system of automatically waiving
regulatory requirements, or of granting
automatic Special Temporary Authority
(STA) in certain instances, and provides
a list of specific Commission
requirements. We invite comment on
this suggestion. Are there other areas
where regulatory relief would be
appropriate? Should we establish
specific thresholds or requirements in
the Commission’s rules pertaining to
demonstrations that should be made?
The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission
coordinate all federal outage and
infrastructure reporting requirements in
times of crisis. We seek comment on
this recommendation and on the
measures the Commission can take
within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction. Parties should address the
appropriate content of emergency
outage reports, format, frequency,
distribution, and related issues. We seek
comment on whether additional
safeguards should be implemented to
address issues concerning potential
disclosure of sensitive infrastructure
information or commercial information
to avoid potential harm to
communications providers or others.
Finally, we invite comment on other
steps beyond those recommended by the
panel that we could take within our
statutory authority and jurisdiction to
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improve or strengthen network
resiliency and reliability.
10. We seek comment on whether and
how the Commission can assist
organizations whose primary business is
not communications (e.g., hospitals,
nursing homes, day care facilities, and
so forth) with developing
communications plans for an
emergency. We also seek comment on
whether the Commission should
develop a hotline and/or Website to
assist these entities.
11. Recovery Coordination. The
Independent Panel observed significant
challenges to maintenance and
restoration of communications services
after Hurricane Katrina due in part to
problems with access to the affected
area and key resources such as power
and/or generator fuel. The Independent
Panel ‘‘generally supports the National
Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee’s (NSTAC’s)
recommendation for a national standard
for credentialing telecommunications
repair workers.’’ The Independent Panel
advocates, however, expanding the
NSTAC’s credentialing
recommendations to include repair
workers of all communications
infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless,
WISP, cable, broadcasting, satellite).
The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission work with other
appropriate Federal departments and
agencies to promptly develop national
credentialing requirements and
guidelines to enable communications
infrastructure providers and their
contracted workers to access affected
areas post-disaster. The Independent
Panel also recommends that the
Commission ‘‘encourage states to
develop and implement a credentialing
program consistent with [the NSTAC’s
guidelines].’’ We seek comment on these
recommendations, including measures
the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction. The
Independent Panel also recommends
that the Commission work with
Congress and appropriate federal
departments and agencies to implement
the NSTAC’s recommendation that
telecommunications infrastructure
providers should be afforded emergency
responder status under the Stafford Act
and that this designation should be
incorporated into the National Response
Plan and state and local emergency
response plans. The Independent Panel
further recommends that the emergency
responder designation be expanded to
include all communications services
providers (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP,
satellite, cable, and broadcast media)
and their contract workers. The
Commission seeks comment on these
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recommendations and on other steps we
can take within our statutory authority
and jurisdiction.
12. The Independent Panel makes
several recommendations related to
improving and enhancing
communications and coordination
among Federal, state, and local
authorities and the private sector. In
particular, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission
‘‘should encourage, but not require,
each regional, state and local
[Emergency Operating Center (EOC)]
and the [Joint Field Office (JFO)] to
engage in the following activities:
• Facilitate coordination between
communications infrastructure
providers and state and local emergency
preparedness officials;
• Develop credentialing requirements
and procedures for the purposes of
allocating communications
infrastructure providers (and their
contractors and security teams) into
disaster areas to perform repairs;
• Develop and facilitate inclusion in
the state’s Emergency Preparedness
Plan, where appropriate, one or more
clearly identified post-disaster
coordination areas for communications
infrastructure providers;
• Share information and coordinate
resources to facilitate repair of key
communications infrastructure; and
• Facilitate electric and other
utilities’ maintenance of priority lists for
commercial power restoration.
We seek comment on these
recommendations and on other
measures the Commission could take
within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction to encourage other Federal
agencies, state and local authorities, and
the private sector to address the
Independent Panel’s recommendations
in this regard.
13. In addition to recommending the
Commission encourage other
governmental bodies to engage in these
activities, the Independent Panel notes
its support for communications
infrastructure providers forming an
industry-only group for disaster
planning, coordinating recovery efforts,
and other purposes. The Independent
Panel also recommends that the
Commission work with the National
Communications System, an
organization within the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), to broaden
the membership of the National
Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications (NCC) to include
representation of all types of
communications systems, including
broadcast, cable, satellite, and other new
technologies. We seek comment on
these recommendations, including how
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the Commission can work within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction to
promote greater membership in the
DHS’s National Communications
System coordination body. We seek
comment on how the Commission could
best work within its own jurisdiction
and statutory authority to assist in
promoting extensive, crossjurisdictional coordination. We also
seek comment generally on how we can
better facilitate coordination during
times of crisis.
14. The Independent Panel also
recommended that the Commission
work with the DHS’s National
Communications System to promote the
use of existing priority communications
services, such as Government
Emergency Telecommunications Service
(GETS), Wireless Priority Service (WPS),
and Telecommunications Service
Priority (TSP). In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with the DHS’s
National Communications System to
promote WPS, GETS and TSP to all
eligible government, public safety, and
critical industry groups. We seek
comment on how the Commission can
address these recommendations within
its statutory authority and jurisdiction.
Finally, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission create
two Web sites identifying: (1) The key
state emergency management contacts
and post-disaster staging areas for
communications providers; and (2)
contact information for the
Commission’s Task Force that
coordinates disaster response efforts and
procedures for facilitating disaster
response and outage recovery. We seek
comment on these recommendations.
15. First Responder Communications.
The Independent Panel made several
recommendations intended to facilitate
the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities. As with
other recommendations, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission encourage state and local
authorities to take actions, and to assist
in supporting these efforts consistent
with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. For example, the
Independent Panel recommended that
the Commission encourage state and
local jurisdictions to retain and
maintain a cache of equipment
components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public
safety communications within hours of
a disaster. Such a cache of prepositioned equipment would include
Radiofrequency (RF) gear (e.g., Internet
Protocol (IP) gateways, dispatch
consoles, etc), trailers, tower system
components (e.g., antenna systems and
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hydraulic masts), back-up power
equipment, and fuel. We seek comment
on these recommendations. We invite
parties to comment on the capabilities
and content of pre-positioned
equipment, as well as the functionalities
most critical to support in the early
stages of a crisis. The Independent Panel
Report also includes recommendations
intended to facilitate interoperability
among first responder communications,
including a recommendation that the
Commission encourage the expeditious
development of regional plans for the
use of 700 MHz systems and move
promptly to review and approve such
plans. The Commission seeks comment
on these recommendations, including
how they should be implemented
within our statutory authority and
jurisdiction.
16. The Independent Panel also made
recommendations intended to ensure a
more robust 911 and E911 service. For
example, the panel recommends that the
Commission encourage the
implementation of certain NRIC best
practices intended to promote the
reliability and resiliency of the 911 and
E911 architecture. In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that
service providers and network operators
should consider placing and
maintaining 911 circuits over diverse
interoffice transport facilities and
should ensure availability of emergency
back-up power capabilities (located onsite, when appropriate). The
Independent Panel further recommends
that network operators should consider
deploying dual active 911 selective
router architectures as a means for
eliminating single points of failure. The
Independent Panel also recommends
that network operators, service
providers, equipment suppliers, and
public safety authorities should
establish alternative methods of
communication for critical personnel.
We seek comment on how the
Commission can best encourage
implementation of these
recommendations consistent with our
statutory authority and jurisdiction, and
we welcome further suggestions on
measures that could be taken to
strengthen 911 and E911 infrastructure
and architecture.
17. With respect to Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends the
designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away
to answer calls when the primary and
secondary PSAPs are disabled. The
Independent Panel also recommends
that the Commission work with other
Federal agencies to enhance funding for
911 enhancement and interoperability.
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The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission work to assist the
emergency medical community to
facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness
of their emergency communications
system. The Independent Panel report
includes four recommendations
regarding the emergency medical
community, stating that the Commission
should, inter alia, educate the
emergency medical community about
emergency communications and the
various priority communications
services and help to coordinate this
sector’s emergency communications
efforts. We seek comment on how to
address these recommendations
consistent with our statutory authority
and jurisdiction. We also invite
comment on what additional steps the
Commission can take within its
statutory authority to assist the
emergency medical community enhance
its disaster response capabilities.
18. Emergency Communications to
the Public. The Independent Panel
report also includes recommendations
intended to facilitate and complement
use of the Emergency Alert System
(EAS), including recommendations that
the Commission educate state and local
officials about the existing EAS, its
benefits, and how it can be utilized.
Further, the report recommends that the
Commission develop a program for
educating the public about EAS and
promote community awareness of
potential mechanisms for accessing
those alerts sent during power outages
or broadcast transmission failures. In
order to ensure that all Americans,
including persons with disabilities and
persons who do not speak English, are
able to receive emergency
communications, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission: (1)
Promptly find a mechanism to resolve
any technical hurdles in the current
EAS to ensure that persons with hearing
or vision disabilities and persons who
do not speak English have equal access
to public warnings; (2) work with the
various industry trade associations to
create and publicize best practices for
serving persons with disabilities and
persons who do not speak English; and
(3) encourage state and local
government agencies who provide
emergency information to take steps to
make critical emergency information
accessible to persons with disabilities
and persons who do not speak English.
We seek comment on how to address
these recommendations consistent with
our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
With respect to item (1), we note that
the issue is the subject of the
Commission’s ongoing EAS rulemaking
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proceeding, and we expect to address
these and related issues in that
proceeding.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
19. As required by the Regulatory
Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
(RFA), the Commission has prepared
this present Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the
possible significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities by
the policies and rules proposed in this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). Written public comments are
requested on this IRFA. Comments must
be identified as responses to the IRFA
and must be filed by the deadlines for
comments on the NPRM provided in
section IV of the item. The Commission
will send a copy of the NPRM,
including this IRFA, to the Chief
Counsel for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration (SBA). In
addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or
summaries thereof) will be published in
the Federal Register.
Need for, and Objectives of, the
Proposed Rules
20. On Monday, August 29, 2005,
Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast
of the United States, causing significant
damage in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The destruction to
communications companies’ facilities in
the region, and therefore to the services
upon which citizens rely, was
extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina
knocked out more than three million
customer phone lines in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The
wireline telecommunications network
sustained enormous damage—dozens of
central offices and countless miles of
outside plants were damaged or
destroyed as a result of the hurricane or
the subsequent flooding. Local wireless
networks also sustained considerable
damage—more than a thousand cell
sites were knocked out of service by the
hurricane. At the hurricane’s height,
more than thirty-five Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of
service, and some parishes in Louisiana
remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
21. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin
J. Martin established the Independent
Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory
Committee Act, Public Law 92–463, as
amended. The mission of the
Independent Panel was to review the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
telecommunications and media
infrastructure in the areas affected by
the hurricane. Specifically, the
Independent Panel was to study the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on all
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sectors of the telecommunications and
media industries, including public
safety communications. In addition, the
Independent Panel was to review the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery effort with respect to the
communications infrastructure. The
Independent Panel was tasked with
making recommendations to the
Commission, by June 15, 2006,
regarding ways to improve disaster
preparedness, network reliability, and
communications among first responders
such as police, fire fighters, and
emergency medical personnel.
22. On June 12, 2006, the Independent
Panel submitted its Report and
Recommendations. As explained in the
NPRM, Congress has charged the
Commission with promoting the safety
of life and property through the use of
wire and radio communications. In this
regard, we have already taken a number
of steps to fulfill this mandate and we
will continue to do so. The Independent
Panel’s report described the impact of
the worst natural disaster in the
Nation’s history as well as the overall
public and private response and
recovery efforts. Our goal in this
proceeding is to take the lessons learned
from this disaster and build upon them
to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts, as well as
heightened readiness and preparedness,
in the future. To accomplish this goal,
we invite comment on what actions the
Commission can take to address the
Independent Panel’s recommendations.
23. As we note in the NPRM, in some
cases, the Independent Panel
recommends action that require the
Commission to modify its rules
pursuant to notice-and-comment
rulemaking. In other cases, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission take actions that are not
dependent upon rulemakings, such as
increased outreach and education
campaigns, or recommends measures
that may not fall within the
Commission’s statutory authority and
jurisdiction. In advocating
implementation of the Independent
Panel’s recommendations, commenters
should note what actions would fall
within the Commission’s statutory
authority and jurisdiction and what the
Commission could do to encourage the
appropriate entities (e.g., states and
local authorities) to take action.
24. To speed response efforts, the
Independent Panel recommends that
adoption of a proactive (rather than
reactive) program for network reliability
and resiliency. Specifically, the
Independent Panel recommends
working with industry sectors,
associations and other organizations to
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establish a ‘‘Readiness Checklist’’ for the
communications industry that would
include developing formal business
continuity plans, conducting training
exercises, developing suitable plans and
procedures, and maintaining prepositioned supplies and equipment to
help in disaster response. The NPRM
seeks comment on these
recommendations. The Independent
Panel also recommends that we rely on
checklists developed by industry
consensus groups, such as the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council
(NRIC) and the Media Security and
Reliability Council (MSRC). The NPRM
seeks comment on this
recommendation, including whether we
should rely on the results of voluntary
consensus recommendations or instead
rely on other measures. The NPRM also
seeks comment on whether we should
adopt guidance or criteria for
developing business continuity plans,
conducting exercises, developing and
practicing communications plans, or
routinely archiving critical system backups for secure off-site facilities.
25. The Independent Panel also
recommends enhancing the public
safety community’s awareness of nontraditional emergency alternatives
through community education
campaigns. The NPRM seeks comment
on this recommendation and other steps
we can take within our jurisdiction and
statutory authority to assist the public
safety community in responding to
disasters and other emergencies. The
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission establish a prioritized
system of automatically waiving
regulatory requirements, or of granting
automatic Special Temporary Authority
(STA) in certain instances, and provides
a list of specific Commission
requirements. The NPRM seeks
comment on this suggestion. The NPRM
also seeks comment on the Independent
Panel’s recommendation that the
Commission coordinate all federal
outage and infrastructure reporting
requirements in times of crisis. In
addition, the NPRM seeks comment on
other steps beyond those recommended
by the Panel that the Commission could
take within our statutory authority and
jurisdiction to improve or strengthen
network resiliency and reliability.
26. As discussed in the NPRM, the
Independent Panel generally supports
the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory
Committee’s (NSTAC’s)
recommendation for a national standard
for credentialing telecommunications
repair workers. The Independent Panel,
however, advocates expanding the
NSTAC recommendations to include
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repair workers of all communications
infrastructure. The Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work
with other appropriate Federal
departments and government agencies
to promptly develop national
credentialing requirements and
guidelines to enable communications
infrastructure providers and their
contracted workers to access affected
areas post-disaster. The Independent
Panel also recommends that the
Commission encourage states to develop
and implement a credentialing program
consistent with the NSTAC guidelines.
The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations as well as measures
the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction.
27. The NPRM seeks comment on the
Independent Panel’s recommendation
that the Commission work with
Congress and appropriate federal
departments and agencies to implement
the NSTAC’s recommendation that
telecommunications infrastructure
providers should be afforded emergency
responder status under the Stafford Act
and that this designation should be
incorporated into the National Response
Plan and state and local emergency
response plans. With respect to this
proposal, the Independent Panel also
recommends that the emergency
responder designation include all types
of communications services.
28. In order to enable the
communications industry and state and
local emergency officials to better
coordinate their preparation for and
response to disasters affecting
communications infrastructure, the
Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with state and local
emergency officials and the
communications industry to encourage
the formation of coordinating and
planning bodies at the state or regional
level. As set forth in the NPRM, the
Panel’s recommendation also lists
activities that the Commission should
encourage each state or regional
coordinating body to engage in. The
NPRM seeks comment on this
recommendation and on the measures
the Commission could take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction to
encourage other Federal agencies, state
and local authorities and the private
sector to address the Independent
Panel’s recommendations in this regard.
29. The Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work
with the National Communications
System (NCS) to broaden the
membership of the National
Coordinating Center for
Telecommunications to include
representation from all types of
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communications systems, including
broadcast, cable, satellite, and other new
technologies. The NPRM seeks comment
on this recommendation, including how
the Commission can work within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction to
promote greater membership in the
DHS’s National Communications
System coordination body.
30. The NPRM seeks comment on
several recommendations designed to
facilitate the use of existing priority
communications services, such as
Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS),
Wireless Priority Service (WPS) and
Telecommunications Service Priority
(TSP), all of which are administered by
DHS’s National Communications
System. In addition, the NPRM seeks
comment on the Independent Panel’s
recommendation that the Commission
create two Web sites identifying: (1) The
key state emergency management
contacts and post disaster staging areas
for communications providers; and (2)
contact information for the
Commission’s Task Force that
coordinates disaster response efforts and
procedures for facilitating disaster
response and outage recovery.
31. In the NPRM, the Commission
seeks comment on several
recommendations intended to facilitate
the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities. For
example, it seeks comment on the
Panel’s recommendation that the
Commission encourage state and local
jurisdictions to retain and maintain a
cache of equipment components that
would be needed to immediately restore
existing public safety communications
within hours of a disaster. The NPRM
also seeks comment on a number of
recommendations intended to facilitate
interoperability among first responder
communications, including a
recommendation that the Commission
encourage the expeditious development
of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz
systems and move promptly to review
and approve such plans.
32. Regarding 911 and E911 service,
the Independent Panel recommends that
the Commission encourage the
implementation of certain NRIC best
practices intended to promote the
reliability and resiliency of the 911 and
E911 architecture. The Panel
recommends that: (1) Service providers
and network operators consider placing
and maintaining 911 circuits over
diverse interoffice transport facilities
and should ensure availability of
emergency back-up power capabilities
(located on-site, when appropriate); (2)
network operators consider deploying
dual service 911 selective router
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architectures as a means for eliminating
single points of failure; and (3) network
operators, service providers, equipment
suppliers, and public safety authorities
establish alternative methods of
communication for critical personnel.
The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations.
33. With respect to Public Safety
Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends (1) the
designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away
to answer calls when the primary and
secondary PSAPs are disabled; (2) that
the Commission work with other federal
agencies to enhance funding for 911
enhancement and interoperability; and
(3) that the Commission work to assist
the emergency medical community to
facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness
of their emergency communications
system. The NPRM seeks comment on
these recommendations. In addition, the
Independent Panel’s Report and
Recommendations includes four
recommendations regarding the
emergency medical community, stating
that the Commission should, inter alia,
educate the emergency medical
community about emergency
communications and the various
priority communications services and
help to coordinate this sector’s
emergency communications efforts. The
NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations.
34. Finally, the NPRM seeks comment
on the Independent Panel’s
recommendations that the Commission:
(1) Work with various industry trade
associations to create and publicize best
practices for serving persons with
disabilities and persons who do not
speak English; and (2) encourage state
and local government agencies to
provide emergency information to take
steps to make critical emergency
information accessible to persons with
disabilities and persons who do not
speak English.
Legal Basis
35. Authority for the actions proposed
in this NPRM may be found in sections
1, 4(i), 4(o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 706 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, (Act) 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i),
154(o), 303(r), 403 and 606.
Description and Estimate of the Number
of Small Entities to Which Rules Will
Apply
36. The RFA directs agencies to
provide a description of, and, where
feasible, an estimate of, the number of
small entities that may be affected by
the rules adopted herein. The RFA
generally defines the term ‘‘small
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entity’’ as having the same meaning as
the terms ‘‘small business,’’ ‘‘small
organization,’’ and ‘‘small governmental
jurisdiction.’’ In addition, the term
‘‘small business’’ has the same meaning
as the term ‘‘small business concern’’
under the Small Business Act. A ‘‘small
business concern’’ is one which: (1) Is
independently owned and operated; (2)
is not dominant in its field of operation;
and (3) satisfies any additional criteria
established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
37. Nationwide, there are a total of
approximately 22.4 million small
businesses, according to SBA data. A
‘‘small organization’’ is generally ‘‘any
not-for-profit enterprise which is
independently owned and operated and
is not dominant in its field.’’
Nationwide, as of 2002, there were
approximately 1.6 million small
organizations. The term ‘‘small
governmental jurisdiction’’ is defined
generally as ‘‘governments of cities,
towns, townships, villages, school
districts, or special districts, with a
population of less than fifty thousand.’’
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate
that there were 87,525 local
governmental jurisdictions in the
United States. We estimate that, of this
total, 84,377 entities were ‘‘small
governmental jurisdictions.’’ Thus, we
estimate that most governmental
jurisdictions are small.
38. Television Broadcasting. The SBA
has developed a small business sized
standard for television broadcasting,
which consists of all such firms having
$13 million or less in annual receipts.
Business concerns included in this
industry are those ‘‘primarily engaged in
broadcasting images together with
sound.’’ According to Commission staff
review of the BIA Publications, Inc.
Master Access Television Analyzer
Database (BIA) on October 18, 2005,
about 873 of the 1,307 commercial
television stations (or about 67 percent)
have revenues of $12 million or less and
thus quality as small entities under the
SBA definition. We note, however, that,
in assessing whether a business concern
qualifies as small under the above
definition, business (control) affiliations
must be included. Our estimate,
therefore, likely overstates the number
of small entities that might be affected
by our action, because the revenue
figure on which it is based does not
include or aggregate revenues from
affiliated companies. There are also
2,127 low power television stations
(LPTV). Given the nature of this service,
we will presume that all LPTV licensees
qualify as small entities under the SBA
size standard.
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39. Radio Stations. The proposed
rules and policies potentially will apply
to all AM and commercial FM radio
broadcasting licensees and potential
licensees. The SBA defines a radio
broadcasting station that has $6.5
million or less in annual receipts as a
small business. A radio broadcasting
station is an establishment primarily
engaged in broadcasting aural programs
by radio to the public. Included in this
industry are commercial, religious,
educational, and other radio stations.
Radio broadcasting stations which
primarily are engaged in radio
broadcasting and which produce radio
program materials are similarly
included. However, radio stations that
are separate establishments and are
primarily engaged in producing radio
program material are classified under
another NAICS number. According to
Commission staff review of BIA
Publications, Inc. Master Access Radio
Analyzer Database on March 31, 2005,
about 10,840 (95%) of 11,410
commercial radio stations have revenue
of $6 million or less. We note, however,
that many radio stations are affiliated
with much larger corporations having
much higher revenue. Our estimate,
therefore, likely overstates the number
of small entities that might be affected
by our action.
40. Cable and Other Program
Distribution. The Census Bureau defines
this category as follows: ‘‘This industry
comprises establishments primarily
engaged as third-party distribution
systems for broadcast programming. The
establishments of this industry deliver
visual, aural, or textual programming
received from cable networks, local
television stations, or radio networks to
consumers via cable or direct-to-home
satellite systems on a subscription or fee
basis. These establishments do not
generally originate programming
material.’’ The SBA has developed a
small business size standard for Cable
and Other Program Distribution, which
is: all such firms having $13.5 million
or less in annual receipts. According to
Census Bureau data for 2002, there were
a total of 1,191 firms in this category
that operated for the entire year. Of this
total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of
under $10 million, and 43 firms had
receipts of $10 million or more but less
than $25 million. Thus, under this size
standard, the majority of firms can be
considered small.
41. Cable Companies and Systems.
The Commission has also developed its
own small business size standards, for
the purpose of cable rate regulation.
Under the Commission’s rules, a ‘‘small
cable company’’ is one serving 400,000
or fewer subscribers, nationwide.
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Industry data indicate that, of 1,076
cable operators nationwide, all but
eleven are small under this size
standard. In addition, under the
Commission’s rules, a ‘‘small system’’ is
a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
subscribers. Industry data indicate that,
of 7,208 systems nationwide, 6,139
systems have under 10,000 subscribers,
and an additional 379 systems have
10,000–19,999 subscribers. Thus, under
this second size standard, most cable
systems are small.
42. Cable System Operators. The
Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, also contains a size standard
for small cable system operators, which
is ‘‘a cable operator that, directly or
through an affiliate, serves in the
aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is
not affiliated with any entity or entities
whose gross annual revenues in the
aggregate exceed $250,000,000.’’ The
Commission has determined that an
operator serving fewer than 677,000
subscribers shall be deemed a small
operator, if its annual revenues, when
combined with the total annual
revenues of all its affiliates, do not
exceed $250 million in the aggregate.
Industry data indicate that, of 1,076
cable operators nationwide, all but ten
are small under this size standard. We
note that the Commission neither
requests nor collects information on
whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross
annual revenues exceed $250 million,
and therefore we are unable to estimate
more accurately the number of cable
system operators that would qualify as
small under this size standard.
43. Multipoint Distribution Systems.
The established rules apply to
Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS)
operated as part of a wireless cable
system. The Commission has defined
‘‘small entity’’ for purposes of the
auction of MDS frequencies as an entity
that, together with its affiliates, has
average gross annual revenues that are
not more than $40 million for the
preceding three calendar years. This
definition of small entity in the context
of MDS auctions has been approved by
the SBA. The Commission completed its
MDS auction in March 1996 for
authorizations in 493 basic trading
areas. Of 67 winning bidders, 61
qualified as small entities. At this time,
we estimate that of the 61 small
business MDS auction winners, 48
remain small business licensees.
44. MDS also includes licensees of
stations authorized prior to the auction.
As noted above, the SBA has developed
a definition of small entities for pay
television services, cable and other
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subscription programming, which
includes all such companies generating
$13.5 million or less in annual receipts.
This definition includes MDS and thus
applies to MDS licensees that did not
participate in the MDS auction.
Information available to us indicates
that there are approximately 392
incumbent MDS licensees that do not
generate revenue in excess of $11
million annually. Therefore, we
estimate that there are at least 440 (392
pre-auction plus 48 auction licensees)
small MDS providers as defined by the
SBA and the Commission’s auction
rules which may be affected by the rules
adopted herein.
45. Instructional Television Fixed
Service. The established rules would
also apply to Instructional Television
Fixed Service (ITFS) facilities operated
as part of a wireless cable system. The
SBA definition of small entities for pay
television services also appears to apply
to ITFS. There are presently 2,032 ITFS
licensees. All but 100 of these licenses
are held by educational institutions.
Educational institutions are included in
the definition of a small business.
However, we do not collect annual
revenue data for ITFS licensees, and are
not able to ascertain how many of the
100 non-educational licensees would be
categorized as small under the SBA
definition. Thus, we tentatively
conclude that at least 1,932 are small
businesses and may be affected by the
established rules.
46. Wireless Service Providers. The
SBA has developed a small business
size standard for wireless small
businesses within the two separate
categories of Paging and Cellular and
Other Wireless Telecommunications.
Under both SBA categories, a wireless
business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
employees. According to Commission
data, 1,012 companies reported that
they were engaged in the provision of
wireless service. Of these 1,012
companies, an estimated 829 have 1,500
or fewer employees and 183 have more
than 1,500 employees. This SBA size
standard also applies to wireless
telephony. Wireless telephony includes
cellular, personal communications
services, and specialized mobile radio
telephony carriers. According to the
data, 437 carriers reported that they
were engaged in the provision of
wireless telephony. We have estimated
that 260 of these are small businesses
under the SBA small business size
standard.
47. Broadband Personal
Communications Service. The
broadband personal communications
services (PCS) spectrum is divided into
six frequency blocks designated A
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through F, and the Commission has held
auctions for each block. The
Commission has created a small
business size standard for Blocks C and
F as an entity that has average gross
revenues of less than $40 million in the
three previous calendar years. For Block
F, an additional small business size
standard for ‘‘very small business’’ was
added and is defined as an entity that,
together with its affiliates, has average
gross revenues of not more than $15
million for the preceding three calendar
years. These small business size
standards, in the context of broadband
PCS auctions, have been approved by
the SBA. No small businesses within the
SBA-approved small business size
standards bid successfully for licenses
in Blocks A and B. There were 90
winning bidders that qualified as small
entities in the Block C auctions. A total
of 93 ‘‘small’’ and ‘‘very small’’ business
bidders won approximately 40 percent
of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and
F. On March 23, 1999, the Commission
reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F Block
licenses; there were 113 small business
winning bidders. On January 26, 2001,
the Commission completed the auction
of 422 C and F Broadband PCS licenses
in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning
bidders in this auction, 29 qualified as
‘‘small’’ or ‘‘very small’’ businesses.
Subsequent events, concerning Auction
35, including judicial and agency
determinations, resulted in a total of 163
C and F Block licenses being available
for grant.
48. Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers (Incumbent LECs). We have
included small incumbent local
exchange carriers in this present IRFA
analysis. As noted above, a ‘‘small
business’’ under the RFA is one that,
inter alia, meets the pertinent small
business size standard (e.g., a telephone
communications business having 1,500
or fewer employees), and ‘‘is not
dominant in its field of operation.’’ The
SBA’s Office of Advocacy contends that,
for RFA purposes, small incumbent
LECs are not dominant in their field of
operation because any such dominance
is not ‘‘national’’ in scope. We have
therefore included small incumbent
local exchange carriers in this RFA
analysis, although we emphasize that
this RFA action has no effect on
Commission analyses and
determinations in other, non-RFA
contexts. Neither the Commission nor
the SBA has developed a small business
size standard specifically for incumbent
local exchange services. The appropriate
size standard under SBA rules is for the
category Wired Telecommunications
Carriers. Under that size standard, such
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a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. According to
Commission data, 1,303 carriers have
reported that they are engaged in the
provision of incumbent local exchange
services. Of these 1,303 carriers, an
estimated 1,020 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 283 have more than
1,500 employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that most
providers of incumbent local exchange
service are small businesses that may be
affected by our proposed rules.
49. Competitive Local Exchange
Carriers (Competitive LECs),
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs),
‘‘Shared-Tenant Service Providers,’’ and
‘‘Other Local Service Providers.’’
Neither the Commission nor the SBA
has developed a small business size
standard specifically for these service
providers. The appropriate size standard
under SBA rules is for the category
Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
Under that size standard, such a
business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
employees. According to Commission
data, 769 carriers have reported that
they are engaged in the provision of
either competitive access provider
services or competitive local exchange
carrier services. Of these 769 carriers, an
estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 93 have more than 1,500
employees. In addition, 12 carriers have
reported that they are ‘‘Shared-Tenant
Service Providers,’’ and all 12 are
estimated to have 1.500 or fewer
employees. In addition, 39 carriers have
reported that they are ‘‘Other Local
Service Providers.’’ Of the 39, an
estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and one has more than 1,500
employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that most
providers of competitive local exchange
service, competitive access providers,
‘‘Shared-Tenant Service Providers,’’ and
‘‘Other Local Service Providers’’ are
small entities that may be affected by
our proposed rules.
50. Satellite Telecommunications and
Other Telecommunications. There is no
small business size standard developed
specifically for providers of satellite
service. The appropriate size standards
under SBA rules are for the two broad
census categories of ‘‘Satellite
Telecommunications’’ and ‘‘Other
Telecommunications.’’ Under both
categories, such a business is small if it
has $13.5 million or less in average
annual receipts.
51. The first category of Satellite
Telecommunications ‘‘comprises
establishments primarily engaged in
providing point-to-point
telecommunications services to other
establishments in the
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telecommunications and broadcasting
industries by forwarding and receiving
communications signals via a system of
satellites or reselling satellite
telecommunications.’’ For this category,
Census Bureau data for 2002 show that
there were a total of 371 firms that
operated for the entire year. Of this
total, 307 firms had annual receipts of
under $10 million, and 26 firms had
receipts of $10 million to $24,999,999.
Consequently, we estimate that the
majority of Satellite
Telecommunications firms are small
entities that might be affected by our
action.
Description of Projected Reporting,
Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
52. This NPRM contains proposals
that may result in specific reporting or
recordkeeping requirements. The NPRM
seeks comment on the Independent
Panel’s recommendation that the
Commission coordinate all federal
outage and infrastructure reporting
requirements in times of crisis.
Specifically, the NPRM seeks comment
on the appropriate content of emergency
outage reports, format, frequency,
distribution and related issues. The
NPRM requests suggestions on the
appropriate content of emergency
outage reports, format, frequency,
distribution and related issues. The
NPRM also seeks comment on the
Independent Panel’s recommendation
that the Commission establish a
‘‘Readiness Checklist’’ for the
communications industry that would
include, inter alia, developing formal
business continuity plans. The NPRM
requests comment on the appropriate
breadth of business continuity plans as
well as whether the Commission should
adopt guidance or criteria for the
elements that would comprise the
Readiness Checklist.
Steps Taken To Minimize the
Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives
Considered
53. The RFA requires an agency to
describe any significant alternatives that
it has considered in developing its
approach, which may include the
following four alternatives (among
others): ‘‘(1) the establishment of
differing compliance or reporting
requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification,
consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements
under the rule for such small entities;
(3) the use of performance rather than
design standards; and (4) an exemption
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from coverage of the rule, or any part
thereof, for such small entities.’’ We
invite comment on whether small
entities should be subject to different
requirements if we adopt rules to
promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts, and
whether differentiating such
requirements based on the size of the
entities is warranted. For example,
should there be timing differences for
requirements imposed on small entities?
Should small entities be subject to
different continuity of operations
requirements?
Federal Rules That May Duplicate,
Overlap, or Conflict With the Proposed
Rules
54. None.
Ex Parte Rules
These matters shall be treated as a
‘‘permit-but-disclose’’ proceeding in
accordance with the Commission’s ex
parte rules. Persons making oral ex parte
presentations are reminded that
memoranda summarizing the
presentations must contain summaries
of the substance of the presentations
and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two
sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally
required. Other requirements pertaining
to oral and written presentations are set
forth in § 1.1206(b) of the Commission’s
rules.
Ordering Clauses
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
55. It is ordered, that pursuant to
sections 1, 4(i) and (o), 201, 303(r), 403,
and 706 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i)
and (o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 606, this
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Is
hereby Adopted.
56. It is further ordered that the
Commission’s Consumer and
Government Affairs Bureau, Reference
Information Center, Shall Send a copy
of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
including the Initial Regulatory
Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief
Council for Advocacy of the Small
Business Administration.
Federal Communications Commission.
William F. Caton,
Deputy Secretary.
Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks
Report and Recommendations to the
Federal Communications Commission
June 12, 2006.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
INTRODUCTION
I. Panel Formation and Charge
II. Process and Activities of the Panel
PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING THE
IMPACT OF HURRICANE KATRINA ON
THE COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND
THE SUFFICIENCY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOVERY
EFFORT
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on Various
Types of Communications Networks
B. Major Problems Identified Following
Katrina
II. Recovery Coordination and Procedures
A. Access to the Affected Area and Key
Resources
B. Coordination Between Industry and
Government
C. Emergency Communications Services
and Programs
III. First Responder Communications
A. Lack of Advanced Planning for Massive
System Failures
B. Lack of Interoperability
C. PSAP Rerouting
D. Emergency Medical Communications
IV. Emergency Communications to the Public
A. Lack of Activation
B. Limitations on Coverage
C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities and
Non-English Speaking Americans
D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency
Information
RECOMMENDATIONS
CONCLUSION
APPENDIX A: Members of the Independent
Panel
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (‘‘Katrina
Panel’’ or ‘‘Panel’’) hereby submits its
report to the Federal Communications
Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FCC’’).
The Panel is charged with studying the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
telecommunications and media
infrastructure in the areas affected by
the hurricane and making
recommendations for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first
responders.
FINDINGS
Hurricane Katrina had a devastating
impact on the Gulf Coast region,
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including its communications networks.
The sheer force of this deadly hurricane
and the extensive flooding from the
breached levees in New Orleans
severely tested the reliability and
resiliency of the communications
infrastructure in the area. Indeed, every
sector of the communications industry
was impacted by the storm. The Panel
observed that most of the region’s
communications infrastructure fared
fairly well through the storm’s extreme
wind and rain, with the coastal areas
suffering the worst damage. However,
the unique conditions in Katrina’s
aftermath—substantial flooding,
widespread, extended power outages,
and serious security issues—were
responsible for damaging or disrupting
communications service to a huge
geographic area for a prolonged period
of time. Indeed, in reviewing the impact
on each communications sector, there
appeared to be three main problems that
caused the majority of communications
network interruptions: (1) flooding; (2)
lack of power and/or fuel; and (3) failure
of redundant pathways for
communications traffic. In addition, a
fourth item—inadvertent line cuts
during restoration—resulted in
additional network damage, causing
new outages or delaying service
restoration.
The Panel also observed significant
impediments to the recovery effort
resulting from:
• Inconsistent and unclear
requirements for communications
infrastructure repair crews and their
subcontractors to gain access to the
affected area;
• Limited access to power and/or
generator fuel;
• Limited security for
communications infrastructure and
personnel;
• Lack of pre-positioned back-up
equipment;
• Lack of established coordination
between the communications industry
and state and local officials as well as
among federal, state and local
government officials with respect to
communications matters; and
• Limited use of available priority
communications services, such as
GETS, WPS and TSP.
On a more positive note, in the wake
of the storm, lines of communication
between the communications industry
and the federal government were
established and seemed generally
effective in facilitating coordination,
promptly granting needed regulatory
relief, and gathering outage information.
The FCC was widely praised as playing
a critical role in helping to restore
communications connectivity. In
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addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of
fuel and equipment among
communications industry participants
helped to maximize the assets available
and bolster the recovery effort.
However, additional coordination of
personnel and assets within industry
and among government agencies could
have substantially facilitated restoration
of communications networks.
With respect to emergency
communications, Hurricane Katrina
significantly hampered the functionality
of these typically resilient systems. The
areas in and around New Orleans were
seriously impacted, due to heavier
storm impact and the levee flooding. As
a result, more than 2,000 police, fire and
emergency medical service personnel
were forced to communicate in single
channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing
only three mutual aid frequencies. This
level of destruction did not extend to
inland areas, which generally did not
lose their communications capabilities
and were soon operating at pre-Katrina
capabilities. In the hardest hit areas,
however, the disruption of public safety
communications operability, as well as
a lack of interoperability, frustrated the
response effort and caused tremendous
confusion among official personnel and
the general public.
The Panel observed that lack of
effective first responder
communications after the storm
revealed inadequate planning,
coordination and training on the use of
technologies that can help to restore
emergency communications. Very few
public safety agencies had stockpiles of
key equipment on hand to implement
rapid repairs or alternative, redundant
systems to turn to when their primary
systems failed. To the extent alternative
systems were available, lack of training
and familiarity with the equipment
limited functionality and impeded the
recovery effort. Communications assets
that could have been used to fill gaps
were apparently not requested or
deployed in sufficient quantities to have
a significant impact. Hurricane Katrina
also highlighted the long-standing
problem of interoperability among
public safety communications systems
operating in different frequency bands
and with different technical standards.
Additionally, 911 emergency call
handling suffered from a lack of
preprogrammed routing of calls to
PSAPs not incapacitated by the
hurricane. Finally, the emergency
medical community seemed lacking in
contingency communications planning
and information about technologies and
services that might address their critical
communications needs.
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The use of communications networks
to disseminate reliable emergency
information to the public is critical—
before, during and after such events.
While the Panel understands that the
National Weather Service used the
Emergency Alert System (‘‘EAS’’) to
provide severe weather warnings to
citizens in the Gulf States in advance of
Katrina making landfall, the system was
apparently not utilized by state and
local officials to provide localized
emergency evacuation and other
important information. In the absence of
EAS activation, inconsistent or
erroneous information was sometimes
provided within the affected area.
Further, the Panel heard about
notification technologies that may
permit emergency messages to be sent to
wireline and wireless telephones as well
as personal digital assistants and other
mobile devices, thus complementing the
traditional broadcast-based EAS.
Ensuring emergency communications
reach Americans with hearing or visual
disabilities or who do not speak English
was a major challenge. Although the
broadcast industry has taken significant
steps to provide on-screen sign language
interpreters, closed captioning, and
critical information in a second
language, these steps were reported to
be insufficient in certain instances.
Shelters also generally did not have
communications capabilities for those
with hearing or speech disabilities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon its observations regarding
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on
communications networks and the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery effort, the Panel has developed
a number of recommendations to the
FCC for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first
responders. These recommendations fall
within four basic areas:
fl Pre-positioning the
communications industry and the
government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and
resiliency. These recommendations
include:
• Pre-positioning for the
Communications Industry—A Readiness
Checklist. The FCC should work with
and encourage each industry sector,
through their organizations or
associations, to develop and publicize
sector-specific readiness
recommendations.
• Pre-positioning for Public Safety—
An Awareness Program for NonTraditional Emergency Alternatives.
The FCC should take steps to educate
the public safety community about the
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availability and capabilities of nontraditional technologies that might
provide effective back-up solutions for
existing public safety communications
systems.
• Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory
Requirements—An A Priori Program for
Disaster Areas. The FCC should explore
amending its rules to permit automatic
grants of certain types of waivers or
special temporary authority (STA) in a
particular geographic area if the
President declares that area to be a
‘‘disaster area’’.
• Pre-positioning for Government
Outage Monitoring—A Single
Repository and Contact with Consistent
Data Collection. The FCC should
coordinate with other federal and state
agencies to identify a single repository/
point of contact for communications
outage information in the wake of an
emergency. The Panel suggests that the
FCC is the Federal agency best situated
to perform this function.
fl Improving recovery coordination
to address existing shortcomings and to
maximize the use of existing resources.
These recommendations include:
• Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—National Credentialing
Guidelines for Communications
Infrastructure Providers. The FCC
should work with other appropriate
federal departments and agencies and
the communications industry to
promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and process guidelines for
enabling communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers
access to the affected area post-disaster.
• Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—Emergency Responder
Status for Communications
Infrastructure Providers. The Panel
supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory
Committee’s (‘‘NSTAC’s’’)
recommendation that
telecommunications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers
be afforded emergency responder status
under the Stafford Act, but recommends
that it be broadened to include all
communications infrastructure
providers.
• Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—Utilization of State/
Regional Coordination Bodies. The FCC
should work with state and local
government and the communications
industry (including wireline, wireless,
WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting)
to better utilize the coordinating
capabilities at regional, state and local
Emergency Operations Centers, as well
as the Joint Field Office.
• Maximizing Existing Resources—
Expanding and Publicizing Emergency
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Communications Programs (GETS, WPS,
and TSP). The FCC should work with
the National Communications System
(‘‘NCS’’) to actively and aggressively
promote GETS, WPS and TSP to all
eligible government, public safety, and
critical industry groups.
• Maximizing Existing Resources—
Broadening NCC to Include All
Communications Infrastructure Sectors.
The FCC should work with the NCS to
broaden the membership of the National
Coordination Center for
Telecommunications (‘‘NCC’’) to
include adequate representation of all
types of communications systems,
including broadcast, cable, satellite and
other new technologies, as appropriate.
• Maximizing Existing Resources—
FCC Web site for Emergency
Coordination Information. The FCC
should create a password-protected Web
site, accessible by credentialed entities,
listing the key state emergency
management contacts, as well as postdisaster coordination areas for
communications providers.
• Maximizing Existing Resources—
FCC Web site for Emergency Response
Team Information. The FCC should
create a Web site to publicize the
agency’s emergency response team’s
contact information and procedures for
facilitating disaster response and outage
recovery.
fl Improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis.
These recommendations include:
• Essential Steps in Pre-positioning
Equipment, Supplies and Personnel—
An Emergency Restoration Supply
Cache and Alternatives Inventory. The
FCC should encourage state and local
jurisdictions to retain and maintain,
including through arrangements with
the private sector, a cache of equipment
components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public
safety communications. The FCC should
also work with the NCC to develop
inventories of alternative
communications assets.
• Essential Steps in Enabling
Emergency Communications
Capabilities—Facilitating First
Responder Interoperability. The FCC
should take several steps to facilitate
interoperability among first responder
communications, including maintaining
the schedule for commercial spectrum
auctions to fund the federal public
safety grant programs; working with the
National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (‘‘NTIA’’)
and the Department of Homeland
Security (‘‘DHS’’) to establish
appropriate criteria for these grants;
encouraging the expeditious
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development and approval of 700 MHz
regional plans; working with NTIA and
DHS to develop spectrum sharing
among federal, state and local agencies
for emergency response purposes; and
publicizing interoperability successes
and best practices.
• Essential Steps in Addressing E–
911 Lessons Learned—A Plan for
Resiliency and Restoration of E–911
Infrastructure and Public Safety
Answering Points (‘‘PSAPs’’). The FCC
should encourage implementation of
certain Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council (‘‘NRIC’’) best
practice recommendations to ensure
more robust E–911 service. In addition,
the FCC should recommend and take
steps to permit the designation of a
secondary back-up PSAP more than 200
miles away, as well as urge applicable
federal programs to expand eligibility
for 911 enhancement/interoperability
grants.
• Essential Steps in Addressing
Lessons Learned Concerning Emergency
Medical and Hospital Communications
Needs—An Outreach Program to
Educate and Include the Emergency
Medical Community in Emergency
Communications Preparedness. The
FCC should work to assist the
emergency medical community to
facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness
of their emergency communications
systems through education and
clarification of Stafford Act
classification and funding eligibility.
fl Improving communication of
emergency information to the public.
These recommendations include:
• Actions to Alert and Inform—
Revitalize and Publicize the
Underutilized Emergency Alert System.
The FCC should revitalize and publicize
the underutilized EAS through
education and the exploration of
complementary notification
technologies.
• Actions to Alert and Inform—
Commence Efforts to Ensure that
Persons with Disabilities and NonEnglish-Speaking Americans Receive
Meaningful Alerts. The FCC should
commence efforts to ensure that persons
with disabilities and non-Englishspeaking Americans receive meaningful
alerts, including resolving technical
hurdles to these individual’s utilization
of EAS, publicizing best practices for
serving these individuals, and
encouraging state and local emergency
agencies to make critical emergency
information accessible to persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans.
• Actions to Alert and Inform—
Ensure Consistent and Reliable
Emergency Information Through a
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Consolidated and Coordinated Public
Information Program. The FCC should
work with federal, state and local
agencies to ensure consistent and
reliable emergency information through
a consolidated and coordinated public
information program.
*
*
*
*
*
The Katrina Panel commends
Chairman Martin and the Commission
for their actions to assist industry and
first responders before, during and after
Hurricane Katrina and for forming this
Panel to identify steps to be taken to
enhance readiness and recovery in the
future. The Panel hopes that its
observations and recommendations
prove useful to the Commission and
assist our Nation in preparing for and
responding to future hurricanes and any
other disasters that might lay ahead for
us.
INTRODUCTION
The Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (‘‘Katrina
Panel’’ or ‘‘Panel’’) hereby submits its
report to the Federal Communications
Commission (‘‘Commission’’ or ‘‘FCC’’).
The Panel is charged with studying the
impact of Hurricane Katrina on the
telecommunications and media
infrastructure1 in the areas affected by
the hurricane. As directed by the
Commission, this report presents the
Panel’s findings as well as
recommendations for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first
responders.
I. Panel Formation and Charge
On September 15, 2005, FCC
Chairman Kevin J. Martin announced
that he would establish an independent
expert panel to review the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on the
communications infrastructure.2
Chairman Martin made the
announcement at the FCC’s Open
Meeting focusing on the effects of
Hurricane Katrina, which was held in
1 Throughout this report, the terms
‘‘communications infrastructure’’ and
‘‘communications networks’’ are intended to refer
to both telecommunications (e.g., telephony,
wireless, satellite, WISP) and media (e.g., radio,
television, cable) infrastructure. ‘‘Communications
providers’’ is intended to refer to the operators of
these networks.
2 Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
Communications Commission, Open Meeting on
the Effects of Hurricane Katrina, Atlanta, GA, at 3
(Sept. 15, 2005), available at https://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC261095A1.pdf [hereinafter ‘‘Martin Sept. 15
Statement’’]; see also FCC Takes Steps to Assist in
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Relief, 2005 FCC LEXIS
5109 (rel. Sept. 15, 2005) (Commission news
release).
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Atlanta, Georgia. He stated that the
Panel would be composed of public
safety and communications industry
representatives.3 The twenty-seven
members of the Panel, reflecting that
diverse composition, are identified in
Appendix A. Chairman Martin
appointed Nancy J. Victory of Wiley
Rein & Fielding LLP, the former
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for
Communications and Information and
Administrator of the National
Telecommunications and Information
Administration, to chair the Panel.4
In accordance with the requirements
of the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
the FCC published a notice announcing
the establishment of the Katrina Panel
in the Federal Register on January 6,
2006.5 The Panel’s charter details the
Katrina Panel’s objectives and the scope
of its activity.6 Specifically, the Charter
directs the Panel:
• To study the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media
industries, including public safety
communications;
• To review the sufficiency and
effectiveness of the recovery effort with
respect to this infrastructure; and
• To make recommendations to the
Commission by June 15, 2006 regarding
ways to improve disaster preparedness,
network reliability, and communication
among first responders such as police,
fire fighters, and emergency medical
personnel.7
Pursuant to the Charter, the Panel
became operational on January 9, 2006.
The Charter also provides that the Panel
will terminate on June 15, 2006 and
must carry out its duties before that
date.
II. Process and Activities of the Panel
In order to gather information to
fulfill the directives of its Charter, the
Panel called upon the experiences of its
members, many of whom were directly
3 Martin
Sept. 15 Statement at 3.
Kevin J. Martin Names Nancy J.
Victory as Chair of the Federal Communication
Commission’s Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, 2005 FCC LEXIS 6514 (rel. Nov. 28,
2005) (Commission news release).
5 See Federal Communications Commission,
Federal Advisory Committee Act, Notice, 71 Fed.
Reg. 933 (Jan. 6, 2006), available at https://
www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/hkipnoe.pdf. Access to the
public comments filed with and notices generated
by the Katrina Panel (unless otherwise noted with
a URL designation in the citations which follow) is
through the Panel’s website, available at https://
www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/.
6 See FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, Charter (filed Jan. 9, 2006), available at
https://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf.
7 Id. at 1–2.
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involved in the recovery efforts
following Hurricane Katrina. The Panel
also solicited broad public input by
providing processes by which interested
parties could submit written comments8
and provide oral presentations.9 The
Panel additionally invited certain
experts to present to the Panel or
demonstrate new technologies and
applications. The written comments
received by the Panel, as well as
transcripts of the Panel’s meetings, are
publicly available at the FCC’s Public
Reference Room and on the Panel’s
website. Finally, the Panel also
reviewed publicly available information
regarding matters under the Panel’s
consideration.
The Panel met five times to hear oral
presentations, to discuss draft findings
and recommendations, and to finalize
and approve this report. Those meetings
occurred on January 30, March 6–7,
April 18, May 12, and June 9, 2006. The
March 6–7 meeting was held in Jackson,
Mississippi, where the Panel was able to
hear oral presentations by interested
parties. All other meetings of the Panel
occurred in Washington, DC. All of
these meetings were public, with prior
notice of their date, time and location
provided to the public.10
The Panel formed informal working
groups (‘‘IWGs’’), made up of small
numbers of Panel members, to help it
effectively review and process the
necessary information within the time
required. The working groups met
numerous times in person and
telephonically during the Panel’s
existence. These working groups were
not decision-making bodies. Rather,
they compiled and sorted information in
particular issue areas for presentation to
the full Panel. The Panel had three
informal working groups:
• IWG–1: Infrastructure Resiliency.
This working group focused its
8 See, e.g., Federal Communications Commission,
Federal Advisory Committee Act; Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Notice of opportunity
to provide oral presentations, 71 Fed. Reg. 5846
(Feb. 3, 2006), available at https://
a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/01jan20061800/
edocket.access.gpo.gov/2006/pdf/06-1057.pdf.
9 Id.
10 See, e.g., Notice of Appointment Of Members
To Serve On Federal Communications
Commission’s Independent Panel Reviewing The
Impact Of Hurricane Katrina On Communications
Networks; And Independent Panel’s First Meeting
Scheduled For January 30, 2006, Public Notice, 21
FCC Rcd 197 (2006). The Commission also
published notices in the Federal Register
announcing Panel meetings. See, e.g., Federal
Communications Commission, Federal Advisory
Committee Act; Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, Notice of public meeting, 71 Fed. Reg.
2233 (Jan. 13, 2006). The Panel’s website at
&fnl;https://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/Meetings.html
contains more information about meeting notices.
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discussions and efforts on four main
areas: (1) Reviewing how and why
certain portions of the communications
networks failed; (2) identifying which
portions of the communications
networks continued to work and
withstood the hurricane and why; (3)
examining how communications
technology can be made less vulnerable
to failing; and (4) studying what steps
can be taken, pre-event, to strengthen
the communications infrastructure.
Marion Scott, Vice President—
Operations, CenturyTel, served as the
Chair of this working group and Steve
Dean, Fire Chief of Mobile, Alabama,
served as Vice-Chair.
• IWG–2: Recovery Coordination and
Procedures. This working group focused
on seven main issues: (1) Examining
ways to increase the speed with which
communications networks can be
restored post-event; (2) reviewing
whether communications technology
could have been used more effectively
during the recovery period, including
issues relating to consumer education
and post-event deployment of
communications technology; (3)
reviewing the intra-industry procedures
that communications providers use to
coordinate recovery efforts; (4)
reviewing the industry-government
procedures that private communications
firms and federal, state and local
governments use to coordinate recovery
efforts; (5) studying ways that private
industry can obtain faster and more
efficient access to impacted areas; (6)
reviewing the security and protection
procedures utilized by private
communications industry members
when they send their first responders to
impacted areas; and (7) reviewing how
well emergency communications
services, including Telecommunications
Service Priority, Government
Emergency Telecommunications
Service, and Wireless Priority Service,
performed during Katrina and the extent
to which emergency responders used
these services. Steve Davis, Senior Vice
President—Engineering, Clear Channel
Radio, served as the Chair of this
working group and Lt. Colonel Joseph
Booth, Deputy Superintendent,
Louisiana State Police, served as ViceChair.
• IWG–3: Emergency
Communications. This working group
focused on six main issues: (1)
Identifying means for ensuring or
enabling rapid deployment of
interoperable communications in the
wake of an event like Hurricane Katrina
that can be implemented in the short
term; (2) identifying any coordination
that needs to occur among public safety
entities to facilitate implementation of
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such a system in the wake of a disaster;
(3) reviewing Hurricane Katrina’s
impact on the Gulf Coast Region’s 911
and E–911 systems; (4) reviewing the
impact of the hurricane on PSAPs and
the procedures used to re-route
emergency calls; (5) examining whether
and how the communications networks
could have provided greater 911
connectivity for private citizens; and (6)
reviewing the adequacy of emergency
communications to the public before,
during and after the hurricane, and the
best ways to alert and inform the public
about emergencies in the future. Steve
Delahousey, Vice President—
Operations, American Medical
Response, served as the Chair of this
working group and Jim Jacot, Vice
President, Cingular Network Group,
served as Vice-Chair.
Typically, discussion about various
findings and recommendations occurred
first within the working groups. The
working groups then presented draft
findings and recommendations to the
full Panel for further discussion. Certain
issues were referred back to the working
groups for additional discussion and
revision.
The Panel held its final meeting on
June 9, 2006. During this meeting, the
Panel discussed the final draft report,
including recommendations to the
Commission. The Panel then
unanimously approved this report for
submission to the Commission.11
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PANEL OBSERVATIONS REGARDING
THE IMPACT OF HURRICANE
KATRINA ON THE
COMMUNICATIONS SECTOR AND
THE SUFFICIENCY AND
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE RECOVERY
EFFORT
The Katrina Panel has been charged
with studying the impact of Hurricane
Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media
industries, including public safety
communications. The Panel has also
been directed to review the effectiveness
of the recovery effort with respect to this
infrastructure. To inform its views on
these issues, the Panel heard oral
presentations and reviewed written
comments from numerous government
and industry representatives, as well as
other interested members of the public.
The Panel members also brought to bear
11 The Panel would like to recognize and express
appreciation to Lisa Fowlkes and Jean Ann Collins,
the Designated and Alternate Designated FACA
Officers for the Panel, for their important
contributions in enabling the Panel to carry out its
mission under the Charter. In addition, the Panel
would like to thank Michael A. Lewis, Thomas
Dombrowsky, and Brendan T. Carr of Wiley Rein
& Fielding LLP for their considerable assistance in
preparing this report.
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their own experiences with Hurricane
Katrina and its aftermath. As a result of
digesting and discussing all of this
information, the Panel members
identified a number of areas where
problems were observed or
communications recovery and
restoration efforts could have been more
effective. The Panel also identified areas
where successes were achieved—
successes that should be repeated.
These observed problems and successes,
which are detailed below, generally
formed the basis for the Panel’s
recommendations to the Commission.
The Panel’s observations below are
divided into four sections. Section I,
Network Reliability and Resiliency,
discusses the successes and failures in
the resiliency and reliability of various
types of communications networks from
an operational perspective. This section
looks at the effects of both the hurricane
itself and the subsequent levee breaches
on communications infrastructure.
Section II, Recovery Coordination and
Procedures, reviews the challenges
communications infrastructure
providers encountered in restoring and
maintaining communications service,
particularly with regard to access and
credentialing issues, restoration of
power, and security. Section III, First
Responder Communications, examines
the challenges posed to public safety
and emergency first responders in the
days following Hurricane Katrina. And
finally Section IV, Emergency
Communication to the Public, focuses
on the adequacy and effectiveness of
emergency communications to the
public before, during and after
Hurricane Katrina.
I. Network Reliability and Resiliency
The sheer force of Hurricane Katrina
and the extensive flooding resulting
from the breached levees severely tested
the reliability and resiliency of
communications networks in the Gulf
Coast region. Katrina also affected areas
of the Gulf Coast in varied fashions. In
the high impact zones near Gulfport, MS
and New Orleans, LA, the hurricane
created much heavier damage to the
infrastructure due to strong winds and,
in New Orleans, extensive flooding in
the days after the storm. In less
impacted areas, damage was less severe
and recovery efforts were more easily
accomplished. Katrina taxed each type
of communications infrastructure in a
variety of ways: (1) strong winds and
rain made it difficult for technical staff
to support and maintain the networks
and blew antennas out of alignment; (2)
heavy flooding following Katrina
overwhelmed a large portion of the
communications infrastructure,
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damaging equipment and impeding
recovery; (3) single points of failure in
vital communications links led to
widespread communications outages
across a variety of networks; and (4) the
duration of power outages far outlasted
most generator fuel reserves, leading to
the failure of otherwise functional
infrastructure. However, there were
resiliency successes in the aftermath: (1)
a large portion of the communications
infrastructure withstood the storm’s
wind and rain with only minor damage
(as distinguished from post-storm
flooding from levee breaches and power
outages, which had a more devastating
impact); (2) satellite networks, although
taxed by extensive numbers of
additional users, remained available and
usable throughout the affected region;
and (3) the communications networks
operated by utilities appeared to have a
very high rate of survivability. By
examining the failures in network
resiliency and reliability, along with the
successes, we can better prepare
communications infrastructure to
withstand or quickly recover from
future catastrophic events.
A. Effect of Hurricane Katrina on
Various Types of Communications
Networks
Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath
had a devastating impact on
communications networks in the Gulf
Coast region. In the affected areas of
Louisiana, Mississippi and Alabama,
more than three million customer
telephone lines were knocked out of
service. Both switching centers and
customer lines sustained damage.
Thirty-eight 911 call centers went down.
Approximately 100 broadcast stations
were unable to transmit and hundreds
of thousands of cable customers lost
service.12 Even generally resilient
public safety networks experienced
massive outages. In short, Katrina had a
catastrophic impact over a huge
geographic area. Further, due to the
unique circumstances associated with
this disaster, repair and activation of the
communications infrastructure in the
region was not a matter of days, but
rather a long and slow process.
To understand the precise impact that
Hurricane Katrina had on
communications networks, it is useful
to distinguish between the impact of the
12 See Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin,
Chairman, Federal Communications Commission,
Hearing on Public Safety Communications from 9/
11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before
the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
United States House of Representatives, at 2 (Sept.
29, 2005), available at https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-261417A1.pdf
[hereinafter ‘‘Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement’’].
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storm itself (i.e., hurricane force winds
and rain) and the effect of what came
later—extensive flooding from breached
levees and widespread, long term power
outages. As detailed below, it appears
that most communications
infrastructure in the areas impacted by
Katrina fared fairly well through the
storm’s wind and rain, in most cases
sustaining only minor damage or
damage that should have been promptly
repairable. Indeed, the tower industry
reported that of all the towers in the
path of the 2005 hurricanes in the
Southeastern and Gulf Coast areas of the
United States, less than 1 percent
suffered any structural damage.13 The
coastal areas that bore the brunt of the
storm suffered the worst infrastructure
damage from the hurricane. Not to
diminish the significant impact of the
hurricane itself, what made Katrina
unique and particularly catastrophic
were the unique conditions after the
winds subsided—substantial flooding
and widespread, extended power
outages. These developments impacted
communications networks greatly,
causing irreparable damage to
submerged electronics and prolonged
outages in many cases. The Panel’s
observations on how each type of
communications infrastructure
withstood Katrina and its challenging
aftermath is presented below.
1. Public Safety Communications
Networks. Public safety
communications networks are generally
built to be reliable in extreme
conditions.14 To ensure this, the
systems are planned to accommodate
everyday peak service times as well as
large incidents. They are also designed
to account for radio system disruptions,
such as power outages, transmission
failures, system interconnect failures,
and personal radio equipment failures.
However, these systems are generally
not designed for widespread
catastrophes of long duration—the
situation resulting from Katrina.15 As a
result of the storm and its aftermath,
public safety networks in the Gulf states
experienced a large number of
transmission outages that impacted the
functionality of both primary and backup systems. The loss of power and the
failure of switches in the wireline
telephone network also had a huge
impact on the ability of public safety
13 See Comments of PCIA—The Wireless
Infrastructure Association, at 1 (May 15, 2006).
14 See, e.g., Written Statement of Chief Harlin R.
McEwen, Chairman, Communications and
Technology Committee, International Association of
Chiefs of Police, at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement’’].
15 Id. at 4.
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systems to function.16 Public safety
personnel’s apparent lack of familiarity
with the operation of back-up or
alternate systems (such as satellite
systems) also limited functionality.
a. Tower Failures. In general, public
safety’s antenna towers remained
standing after the storm. The winds did
blow antennas out of alignment,
requiring readjustment. However, the
main cause of transmission failures was
loss of power (as discussed below). Most
public safety radio systems by design
are able to handle and manage a single
or isolated subsystem failure or loss.17
However, Katrina affected parts of four
states, causing transmission losses at a
much greater number and over a larger
area than public safety planning had
envisioned.
b. Power Failures. Power for radio
base stations and battery/chargers for
portable radio devices are carefully
planned for public safety systems.
However, generators are typically
designed to keep base stations operating
for 24 to 48 hours. The long duration of
power outages in the wake of Katrina
substantially exceeded the capabilities
of most of public safety’s back-up
generators and fuel reserves.18
Similarly, portable radios and back-up
batteries generally have an 8 to 10 hour
duty cycle.19 Without access to power to
recharge the devices and backup
batteries, portable devices quickly ran
out of power.
c. Wireline and Network
Infrastructure Failures. Katrina and the
subsequent levee breaches caused
significant failures of the Public
Switched Telephone Network
(‘‘PSTN’’), particularly in the New
Orleans area.20 Public safety radio
networks rely on interconnection with
the PSTN or by fixed microwave links
to get communications through to
public safety responders. Given PSTN
failures, as well as damage to fixed
microwave links, public safety
communications were significantly
affected.
d. Training Issues. Because of failures
of the primary public safety networks,
public safety personnel had to utilize
back-up or alternative communications
technologies with which they may not
have had substantial experience.
Confusion or unfamiliarity with the
capabilities or operational requirements
of the alternative technology seemed to
result in limitations in functionality.21
id. at 6.
id. at 5.
18 See id.
19 Id. at 6.
20 Id.
21 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Sandy Bogucki,
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Tr.
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17 See
Frm 00040
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For example, some public safety
personnel handed satellite phones were
not familiar with their special dialing
requirements and, as a result, thought
the phones did not work.22 Public safety
personnel did not seem to have
adequate training on alternative
communications technologies, such as
paging, satellite, license-exempt WISP
systems, and thus were not able to
transition seamlessly to these
alternatives when existing public safety
communications networks failed.
Additionally, because alternative
technologies were used so infrequently,
there were reported problems with
upkeep and maintenance of the
equipment.23
2. Public Safety Answering Points
(PSAPs). Handling of 911 calls was
identified as a problem during Katrina.
As a result of the storm and subsequent
flooding, thirty-eight 911 call centers
ceased to function.24 Limited training
and advanced planning on how to
handle rerouting of emergency calls
under this situation created serious
problems.25 As an example, the City of
Biloxi was able to relocate their 911 call
center prior to landfall; however,
representatives relocated to the facility
did not have full 911 capabilities. This
severely hampered their ability to
effectively route 911 calls to the
appropriate agencies. The Katrina
experience identified that there
appeared to be a lack of 911 PSAP
failovers and some deficits in training
on routing and handling of calls when
a crisis and rerouting occurs.
Nevertheless, the vast majority of 911
call centers, especially in the less
impacted portions of the region, were
up and running by September 9.26
3. Wireline. According to FCC data,
more than 3 million customer phone
lines were knocked out in the Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama area following
Hurricane Katrina.27 The wireline
at 54–55 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Bogucki Mar.
6 Oral Testimony’’].
22 Written Testimony of David Cavossa, Executive
Director, Satellite Industry Association, Before the
FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, at 4–5 (Mar. 3, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony’’]; Bogucki Mar. 6
Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.
23 See Bogucki Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 55.
24 See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
25 See, e.g., Comments of Comcare at 2 (May 11,
2006) (there was no plan to bring in additional
telecommunicators to the region to keep up with
the influx of 911 calls from victims and rescue
response teams).
26 See Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 27.
27 See Written Statement of Kenneth P. Moran,
Director, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement
Bureau, FCC, on Hurricane Katrina, Before the
Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States
House of Representatives, at 2 (Sept. 7, 2005),
available at https://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
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telephone network sustained significant
damage both to the switching centers
that route calls and to the lines used to
connect buildings and customers to the
network.28 Katrina highlighted the
dependence on tandems and tandem
access to SS7 switches.29 The high
volume routes from tandem switches,
especially in and around New Orleans
were especially critical and vulnerable.
Katrina highlighted the need for
diversity of call routing and avoiding
strict reliance upon a single routing
solution. One tandem switch, which
was critical for 911 call routing, was lost
from September 4 to September 21. This
switch went down due to flooding that
did not allow for fuel to be replenished.
Due to the high winds and severe
flooding, there were multiple breaks in
the fiber network supporting the PSTN.
Katrina demonstrated that in many areas
there may be a lack of multiple fiber
routes throughout the wireline network
and that aerial fiber was more at risk
than underground fiber. As with other
private sector communications
providers, lack of access to facilities
(due to both flooding and inadequate
credentialing), lack of commercial
power, and lack of security greatly
hampered recovery efforts.
Nevertheless, ten days after Katrina,
nearly 90 percent of wireline customers
in the Gulf region who had lost service
had their service restored.30 However,
the vast majority of these customers
were in the less impacted regions of the
Gulf; regions that were harder hit
sustained more infrastructure damage
and continued to have difficulty in
restoring service.
4. Cellular/PCS. Local cellular and
personal communications service
(‘‘PCS’’) networks received considerable
damage with more than 1,000 base
station sites impacted.31 In general,
cellular/PCS base stations were not
destroyed by Katrina, although some
antennas required adjustment after the
storm. Rather, the majority of the
adverse effects and outages encountered
by wireless providers were due to a lack
of commercial power or a lack of
transport connectivity to the wireless
switch (wireline T1 line lost or fixed
microwave backhaul offline). The
transport connectivity is generally
provided by the local exchange carrier.
With either failure, wireless providers
attachmatch/DOC-260895A1.pdf [hereinafter
‘‘Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement’’].
28 Id. at 2–3.
29 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Woody Glover,
Director, St. Tammany Parish Communications
District, Tr. at 64–67 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony’’].
30 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 43.
31 Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
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would be required to make a site visit
to return the base station to operational
status. Wireless providers cited security
for their personnel, access and fuel as
the most pressing needs and problems
affecting restoration of wireless service.
However, within one week after Katrina,
approximately 80 percent of wireless
cell sites were up and running.32
Consistent with other systems, the 20
percent of base stations still affected
were in the areas most impacted by
Katrina. Cellular base stations on wheels
(‘‘COWs’’) were successfully used as
needed to restore service throughout the
affected region. Over 100 COWs were
delivered to the Gulf Coast region.33 In
addition to voice services, text
messaging was used successfully during
the crisis and appeared to offer
communications when the voice
networks became overloaded with
traffic. Additionally, wireless providers’
push-to-talk services appeared to be
more resilient than interconnected voice
service inasmuch as they do not
necessarily rely upon connectivity to
the PSTN.34
5. Paging. Paging systems seemed
more reliable in some instances than
voice/cellular systems because paging
systems utilize satellite networks, rather
than terrestrial systems, for backbone
infrastructure.35 Paging technology is
also inherently redundant, which means
that messages may still be relayed if a
single transmitter or group of
transmitters in a network fails.36 Paging
signals penetrate buildings very well,
thus providing an added level of
reliability.37 Additionally, pagers
benefited from having a long battery life
and thus remained operating longer
during the power outages.38 Other
positive observations concerning paging
systems included that they were
Sept. 29 Written Statement at 44.
Comm. on Homeland Security and Gov’t
Affairs, 109th Cong., Hurricane Katrina: A Nation
Still Unprepared at 18–4, May 2006, available at
https://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/Katrina/
FullReport.pdf [hereinafter ‘‘Senate Report on
Katrina’’].
34 See Written Testimony of Dave Flessas, VP,
Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp, Before the
FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, at 3 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘Sprint Nextel Jan. 30 Written Testimony’’].
35 See, e.g., Written Testimony of Vincent D.
Kelly, President and Chief Executive Officer, USA
Mobility, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina at 7
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Vincent Kelly-USA
Mobility Mar. 6 Written Testimony’’]; Oral
Testimony of Bruce Deer, President, American
Association of Paging Carriers, Tr. at 122–123 (Mar.
6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Deer Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony’’].
36 See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6
Written Testimony at 7–8.
37 Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 123.
38 Id.
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33 S.
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effective at text messaging and were
equipped to provide broadcast
messaging.39 Finally, although it is
unclear whether this function was
utilized, group pages can be sent out
during times of emergencies to alert
thousands of pager units all at the same
time.40
6. Satellite. Satellite networks
appeared to be the communications
service least disrupted by Hurricane
Katrina.41 As these networks do not
heavily depend upon terrestrial-based
infrastructure, they are typically not
affected by wind, rain, flooding or
power outages.42 As a result, both fixed
and mobile satellite systems provided a
functional, alternative communications
path for those in the storm-ravaged
region.43 Mobile satellite operators
reported large increases in satellite
traffic without any particular network/
infrastructure issues.44 More than
20,000 satellite phones were deployed
to the Gulf Coast region in the days
following Katrina.45 Broadband capacity
39 See, e.g., Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6
Written Testimony at 3.
40 See, e.g., Comments of Interstate Wireless, Inc.,
at 1 (May 10, 2006).
41 See, e.g., Comments of Globalstar LLC, at 1 (Jan.
27, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Globalstar Comments’’].
42 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–9
(‘‘satellite phones do not rely on terrestrial * * *
infrastructure that is necessary for land mobile
radio, land-line, and cellular communications’’);
Written Statement of Tony Trujillo, Chairman,
Satellite Industry Association, Hearing on Public
Safety Communications From 9/11 to Katrina:
Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
United States House of Representatives, at 3 (Sept.
29, 2005), available at https://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/
09292005Hearing1648/Trujillo.pdf [hereinafter
‘‘Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement’’].
43 See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel Jeff
Smith, Deputy Director, Louisiana Office of
Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness,
Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and Response by
the State of Louisiana, Before the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, United States House
of Representatives, at 12 (Dec. 14, 2005), available
at https://katrina.house.gov/hearing/12–14–05/
smith_121405.doc [hereinafter ‘‘Jeff Smith Written
Statement’’]; Written Statement of Bruce Baughman,
Director, Alabama State Emergency Management
Agency, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and
Response by the State of Alabama, Before the Select
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation
for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, United
States House of Representatives, at 4 (Nov. 9, 2005),
available at https://katrina.house.gov/hearings/
11_09_05/baughman_110905.doc; Written
Statement of Robert Latham, Director, Mississippi
Emergency Management Agency, Hurricane
Katrina: Preparedness and Response by the State of
Mississippi, Before the Select Bipartisan Committee
to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to
Hurricane Katrina, United States House of
Representatives, at 4 (Dec. 7, 2005), available at
https://katrina.house.gov/hearings/12_07_05/
latham_120705.pdf.
44 Globalstar Comments at 2.
45 Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at 4.
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was provided by fixed satellite operators
for voice, video and data network
applications. Nevertheless, there were
functionality issues with satellite
communications – largely due to lack of
user training and equipment
preparation.46 Some satellite phones
require specialized dialing in order to
place a call. They also require line of
sight with the satellite and thus do not
generally work indoors.47 Users who
had not been trained or used a satellite
phone prior to Katrina reported
frustration and difficulty in rapid and
effective use of these devices.48 Satellite
phones also require charged batteries.
Handsets that were not charged and
ready to go were of no use as there was
often no power to recharge handsets.
Additionally, most of Louisiana’s
parishes (all but three) did not have
satellite phones on hand because they
had previously chosen to discontinue
their service as a cost-saving measure.49
Finally, users expressed the observation
that satellite data networks (replacing
wireline T1 service) were more robust
and had fewer difficulties in obtaining
and maintaining communications with
the satellite network than voice services.
7. Broadcasting. The television and
radio broadcasting industry was also
hard hit by Katrina. Approximately 28
percent of television stations
experienced downtime in the storm
zone; approximately 35 percent of radio
stations failed in one fashion or
another.50 In addition, in New Orleans
and the surrounding area, only 4 of the
41 broadcast radio stations remained on
the air in the wake of the hurricane.51
Some broadcasters continued
broadcasting only by partnering with
other broadcasters whose signals were
not interrupted.52 Broadcasters reported
46 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–9
(problems with satellite phones do not appear to
have been caused by the phones themselves or the
satellite networks; a combination of user error and
obstruction of satellite signals were most likely the
problems); Cavossa-SIA Testimony at 4–5; Bogucki
Mar. 6 Public Testimony, Tr. at 55.
47 Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 5.
48 Id. at 4.
49 See Final Report of the Select Bipartisan
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and
Response to Hurricane Katrina, H.R. Rep. No. 109–
377, at 172–73 (2006), available at https://
www.gpo.access.gov/serialset/creports/
Katrina.html, [hereinafter ‘‘House Report’’].
50 See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at
45; Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman,
Federal Communications Commission, Hearing on
Communications in a Disaster, Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
at 2 (Sept. 22, 2005) (an estimated 100 broadcast
stations were knocked off the air).
51 Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 3.
52 Oral Testimony of Dave Vincent, Station
Manager, WLOX–TV, Before the FCC’s Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Tr. at 309 (Mar. 6,
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very few tower losses as a result of
Katrina. Instead, the wind displacing
and causing misaligning antennas was
the biggest cause of broadcast outages.
Although this type of damage could be
readily repaired, the lengthy power
outages—which substantially exceeded
back-up generator capabilities—
prevented many broadcast stations from
coming back on the air. Power outages
at the viewer/listener end were also an
issue as they prevented broadcast
transmissions from being successfully
received. Additionally, the lack of
security for broadcast facilities and
repair personnel impeded recovery
efforts. Nevertheless, within three weeks
after Katrina, more than 90 percent of
broadcasters were up and running in the
affected region.53 However, in the areas
most impacted by the storm, the vast
majority of stations remained down
much longer.
8. Cable. As with the broadcasting
industry, cable companies in the region
reported limited infrastructure damage
to their head ends following Katrina. In
the areas hardest hit by the storm itself,
aerial cable infrastructure was heavily
damaged. Some cable facilities are
underground; the storm’s wind and rain
had only minimal effects on them.
However, the opposite was true in areas
where the levees’ breach caused heavy
flooding. There, underground facilities
were heavily damaged and the
electronics in those facilities were
generally completely lost. The cable
industry indicated that new cable plants
generally allowed for multiple points of
failure and system workarounds that
permitted the network to operate in
spite of some widespread faults in the
infrastructure. However, lack of power
to cable facilities and security proved to
be key problems. The cable operator
serving New Orleans indicated that,
even where its network was intact, lack
of power/fuel prevented it from
restoring operations in those areas.54
Also, similar to broadcasting, power
outages at the viewer end prevented
cable programming from being
successfully received.
9. Utilities. Electric utility networks
(including utility-owned commercial
wireless networks) appeared to have a
high rate of survivability following
Katrina.55 These communications
2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Vincent-WLOX–TV Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony’’] (WLOX in Biloxi partnered with
WXXV in Gulfport, Mississippi, which carried
WLOX’s signal until they could get back on the air).
53 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 45.
54 See, e.g., Comments of Greg Bicket, Cox
Communications, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006).
55 See, e.g., UTC Comments, Hurricanes of 2005:
Performance of Gulf Coast Critical Infrastructure
Communications Networks, at 2 (Jan. 27, 2006).
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systems did not have a significant rate
of failure because: (1) the systems were
designed to remain intact to aid
restoration of electric service following
a significant storm event; (2) they were
built with significant onsite back-up
power supplies (batteries and
generators); (3) last mile connections to
tower sites and the backbone transport
are typically owned by the utility and
have redundant paths (both T1 and
fixed microwave); and (4) the staff
responsible for the communications
network have a focus on continuing
maintenance of network elements (for
example, exercising standby generators
on a routine basis).
10. License Exempt Wireless (WISPs).
The License Exempt Wireless or
wireless internet service provider
(‘‘WISP’’) infrastructure, in general, was
not heavily damaged by Katrina or the
subsequent flooding, although some
antennas required adjustment because
of high winds. Rather, the majority of
the adverse effects and outages
encountered by WISP providers were
due to a lack of commercial power and
difficulty with fuel resupply. WISP
providers cited access difficulties as
their most pressing problem in restoring
their networks.
11. Amateur Radio Service. As with
other communications services, amateur
radio stations were also adversely
affected by Katrina. Equipment was
damaged or lost due to the storm and
trained amateurs were difficult to find
in the immediate aftermath. However,
once called into help, amateur radio
operators volunteered to support many
agencies, such as FEMA, the National
Weather Service, Hurricane Watch and
the American Red Cross.56 Amateurs
provided wireless communications in
many locations where there was no
other means of communicating and also
provided other technical aid to the
communities affected by Katrina.57
B. Major Problems Identified Following
Katrina
In reviewing the detailed reports from
each communications sector, there were
three main problems that caused the
majority of communications network
interruptions: (1) Flooding; (2) lack of
power and/or fuel; and (3) failure of
redundant pathways for
communications traffic. In addition, a
fourth item—inadvertent line cuts
during restoration—resulted in
additional network damage, causing
56 See Hurricane Katrina Amateur Radio
Emergency Communications Relief Effort
Operations Review Summary, Written Statement
submitted by Gregory Sarratt, W4OZK, at 2 (Mar. 7,
2006).
57 Id. at 4.
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new outages or delaying service
restoration. Each of these areas of
concern is detailed below.
1. Flooding. Hurricanes typically have
flooding associated with them due to
the torrential rainfall and storm surge
associated with the storms. However, in
addition to these sources of flooding,
the levee breaks in New Orleans caused
catastrophic flooding that was extremely
detrimental to the communications
networks.58 While communications
infrastructure had been hardened to
prepare against strong winds from a
hurricane, the widespread flooding of
long duration associated with Katrina
destroyed or disabled substantial
portions of the communications
networks and impeded trained
personnel from reaching and operating
the facilities.59 In addition, as detailed
below, the massive flooding caused
widespread power outages that were not
readily remedied (electric substations
could not be reached nor were there
personnel available to remedy the
outages). The flooding also wiped out
transportation options, preventing fuel
for generators from getting where it
needed to be.
2. Power and Fuel. Katrina caused
extensive damage to the power grid.
Significant portions of electrical
facilities in Mississippi, Alabama and
Louisiana—including both power lines
and electric plants—were severely
impaired due to wind and flooding. As
a result, power to support the
communications networks was
generally unavailable throughout the
region.60 This meant that, for
communications systems to continue to
operate, backup batteries and generators
were required. While the
communications industry has generally
been diligent in deploying backup
batteries and generators and ensuring
that these systems have one to two days
of fuel or charge, not all locations had
them installed. Furthermore, not all
locations were able to exercise and test
the backup equipment in any systemic
fashion. Thus, some generators and
batteries did not function during the
crisis. Where generators were installed
and operational, the fuel was generally
exhausted prior to restoration of power.
Finally, flooding, shortages of fuel and
58 See, e.g., House Report at 164 (reporting that
flooding knocked out two telephone company
switches and hindered the communications
abilities of six out of eight police districts in New
Orleans, as well as the police department
headquarters).
59 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Dr. Juliette M.
Saussy, Director, Emergency Medical Services of
the City of New Orleans, Louisiana, Tr. at 43–44
(Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Saussy Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony’’].
60 House Report. at 166.
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restrictions on access to the affected
area made refueling extraordinarily
difficult.61 In some instances, fuel was
confiscated by federal or local
authorities when it was brought into the
Katrina region.62
3. Redundant pathways. The switches
that failed, especially tandems, had
widespread effects on a broad variety of
communications in and out of the
Katrina region. In addition, T1 and other
leased lines were heavily used by the
communications networks throughout
the region, with those failures leading to
loss of service. As an example, a major
tandem switch in New Orleans was
isolated, which meant that no
communications from parts of New
Orleans to outside the region could
occur. This switch, an access tandem
that carried long distance traffic through
New Orleans and out to other offices,
had two major routes out of the city (one
to the east and one to the west). The
eastern route was severed by a barge
that came ashore during the hurricane
and cut the aerial fiber associated with
the route. If only this route had been
lost, the access tandem traffic could
have continued. However, the western
route was also severed—initially by
large trees falling across aerial cables,
then subsequently by construction
crews removing debris from highway
rights-of-way. While there were
provisions for rerouting traffic out of the
city, the simultaneous loss of both of
these major paths significantly limited
communications service in parts of New
Orleans.
4. Line cuts. During the restoration
process following Katrina, there were
numerous instances of fiber lines cut
accidentally by parties seeking to restore
power, phone, and cable, remove trees
and other debris, and engage in similar
restoration activities.63 BellSouth
indicated in its comments to the Katrina
Panel that several of its major routes
were cut multiple times.64 For example,
on Monday, September 12th, a major
fiber route from Hammond, Louisiana to
Covington, Louisiana was cut by a tree
trimming company.65 Cox
Communications reported that, by the
at 164.
e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–4
(citing Committee staff interview of William Smith,
Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth, conducted on
Jan. 25, 2006) (FEMA commandeered
communications fuel reserves in order to refuel
helicopters).
63 See, e.g., Woody Glover Mar. 6 Oral Testimony,
Tr. at 66 (Mar. 6, 2006).
64 See Comments by William L. Smith, BellSouth,
Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications
Networks, at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘SmithBellSouth Jan. 30 Written Statement’’).
65 Id.
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61 Id.
62 See,
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eleventh day after the storm, more
outages of its network in the region were
caused by human damage than storm
damage. Public safety entities also noted
similar cuts in service during the
restoration process.66
In addition to these major causes of
network interruptions, security and
access to facilities were consistently
mentioned as significant issues affecting
restoration of communications services.
These problems are discussed in detail
in the following section.
II. Recovery Coordination and
Procedures
After Katrina’s wind and rain
subsided, challenges to communications
service maintenance and restoration
continued. Flooding, which submerged
and damaged equipment and blocked
access for restoration, was a major
problem. The Panel also observed
significant challenges to the recovery
effort resulting from (1) inconsistent and
unclear requirements for
communications infrastructure repair
crews and their subcontractors to gain
access to the affected area; (2) limited
access to power and/or generator fuel;
(3) limited security for communications
infrastructure and personnel and lack of
pre-positioned back-up equipment; (4)
lack of established coordination
between the communications industry
and state and local officials as well as
among federal, state and local
government officials with respect to
communications matters; and (5)
limited use of available priority
communications services. On the other
hand, lines of communication between
the communications industry and the
federal government were established
and seemed generally effective in
facilitating coordination, promptly
granting needed regulatory relief, and
gathering outage information. In
addition, ad hoc, informal sharing of
fuel and equipment among
communications industry participants
helped to maximize the assets available
and bolster the recovery effort.
However, additional industry
coordination of personnel and assets
internally and among governments
could have substantially facilitated
restoration of communications
networks.
A. Access to the Affected Area and Key
Resources.
1. Perimeter Access and
Credentialing. Communications
66 See, e.g., Comments of Robert G. Bailey,
National Emergency Number Association, Harris
County Emergency Communications, at 1 (Jan. 30,
2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Bailey Jan. 30 Written
Testimony’’].
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restoration efforts were hampered
significantly by the inability of
communications infrastructure repair
crews and their contracted workers to
access the impacted area post-disaster.67
For important safety and security
reasons, law enforcement personnel set
up a perimeter around much of the
impacted region and imposed
restrictions on who could access the
area. Communications infrastructure
repair crews from all sectors of the
industry had great difficulty crossing
the perimeter to access their facilities in
need of repair.68 This seemed to be a
particular problem for smaller or nontraditional communications
companies,69 who tended to have lower
levels of name recognition with law
enforcement personnel guarding the
perimeter.
Although some jurisdictions provided
credentials to communications
infrastructure repair crews to permit
them to access the affected area, the
process appeared to be unique for each
local jurisdiction. Communications
providers reported that credentials that
permitted access through one
checkpoint would not be honored at
another.70 In many cases, different
checkpoints required different
documentation and credentialing before
permitting access.71 As a result, repair
67 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of William L. Smith,
Chief Technology Officer, BellSouth Corp., Before
the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 188 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral
Testimony’’]; see also Statement of Jim Jacot, Vice
President, Cingular Network Group, Before the
FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 125 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral
Testimony’’]; Trujillo Sept. 29 Written Statement at
9; Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
68 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–4
(repair workers sometimes had difficulty gaining
access to their equipment and facilities because the
police and National Guard refused to let crews enter
the affected area); Federal Support to
Telecommunications Infrastructure Providers in
National Emergencies: Designation as ‘‘Emergency
Responders (Private Sector)’’, The President’s
National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, Legislative and Regulatory Task Force,
at 7 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Jan. 31 NSTAC
Report’’].
69 See, e.g., Comments of the Satellite Industry
Association at 6 (January 27, 2006) (describing how
satellite system repair crews had difficulty
obtaining access to the impacted area); Comments
of Xspedius Communications, LLC, at 2, 6 (Mar. 6,
2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Comments of Xspedius’’].
70 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–4
(citing Committee staff interview of Christopher
Guttman-McCabe, Vice President, Regulatory
Affairs, CTIA, conducted on Jan. 24, 2006) (industry
representatives said that their technicians would
benefit from having uniform credentialing that is
recognized by the multiple law enforcement
agencies operating in a disaster area).
71 See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX-TV Mar. 6 Written
Testimony at 5 (stating that a credential that
permitted access in one county was sometimes not
honored in a different county).
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crews needed to carry multiple
credentials and letters from various
federal, state and local officials.72 There
was no uniform credentialing method in
place whereby one type of credential
would permit access at any
checkpoint.73 Communications
providers were also not clear about
which agency had authority to issue the
necessary credentials.74 And there did
not appear to be any mechanism in
place for issuing credentials to those
who needed them prior to Katrina
making landfall.
Once communications infrastructure
repair crews gained access to the
impacted area, they had no guarantee
they would be allowed to remain there.
The enforcement of curfews and other
security procedures at times interrupted
repair work and required
communications restoration crews to
exit the area. In at least one instance,
law enforcement personnel insisted that
communications technicians cease their
work splicing a key telecommunications
cable and exit the area in order to
enforce a curfew.75 Although such
practices may have been necessary from
a security standpoint, they did interrupt
and hamper the recovery process.
The problems with access were not all
one-sided. Law enforcement personnel
also expressed frustration with the
access situation, particularly with
respect to the different credentials
issued and not knowing what to ask for
or what to honor. It was also reported
that credentialed communications
infrastructure repair personnel
sometimes allowed non-credentialed
individuals to ride in their vehicles
through checkpoints, which
compromised the security of the area. It
also caused law enforcement personnel
at the perimeter to be wary of persons
seeking to access the affected area and
the credentials they presented,
potentially further slowing the access
process.
2. Fuel. Problems with maintaining
and restoring power for
communications infrastructure
significantly affected the recovery
process. As described in Section I.B.2
above, many facilities could have been
up and operating much more quickly if
communications providers had access to
sufficient fuel. The commercial power
e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 2–3.
e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at Findings
at 8 (efforts by private sector to restore
communications efforts were hampered by the fact
that the government did not provide uniform
credentials to gain access to affected areas).
74 See, e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
75 Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
191; see also Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony,
Tr. at 125.
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73 See,
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upon which the vast majority of
communications networks depended for
day-to-day operations was knocked out
over a huge geographic area. Back-up
generators and batteries were not
present at all facilities. Where they were
deployed, most provided only enough
power to operate particular
communications facilities for 24–48
hours—generally a sufficient period of
time to permit the restoration of
commercial power in most situations,
but not enough for a catastrophe like
Hurricane Katrina.
Access to fuel reserves or priority
power restoration appeared extremely
limited for the communications
industry.76 Only a few communications
providers had stockpiles of fuel or
special supplier arrangements.
However, if the fuel was not located
fairly near to the perimeter, it was
difficult and expensive to get it where
it was needed in a timely fashion.
Perimeter access issues also impeded
the ability to bring reserve fuel into the
region. Moreover, many roads and
traditional means of accessing certain
facilities could not be used due to the
extensive flooding that followed
Hurricane Katrina. And many
communications providers did not
anticipate the need for alternative
means of reaching their facilities. In
addition, some providers reported
having their limited fuel reserves
confiscated by law enforcement
personnel for other pressing needs.77
Although electric and other utilities
maintain priority lists for commercial
power restoration, it does not appear
that commercial communications
providers were on or eligible for such
lists. Indeed, one wireless provider
speaking at the Katrina Panel’s January
2006 meeting—more than 4 months
after Katrina’s landfall—reported that it
had 23 cell sites in the impacted area
still running on backup generators.78
Most communications providers also
did not appear to be able to access any
government fuel reserves.
On a positive note, several companies
apparently shared their reserve fuel
with other communications providers
who needed it, even their competitors.79
76 See, e.g., Comments of Mississippi Assn. of
Broadcasters at 1–2 (Jan. 27, 2006).
77 See, e.g., id.; House Report at 167 (‘‘[O]ne of
Nextel’s fuel trucks was stopped at gunpoint and its
fuel taken for other purposes while en route to
refuel cell tower generators, and the Mississippi
State Police redirected a fuel truck carrying fuel
designated for a cell tower generator to fuel
generators at Gulfport Memorial Hospital.’’).
78 See Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral Testimony, Tr.
at 123.
79 See, e.g., Vincent-WLOX–TV Mar. 6 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 312 (describing how the radio
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This sharing occurred on a purely ad
hoc basis.80 There did not appear to be
any forum or coordination area for
fostering industry sharing of fuel or
other equipment.
3. Security. Limited security for key
communications facilities and
communications infrastructure repair
crews also hampered the recovery
effort.81 Security concerns, both actual
and perceived, led to delays in the
restoration of communications
networks.82 Communications providers
reported generators being stolen from
key facilities, even if they were bolted
down. Lack of security for
communications infrastructure repair
workers at times delayed their access to
certain facilities to make repairs.83 Some
providers employed their own security
crews.84 However, obtaining credentials
to allow these individuals to access the
affected area was sometimes a problem.
Further, communications infrastructure
repair crews generally did not receive
security details from law enforcement.
Clearly, law enforcement had other very
significant responsibilities in the wake
of Katrina. In addition, communications
providers are apparently not considered
‘‘emergency responders’’ under the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act 85 and the
National Response Plan and thus are not
eligible to receive non-monetary Federal
assistance, like security protection for
critical facilities and repair personnel.86
In one instance, however, a major
station shared fuel with a nearby news
organization).
80 See, e.g., Oral Testimony of Steve Davis, Senior
Vice President of Engineering, Clear Channel Radio,
Before the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 81–82 (Jan. 30,
2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan.
30 Oral Testimony’’].
81 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–4.
82 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina
Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 40, available at
https://www.whitehouse.gov/reports/katrina-lessonslearned/.
83 Jan. 31 NSTAC Report at 5.
84 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 18–4
(when government security proved unavailable,
many telecommunications providers hired private
security to protect their workers and supplies);
Written Statement of Dave Flessas, Vice President
for Network Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp., Before
the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, at 2 (Jan. 30, 2006) (security
issues forced Sprint to hire armored guards to
protect its employees and contractors); Jan. 31
NSTAC Report at 5.
85 Pub. L. No. 93–288, as amended [hereinafter
‘‘Stafford Act’’].
86 See, e.g., Smith-BellSouth Jan. 30 Written
Statement at 9; Jacot-Cingular Jan. 30 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 125; see also Oral Testimony of
Captain Thomas Wetherald, Deputy Operations
Director, National Communications System, Before
the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, Tr. at 24 (Apr. 18, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral
Testimony’’].
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communications provider successfully
sought governmental security for its
Poydras St. office in New Orleans,
which serves as a regional hub for
multiple telecommunications carriers.
Both the Louisiana State Police and the
FBI provided security so that BellSouth
workers could return to the office and
keep it in service.87
Apparently, several companies that
had their own security forces shared
them with other communications
providers by forming a convoy to go to
a particular area.88 Such arrangements
seemed to occur on a purely informal
basis. There did not appear to be any
forum or staging area for fostering
industry sharing of security forces or
other resources.
4. Pre-positioning of Equipment.
Limited pre-positioning of
communications equipment may have
slowed the recovery process. While
some individual companies and
organizations had some backup
communications technologies on-hand
for use after a disaster, most did not
appear to locate strategic stockpiles of
communications equipment that could
be rapidly deployed and immediately
used by persons in the impacted area.
B. Coordination Between Industry and
Government
1. Industry—Federal Government
Coordination. Despite problems related
above at the scene of the disaster, at the
federal level, industry and government
recovery coordination for the
communications sector appeared to
function as intended. Under the
National Response Plan, the lead federal
agency for emergency support functions
regarding communications is the
National Communications System
(‘‘NCS’’). NCS manages the National
Coordination Center for
Telecommunications (‘‘NCC’’) in
Washington, DC, which is a joint
industry-federal government endeavor
with 36 member companies.89 The NCC
meets on a regular basis during nonemergency situations; during and
immediately after Katrina, it met daily
and conducted analysis and situational
monitoring of ongoing events and
response capabilities.90 The Katrina
87 Smith-BellSouth
Jan. 30 Written Statement at
8–9.
e.g., Comments of Xspedius at 3.
NSTAC Report on the National
Coordinating Center (4/27/06 Draft), The President’s
National Security Telecommunications Advisory
Committee, May 10, 2006, at 9–10 [hereinafter
‘‘May 10 NSTAC Report’’].
90 See Written Statement of Dr. Peter M. Fonash,
Director, National Communications System, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Ensuring
Operability During Catastrophic Events, Before the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
PO 00000
88 See,
89 The
Frm 00045
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38583
Panel heard that this group played an
important and effective role in
coordinating communications network
recovery and allowing for information
sharing among affected industry
members.91 Yet, NCC membership is
limited to only certain providers and
does not represent a broad cross-section
of the communications industry (for
example, no broadcasters, WISPs, or
cable providers are members).92
Accordingly, certain industry sectors or
companies that might have been helpful
were not a part of this coordination
effort. State and local government are
also not a part of this coordination
effort.
The FCC was widely praised as
playing a critical role in helping to
restore communications connectivity in
the wake of Hurricane Katrina.93 During
and immediately after Katrina, the
Commission stayed open 24 hours a
day, seven days a week to respond to
the disaster.94 Within hours of Katrina’s
landfall in the Gulf Coast region, the
Commission established an internal
Task Force to coordinate its response
efforts,95 focusing on providing
regulatory relief where necessary,
coordinating efforts with other federal
agencies, and providing information and
assistance to evacuees. To assist
communications providers in their
recovery, the Commission established
emergency procedures to streamline
various waiver and special temporary
authority processes to speed needed
relief,96 reached out to various
providers to determine their needs, and
assisted communications providers in
obtaining access to necessary
resources.97
These actions by the Commission
appeared substantially to assist the
industry in the recovery effort. The
emergency, 24/7 contacts the
Commission made available and the
Committee on Homeland Security, United States
House of Representatives, at 2, 6 (Oct. 26, 2005),
available at https://hsc.house.gov/files/
TestimonyFonash.pdf.
91 See, e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 17–18.
92 See May 10 NSTAC Report at 4.
93 See, e.g., The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina: Lessons Learned at 142–43 (February
2006).
94 See, e.g., Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at
3.
95 Moran Sept. 7 Written Statement at 4.
96 See, e.g., International Bureau Announces
Procedures to Provide Emergency Communications
in Areas Impacted by Hurricane Katrina, FCC
Public Notice (rel. Sept. 1, 2005), available at https://
hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC260835A1.pdf.
97 See Steve Davis-Clear Channel Jan. 30 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 83 (describing how the Audio
Division of the FCC’s Media Bureau helped radio
licensees secure access to fuel).
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new streamlined processes clearly
accelerated the time frame for receiving
necessary regulatory approvals.
However, the extensive communications
outages made accessing this new
information about who to contact and
how to comply with the new processes
difficult. Similarly, repair crews often
did not know what repairs they needed
to make until they reached the site.
In addition, while it was generally
clear to communications providers that
the Commission was the right agency to
contact for regulatory relief after the
disaster, the roles of other federal
agencies in the recovery effort were not
as clear to a large portion of the
industry.98 Communications providers
who needed federal assistance (such as
obtaining fuel authorizations or access
to the impacted area), often did not
know whom to contact. Industry
participants also appeared generally
unclear about which federal agency was
responsible for implementing important
recovery programs or distributing
resources to communications companies
operating in the impacted area.
Competing requests for outage
information from government entities at
the federal, state and local level added
to the confusion about agency roles.
And responding to duplicative, repeated
inquiries in the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina was cited by some as a
distraction to communications
providers’ restoration efforts.
2. Industry—State and Local
Government Coordination. In general,
coordination between communications
providers and state and local
government officials in the affected
region for communications network
recovery purposes did not appear to
exist except on an ad hoc basis. For the
most part, there did not appear to be in
existence any organized mechanism for
communications providers to share
information with local officials or to
seek their assistance with respect to
specific recovery issues, like access and
fuel. Following Katrina, the Panel heard
that state and local government
representatives were exchanging
business cards with communications
providers in their area for the first time.
Local government officials noted that
they sometimes did not know where to
98 See, e.g., Written Statement of C. Patrick
Roberts, President of the Florida Association of
Broadcasters, Before the FCC’s Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina, at 3
(Mar. 7, 2006) (observing that America must have
a more cohesive and comprehensive program
among federal, state, and local governments to
prepare for disasters); see also Sprint-Nextel Jan. 30
Written Testimony at 4–5 (recognizing that there is
a need to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the
government agencies that are involved in
telecommunications restoration).
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turn to figure out why communications
to and from key government locations
did not work and how to express their
priorities for communications service
restoration. In addition, coordinating
credentialing, access, fuel sharing,
security and other key recovery efforts
was difficult because there were no
identified staging areas or coordination
points for the communications industry.
3. Federal Government, State and
Local Government Coordination. The
Panel is not aware of pre-established
mechanisms through which the federal
government coordinated with state and
local governments concerning
communications network restoration
issues in the wake of Katrina. For
example, the Panel heard that civilian
public safety officials were often unable
to communicate with military officials
brought in to assist local law
enforcement. In addition, state and local
governments are not a part of the NCC 99
and, therefore, were not able to directly
coordinate with that industry-federal
government group. As noted above, and
due in part to a lack of pre-arranged
recovery procedures, state and local
government officials did not seem to be
part of communications network
recovery efforts. This meant that their
restoration priorities may not have been
effectively conveyed to communications
providers and that communications
providers did not have an identified
place to turn for assistance with access
and other recovery issues.
C. Emergency Communications Services
and Programs
The federal government, through the
NCS, has established several programs
for priority communications services
during and following an emergency.100
These are the Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (‘‘GETS’’),
which enables an eligible user to get
priority call completion for wireline
telephone calls; the Wireless Priority
Service (‘‘WPS’’), which enables an
eligible user to get access to the next
free channel when making a wireless
call; and Telecommunications Service
Priority (‘‘TSP’’), which enables a
qualifying user to get priority restoration
and provisioning of telecommunications
services.101 During and after Katrina,
these priority services seemed to work
May 10 NSTAC Report at 3.
e.g., Capt. Wetherald Apr. 18 Oral
Testimony, Tr. at 18.
101 See, e.g., Written Statement of Dr. Peter
Fonash, Deputy Manager, National
Communications System, S. Comm. on Homeland
Security and Gov’t Affairs, Hearing on Managing
Law Enforcement and Communications in a
Catastrophe at 3–4 (Feb. 6, 2006), available at
https://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/020606Fonash.pdf.
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100 See,
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well for those who subscribed to them.
However, only a small percentage of
those eligible for the services appeared
to do so. This is particularly true of
public safety users—many eligible
public safety entities have not signed up
for these services. It also appears to be
true for some communications
providers, including broadcast, WISP,
and cable companies. These priority
services could be an extremely useful
tool in network restoration efforts. Yet,
they are tools that appear not fully
utilized. Like other emergency tools,
they require training and practice. In
some cases, users who had access to
these services did not fully understand
how to use them (e.g., that a WPS call
requires inputting a GETS code so the
call would get priority treatment when
it reached the landline network).
III. First Responder Communications
In the days following Hurricane
Katrina, the ability of public safety and
emergency first responders to
communicate varied greatly across the
affected region. The areas in and around
New Orleans were seriously
impacted.102 New Orleans EMS was
forced to cease 911 operations in
anticipation of Katrina’s landfall and,
after the levees were breached, a total
loss of EMS and fire communications
ensued.103 The communications
infrastructure in coastal areas was
heavily damaged due to winds or
flooding.104 As a result, more than 2,000
police, fire and EMS personnel were
forced to communicate in single
channel mode, radio-to-radio, utilizing
only three mutual aid frequencies.105
Some mutual-aid channels required
each speaker to wait his or her turn
before speaking, sometimes up to
twenty minutes.106 This level of
destruction did not extend to inland
areas affected by the hurricane so, in
contrast to New Orleans, neither Baton
Rouge nor Jackson County, Mississippi,
completely lost their communications
capabilities and were soon operating at
pre-Katrina capabilities.107 In the
102 See,
e.g., Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at
43.
103 Id.
104 Jeff
Smith Written Statement at 12.
of Major Mike Sauter, Office of
Technology and Communications, New Orleans
Police Department, Before the FCC’s Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina,
at 1 (Feb. 1, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Sauter Written
Statement’’].
106 See, e.g., Senate Report on Katrina at 21–6
(NOFD and NOPD were forced to use a mutual aid
channel, rather than the 800 MHz trunk system they
were supposed to operate on; transmission over the
mutual aid channel was limited and could not
reach certain parts of the city).
107 See Oral Testimony of George W. Sholl,
Director, Jackson County Emergency
105 Presentation
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hardest hit areas, however, the
disruption of public safety
communications operability, as well as
a lack of interoperability, frustrated the
response effort and caused tremendous
confusion among official personnel 108
and the general public.
State and local first responders are
required to act and communicate within
minutes after disasters have occurred
and not hours or days later when
Federal or other resources from outside
the affected area become available. As
further described below, the lack of
effective emergency communications
after the storm revealed inadequate
planning, coordination and training on
the use of technologies that can help to
restore emergency communications.
Hurricane Katrina also highlighted the
long-standing problem of
interoperability among public safety
communications systems operating in
different frequency bands and with
different technical standards.109 One
advantage that New Orleans had was the
fact that no broadcasters were using the
700 MHz spectrum set aside for public
safety, thus freeing it up immediately
for first responder use.110 As a result of
this availability, communications
providers were able to provide
emergency trucks and hundreds of
radios that operated on this spectrum as
soon as first responders needed them.111
Finally, 911 emergency call handling
suffered from a lack of preprogrammed
routing of calls to PSAPs not
incapacitated by the hurricane.
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A. Lack of Advanced Planning for
Massive System Failures
It was described to the Panel that
public safety officials plan for disasters
but that Hurricane Katrina was a
catastrophe.112 This left many state and
Communications District, Before the FCC’s
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina, at Tr. at 58–59 (Mar. 6, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Scholl Mar. 6 Oral Testimony’’].
108 Saussy Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43–44.
109 See, e.g., Written Statement of Colonel (ret.)
Terry J. Ebbert, Director, Homeland Security for
New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina: Preparedness and
Response by the State of Louisiana, Before the
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the
Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina,
United States House of Representatives, at 3–4 (Dec.
14, 2005), available at https://katrina.house.gov/
hearings/12_14_05/ebbert_121405.doc.
110 See Written Statement of Kelly Kirwin, Vice
President, Motorola Comm. & Electronics, Before
the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement’’] (in
some major cities (e.g., New York, Los Angeles, San
Francisco), the 700 MHz spectrum would not be
available to first responders).
111 See id.
112 Written Statement of Sheriff Kevin Beary,
Major County Sheriffs Assn. at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006)
[hereinafter ‘‘Beary Jan. 30 Written Statement’’].
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local agencies, those who are required to
respond first to such emergencies, illprepared to restore communications
essential to their ability to do their
jobs.113 Very few public safety agencies
had stockpiles of key equipment on
hand to implement rapid repairs or
patches to their systems. Had they been
available, spare radios, batteries and
chargers as well as portable repeaters or
self-sufficient communications vehicles
(also known as ‘‘communications on
wheels’’) would have enabled greater
local communications capabilities.114
Further, when the primary
communications system failed, many
public safety entities did not have plans
for an alternative, redundant system to
take its place.115 Similarly, public safety
entities, including state and local
government offices, did not appear to
have plans in place for call forwarding
or number portability to route their calls
to alternative locations when they
relocated. The apparent absence of
contingency plans to address massive
system failures, including widespread
power outages,116 was a major
impediment to the rapid restoration of
first responder communications.
Public safety agencies rely heavily on
their equipment vendors to support
them during such disasters by providing
replacement parts and spare radios.
Motorola stated that 72 hours prior to
Katrina’s landfall, it had mobilized more
than 100,000 pieces of equipment and
more than 300 employees to support
their customers.117 Similarly, M/A-Com
supported the restoration and
maintenance of the New Orleans 800
MHz system as well as the systems for
Mobile, Biloxi, Gulfport, and St.
Tammany Parish.118 Reports indicate
that these efforts with established
vendors were generally well-executed,
except for problems with access into
New Orleans.
However, the Panel was made aware
of a variety of non-traditional,
alternative technologies that could have
served as effective, back-up
communications for public safety until
their primary systems were repaired. As
noted in Section I, satellite
infrastructure was generally unaffected
by the storm and could have provided
a viable back-up system. Two-way
paging operations remained generally
operational during the storm and did
provide communications capabilities for
Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 43–44.
Jan. 30 Written Statement at 1.
115 Presentation of Sheriff Ted Sexton, Sr.
National Sheriffs Assn at 5 (Jan. 30, 2006); McEwen
Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 35–36.
116 McEwen Mar. 6 Written Statement at 5–6.
117 Kirwin Jan. 30 Written Statement at 2.
118 Comments of M/A-Com at 7 (Jan. 30, 2006).
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114 Beary
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38585
some police, fire emergency medical
personnel, but could have been more
widely utilized.119 Other types of nontraditional technology that can be
deployed quickly, such as WiFi and
WiMax, or self-contained
communications vehicles, could also
have been effectively utilized. These all
appear deserving of exploration as backup communications options to primary
public safety systems.
First responders’ lack of training on
alternative, back-up communications
equipment was also an impediment in
the recovery effort.120 This lack of
training may have accounted for a
sizeable number of communications
failures during the first 48 hours after
Katrina.121 Public safety officials noted
that that there was little time after
Katrina to investigate the capabilities of
new technologies for which none of
their personnel had been adequately
trained. This highlights the need for
public safety entities to have
contingency communications plans
with training as a key component. The
lack of training issue evidenced itself in
particular with the distribution of
satellite phones. These phones proved
to be a beneficial resource to some,
while others described the service as
spotty and capacity strained. In many
cases, it appears that complaints about
spotty coverage really resulted from the
user’s lack of understanding about how
to use the phone (e.g., some satellite
phones have a unique dialing pattern
and they generally do not work
indoors).122 However, the uncontrolled
distribution of satellite phones could
also have triggered capacity issues in
certain areas.123 Additionally, public
safety officials reminded the Panel that
users must be properly trained before
they can be expected to competently use
technologies during high stress
events.124
Finally, it seems that communications
assets that were available and could
have been used by first responders were
119 Vincent Kelly-USA Mobility Mar. 6 Written
Testimony at 7–9; Deer Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr.
at 122–23.
120 See, e.g., Written Statement of James Monroe
III, Chief Executive Officer, Globalstar LLC, Before
the FCC’s Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina at 4 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement’’] (some first
responders failed to keep handset batteries charged,
others did not realize that satellite phones require
a clear line of sight between the handset and the
satellite).
121 Id.
122 Cavossa-SIA Written Testimony at 4–5.
123 See Report of Ed Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge
Fire Department, Hurricane Katrina Independent
Panel Meeting, at 1 (Jan. 30, 2006) [hereinafter
‘‘Written Report of Ed Smith’’].
124 See, e.g., Scholl Oral Testimony, Tr. at 57–58,
61–62.
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not requested or deployed. There have
been reports that federal government
communications assets operated and
maintained by FEMA and USDA were
available, but not utilized, for state and
local public safety operations.125 This
underutilization may have been due to
the fact that FEMA’s pre-staged
communications vehicles apparently
were located 250–350 miles away from
the devastated areas,126 and that FEMA
did not request deployment of these
vehicles until twenty-four hours after
landfall.127 Further, first responders
were not made aware of these assets
and/or did not know how to request
them.128 As noted above, many public
safety officials failed to subscribe to the
GETS, TSP and WPS priority programs,
despite their eligibility.129
Communications assets made available
by the private sector also appear to have
been underutilized by first responders.
The Panel heard that manufacturers of
alternative public safety
communications systems were unable to
gain the attention of key public safety
officials to effectuate their proposed
donation of equipment and services.
Some offered equipment or access to
their network in Katrina’s aftermath but
‘‘found no takers’’.130 These and other
outlets could have provided some
measure of communications
capabilities, while repairs to primary
systems were completed.
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B. Lack of Interoperability
Because of its scope and severity,
Hurricane Katrina demanded a
coordinated response from federal and
affected state and local agencies, as well
125 The Federal Response To Hurricane Katrina
Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 55.
126 Senate Report on Katrina at 12–19 (citing
Committee staff interview of James Attaway,
Telecommunications Specialist, Region VI, FEMA,
conducted on Jan. 13, 2006).
127 Senate Report on Katrina at 12–19 (citing
Committee staff interview of William Milani, Chief
Mobile Operations Section, FEMA, conducted on
Jan. 13, 2006).
128 See, e.g., Monroe-Globalstar Written Statement
at 5 (first responders generally did not have preemergency deployment plans that they could
invoke in advance of the actual emergency).
129 During and after Katrina, the NCS issued 1,000
new GETS access code numbers to first responders,
and the GETS system was used to make more than
35,000 calls between August 28 and September 9.
House Report at 176. During Katrina, the NCS
enabled and distributed more than 4,000 new WPS
phones. Id. The NCS also completed more than
1,500 TSP assignments following Hurricane
Katrina. Id. at 177. It would have been helpful if
these assets had been in place before the disaster
and first responders were fully trained in how to
use them.
130 Statement of Jerry Knoblach, Chairman & CEO,
Space Data Corporation, Before the Federal
Communications Commission’s Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, at 6 (Mar. 7, 2006).
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as volunteers from states both
neighboring and distant. The Panel
heard evidence that, in many cases,
responders in different agencies were
unable to communicate due to
incompatible frequency assignments.131
When the existing infrastructure for the
New Orleans system was incapacitated
by flooding, communications were
almost completely thwarted as too many
users attempted to use the three mutual
aid channels in the 800 MHz band.132 In
addition, communications between the
military and first responders also
appeared to suffer from lack of
interoperability.133 In some cases, the
military was reduced to using human
runners to physically carry messages
between deployed units and first
responders.134 In another case, a
military helicopter had to drop a
message in a bottle to warn first
responders about a dangerous gas
leak.135
While most observers characterized
‘‘operability’’ as the primary
communications failure following
Katrina,136 increased ability to
interoperate with other agencies would
have provided greater redundant
communications paths and a more
coordinated response. While
technological solutions, such as IP
gateways to integrate frequencies across
multiple bands,137 are a critical tool for
131 A Failure to Communicate: A Stocktake of
Government Inaction to Address Communications
Interoperability Failures Following Hurricane
Katrina, First Response Coalition, December 2005.
132 Sauter Written Statement at 1; Written Report
of Ed Smith at 1.
133 See Written Statement of Dr. William W.
Pinsky on behalf of the American Hospital
Association, The State of Interoperable
Communications: Perspectives from the Field,
Before the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Science, and Technology, Committee
on Homeland Security, United States House of
Representatives, at 5 (Feb. 15, 2006), available at
https://hsc.house.gov/files/TestimonyPinsky.pdf.
134 See, e.g., Written Statement of The Honorable
Timothy J. Roemer, Director, Center for National
Policy, Public Safety Communications From 9/11 to
Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the
Internet, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
United States House of Representatives, at 5 (Sept.
29, 2005), available at https://
energycommerce.house.gov/108/hearings/
09292005Hearing1648/Roemer.pdf (describing the
use of human couriers by the National Guard).
135 Heather Greenfield, Katrina Revealed Gaps In
Emergency Response System, The Wash. Times,
Dec. 28, 2005, at B1, available at https://
washingtontimes.com/metro/20051227-0951343753r.htm.
136 The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina—
Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 55; Saussy Mar.
6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 44.
137 See, e.g., Presentation to the Meeting of the
Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,
Dr. John Vaughan, Vice President TYCO
Electronics: M/A–COM, March 6, 2006; see also
Presentation to the FCC’s Independent Panel
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improving interoperability, the Panel
was reminded that technology is not the
sole driver of an optimal solution.138
Training, agreement on standard
operating procedures, governance or
leadership and proper usage are all
critical elements of the interoperability
continuum.139 However, the Panel
heard testimony that Project SAFECOM,
which is intended to provide a solution
for interoperability among Federal, state
and local officials, will take years to
achieve its objectives.140 However, the
Panel is also aware of more expedient
proposals, such as the M/A-COM, Inc.
proposal to mandate construction of all
Federal and non-Federal mutual aid
channels to provide baseline
interoperability to all emergency
responders that operate across multiple
frequency bands using disparate
technologies.141
C. PSAP Rerouting
When a PSAP becomes disabled, 911
emergency calls from the public are
typically diverted to a secondary
neighboring PSAP using preconfigured
traffic routes. In many cases, Katrina
disabled both the primary and
secondary PSAPs, which resulted in
many unanswered emergency calls.
Additionally, many PSAPs in Louisiana
did not have protocols in place to
identify where 911 calls should go and
had not arranged for any rerouting,
resulting in dropped emergency calls.142
The Panel heard testimony that Katrina
has highlighted a need to identify
additional back-up PSAPs at remote
locations. However, FCC regulations
may currently restrict the ability of local
phone companies to establish preconfigured routes across LATA
boundaries.143 In addition, the routing
of calls to more distant PSAPs would
require specific planning to ensure
appropriate and timely response to
emergency calls.
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks, Wesley D. Smith,
Technical Director, ARINC (Mar. 7, 2006).
138 See Interoperability Continuum Brochure,
Project Safecom, Dept. of Homeland Security (April
5, 2005), available at https://
www.safecomprogram.gov/NR/rdonlyres/5C103F66A36E-4DD1-A00A-54C477B47AFC/0/
ContinuumBrochure40505.pdf.
139 Id. at 4.
140 Oral Testimony of Dr. David G. Boyd, Director
of SAFECOM, Dept. of Homeland Security, Tr. at
29–30 (Apr. 18, 2006); see also Stephen Losey,
Defense re-examines homeland role, tactics, Federal
Times.com (Oct. 18, 2005), available at https://
www.federaltimes.com/index.php?S=1174164.
141 See Further Comments of M/A–Com, Inc.
(May 30, 2006).
142 House Report at 173.
143 Bailey Jan. 30 Written Testimony at 3.
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D. Emergency Medical Communications
There are indications that the
emergency medical community was
lacking in contingency communications
planning and information about
technologies and services that might
address their critical communications
needs.144 In particular, this group of
first responders did not seem to avail
itself of existing priority
communications services, such as
GETS, WPS and TSP. It also appeared
that emergency medical personnel were
not always integrated into a locality’s
public safety communications planning.
IV. Emergency Communications to the
Public
The communications infrastructure,
in all of its forms, is a key asset in
delivering information to the American
public. In emergencies and disaster
situations, ensuring public safety is the
first priority. The use of
communications networks to
disseminate reliable and relevant
information to the public is critical—
before, during and after such events.
Moreover, to the extent a more wellinformed citizenry is better able to
prepare for and respond to disasters,
there should be less strain on already
taxed resources, thereby benefiting
recovery efforts.
The Emergency Alert System (‘‘EAS’’)
and its predecessor systems have long
made use of broadcast radio and
television stations as the principal tools
for communicating with the public
about emergencies and disaster
situations. The Panel heard stories of
heroic efforts by broadcasters and cable
operators to provide members of the
public impacted by Katrina with
important storm-related information.
However, there were also reports of
missed opportunities to utilize the EAS
and limitations in existing efforts to
deliver emergency information to all
members of the public. New
technologies may address some of these
limitations by facilitating the provision
of both macro- and micro-level
information about impending disasters
and recovery efforts.
jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
A. Lack of Activation
The EAS can be activated by the
federal government as well as by state
and local officials to disseminate official
news and information to the public in
the event of an emergency. The Panel
understands that the National Weather
Service used the EAS to provide severe
weather warnings to citizens in the Gulf
States in advance of Katrina making
144 See
House Report at 269.
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landfall.145 However, the Panel also
heard that the EAS was not utilized by
state and local officials to provide
localized emergency evacuation and
other important information.146 That
means that an existing and effective
means of distributing timely
information to our citizens was not fully
utilized.
B. Limitations in Coverage
The primary source of emergency
information about Katrina came through
broadcast (including satellite broadcast)
and cable infrastructure, whether
through the EAS or local or national
news programming. Citizens who were
not watching TV or listening to the
radio at the time of the broadcast missed
this emergency information. Damage to
communications infrastructure made it
difficult for news and emergency
information to reach the public, as did
power outages.147 As a result, a fairly
large percentage of the public likely
were uninformed. The Panel heard
about notification technologies that may
permit emergency messages to be sent to
wireline and wireless telephones as well
as personal digital assistants and other
mobile devices.148 For example, the
Association of Public Television
Stations has developed a means for
utilizing the digital transmissions of
public television stations to datacast
emergency information to computers or
wireless devices.149 In addition, the St.
Charles Parish Public School District
used a telephone-based, time-sensitive
notification technology to send out
recorded evacuation messages to over
21,000 phone numbers in advance of
Katrina’s landfall.150 The District
continued to utilize this technology to
provide members of the public with
specific information regarding
conditions in the community in the
storm’s aftermath. While the use of
phone-based technologies for postdisaster communications is necessarily
dependent on the state of the telephone
network, such technologies—which are
less subject to disruption from power
outages—offer the potential for
145 The Federal Response to Hurricane
Katrina——Lessons Learned, February 2006, at 28.
146 Comments of Hilary Styron of the National
Organization on Disability Emergency Preparedness
Initiative at 2 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Styron
Mar. 6 Written Testimony’’].
147 Martin Sept. 29 Written Statement at 2.
148 Comments of Notification Technologies, Inc.,
EB Docket No. 04–296 (Jan. 24, 2006).
149 Written Testimony of John M. Lawson,
President and CEO, Association of Public
Television Stations, Before the FCC’s Independent
Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks (April 18, 2006).
150 Id. at 12.
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complementing the traditional
broadcast-based EAS.
The Panel also understands that the
FCC is considering extending the reach
of the existing emergency alert system to
other technologies, such as wireless and
the Internet.151 The Panel understands
that there are ongoing collaborative
industry-government efforts to
overcome the hurdles to extending
alerts to other technologies.
C. Reaching Persons With Disabilities
and Non-English-Speaking Americans
Ensuring emergency communications
reach all Americans, even those with
hearing and visual disabilities or who
do not speak English, remains a major
challenge. Unfortunately, accessibility
to suitable communications devices for
the deaf and hard of hearing was
difficult during and after Hurricane
Katrina.152 This problem was intensified
by the fact that Katrina brought
humidity, rain, flooding, and high
temperatures (which translate into
perspiration), all of which reduce the
effectiveness of hearing aids and
cochlear implants.153 For persons with
visual impairments, telephone and
broadcast outages made information
very hard to obtain, and many people
with vision loss were unable to
evacuate.154
The broadcast industry has taken
significant steps to provide on-screen
sign language interpreters and close
captioning. Broadcasters also sometimes
broadcast critical information in a
second language where there are a
significant number of non-English
speaking residents in the community.
For example, a Spanish-language radio
station in the New Orleans area
provided warnings, and information
about family members and disaster
relief assistance.155
151 Review of the Emergency Alert System, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 18,625, 18,653 (¶ 69)
(2005).
152 See, e.g., Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at
2 (over 80% of shelters did not have access to
communications devices for the deaf; over 60% of
shelters did not have captioning capabilities
utilized on the televisions screens and several
broadcasters did not caption their emergency
information, even though it is required by the FCC);
Oral Testimony of Cheryl Heppner, Vice Chair, Deaf
and Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network,
FCC Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks,
Tr. at 283 (Mar. 6, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘Heppner Mar.
6 Oral Testimony’’] (many television stations did
not provide visual information).
153 Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 282.
154 Comment of the American Council of the
Blind and American Foundation for the Blind, at 2
(May 3, 2006).
155 See, e.g., Comments by the National Council
of La Raza, In the Eye of the Storm: How the Gov’t
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However, the Panel also heard that
written or captioned information was at
times inadequate and that station logos
or captions sometimes covered up the
sign-language interpreter or closecaptioning.156 Additionally, personnel
who provided these critical services
often evacuated, leaving the station with
no ability to deliver these services.
Further, specialized radios relied upon
by the hearing-impaired, because they
can display text messages, are not
currently designed to be batteryoperated and thus became useless when
power goes out.157 The distribution of
emergency weather information in
languages other than English appeared
limited, based primarily on the
willingness and ability of local weather
forecasting offices and the availability of
ethnic media outlets.158 Innovative
notification technologies, such as those
described above, may provide a partial
answer to the emergency
communications needs of persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking
members of the public as such
technologies can be used to deliver
targeted messages in a specified format.
Relatedly, individuals with
disabilities often had a difficult time
using communications capabilities at
shelters or other recovery areas.159
Phone and computer banks provided at
these locations generally did not have
capabilities to assist the hearing or
speech-impaired.160
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D. Inconsistent or Incorrect Emergency
Information
One of the benefits of the EAS is that
it facilitates the communication of a
uniform message to the public by an
authoritative or credible spokesperson,
thereby minimizing confusion and
contributing to an orderly public
response. However, as noted above, the
EAS was not activated in several
jurisdictions. Moreover, while
broadcasters, cable operators and
satellite providers went to considerable
lengths to provide the public with
information regarding Katrina and its
impact, the Panel understands that
inconsistent or erroneous information
and Private Response to Hurricane Katrina Failed
Latinos at 5 (Apr. 24, 2006) [hereinafter ‘‘La Raza
Comments’’].
156 Heppner Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 283–
84; Remarks by Cheryl Heppner, Deaf and Hard of
Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network, at 2 (Mar. 6,
2006).
157 Heppner Mar. 6. Oral Testimony at 283–85.
158 See, e.g., La Raza Comments at 5 (citing
Interview with official at the National Weather
Service, Jan. 6, 2006).
159 Id.; Styron Mar. 6 Written Testimony at 2.
160 See, e.g., id.; Comments of the Consortium for
Citizens With Disabilities at 1–2 (April 13, 2006);
Styron Mar. 6 Oral Testimony, Tr. at 291.
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about critical emergency issues was
sometimes provided within the affected
region. For example, information
regarding conditions in one portion of
New Orleans did not necessarily
accurately depict conditions in other
areas of the city. The dissemination of
targeted information from an
authoritative source through the EAS or
other notification technologies might
have assisted with this problem.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Based upon its observations regarding
the impact of Hurricane Katrina on
communications networks and the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the
recovery effort, the Panel has developed
a number of recommendations to the
FCC for improving disaster
preparedness, network reliability and
communications among first
responders. As with its observations,
these recommendations are grouped
into four sections. The first contains
recommendations for steps to better preposition the communications industry
and the government for disasters in
order to achieve greater network
reliability and resiliency. The second
section presents suggestions for
improving recovery coordination to
address existing shortcomings and to
maximize the use of existing resources.
The third section focuses on first
responder communications issues,
recommending essential steps for
improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911
communications in times of crisis. And
finally, the last group of
recommendations presents the Panel’s
suggestions for improving emergency
communications to the public. All of
our citizens deserve to be sufficiently
informed should a major disaster strike
in the future.
Pre-Positioning for Disasters—A
Proactive, Rather Than Reactive
Program for Network Reliability and
Resiliency
1. Pre-positioning for the
Communications Industry—A Readiness
Checklist—The FCC should work with
and encourage each industry sector,
through their organizations or
associations, to develop and publicize
sector-specific readiness
recommendations. Such a checklist
should be based upon relevant industry
best practices as set forth by groups
such as the Media Security and
Reliability Council (‘‘MSRC’’) and the
Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council (‘‘NRIC’’). Any such checklist
should include the following elements:
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a. Developing and implementing
business continuity plans, which would
at a minimum address:
i. Power reserves,
ii. Cache of essential replacement
equipment,
iii. Adequate sparing levels,
iv. Credentialing,
v. Emergency Operations Center
(‘‘EOC’’) coordination,
vi. Training/disaster drills, and
vii. Appropriate disaster preparedness
checklists;
b. Conducting exercises to evaluate
these plans and train personnel;
c. Developing and practicing a
communications plan to identify ‘‘key
players’’ and multiple means of
contacting them (including alternate
communications channels, such as
alpha pagers, Internet, satellite phones,
VOIP, private lines, BlackBerry-type
devices, etc.);
d. Routinely archiving critical system
backups and providing for their storage
in a ‘‘secure off-site’’ facilities.
2. Pre-positioning for Public Safety—
An Awareness Program for NonTraditional Emergency Alternatives—
The FCC should take steps to educate
the public safety community about the
availability and capabilities of nontraditional technologies that might
provide effective back-up solutions for
existing public safety communications
systems. Examples of these technologies
would be pagers, satellite technology
and phones, portable towers and
repeaters, point-to-point microwave
links, license-exempt WISP systems,
other systems less reliant on the PSTN,
and bridging technologies/gateways that
would facilitate interoperability. One
means for the FCC to do this would be
to organize an exhibit area or
demonstration of these technologies in
conjunction with one or more large
public safety conferences, such as:
a. APCO International Annual
Conference and Exposition August 6–
10, 2006; Orlando, FL
b. IAFC Fire Rescue International
September 14–16, 2006; Dallas, TX
c. International Association of Chiefs
of Police Conference October 14–18,
2006; Boston, MA
d. NENA Annual Conference and
Trade Show June 9–14, 2007; Fort
Worth, TX
e. National Sheriff’s Association
Annual Conference June 23–27, 2007;
Salt Lake City, UT
f. National Fraternal Order of Police
August 13–16, 2007; Louisville, KY
The FCC should also consider
organizing a similar exhibit/
demonstration for other industry sectors
that might benefit from this information
3. Pre-positioning for FCC Regulatory
Requirements—An A Priori Program for
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Disaster Areas—The FCC should
explore amending its rules to permit
automatic grants of certain types of
waivers or special temporary authority
(STA) in a particular geographic area if
the President declares that area to be a
‘‘disaster area’’. As a condition of the
waiver or STA, the FCC could require
verbal or written notification to the
Commission staff contemporaneously
with activation or promptly after the
fact. Further, the FCC should examine
expanding the on-line filing
opportunities for STA requests,
including STA requests for AM
broadcast stations. Examples of possible
rule waivers and STAs to study for this
treatment include:
a. Wireline.
i. Waiver of certain carrier change
requirements to allow customers whose
long distance service was disrupted to
be connected to an operational long
distance provider.
ii. Waiver of aging residential
numbers rules for customers in the
affected area. This allows carriers to
disconnect temporarily customers’
telephone service, upon request, and
reinstate the same number when the
service is reconnected.
iii. Waiver of number portability
requirements to allow rerouting of
traffic to switches unaffected by the
crisis.
iv. Waiver of reporting filings, such as
Form 477 on local competition and
broadband data, during the crisis.
b. Wireless.
i. Waiver of amateur radio and license
exempt rules permitting transmissions
necessary to meet essential
communications needs.
ii. Waiver of application filing
deadlines (e.g., renewals, construction
notifications, discontinuance notices,
etc.), construction requirements, and
discontinuance of service requirements.
iii. Streamlined STA process, such
that parties in the affected area may
simply notify the FCC in writing or
verbally of a need to operate in order to
restore service.
c. Broadcast and Cable.
i. Waiver of non-commercial
educational (‘‘NCE’’) rules to permit
NCE television and radio stations in the
affected area to simulcast and
rebroadcast commercial station
programming during a crisis.
ii. Waiver of requirements for
notifying the FCC of use of emergency
antennas within 24 hours.
iii. Waiver of limits on AM nighttime
operations, so long as operation is
conducted on a noncommercial basis.
iv. Waiver of rules on limited and
discontinued operations.
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v. Tolling of broadcast station
construction deadlines.
vi. Automatic STAs, or STAs granted
through written or oral notification, for
broadcast stations to go silent.
vii. Waiver of restrictions on
simulcast programming of commonly
owned stations within the same band.
viii. Waiver of location and staffing
requirements of a main studio within
the community.
ix. Waiver of activation and postevent Section 73.1250 reporting
requirements related to transmission of
point-to-point communications during a
declared emergency.
d. Satellite.
i. Waiver of requirements for notifying
the FCC of use of emergency antenna
equipment within 24 hours.
ii. Streamlined STA process for
satellite operators responding to a
declared emergency.
4. Pre-positioning for Government
Outage Monitoring—A Single
Repository and Contact with Consistent
Data Collection—The FCC should
coordinate with other federal and state
agencies to identify a single repository/
point of contact for communications
outage information in the wake of an
emergency. The Panel suggests that the
FCC is the federal agency best situated
to perform this function. The FCC
should work with affected industry
members and their trade associations to
establish a consolidated data set and
geographic area for data collection.
Once broad agreement is reached on the
appropriate outage information to be
collected, it should be consistently
applied and not subject to routine
changes. To the extent practical, the
frequency of voluntary reporting and
duration of reporting requirements
should be specified as part of any
emergency outage reporting plan. The
Panel suggests that reporting no more
than once a day would strike the right
balance between supplying important
outage information and not distracting
resources from critical recovery efforts.
Additionally, any proprietary
information that is gathered through
voluntary outage reporting must be kept
confidential, with only aggregated
information provided to appropriate
government entities, such as the local
EOC, during a crisis situation. Any
carrier-specific data should be disclosed
to other agencies only with appropriate
confidentiality safeguards (such as nondisclosure agreements) in place.
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Recovery Coordination—Critical Steps
for Addressing Existing Shortcomings
and Maximizing Use of Existing
Resources
1. Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—National Credentialing
Guidelines for Communications
Infrastructure Providers—The Panel
generally supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory
Committee’s (‘‘NSTAC’s’’)
recommendation for a national standard
for credentialing telecommunications
repair workers, but believes this should
be broadened to include repair workers
of all communications infrastructure
providers (including wireline, wireless,
WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting
infrastructure providers). Specifically,
the Panel recommends that the FCC
work with other appropriate federal
departments and agencies and the
communications industry to promptly
develop national credentialing
requirements and process guidelines for
enabling communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers
access to the affected area post-disaster.
The FCC should encourage states to
develop and implement a credentialing
program consistent with these
guidelines as promptly as possible and
encourage appropriate communications
industry members to secure any
necessary credentialing. Under this
program, credentials should be available
to be issued to communications
infrastructure providers at any time
during the year, including before,
during and after a disaster situation. The
credentials should be issued directly to
communications infrastructure
providers, which will then be
responsible for distributing these
credentials to their employees and
contracted workers. These credentials,
together with company-issued employee
or contractor identification should be
sufficient to permit access. As a
condition of credentialing, the program
should require that communications
infrastructure providers receiving
credentials ensure that their employees
and contracted workers receiving
credentials complete basic National
Incident Management System (‘‘NIMS’’)
training (i.e., ‘‘Introduction to NIMS’’).
The FCC should work with the
communications industry to develop an
appropriate basic NIMS training course
(no more than one hour) for
communications repair workers that can
be completed online. Once developed,
this communications-specific training
course should replace ‘‘Introduction to
NIMS’’ as the requirement for
credentialing. The FCC should also
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encourage states to recognize and accept
credentials issued by other states.
2. Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—Emergency Responder
Status for Communications
Infrastructure Providers—The Panel
supports the NSTAC’s recommendation
that telecommunications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers
be afforded emergency responder status
under the Stafford Act and that this
designation be incorporated into the
National Response Plan, as well as state
and local emergency response plans.
However, the Panel suggests that this
recommendation be broadened to
include all communications
infrastructure providers (including
wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable
and broadcasting infrastructure
providers) and their contracted workers.
The FCC should work with Congress
and the other appropriate federal
departments and agencies to implement
this broadened recommendation.
3. Remedying Existing
Shortcomings—Utilization of State/
Regional Coordination Bodies—The
FCC should work with state and local
government and the communications
industry (including wireline, wireless,
WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting)
to better utilize the coordinating
capabilities at regional, state and local
EOCs, as well as the Joint Field Office
(‘‘JFO’’). The FCC should encourage, but
not require, each regional, state and
local EOC and the JFO to engage in the
following activities:
a. Facilitate coordination between
communications infrastructure
providers (including wireline, wireless,
WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting
providers, where appropriate) and state
and local emergency preparedness
officials (such as the state emergency
operations center) in the state or region
at the EOC or JFO. The parties should
meet on a periodic basis to develop
channels of communications (both preand post-disaster), to construct joint
preparedness and response plans, and to
conduct joint exercises.
b. Develop credentialing requirements
and procedures for purposes of allowing
communications infrastructure
providers, their contracted workers and
private security teams, if any, access to
the affected area post-disaster. These
requirements and procedures should be
consistent with any nationallydeveloped credentialing guidelines.
Where possible, web-based applications
should be created to pre-clear or
expedite movement of communications
infrastructure providers into a disaster
area.
c. Develop and facilitate inclusion in
the state’s Emergency Preparedness
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Plan, where appropriate, one or more
clearly identified post-disaster
coordination areas for communications
infrastructure providers, their
contracted workers, and private security
teams, if any, to gather post-disaster
where credentialing, security, escorts
and further coordination can be
achieved. The state’s Emergency
Preparedness Plan should describe the
process for informing communications
infrastructure providers where these
coordination area(s) will be located.
d. Post-disaster, share information
and coordinate resources to facilitate
repair of key communications
infrastructure. Specifically, this would
include identifying key damaged
infrastructure; if necessary, assigning
priorities for access and scarce resources
(fuel, security, etc.) to repair this
infrastructure. Additionally, the
coordination body and staging area can
provide a means for industry to share
and maximize scarce resources (share
surplus equipment, double and triple up
on security escorts to a particular area,
etc.).
e. Facilitate electric and other
utilities’ maintenance of priority lists for
commercial power restoration. Include
commercial communications providers
on this priority list and coordinate
power restoration activities with
communications restoration.
The Panel would also support
communications infrastructure
providers in a state or region forming an
industry-only group for disaster
planning, coordinating recovery efforts
and other purposes. Nevertheless, the
Panel believes that coordinating
capabilities and staffing of regional,
state and local EOCs, as well as the JFO,
need to be better utilized for the
purposes described above.
4. Maximizing Existing Resources—
Expanding and Publicizing Emergency
Communications Programs (GETS, WPS
and TSP)—To facilitate the use of
existing emergency communications
services and programs, the FCC should:
a. Work with the National
Communications System (‘‘NCS’’) to
actively and aggressively promote
GETS, WPS and TSP to all eligible
government, public safety, and critical
industry groups. As part of this outreach
effort, the Commission should target
groups that have relatively low levels of
participation. For example, the Panel
recommends that the Commission reach
out to the emergency medical
community and major trauma centers to
make them aware of the availability of
these services.
b. Work with the NCS to clarify
whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, and
cable company repair crews are eligible
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for GETS and WPS under the
Commission’s existing rules. If so, the
Commission should promote the
availability of these programs to those
entities and urge their subscribership. If
the Commission determines that these
entities are not eligible, the Panel
recommends that the Commission revise
its rules so that these entities can
subscribe to WPS and GETS.
c. Work with the NCS to explore
whether it is technically and financially
feasible for WPS calls to automatically
receive GETS treatment when they
reach landline facilities (thus avoiding
the need for a WPS caller to also enter
GETS information). The Commission
may desire to set up an industry task
force to explore this issue.
d. Work with the NCS and the
communications sector to establish and
promote best practices to ensure that all
WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are
properly trained in how to use these
services.
5. Maximizing Existing Resources—
Broadening NCC to Include All
Communications Infrastructure
Sectors—The FCC should work with the
NCS to broaden the membership of the
National Coordination Center for
Telecommunications (‘‘NCC’’) to
include adequate representation of all
types of communications systems,
including broadcast, cable, satellite and
other new technologies, as appropriate.
6. Maximizing Existing Resources—
FCC Web site for Emergency
Coordination Information—The FCC
should create a password-protected Web
site, accessible by credentialed entities
(under recovery coordination
recommendation #1), listing the key
state emergency management contacts
(especially the contacts for
communications coordinating bodies),
as well as post-disaster coordination
areas for communications providers.
During an emergency, this Web site
should be updated on a 24/7 basis.
7. Maximizing Existing Resources—
FCC Web site for Emergency Response
Team Information—The FCC should
create a Web site to publicize the
agency’s emergency response team’s
contact information and procedures for
facilitating disaster response and outage
recovery.
First Responder Communications—
Essential Steps for Addressing Lessons
Learned From Hurricane Katrina
1. Essential Steps in Pre-positioning
Equipment, Supplies and Personnel—
An Emergency Restoration Supply
Cache and Alternatives Inventory—To
facilitate the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities, the FCC
should:
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a. Encourage state and local
jurisdictions to retain and maintain,
including through arrangements with
the private sector, a cache of equipment
components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public
safety communications within hours of
a disaster. At a minimum, the cache
should include the necessary equipment
to quickly restore communications
capabilities on all relevant mutual aid
channels. Such a cache would consist
of:
i. RF gear, such as 800 MHz, UHF,
VHF, Mutual Aid, IP Gateway, and
dispatch consoles;
ii. trailer and equipment housing;
iii. tower system components
(antenna system, hydraulic mast);
iv. power system components
(generator, UPS, batteries, distribution
panel); and
v. fuel.
The cache should be maintained as a
regional or statewide resource and
located in areas protected from disaster
impacts. The cache should be included
as an element of the National Response
Plan.
b. Encourage state and local
jurisdictions to utilize the cache through
training exercises on a regular basis.
c. Support the ongoing efforts of the
NCC to develop and maintain a database
of state and local public safety system
information, including frequency usage,
to allow for more efficient spectrum
sharing, rapid on-site frequency
coordination, and emergency provision
of supplemental equipment in the event
of system failures.
d. Urge public safety licensees to
familiarize themselves with alternative
communications technologies to
provide communications when normal
public safety networks are down. Such
technologies include satellite
telephones, two-way paging devices,
and other technologies less reliant on
the PSTN. Most importantly, public
safety agencies should be reminded/
encouraged to train and use such
devices prior to emergencies.
e. Support the efforts of the NCC to
develop an inventory of available
communications assets (including local,
state, federal civilian and military) that
can be rapidly deployed in the event of
a catastrophic event. The list should
include land mobile radios, portable
infrastructure equipment, bridging
technologies/gateways, and backup
power system components. This
information should include the steps
necessary for requesting the deployment
of these assets. The FCC should work
with the NCC and the appropriate
agencies to educate key state and local
emergency response personnel on the
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availability of these assets and how to
request them.
f. Coordinate with the NCS/NCC to
assure that, immediately following any
large disaster, there is an efficient means
by which federal, state and local
officials can identify and locate private
sector communications assets that can
be made rapidly available to first
responders and relief organizations. One
such means to be considered would be
a Web site maintained by either the FCC
or NCC through which the private sector
could register available assets along
with product information. The Web site
should be designed with a special area
for registering available equipment to
assist persons with disabilities in their
communications needs.
2. Essential Steps in Enabling
Emergency Communications
Capabilities—Facilitating First
Responder Interoperability—To
facilitate interoperability among first
responder communications, the FCC
should:
a. Consistent with recent legislation,
maintain the schedule for commencing
commercial spectrum auctions before
January 28, 2008 to fully fund the $1
billion public safety interoperability
program.
b. Work with National
Telecommunications and Information
Administration (‘‘NTIA’’) and the
Department of Homeland Security
(‘‘DHS’’) to establish appropriate criteria
for the distribution of the $1 billion in
a manner that best promotes
interoperability with the 700 MHz band.
Among other things, such criteria
should mandate that any radios
purchased with grant monies must be
capable of operating on 700 MHz and
800 MHz channels established for
mutual aid and interoperability voice
communications.
c. Encourage the expeditious
development of regional plans for the
use of 700 MHz systems and move
promptly to review and approve such
plans.
d. Expeditiously approve any requests
by broadcasters to terminate analog
service in the 700 MHz band before the
end of the digital television transition in
2009 in order to allow public safety
users immediate access to this
spectrum.
e. Work with the NTIA and DHS to
develop strategies and policies to
expedite allowing Federal (including
the military), state and local agencies to
share spectrum for emergency response
purposes, particularly the Federal
incident response channels and
channels established for mutual aid and
interoperability.
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f. Publicize interoperability successes
and/or best practices by public safety
entities to serve as models to further
interoperability.
3. Essential Steps in Addressing E–
911 Lessons Learned—A Plan for
Resiliency and Restoration of E–911
Infrastructure and PSAPs—In order to
ensure a more robust E–911 service, the
FCC should encourage the
implementation of these best practice
recommendations issued by Focus
Group 1C of the FCC-chartered NRIC
VII:
a. Service providers and network
operators should consider placing and
maintaining 911 circuits over diverse
interoffice transport facilities (e.g.,
geographically diverse facility routes,
automatically invoked standby routing,
diverse digital cross-connect system
services, self-healing fiber ring
topologies, or any combination thereof).
See NRIC VII Recommendation 7–7–
0566.
b. Service providers, network
operators and property managers should
ensure availability of emergency/backup
power (e.g., batteries, generators, fuel
cells) to maintain critical
communications services during times
of commercial power failures, including
natural and manmade occurrences (e.g.,
earthquakes, floods, fires, power brown/
blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/
backup power generators should be
located onsite, when appropriate. See
NRIC VII Recommendation 7–7–5204.
c. Network operators should consider
deploying dual active 911 selective
router architectures to enable circuits
from the caller’s serving end office to be
split between two selective routers in
order to eliminate single points of
failure. Diversity should also be
considered on interoffice transport
facilities connecting each 911 selective
router to the PSAP serving end office.
See NRIC VII Recommendations 7–7–
0571.
d. Network operators, service
providers, equipment suppliers and
public safety authorities should
establish alternative methods of
communication for critical personnel.
See NRIC VII Recommendation 7–7–
1011.
In addition, the FCC should:
a. Recommend the designation of a
secondary back-up PSAP that is more
than 200 miles away to answer calls
when the primary and secondary PSAPs
are disabled. This requires the FCC to
eliminate any regulatory prohibition
against the transport of 911 across
LATA boundaries. The Panel
recommends that the FCC expeditiously
initiate such a rulemaking. This
rulemaking should also consider
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permitting a backup E–911 tandem
across a LATA boundary.
b. Recommend that the FCC urge the
DHS, Fire Grant Act, and other
applicable federal programs to permit
state or local 911 commissions or
emergency communications districts,
which provide 911 or public safety
communications services, to be eligible
to apply for 911 enhancement and
communications enhancement/
interoperability grants.
4. Essential Steps in Addressing
Lessons Learned Concerning Emergency
Medical and Hospital Communications
Needs—An Outreach Program to
Educate and Include the Emergency
Medical Community in Emergency
Communications Preparedness—The
FCC should work to assist the
emergency medical community to
facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness
of their emergency communications
systems. Among other things, the FCC
should:
a. Educate the emergency medical
community about emergency
communications and help to coordinate
this sector’s emergency communications
efforts;
b. Educate the emergency medical
community about the various priority
communications services (i.e., GETS,
WPS and TSP) and urge them to
subscribe;
c. Work with Congress and the other
appropriate federal departments and
agencies to ensure emergency medical
personnel are treated as public safety
personnel under the Stafford Act; and
d. Support DHS efforts to make
emergency medical providers eligible
for funding for emergency
communications equipment under the
State Homeland Security Grant Program.
Emergency Communications to the
Public—Actions To Alert and Inform
1. Actions to Alert and Inform—
Revitalize and Publicize the
Underutilized Emergency Alert
System—To facilitate and complement
the use of the existing Emergency Alert
System (‘‘EAS’’), the FCC should:
a. Educate state and local officials
about the existing EAS, its benefits, and
how it can be best utilized.
b. Develop a program for educating
the public about the EAS and promote
community awareness of potential
mechanisms for accessing those alerts
sent during power outages or broadcast
transmission failures.
c. Move expeditiously to complete its
proceeding to explore the technical and
financial viability of expanding the EAS
to other technologies, such as wireless
services and the Internet, recognizing
that changes to communications
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networks and equipment take time to
implement.
d. Consistent with proposed
legislation, work with Congress and
other appropriate federal departments
and agencies to explore the technical
and financial viability of establishing a
comprehensive national warning system
that complements existing systems and
allows local officials to increase the
penetration of warnings to the public as
well as target, when necessary, alerts to
a particular area.
e. Work with the DHS and other
appropriate federal agencies on pilot
programs that would allow more
immediate evaluation and testing of
new notification technologies.
f. Work with the Department of
Commerce to expand the distribution of
certain critical non-weather emergency
warnings over NOAA weather radios to
supplement the EAS.
2. Actions to Alert and Inform—
Commence Efforts to Ensure that
Persons with Disabilities and NonEnglish-Speaking Americans Receive
Meaningful Alerts—To help to ensure
that all Americans, including those with
hearing or visual disabilities or who do
not speak English, can receive
emergency communications, the FCC
should:
a. Promptly find a mechanism to
resolve any technical and financial
hurdles in the current EAS to ensure
that non-English-speaking people or
persons with disabilities have access to
public warnings, if readily achievable.
b. Work with the various industry
trade associations and the disabled
community to create and publicize best
practices for serving persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans.
c. Encourage state and local
government agencies who provide
emergency information (through video
or audio broadcasts or Web sites) to take
steps to make critical emergency
information accessible to persons with
disabilities and non-English-speaking
Americans.
3. Actions to Alert and Inform—
Ensure Consistent and Reliable
Emergency Information Through a
Consolidated and Coordinated Public
Information Program—Public
information functions should be
coordinated and integrated across
jurisdictions and across functional
agencies, among federal, state, local and
tribal partners, and with private sector
and non-governmental organizations.
The FCC should work with all involved
parties to help facilitate the following:
a. Integration of media representatives
into the development of disaster
communications plans (ESF #2). These
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
plans should establish systems and
protocols for communicating timely and
accurate information to the public
during crisis or emergency situations.
b. Designation of a public information
officer at each EOC. This individual
should be accessible to the media to
handle media and public inquiries,
emergency public information and
warnings, rumor monitoring and
response, and other functions required
to coordinate, clear with appropriate
authorities, and disseminate accurate
and timely information related to the
incident, particularly regarding
information on public health, safety and
protection.
c. During large-scale disasters, the
formation of a Joint Information Center
(‘‘JIC’’) for the collocation of
representatives from federal, regional,
state, local and/or tribal EOCs tasked
with primary incident coordination
responsibilities. The JIC would provide
the mechanism for integrating public
information activities across
jurisdictions and with private sector and
non-governmental organizations. Media
operations should be an integral part of
the JIC.
CONCLUSION
The Katrina Panel commends
Chairman Martin and the Commission
for their actions to assist industry and
first responders before, during and after
Hurricane Katrina and for forming this
Panel to identify steps to be taken to
enhance readiness and recovery in the
future. The Panel thanks the
Commission for the opportunity to
address the important issues associated
with this devastating hurricane’s effect
on our nation’s communications
networks. In this effort, the Panel
members have brought to bear a broad
background of public safety and
industry experiences, including (for
many) first-hand knowledge of the
devastation wrought by Katrina. The
Panel has also benefited from
information provided in the many
comments and expert presentations. The
Panel hopes that its resulting
observations and recommendations
prove useful to the Commission in
helping to ensure that the
communications industry, first
responders, and government at all levels
are better prepared for future hurricanes
and any other disasters that might lie
ahead for us.
APPENDIX A—Members of the
Independent Panel Reviewing the
Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
Communications Networks
Chair: Nancy J. Victory, Partner, Wiley Rein
& Fielding LLP
E:\FR\FM\07JYP1.SGM
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jlentini on PROD1PC65 with PROPOSAL
Federal Register / Vol. 71, No. 130 / Friday, July 7, 2006 / Proposed Rules
Carson Agnew, Executive Vice President,
Mobile Satellite Ventures, LP
Michael R. Anderson, Chairman, PART–
15.ORG
Robert G. (Gil) Bailey, ENP,
Telecommunications Manager, Harrison
County, MS Emergency Communications
Commission
Kevin Beary, Sheriff, Orange County, FL
Greg Bicket, Vice President/Regional
Manager, Cox Communications
Lt. Colonel Joseph Booth, Deputy
Superintendent, Louisiana State Police
Steve Davis, Senior Vice President—
Engineering, Clear Channel Radio
Robert G. Dawson, President & CEO,
SouthernLINC Wireless
Stephen A. Dean, Fire Chief, City of Mobile,
AL
Steve Delahousey, Vice President—
Operations, American Medical Response
Dave Flessas, Vice President—Network
Operations, Sprint Nextel Corp.
Martin D. Hadfield, Vice President—
Engineering, Entercom Communications
Corp.
Jim O. Jacot, Vice President, Cingular
Network Group
Tony Kent, Vice President—Engineering &
Network Operations, Cellular South
Kelly Kirwan, Vice President—State and
Local Government and Commercial
Markets Division, The Americas Group,
Government, Enterprise, and Mobility
Solutions, Motorola Communications
and Electronics, Inc.
Jonathan D. Linkous, Executive Director,
American Telemedicine Association
Adora Obi Nweze, Director, Hurricane Relief
Efforts, NAACP; President, Florida State
Conference, NAACP; Member, National
Board of Directors, NAACP
˜
Eduardo Pena, Board Member, League of
United Latin American Citizens
Billy Pitts, President of Government Affairs,
The NTI Group
Major Michael Sauter, Commander, Office of
Technology and Communications, New
Orleans Police Department
Marion Scott, Vice President—Operations,
CenturyTel
Kay Sears, Senior Vice President of Sales and
Marketing, G2 Satellite Solutions,
PanAmSat Corporation
Edmund M. ‘‘Ted’’ Sexton, Sr., President,
National Sheriffs Association
Edwin D. Smith, Chief, Baton Rouge Fire
Department
William L. Smith, Chief Technology Officer,
BellSouth Corporation
Patrick Yoes, President, Louisiana Fraternal
Order of Police, National Secretary,
Fraternal Order of Police
[FR Doc. 06–6013 Filed 7–6–06; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 6712–01–P
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17:37 Jul 06, 2006
Jkt 208001
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Fish and Wildlife Service
50 CFR Part 17
RIN 1018–AU50
Endangered and Threatened Wildlife
and Plants; Proposed Designation of
Critical Habitat for the Laguna
Mountains Skipper (Pyrgus ruralis
lagunae)
AGENCY:
Fish and Wildlife Service,
Interior.
ACTION: Proposed rule; reopening of
public comment period and notice of
availability of draft economic analysis.
SUMMARY: We, the U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service (Service), announce the
reopening of the public comment period
on the proposed designation of critical
habitat for the Laguna Mountains
skipper (Pyrgus ruralis lagunae) and the
availability of a draft economic analysis
of the proposed designation of critical
habitat. The draft economic analysis
estimates the potential total future
impacts to range from $6.5 million to
$8.9 million (undiscounted) over 20
years. Discounted future costs are
estimated to be $3.7 million to $5.1
million over this same time period
($351,000 to $480,000 annually) using a
real rate of 7 percent, or $5.0 million to
$6.9 million ($337,000 to $461,000
annually) using a real rate of 3 percent.
We are reopening the comment period
to allow all interested parties an
opportunity to comment simultaneously
on the proposed rule and the associated
draft economic analysis. Comments
previously submitted on the proposed
rule need not be resubmitted as they
have already been incorporated into the
public record and will be fully
considered in our final determination.
DATES: We will accept public comments
and information until August 7, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Written comments and
materials may be submitted to us by any
one of the following methods:
1. You may submit written comments
and information to Jim Bartel, Field
Supervisor, Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife
Office, 6010 Hidden Valley Road,
Carlsbad, CA 92011;
2. You may hand-deliver written
comments and information to our
Carlsbad Fish and Wildlife Office at the
above address;
3. You may fax your comments to
760/431–9624.
4. You may send your comments by
electronic mail (e-mail) to
FW8pchskipper@fws.gov. For directions
on how to submit e-mail comments, see
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Fmt 4702
Sfmt 4702
38593
the ‘‘Public Comments Solicited’’
section.
5. Federal eRulemaking Portal:
https://www.regulations.gov. Follow the
instructions for submitting comments.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jim
Bartel, Field Supervisor, Carlsbad Fish
and Wildlife Office, at the address listed
in ADDRESSES (telephone, 760/431–
9440; facsimile, 760/431–9624.)
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Public Comments Solicited
We will accept written comments and
information during this reopened
comment period. We solicit comments
on the original proposed critical habitat
designation, published in the Federal
Register on December 13, 2005 (70 FR
73699), and on our draft economic
analysis of the proposed designation.
We will consider information and
recommendations from all interested
parties. We particularly seek comments
concerning:
(1) The reasons any habitat should or
should not be determined to be critical
habitat, as provided by section 4 of the
Endangered Species Act of 1973, as
amended (Act) (16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq.),
including whether it is prudent to
designate critical habitat and whether
the benefit of designation will outweigh
any threats to the species due to
designation;
(2) Specific information on: the
amount and distribution of Laguna
Mountains skipper habitat; which areas
should be included in the designation
that were occupied at the time of listing
and contain the physical and biological
features that are essential to the
conservation of the species and why;
and which areas not occupied at the
time of listing are essential to the
conservation of the species and why;
(3) Land use designations and current
or planned activities in the subject areas
and their possible impacts on proposed
critical habitat;
(4) Any foreseeable economic,
national security, or other potential
impacts resulting from the proposed
designation and, in particular, any
impacts on small entities;
(5) Whether the draft economic
analysis identifies all State and local
costs, and, if not, what other costs
should be included;
(6) Whether the draft economic
analysis makes appropriate assumptions
regarding current practices and likely
regulatory changes imposed as a result
of the listing of the species or the
designation of critical habitat;
(7) Whether the economic analysis
correctly assesses the effect on regional
costs associated with land- and water
E:\FR\FM\07JYP1.SGM
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Agencies
[Federal Register Volume 71, Number 130 (Friday, July 7, 2006)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Pages 38564-38593]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 06-6013]
=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
47 CFR Parts 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 18, 20, 22, 24, 25,
27, 52, 53, 54, 63, 64, 68, 73, 74, 76, 78, 79, 90, 95, 97 and 101
[EB Docket No. 06-119; FCC 06-83]
In the Matter of Recommendations of the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
AGENCY: Federal Communications Commission.
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
SUMMARY: In this document, the Federal Communications Commission
(Commission) initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel
Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks
(Independent Panel). The Independent Panel's report described the
impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as
the overall public and private response efforts. In addition, the
report included recommendations which relate to: pre-positioning the
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; improving recovery
coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize the use
of existing resources; improving the operability and interoperability
of public safety and 911 communications in times of crisis; and
improving communication of emergency information to the public. The
Commission, in this proceeding, is to take the lessons learned from
this disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts as well as heightened readiness and
preparedness in the future. To accomplish this goal, the Commission
invites comment on what actions the Commission can take to address the
Independent Panel's recommendations.
DATES: Comments are due on or before August 7, 2006, and reply comments
are due on or before August 21, 2006. Written comments on the Paperwork
Reduction Act proposed information collection requirements must be
submitted by the public, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and
other interested parties on or before September 5, 2006.
ADDRESSES: Send comments and reply comments to the Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Room TW-A325, Washington, DC 20554. You may submit comments, identified
by EB Docket No. 06-119, by any of the following methods:
Federal eRulemaking Portal: https://www.regulations.gov/.
Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
Federal Communications Commission's Web site: https://
www.fcc.gov/cgb/ecfs/. Follow the instructions for submitting comments.
People with Disabilities: Contact the FCC to request
reasonable accommodations (accessible format documents, sign language
interpreters, CART, etc.) by e-mail; FCC504@fcc.gov or phone: 202-418-
0530 or TTY: 202-418-0432.
In addition to filing with the Secretary, a copy of any comments on
the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements
contained herein should be submitted to Judith B. Herman, Federal
Communications Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12th Street, SW.,
Washington, DC 20554, or via the Internet to PRA@fcc.gov, and to Kristy
L. LaLonde, OMB Desk Officer, Room 10234, NEOB, 725 17th Street, NW.,
Washington, DC 20503, via the Internet to Kristy--L.LaLonde@omb.eop.gov
or via fax at 202-395-5167.
[[Page 38565]]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Lisa M. Fowlkes, Assistant Bureau
Chief, Enforcement Bureau, at (202) 418-7450 or Jean Ann Collins,
Senior Counsel, Office of Homeland Security, Enforcement Bureau at
(202) 418-1199. For additional information concerning the Paperwork
Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this
document, contact Judith B. Herman at (202) 418-0214 or via the
Internet at PRA@fcc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This is a summary of the Commission's Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in EB Docket No. 06-119, FCC 06-83,
adopted June 16, 2006 and released June 19, 2006. The complete text of
this document is available for inspection and copying during normal
business hours in the FCC Reference Information Center, Portals II, 445
12th Street, SW., Room CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554. This document may
also be purchased from the Commission's duplicating contractor Best
Copy and Printing, Inc., Portals II, 445 12th Street, SW., Room CY-
B402, Washington, DC 20554, telephone (800) 378-3160 or (202) 488-5300,
facsimile (202) 488-5563, or via e-mail at fcc@bcpiweb.com. It is also
available on the Commission's Web site at https://www.fcc.gov.
This document contains proposed information collection
requirements. The Commission, as part of its continuing effort to
reduce paperwork burdens, invites the general public and the OMB to
comment on the proposed information collection requirements contained
in this document, as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,
Public Law 104-13. Public and agency comments are due September 5,
2006.
Comments should address: (a) Whether the proposed collection of
information is necessary for the proper performance of the functions of
the Commission, including whether the information shall have practical
utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission's burden estimates; (c)
ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information
collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the collection of
information on the respondents, including the use of automated
collection techniques or other forms of information technology. In
addition, pursuant to the Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002,
Public Law 107-198, see 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we seek specific comment
on how it might ``further reduce the information collection burden for
small business concerns with fewer than 25 employees.''
OMB Control Number: None
Title: Emergency Communications Status and Contact Information.
Form No.: N/A.
Type of Review: New Collection.
Respondents: Business or other for-profit, not-for-profit, state,
local or tribal governments.
Estimated Number of Respondents: 1,300.
Frequency of Response: Contact information--0.167 hours for initial
collection; 0.084 hours for updates; Readiness Checklist--40 hours.
Frequency of Response: On occasion.
Estimated Total Annual Burden: 16,113 hours.
Estimated Total Annual Costs: $0.
Privacy Act Impact Assessment: N/A.
Needs and Uses: The Commission will use the information collected
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts in
the event of a natural disaster or emergency situation, as well as
heightened readiness and preparedness. Additionally, this information
collection will be used to compile a roster of key communications
providers and other emergency personnel throughout the United States
and in determining the extent of communications disruption and the
appropriate agency response. This information collection will be used
to compile a list of outages to communications infrastructure within an
area affected by a disaster. This information will assist in ensuring
rapid restoration of communications capabilities after disruption by a
natural disaster, terrorist attack or other emergency and will assist
in ensuring the public safety, public health, and other emergency and
defense personnel have effective communications services available to
them.
Synopsis of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
1. Background. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck
the Gulf Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in
Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plant
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service,
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
2. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Public Law 92-463, as amended (71 FR 933, January 6, 2006). The mission
of the Independent Panel was to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina
on the telecommunications and media infrastructure in the areas
affected by the hurricane. Specifically, the Independent Panel was to
study the impact of Hurricane Katrina on all sectors of the
telecommunications and media industries, including public safety
communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to review the
sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with respect to
the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was tasked
with making recommendations to the Commission by June 15, 2006,
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability,
and communications among first responders such as police, fire
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
3. The Independent Panel met directly on five occasions. Four of
these meetings were used to examine the facts surrounding the impact of
Hurricane Katrina and to obtain evidence concerning the extent of the
damage and the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery efforts.
On one occasion, the Independent Panel met in the area struck by
Hurricane Katrina to hear first-hand from victims of the disaster. In
addition to the in-person meetings, the Independent Panel also received
written comments from interested members of the public. Finally, the
Independent Panel's informal working groups met on numerous occasions
via conference call and in person to discuss their progress.
4. On June 9, 2006, the Independent Panel held its final meeting in
Washington, DC to conclude its analysis and deliberations. The
Independent Panel finalized its findings and recommendations and
submitted its report on June 12, 2006. A copy of the report is attached
to this NPRM.
5. Introduction. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, the
Commission initiates a comprehensive rulemaking to address and
implement the recommendations presented by the Independent Panel.
Congress has charged the Commission with promoting the safety of life
and property
[[Page 38566]]
through the use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, the
Commission has already taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate
and we will continue to do so. The Independent Panel's report described
the impact of the worst natural disaster in the Nation's history, as
well as the overall public and private response and recovery efforts.
Our goal in this proceeding is to take the lessons learned from this
disaster and build upon them to promote more effective, efficient
response and recovery efforts, as well as heightened readiness and
preparedness, in the future. To accomplish this goal, we invite comment
on what actions the Commission can take to address the Independent
Panel's recommendations.
6. We seek comment on the recommendations presented by the
Independent Panel in its final report. The Independent Panel's
recommendations are organized into four areas: (1) Pre-positioning the
communications industry and the government for disasters in order to
achieve greater network reliability and resiliency; (2) improving
recovery coordination to address existing shortcomings and to maximize
the use of existing resources; (3) improving the operability and
interoperability of public safety and 911 communications in times of
crisis; and (4) improving communication of emergency information to the
public. In some cases, the Independent Panel recommends actions that
require the Commission to modify its rules pursuant to notice-and-
comment rulemaking. In other cases, the Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission take actions that are not dependent upon
rulemakings, such as increased outreach and education campaigns, or
recommends measures that may not fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction. In advocating implementation of the
Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters should note what
actions would fall within the Commission's statutory authority and
jurisdiction, and what the Commission could do to encourage the
appropriate entities (e.g., state and local authorities) to take
action. In evaluating the Independent Panel's recommendations, our goal
is to determine what actions the Commission should take to promote
greater resiliency and reliability of communications infrastructure, as
well as the actions the Commission should take to strengthen and
improve response and recovery efforts. We therefore invite broad
comment on the Independent Panel's recommendations and on the measures
the Commission should take to address the problems identified. We also
generally seek comment on whether, in adopting any of the Independent
Panel's recommendations, any additional safeguards should be
implemented to limit disclosure of sensitive infrastructure information
or commercial information to prevent exposing potential targets to
wrongdoers and subjecting regulated entities to competitive harm.
7. In addition to presenting recommendations, the Independent
Panel's final report describes the Independent Panel's observations
regarding the hurricane's impact and the sufficiency of the recovery
efforts. We also seek comment on whether the Independent Panel's
observations warrant additional measures or steps beyond the report's
specific recommendations. Thus, to the extent parties believe
additional measures beyond the Independent Panel's recommendations or
different actions are warranted, we welcome these suggestions and
recommendations. We also seek comment whether we should rely on
voluntary consensus recommendations, as advocated by the Independent
Panel, or whether we should rely on other measures for enhancing
readiness and promoting more effective response efforts.
8. Pre-Positioning for Disasters. The Independent Panel
recommendation notes that the sheer force of Hurricane Katrina and the
extensive flooding that occurred severely tested the reliability and
resiliency of communications networks in the Gulf Coast region. To help
speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends the adoption
of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network reliability
and resiliency. At the heart of the Independent Panel's recommendations
are steps the Independent Panel believes the communications industry,
public safety organizations, and the Commission should take for a
faster, more effective response to disasters and emergencies. In
particular, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work
with industry sectors, associations, and other organizations to
establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the communications industry
that would include developing formal business continuity plans,
conducting training exercises, developing suitable plans and
procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and equipment to
help in disaster response. We seek comment on these recommendations.
The Independent Panel recommends that we rely on checklists developed
by industry consensus groups, such as the Network Reliability and
Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability
Council (MSRC). We seek comment on this recommendation, including
whether we should rely on the results of voluntary consensus
recommendations or instead rely on other measures. We invite parties to
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans. Are
the suggested elements presented by the Independent Panel adequate, or
are other elements useful or necessary? We seek comment on whether we
should adopt guidance or criteria for developing business continuity
plans, conducting exercises, developing and practicing communications
plans, or routinely archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-
site facilities.
9. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the awareness of
the public safety community in non-traditional emergency alternatives
through community education campaigns. We seek comment on this
recommendation and on other steps we can take within our jurisdiction
and statutory authority to assist the public safety community response
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of
specific Commission requirements. We invite comment on this suggestion.
Are there other areas where regulatory relief would be appropriate?
Should we establish specific thresholds or requirements in the
Commission's rules pertaining to demonstrations that should be made?
The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission coordinate
all federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times
of crisis. We seek comment on this recommendation and on the measures
the Commission can take within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction. Parties should address the appropriate content of
emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution, and related
issues. We seek comment on whether additional safeguards should be
implemented to address issues concerning potential disclosure of
sensitive infrastructure information or commercial information to avoid
potential harm to communications providers or others. Finally, we
invite comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the panel
that we could take within our statutory authority and jurisdiction to
[[Page 38567]]
improve or strengthen network resiliency and reliability.
10. We seek comment on whether and how the Commission can assist
organizations whose primary business is not communications (e.g.,
hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, and so forth) with
developing communications plans for an emergency. We also seek comment
on whether the Commission should develop a hotline and/or Website to
assist these entities.
11. Recovery Coordination. The Independent Panel observed
significant challenges to maintenance and restoration of communications
services after Hurricane Katrina due in part to problems with access to
the affected area and key resources such as power and/or generator
fuel. The Independent Panel ``generally supports the National Security
Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's) recommendation for a
national standard for credentialing telecommunications repair
workers.'' The Independent Panel advocates, however, expanding the
NSTAC's credentialing recommendations to include repair workers of all
communications infrastructure (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, cable,
broadcasting, satellite). The Independent Panel recommends that the
Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and agencies
to promptly develop national credentialing requirements and guidelines
to enable communications infrastructure providers and their contracted
workers to access affected areas post-disaster. The Independent Panel
also recommends that the Commission ``encourage states to develop and
implement a credentialing program consistent with [the NSTAC's
guidelines].'' We seek comment on these recommendations, including
measures the Commission can take within its statutory authority and
jurisdiction. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
work with Congress and appropriate federal departments and agencies to
implement the NSTAC's recommendation that telecommunications
infrastructure providers should be afforded emergency responder status
under the Stafford Act and that this designation should be incorporated
into the National Response Plan and state and local emergency response
plans. The Independent Panel further recommends that the emergency
responder designation be expanded to include all communications
services providers (e.g., wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable,
and broadcast media) and their contract workers. The Commission seeks
comment on these recommendations and on other steps we can take within
our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
12. The Independent Panel makes several recommendations related to
improving and enhancing communications and coordination among Federal,
state, and local authorities and the private sector. In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission ``should encourage,
but not require, each regional, state and local [Emergency Operating
Center (EOC)] and the [Joint Field Office (JFO)] to engage in the
following activities:
Facilitate coordination between communications
infrastructure providers and state and local emergency preparedness
officials;
Develop credentialing requirements and procedures for the
purposes of allocating communications infrastructure providers (and
their contractors and security teams) into disaster areas to perform
repairs;
Develop and facilitate inclusion in the state's Emergency
Preparedness Plan, where appropriate, one or more clearly identified
post-disaster coordination areas for communications infrastructure
providers;
Share information and coordinate resources to facilitate
repair of key communications infrastructure; and
Facilitate electric and other utilities' maintenance of
priority lists for commercial power restoration.
We seek comment on these recommendations and on other measures the
Commission could take within its statutory authority and jurisdiction
to encourage other Federal agencies, state and local authorities, and
the private sector to address the Independent Panel's recommendations
in this regard.
13. In addition to recommending the Commission encourage other
governmental bodies to engage in these activities, the Independent
Panel notes its support for communications infrastructure providers
forming an industry-only group for disaster planning, coordinating
recovery efforts, and other purposes. The Independent Panel also
recommends that the Commission work with the National Communications
System, an organization within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), to broaden the membership of the National Coordinating Center
for Telecommunications (NCC) to include representation of all types of
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and
other new technologies. We seek comment on these recommendations,
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National
Communications System coordination body. We seek comment on how the
Commission could best work within its own jurisdiction and statutory
authority to assist in promoting extensive, cross-jurisdictional
coordination. We also seek comment generally on how we can better
facilitate coordination during times of crisis.
14. The Independent Panel also recommended that the Commission work
with the DHS's National Communications System to promote the use of
existing priority communications services, such as Government Emergency
Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless Priority Service (WPS), and
Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP). In particular, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with the DHS's
National Communications System to promote WPS, GETS and TSP to all
eligible government, public safety, and critical industry groups. We
seek comment on how the Commission can address these recommendations
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction. Finally, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission create two Web sites
identifying: (1) The key state emergency management contacts and post-
disaster staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact
information for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster
response efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and
outage recovery. We seek comment on these recommendations.
15. First Responder Communications. The Independent Panel made
several recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of
public safety communications capabilities. As with other
recommendations, the Independent Panel recommends that the Commission
encourage state and local authorities to take actions, and to assist in
supporting these efforts consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. For example, the Independent Panel recommended that the
Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to retain and
maintain a cache of equipment components that would be needed to
immediately restore existing public safety communications within hours
of a disaster. Such a cache of pre-positioned equipment would include
Radiofrequency (RF) gear (e.g., Internet Protocol (IP) gateways,
dispatch consoles, etc), trailers, tower system components (e.g.,
antenna systems and
[[Page 38568]]
hydraulic masts), back-up power equipment, and fuel. We seek comment on
these recommendations. We invite parties to comment on the capabilities
and content of pre-positioned equipment, as well as the functionalities
most critical to support in the early stages of a crisis. The
Independent Panel Report also includes recommendations intended to
facilitate interoperability among first responder communications,
including a recommendation that the Commission encourage the
expeditious development of regional plans for the use of 700 MHz
systems and move promptly to review and approve such plans. The
Commission seeks comment on these recommendations, including how they
should be implemented within our statutory authority and jurisdiction.
16. The Independent Panel also made recommendations intended to
ensure a more robust 911 and E911 service. For example, the panel
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency
of the 911 and E911 architecture. In particular, the Independent Panel
recommends that service providers and network operators should consider
placing and maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport
facilities and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power
capabilities (located on-site, when appropriate). The Independent Panel
further recommends that network operators should consider deploying
dual active 911 selective router architectures as a means for
eliminating single points of failure. The Independent Panel also
recommends that network operators, service providers, equipment
suppliers, and public safety authorities should establish alternative
methods of communication for critical personnel. We seek comment on how
the Commission can best encourage implementation of these
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction, and we welcome further suggestions on measures that could
be taken to strengthen 911 and E911 infrastructure and architecture.
17. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled. The Independent Panel also recommends
that the Commission work with other Federal agencies to enhance funding
for 911 enhancement and interoperability. The Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission work to assist the emergency medical
community to facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of their
emergency communications system. The Independent Panel report includes
four recommendations regarding the emergency medical community, stating
that the Commission should, inter alia, educate the emergency medical
community about emergency communications and the various priority
communications services and help to coordinate this sector's emergency
communications efforts. We seek comment on how to address these
recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. We also invite comment on what additional steps the
Commission can take within its statutory authority to assist the
emergency medical community enhance its disaster response capabilities.
18. Emergency Communications to the Public. The Independent Panel
report also includes recommendations intended to facilitate and
complement use of the Emergency Alert System (EAS), including
recommendations that the Commission educate state and local officials
about the existing EAS, its benefits, and how it can be utilized.
Further, the report recommends that the Commission develop a program
for educating the public about EAS and promote community awareness of
potential mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during power
outages or broadcast transmission failures. In order to ensure that all
Americans, including persons with disabilities and persons who do not
speak English, are able to receive emergency communications, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission: (1) Promptly find a
mechanism to resolve any technical hurdles in the current EAS to ensure
that persons with hearing or vision disabilities and persons who do not
speak English have equal access to public warnings; (2) work with the
various industry trade associations to create and publicize best
practices for serving persons with disabilities and persons who do not
speak English; and (3) encourage state and local government agencies
who provide emergency information to take steps to make critical
emergency information accessible to persons with disabilities and
persons who do not speak English. We seek comment on how to address
these recommendations consistent with our statutory authority and
jurisdiction. With respect to item (1), we note that the issue is the
subject of the Commission's ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding, and we
expect to address these and related issues in that proceeding.
Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis
19. As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as
amended (RFA), the Commission has prepared this present Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) of the possible significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities by the
policies and rules proposed in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM). Written public comments are requested on this IRFA. Comments
must be identified as responses to the IRFA and must be filed by the
deadlines for comments on the NPRM provided in section IV of the item.
The Commission will send a copy of the NPRM, including this IRFA, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration
(SBA). In addition, the NPRM and IRFA (or summaries thereof) will be
published in the Federal Register.
Need for, and Objectives of, the Proposed Rules
20. On Monday, August 29, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf
Coast of the United States, causing significant damage in Alabama,
Louisiana, and Mississippi. The destruction to communications
companies' facilities in the region, and therefore to the services upon
which citizens rely, was extraordinary. Hurricane Katrina knocked out
more than three million customer phone lines in Alabama, Louisiana, and
Mississippi. The wireline telecommunications network sustained enormous
damage--dozens of central offices and countless miles of outside plants
were damaged or destroyed as a result of the hurricane or the
subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also sustained
considerable damage--more than a thousand cell sites were knocked out
of service by the hurricane. At the hurricane's height, more than
thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs) were out of service,
and some parishes in Louisiana remained without 911 or enhanced 911
(E911) service for weeks.
21. In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the
Independent Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act,
Public Law 92-463, as amended. The mission of the Independent Panel was
to review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the telecommunications and
media infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane.
Specifically, the Independent Panel was to study the impact of
Hurricane Katrina on all
[[Page 38569]]
sectors of the telecommunications and media industries, including
public safety communications. In addition, the Independent Panel was to
review the sufficiency and effectiveness of the recovery effort with
respect to the communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel was
tasked with making recommendations to the Commission, by June 15, 2006,
regarding ways to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability,
and communications among first responders such as police, fire
fighters, and emergency medical personnel.
22. On June 12, 2006, the Independent Panel submitted its Report
and Recommendations. As explained in the NPRM, Congress has charged the
Commission with promoting the safety of life and property through the
use of wire and radio communications. In this regard, we have already
taken a number of steps to fulfill this mandate and we will continue to
do so. The Independent Panel's report described the impact of the worst
natural disaster in the Nation's history as well as the overall public
and private response and recovery efforts. Our goal in this proceeding
is to take the lessons learned from this disaster and build upon them
to promote more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, as
well as heightened readiness and preparedness, in the future. To
accomplish this goal, we invite comment on what actions the Commission
can take to address the Independent Panel's recommendations.
23. As we note in the NPRM, in some cases, the Independent Panel
recommends action that require the Commission to modify its rules
pursuant to notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other cases, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission take actions that are
not dependent upon rulemakings, such as increased outreach and
education campaigns, or recommends measures that may not fall within
the Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction. In advocating
implementation of the Independent Panel's recommendations, commenters
should note what actions would fall within the Commission's statutory
authority and jurisdiction and what the Commission could do to
encourage the appropriate entities (e.g., states and local authorities)
to take action.
24. To speed response efforts, the Independent Panel recommends
that adoption of a proactive (rather than reactive) program for network
reliability and resiliency. Specifically, the Independent Panel
recommends working with industry sectors, associations and other
organizations to establish a ``Readiness Checklist'' for the
communications industry that would include developing formal business
continuity plans, conducting training exercises, developing suitable
plans and procedures, and maintaining pre-positioned supplies and
equipment to help in disaster response. The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations. The Independent Panel also recommends that we rely on
checklists developed by industry consensus groups, such as the Network
Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC) and the Media Security
and Reliability Council (MSRC). The NPRM seeks comment on this
recommendation, including whether we should rely on the results of
voluntary consensus recommendations or instead rely on other measures.
The NPRM also seeks comment on whether we should adopt guidance or
criteria for developing business continuity plans, conducting
exercises, developing and practicing communications plans, or routinely
archiving critical system back-ups for secure off-site facilities.
25. The Independent Panel also recommends enhancing the public
safety community's awareness of non-traditional emergency alternatives
through community education campaigns. The NPRM seeks comment on this
recommendation and other steps we can take within our jurisdiction and
statutory authority to assist the public safety community in responding
to disasters and other emergencies. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission establish a prioritized system of automatically
waiving regulatory requirements, or of granting automatic Special
Temporary Authority (STA) in certain instances, and provides a list of
specific Commission requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on this
suggestion. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission coordinate all federal outage and
infrastructure reporting requirements in times of crisis. In addition,
the NPRM seeks comment on other steps beyond those recommended by the
Panel that the Commission could take within our statutory authority and
jurisdiction to improve or strengthen network resiliency and
reliability.
26. As discussed in the NPRM, the Independent Panel generally
supports the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee's
(NSTAC's) recommendation for a national standard for credentialing
telecommunications repair workers. The Independent Panel, however,
advocates expanding the NSTAC recommendations to include repair workers
of all communications infrastructure. The Independent Panel recommends
that the Commission work with other appropriate Federal departments and
government agencies to promptly develop national credentialing
requirements and guidelines to enable communications infrastructure
providers and their contracted workers to access affected areas post-
disaster. The Independent Panel also recommends that the Commission
encourage states to develop and implement a credentialing program
consistent with the NSTAC guidelines. The NPRM seeks comment on these
recommendations as well as measures the Commission can take within its
statutory authority and jurisdiction.
27. The NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission work with Congress and appropriate
federal departments and agencies to implement the NSTAC's
recommendation that telecommunications infrastructure providers should
be afforded emergency responder status under the Stafford Act and that
this designation should be incorporated into the National Response Plan
and state and local emergency response plans. With respect to this
proposal, the Independent Panel also recommends that the emergency
responder designation include all types of communications services.
28. In order to enable the communications industry and state and
local emergency officials to better coordinate their preparation for
and response to disasters affecting communications infrastructure, the
Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with state and
local emergency officials and the communications industry to encourage
the formation of coordinating and planning bodies at the state or
regional level. As set forth in the NPRM, the Panel's recommendation
also lists activities that the Commission should encourage each state
or regional coordinating body to engage in. The NPRM seeks comment on
this recommendation and on the measures the Commission could take
within its statutory authority and jurisdiction to encourage other
Federal agencies, state and local authorities and the private sector to
address the Independent Panel's recommendations in this regard.
29. The Independent Panel recommends that the Commission work with
the National Communications System (NCS) to broaden the membership of
the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications to include
representation from all types of
[[Page 38570]]
communications systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite, and
other new technologies. The NPRM seeks comment on this recommendation,
including how the Commission can work within its statutory authority
and jurisdiction to promote greater membership in the DHS's National
Communications System coordination body.
30. The NPRM seeks comment on several recommendations designed to
facilitate the use of existing priority communications services, such
as Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), Wireless
Priority Service (WPS) and Telecommunications Service Priority (TSP),
all of which are administered by DHS's National Communications System.
In addition, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendation that the Commission create two Web sites identifying:
(1) The key state emergency management contacts and post disaster
staging areas for communications providers; and (2) contact information
for the Commission's Task Force that coordinates disaster response
efforts and procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage
recovery.
31. In the NPRM, the Commission seeks comment on several
recommendations intended to facilitate the restoration of public safety
communications capabilities. For example, it seeks comment on the
Panel's recommendation that the Commission encourage state and local
jurisdictions to retain and maintain a cache of equipment components
that would be needed to immediately restore existing public safety
communications within hours of a disaster. The NPRM also seeks comment
on a number of recommendations intended to facilitate interoperability
among first responder communications, including a recommendation that
the Commission encourage the expeditious development of regional plans
for the use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to review and approve
such plans.
32. Regarding 911 and E911 service, the Independent Panel
recommends that the Commission encourage the implementation of certain
NRIC best practices intended to promote the reliability and resiliency
of the 911 and E911 architecture. The Panel recommends that: (1)
Service providers and network operators consider placing and
maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport facilities
and should ensure availability of emergency back-up power capabilities
(located on-site, when appropriate); (2) network operators consider
deploying dual service 911 selective router architectures as a means
for eliminating single points of failure; and (3) network operators,
service providers, equipment suppliers, and public safety authorities
establish alternative methods of communication for critical personnel.
The NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
33. With respect to Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), the
Independent Panel recommends (1) the designation of a secondary back-up
PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the primary
and secondary PSAPs are disabled; (2) that the Commission work with
other federal agencies to enhance funding for 911 enhancement and
interoperability; and (3) that the Commission work to assist the
emergency medical community to facilitate the resiliency and
effectiveness of their emergency communications system. The NPRM seeks
comment on these recommendations. In addition, the Independent Panel's
Report and Recommendations includes four recommendations regarding the
emergency medical community, stating that the Commission should, inter
alia, educate the emergency medical community about emergency
communications and the various priority communications services and
help to coordinate this sector's emergency communications efforts. The
NPRM seeks comment on these recommendations.
34. Finally, the NPRM seeks comment on the Independent Panel's
recommendations that the Commission: (1) Work with various industry
trade associations to create and publicize best practices for serving
persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak English; and (2)
encourage state and local government agencies to provide emergency
information to take steps to make critical emergency information
accessible to persons with disabilities and persons who do not speak
English.
Legal Basis
35. Authority for the actions proposed in this NPRM may be found in
sections 1, 4(i), 4(o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications
Act of 1934, as amended, (Act) 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i), 154(o), 303(r),
403 and 606.
Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to Which Rules
Will Apply
36. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and,
where feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may
be affected by the rules adopted herein. The RFA generally defines the
term ``small entity'' as having the same meaning as the terms ``small
business,'' ``small organization,'' and ``small governmental
jurisdiction.'' In addition, the term ``small business'' has the same
meaning as the term ``small business concern'' under the Small Business
Act. A ``small business concern'' is one which: (1) Is independently
owned and operated; (2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and
(3) satisfies any additional criteria established by the Small Business
Administration (SBA).
37. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4 million
small businesses, according to SBA data. A ``small organization'' is
generally ``any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently owned
and operated and is not dominant in its field.'' Nationwide, as of
2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small organizations. The
term ``small governmental jurisdiction'' is defined generally as
``governments of cities, towns, townships, villages, school districts,
or special districts, with a population of less than fifty thousand.''
Census Bureau data for 2002 indicate that there were 87,525 local
governmental jurisdictions in the United States. We estimate that, of
this total, 84,377 entities were ``small governmental jurisdictions.''
Thus, we estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.
38. Television Broadcasting. The SBA has developed a small business
sized standard for television broadcasting, which consists of all such
firms having $13 million or less in annual receipts. Business concerns
included in this industry are those ``primarily engaged in broadcasting
images together with sound.'' According to Commission staff review of
the BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Television Analyzer Database
(BIA) on October 18, 2005, about 873 of the 1,307 commercial television
stations (or about 67 percent) have revenues of $12 million or less and
thus quality as small entities under the SBA definition. We note,
however, that, in assessing whether a business concern qualifies as
small under the above definition, business (control) affiliations must
be included. Our estimate, therefore, likely overstates the number of
small entities that might be affected by our action, because the
revenue figure on which it is based does not include or aggregate
revenues from affiliated companies. There are also 2,127 low power
television stations (LPTV). Given the nature of this service, we will
presume that all LPTV licensees qualify as small entities under the SBA
size standard.
[[Page 38571]]
39. Radio Stations. The proposed rules and policies potentially
will apply to all AM and commercial FM radio broadcasting licensees and
potential licensees. The SBA defines a radio broadcasting station that
has $6.5 million or less in annual receipts as a small business. A
radio broadcasting station is an establishment primarily engaged in
broadcasting aural programs by radio to the public. Included in this
industry are commercial, religious, educational, and other radio
stations. Radio broadcasting stations which primarily are engaged in
radio broadcasting and which produce radio program materials are
similarly included. However, radio stations that are separate
establishments and are primarily engaged in producing radio program
material are classified under another NAICS number. According to
Commission staff review of BIA Publications, Inc. Master Access Radio
Analyzer Database on March 31, 2005, about 10,840 (95%) of 11,410
commercial radio stations have revenue of $6 million or less. We note,
however, that many radio stations are affiliated with much larger
corporations having much higher revenue. Our estimate, therefore,
likely overstates the number of small entities that might be affected
by our action.
40. Cable and Other Program Distribution. The Census Bureau defines
this category as follows: ``This industry comprises establishments
primarily engaged as third-party distribution systems for broadcast
programming. The establishments of this industry deliver visual, aural,
or textual programming received from cable networks, local television
stations, or radio networks to consumers via cable or direct-to-home
satellite systems on a subscription or fee basis. These establishments
do not generally originate programming material.'' The SBA has
developed a small business size standard for Cable and Other Program
Distribution, which is: all such firms having $13.5 million or less in
annual receipts. According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were a
total of 1,191 firms in this category that operated for the entire
year. Of this total, 1,087 firms had annual receipts of under $10
million, and 43 firms had receipts of $10 million or more but less than
$25 million. Thus, under this size standard, the majority of firms can
be considered small.
41. Cable Companies and Systems. The Commission has also developed
its own small business size standards, for the purpose of cable rate
regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a ``small cable company'' is
one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers, nationwide. Industry data
indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but eleven are
small under this size standard. In addition, under the Commission's
rules, a ``small system'' is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
subscribers. Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems nationwide,
6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an additional 379
systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers. Thus, under this second size
standard, most cable systems are small.
42. Cable System Operators. The Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, also contains a size standard for small cable system
operators, which is ``a cable operator that, directly or through an
affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent of all
subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with any entity
or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate exceed
$250,000,000.'' The Commission has determined that an operator serving
fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a small operator, if its
annual revenues, when combined with the total annual revenues of all
its affiliates, do not exceed $250 million in the aggregate. Industry
data indicate that, of 1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten
are small under this size standard. We note that the Commission neither
requests nor collects information on whether cable system operators are
affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed $250
million, and therefore we are unable to estimate more accurately the
number of cable system operators that would qualify as small under this
size standard.
43. Multipoint Distribution Systems. The established rules apply to
Multipoint Distribution Systems (MDS) operated as part of a wireless
cable system. The Commission has defined ``small entity'' for purposes
of the auction of MDS frequencies as an entity that, together with its
affiliates, has average gross annual revenues that are not more than
$40 million for the preceding three calendar years. This definition of
small entity in the context of MDS auctions has been approved by the
SBA. The Commission completed its MDS auction in March 1996 for
authorizations in 493 basic trading areas. Of 67 winning bidders, 61
qualified as small entities. At this time, we estimate that of the 61
small business MDS auction winners, 48 remain small business licensees.
44. MDS also includes licensees of stations authorized prior to the
auction. As noted above, the SBA has developed a definition of small
entities for pay television services, cable and other subscription
programming, which includes all such companies generating $13.5 million
or less in annual receipts. This definition includes MDS and thus
applies to MDS licensees that did not participate in the MDS auction.
Information available to us indicates that there are approximately 392
incumbent MDS licensees that do not generate revenue in excess of $11
million annually. Therefore, we estimate that there are at least 440
(392 pre-auction plus 48 auction licensees) small MDS providers as
defined by the SBA and the Commission's auction rules which may be
affected by the rules adopted herein.
45. Instructional Television Fixed Service. The established rules
would also apply to Instructional Television Fixed Service (ITFS)
facilities operated as part of a wireless cable system. The SBA
definition of small entities for pay television services also appears
to apply to ITFS. There are presently 2,032 ITFS licensees. All but 100
of these licenses are held by educational institutions. Educational
institutions are included in the definition of a small business.
However, we do not collect annual revenue data for ITFS licensees, and
are not able to ascertain how many of the 100 non-educational licensees
would be categorized as small under the SBA definition. Thus, we
tentatively conclude that at least 1,932 are small businesses and may
be affected by the established rules.
46. Wireless Service Providers. The SBA has developed a small
business size standard for wireless small businesses within the two
separate categories of Paging and Cellular and Other Wireless
Telecommunications. Under both SBA categories, a wireless business is
small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees. According to Commission data,
1,012 companies reported that they were engaged in the provision of
wireless service. Of these 1,012 companies, an estimated 829 have 1,500
or fewer employees and 183 have more than 1,500 employees. This SBA
size standard also applies to wireless telephony. Wireless telephony
includes cellular, personal communications services, and specialized
mobile radio telephony carriers. According to the data, 437 carriers
reported that they were engaged in the provision of wireless telephony.
We have estimated that 260 of these are small businesses under the SBA
small business size standard.
47. Broadband Personal Communications Service. The broadband
personal communications services (PCS) spectrum is divided into six
frequency blocks designated A
[[Page 38572]]
through F, and the Commission has held auctions for each block. The
Commission has created a small business size standard for Blocks C and
F as an entity that has average gross revenues of less than $40 million
in the three previous calendar years. For Block F, an additional small
business size standard for ``very small business'' was added and is
defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has average
gross revenues of not more than $15 million for the preceding three
calendar years. These small business size standards, in the context of
broadband PCS auctions, have been approved by the SBA. No small
businesses within the SBA-approved small business size standards bid
successfully for licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning
bidders that qualified as small entities in the Block C auctions. A
total of 93 ``small'' and ``very small'' business bidders won
approximately 40 percent of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F.
On March 23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F Block
licenses; there were 113 small business winning bidders. On January 26,
2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and F Broadband PCS
licenses in Auction No. 35. Of the 35 winning bidders in this auction,
29 qualified as ``small'' or ``very small'' businesses. Subsequent
events, concerning Auction 35, including judicial and agency
determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block licenses being
available for grant.
48. Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs). We have
included small incumbent local exchange carriers in this present IRFA
analysis. As noted above, a ``small business'' under the RFA is one
that, inter alia, meets the pertinent small business size standard
(e.g., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer
employees), and ``is not dominant in its field of operation.'' The
SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because any
such dominance is not ``national'' in scope. We have therefore included
small incumbent local exchange carriers in this RFA analysis, although
we emphasize that this RFA action has no effect on Commission analyses
and determinations in other, non-RFA contexts. Neither the Commission
nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard specifically
for incumbent local exchange services. The appropriate size standard
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 1,303 carriers have
reported that they are engaged in the provision of incumbent local
exchange services. Of these 1,303 carriers, an estimated 1,020 have
1,500 or fewer employees and 283 have more than 1,500 employees.
Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of incumbent
local exchange service are small businesses that may be affected by our
proposed rules.
49. Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs),
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers.'' Neither the
Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business size standard
specifically for these service providers. The appropriate size standard
under SBA rules is for the category Wired Telecommunications Carriers.
Under that size standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or
fewer employees. According to Commission data, 769 carriers have
reported that they are engaged in the provision of either competitive
access provider services or competitive local exchange carrier
services. Of these 769 carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 12
carriers have reported that they are ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and all 12 are estimated to have 1.500 or fewer employees.
In addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are ``Other Local
Service Providers.'' Of the 39, an estimated 38 have 1,500 or fewer
employees and one has more than 1,500 employees. Consequently, the
Commission estimates that most providers of competitive local exchange
service, competitive access providers, ``Shared-Tenant Service
Providers,'' and ``Other Local Service Providers'' are small entities
that may be affected by our proposed rules.
50. Satellite Telecommunications and Other Telecommunications.
There is no small business size standard developed specifically for
providers of satellite service. The appropriate size standards under
SBA rules are for the two broad census categories of ``Satellite
Telecommunications'' and ``Other Telecommunications.'' Under both
categories, such a business is small if it has $13.5 million or less in
average annual receipts.
51. The first category of Satellite Telecommunications ``comprises
establishments primarily engaged in providing point-to-point
telecommunications services to other establishments in the
telecommunications and broadcasting industries by forwarding and
receiving communications signals via a system of satellites or
reselling satellite telecommunications.'' For this category, Census
Bureau data for 2002 show that there were a total of 371 firms that
operated for the entire year. Of this total, 307 firms had annual
receipts of under $10 million, and 26 firms had receipts of $10 million
to $24,999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the majority of
Satellite Telecommunications firms are small entities that might be
affected by our action.
Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other Compliance
Requirements for Small Entities
52. This NPRM contains proposals that may result in specific
reporting or recordkeeping requirements. The NPRM seeks comment on the
Independent Panel's recommendation that the Commission coordinate all
federal outage and infrastructure reporting requirements in times of
crisis. Specifically, the NPRM seeks comment on the appropriate content
of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution and
related issues. The NPRM requests suggestions on the appropriate
content of emergency outage reports, format, frequency, distribution
and related issues. The NPRM also seeks comment on the Independent
Panel's recommendation that the Commission establish a ``Readiness
Checklist'' for the communications industry that would include, inter
alia, developing formal business continuity plans. The NPRM requests
comment on the appropriate breadth of business continuity plans as well
as whether the Commission should adopt guidance or criteria for the
elements that would comprise the Readiness Checklist.
Steps Taken To Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on Small
Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered
53. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant
alternatives that it has considered in developing its approach, which
may include the following four alternatives (among others): ``(1) the
establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
timetables that take into account the resources available to small
entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification of
compliance and reporting requirements under the rule for such small
entities; (3) the use of performance rather than design standards; and
(4) an exemption
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from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof, for such small
entities.'' We invite comment on whether small entities should be
subject to different requirements if we adopt rules to promote more
effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, and whether
differentiating such requirements based on the size of the entities is
warranted. For example, should there be timing differences for
requirements imposed on small entities? Should small entities be
subject to different continuity of operations requirements?
Federal Rules That May Duplicate, Overlap, or Conflict With the
Proposed Rules
54. None.
Ex Parte Rules
These matters shall be treated as a ``permit-but-disclose''
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's ex parte rules. Persons
making oral ex parte presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance
of the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects
discussed. More than a one or two sentence description of the views and
arguments presented is generally required. Other requirements
pertaining to oral and written presentations are set forth in Sec.
1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.
Ordering Clauses
55. It is ordered, that pursuant to sections 1, 4(i) and (o), 201,
303(r), 403, and 706 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47
U.S.C. 151, 154(i) and (o), 201, 303(r), 403, and 606, this Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking Is hereby Adopted.
56. It is further ordered that the Commission's Consumer and
Government Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, Shall Send a
copy of this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, including the Initial
Regulatory Flexibility Analysis, to t